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This dissertation investigates changes in the extent and nature of al-Qaida‘s involvement in 
Salafist-motivated terrorism over time.  It makes use of an original, hand-coded dataset that 
examines relationships among individuals involved in terror events in order to build a formal 
network-based model of violent extremist organizations‘ membership.  These designations serve 
as the basis for a procedure that estimates the extent of organizations‘ functional involvement in 
more than 500 completed terror attacks, as well as approximately 180 incomplete terror plots.  
According to these quantitative estimates, al-Qaida‘s role in Islamist terrorism is far less 
substantial than often assumed by the press and policy makers, but in order to more fully explore 
changes in the organization‘s pattern of involvement in terrorism, the study‘s quantitative 
findings also served as a metric for the selection of qualitative cases, which were examined using 
structured-focused comparison.  This narrative assessment reinforced the conclusions of the 
quantitative estimate, and found that the quality and capability of al-Qaida‘s operatives has 
steadily declined over time, even as the depth of al-Qaida‘s involvement with so-called partner 
organizations has waned.  Because al-Qaida is not the global Islamist juggernaut it is often 
portrayed to be, the United States‘ already well-designed counterterrorism strategy requires 
iv 
 
minor amendment in order to better target the myriad terror groups that comprise the 
contemporary Islamist threat. 
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1.0 CLASSIFYING AL-QAIDA 
 
 
Effective organizations must evolve in response to shifts in their environment.1  Given 
the tremendous changes to al-Qaida‘s strategic context that have occurred since 1998, when the 
organization first gained international notoriety for bombing two United States Embassies in 
Eastern Africa, it should come as no surprise that al-Qaida looks different today than it did more 
than a decade earlier.  For example, in 2001, the U.S. deprived al-Qaida of its safe-haven in 
Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks, only to open a new front for Islamist extremism two 
years later by invading Iraq.  As best demonstrated by the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed in 
20032 and the death of Usama bin Laden in 2011,3 al-Qaida has also lost senior leaders, but 
others have risen to take their place and have reshaped al-Qaida in the process.4  In order to 
understand these changes, it is necessary to accurately classify the nature and extent of al-
Qaida‘s involvement in plots and attacks over time.  This task is the central focus of this study. 
A number of scholars have made contributions that assist in the process.  The first section 
following this introduction charts the evolution of terror-classification systems from simple two-
                                                          
1 Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 
1983).  For information on the need for adaptability in specific industries, see Robert G. Eccles and Dwight B. 
Crane, ―Managing Through Networks in Investment Banking,‖ California Management Review, (Fall, 1987) p. 183; 
and Judith R. Blau, ―Paradoxical Consequences of Excess in Structural Complexity: A Study of a State Children‘s 
Psychiatric Hospital,‖ Sociology of Health and Illness, Vol. 2 No. 3 (1980), p. 279-285. 
2 Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," The New Yorker, 
September 13, 2010. 
3 "Phone call by Kuwaiti courier led to bin Laden," Associated Press, May 3, 2011. 
4 For example, Adnan G. el-Shukrijumah was unknown at the time of the 9/11 attacks, but by 2010 he had become 
prominent enough within bin Laden‘s organization that FBI agents stated that ―He would be equated with being 
chief of (al-Qaida) operations.‖  Special Agent Brian LeBlanc, quoted in ―"Rising Al-Qaeda leader spent youth in 
US: report," Agence France Presse, August 6, 2010. 
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tiered characterizations, to more nuanced three-tiered characterizations, to Bale‘s expansive six-
tiered characterization, before concluding that the relative frequency of the patterns these 
systems describe remain unknown because none of the existing typologies have been broadly 
implemented.  Typologists‘ failure to apply their classification systems is somewhat 
understandable, because practical data restrictions greatly complicate the process of studying 
terrorism through a wide lens.  These obstacles are the subject of the second section, which 
outlines gaps and problems in existing datasets that attempt to address the breadth of Islamist 
terrorism.  The third section describes how this study attempts to overcome these information 
gaps by using a novel adaptation of anthropological sampling method.  Because methodological 
perspective always colors the collection and interpretation of data, the fourth section introduces 
Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA) and briefly discusses its interaction with the data sample, 
before the fifth section returns to questions of theory and draws on the existing terrorism 
literature to build an ontology of relationship types that clarifies the nature of al-Qaida‘s 
involvement in terror events.  This perspective is then synthesized with aspects of network 
theory and the existing typological literature in order to offer a testable system that classifies the 
nature and scale of al-Qaida‘s involvement in terror attacks and plots.  In order to explain the 
implementation of this typology, the sixth and final section outlines the contents and progression 
of this study‘s remaining chapters.  
Before proceeding with an assessment of the existing literature, it is necessary to include 
a brief note on terminology.  The vocabulary the scholarly community uses to discuss violence 
perpetrated in the name of Islam is inherently imprecise.  Terms like extremist, Islamist, jihadist, 
salafist, terrorist, and insurgent are often used interchangeably, although it is possible (and often 
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appropriate) to draw finite definitional divisions between these and other similar terms.5  
Unfortunately, confusion endures because there are no unanimously accepted definitions of these 
and related terms.   
 Analysts often use the same word to reference wildly different ideas, resulting in a 
phenomenon that Kenney dubs ―conceptual lumping.‖6  The term ―jihad‖ provides a useful 
illustration.  According to strict translation from the original Arabic, ―jihad‖ is synonymous with 
generic struggle.7  However, Islamic scholars have redefined the term depending on their 
political and cultural context, often to justify violence against political opponents on religious 
grounds.8  Consequently, many analysts, especially those hailing from the West, interpret the 
term ―jihad‖ as a synonym for holy war, while many Muslims continue to define ―jihad‖ in more 
classical terms, as an internal struggle for piety that has virtually nothing to do with the conduct 
of religious violence against non-believers.9  Given the stark differences between these 
definitions, it requires little imagination to envision the analytic ambiguities that arise when 
readers fail to understand which concept authors intended to reference when they used the term 
―jihad.‖ 
 On the other hand, scholars have also invented a wealth of conflicting terminology to 
describe identical concepts.  The Welsh scholar Phil Williams provides one relevant example in 
his effort to catalogue the various types of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs).  He lists 
warlords, militias, and paramilitary forces as classes of ―private military forces‖ previously 
                                                          
5 Michael Kenney, ―Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy,‖ National Institute of Justice, May 2009, pp. 
27-29; available online: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226808.pdf. 
6Ibid, p. 27. 
7 Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism, (New York: Ballentine Books, 2000). 
8 For the evolution of the interpretation of jihad see Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the 
War on Terror, (New Haven, CT: Yale Univeristy Press, 2006), pp. 17-40.  See also, Daniel Benjamin and Steven 
Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America, (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 
38-94. 
9 A.G. Noorani, Islam & Jihad: Prejudice Versus Reality, (New York: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 45-49. 
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described within the academic literature, but argues convincingly that there are negligible 
differences between these categories.10  Indeed, the primary distinction between a warlord‘s 
forces and a militia seems to be the presence of a charismatic leader, namely the warlord.  
Because Williams ultimately states that ―the distinction between militias and paramilitaries is not 
entirely clear,‖ he suggests that these terms are nearly perfect synonyms, despite scholars‘ 
tendency to view ―militias‖ and ―paramilitaries‖ as distinct categories of analysis.11  In short, this 
example highlights the excessively jargonistic nature of the literature on religious, political, and 
criminal violence by demonstrating that scholars in the field have an unfavorable tendency to 
draw pedantic and largely subjective delineations between equivalent terms. 
 This analysis attempts to occupy a middle ground between conceptual lumping and the 
sort of false differentiation Williams describe by explicitly defining the handful of pseudo-
technical terms that are unavoidable in inquiries of this type.  Though other analysts may offer 
competing definitions, the list below specifies how key terms should be interpreted within the 
context of this analysis.  
 Terrorism is defined as the conduct or attempted conduct of violence against non-
combatants, broadly defined to include government personnel and soldiers serving 
outside of active war-zones.12   
 
 Insurgency is defined as the organized use of force in an effort to seize power and/or 
territory from an existing government.13  
                                                          
10 Phil Williams, ―Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security,‖ International Relations and 
Security Network, ETH Zurich, 2008, p. 9-11. 
11 Ibid, p. 11. 
12 This definition draws heavily on that offered by the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which 
defines non-combatants to include ―military personnel and assets outside war zones and war-like settings,‖ and 
which also explicitly recognizes that the dividing line between terrorism and other related forms of violence is 
subjective and difficult to determine.  See, U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, 2010 Report on Terrorism, April 
30, 2011, p. 1; available online: http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2010_report_on_terrorism.pdf.    
13 This definition is based on Williams‘ synthesis of existing definitions offered by the U.S. Department of Defense.  
Although he neglects to provide citations for the directly quoted souces listed below, the publications he cites are 
Joint Publication 3-24 – Counterinsurgency Operations, which defines insurgency as  the ―organized use of 
subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority‖ 
(p. xi), and Army Field Mannual 100-20 – Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, which states that ―An 
insurgency is an organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the 
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 Jihad is defined in accordance with the typical Western understanding of the concept, 
which equates jihad with holy war.14  Jihad is intended to be understood as a broader 
concept than either terrorism or insurgency that often incorporates aspects of both. 
 
 Jihadists are defined as those individuals who actively pursue holy war through direct or 
indirect involvement in terrorism and/or insurgency.   
 
 Salafism is defined as a puritanical brand of Islam that seeks to emulate the religious 
practices of the earliest Muslims.15  Because several salafist preachers believe that 
violence against civilians is an illegitimate means to advance their interpretation of Islam, 
salafism is not synonymous with terrorism or jihad.  Put more simply, salafism is a 
religious ideology that has both violent and non-violent variants.16  
 
 Salafists are defined as those individuals who practice salafism. 
 
 Islamists are defined as adherents to fundamental interpretations of Islam that place 
particular emphasis on the imposition of Islamic religious law (Sharia).  Unless modified 
with additional descriptors, this term is intended to broadly reference adherents of 
puritanical Islam.17 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing 
government. In some cases, however, an insurgency‘s goals may be more limited. For 
example, the insurgency may intend to break away from government control and 
establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious territorial bounds.  The insurgency may also only 
intend to extract limited political concessions unattainable through less violent means‖ (p. 2-0).  The Joint 
Publication and Army Field Mannual can be respectively found at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf and http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fm-100-20-military-
operations-in-low-intensity-conflict.shtml.   
14 Although religious scholars disagree with this convention, a number of prominent scholars within the security 
community use jihad and holy war as interchangeable terms.  For example, Simon and Benjamin explicitly define 
jihad as ―Islamic holy war‖ (p. 5).  Similarly, Fawas A. Gerges equates jihad to ―armed struggle‖ (The Far Enemy: 
Why Jihad Went Global, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 1).  Finnaly, James JF Forest argues 
that jihad is a practice which ―incorporates warfare with an individual effort to live a holy life,‖ (―Training Camps 
and Other Centers of Learning,‖ in James JF Forest (ed.), Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the 
Terrorist World, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, p. 70).    
15 Simon and Benjamin, p. 491. 
16 Kenney, pp. 27-29. 
17 Conceptions of the terms ―Islamist‖ are exceptionally broad, but center around the themes encapsulated in the 
general definition provided by this analysis.  For example, Benjamin and Simon define Islamists as those who 
believe in ―a religious ideology that insists on the application of sharia law by the state‖ (p. 490).  Kumar 
Ramakrishna argues that salafists become Islamists when they ―see it as an added obligation to actively seek 
recourse to political power in order to impose their belief system on the society at large‖ (emphasis in the original, 
―The Making of the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist,‖ in James JF Forest (ed.), Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical 
Learning in the Terrorist World, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, p. 229).  Habeck makes a similar 
argument, stating that Islamists are adherents of a reformist vision of Islam ―that calls for a revival of the religion 
and a ‗return‘ of Islam to political power,‖ while noting that Islamists hail from myriad ―often antagonistic groups 
with differeing beliefs, goals, and methodologies for attaining their ends‖ (p. 4).  Gerges uses the term ―Islamist‖ as 
a perfect synonym for ―Islamic militant‖ and traces the rise of contemporary Islamists to 1967 military losses Arab 
states suffered to Israel, after which Islamists ―launched a frontal assault against the failed ideologies of nationalism, 
socialism, communism, and ‗decadent‘ Western liberalism in a daring bid to overthrow Muslim rulers and establish 
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Finally, the definition of the term ―al-Qaida‖ also merits explicit definition.  Although 
analysts often use the word to reference both the broader Islamist extremist movement and 
regional affiliates of the organization Usama bin Laden founded,18 this study does not.  As the 
second chapter describes in detail, this study defines ―al-Qaida‖ as the core group of supporters 
surrounding bin Laden and his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Unless otherwise noted, regional 
organizations which include the term ―al-Qaida‖ in their name, such as al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, should be understood as distinct entities.       
 
 
 
1.1 THE EVOLUTION OF TERROR TYPOLOGIES 
 
Efforts to differentiate between the nature and extent of al-Qaida‘s involvement in 
terrorism almost always come down to questions of categorization.  The protracted and 
increasingly personal debate that Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman regarding the relative 
importance of ―top down‖ and ―bottom up‖ terrorist organizations provides a useful starting 
point.  While Sageman advocated that ‗leaderless‘ self-organizing jihadists are the foremost 
threat within the violent Islamist movement,19 he acknowledged that formal, established jihadist 
groups still exist and pose a legitimate, if lesser, danger, which ―will grow if vigilance is 
relaxed.‖20  Hoffman, by contrast, acknowledged the existence of the local, largely autonomous 
ad hoc groups that worried Sageman, and even went so far as to state that ―bin Laden and his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Islmic States.  Religion became their tool for political mobilization‖ (Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim 
Militancy, (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2006, p. 11).   
18 Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and 
Competitive Advantage, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), p. 11. 
19 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
20 Marc Sageman, ―The Reality of Grass-Roots Terrorism,‖ Foreign Affairs (July-August 2008), pp. 163-5.  
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lieutenants have engineered nothing short of a stunning transformation of Al Qaeda from the 
more or less unitary, near bureaucratic entity it once had been to something more akin to an 
ideology.‖21  However, Hoffman still vociferously contended that formal terror organizations, 
most especially the core group of al-Qaida members surrounding bin Laden, represent the greater 
threat to global security.22  Ultimately, the Hoffman-Sageman debate was over the relative 
dangers that hierarchical terror organizations and self-organizing jihadist groups present, but 
both men tacitly agreed that violent Islamists fell into one of these two categories.23 
Other analysts made similar implicit divisions, which rather than emphasizing the 
distinction between grassroots jihadists and established terror groups, highlighted the differences 
between al-Qaida and regional groups, which have often (but not always) adopted names that 
suggest ties to bin Laden‘s organization, such al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-
Qaida in Iraq (AQI), and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  Terrorism studies is an 
unforgivably jargonistic field, so vocabulary disputes abound, but the term ―franchise model‖ is 
fairly widely used to describe this school of thinking.24   
John Simpson, the BBC‘s longtime world affairs editor, traced the origins of this 
intellectual model to the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when Frank Gardner, another well-
regarded BBC journalist with decades of experience in the Middle East, popularized the idea that 
                                                          
21 Bruce Hoffman, ―The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism,‖ Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, Vol. 27 (2004), p. 551. 
22 Bruce Hoffman, ―The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,‖ Foreign Affairs 87:3 
(May-June 2008), pp. 133-8. 
23 Will McCants, ―Smackdown! Sageman vs. Hoffman,‖ Jihadica website, 8 June 2008, available at 
www.jihadica.com/smackdown-sageman-vs-hoffman/.  Note: the colloquial title that McCants selected for his 
critique of the Hoffman-Sageman debate should not imply a lack of content.  McCants is affiliated with the 
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, one of the leading research groups on the subject of Islamist extremism.   
24 For an example of the franchise metaphor‘s use by American policy makers, see, Alfred De Montesquiou, 
―Official: Al-Qaeda like a fast food franchise for terrorism,‖ USA Today, June 7, 2009; available online: 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-06-07-al-qaeda_N.htm. Examples of the franchise metaphor‘s use to 
describe al-Qaida‘s relationship to specific groups includes: Emily Hunt, ―Al-Qaeda‘s North African Franchise: The 
GSPC Regional Threat,‖ (Policy Watch #1034), The Washington Institute, September 8, 2005; ―The Endurance of 
Yemen‘s Al Qaeda Franchise,‖ STRATFOR, November 2, 2010; and Camille Tawil, ―How Bin Ladin‘s Death Will 
Affect Al-Qa‘ida‘s Regional Franchises,‖ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 1, 2011. 
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―Just as you can buy the franchise for, say, a Holiday Inn or an Intercontinental hotel, so you can 
adopt the principles of Osama bin Laden and set up your own deadly group, murdering those you 
identify as the enemies of the faith - and anyone else, of course, who happens to be passing at the 
time.‖25  This categorization suggests that the violent Islamist movement operates along 
hierarchical lines; al-Qaida sits alone at the top of the structure and functions like a ‗home office‘ 
that sets grand-strategy, while regional groups function like ‗independently owned outlets‘ that 
follow al-Qaida‘s dictates in exchange for immediate brand recognition, which enables the 
franchise to reap greater rewards than it would by operating an almost identical organization 
under its own distinct name.  However, the self-organizing jihadists debated by Hoffman and 
Sageman completely escaped this typology. 
Other scholars reconciled this omission by presenting three-tiered amalgamations of the 
Hoffman-Sageman characterization and the franchise model.  For example, in 2010, Martha 
Crenshaw argued that the contemporary Islamist terror movement consists of: (1) a core group of 
leaders that ―provides ideological direction and guidance as well as some resources (mainly 
assistance with training and funding),‖ (2) a second-tier leadership consisting of ―affiliated or 
merged local organizations with their own interests in specific conflict zones‖—groups 
analogous to Gardner‘s franchises—and members of the organization who serve as ―local leaders 
in Western countries,‖ and (3) the sort of self-organizing jihadists that most-worried Sageman.26  
Ultimately, she sought to explain that Islamist terrorism is simultaneously organized from the 
―top down‖ and the ―bottom up.‖ 
                                                          
25 John Simpson, ―Battling the al-Qaeda franchise,‖ BBC News, October 3, 2005; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4304516.stm.  
26 Martha Crenshaw, ―Assessing the Al-Qa‘ida Threat to the United States,‖ CTC Sentinel, January 13, 2010; 
available online: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/assessing-the-al-qaida-threat-to-the-united-states.    
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Scott Helfstein and Dominic Wright, a pair of researchers at West Point‘s Combating 
Terrorism Center, attempted to recast Crenshaw‘s theory in more formal terms.27  Their effort 
centered on distinguishing between her three levels based on the strength of ties.  They re-
appropriated terminology that sociologist Mark Granovetter first put forth in the 1970s to explain 
the important role that casual, weakly-tied acquaintances play in employment searches by 
expanding job-seekers‘ awareness of open positions beyond the few jobs about which seekers‘ 
close associates, who share a common pool of knowledge and frame of reference, have 
information.28  According to Helfstein and Wright‘s revision of Crenshaw, Islamists with strong 
ties to al-Qaida‘s leaders, most especially Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, comprise 
al-Qaida‘s core.  Islamists with weak ties to members of the core comprise al-Qaida‘s periphery, 
a broad category that includes members of local organizations like Somalia‘s al-Shabab and 
AQAP.  Finally, violent Islamists who operate absent ties to al-Qaida are merely motivated by 
―Al Qaeda ideals of transnational jihad‖ and offer examples of self-organizing terrorism.29  To 
restate Helfstein and Wright‘s typology in the simplest terms, the Islamist terror movement is a 
core-periphery-isolate structure with al-Qaida at its center. 
However, theirs is not the only effort to reconcile the franchise model and the Hoffman-
Sageman characterization.  European researchers Javier Jordán, Fernando Mañas, and Nicola 
Horsburgh independently developed a competing, but similar, tripartite categorization.  
According to their vocabulary, the violent Islamist movement contains:   
                                                          
27 Scott Helfstein and Dominick Wright, ―Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al 
Qaeda,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2011), p. 369.  According to the authors‘ own 
characterization of their work, Helfstein and Wright‘s typology draws heavily on a characterization of al-Qaida that 
Martha Crenshaw offered during Congressional testimony.  She then restated her views in a piece written for West 
Point‘s Combatting Terrorism Center: Martha Crenshaw, ―Assessing the Al-Qa‘ida Threat to the United States,‖ 
CTC Sentinel, January 13, 2010; available online: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/assessing-the-al-qaida-threat-to-
the-united-states. 
28 Mark S. Granovetter, ―The Strength of Weak Ties,‖ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 6 (May 1973), 
pp. 1360-1380. 
29 Ibid. 
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1. Grassroots Jihadist Networks (GJNs), which Jordán and his co-authors define as 
―a group of individuals that accepts the strategic objectives of the Global Jihad 
Movement (GJMV) and attempt to contribute to these from their country of 
residence,‖ while lacking membership in the ―hierarchical structure of Al Qaeda 
or other associated GJMV organizations.‖30  In short, groups that are broadly 
equivalent to the West Point researchers‘ isolates. 
 
2. Local cells, which are led by members of al-Qaida or related groups, but which 
also contain many individuals who lack membership in ―the mother 
organization.‖31  In other words, individuals with indirect, weak ties to the core.  
 
3.  Full-fledged members of GJMV groups, including operational commanders and 
members of ―hit squads,‖ which benefit from the organization‘s full logistical 
support and are deployed to conduct a specific attack, as best illustrated by ―the 
pilots and hijackers of 9/11.‖32  Given that ―ordering hits‖ seems to constitute a 
strong interaction, the individuals contained in this category would qualify as part 
of al-Qaida‘s core as described by Helfstein and Wright. 
But why stop at three categories?  Bale drew heavily on the work of Jordán and his co-
authors as the basis for a five-tiered system that describes the nature of European terror groups‘ 
ties to al-Qaida.  He argued that there are (1) ―hit teams‖ deployed to the West to conduct 
specific operations, (2) local cells with long-term objectives that were deliberately planted in the 
West by their parent organizations and which continue to receive periodic support from the 
parent organization, (3) local Western jihadist cells that formerly held close ties to foreign terror 
groups, but which re-formed independently without outside influence, (4) self-generating 
grassroots groups that hold direct or indirect connections to established terror groups or to other 
independent grassroots groups, and (5) self-generating grassroots groups that lack demonstrable 
connections to other components of the broader jihadist movement.33  Yet, because Europe is 
                                                          
30 Javier Jordán, Fernando M. Mañas, and Nicola Horsburgh, ―Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroots Jihadist 
Networks: The Madrid Bombings,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008), p. 18. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, p. 19. 
33 Jeffrey M. Bale, ―Jihadist Cells and ‗I.E.D.‘ Capabilities in Europe: Assessing the Present and Future Threat to the 
West,‖ Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2010, pp. 28, 62-63. 
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Bale‘s explicit focus, there is an implicit sixth category: the South Asian, South East Asian, 
Middle Eastern, and North African terror groups to which European cells are (or are not) 
connected. 
While several of these typologies are sophisticated, they all suffer from the same failing: 
none have been broadly implemented.  For all of their bickering about the relative dangers of 
self-organizing terrorism and formal jihadist groups, neither Hoffman nor Sageman ever 
formally estimate the frequency of either pattern.  They were more concerned with stating which 
pattern is more potentially lethal than which pattern is more common.  Simpson and Crenshaw 
discussed their typologies in purely theoretical terms and offered no supporting cases.  Jordan, et 
al, and Bale discussed individual cases in the context of theory building, but their goal was to 
demonstrate that various categories exist in the real world, rather than to assess their prevalence.  
Helfstein and Wright offered the broadest take and considered two dozen incidents, but given 
that government bean-counters claim that Sunni Islamists have conducted upwards of 25,000 
terrorist attacks, the West Point researchers‘ sample does not seem particularly representative.34    
Why are narrow implementations problematic?  The answer is, perhaps, best illustrated 
with a simple example drawn from outside terrorism.  Consider a typology of human physiology 
that classifies people based on the number of limbs they possess.   Owing to amputations and 
genetic abnormalities, the typology would need to include all values between zero and eight (in 
2005, an eight-limbed girl was born in India, where she was worshipped as a reincarnated Hindu 
deity).35  However, wide implementation of the typology would reveal that the vast majority of 
                                                          
34 WITS, filtered by perpetrator and group type.  Last accessed January 30, 2012. 
35 She had two sets of arms and legs as the result of subsuming a parasitic twin in the womb.  Her parents named her 
Lakshmi in honor of the eight-limbed Hindu deity.  For additional detail, see Bob Brown, ―Girl Born With Eight 
Limbs Thrives in India,‖ ABC News, June 13, 2008; available online: 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=5055673&page=1#.TyHNtvl-e-c.   
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people fall into the four-limbed category.  Most of the possible values represent aberrant cases 
that, while interesting, do not accurately represent common patterns in human physiology.    
To extend the metaphor, terrorism researchers run an extreme risk of studying quadruple 
amputees and eight-legged babies when they use single cases to explore the theoretical 
boundaries of jihadist terrorism.  It simply is not clear that the findings of such studies are 
generalizable to the broader phenomenon.  If cases hopes to represent general trends, or even 
they hope to highlight behavior that is unique but meaningful, then logic dictates that a broad 
empirical effort at categorization must precede case-based analyses, because it is impossible to 
determine how representative or unique a case may be without first examining the frequency of 
possible outcomes.  Typology building done for its own sake is ultimately of questionable 
intellectual value, because broad-based testing is necessary to demonstrate that theoretical 
categorizations accurately characterize real-world outcomes.36 
 
 
1.2 PRACTICAL BARRIERS FACED BY BROAD-BASED STUDIES OF JIHADIST 
TERRORISM 
Unfortunately, a number of obstacles complicate the seemingly simple process of 
conducting this sort of badly needed empirical work, and data is first among them.  As Helfstein 
and Wright correctly note, none of the currently available databases include comprehensive 
information on both successful terror attacks and failed plots.37  Indeed, the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
                                                          
36 This opinion is essentially a restatement of the oft-stated conclusion that research should move from the 
exploratory, to the descriptive, to the explanatory.  For a succinct discussion of this intellectual progression, see: 
Colin Robson, Real World Research, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 41-42.  For a more thorough discussion on the 
pitfalls of inquiries that proceed despite significant bias in their case selection, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, 
and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), pp. 128-137.  For a rebuttal to King, et al, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, 
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 22-25. 
37 Helfstein and Wright, p. 370. 
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Responses to Terrorism (START), the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) maintained 
by the United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the RAND Database of 
Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) all explicitly exclude plots that were foiled early-on, 
as well as plots that terrorists aborted of their own volition.38  Thus, despite their impressive size, 
these resources greatly truncate the phenomenon of terrorism, and these databases are arguably 
the most complete sources of quantitative data available to researchers.  Less comprehensive 
resources contain even greater omissions. 
Moreover, these ―big three‖ are of scant utility for analyzing terrorism at the 
organizational level, because WITS categorizes perpetrators only by broad type (e.g., 
―Secular/Political/Anarchist,‖ ―Islamic Extremist (Sunni),‖ and ―Christian Extremist‖), while the 
GTD and the RDWTI both use vague processes of attribution that are non-replicable and fraught 
with flaws.  Specifically, in order to determine organizations‘ involvement in attacks, the GTD 
and the RDWTI use nearly identical methodologies that rely heavily on terror groups‘ own 
claims of responsibility.  Regional and topical experts have the opportunity to object to these 
classifications, but they then impose entirely subjective assessments that fail to estimate the scale 
of organizations‘ involvement.   
Consider the 2002 Bali bombings as an example that highlights the shortcomings of this 
approach.  Both the GTD and the RDWTI state that al-Qaida claimed the attack and that 
members of Jemmah Islamiyyah (JI) were known or suspected to have participated in the 
                                                          
38 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), ―Criteria: Methodology Utilized to Compile NCTC‘s Database of 
Terrorist Incidents,‖ date unknown, available online: http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/wits_subpage_criteria.html; 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), ―Frequently Asked 
Questions,‖ Global Terrorism Database (GTD), date unknown; available online: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/faq/.  
RAND Corporation, ―Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents: Database Definitions,‖ date unknown, available 
online: http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/about/definitions.html.  All sites last accessed January 
27, 2012. 
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bombing, but neither database stipulates how large a role the respective organizations played.39  
Without additional information, the roles of al-Qaida and JI seem equivalent—a finding disputed 
by several reputable analysts who have studied the Bali attacks.40  Assessments of organizational 
involvement in terrorist events must estimate the extent of responsibility in order to provide true 
analytic value. 
However, the ambiguities inherent to these databases extend well beyond these sorts of 
scaling issues; the vague processes used to determine organizational involvement in attacks can 
attribute responsibility to groups that may exist in name only.  For example, numerous 
analysts—including those at START, the organization that maintains the GTD—question 
whether or not the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades (AHMB) actually exist, because the group has 
claimed high-profile attacks on three continents, as well as a U.S. power black-out that has been 
definitively disproven as an incident of terror.41  Yet the GTD and the RDWTI both attribute 
responsibility for the 2004 Madrid attacks to the organization based solely on a single AHMB 
spokesman‘s claim of responsibility.42  Thus, it is unwise to trust the existing databases‘ 
                                                          
39 START, Global Terrorism Database, Incident Identification Numbers 200210120005 and 200210120004; 
RDWTI, ―Incident Detail: Oct 12, 2002, Bali, Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),‖ available online: 
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident_detail.php?id=13504.   
40 For a journalistic take on the 2002 Bali attacks, see: Sally Neighbor, In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of 
Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia, (Sydney, Australia: Harper Collins, 2004).  For a more academic 
treatment, see: Zachary Abuza, ―Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages,‖ Institute of Defence and 
Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), March 7, 2003.  
41 START, ―Terrorist Organization Profile: Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades,‖ date unknown, available online: 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3903; Stephen Ulp, ―Abu 
Hafs al-Masri Brigades: Fraud or Dissimulation?‖ Terrorism Focus, Vol. 1, No. 2 (March 2005); available online: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=280&tx_ttnews[backPid]=237&no_cache=1;  
―Group‘s Responsibility Claims Doubtful,‖ Associated Press, July 22, 2005; available online: 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,163395,00.html.  
42 RDWTI, ―Incident Detail: Mar 11, 2004, Madrid, Spain, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades,‖ available online: 
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident_detail.php?id=18518.  GTD actually attributes 11 incidents to the Abu Hafs al-
Masri Brigades, but six of them took place on March 3, 2004 in Spain and are typically referenced by scholars as a 
single incident, namely the 2004 Madrid attacks, and another four of the 11 attacks took place in London on July 7, 
2005 and are also typically referenced as a single incident, namely the 2005 London bombings or, alternately, the 
7/7 attacks.  This level of abstraction issue is not mentioned as a criticism in the body of the review, because to date 
no one has offered a reasonable solution.  Questions regarding when to consider a string of bombings as a single 
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characterization of organizational involvement in attacks at face value, because many claims of 
responsibility are unreliable. 
The impact of these failings is clear: much of the empirical literature on terrorism is 
falsely definitive because researchers implement these databases without fully considering their 
shortcomings.  Ogen Goldman‘s effort to estimate the extent of terrorism‘s globalization offers a 
useful illustration.  His study is theoretically sound; it attempted to gauge the accuracy of 
assertions that policy makers and the media frequently make regarding the increasingly 
transnational character of terrorism.  The broad strokes of Goldman‘s methodological approach 
are similarly sound; he attempted to determine the share of terrorism that groups conduct outside 
of their ‗home turf‘ and then compared the results over time in order to highlight longitudinal 
trends.  Using rigorous statistical methods, he found that terrorism has become decreasingly 
transnational.  Therefore, at first blush, Goldman seemed debunk beliefs held by policy makers 
and the media, and seemed to put-to-bed the need for additional inquiries into the geographic 
scope of terror operations. 
However, in reality, the inherent flaws of the existing databases, specifically the RDWTI, 
trickled-down to undermine an otherwise well-conceived and well-executed analysis.  The 
database‘s sole emphasis on attacks dictated that Goldman likely truncated terrorism‘s 
transnational variance by ignoring incomplete plots, and because the data examined events only 
at the organizational level, Goldman was incapable of analyzing the sort of transnational 
interactions that occurred at the individual level when Indonesians traveled to Afghanistan to 
receive training, before conducting attacks back home.  Moreover, the data‘s inclusion of 
ambiguous organizations like the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades may undermine Goldman‘s study 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
incident, versus several distinct incidents, are inherent to the field of study.  START, Global Terrorism Database.  
Incidents filtered by perpetrator.   
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entirely, because it remains to be seen how an organization that does not exist can have ‗home 
turf.‘  In addition to demonstrating that even basic questions regarding the geography of 
terrorism remain unanswered, this critique shows that inquiries based on typical approaches to 
quantitative data are just as incapable of accurately characterizing the breadth of terrorism as are 
the small-N qualitative approaches associated with the construction of unpopulated typologies. 
A number of scholars have attempted to overcome such problems by constructing 
original datasets that focus on terrorists at the individual level.  Unfortunately, these efforts fell 
victim to many of the same shortcomings as the preceding approaches.  Several scholars have 
created datasets that examine the relationships that exist between the individuals involved in a 
single event or organization.43  In theory, such inquiries enable analysts to characterize actors‘ 
structural role in a single event or organization, but it is rarely clear how the authors have 
bounded the inquiry, because they fail to specify how distant individuals must be from an event 
or organization before they cease to be included in the data.  Moreover, as Bale highlights by 
postulating that the individual with the greatest number of contacts (highest degree centrality) 
may be an errand boy tasked with taking food orders from the cell‘s more important members, 
this approach sometimes conflates formal measures of centrality with importance.44  And even 
when well-constructed, quantitative data collected at the individual level cannot, in and of itself, 
enable an inquiry to draw inferences regarding the broader phenomenon under study.  Formal, 
structural analyses of individual terror events and groups are nothing more than quantified 
                                                          
43 See, for example, Valdis E. Krebs, ―Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,‖ Connections, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2002); 
available online: http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/Connections-Web/Volume24-3/Valdis.Krebs.web.pdf; Jose A. 
Rodriguez, ―The March 11th Terrorist Network: In its Weakness Lies Its Strength,‖ EPP-LEA Working Paper, 
University of Barcelona (December 2005); and Stuart Koschade, ―A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: 
The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 6 (2006), 
pp. 559-575.        
44 Bale, p. 31.  
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single-case case studies and consequently face all of the same generalizability issues associated 
with small-N qualitative approaches.  
Broader datasets are fairly rare, but suffer from the same classification issues that 
undermine the GTD and the RWDTI.  The John Jay and ARTIS Transnational Terrorism 
(JJATT) Database,45 which constitutes a limited public release of the data that Marc Sageman 
used to generate his controversial ―leaderless‖ characterization of the Islamist terror movement,46 
and the terrorism resources maintained by the Center for Computational Analysis of Social and 
Organizational Systems (CASOS) at Carnegie Mellon University offer examples.47  Within the 
JJATT data, individuals‘ group affiliation is ―self-declared or assigned by (an) expert,‖ but the 
codebook fails to mention what criteria are used to determine the veracity of the individuals‘ 
membership claims or the process that experts use to assess membership.48  Thus, the process is 
vague, non-replicable, and may fall victim to deception by individuals who wish to exaggerate 
their ties to prominent jihadist groups.  Given that slight shifts in the boundaries of terror groups 
can greatly affect how ‗leaderless‘ various operational cells appear to be, it is also worth 
questioning the role that coders‘ pre-existing biases about the breadth of al-Qaida may have 
played in determining Sageman‘s conclusions.  If the individuals who coded the JJATT data 
                                                          
45 John Jay and ARTIS Transnational Terrorism Database is available online: 
http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/data.php.  
46 This supposition is based on the affiliations that Sageman and his frequent research partner, Scott  Atran, hold 
with ARTIS.  Both men are Senior Fellows; Sageman is the Director of Research, and Atran is the organization‘s 
overall Director.  For information on ARTIS‘s staffing, see: http://artisresearch.com/.     
47 CASOS provides general information on its counterterrorism research online: 
http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/terrorism/index.php.  Specific examples of the center‘s terrorism research include: 
Mathew Dombroski, Paul Fishbeck, and Kathleen Carley, ―Estimating the Shape of Covert Networks,‖ Proceedings 
of the 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Conference held at the 
National Defense War College, Washington DC. Evidence Based Research, Track 3 , Vienna, VA, (2003); Kathleen 
Carley, ―Destabilizing Terror Networks,‖ Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and 
Technology Symposium. Conference held at the National Defense War College, Washington DC. Evidence Based 
Research, Track 3, Vienna, VA (2003) and Kathleen Carley and Ju-Sung Lee, “Destabilizing Networks,” 
Connections, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2001).  These articles and full listing of CASOS’ terror research is available online: 
http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/terrorism/publications.php.    
48 ARTIS Research, ―Nodes Codebook – Public,‖ (2009); available online: 
http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/files/Nodes_CodeBook_Public_Version2.pdf.   
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started the project believing that ‗leaderless‘ cells were prevalent, then their subjective 
assessments of al-Qaida‘s membership may have been overly conservative and may have greatly 
contributed to Sageman‘s ultimate finding.  Put most simply, overly subjective membership 
assessments can create self-fulfilling prophecies.   
The CASOS data is slightly more explicit about its approach, yet fails to adequately 
address the issue of subjective coding.  The CASOS data determines individuals‘ organizational 
affiliations based on media portrayals: if a news source states that someone is a member of a 
group, then the CASOS data accepts this assessment at face value.49  However, this approach 
constitutes little more than an end-run around classification ambiguities; it places responsibility 
for determining individuals‘ group affiliations with journalists, who never specify how they 
classify terrorists.  Ultimately, neither dataset provides well-reasoned judgments regarding 
membership in terrorist organizations.  
Moreover, the JJATT and CASOS datasets fail to adequately address the completion 
issues raised by the big-three databases‘ exclusive focus on completed events.  Although the 
JJATT data focuses on several failed plots, it includes only 92 total events, and many of these 
cases are drawn from ‗traditional‘ political terrorism, rather than the world of violent Islamist 
extremism.50  It is also unclear how and why the authors of the JJATT data selected these events 
instead of others, so, to revive the physiology metaphor, the data‘s authors may have simply 
collected all of the eight-limbed babies into a single nursery.  It is unclear how well the JJATT 
sample represents Islamist terrorism as a phenomenon.  
                                                          
49 Luke M. Gerdes, ―Codebook for Network Data on Individuals Involved with Terrorism and Counterterrorism,‖ 
Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical Report CMU-
ISR-08-136, October 10, 2008; available online: http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers.php.   
50 ARTIS Research, ―REL Codebook – Public,‖ June 2009, available online: 
http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/files/Relations_Codebook_Public_Version2.pdf.   
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Finally, the public version of the data is exceptionally opaque.  For reasons that remain 
unclear, the authors anonymized the information; the individuals included in the data are listed 
only by identification number, not by name, making it impossible to independently verify the 
data‘s accuracy or completeness, much less to replicate the author‘s coding decisions.  It is, for 
example, impossible to use the data to create a list of events involving Usama bin Laden, and it is 
impossible to determine how the authors characterized relationships among the various 
participants in the 9/11 attacks.   
JJATT‘s opacity also takes a second form; although Sageman‘s published work claims 
that his data made wide use of news articles and court documents,51 none of the available 
literature specifies the scope and composition of the sources used to construct the JJATT data.  
The number of sources that the data contains and the frequency with which it cites different types 
of sources remain unclear.  Although Sageman persistently claims to practice ‗science‘ in the 
study of terrorism,52 anyone who uses his data must trust on faith that it reliably characterizes the 
Islamist terror movement. 
Because the analysts at CASOS specify that their data drew on 202 media articles 
collected from Lexis-Nexis Academic, 45 documents drawn from ―non-classified trial 
transcripts, excerpts from books, scientific articles, and texts from web pages,‖53 as well as 
numerous government sanctioning lists,54 their dataset offers an alternative to the JJATT data 
                                                          
51 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 26-27.  Although Sageman does not reference his work, the idea of applying network 
coding methodology to court transcripts originated with Malcolm K. Sparrow, ―The application of network analysis 
to criminal intelligence: An assessment of the process,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 13 (1991), pp. 251-274. 
52 See, for example, Leaderless Jihad, pp. xx-yy (all of chapter 2), and Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, ―Does 
Osama Still Call the Shots? Debating the Containment of al Qaeda‘s Leadership,‖ Foreign Affairs, July/August 
2008; available online: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-
osama-still-call-the-shots.  
53 Jana Diesner and Kathleen M. Carley, ―Using Network Text Analysis to Detect the Organizational Structure of 
Covert Networks,‖ Proceedings of the NAACSOS 2004 Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, 2004. 
54 Gerdes, p. 1. 
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that is comparable in size and largely avoids issues of source opacity.55  However, the CASOS 
data has other unique characteristics that may make the dataset better suited to the study of pure 
network theory than to rigorous explorations of the nature of the Islamist terrorism.   
In order to code the data, CASOS relied on AutoMap, a semi-automated text analysis 
program that determines the existence of relationships based on terms‘ proximity to each other in 
printed text.56  The limitations created by this reliance on technology are best demonstrated by 
considering the manner in which AutoMap would process a simple declarative sentence:  
“The United States lacks diplomatic relationships with Bhutan, Iran, and Cuba, but maintains 
close ties with Canada and Mexico.” 
An intuitive reading of the sentence reveals only two ties: one between the US and 
Canada, the other between the US and Mexico.  By contrast, the number of relationships that 
AutoMap would find depends on a user-controlled variable known as ―window size,‖ which sets 
the maximum distance that can exist between related terms.  At a window size of two, the term 
―United States‖ would be linked to the words ―lacks‖ and ―diplomatic.‖  At a window size of 
five, ―United States‖ would be linked to with ―lacks,‖ ―diplomatic,‖ ―relationships,‖ ―with,‖ and 
―Bhutan.‖  In order to reach Canada and Mexico, the only two countries that the sentence 
specifies as American diplomatic partners, the window size would need to be set equal to the 
number of words included in the sentence—a coding scheme that would also cause AutoMap to 
find relationships between the US and the three countries it does not recognize, as well as 
                                                          
55 The available literature does not list the number of events the CASOS dataset contains.  Instead, the data is 
characterized in terms of agents and organizations and data on 3,029 individuals and 1,635 organizations.  As JJATT 
data is characterized in terms of both events and agents/organizations, a size comparison is still possible.  JJATT 
includes information on 2,158 individuals and approximately 1367 organizations.  For a characterization of the 
CASOS data, see: Luke M. Gerdes and Kathleen Carley, ―Learning What We Don‘t Know: An Estimation of the 
Accuracy of Media Sources Used in Network Analyses of Terror,‖ Paper Presented to the 29th Annual International 
Sunbelt Social Network Conference of the International Network for Social Network Analysis (INSNA), San Diego, 
CA, 2009.  For information on the size of JJATT data, see ―Attributes.xls,‖ available online: 
http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/attributes.php.   
56 Jana Diesner and Kathleen M. Carley, ―Using Network Text Analysis to Detect the Organizational Structure of 
Covert Networks,‖ Proceedings of the NAACSOS 2004 Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, 2004.  
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relationships that the sentence does not describe among Bhutan, Iran, Cuba, Canada, and 
Mexico.  There is no scientific means to determine an ‗accurate‘ window size; users must base 
their decision on experience or trial-and-error.  Consequently, AutoMap‘s results are not 
deterministic; a number of different networks could be obtained from identical texts. 57 
Moreover, in order to obtain good results, users must provide the program with a 
substantial amount of additional information.  At a minimum, AutoMap requires comprehensive 
delete lists (to remove superfluous terms like ―and‖ or ―the‖), extensive thesauri (to allow the 
program to recognize equivalent terms and alternative spellings as the same concept), and 
attribute lists (to allow the program to associate terms like ―United States‖ with a class of actors 
like ―Countries‖).58  Broad inquiries, especially those that take place in the ambiguity-ridden 
field of terrorism, are unlikely to have all of this necessary information at the outset of a study, 
and AutoMap‘s accuracy will decline accordingly, regardless of the window size used in coding.  
Ultimately, the program represents a substantial contribution to the bodies of work that address 
coding processes and semantic analysis, but AutoMap‘s information requirements and 
susceptibility to false positives makes its results less than ideal for the study empirical 
relationships. 
 
 
1.3 THE MODIFIED SNOWBALL PROCESS FOR DATA COLLECTION 
 
Clearly, it is necessary to create an original, hand-coded dataset of substantial size in 
order to study the breadth of the Islamist terror movement, but even this effort is doomed to 
imperfection.  As the NCTC analysts who compile WITS make clear, Islamist terrorism is poorly 
                                                          
57 Gerdes and Carley; see also, Kathleen Carley, Dave Columbus, Michael Bigrigg, and Frank Kunkel, ―AutoMap 
User‘s Guide,‖ Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical 
Report, CMU-ISR-11-108, 2011.  
58 Ibid.  
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bounded and distinguishing it from related forms phenomena like insurgency and crime ―can be 
more art than science.‖59  Gaps in information are also unavoidable, and judgments regarding 
both the nature of events and the perpetrators involved frequently change over time.  
Consequently, substantial ambiguity is inherent to the subject matter and it is impossible for any 
terror dataset to provide truly comprehensive coverage.60  
While they cannot eliminate these problems, structured data-collection efforts are 
necessary to mitigate these issues to the greatest extent possible.  Anthropological methods used 
in the study of hard-to-reach populations like drug addicts and prostitutes offer a reasonable 
starting place because these research approaches have a proven track-record on subjects that rival 
terrorism in terms of inherent clandestineness and ambiguity.  Specifically, the snowball 
sampling method, which earned its name from the image of a snowball gathering size and speed 
as it rolls downhill, offers a compelling logic that compliments the emphasis on person-to-person 
relationships that is part-and-parcel of studying terrorism at the individual level.   
In traditional implementations of snowballing, researchers begin by interviewing a small 
handful of subjects who exist within the target population.  These initial subjects then provide 
additional names of other members of the target population, who in turn provide more names.  
This process continues iteratively, until the researcher either obtains a statistically significant 
sample size or, more frequently, hits a wall and cannot obtain any new names.  Thus, the 
method‘s underlying assumption is that members of a community, whether comprised of heroin 
addicts or astrophysicists, know each other. 61       
                                                          
59 NCTC, ―Criteria: Methodology Utilized to Compile NCTC‘s Database of Terrorist Incidents.‖ 
60 Ibid. 
61 Snowball sampling is widely used across the social sciences; for information on the conduct of the methodology, 
see: R. Atkinson and J. Flint, ―Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research Strategies,‖ 
Social Research Update, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2001); S. Curtis, W. Gesler, G. Smith, and S. Washburn, ―Approaches to 
Sampling and Case Selection in Qualitative Research: Examples in the Geography of Health,‖ Social Science and 
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Unfortunately, characteristics of Islamist terrorism complicate snowball sampling‘s 
implementation in a traditional, interview-based format.  Although Horgan argues rather 
convincingly that researchers can (and should) conduct first-hand interviews with active 
terrorists, all of the examples that he uses to support his argument are drawn from traditional 
political terrorism.62  Violent Islamists‘ treatment of journalists elucidates that religious terrorists 
often view impartial interviewers as legitimate targets.  For example, while seeking an interview 
with a radical cleric in Pakistan, the Wall Street Journal‘s Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and 
beheaded by Islamist militants in 2003.  Similarly, in 2008, members of the Haqqani network in 
Afghanistan abducted British journalist David Rohde,63 and in the southern Philippines, the Abu 
Sayyaf Group has kidnapped journalists on at least three separate occasions since 2000.64  
Though Rohde and the Abu Sayyaf victims were eventually returned to safety, it seems clear that 
efforts to interview active jihadists are inherently dangerous.  Former jihadists, who left radical 
organizations of their own volition, and imprisoned jihadists, whose potential for harm is greatly 
mitigated by their incarceration, may serve as strong sources of information on the violent 
Islamist movement, and, indeed, Horgan has relied heavily on interviews with these populations 
when researching radical Islam instead of political terror, but ex-terrorists and prisoners are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Medicine, Vol. 50, No. 7/8 (2000), pp. 1001-1014; V.M. Hendricks, P. Blanken, and N. Adriaans, Snowball 
Sampling: A Pilot Study on Cocaine Use, (Rotterdam: IVO, 1992); and C.A. McLean and C.M. Campbell, ―Locating 
Research Informants in a Multi-Ethnic Community; Ethnic Identities, Social Networks, and Recruitment Methods,‖ 
Ethnicity and Health, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2003), pp. 41-61.  
62 John Horgan, ―The Case for Firsthand Research,‖ in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, 
Achievements and Failures, (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 30-56.  See also, John Horgan, ―Interviewing the 
Terrorists: Reflections on Fieldwork and Implications for Psychological Research,‖ Behavioral Sciences of 
Terrorism and Political Aggression, (in press).  
63 Matthew Cole, "The David Rohde Puzzle," New York Magazine, January 22, 2009. 
64 For details on the various kidnappings, see: "Philippine military suspects Abu Sayyaf has 'leadership problem,'" 
BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political, June 22, 2008.  "Abu Sayyaf strikes again, kidnaps trader in Jolo, Sulu," 
Manila Times (Philippines), January 31, 2008; Darwin T. Wee, "Business airs concern over rising criminality," 
Businessworld (Philippines), February 4, 2008.  Hrvoje Hranjski, "Philippine court hands down terror convictions," 
Associated Press Online, January 23, 2009. 
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exceptionally difficult to access.65  In combination, these factors dictate that traditional 
implementations of snowball sampling are less than ideally suited to provide broad coverage of 
the Islamist movement, though the method remains capable of providing detailed insight into 
small pockets of the phenomenon, particularly its less violent portions.   
Therefore, this study adopted snowball sampling‘s logic, but implemented it in relation to 
the types of media, court, and government sources used in the construction of preceding datasets 
that study terrorism at the individual level, such as those produced by JJATT and CASOS.  For 
example, the study‘s inquiry into the 2004 bombings of trains near Atocha Station in Madrid 
began with a single name: Jamal Zougam, a Moroccan convicted for his involvement in the 
bombing.  A Lexis-Nexis search conducted on Zougam‘s name produced news articles that 
discussed a number of additional people, including the Madrid-based Islamic cleric Abu Dahdah 
and several others known or suspected of involvement in the Madrid attacks, such as Jamal 
Ahmidan, Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, and Abdennabi Kounjaa.  Each of these new names 
served as an additional search term, which in turn resulted in more new names.  The process was 
repeated with each successive wave of search terms, until the study either hit a dead end, where 
additional searches returned no relevant new names, or the study veered too far from the subject 
of attacks on civilians.  When the process provided information on people involved in 
insurgencies, such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, the study recorded the data, but 
did not use the criminals or insurgents as new search terms.  For the visually minded, Figure 1.1 
provides a graphic representation of the process. 
  
                                                          
65 John Horgan, Walking Away From Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2009). 
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Figure 1.1: Visualization of the Snowball Sampling Process Through Three Steps 
 
However, because this study seeks to examine overall changes in al-Qaida‘s connection 
to jihadist attacks, a single starting point would be inappropriate.  Instead, the study began with a 
dozen major completed attacks that occurred between 1998, when al-Qaida first debuted on the 
international security agenda with the bombing of United States embassies in East Africa, and 
the end of 2008.  The study then worked each attack as an expanding snowball sample, in order 
to see how these attacks connected to each other, as well as to smaller, lesser-known attacks and 
failed plots.    
Issues of journalistic accuracy dictate that it is just as important to include a diversity of 
source types as it is to begin from multiple starting points.  Specifically, Maier‘s research on 
media accuracy suggests that between 41 and 60 percent of newspaper articles contain some sort 
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of factual mistake.66  Therefore, although the breadth of coverage offered from media databases 
is truly impressive—Lexis-Nexis alone boasts more than five billion individual documents 
obtained from some 40,000 sources67— the snowball process attempted to mitigate the data 
ambiguity inherent to media sources by extending the pool of sources to include relevant court 
documents, available police reports, declassified and unclassified reports issued by federal 
agencies, relevant reports from international organizations like Interpol, and reports from select 
non-governmental organizations like the International Crisis Group.  Additional streams of 
information were derived from site visits, which were conducted in more than a dozen countries, 
and interviews, which were conducted in a semi-structured format with 16 subjects drawn from 
the policy community, foreign law enforcement, foreign intelligence services, foreign court 
officials involved in terrorism trials, foreign academics involved in the study of terrorism, 
technical experts, and one reformed terrorist.68  Although the academic literature on terrorism 
serves as a bountiful, perhaps even bloated, source of theory, the snowball process excluded 
academic journals as a source of data because their inclusion would introduce substantial 
entropy, by trusting that previous scholars faithfully and impartially reproduced data included 
                                                          
66 Scott Maier, ―Getting It Right?  Not in 59 Percent of Stories,‖ Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1 
(Winter 2002). 
67 ―LexisNexis Fast Facts,‖ available online: http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/fast-facts.aspx (accessed 19 Nov. 
2008). 
68 The site visits and interviews were conducted between June and August of 2010 with support from the Smith 
Richardson World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship.  Nations visited included the United Kingdom, Spain, 
Morocco, Kenya, Tanzania, India, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  Initially, prospective interview 
subjects were approached via email, and additional subjects were then obtained via snowball sampling.  However, 
response rates for interview requests were fairly low, in the neighborhood of 20 percent.  In total, 21 interviews were 
conducted, but six of the subjects self-identified as possessing no useful knowledge on the topic of the interview, 
and their responses were consequently disregarded, leaving a final sample of 16 interviews.  These low numbers 
dictate that the sample was non-representative and should ultimately be viewed as an opportunity sample.  In terms 
of process, the interviews were conducted in English, which was a second language for 5 of the 16 interview 
subjects.  In accordance with IRB protocols regarding the protection of subjects‘ right to privacy, subjects were 
allowed the opportunity to participate anonymously if they so desired, and 11 of the 16 subjects chose to remain un-
named confidential informants.  Similarly, interview subjects were allowed the opportunity to decline audio 
recording of the interview; 7 of the interview subjects availed themselves of this option.  These subjects‘ responses 
were recorded as detailed notes, while the responses of the 9 remaining subjects were audio-recorded and then 
transcribed.  Given that the interview subjects had expertise on specific events and issues, the survey instrument 
varied accordingly.  One example can be found in Appendix B.   
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from their often un-cited sources,69 and also because journals‘ inclusion in the data would run the 
severe risk of conflating authors‘ interpretive conclusions with accepted fact, a particularly 
pernicious problem given the wide diversity of views that exist on terrorism even among 
reputable scholars.70   
This criticism of the academic literature should not imply that the primary documents 
listed above are free from flaws.  Indeed, each category of sources contains its own inherent 
deficiencies and biases,71 so data was triangulated from multiple independent sources whenever 
possible, but despite this effort it remains unclear how great the corrective effects of the primary 
documents were.  Ultimately, all document-based research on terrorism, whether qualitative or 
quantitative in approach, suffers from an inescapable and unsolvable problem: it is never entirely 
clear if the patterns evident in the data stem from meaningful changes in the organizations under 
study, or if the patterns existed all along and were merely revealed because journalists, the 
courts, government analysts, and police began to devote additional attention to the organizations 
in question. 
In an effort to avoid the source opacity that characterizes the JJATT data, figure 1.2 
summarizes the relative frequency of the various types of sources included in the sample of 
roughly 3,200 documents yielded by the snowball sample.  Media sources constitute the vast 
majority (81 percent) of the sources cited in the data, but as figure 1.3 demonstrates, news 
                                                          
69 For information on the pernicious effects that data entropy has on analysis, see: Robert M. Clark, Intelligence 
Analysis: A Target Centric Approach, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004), pp. 107-108.  For a critique of citation 
practices within the field of terrorism studies, see: Andrew Silke, ―The Devil You Know,‖ in Andrew Silke, ed., 
Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, (London (UK): Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 57-71 (but most 
especially page 65). 
70 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data 
Bases, Theories, and Literature, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 179.  See also: Silke, pp. 57-71; 
Sageman, pp. 26-27; and Horgan, ―Interviewing the Terrorists,‖ p. 18. 
71 For a thorough discussion of the relative weight that scholars should attribute to police reports and court 
transcripts, see Carlo Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 44-45.  He attributes 
particular weight to prosecutorial evidence in cases in which guilty verdicts have been returned.  
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sources account for less than half (46 percent) of the nearly 24,000 individual citations that 
constitute the main body of the dataset.72  Though far fewer in number, each primary document 
was a comparatively rich source of data that yielded more citations than the far more numerous 
media articles.   
Figure 1.2: Breakdown of Sources Resulting from the Modified Snowball Process 
 
 
  
                                                          
72 Many individual citations contain multiple sources.  If they were of different types (e.g. one source was a court 
document and the other was a news article), the benefit of the doubt went to the primary document, as it became 
clear during the course of coding some 24,000 interactions that the primary documents were invariably ‗closer‘ to 
the event they attempted to portray.  Indeed, as it concerns court documents, the new coverage of a given event is 
often a second or third person recounting of evidence presented at trial.  This conclusion raises questions regarding 
entropy within news sources that are beyond the scope of this inquiry, but which must ultimately be answered if 
terrorism scholars wish to produce truly objective datasets. 
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Figure 1.3: Breakdown of Citations Resulting from the Modified Snowball Process 
  
 
While valuable, purely quantitative descriptions of the sources likely fall short in their 
efforts to elucidate the potential extent of source biases.  Not all interactions included in the data 
are of equal analytic value, so quantitative descriptions at least partially conflating the quantity 
of data provided by various types of sources with that data‘s importance.  Interactions that 
contain strong evidence of surprising, novel, and/or vital connections among violent Islamists are 
inherently more analytically valuable than interactions which merely strengthen or extend an 
already robust relationship that has existed for years.  Anecdotal experience suggests that, with 
the exception of a handful of penetrating pieces of investigative journalism, domestic American 
news sources and news wires tended to yield the largest share of ‗routine‘ information, while 
foreign media publications provided the greatest number of surprises—a conclusion that may say 
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as much about these sources‘ reliability as their attention to local stories ignored by western 
news outlets writing for audiences thousands of miles removed from the event.  Finally, primary 
documents provide the greatest level of detail, but the quantity of minute interactions that court 
documents contain can sometimes be so great as to be almost crippling.  However, it is 
impossible to confirm these assessments, as no two analysts are likely to be in complete 
agreement regarding which pieces of data are important or surprising, and few people are likely 
to be willing to wade through more than 24,000 interactions to make such judgments.  Thus, the 
potential impact that sources biases may have on any conclusions stemming from the data 
remains an open and ultimately unanswerable question. 
Beyond ensuring coverage of a wide swath of sources, the primary benefit of the 
modified snowball process was to ensure that individuals received as even a research treatment 
as the underlying source material allows.  As Malcolm Sparrow illustrated in his assessment of 
the implementation of network analysis in the field of criminal intelligence, investigators often 
create false patterns of individual centrality by focusing collection efforts on the people that they 
find most interesting, or the people that they suspect are the most important at the outset of the 
inquiry.73  Consequently, purely intuitive collection efforts, as epitomized by many studies that 
utilize Analyst‘s Notebook, Palantir, and other visually-driven collection interfaces, run the 
severe risk of creating self-fulfilling prophecies that merely quantify the investigator‘s pre-
existing biases by attributing quantitative scores of importance to actors who merely received a 
disproportionate share of the investigator‘s attention.  When strictly implemented, the modified 
snowball process‘s iterative use of search terms ameliorates such tendencies by forcing 
researchers to devote equal attention to the fascinating and the mundane. 
                                                          
73 Malcolm K. Sparrow, ―The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: An assessment of the 
process,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 13 (1991), pp. 251-274. 
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However, the process mitigates only the collector‘s bias and does not address similar 
underlying issues in the source material itself.  Because sources are inconsistent in the amount of 
detail they provide on individuals involved in terrorism, the data may still falsely attribute 
importance to the most discussed actors.  Therefore, despite the breadth of the data‘s coverage, it 
is only questionably suited to answering questions of individual centrality (i.e., ―who played the 
key logistical role in the Madrid bombings?‖) and is better suited to the study of general patterns 
that are not as heavily affected by unavoidable data omissions.   
The standard rebuttal to such concerns draws on a slight misinterpretation of 
methodological research into the robustness of formal measures of centrality.  For example, 
Carlo Morselli justified his use of formal centrality scores in ―the identification of various types 
of key participants‖ in clandestine networks on the grounds that such measures ―have proven to 
robust measures in view of missing data problems.‖74  To support his assertion, he cited detailed 
empirical analyses of robustness conducted by a trio of methodological heavyweights, namely 
Steve Borgatti, Kathleen Carley, and David Krackhardt.  However, Morselli over-generalized the 
results of their analysis.  
 Borgatti, et al, found that formal measures of centrality are robust in the face of random 
data errors in random networks.75  Neither this analysis nor subsequent work has addressed the 
analytic impact of non-random omissions and errors, such as those that occur because sources 
bias coverage in the favor of individuals that police investigators or journalists find most 
interesting.  Similarly, Carley‘s more recent work, conducted in partnership with Terrill Frantz 
and Marcelo Cataldo, found that a network‘s overall shape (topology) had a profound impact on 
                                                          
74 Morselli, p. 48.  
75 Stephen P. Borgatti, Kathleen M. Carley, and David Krackhardt, ―On the robustness of centrality measures under 
conditions of imperfect data,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 28 (2006), pp. 124-136. 
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the sensitivity of centrality measures to missing data,76 thereby indicating that claims of data 
robustness do not extend to the sort of non-random, functionally-organized clandestine networks 
that Morselli described.  Finally, Morselli‘s own characterization of clandestine networks as 
lacking density (i.e., having low ratios between the actual ties in the network to the number of 
ties that would exist if all actors were tied to each other),77 suggests that analyses of individual 
importance in ―dark networks‖ may be problematic, because additional inquiries into the 
robustness of formal centrality measures found that such characterizations are least reliable in 
sparse networks.78     
However, the analytic limits imposed by issues of source bias are not unique to 
Morselli‘s work, and, as his inquiry made extensive use of recorded telephone intercepts and 
other pools of detailed data not typically available to the public, these issues are less likely to be 
profound in his analysis than in work which draw on smaller pools of less reliable data, such as 
Valdis Krebs‘ widely-publicized (but questionably conducted) attempt to formally characterize 
relationships among the 9/11 hijackers using only press accounts published in the first six weeks 
after the 2001 attacks.79  Nor are the source limitations discussed in regards to Morselli‘s work 
inherent only to quantitative analyses; indeed, they be even more problematic in qualitative 
assessments, where according to the pioneering philosopher of science Karl Popper, ―uncritical‖ 
researchers have complete freedom to cherry-pick sources ―to obtain what appears to be 
overwhelming evidence in favor of a theory which, if approached critically, would have been 
                                                          
76 Terrill L. Frantz, Marcelo Cataldo, and Kathleen M. Carley, ―Robustness of centrality measures under 
uncertainty: Examining the role of network topology,‖ Computational Mathematics and Organizational Theory, 
Vol. 15 (2009), pp. 303-328. 
77 Morselli, pp. 47-48. 
78 Barbara Zemljic and Valentina Hlebec, ―Reliability of measures of centrality and prominence,‖ Social Networks, 
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refuted.‖ 80  Therefore, this process-oriented discussion of sources on terrorism ends where it 
began, with a disclaimer regarding the opacity inherent to clandestine topics: 
Regardless of the process used to compile data, efforts to study terrorism at the individual-level 
will remain mired in a substantial amount of unavoidable ambiguity.  The modified snowball 
process minimizes these issues; it does not eliminate them.  
 
1.4 THE PERSPECTIVE OF DYNAMIC NETWORK ANALYSIS 
While the roughly 24,000 interactions summarized above begin to hint at the size of the 
dataset that resulted from the modified snowball process, this description does not adequately 
describe the breadth of the data‘s coverage, because the figures provide no information on whom 
or what the data describes.  A brief discussion of analytic methodology must necessarily precede 
such a summary, because methods are exceptionally uneven in their treatment of data, and 
different methods mandate different data collection criteria.  Because network analysis is best 
understood as the formal quantitative study of the relationships that exist between entities,81 this 
methodological perspective dovetails nicely with the emphasis on person-to-person interactions 
that is inherent to the modified snowball.  Moreover, network analysis has the ability to provide 
the sort of continuous data necessary to accurately classify al-Qaida‘s involvement in Islamist 
terrorism.  To be blunt: network analysis is well-suited to this analysis.   
However, data criteria vary greatly between different types of network analysis.  Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) is the most familiar member of this family of methods, and in its 
simplest incarnation, examines relationships within a single class of entities, such as individual 
people, small groups, large organizations, websites, nation states, or even ideas.  In the jargon of 
                                                          
80 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Chapter 29, (1957). 
81 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, (Cambridge (UK): 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 3; John Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook (2nd Edition), (Los 
Angeles, CA: Sage, 2000), p. 2; David Knoke and Song Yan, Social Network Analysis (2nd Edition), #154 in the 
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34 
 
the discipline, such networks are called one-mode networks because they contain data about only 
a single type of actor.  The most accessible example is of interactions among a small group of 
people;82 the binary data matrix and the graph below, which contain equivalent data, illustrate 
how simple network analysis begins to quantify the study of relationships and begins to 
demonstrate the method‘s collection requirements. 
 
Figure 1.4: A Simple Agent x Agent Network 
 
 
But the complexity of the real world is far greater than that suggested by small, flat 
networks.  Actors share connections not only with other actors, but also with events, 
organizations, beliefs, and knowledge, to name only a few items.  Some social network analyses 
consider two-mode data, for example by examining actors‘ interaction with events, but this 
perspective struggles to accommodate a wider complement of interactions.  Moreover, SNA 
often ignores the diversity of relationships and codes all interactions as identical, despite the 
                                                          
82 Scott, p. 40. 
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obvious qualitative differences between, for example, family bonds and business interactions.83  
Some prominent studies, such as Krackhardt‘s work on the differences between advice networks 
and friendship networks inside entrepreneurial firms,84 adopt a multi-relational perspective, but 
these efforts are the exception, not the rule, and even these studies typically confine themselves 
to no more than three classes of relationships.  The vast majority of studies also tend to focus on 
small organizations, thereby ensuring near-perfect information, and typically consider only one 
point in time.85  Ultimately, these factors dictate that SNA is less than ideally suited to the study 
of large, ambiguity-ridden, evolutionary phenomena like terrorism.   
Enter Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA).  This perspective comes closer to 
approximating the real world by explicitly considering large networks filled with multiple node 
classes.  The method and its tools are flexible—they accommodate virtually any ontology the 
user can create—but, as Carley argues, people, organizations, events, knowledge, resources, 
roles, and locations are particularly relevant to the study of terrorism, because this array of node 
classes facilitates the analysis of a broad range of human, technological, and geographical 
interdependencies.86  Moreover, DNA does not present a single ‗flat‘ network; instead, the 
                                                          
83 Kathleen M. Carley, ―Dynamic Network Analysis,‖ in Dynamic Social Network Modeling and Analysis: 
Workshop Summary and Papers, (Washington, D.C.: National Academic Press, 2003), p. 134. 
84 David Krackhardt, ―QAP Partialling as a Test of Spuriousness,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1987), pp. 171-
186; David Krackhardt and Martin Kilduff, ―Structure, Culture, and Simmelian Ties in Entrepreneurial Firms,‖ 
Social Networks, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2002), pp. 279-290. 
85 Carley, ―Dynamic Network Analysis,‖ p. 134. 
86 This assessment is an extension of Krackhardt and Carley‘s work on the PCANS framework, which stressed 
Precedence, Commitment of resources, Assignment of individuals to tasks, Networks of relations among personnel, 
and Skills linking individuals to resources.  Carley rebranded the framework along similar lines in her 2002 and 
2003 publications, and the emphasis on geography stems from recent advancements in DNA tools, which now allow 
for the geospatial display of data.  David Krackhardt and Kathleen M. Carley, ―A PCANS Model of Structure in 
Organizations,‖ in Proceedings of the 1998 International Symposium on Command and Control Research and 
Technology, Conference held June 1998, Monterrey, CA: Evidence Based Research, Vienna VA; Kathleen M. 
Carley, ―Smart Agents and Organizations of the Future,‖ in Leah Lievrouw and Sonia Livingston (eds.), The 
Handbook of New Media, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), pp. 206-220; Carley, ―Dynamic Network Analysis,‖ p. 
135; Il-Chul Moon and Kathleen M. Carley, ―Modeling and Simulation of Terrorist Networks in Social and 
Geospatial Dimensions,‖ IEEE Intelligent Systems, Special Issue on Social Computing, Vol. 22 (Sep/Oct 2007), pp. 
40-49.    
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method represents interactions as a sequence of networks over time, which allows DNA to 
explore and formally model adaptation, which occurs as ―the set of networks linking people, 
knowledge, tasks, and other groups or organizations co-evolve.‖87  In short, this study adopted 
DNA because the method‘s explicit emphasis on large networks and complexity makes it better 
suited to the study of terrorism than SNA. 
The node classes described by Carley served as the basis for the scheme used to code the 
data collected via the modified snowball process, but additional attribute data was collected to 
enable the analysis to sub-divide the classes by type.  Therefore, the breadth of the data can be 
described by summarizing the quantity of actors that fell into some of the larger sub-categories, 
though gluttons for punishment can indulge their desire to examine the details of the data by 
reviewing Appendixes C through F, which contain various types of attribute information on 
agents and events included in the snowball sample, and Appendix H, a data file that recounts 
each individual interaction, the evidence that supports the classification of each interaction, and 
the relevant sources for each interaction.   Less masochistic readers can obtain an appreciation 
for the breadth of the data by examining Figures 1.5, which categorizes the people, relevant 
events, and non-terrorist organizations listed in the data.  For reasons outlined in detail in the 
second chapter, it would be inappropriate to list the number of jihadist organizations as 
contained in the raw data.  
                                                          
87 Carley, ―Dynamic Network Analysis,‖ p. 136. 
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Figure 1.5: Breakdown of the People, Relevant Events and Non-Terrorist Organizations 
Listed in the Data 
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1.5 BEYOND THE SNOWBALL: SITUATING A CONTINUOUS ESTIMATION OF AL-
QAIDA‘S INVOLVMENT IN TERRORISM WITHIN THE EXISTING THEORETICAL 
LITERATURE 
 
Merely building a broad-based sample of individuals involved in Islamist terrorism is not 
sufficient to ensure meaningful results.  Because there are an infinite number of ways to interpret 
data, theory also plays a necessary role.  Helfstein and Wright‘s attempt to determine operational 
differences among three levels of al-Qaida (the core, the periphery, and isolates) provides a 
useful starting point to discuss the role of theory in broad-based inquiries, because although this 
study includes only two dozen events drawn from the somewhat problematic JJATT data, it 
represents one of the broadest attempts to implement a classification system that categorizes 
relationships within the Islamist terror movement.  Their work begins to highlight definitional 
ambiguities that problematize most inquiries into terrorism.  
Helfstein and Wright‘s classification scheme hinges on differentiating between ―strong,‖ 
―weak,‖ and ―absent‖ ties to the highest echelons of al-Qaida‘s leadership, but they neglect to 
provide explicit definitions of these terms.  They define cells with strong ties as those that are 
―tightly associated with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,‖ while cells with weak ties 
―loosely associate with Al Qaeda senior leadership.‖1  However, such statements are of 
questionable utility because they akin to defining a ―tall man‖ as someone who is ―long-legged.‖   
To their credit, Helfstein and Wright provide some examples to help conceptualize the 
differences between categories: the 9/11 hijackers have strong ties to al-Qaida, and the 
perpetrators of the 1995 Riyadh bombing, who purportedly trained in a bin Laden-funded camp, 
have weak ties to al-Qaida.  But ultimately the authors ultimately describe their terms, rather 
than defining them.  Without an explicit discussion of thresholds between categories, the 
authors‘ terms are ambiguous at best.   
                                                          
1 Helfstein and Wright, p. 369. 
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An examination of the JJATT data that underlies Helfstein and Wright‘s inquiry does 
little to resolve the ambiguity.  According to the JJATT codebook, relationships between 
individuals take four possible values: 
0. To indicate the absence of a relationship 
1. To indicate acquaintances and distant family ties 
2. To indicate friends, moderately close family members, roommates, co-workers, and 
operational ties, such as those that exist between individuals who ―worked closely on 
a bombing together.‖  
3. To indicate close friends, close family members, and ―tight knit operational cliques 
(who) would die for each other.‖2 
Unfortunately, the distinctions between the categories are unclear.  For example, the 
difference between individuals who worked closely on a bombing together and individuals that 
are members of the same tight-knit operational clique is imprecise and entirely subjective.  The 
categorization scheme also conflates several types of distinct relationships.  For example, while 
family ties and operational terror ties can overlap, there are an equal number of times when close 
family members are appalled by their kinsman‘s participation in jihadist terrorism;3 therefore, it 
seems inaccurate to meld familial ties and operational ties into a single category.  Finally, it 
remains unclear how this four-part typology of individual relationships interacts with the three-
part typology that Helfstein and Wright used to classify attacks and plots, especially considering 
that a number of authors, including Bale and Jordán, et al, have argued that different members of 
the same operational cell often hold different types of relationships with al-Qaida.  The 
definitional ambiguities inherent to the JJATT data and Helfstein and Wright‘s fuzzy conception 
of tie strength are ultimately additive and problematize the West Point researchers‘ findings.  
                                                          
2 REL Codebook, p. 2. 
3 For example, the father of Umar Farouk Abdulmutalab, a Nigerian national who attempted to down a U.S.-flagged 
jetliner by detonating an explosive hidden in his underwear in December 2009, tried to warn the U.S. State 
Department that his son was dangerous and might attempt to attack American interests.  "One boy's journey to jihad; 
A former London student, inspired by radical clerics, managed to slip through the intelligence net and launch a 
suicide mission that nearly brought carnage to America," Sunday Times (London), January 3, 2010. 
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Comparable issues plague other writers.  According to Jordán, et al, the differences 
between GJNs, local cells, and GJMV groups hinge on the extent of participation of full-fledged 
members of terror groups.  These full-fledged members do not participate in GJNs, but do 
comprise a portion of the membership of local cells, and entirely staff GJMV groups.  However, 
because the authors never define the boundaries of membership, their argument becomes 
circular.  Rather than clarifying the varying extent of established terror groups‘ involvement in 
attacks, their typology merely shifts the discussion to a debate about which individuals met the 
criteria necessary to be considered full-fledged members of GJMV groups.   
Bale is considerably clearer and attempts to use functional criteria to distinguish between 
categories in his typology, but as his characterization draws heavily on the work of Jordán, et al, 
he does not entirely escape their definitional failings.  Consider the unclear difference between 
―local jihadist cells organized, supported, and/or directed from abroad‖ and ―self-generating 
European jihadist cells that are in direct contact with operatives from al-Qa‘ida Central.‖4  At 
what point does ―direct contact‖ translate into a measure of support or direction from the parent 
organization, and without an explicit definition of the boundaries of the parent organization, how 
is it possible to determine which cells were self-generating and which cells were established to 
provide a foreign group with a ‗local‘ presence?  For all of its nuance, Bale‘s characterization 
still hinges on the contentious question of how to define al-Qaida.  Clearly, a firm definition of 
group membership is a necessary component of any attempt to categorize the Islamist terror 
movement; the second chapter discusses how to do so at length. 
Despite this definitional ambiguity, Bale‘s work represents a step forward, because he 
begins to resolve many of the conflation issues that undermine earlier attempts to categorize the 
violent Islamist movement.  Unlike the JJATT data and Helfstein and Wright‘s inquiry, Bale‘s 
                                                          
4 Bale, pp. 62-63.  Emphasis in the original. 
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typology distinguishes between levels based less on subjective judgments of tie strength and 
more on comparatively clear differences in the type of connection.  For example, Bale 
differentiates between locally-owned jihadist cells and self-generating cells largely on the basis 
of training: members of the former category received it from established foreign terror groups; 
members of the latter category did not.  Thus, Bale begins to suggest that the many types of 
relationships that exist between Islamist terrorists must be considered independently in order to 
untangle the complexities of their interactions.  
However, Bale‘s emphasis on the function of ties is incomplete because he discusses 
many interactions in vague terms.  For example, his ―connected self-generating European 
jihadist cells‖ often have ―direct contact with operatives from al-Qa‘ida Central,‖5 but he never 
specifies the nature of these direct links.  Are they financial ties?  Are they friendship bonds?  Do 
they stem from worshipping at the same mosques as ‗proper‘ members of al-Qaida?  
Consequently, it is necessary to consider additional theoretical perspectives in order to fully 
resolve the definitional ambiguities that problematize efforts to gauge the extent of established 
extremist groups‘ participation in terror events. 
  A number of analysts have obliquely discussed the types of links that exist between 
terrorists.  For example, Richard Clarke, et al, spoke to the importance of family ties when they 
observed that a ―complicated web of marriage alliances‖ exists between members of Jemmah 
Islamiyah, the Southeast Asian terror group best remembered for bombing Bali in 2002.6  
Memoirs penned by Omar Nasiri and Ed Husain, both of whom once participated directly in the 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
6 Richard A. Clarke, Glenn P. Aga, Roger W. Cressey, Stephen E. Flynn, Blake W. Mobley, Eric Rosenback, Steven 
Simon, William F. Wechsler, and Lee S. Wolosky, Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action, A Century 
Foundation Task Report, (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2004), p. 25. 
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Islamist movement, describe the importance of comradeship between terrorists,7 and John 
Horgan‘s interview-based work on the psychology of terrorism draws similar, but more formal, 
conclusions regarding the primary role that affinity bonds play in adoption and maintenance of 
extremist beliefs.8  However, Steve Coll‘s work demonstrates that animosity and outright enmity 
can also exist between Islamists.  His history of South Asian terrorism suggests that Abdullah 
Azzam, the Palestinian preacher who served as bin Laden‘s early mentor, was assassinated in 
1989 by rivals within the Islamist movement,9 and his account of the interactions between the 
Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Afghan warlord who has led the militant group Hezb-e-
Islami for decades, paints a picture of an on-again-off-again relationship that makes a tumultuous 
teen romance seem comparatively stable.10 
Beyond characterizations that highlight the existence of individual relationship types, the 
late Israeli scholar Ehud Sprinzak described several types of qualitatively distinct ties that exist 
between terrorists in his pre-9/11 work on the ―long organizational chain‖ that supports 
Palestinian suicide terror.11  Specifically, he spoke to the existence of planning ties by discussing 
the ―target selection‖ and ―intelligence gathering‖ that necessarily precede an attack, and he 
                                                          
7 Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life With Al Qaeda, A Spy’s Story, (New York: Basic Books, 2006), and Ed 
Husain, The Islamist: Why I Became and Islamic Fundamentalist, What I Saw Inside, and Why I Left, (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2007). 
8 John Horgan, Walking Away From Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 10, 41-44, and 65-66.  Comparable 
findings on the importance of social constructs have also been made in regards to ‗traditional‘ political terrorism.  
See, for example: Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, ―Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways 
Toward Terrorism,‖ Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 20, No. 3 (2008). 
9 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to 
September 10, 2001, (New York: Penguin, 2004), p. 204.  See also: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (9/11 Commission), Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), p. 56. (Hereafter the ―9/11 Report‖). 
10 Coll. For additional information on Hekmatyar‘s enmity toward the Taliban in the mid-1990s, see: Kenneth J. 
Cooper, "Afghan leaders face toughest foe; Kabul pacifies 3 militias as fourth group makes major territorial gains," 
Washington Post, September 15, 1996.  For information on Hekmatyar‘s warm feelings toward the Taliban in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, see: "Exiled Afghan warlord threatens to return if US sends ground troops," Agence 
France Presse, October 17, 2001; "Taliban ally warns US of long guerilla war," Agence France Presse, November 
13, 2001; and Phil Reeves, "The threat of war: Fifteen killed in attack blamed on al-Qa'ida; Afghanistan," The 
Independent (London), February 1, 2003. 
11 Ehud Sprinzak, ―Rational Fanatics,‖ Foreign Policy, No. 122 (Sep/Oct 2000), p. 69. 
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noted the existence of logistical ties in his description of the individuals involved in the 
―preparation of explosives‖ and ―transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area.‖  
Finally, Sprinzak‘s mention of ―physical and ‗spiritual‘ training,‖ described both the ideological 
bonds that exist between adherents of the same worldview and the relationships formed through 
the shared instruction.12   
However, the Australian scholar Clive Williams made the largest and most direct 
contribution to the discourse on relationship types among terrorists.  He explicitly recognized 
that general terms like ―link‖ and ―tie‖ are far too vague, because they include ―anything serving 
to connect one part or thing with another.‖13  When used to describe relationships within the 
jihadist movement, these terms will cause analysts to exaggerate al-Qaida‘s role in terrorism, 
because it is likely impossible to find any violent Islamist group that is not tied to al-Qaida in at 
least some fashion.  He argued that six categories of links exist between groups and individuals 
involved in Islamist terrorism: (1) links related to ―funding for a spiritual leader‘s activities,‖ (2) 
links from ―training in Afghanistan, Pakistan or elsewhere,‖ (3) links from training ―at a local 
level,‖ (4) financial links related to ―regional operational activities,‖ (5) financial links related to 
―logistic support, such as weapons and explosives,‖ and (6) links that stem from direct 
operational partnerships.14   
When abstracted and combined with the contributions of the scholars who discussed 
terrorists‘ relationships in more oblique terms, this framework yields a fairly comprehensive 
ontology for the study of interactions among violent Islamists: 
  
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 The Macquarie Dictionary, quoted in Clive Williams M.G., ―The Question of ‗Links‘ Between Al Qaeda and 
Southeast Asia,‖ in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, eds., After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast 
Asia, (Singapore: World Scientific and the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 83. 
14 Clive Williams, pp. 83-84.  
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1. Direct operational links that occur between those who fight together (Williams 6), 
2. Logistical links that occur through the provision of manpower and materiel (Williams 5; 
Sprinzak), 
3. Planning links that occur through target selection and/or the conduct of surveillance 
(Sprinzak), 
4. Financial links that occur through the direct provision of money (Williams 1,4, & 5), 
5. Training links that occur through teaching and shared instruction (Williams 2 & 3; 
Sprinzak), 
6. Ideological links that occur through explicit interactions of a spiritual or religious nature 
(Williams 1; Sprinzak; Horgan), 
7. Family links that occur through shared bloodlines or marriage (Clarke, et al), 
8. Friendship links that develop through mutual affinity (Nasiri, Husain, Horgan), 
9. Enmity links that develop as the result of personal animus or competition (Coll). 
Unfortunately, practical constraints preclude this ontology‘s implementation in its 
unadulterated form.  Raw data on terrorism is of notoriously poor quality,15 and, as Carlo 
Morselli‘s noted in his more general characterization of clandestine networks, it is often 
necessary to couch interactions in terms of uncertainty, because some sources, even official ones, 
merely allege that individuals shared a relationship or played a role in an event, without offering 
definitive evidence.16   
Fahim Ansari‘s uncertain involvement in the 2008 Mumbai rampage is illustrative.  
Although Indian law enforcement argued that Ansari had ―meticulously prepared‖ hand-drawn 
maps to enable the LeT attack team to maneuver through South Mumbai‘s hectic urban 
landscape,17 an Indian court acquitted Ansari of any involvement in the attack,18 and David 
                                                          
15 Silke, pp. 59-68. 
16 Carlo Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, (New York: Springer, 2009), pp. 44-45. 
17 Ashok T. Duraphe, Final Form/Report (Under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) In the Court of Addl. Ch. M.M., 37th Court, 
Esplanade, Mumbai, February 25, 2009. 
18 ―Fahim Ansari‘s acquittal challenged,‖ Times of India, October 4, 2011. 
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Headley, an American, has since pleaded guilty to conducting the bulk of the reconnaissance in 
preparation for the attack.19  Still, as of the fall of 2011, Indian prosecutors hoped to pin charges 
on Ansari.20  It remains unclear what role, if any, he played in the Mumbai attacks. Therefore, 
when the source material offers mutually exclusive portrayals of an individual‘s involvement, 
and when the source material is overt in specifying the speculative nature of an interaction, it is 
necessary to add an additional category:  
10. Uncertain links that may or may not have taken place (Morselli). 
Moreover, information on some specific link types is frustratingly sparse; open-sources 
are exceptionally inconsistent in their coverage of the individuals involved in clandestine 
financial transfers.  For a small number of events, detailed information is available, and it is 
possible to follow money from person-to-person, but attack funding is more often attributed to a 
region, rather than a person or group.  For example, the U.S. Treasury department describes how 
Ruben Omar Lavilla, one of the three men explicitly named as a participant in the 2004 bombing 
of SuperFerry 14 in the Philippines, channeled money from his ―personal Arab contacts‖ to 
Filipino extremists,21 but the open-source data never specifies the names or organizational 
affiliations of Lavilla‘s contacts in the Middle East.  It is also worth noting that this analysis‘ 
specific emphasis on attacks and plots largely precluded the inclusion of more diffuse funding 
links, as epitomized by several crooked charities‘ contributions to al-Qaida‘s general operating 
fund.22  Preliminary analyses conducted on the snowball sample demonstrated that these sorts of 
                                                          
19 USA v. David Headley (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division 
(No. 09 CR 830-3), Plea Agreement, March 18, 2010. 
20 ―Fahim Ansari‘s acquittal challenged.‖ 
21 ―Treasury Designates Seven Member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement,‖ U.S. Treasury Department Press 
Release, June 16, 2008. 
22 See, for example, the case of Benevolence International Foundation (BIF): USA v. Enaam M. Arnaout, Plea 
Agreement (No. 02 CR 892), United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, February 
11, 2003. 
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ambiguities were prevalent enough to preclude attack-finance ties from consistently serving as a 
stand-alone category of analysis.      
In other instances, sources described links in exceptionally general terms.  For example, 
in its description of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed‘s activities in the mid-1990s, the 9/11 
Commission Report mentions a meeting with Abu Hafs al-Masri, an Egyptian who all sources 
agree was one of bin Laden‘s top lieutenants:  
―KSM continued to travel among the worldwide jihadist community . . . 
visiting the Sudan, Yemen, Malaysia, and Brazil in 1995. No clear evidence 
connects him to terrorist activities in those locations. While in Sudan, he 
reportedly failed in his attempt to meet with Bin Ladin. But KSM did see Atef, 
who gave him a contact in Brazil.‖23   
While it is clear that a meeting took place and that the interaction was vaguely operational in 
nature, it is unclear what the men discussed.  If they considered a specific attack, the meeting 
may have dealt with planning.  If Atef‘s Brazilian contact was a source of manpower or materiel 
to support one of KSM‘s myriad operations, the meeting may have also been logistical in nature.  
Similarly, the meeting may have been financial in nature, if Atef‘s Brazilian contact was a source 
of funds, or if Atef provided KSM with some money to facilitate his travel.  Given that the data 
contains thousands of other similar examples, the boundaries between these types of ties were 
indistinct, making it impossible to consider them as separate categories of analysis in all 
situations.   
Ultimately, theory had to yield to practicality and some of the link types had to be 
amalgamated to create an ontology robust enough to support formal methods.  Therefore, when 
                                                          
23 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 
p. 148. (Hereafter ―The 9/11 Report‖). 
47 
 
considering high-level questions such as responsibility for an attack, the analysis considered the 
following types of links:  
1. Functional links formed through operational interactions, planning interactions, logistical 
interactions, and/or financial interactions. 
 
2. Training links formed through shared teaching or instruction. 
 
3. Ideological links formed through explicit interactions of a spiritual or religious nature. 
 
4. Family links formed through shared bloodlines or marriage. 
 
5. Friendship links formed through mutual affinity. 
 
6. Enmity links formed through personal animus or competition. 
 
7. Uncertain links that may or may not have taken place. 
 
However, this necessary amalgamation does not come without cost.  Some of the more 
nuanced characterizations vanish from the data, and the dedicated emphasis on attacks and plots 
likely precludes the data from fully describing ―financial‖ members of al-Qaida, whose support 
shapes the organization, but who otherwise exist outside al-Qaida‘s locus of decision-making.  
That said, Jemaah Islamiyah‘s internal system of finance, which generates operating funds by 
taxing five percent of members‘ incomes, demonstrates that finance and membership are often 
intricately intertwined,24 and because this study‘s ultimate aim is to characterize the extent of 
organizational involvement in terror events, there is a sound rationale for the potentially 
contentious amalgamation of financial and operational ties, as it is difficult to argue that 
individuals who provide money in direct support of an attack lack culpability for its outcome.  
Hopefully, as more information on terrorist finance trickles into the open source, the available 
                                                          
24 International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia 
Report No. 63, August 26, 2003, p. 12. 
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data on money flows will become robust enough to allow for its analysis as a separate category 
of interaction and future analyses will be able to examine the nature of organizational 
involvement in terror events at a finer level of abstraction.  In the interim, Figure 1.6 summarizes 
the frequency of various relationship types within the snowball data sample. 
 
Figure 1.6: Frequency of Relationship Types within the Snowball Data Sample 
 
 
With the definitional framework reasonably well-addressed, it is time to return to the 
issues of tie strength that have preoccupied terror theorists‘ attempts to classify the nature of al-
Qaida‘s involvement in attacks and plots.  Network theorists have offered several alternatives to 
non-replicable intuitive approaches, but unfortunately the nature of data on terrorism precludes 
most implementations.  Granovetter, whose argument on the importance of weak ties first 
sparked the debate about how to quantify relationships, proposed that the strength of a tie 
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probably relates linearly to some ―combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, 
the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.‖25  
However, he postponed questions of how to measure and index such variables ―to future 
empirical studies.‖26   
Given the rather weighty data requirements imposed by Granovetter‘s characterization, 
survey-based approaches have abounded.27  While rigorous, they are well suited neither to large 
networks, in which tens of thousands surveys would be needed to quantify the various 
relationships between actors, nor to clandestine topics, in which the very possibility of 
distributing surveys to subjects becomes farcical.  Consequently, other researchers, including 
Granovetter, have treated the issue by proxy and have adopted simple continuous measurements 
that determine tie strength by summing the frequency of interactions between two agents.28  This 
approach suits the available open-source data on terrorism and serves as the foundation for this 
study‘s treatment of the strength of individual interactions. 
However, a minor adjustment to Granovetter‘s approach was necessary to accommodate 
the dynamic network analysis perspective.  In order to enable the analysis to highlight the 
severance of relationships, this study adopted a time-based additive approach.  Specifically, all 
interactions were coded in simple binary terms and then summed across calendar year and link 
type.  So, for example, if actor ―A‖ passed bomb-making materials to actor ―B‖ three times in 
                                                          
25 Mark S. Granovetter, ―The Strength of Weak Ties,‖ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 6 (May 1973), 
p. 1361. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See, for example, Peter V. Marsden and Karen E. Campbell, ―Measuring Tie Strength,‖ Social Forces, Vol. 63, 
No. 2 (December 1984), pp. 482-501; Andrea Petróczi, Tamás Nepusz, and Fülöp Bazsó, ―Measuring tie-strength in 
virtual social networks,‖ Connections, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2007), pp. 39-52; Noah E. Friedkin, ―A Guttman Scale for the 
Strength of an Interpersonal Tie,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 12 (1990), pp. 239-252; and Kevin B. Wright and Claude 
H. Miller, ―A Measure of Weak-Tie/Strong-Tie Support Network Preference,‖ Communication Monographs, Vol. 
77, No. 4 (2010), pp. 500-517. 
28 Granovetter, p. 1371.  See also, Mario Benassi, Arent Greve, and Julia Harkola, ―Looking for a Network 
Organization: The Case of GESTO,‖ Journal of Market Focused Management, Vol. 4 (1999), pp. 205-229.  
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2005, and also shared audio recordings of radical sermons with actor ―B‖ twice in that same 
year, then in 2005, the pair‘s functional relationship would be of strength 3, and their ideological 
relationship of strength 2.  The data on 2005 has no bearing on the following year; the pair‘s 
relationships in 2006 would be evaluated independently, though it remained possible to calculate 
cumulative relationship strengths through simple addition when merited by the project‘s analytic 
demands.   
 The primary benefits to this approach are that it allows relationships to change over time, 
as interactions vary in strength from year-to-year, while avoiding the ambiguity inherent to 
subjective descriptions of tie strength.   The primary limitation to this approach is that the 
calendar year is a somewhat arbitrary dividing line that can artificially break a continual stream 
of interactions into two less profound annual estimates of a relationship.  The resulting over-time 
characterizations must necessarily be interpreted in fuzzy terms.   
How does this characterization of the intensity of relationships fit into a larger theoretical 
picture? Ultimately, this study‘s analytic framework synthesizes a Granovettric characterization 
of tie strength with the literature that Sprinzak, Williams, and other scholars have created to 
describe the nature of relationships, in order to modify Bale‘s nuanced system of classifying 
various levels of al-Qaida involvement.  Bale already explicitly considered the nature and 
strength of ties, so the characterization outlined below merely draws on the other literatures to 
refine these distinctions.  The largest difference between Bale‘s original characterization and this 
study‘s offering is a shift from the description of groups to a description of events.  Because 
groups are tied to events (and events to groups), this change primarily constitutes a refocusing of 
perspective that more easily highlights organizational adaptation on the part of terrorists by 
making it possible for al-Qaida to interact with groups of actors in different ways on different 
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attacks, even within the same period of analysis.  Put more simply, this accommodation paints a 
more nuanced picture by allowing organizations‘ roles to vary from event-to-event.     
Temporarily setting aside definitional questions of how to divide between weak and 
strong involvement in events—a topic discussed in detail in the third chapter—various aspects of 
the network data allow al-Qaida‘s involvement in any attack to be classified in any of the 
following five categories: 
1. Attacks and plots with ‗strong‘ functional and/or training links to the organization.  
a. Events that do not display functional links to al-Qaida and/or strong training 
links to al-Qaida are excluded from this category. 
b. The characterization of tie strength allows an additional narrowing of the 
field, by excluding those events with weak al-Qaida involvement. 
c. Geographical data, drawn from the dynamic network‘s event x location 
matrix, allows an additional narrowing of the field, by excluding events 
conducted by hit squads deployed to the West.  
2. Attacks and plots conducted by al-Qaida ―hit squads‖ deployed to the West. 
a. Events that do not display functional links to al-Qaida and/or strong training 
links to al-Qaida are excluded from this category. 
b. Additional events are excluded based on tie strength; this category excludes 
weakly-tied events. 
c. Non-Western events are excluded in order to distinguish this category from 
the previous one. 
3. Attacks and plots with ‗weak‘ functional and/or training connections to al-Qaida. 
a. Events that do not display functional links to al-Qaida and/or training links to 
al-Qaida are excluded from this category. 
b. Additional events are excluded based on tie strength; this category excludes 
all strongly-tied events. 
c. This categorization does not include a geographic component. 
4. Attacks and plots tied to individuals who formerly held strong ties to al-Qaida, but 
now operate independent of the organization. 
a. Determinations of tie strength enable differentiation by excluding events 
conducted by individuals that never held strong ties to al-Qaida. 
b. The annualized nature of the dynamic data makes it possible to determine 
―end dates‖ for individuals‘ involvement with al-Qaida; this information 
enables additional exclusions by removing all people with ongoing ties to al-
Qaida from this category.  
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5. Attacks and plots with explicit ideological ties to al-Qaida. 
a. Events that display functional ties to al-Qaida and/or strong training links to 
al-Qaida are excluded from this category, leaving events that are primarily 
tied to al-Qaida through weak ideological bonds or through exceptionally 
uncertain links 
6. Attacks and plots with no links to al-Qaida.   
a. Events that display links of any type to anyone who has ever held ties to al-
Qaida are excluded from this category.   
The jihadists that Bale describes as local cells planted in the West with long-term 
objectives are beyond the scope of this inquiry, because their stated mission is long-term 
logistical and financial support of the broader organization, rather than direct support of attacks.  
Similarly, it is important to note that the sixth category is not synonymous with the self-
organization grassroots organizations described by Sageman and Jordan, et al, because this 
category includes attacks and plots conducted by recognized terror groups that merely lack 
demonstrable ties to bin Laden‘s organization.  Indeed, as estimates provided by the third chapter 
demonstrate, many of these self-organizing groups more accurately fall within the fifth Baleian 
category. 
 
1.6 FROM THEORY TO IMPLEMENTATION: AN OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Because it is impossible to determine how al-Qaida is connected to an event without first 
explicitly defining the organization‘s boundaries, the second chapter discusses the need for a 
methodologically rigorous definition of terror groups, before describing a network-based 
grouping method that utilizes the snowball sample to offer one reasonable solution to the 
problems inherent to existing definitional approaches.  This chapter closes by testing the output 
of the grouping model against expert characterizations of terror groups‘ membership.  However, 
because reliable, full membership rosters for contemporary terror groups simply do not exist in 
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the open-source, this test offers only partial proof of concept for the membership model, not 
complete validation.   
 The third chapter, which is also methodological in nature, turns its attention to the 
question of implementation.  This chapter explains how the analysis moves from individual-level 
characterizations of involvement in events to formal estimates of organizational involvement in 
terrorist events.  The chapter then revisits the distinction between ―weak‖ and ―strong‖ 
involvement in attacks and describing a non-subjective means of differentiating between these 
levels.  These findings then serve to classify the plots and attacks listed in the snowball data 
sample into the six-tiered, events-oriented Baleian typology outlined above.  Therefore, this 
chapter contributes to the theoretical literature on terrorism by offering a broad estimation of the 
relative frequencies of patterns of al-Qaida involvement.  Although the patterns that this chapter 
finds rely heavily on the membership model‘s definitions of organizational boundaries, the 
processes outlined could be applied to any membership list that an analyst chose to use; 
therefore, this chapter also makes a useful amendment to the methodological discourse on 
terrorism. 
 The findings of the third chapter serve as a metric that aids in the selection of 
representative cases, and the remaining topical chapters turn their attention toward issues of 
within-group variability and use case study to explore patterns of change over time within the 
categories of the Baleian typology.   Toward that end, the fourth chapter discusses attacks and 
plots with strong links to al-Qaida that take place in the organization‘s back yard and examines 
patterns of training, finance, logistics, and operations among the individuals involved in three 
cases: (1) the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Eastern Africa, (2) the 2002 Mombasa attacks 
on Israeli-linked targets, and (3) a string of bombings conducted in Pakistan in 2004 under the 
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leadership of two men who ‗graduated‘ from one of al-Qaida‘s Waziristan-based camps 
immediately prior to the terror campaign.  Broadly speaking, the comparison of these cases 
suggests that the scale of al-Qaida‘s operations and the quality of its operatives have decreased 
steadily over time.  Similarly, the scale of support that bin Laden‘s organization has been able to 
offer operatives has decreased steadily, and even those individuals with strong ties to al-Qaida 
have had to either become more self-reliant or have had to partner with outside organizations in 
order to accomplish attacks.       
 The fifth chapter discusses hit squads deployed by al-Qaida to the West.  It discusses five 
cases: (1) the 9/11 attacks of 2001; (2) a 2004 fertilizer-bomb plot against London, (3) the July 7, 
2005, London bombings, which featured some of the same players as the 2004 plot; (4) the failed 
July 21, 2005, attack on London, which shared training ties to the previous attack; and (5) a 2009 
plot against New York city‘s subway system conducted by three long-time residents of the 
United States shortly after they graduated from an al-Qaida training camp, which shared diffuse 
training ties to the two previous cases.  However, as the events of 9/11 are well known and have 
been described in thorough detail elsewhere,29 this case is considered primarily for comparative 
purposes.  The results of this comparison demonstrate that similar patterns characterize both al-
Qaida‘s Western and non-Western operations over time: the scale of hit squad attacks have 
decreased over time; the quality of hit squad operatives, as measured by the extent of their 
training, has similarly decreased over time, and it seems that the amount of financial and 
logistical support al-Qaida provides to these operatives has decreased substantially over time.     
 The sixth chapter turns its attention toward plots and attacks with weak connections to al-
Qaida.  It considers five cases drawn from Indonesia: (1) the 2002 Bali bombings, (2) the 2003 
                                                          
29 See, for example: The 9/11 Report; Ghost Wars, and Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the 
Road to 9/11, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006). 
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bombing of the Jakarta Marriott, (3) the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, (4) 
the 2005 Bali bombings, and (5) the 2009 near-simultaneous bombings of the Marriott and Ritz-
Carlton hotels in Jakarta.  This chapter argues that relationships within the violent Islamist 
community have a certain evolutionary character, as evidenced by Noordin‘s gradual creation of 
a new independent terrorist organization.  In terms of theory, this chapter has implications for the 
literature that describes the causes of organizational fracture among terror groups, as Noordin‘s 
experience demonstrates that splinters do not always form in sharp response to peace settlements 
or other events that cause an immediate rift between organizations‘ hard-line and moderate 
members. 
 The seventh chapter deals with plots and events involving individuals who formerly held 
close ties to al-Qaida, but who now operate independent of bin Laden‘s organization.  Data 
fidelity precludes this chapter from fully adopting the events-based perspective utilized in other 
chapters; there for the chapter examines two cases at the organizational level: (1) al-Qaida in the 
Islamic Maghreb and (2) al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.  The findings of this section 
reinforce the evolutionary arguments put forth in the previous chapter, while simultaneously 
aiding in the creation of a theory that addresses why relationships among violent Islamists 
degrade over time.  It seems that access to financial resources obtained from crime may be 
causally related to the extent of violent Islamists‘ functional independence from parent 
organizations.  
 The eighth chapter turns its attention to plots and attacks conducted by individuals with 
loose, non-functional ties to al-Qaida.  Given the breadth of the topic, case selection is 
particularly challenging, so this study employed a double-binding constraint to ensure 
comparability of cases and discusses only those events that took place in the United States and 
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targeted military personnel.  Three cases emerge: (1) the 2007 plot against Fort Dix in New 
Jersey, (2) the 2009 shooting at an Army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, and (3) the 
2009 shootings at Fort Hood in Texas.  While such plots remain of concern, this chapter finds 
that both the threat that they pose and their connection to al-Qaida are typically exaggerated.  
Moreover, this chapter questions the extent of the role that online propaganda, which constitutes 
these plots‘ primary ties to al-Qaida, plays in the indoctrination process, as social ties to existing 
jihadists seemed to play a more dominant role. 
 Because the final Baleian category deals with attacks and plots that have no connection to 
al-Qaida, it is omitted from discussion on the grounds that it falls beyond the bounds of this 
study.  Therefore, the ninth and final chapter offers some general conclusions and makes policy 
recommendations regarding how to best combat the threat posed by al-Qaida.  
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2.0 CUTTING THE PIECES OF THE JIHADIST JIGSAW PUZZLE: HOW TO DEFINE 
MEMBERSHIP IN ISLAMIST TERROR GROUPS USING IMPERFECT DATA AND WHY 
THE PROCESS IS IMPORTANT 
 
 
Defining al-Qaida is difficult, but important.  Unfortunately, no consensus exists 
regarding the nature of the organization.  To some, al-Qaida is a finite group with a well-defined 
membership and explicit organizational boundaries.  To others, al-Qaida is more of an ideology, 
to which any motivated individual can self-subscribe prior to undertaking violence aimed at 
furthering the Islamist cause.1  Consequently, estimates of the number of individuals who have 
ever held membership in the organization range from ―several hundred‖2 to at least 70,000.3  
Such disagreements matter because they are the root cause of substantial debate surrounding al-
Qaida‘s role in various attacks, which in turn shapes policy arguments about how to best combat 
the threat of Islamist terrorism. 
Following this introduction, this chapter contains three sections that explore the nature of 
membership in al-Qaida.  The first section highlights the need for a formal, functional definition 
of al-Qaida by discussing the shortcomings associated with traditional criteria used to determine 
membership in Islamist terror groups.   Network-based grouping methods and their applicability 
                                                          
1 Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and 
Competitive Advantage, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), p. 11; see also, Bruce 
Hoffman and Marc Sageman, ―Does Osama Still Call the Shots?‖ Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008; available 
online: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faresponse87415/marc-sageman-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-still-
call-the-shots.html. 
2 Richard A. Clarke, Glenn P. Aga, Roger W. Cressey, Stephen E. Flynn, Blake W. Mobley, Eric Rosenback, Steven 
Simon, William F. Wechsler, and Lee S. Wolosky, Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action, A Century 
Foundation Task Report, (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2004), p. 15. 
3 Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, ―Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the Threat,‖ Strategic 
Insights, Vol. 2, No. 10 (October 2003). 
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to the modeling of terrorist organizations are the subjects of the second section, which closes by 
outlining the procedures this analysis followed to create a formal model of al-Qaida membership.   
The third and final section turns its attention to results and compares the output of the formal 
grouping method against expert characterizations of membership, in order to address questions 
of model fit to the greatest extent allowed by the ambiguity-ridden subject matter. 
 
2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINITIONS 
Definitions matter because they shape policy.  This statement is easily tested in the realm 
of counterterrorism by considering the implications of viewing al-Qaida in the widest possible 
terms: when analysts use ―al-Qaida‖ as a perfect synonym for the larger violent Islamist 
movement, it seems that the jihadist threat can be neutralized by eliminating a single 
organization that is responsible for virtually every attack.  More finite definitions of the 
organization draw additional boundaries within the Islamist terror movement, thereby arguing 
that counterterrorism policy must combat multiple, distinct terror groups to mitigate the jihadist 
threat.  Thus, determining if and where to draw the lines between terror organizations is more 
than an academic exercise in classification; it has practical implications that affect national and 
international security. 
 Unfortunately, there is no straightforward process for finding the boundaries of Islamist 
terror groups.  The easiest solution is to simply rely on classifications found in existing 
descriptions of the jihadist threat.4  However, because journalists and scholars are rarely explicit 
                                                          
4 For example, the Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) has adopted 
this perspective in the construction of its counterterrorism database.  Luke M. Gerdes, ―Codebook for Network Data 
on Individuals Involved with Terrorism and Counterterrorism,‖ Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer 
Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical Report CMU-ISR-08-136, October 10, 2008; available online: 
http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers.php.   
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about how they define al-Qaida or other terror groups, the secondary source-material on jihadist 
terrorism is replete with conflicting and irreconcilable accounts of organizations‘ membership.   
 The 2004 attacks on Madrid‘s commuter rail system offer a useful illustration.  Scott 
Atran, an American scholar with extensive experience consulting on national security issues for 
the U.S. government, claims that the Madrid bombers worked independent of support from bin 
Laden‘s organization.  ―There isn't the slightest bit of evidence of any relationship with al-
Qaida,‖ Atran stated. ―We've been looking at it closely for years and we've been briefed by 
everybody under the sun ... and nothing connects them.‖5  Fernando Reinares, a Spanish scholar, 
disagrees and argues that the Madrid bombers had ―international connections‖ with both al-
Qaida and its affiliated organizations.6  Jeffrey Bale‘s characterization of the attack includes the 
aspect of time; he argues that the Madrid bombers formerly held ties to al-Qaida, but reformed as 
an independent network prior to conducting the attacks.7  Jose A. Rodriguez, a Spanish network 
analyst, takes arguments about al-Qaida‘s involvement in the Madrid attacks to their farthest 
extreme and argues that ―the March 11th terrorist cell . . . is also linked to, and a part of, al 
Qaeda‘s much larger and more diffuse network.‖8  Although these scholars debate the nature and 
extent of some participants‘ roles, there is a surprising level of consensus regarding the specific 
individuals involved in the attacks; therefore, the academic community‘s widely divergent 
conclusions about the extent of the Madrid bombers‘ affiliations with al-Qaida stem primarily 
                                                          
5 Quoted in Paul Halimos and Mark Tran, ―21 guilty, seven cleared over Madrid train bombings,‖ Guardian, 
October 31, 2007; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/31/spain.marktran.  Atran‘s 
academic conclusions match the sentiments expressed in the quote.  See, for example, Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod, 
Richard Davis, and Marc Sageman, ―Terror Networks and Sacred Values: Synopsis of Report from Madrid – 
Morocco – Hamburg – Palestine – Israel – Syria,‖ Delivered to NSC Staff, March 28, 2007; available online: 
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/synopsis_atran-sageman_nsc_brief_28_march_2007.pdf.   
6 Fernando Reinares, ―The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism,‖ Survival, Vol. 52, No. 2 (April-May 2010), 83-
104. 
7 Jeffrey M. Bale, ―Jihadist Cells and ‗I.E.D.‘ Capabilities in Europe: Assessing the Present and Future Threat to the 
West,‖ Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2010. 
8 Jose A. Rodriguez, ―The March 11th Terrorist Network: In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength,‖ Working Papers EPP-
LEA, Study Group on Power and Privilege, Department of Sociology, University of Barcelona, December 2005. 
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from irreconcilable views about where to bound al-Qaida as an organization.  Given such 
discord, existing characterizations of membership cannot be trusted at face value. 
Another approach to determining membership centers on compiling a list of followers 
who ―made bayat‖ by swearing oaths of allegiance to a terrorist leader or a terrorist organization.  
While these oaths makes it possible, at least in some theoretical sense, to construct membership 
rosters for terror groups, such attempts require nearly perfect information, which is not available 
because terrorist organizations are, by their very nature, clandestine.  Intelligence analysts 
working with highly classified data might be able to reconstruct such lists by analyzing the 
contents of computer hard drives seized during the capture of high-level terrorists, but even with 
the best data available, the task remains herculean and fraught with gaps.   
In large part, this difficulty stems from organizational adaptation on the part of the 
terrorists.  Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) suffered tremendous operational losses in the mid-1990s, 
when hundreds of members were arrested after the Egyptian intelligence service seized a copy of 
EIJ‘s membership roster during the arrest of a high-ranking leader.9  As this incident is well 
known in Islamist circles, it presumably serves as a cautionary tale that makes jihadists leery of 
committing too much information to storage in physical or digital files.10   
                                                          
9 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), pp. 
209-210. 
10 At first blush, the experience of Mohammed Naem Noor Khan, a Pakistani computer engineer, seems to 
contradict this statement. He was characterized as a hub in al-Qaida‘s communications network at the time of his 
arrest in 2004, because his computer hard-drive contained contact information on several terrorists in South Asia and 
Britain.  However, Pakistani authorities released Khan in 2007, without ever filing any charges against him.  
Knowledgeable observers, including former counterterrorism tsar Richard Clarke, have suggested that Khan was 
working with Pakistani authorities in a sting-operation against al-Qaida.  Thus, while the wave of arrests that 
stemmed from information contained on Khan‘s hard drive demonstrates that computer records can serve as 
valuable ―membership lists,‖ Khan‘s example says little about terrorists‘ reticence to record information, as he was 
likely working at the authorities‘ behest.  For early characterizations of Khan‘s role in al-Qaida, see: Doug Saunders, 
"Al-Qaeda raid in Pakistan led to arrests in London; British officials say information gathered is not enough to raise 
terror alert levels," The Globe and Mail (Canada), August 6, 2004; "Outisde view: Focus on Pakistan's jihadis," 
United Press International, August 9, 2004; "Naeem was top terror planner," The Pakistan Newswire, August 4, 
2004.  For an account of Khan‘s release, see: Habibullah Khan and Maddy Sauer, ―Pakistan Computer Expert With 
Alleged Al Qaeda Ties Released,‖ ABC News, August 21, 2007.  
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 Beyond the information challenges associated with an oath-based approach, questions 
remain about its utility.  Defining al-Qaida‘s membership based exclusively around the ideal of 
bayat would exclude several individuals intimately involved in the organization‘s operations, 
because a number of people participated in al-Qaida attacks without first swearing allegiance to 
bin Laden.11  Most famously, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (KSM), the acknowledged mastermind 
of the 9/11 attacks, delayed pledging loyalty to bin Laden for as long as possible.  He did not 
take an oath until well after the September 11th attacks and only did so because members of al-
Qaida‘s leadership convinced him that his refusal set a poor example for the organization‘s rank-
and-file.12   Yet, by any functional definition, KSM had been a member of the organization for 
years.  
 Nor is this pattern unique to al-Qaida.  Yasin Syawal offers an example that demonstrates 
the disutility of bayat as a proxy for organizational membership in a Southeast Asian context.   
Syawal, an Indonesian, first became involved in jihadist violence in the mid-1980s, in 
Afghanistan, where he fought against the Soviets alongside several of the men who would go on 
to found al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).13  He also married into the movement, by wedding 
the step-daughter of Abdullah Sungkar, who served as JI‘s emir from the organization‘s founding 
in 1993 until his death in 1999.  By the late 1990s, Syawal had become involved in both attack-
planning and terror training; he attended a 1999 meeting that discussed assassination targets, 
                                                          
11 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 30. 
12 USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria 
Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-A), Evidence Presented in Lieu of Testimony by KSM, date unknown; see also, 
Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), 
Unclassified, March 10, 2007. 
13 International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia 
Report No. 63, August 26, 2003. 
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including the president of Indonesia,14 and he instructed recruits at Camp Hudiebiyah, a JI 
facility that operated on the remote southern Philippine island of Mindanao until it was over-run 
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in July 2000.15  But despite holding familial, operational, 
and training ties that bound him to JI, Syawal clung to a façade of independence and refused to 
swear fealty to Sungkar or his successors.16  When viewed alongside KSM‘s complicated 
relationship to al-Qaida, Syawal‘s experience with JI demonstrates that bayat is a poor measure 
of membership for two of the world‘s best-known Islamist terror organizations.  It is hardly an 
intellectual leap to assume that this pattern applies more broadly to the jihadist movement. 
 Moreover, a lack of enforcement mechanisms often problematizes oath-based definitions 
of terror groups.  There are isolated examples of terror leaders imposing corporal punishments—
even including execution—on wayward members,17 but many groups have seen little need for a 
codified system of penalties, because oath-takers‘ religious devotion theoretically ensures 
compliance.   According to information obtained from KSM after his 2003 capture, violations of 
bayat within al-Qaida ―were considered to be between the individual and God.‖18  Consequently, 
individuals were free to be as insubordinate as allowed by their individual fears of divine 
retribution or subsequent re-evaluations of the justness of their organization‘s leadership.  
Indeed, this theological loophole allowed some prominent followers of bin Laden to operate 
virtually independently, despite their promise to heed the commands of al-Qaida‘s leadership.   
                                                          
14 U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Snow announces designation of 10 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists," FDCH 
Federal Department and Agency Documents, September 5, 2003. 
15 International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia 
Report No. 63, August 26, 2003. 
16 Ibid, p. 14. 
17 Wright, pp. 242-246; see also, "London-based Islamists view death of Al-Qa'idah's Abu-Khabab al-Masri," BBC 
Monitoring Middle East - Political, August 5, 2008. 
18 USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria 
Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-A), Evidence Presented in Lieu of Testimony by KSM, date unknown. 
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Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who led al-Qaida in Mesopotamia until his death in 
June 2006, offers a useful illustration.  Despite making bayat to bin Laden in October 2004,19 
Zarqawi engaged in widespread violence against Iraqi Shiites throughout 2005.20  These actions 
were in open defiance of al-Qaida‘s leadership, which felt that sectarian violence in Iraq created 
dissent among insurgents that was inimical to the organization‘s larger goal of defeating the 
American military.  With no formal means to discipline Zarqawi, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the 
Egyptian physician who long-served as bin Laden‘s second-in-command, could do little more 
than cajole the wayward Jordanian back into line with al-Qaida‘s polices.  Toward that end, 
Zawahiri wrote a letter, later captured by American forces, that attempted to influence Zarqawi‘s 
behavior, but Zarqawi‘s supposed superior stopped well short of issuing commands.21 
As an even more egregious example of the fallibility of bayat, consider Jamal Ahmed 
Mohamed al-Fadl.  Sudanese by birth, al-Fadl fell-in with a radical crowd after moving to 
Brooklyn and attending the Farouq Mosque, where Omar Abdel Rahman, the Blind Sheikh, 
began leading services in 1987.22  By 1988, al-Fadl had acquired terror training in Afghanistan, 
at Khalid Ibn Walid Camp, and the following year, he swore a formal oath of allegiance to al-
Qaida‘s leadership.  Al-Fadl rose fairly high in the organization; he reported directly to al-
Qaida‘s Shura Council and ostensibly functioned as bin Laden‘s personal secretary during the 
dissident Saudi‘s sojourn to the Sudan.  But al-Fadl felt undervalued.  He embezzled $110,000 of 
al-Qaida funds because he was angry that his salary was lower than that of several EIJ members 
                                                          
19 Dexter Filkins, "Wanted rebel vows loyalty to bin Laden, web sites say," New York Times, October 18, 2004; 
Mark MacKinnon, "Empty chairs, angry youths and ignominy," Globe and Mail (Canada), June 9, 2006. 
20 See, for example, Dexter Filkins, "On bus, bicycle, and foot, suicide bombers aim at Shiite holy day," New York 
Times, February 20, 2005; Sabrina Tavernise and Robert F. Worth, "Relentless rebel attacks test Shiite endurance," 
New York Times, September 19, 2005; and James Palmer, "Co-ordinated blasts kill at least 60 in Iraq; Latest 
bombings viewed as first wave of increased terror in run up to key vote," Globe and Mail (Canada), September 30, 
2005. 
21 Dexter Filkins, "Top insurgent in Iraq adopts lower profile," New York Times, March 25, 2006. 
22 USA v. Usama bin Laden, et al (Defendants), United States District Court Southern District of New York (S(7) 98 
Cr. 1023), Day 2 (February 6, 2001) and Day 6 (February 15, 2001) of testimony. 
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on bin Laden‘s payroll.  When confronted, al-Fadl fled the Sudan, and in 1996, he walked into an 
American Embassy to offer his services as an informant.  Al-Fadl ultimately became the U.S. 
Justice Department‘s star witness in the trial of the perpetrators of the 1998 bombings of U.S. 
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.23  His formal pledge of loyalty 
precluded al-Fadl neither from stealing al-Qaida‘s funds nor from taking actions that condemned 
several of his brethren to life-long imprisonment.24       
Such examples demonstrate that terror leaders‘ power stems from their ability to inspire, 
guide, and encourage followers, rather than from the sort of true command and control held by 
military officers in traditional state-based armies.  Individual members‘ ability to re-interpret the 
context and meaning of their oaths of allegiance preclude lists of sworn followers from serving 
as a reliable proxy for functional membership in terrorist organizations, because these oaths fail 
to ensure compliance with organizational goals.  In short, bayat can be fleeting.  
 
2.2 NETWORK-BASED GROUPING METHODS 
What means exist to overcome the inconsistencies the plague the secondary literature‘s 
characterization of organizational affiliations and the shortfalls of oath-based approaches to 
determining group membership?   Formal, network-based models of group membership offer one 
reasonable solution.  The difficulty lies in choosing the right grouping method.  
Scholars have devised an almost limitless number of techniques and variations, which 
differ greatly in their ability to find accurate boundaries between terror groups.  Many of the 
simplest, best-known methods are far too restrictive.  For example, groupings known in network-
                                                          
23 Ibid, Day 2 (February 6, 2001) and Day 3 (February 7, 2001) of testimony. 
24 Specifically, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-‗Owhali, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, and 
Wadih el-Hage received life sentences.  See, USA v. bin Laden, et al, sentencing hearing, October 18, 2001.  For a 
briefer journalistic treatment of the case‘s outcome, see: Phil Hirschkorn, ―Four embassy bombers get life,‖ 
CNN.com, October 21, 2001; available online: http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/10/19/embassy.bombings/.   
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speak as ―cliques‖ have unrealistic membership requirements that clash with the even the most 
basic understanding of real-world organizations.   
Cliques exist when all members share connections with each other, and the group is 
―maximal‖ because it cannot be made larger by including another member.  However, all 
members of large organizations are unlikely to know one another.  It would be foolish to assume 
that all faculty members in a large university were personally acquainted, much less to assume 
that all members of a violent clandestine organization, which may deliberately isolate 
components of the organization in the name of operational security, were members of a single 
formal clique.  Real-world organizations contain several overlapping cliques, as well as a 
number of other individuals who exist outside of these structures.  Ultimately, cliques and the 
countless other clique-like measurements are ill-suited to determining the boundaries of Islamist 
terror groups. 
Even the briefest comparison between the nature of the jihadist threat and the 
mathematical input requirements of potentially useful grouping algorithms allows the field of 
candidates to be narrowed considerably further, because the vast majority of non-clique-like 
grouping methods require a-priori knowledge of the number of groups that exist in the data.  
These algorithms are useful for predicting how members are likely to align in the event of an 
organizational fissure, by simulating the groupings that would likely result if an organization 
split into two, three, or four distinct components, but these methods are ill-suited to a broad study 
of membership among Islamist terrorists, because, for reasons illustrated below, the total number 
of groups involved in the jihadist movement remains unknown.   
An accurate count of the number of Islamist terror groups remains exceptionally difficult 
to complete, because many groups that claim attacks may exist in name only.  The best known 
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such group is undoubtedly the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, an ‗organization‘ that has claimed 
responsibility for attacks in Turkey, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and Spain, as well as for a 
2003 power black-out in the Northeast United States—a case in which authorities have ruled out 
any possibility of sabotage.25  Knowledgeable observers almost unanimously agree that this 
group does not exist.26  Instead, the al-Masri Brigades seem to be a ruse designed to panic 
Westerners into believing that extremists present a unified threat with global reach.  If the 
organization‘s claims are accepted at face value, then several distinct terror groups would blend 
into one, resulting in a wildly inaccurate count. 
Organizational mergers complicate estimates of the number of active terror organizations 
in a similar fashion.  Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of several organizations 
claiming regional partnerships with bin Laden‘s organization, offers an example.  Despite the 
similarity of the organizations‘ names, the nature and depth of AQIM‘s relationship to al-Qaida 
remains ambiguous.  Do the organizations share day-to-day operations?  Are there sporadic and 
intermittent financial partnerships?  Or, do these allegiances exist in name only, at a purely 
ideological level?  Until such questions are satisfactorily answered in relation to al-Qaida‘s many 
regional ‗partners,‘ it would be irresponsible to implement any formal method that required the 
analyst to specify the number of divisions that the grouping process should find, because it 
remains unclear whether or not these groups are truly part of al-Qaida.     
In practice, this restriction eliminates all but Newman‘s grouping process, the only 
grouping method that can find meaningful group divisions within large networks absent any 
                                                          
25 ―Group‘s Responsibility Claims Doubtful,‖ Associated Press, July 22, 2005; available online: 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,163395,00.html.   
26 See, for example: START, ―Terrorist Organization Profile: Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades,‖ date unknown, available 
online: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3903; Bryan 
Bender and Farah Stockman, ―Officials: Group tying self to blasts may not be real,‖ Boston Globe, March 13, 2004; 
Stephen Ulp, ―Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades: Fraud or Dissimulation?‖ Terrorism Focus, Vol. 1, No. 2 (March 2005); 
available online: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=280&tx_ttnews[backPid]=237&no_cache=1 
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user-specified information on the number of groups that exist within the data.27  Named for its 
discoverer, this method operates according to a simple underlying logic: individuals within a 
natural group will share more ties between each other than between non-members.28  
Consequently, the method centers on finding the individuals who play the largest role in binding 
together the network.  These individuals score highest in a network measure known as 
betweenness, which scores the extent to which actors function as bridges that connect disparate 
sub-groups that would otherwise remain untied.29    
After finding the individual with the highest betweenness, the Newman method simulates 
his removal, and then tests the fit of the simulated split against data that contains identical group 
divisions, but random patterns of links. When the value of this comparison, known as a 
modularity score, approaches zero, the simulated divisions perform no better than random data.  
When modularity approaches the theoretical maximum of one—in practice, scores above 0.7 are 
                                                          
27 Although CONCOR grouping (CONvergence of iterated CORrelations) can also be conducted without any 
underlying knowledge of the number of organizations that exist within the data, this method is an improper choice 
for this analysis, because CONCOR groups actors based on structural equivalence.  In plain language, CONCOR 
finds individuals who share similar patterns of ties and thus play similar roles within the network.  Consequently, 
this method provides a measure of individuals‘ redundancy in the network and does not find boundaries between 
organizations within the data.  Indeed, several CONCOR groups are likely to exist within the same organization.  
Because it assesses the role of interstitial individuals and allows for multiple membership, Davis and Carley‘s Fuzzy 
Overlapping Groups (FOG) algorithm has much appeal for this sort of analysis, but the original K-FOG algorithm 
requires users to specify the number of groups (K) in the data, and the alpha-FOG algorithm, which suggests the 
number of groups based on a user-specified error tolerance, is too computationally complex to be applied to large 
networks.  Attempts to do so are beyond the calculative power of current technology.  Consequently, efforts to 
implement alpha-FOG on the data derived from the snowball sampling process caused repeated computer crashes.  
Thus, Newman is the only grouping option available.  For an accessible and fairly non-technical discussion of 
CONCOR and the broader topic of structural equivalence, see: John Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, 
2nd Edition, (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2001), pp. 124-138.  For a more mathematical treatment, see: Stanley 
Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, (Cambridge (UK): 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 356-381.  For information on FOG, see: George B. Davis and Kathleen M. 
Carley, ―Clearing the FOG: Fuzzy Overlapping Groups for Social Networks,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July 
2008), pp. 201-212. 
28 M.E.J. Newman and M. Girvan, ―Finding and Evaluating Community Structure in Networks,‖ Physics Review E, 
Vol. 69 (2004).  
29 For a formal discussion on the calculation of betweenness, see: Wasserman and Faust, pp. 189-191. 
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rare—there is strong evidence that the simulated groupings are non-random and, therefore, 
meaningful.30 
However, the Newman method does not stop after this first division; the process is 
iterative.  It simulates the deletion of each node in sequence according to its betweenness scores, 
until the method has divided the network into a series of disconnected isolate nodes.  Because the 
process produces modularity scores after each simulated removal, this method is able to find the 
most meaningful result, by finding the simulation that produces the highest modularity score.  
Thus, the final output is a single graph displaying the group divisions most likely to be 
meaningful.31   
Just how probable are these ―most likely divisions‖?  The exact mathematical answer 
varies from case to case, but the Newman method performs with admirable accuracy.  When 
benchmarked against real-world data, in which ethnographers observed and recorded group 
splits, and when tested against computer generated data, this process correctly classified about 90 
percent of actors.32  Consequently, the Newman method is well suited to the study of jihadist 
terrorism, because it offers an elegant method to find ‗natural‘ groups, without requiring the user 
to specify the number of divisions that exist within the data. 
The trick of applying the method involves determining which sorts of relationships to 
include in the grouping analysis.  Organizational theory argues that group membership choices 
are determined by a confluence of factors, including: friendship choices, family relationships, 
ideological affinities, operational overlaps, and financial interactions.  In order to encompass this 
complexity, there is little sense in excluding any specific type of interaction, save enmity ties and 
ties exceptionally unlikely to have taken place, during the initial grouping.   
                                                          
30 Newman and Girvan.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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However, implementing the Newman grouping process in a multi-modal, multi-relational 
network is a somewhat more complicated process, because this method performs erratically 
when data is not in a uni-relational, one-mode format.33  A substantial amount of data pre-
processing must consequently be conducted prior to implementing the method.  Unfortunately, 
standard approaches to data transformation carry significant analytic cost when applied to 
weighted data that scales the strength of relationships.  
Analysts typically derive one-mode matrixes from two-mode data via a ―folding‖ process 
that makes use of basic matrix multiplication.34  To understand how this process works, consider 
the simple two-mode network depicted in figure 2.1, which shows four friends‘ participation in 
celebrations held on four major American holidays.35 
  
                                                          
33 Kathleen M. Carley, personal communication via email, June 16, 2011. 
34 Wasserman and Faust, pp. 307-312.  The example that follows, while original, is merely an illustration of the 
concepts outlined by this citation. 
35 Unless otherwise noted, all network graphics and all network measures presented in this analysis were generated 
using the Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) developed by Kathleen M. Carley and the Center for Computational 
Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) at the Institute for Software Research in the School of 
Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University.  For an introduction to ORA, see: Kathleen M. Carley, Jeff 
Reminga, Jon Storrick, and Dave Columbus, ―ORA User‘s Guide 2012,‖ Carnegie Mellon University, School of 
Computer Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical Report CMU-ISR-12-105, 2012.  
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Figure 2.1: Friends x Holiday Events 
 
It is possible to infer relationships among the friends based on their co-attendance of the same 
holiday events.  As summarized by figure 2.2, the process begins by transposing the rows and 
columns in the original matrix. 
Figure 2.2: Transpose of Friends x Holiday Events 
 
The original matrix is then multiplied with the transpose in order to restate the information as an 
agent x agent network, in which the diagonal values summarize the number of events in which 
each individual participated, and the remaining fields in the matrix contain binary relational data 
inferred from the friends‘ co-participation in events.  Values of ―1‖ indicate that an interaction 
took place; values of ―0‖ indicate that one did not. 
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Figure 2.3: Derived Agent x Agent Network 
 
While this multiplicative process works well for binary data, folding creates significant 
distortions when applied to weighted data, such as that contained in the annualized snowball 
sample.  Figure 2.4, which reprises the holiday example to consider weighted interactions, 
demonstrates that the arithmetic involved in the folding process produces agent x agent 
interactions of exaggerated scale when analysts apply the process to non-binary data. 
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Figure 2.4: Folding a Weighted Matrix 
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Researchers often resolve this problem by simply ignoring the weighting of the original 
two-mode matrix and treating the folding process as a Boolean operation that produces binarized 
one-mode matrixes, in which a value of 0 indicates the absence of a relationship between a pair 
of agents, and a value of 1 indicates the presence of a relationship of unknown strength between 
a pair of agents.  While this binarization process standardizes results, it also obliterates any 
information that the original two-mode matrix contained on the strength of interactions.   
Moreover, multi-modal data containing three or more types of nodes has special characteristics 
that may undermine the fidelity of data ultimately obtained from the binarization process.  
As an example, consider the simple network depicted in figure 2.5, which contains four 
agents (Tom, Dick, Harry, and Bob), one event (Thanksgiving), and one resource (food).  
Intuitively, it is clear that that the agent x event and agent x resource networks cannot be 
combined without first transforming each network into one-mode agent x agent data, because 
holidays and resources cannot be summed, as they are fundamentally different classes of nodes.  
However, if an analyst were to implement a Boolean approach to data transformation and obtain 
binarized agent x agent networks from the agent x event and agent x resource matrixes, before 
summing the pair of one-mode networks to create a composite matrix showing all ties between 
the individuals in the network, then the data processing would contain implicit judgments about 
the relative importance of interactions.  Specifically, the final output would weight relationships 
between individuals like Tom and Harry, who share interactions across multiple modes, more 
heavily than interactions between individuals like Tom and Dick, who share a single stronger 
interaction within a single mode.  Put most simply, a ―binarize and fold, then sum‖ approach to 
network transformation has tremendous potential to misstate information that the original matrix 
contained regarding the observed strength of relationships between agents.   
74 
 
Figure 2.5: Comparison of Binary and Weighted Foldings of Multi-Modal Data 
 
 
Researchers are left with few appealing options.  They can either ignore the problem and 
use the questionable weightings that result from the ―binarize and fold, then sum‖ approach, or 
they can re-binarize the data, in which causes the final agent x agent network to be abstracted 
from the observed interactions by an additional step of data pre-processing—a step which 
obliterates any and all observed variations in relative tie strength contained in the original data.   
There are no hard and fast rules about how far removed from reality data can be before it loses 
its analytic value, so these processes may be appropriate to certain research questions, but it is 
also quite clear that data containing three or more modes becomes greatly distorted when 
processed using binary approaches to transformation.    
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 As a final alternative, analysts can ignore the overly-large values that matrix 
multiplication produces when applied to weighted multi-modal data and use the agent x agent 
outputs ―as is,‖ on the logic that, while exaggerative, the resulting agent x agent interactions at 
least capture the notion of relative strength.  However, this option is equally problematic, 
because the addition of these agent x agent networks amplifies the already exaggerative weight 
of interactions between individuals.  As demonstrated by the bottom figure of right-hand column 
of figure  2.5, which contains the final weighted agent x agent matrix derived from the simple 
three-mode holiday network,  ignoring the exaggerations inherent to the folding of multi-modal 
weighted data has a ―rich get richer‖ effect, in which even minor differences in tie strength in the 
observed data produce drastically different values once transformed into a single agent x agent 
network. 
Fortunately, another means of data transformation, referenced here as additive 
projection,36  avoids the distortions inherent to the multiplicative processes that underlie both 
binary and weighted data folding.  Additive projection determines the strength of agents‘ 
relationship in a one-mode agent x agent matrix by conducting a pair-wise comparison of the 
weighted interactions agents share in a two-mode network.  The typical implementation of the 
process is best demonstrated by considering a simple network containing only two agents (Bob 
and Tom) and two events (Thanksgiving and Christmas).  As Figure 2.6 demonstrates, the 
typical implementation of additive projection produces a directed network in which the strength 
                                                          
36 Padrón, et al, and Opsahl use the term ―projection‖ in a more general sense, to reference any means of deriving 
one-mode matrixes from multi-modal data.  According to their lexicon, the previously described folding process 
would be one means of projection.  Indeed, the term ―multiplicative projection‖ would be an appropriate synonym 
for ―data folding,‖ but because the semantic difference between the terms ―additive projection‖ and ―multiplicative 
projection‖ is small enough to introduce substantial potential for confusion, this analysis references the process of 
inferring links by multiplying a matrix by its transpose only as ―folding.‖  For a more general discussion of data 
projection, see Benigno Padrón, Manuel Nogales, and Anna Traveset, ―Alternative approaches of transforming 
bimodal into unimodal mutualistic networks: The usefulness of preserving weighted information,‖ Basic and 
Applied Ecology, Vol 12 (2011), pp. 713-721; Tore Opsahl, ―Triadic closure in two-mode networks: Redefining the 
global and local clustering coefficients,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 34 (2012). 
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of the tie from Bob to Tom is valued at 5, and the strength of the tie from Tom to Bob is valued 
6.  These values were obtained by summing the number of times Bob appeared at the events 
involving Tom, and vice versa.  Thus, additive projection can be formalized as: 
 
    ∑    
       
 
 
Where Wij is the weight between node i and node j in the agent x agent matrix, and k represents 
the column number of the events on which i and j partnered in the original agent x event matrix, 
M.37   
  
                                                          
37 Padrón, et al, present the same equation using alternative notion, p. 715.  In his work on scientific collaboration 
networks, Newman offers a similar method, which weights interactions based on the total number of agents that 
partner on an event, such that partnerships are weaker when they contain large numbers of participants (e.g. 
collaborative academic articles involving nearly a dozen authors) and stronger when they contain smaller numbers 
of participants (e.g. collaborative academic articles involving only two authors).  See, M.E.J. Newman, ―Scientific 
collaboration networks. II. Shortest Paths, weighted networks, and centrality,‖ Physical Review E, Vol. 64 (2001), 
016132.   
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Figure 2.6: Additive Projection 
 
 
  
 Although this method has applications in the biological sciences—for example, Padrón, 
et al, use it to determine a directed species x species network based on shared food sources—
standard additive projection is less than ideally suited for the analysis of interactions involving 
individual people.  For example, to return to the example summarized in Figure 2.6, it seems 
illogical to infer that Bob interacted with Tom only twice at Thanksgiving, while Tom interacted 
with Bob four times.   
Additive projection is even more problematic for networks derived from qualitative 
sources of information, because such sources rarely contain information on the exact period of 
agents‘ interaction. For example, news coverage of terrorism often states that two individuals 
participated in the same attack, but given the clandestine nature of such events, it is typically 
impossible to determine exactly when each terrorist made their individual contribution.  
Consequently, it is possible for individuals to have participated in the same event at different 
times, resulting in the sort of absence of interaction between co-participants in events that is 
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familiar to anyone who has ever arrived at a party five minutes after his or her friends left.  The 
left-hand panel of figure 2.7 offers a visual illustration of this ―ships in the night‖ scenario that 
expands on the example of Bob and Tom‘s holiday interactions and demonstrates that it would 
have been possible for the two men to share no interactions, even though both made multiple 
appearances at the celebration across five distinct time periods.   
 
Figure 2.7: Recreating Minimum and Maximum Interactions When the Period of Agents’ 
Interactions is Unknown—Bob and Tom at Thanksgiving 
 
  
Thus, it seems clear that additive projection requires minor amendment to be of true utility in 
analyzing the majority of multi-modal data on human relationships, most especially when the 
data is derived from qualitative sources containing ambiguous information on the timing of 
interactions.  The right-hand panel of figure 2.7 shows that when the period of agents‘ 
interactions with events is unknown, the maximum number of interactions between co-
participants in an event is equal to the number of ties held by whichever agent has more ties to 
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the event.  Put simply, in the absence of additional data that recorded each time-slice as an 
independent event—data that cannot be created if the original historical record failed to it—then 
Bob and Tom could not have interacted with each other more than three times at Thanksgiving, 
regardless of the respective length of their agent x event interactions. 
 When analysts seeks to examine worst (or best) case scenarios, it may be appropriate to 
consider these maximum values, but common sense dictates that when two individuals share 
observed ties to an event, the number of real-world interactions between those agents will fall 
somewhere between the minimum possible interactions—which is always zero—and the 
theoretical maximum described above.  Because the median between any number and zero can 
be determined by dividing the original value by two, the average expected interactions between 
two agents who co-participated in an event can be determined by determining which agent held 
more ties to the event, and then dividing this value in half.  A probabilistic estimate of the total 
number of agent x agent ties between two individuals in the network can then be obtained by 
summing these average values across all events in which the pair co-participated.    To return to 
the example in Figure 2.6, this Median-Additive Projection Process (MAPP) would estimate Bob 
and Tom‘s relationship at 3.5 interactions (4/2 + 3/2 = 3.5), and, more generally, the process  can 
be formalized as:   
 
    ∑        
            
         
  
Thus, agent x agent matrixes derived from MAPP preserve realistic tie weights throughout the 
transformation from multi-modal to one-mode data.  Moreover, MAPP-derived agent x agent 
matrixes generated from multiple two-mode matrixes can be summed to yield theoretically valid 
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estimations of the total number of ties shared between agents, in lieu of the distorted values 
obtained by summing binarized or weighted agent x agent networks derived from folding 
processes.   In short, MAPP offers a data transformation process that is well-suited to the study 
of multi-modal terror networks derived from qualitative data, because the nature of the subject 
matter and the nature of the source material dictate that it is impossible to reconstruct the exact 
timing of agents‘ shared participation in events, shared access to resources, and shared 
membership in organizations.   
 Unfortunately, none of the out-of-the-box software packages available for the analysis of 
network data contain pre-programmed capabilities for additive projection, much less for original 
user-generated processes like MAPP.  It was, therefore, necessary to program new code to 
generate MAPP-derived agent x agent networks from the multi-modal data.  The ―R‖ computer 
language was used to run a pair-wise MAPP comparison of all relevant two-mode interactions 
agents shared annually across all relationships types, excluding enmity ties and uncertain ties.38  
For each year in the data, this processing required N2 * I calculations, where N represents the 
number of agents in the network, and I represents the number of incidents (shared events, shared 
resources, and shared organizations) in the data.39  The resulting weighted agent x agent 
networks were then summed with annualized hand-coded agent x agent matrixes in order to yield 
a weighted agent x agent network in which tie strength between actors is equal to the total 
number of interactions that they most likely shared in a given year.40  
                                                          
38 R Core Team, R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing, (Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, 2012), ISBN 3-900051-07-0; available online: http://www.R-project.org. 
39 The MAPP transformation allows for self-loops, in which an agent can interact with itself.  The value of each 
agent‘s self-looped score in the final agent x agent matrix is equal to the total number of ties that agent held to all 
incidents included in the original multi-modal matrix, i.e. the agent‘s unnormalized degree in the original matrix.  
40 Because the hand-coded agent x agent networks are not symmetrical (AB≠BA), it is vital to symetrize the 
hand-coded agent x agent networks by adding, so that the hand-coded link weight between two agents is equivalent 
to the total number of ties they share (AB + BA).  If this step is not taken  prior to utilizing the hand-coded data 
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 Beyond the mathematics, theory plays a necessary role in the data preprocessing, because 
MAPPing some two-mode networks will infer interpersonal relationships where none actually 
exist.  For example, if an agent x role network is MAPPed, then all individuals who share the 
same job-description become linked in the resulting agent x agent network, regardless of whether 
or not they ever partnered on a specific operation: all of the bomb-makers in al-Qaida, all of the 
bomb-makers in Jemaah Islamiyah, all of the bomb-makers in Lashkar-e-Toiba, and all of the 
bomb-makers in every other organization become part of a single clique.  Similarly problematic 
results would be obtained by MAPPing agent x knowledge networks, and because the data is 
annualized, it would also be inappropriate to MAPP agent x location networks, since there is 
little reason to assume that someone who visited a city in January had any sort of meaningful 
interaction with an individual who visited the same city in July.  Consequently, agent x role, 
agent x knowledge, and agent x location networks were excluded from the transformation 
process and played no role in determining the inferential links that underlie the grouping process. 
Similarly, the MAPPing process must be conducted cautiously because events are not of 
comparable size.  It is, for example, reasonable to infer that the dozen attendees of a small Super 
Bowl party knew each other, but it would be ludicrous to apply the projection technique to the 
game itself and imply that the tens-of-thousands of ticketholders that attended in person shared 
any kind of meaningful interpersonal relationship.  Therefore, large-scale conflicts, like the 
Soviet-Afghan War, were excluded from MAPPing as applied to agent x event networks, since it 
seems exceptionally presumptive to assume that the thousands of mujahideen involved in this 
event all knew each other.  General resources, such as ―money‖ and ―forged documents,‖ were 
excluded on similar grounds from the projection process as applied to the agent x resource 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
alongside the symmetrical networks generated by projecting agent x agent networks from two-mode data, then any 
resulting analyses of the unioned agent x agent network will be invalid.   
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networks, and large organizations with national and/or international membership, such as 
political parties and transnational NGOs, were excluded from the projection process as applied to 
the agent x organization networks.   
However, co-participation in smaller events (e.g. attending the same social events or 
partnering on the same terror attack of limited scale), access to specific resources (e.g. the 
Mitsubishi van that Jemaah Islamiyah operatives used as the attack vehicle in the 2002 Bali 
bombing), and co-membership in smaller local organizations (e.g. co-ownership of businesses) 
served to infer relationships among the individuals included in the data.  Moreover, the 
exclusions discussed above should not imply that it was impossible for relationships to exist 
among co-participants in large events, individuals who shared access to general resources, or 
individuals who co-participated in large non-jihadist organizations.  These interactions were 
merely excluded from the process of inference, so, for example, when the data contained clear 
evidence of interactions between two participants in the Soviet-Afghan War, such ties were hand 
coded as agent x agent ties.   
Once these projections were accomplished, the data transformation process ended by 
summing all of the agent x agent networks.  The final output of all of this matrix addition was a 
network well-suited to Newman Grouping and which captures a probabilistic estimate of the 
weighted relationships that exist between the individuals included in the snowball sample.  Given 
the ambiguities inherent to the subject matter and the uncertainties inherent to any attempt to 
reconstruct individual relationships using historical records, this estimative network is the most 
detailed and realistic depiction allowed by the source material.    
Because of the complexities involved in the process, it is perhaps best illustrated with a 
visual example.  Consider the sparse agent x agent network depicted in figure 2.8.  These ties, 
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which have been restricted to binary values for the sake of simplicity, are very loosely based on 
real-world data surrounding the 2002 Bali attacks and represent the direct interactions coded by 
hand from the data.  They serve as the baseline to which additional interactions will be added. 
 
Figure 2.8: Sparse Agent x Agent Network Involving JI & AQ Members (Sample Only) 
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Additional information regarding these actors‘ relationships can be obtained by MAPPing some 
of the two-mode matrixes contained in the data.  Figure 2.9 contains sample data, also loosely 
based on events surrounding the 2002 Bali bombings, that depicts a binary agent x event network 
involving three events: (1) the 1999-2002 Ambon conflict, a large-scale insurgency in which 
several JI members participated, (2) a January 2002 planning meeting that several JI members 
attended in Thailand to discuss the upcoming Bali operation, and (3) the ―Second Wave‖ of the 
9/11 attacks, an aborted airline-hijacking plot which was supposed to make use of South East 
Asian terrorists who would appear less suspicious to airport security personnel than men of 
Middle Eastern appearance.  As the panels below depict, MAPPing the two-mode data without 
excluding the Ambon conflict, results in a far more connected graph, by (incorrectly) including 
all participants in the Ambon conflict in a single dense clique.  
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Figure 2.9: Agent x Event Network Involving JI & AQ Members (Sample Only) 
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Still more applicable data can be obtained by MAPPing an agent x resource network, but 
this action is subject to the same potential pitfalls as the events data.  Including overly general 
terms, like the generic ―explosives‖ highlighted in red in the matrix depicted in figure 2.10, 
creates a falsely connected graph.  Indeed, Amine Mezbar and Mohd Atlaf had nothing to do 
with the Jemaah Islamiyah; they respectively operated in Europe and South Asia in 2002 and 
merely had access to explosives.  However, meaningful, accurate relationships can be inferred by 
including in the folding process specific resources, such as the Mitsubishi van that served as the 
bomb-truck in the Bali bombings and the Denpassar safehouse where the bomb for that attack 
was assembled. 
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Figure 2.10: Agent x Resource Network Involving JI & AQ Members (Sample Only) 
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Similar examples could be drawn from agent x organization networks, but the need to 
restrict the folding process to small events, specific resources, and local organizations is best 
demonstrated by considering the final networks that result from the example outlined above.  
Figure 2.11 (below) contains two columns; the top row of each contains an identical copy of the 
sparse agent x agent network depicted in figure 2.8.  The left hand column then contains the 
agent x agent matrix derived from co-participation in all events, followed by the agent x agent 
matrix derived from shared access to all resources.  The bottom figure in the column represents 
the sum of the three networks above.  The right hand column repeats this same pattern, except 
that the derived matrixes it presents respectively excluded the Ambon conflict and generic 
explosives.  
Visual inspection of the bottom two graphs is sufficient to conclude that they are 
remarkably different, but some comparative statistics serve to drive home the point.  Because 
both networks contain identical node sets, it is possible to run a Quadratic Assignment Procedure 
(QAP) analysis, which is a special type of correlation test specifically designed to deal with the 
sorts of interdependence between variables that result from overlapping node sets.41  This 
analysis produced a p-vale of 0.0000, indicating that the results are statistically significant at the 
most stringent level of analysis, but found that the two networks were only 69.5 percent 
correlated.  A total of 62 different links would need to be deducted from the bottom left-hand 
graph in order to make it match its counterpart on the right.  And these values stem from the 
exclusion of only two nodes, namely the Ambon conflict and generic explosives, from a small 
network of only 20 people.  Clearly, determining what to include and exclude from the 
projection process is a non-trivial decision that greatly impacts the outcome of the analysis.   
                                                          
41 David Krackhardt, ―QAP Partialling as a Test of Spuriousness,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 9 (1988), pp. 171-186; 
D.D. Dekker, D. Krackhardt, and T.A.B. Snijder, ―Sensitivity of MRQAP Tests to Colinearity and Autocorrelation 
Conditions,‖ Psychometrika, Vol. 72 (2007), pp. 563-581. 
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Figure 2.11: Comparative Matrix Addition 
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With the algebraic data transformations accomplished, the analysis returned to the task of 
grouping and conducted the Newman process.  Table 2.1 summarizes the modularity scores of 
the resulting annual groupings.  The left-hand chart presents average scores for all years since al-
Qaida‘s inception in 1988 and 2010; the right-hand chart presents average scores for all years 
since al-Qaida first actively participated in a terrorist attack in 1993 and 2010.  Although both 
results suggest that Newman groupings found meaningful divisions on average, the worrying low 
minimum score in the left-hand graph, as well as its lower mean score than the right-hand graph, 
suggest that the grouping process is not especially well-suited to years in which terror groups are 
not actively involved in attacks. 
 
Table 2.1: Modularity Scores for the Newman Groupings Used to Determine Membership 
1988-2010 
 
1993-2010 
Mean 0.70133 
 
Mean 0.75978 
Median 0.74626 
 
Median 0.79516 
Mode N/A 
 
Mode N/A 
Maximum 0.89505 
 
Maximum 0.89505 
Minimum 0.25082 
 
Minimum 0.50188 
Std. Dev. 0.17213 
 
Std. Dev. 0.11919 
 
Once the groups were determined, the next step was to match the computer-generated 
groupings to real-world organizations.  Fortunately, the terrorism literature, for all its 
disagreements about the specific boundaries of terror organizations, is generally in consensus 
regarding organizations‘ named leaders.  Thus, matching the simulated divisions to real-world 
organizations became a game of ―find the emir,‖ and, for example, individuals obtained al-Qaida 
‗membership‘ for a given year by virtue of inclusion in the same Newman group as Usama bin 
Laden.  Figure 2.12 illustrates the process visually in relation to al-Qaida; Newman groups are 
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defined by color, with bin Laden‘s Newman group depicted in yellow-green.  In order to better 
demonstrate the functionality of the approach, a handful of well-known al-Qaida members have 
been highlighted with a different node shape and labeled in order to make them more easily 
distinguishable.  Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the acknowledged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks; 
Mohammed Atta, the acknowledged field commander of the 9/11 attacks; and Abu Hafs al-
Masry (a.k.a. Mohammed Atef), the alleged military chief of al-Qaida in 2001, all appear in bin 
Laden‘s Newman group. 
Figure 2.12: Visual Illustration of the Initial Newman Grouping Process in 2001 
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 However, it would be foolish to suggest that bin Laden‘s Newman group offers a 
comprehensive and unflawed definition of al-Qaida.  Imperfections in the data, which are 
inevitable when working on clandestine subject matter, lead to the underestimation of ties 
between some individuals.  Moreover, the best-hidden terrorists are likely to have escaped 
mention in the data altogether.  The impact of these unavoidable data omissions is clear: bin 
Laden‘s Newman group is likely to exclude several important members of al-Qaida. 
 The nature of the grouping algorithm also problematizes the results, because the Newman 
method finds hard boundaries between groups.  Links can exist between the divisions, but 
individuals cannot hold membership in multiple groups.  This assumption contradicts the 
accepted wisdom on Islamist terrorism, because many prominent jihadists have held 
simultaneous membership in more than one terrorist organization.  For example, numerous 
analysts concluded that Hambali, an Indonesian-born Islamist who gained notoriety for his 
involvement in a series of bombings and plots throughout southeast Asia, belonged to both 
Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaida at the time of his capture in August 2003.42  Similarly, numerous 
media outlets alleged that Illyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani militant involved in attacks against Indian 
targets and assassination attempts on former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, held 
membership in a branch of Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) as well as al-Qaida when he was 
killed by an American missile strike in early June 2011.43  Such examples demonstrate that the 
Newman method‘s inability to allow individuals to hold multiple memberships greatly limits its 
applicability to contemporary Islamist terrorism.      
                                                          
42 See, for example, Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.1.87.03. 
Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin,‖ available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI08703E.shtml; Rohan 
Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (New York: Berkley Books, 2002), pp. 258-262; and Sally 
Neighbor, In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia, (Sydney, Australia: 
Harper Collins, 2004), p. 167.  
43 "Terror Quartet Plots al-Qaida Attacks," United Press International, February 23, 2011; Syed Saleem Shahzad, 
"Al-Qaeda's guerilla chief lays out strategy," Asia Times Online, October 15, 2009. 
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Finally, structural considerations may also problematize a model of al-Qaida premised on 
strict Newman groups.  A number of analyses suggest that terror groups deliberately organize in 
formal cells to promote operational security.44  As depicted in figure 2.13 (below), cellular 
networks occur when members of each cell are densely connected to each other, in non-
overlapping clique-like structures, that have sparse connections to other cells, ideally through a 
single tie, so that in the event of a cell‘s compromise, its members can only inform on the same 
redundant handful of operatives, and not the broader network.45  Thus, if al-Qaida follows this 
model, the organization is apt to contain a number of natural divisions, not just a single Newman 
group centered around bin Laden.  Clearly, it is necessary to relax the formally determined 
boundaries of bin Laden‘s Newman group in order to produce a meaningful model of al-Qaida. 
  
                                                          
44 The military explicitly characterizes terror groups‘ organization in cellular terms.  See: U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Intelligence (DCSINT) Handbook No. 1, (August 15, 2007), p. 3-1.  A number of academics implicitly suggest 
cellular structure by using the term ―cell‖ to discuss sub-sets of terror groups.  However, given the rarity of explicit 
definitions in the terrorism literature, this implicit characterization may result as much from a vocabulary dispute as 
a consensus regarding cellular structure.  It sometimes seems that ―cell‖ is used as a synonym for ―group,‖ rather 
than as a formal term that references a specific type of organization.  For examples of academic literature that 
includes fairly clear characterizations of Islamist terrorism as a cellularly-organized phenomenon, see: Anthony H. 
Coredesman and Nawaf Obaid, ―Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamist Extremists,‖ Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, January 26, 2005; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, ―Assessing 
the Dangers of Illicit Networks,‖ International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 7-44; Scott Helfstein and 
Dominick Wright, ―Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al Qaeda,‖ Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2011), pp. 367-382.  
45 Terrill L. Frantz and Kathleen M. Carley, ―A Formal Characterization of Cellular Networks, CASOS Technical 
Report, Carnegie Mellon University, September 2005. 
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Figure 2.13: A Stylized Cellular Network 
 
Fortunately, a simple additive process addresses many of the issues created by applying 
the Newman method to data that contains information gaps, real-world membership overlaps, 
and the strong possibility of cellular networks.  By adding all the individuals that share 
meaningful relationships with members of bin Laden‘s Newman group to the sample of ―al-
Qaida members,‖ a more expansive model of the terror organization emerges.   
The logical underpinning of this process is exceptionally straightforward: because the 
limitations inherent to the study of terrorism dictate that even the most detailed research will 
unearth only a portion of the ties that actually exist between Islamists, it is sound to assume that 
any individual who shares a demonstrable pattern of functional ties to bin Laden‘s Newman 
group also shares other meaningful ties to the group that are merely hidden from observation.  
However, this proposed extension immediately raises two questions: Is the process expansive 
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enough to ensure a reasonably realistic representation of al-Qaida?  And, is the process so 
expansive that it exaggerates al-Qaida‘s size? 
The first question can be partially answered by briefly examining how the additive 
process mitigates the Newman method‘s unrealistic assumption of hard organizational 
boundaries and allows individuals to hold multiple memberships.  For example, in 1999, 
Hambali falls into the same Newman group as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, the 
named leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah, squarely making him a member of this organization.  
However, by virtue of Hambali‘s operational connections to individuals like Walid bin Attash 
(a.k.a. Khallad), a bin Laden confidant who helped to select the operatives responsible for the 
9/11 Attacks,46 the model also attributes al-Qaida membership to the Indonesian.  Because 
individuals retain their original organizational affiliations alongside the memberships determined 
through this additive process, the relaxed model allows for a more realistic depiction of 
organizational overlap.  
However, the problems created by cellular structure are only partially addressed by the 
additive process.  If, in the graph below, component A,B,C,D,E represented a Newman group 
surrounding a terrorist leader, then the additive process would include only node F, leaving the 
rest of his cell out of the model. 
  
                                                          
46 High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, available online: 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/. 
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Figure 2.14: Linked Cliques 
 
At first blush, this example suggests that the simplest solution is to extend the additive process 
by another step, by including all those within two steps of the original Newman group.  
However, the theory of ―six degrees of separation‖ highlights the dangers of this approach. 
This theory, popularized by a stage play and later a film of the same name, states that all 
currently living people are separated by no more than six intervening connections.47  Ultimately, 
the idea found its best-known representation in ―The Kevin Bacon Game,‖ in which players 
attempt to connect actors to the Hollywood legend in as few steps as possible by using shared 
appearances in films as links.48  For example, Tom Hanks has a Bacon-distance of one because 
he starred alongside the game‘s namesake in Ron Howard‘s Apollo 13.  Comedian Dan Aykroyd 
has a Bacon-distance of two, because Aykryod co-starred in The Blues Brothers alongside John 
Belushi, who also starred in Animal House, in which a very young Kevin Bacon played a small 
supporting role.   
                                                          
47 Albert-Laszlo Barabasi provides a superb non-technical overview of the concept in Linked: How Everything is 
Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life, (New York: Plume, 
2003), pp. 25-40; See also, Duncan J. Watts Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age, (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 2003), pp. 69-100.   
48 A number of websites are dedicated to this game, most prominently ―The Oracle of Bacon‖ 
(http://oracleofbacon.org/) and ―The Kevin Bacon Game‖ (http://www.thekevinbacongame.com/). 
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At an intuitive level, it is fairly easy to see that when links are extended beyond a 
distance of one, the implied relationships are often meaningless, even when the participants work 
in a confined and specialized field, such as the film industry or Islamist terrorism.  Just as there is 
no evidence to support a substantive working relationship between Bacon and Aykryod, there is 
no guarantee that al-Qaida members have meaningful ties with the associates of associates.  The 
cliques depicted above might be part of a single organization that adopted a cellular structure, or 
they might be two distinct groups that share a single, one-off operational tie.  Without 
information that provides additional context, it is impossible to tell.  If the model were to 
automatically include such nodes in its definition of al-Qaida by extending the additive process 
to include actors two steps removed from the core Newman group, the risk of conflating the 
organization with the broader Islamist terror movement would increase exponentially. 
A better solution to the dilemma created by cellular structure involves the use of multiple 
Newman groups.  Although terror groups typically have a single acknowledge emir, he is rarely 
the only leader in the organization.  For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian physician 
turned jihadist, was acknowledged as bin Laden‘s number two from the time of Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad‘s formal merger with al-Qaida in 2001 until the dissident Saudi‘s death in 2011.  These 
sorts of secondary leaders often fall within the named emir’s Newman group, but when they do 
not, these secondary leaders offer additional starting points from which to construct broader 
models that take cellular structure into consideration when estimating membership in Islamist 
groups.  
However, there is a trade-off.  This process brings additional subjectivity into the model, 
because it is not always entirely clear who serves as an important secondary leader in a given 
organization.  Consequently, it is incredibly important to use as additional starting points only 
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those secondary leaders for whom an overwhelming consensus exists regarding their role in the 
terrorist organization under study, lest the model create overly expansive groups.  In combination 
with the preceding characterization of individuals who held simultaneous membership in more 
than one organization, this characterization suggests that a one-step extension of Newman 
grouping is necessary to ensure realistic modeling, but this accommodation insufficiently 
addresses the issue of cellular structure when conducted absent multiple, carefully-selected 
starting points. 
But what about false positives?  The primary danger of extending Newman groups is that 
the process labels individuals who only hold passing acquaintance with an organization as 
members of it.  In order to address issues of over-expansiveness, this analysis turned to theory 
and limited the extension process based on link type.   Although the original Newman grouping 
considers all types of relationships in an attempt to model the complexities of organizational 
membership, the additive process included only the functional ties defined in the previous 
chapter.  The examples outlined below make clear that other types of relationships, such as 
family ties, ideological affiliations, and training links serve as insufficient criteria for inclusion in 
the estimate of group membership when considered in isolation.  Their use outside of the 
Newman model‘s complex consideration of multiple intersecting ties would create an overly 
broad characterization of Islamist terror organizations. 
There is some strong evidence that members of the same family often become involved in 
terrorism.  Perhaps most famously, the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200 
nightclub patrons at the popular Indonesian beach retreat, were largely the work of three 
99 
 
Indonesian brothers: Ali Ghufron (a.k.a. Mukhlas), Ali Imron, and Amrozi.49  However, there is 
also ample evidence showing that family ties alone are insufficient to brand people as members 
of a terrorist organization.  For example, bin Laden‘s eldest half-sibling (the dissident Saudi had 
no full siblings), Salem, lived a flamboyant life that directly opposed Usama‘s dour 
fundamentalism.  Salem enjoyed champagne, fine food, women, and nightlife.  He was even 
known to bribe his way onto barroom stages in order to indulge a passion for karaoke.50  
Similarly, the father of Umar Farouk Abdulmutalab—a Nigerian national who gained dubious 
renown as the ―underwear bomber‖ in December 2009, when he attempted to down an 
American-flagged jetliner by detonating explosives hidden beneath his pants—was so opposed to 
Islamist terrorism that he visited an American Embassy in the hopes of convincing the State 
Department that his son posed a threat that required close monitoring.51  If al-Qaida-linked 
families follow the pattern evident in the 2002 Bali attacks, rather than the patterns evidenced by 
Salem bin Laden or the senior Abdulmutalab, then their members will find their way into the 
sample by means of operational and financial ties to the core Newman group, rather than via 
kinship.  Assuming that family ties guarantee membership in terrorist organizations would grant 
these groups unnatural size, because brothers are not necessarily brothers-in-arms. 
 When viewed in isolation, ideological connections play a similarly problematic role, 
since many individuals who developed an affinity for al-Qaida‘s extremist ideology never had 
any actual contact with members of the organization.  Michael C. Finton, who is currently 
incarcerated for plotting to bomb government buildings in Springfield, IL, offers a useful 
                                                          
49 "Witness Interrogation Report of Amrozi," Detective Corps, State Police of Republic of Indonesia (Report No.: 
LP591/XII/2000), November 14, 2002. 
50 Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Centruy, (New York: Penguin, 2008). 
51 "One boy's journey to jihad; A former London student, inspired by radical clerics, managed to slip through the 
intelligence net and launch a suicide mission that nearly brought carnage to America," Sunday Times (London), 
January 3, 2010. 
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illustration.  In 2006, he demonstrated his fealty to bin Laden‘s ideals by swearing an oath of 
allegiance to a man he believed to be both his mentor in jihadism and an al-Qaida member, but 
who was actually an undercover federal agent.  A couple of months later, Finton‘s loyalty was 
seemingly rewarded, when the same mentor handed him a remote-control detonator and the keys 
to what appeared to be a bomb-laden van—a vehicle that was actually filled with inert material.  
After parking the van next to a federal building, Finton repeatedly tried in vain to ignite the 
‗bomb‘ and was promptly arrested for his attempts toward terrorism.  Finton clearly desired to 
become a part of al-Qaida, but it would be dishonest to claim that he had any substantive 
connection to bin Laden‘s organization, since Finton‘s plot at no time involved even a single 
member of the organization.52  Attributing such events to al-Qaida, or labeling individuals like 
Finton as ―al-Qaida members‖ based on their affinity for extremism,  creates a pointless 
tautology, in which it becomes impossible to disprove any violent jihadists‘ membership in al-
Qaida, because participation in Islamist-motivated violence is the very metric used to determine 
membership.  Indeed, as Clive Williams noted in his discussion of relationships among Islamist 
terrorists, it would be difficult to find any act of Sunni-motivated Islamist jihad that did not have 
at least a partial ideological overlap with al-Qaida‘s worldview.53 
 Aside from ideology, no interaction provides as much confusion about al-Qaida 
membership as training.  The problem stems from the failure to distinguish between those trained 
by al-Qaida and those who attain true membership in the organization.  According to the sworn 
testimony of former al-Qaida members, only the top-tier of graduates from bin Laden-affiliated 
                                                          
52 USA v. Michael C. Finton (Defendant), United States District Court Central District of Illinois (Case No.: 09-
3048-m), Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent Trevor S. Stalets, September 24, 2009. 
53 Clive Williams M.G., ―The Question of ‗Links‘ Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia,‖ in Kumar Ramakrishna 
and See Seng Tan, eds., After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: World Scientific and the 
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 83. 
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training centers, such as Khaldun and Farouq camps, were admitted into the organization.54  The 
remaining individuals were largely excluded from al-Qaida‘s operational network; most returned 
to their home countries and joined (or returned to) other less selective organizations.55 Others 
founded new independent organizations,56 and still more trainees undertook attacks absent any 
financial or logistical support from established terror groups.57  While al-Qaida‘s standards of 
admittance likely declined as the pace of counterterrorism initiatives eliminated key members of 
the organization, and although practical participation in al-Qaida attacks remains a far more 
relevant metric for assessing organizational affiliation than formal membership rites, there is 
little reason to assume that every individual trained by al-Qaida became a member of the 
organization.   
                                                          
54 USA v. bin Laden, et al, Day 11 of testimony (February 27,2001). 
55 Dulmatin, an Indonesian who gained dubious renown for his involvement in a host of JI-linked attacks, including 
the 2002 Bali bombings, offers a useful illustration.  In 1989 and 1990, he trained at Sada Camp under Abdul Rasool 
Sayyaf, a close confidant of bin Laden‘s who was so well-regarded among Islamists that a Filipino jihadist group 
later named itself in his honor.  Despite this training, Dulmatin lacked any demonstrable financial or operational 
involvement with al-Qaida until ten years later, when he found himself on the al-Qaida‘s fringes owing to his 
participation in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings that Hambali, who held dual membership in al-Qaida and JI, 
directed and which JI conducted at bin Laden‘s behest.  For information on Dulmatin‘s training in South Asian and 
participation in the Christmas Eve Bombings, see: International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East 
Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003.  (Hereafter ―Damaged But Still 
Dangerous‖).  For information linking bin Laden to the Christmas Eve Bombings, see: Alan Sipress, "Bin Laden 
named in Asian terror plots," Washington Post, June 27, 2003.  For information on Abdul Rasool Sayyaf‘s 
relationship with bin Laden, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin 
Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York: Penguin, 2004). 
56 For example, Aburajak Janjalani trained under Abdul Rasooy Sayyaf between 1988 and 1990, before returning to 
the Philippines and founding the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a radical Islamist organization that Janjalani named in 
honor of his mentor. For information on Janjalani‘s training, see: Damaged but Still Dangerous.  For information on 
the founding of ASG and the etymology of the organization‘s name, see: Robert H. Reid, "Government says Abu 
Sayyaf links extend through Afghanistan to Middle East," Associated Press Worldstream, April 9, 1995. 
57 For example, Atta-ur Rahman and Shahzad Bajwa, two Pakistani militants arrested for a string of attacks 
conducted in Pakistan, trained in an al-Qaida linked camp in Waziristan in 2003.  Rahman and Bajwa then went-on 
to conduct a string of attacks—many of them botched—in and around Karachi.  Although the men claimed to 
operate under the organizational name of ―Jundallah,‖ this group never had more than half a dozen members, and 
seems to have received no operational or financial support from al-Qaida after Rahman and Bajwa left training. See: 
"Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases," Pakistan Newswire, September 28, 2004; 
"ATC hears ranger mobile attack case," Pakistan Newswire, June 2, 2005; "Arrested Pakistani militants reveal plan 
of attacking US consulate, other target," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 20, 2004; Paul Haven, "AP: 
Arrests damage al-Qaida network," Associated Press Online, August 6, 2004.   
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Indeed, it is fairly standard practice for organizations operating in a host of occupational 
fields to train outsiders.   For example, the United States Army War College, an institution 
dedicated to training high-level officers to become strategic thinkers, educates a host of foreign 
military officers alongside the college‘s American students.  These international fellows remain 
part of their home governments‘ armed forces and never become members of the U.S. Army.  
There are few reasons to assume that terror groups operate according to a fundamentally 
different logic.  Ultimately, training ties are insufficient to use in the extension of Newman 
groups because terror groups have no control over the actions of non-members once they leave 
training.  
Finally, financial ties merit some specific discussion because of the context of this 
analysis.  Although broad funding patterns are remarkably important to the function of terror 
groups, these patterns are not the explicit focus of this analysis.  Its events-oriented approach 
precludes it from assessing any money streams that augment terror groups‘ general operating 
budgets, such as those that flowed between Benevolence International Foundation, a crooked 
charity based in suburban Chicago, and al-Qaida.58  Instead, the financial ties included in the 
membership modeling process, and more generally in the network data sample, pertain to 
specific events.  Consequently, the membership judgments that the model makes may place a 
handful of important funders outside of terror groups.  Given that intuitive judgments of group 
membership often draw distinctions between members of the organizations and ―linked‖ 
funders,59 this pattern does not represent a deviation from accepted notions of membership, 
                                                          
58 USA v. Enaam M. Arnaout, Plea Agreement (No. 02 CR 892), United States District Court, Northern District of 
Illinois, Eastern Division, February 11, 2003. 
59 For example, the terrorist sanctions list maintained by the United Nations security council characterizes Abd al 
Hamid Sulaiman Muhammad al-Mujil, the former executive director of the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief 
Organization (IIRO), as a funder of both al-Qaida and the Abu Sayyaf Group, rather than a member of either 
organization.  The narrative summary that explains the reasons for his sanctioning state: ―He provided donor funds 
directly to Al-Qaida and has been identified as a major fundraiser for the Abu Sayyaf Group. . . . Al-Mujil traveled 
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though, given the importance of money to all organizations, there is a sound logic for 
reconsidering the distinction between linked funders and members in subsequent analyses. 
Figure 2.15 provides a visual illustration of the results obtained by extending the 
Newman groups according to the restrictions outlined above.  Given the complexities of the data 
representation, this image emphasizes only two of the organizations included in the larger 
analysis: al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah.  The image is colored by Newman grouping; the 
original group surrounding bin Laden is depicted in yellow-green, and the Newman group 
surrounding Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir, who served as JI‘s emir in 2001, is kelly-green. (Users of the 
visualization software have no control over the output‘s color scheme, so it was not possible to 
choose more contrasting colors).  The triangles represent all individuals deemed to be al-Qaida 
members by the final modeling process; the squares represent all individuals deemed to be 
outside of al-Qaida by the final modeling process.  Transparent nodes represent all individuals 
deemed to be JI members, and opaque nodes represent all individuals deemed to be outside JI. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
frequently to meet members of Usama bin Laden‘s organization.‖  For additional details, see: Security Council 
Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individual and 
entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.255.06. Abd al Hamid Sulaiman Muhammad al-Mujil,‖ 
August 4, 2006; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI22506E.shtml.   
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Figure 2.15: Visual Illustration of Final Membership Model in 2001   
 
 Thus, the final modeling process‘ estimation of al-Qaida includes the following six types 
of nodes included in the image above: 
1. Opaque yellow-green triangles: all those individuals who were part of bin Laden‘s 
original Newman group, but who were not modeled as part of JI.  Mohammed Atta, the 
acknowledged field commander of the 9/11 hijackers,60 offers an example. 
 
2. Transparent yellow-green triangles: all those individuals who were part of bin Laden‘s 
original Newman group, but who obtained JI membership via the extension process.  
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who interacted extensively with bin Laden‘s immediate 
supporters and South East Asian terrorists like Hambali offers an example.61  However, 
                                                          
60 Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10013 (Ramzi Bin al Shibh), United 
States Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 9, 2007; High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of 
Defense, Date Unknown, avaialble online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/. 
61 For examples of KSM‘s interactions with JI, see: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 151; USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui 
(Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-
A), Evidence Presented in Lieu of Hambali's Testimony, date unknown; USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui (Defendant), 
United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-A), Evidence 
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as bin Laden also offers an example, because he shared functional ties with Hambali and 
other JI members in 2001, it is important to note that extensions are reciprocal62 and 
interstitial individuals can obtain memberships that are non-intuitive.  Interpretation of 
these designations is largely a matter of perspective; individuals who hold strong 
subjectively-determined views on the subject of membership in terror groups are more 
likely to see such designations as errors, while structurally-minded researchers are more 
likely to argue that such designations unveil meaningful hidden patterns.    
 
3. Opaque triangles that are not yellow-green: all those individuals who were added to al-
Qaida via the extension process, but are not modeled as members of JI.  Fazul Abduallh 
Mohammed, who played a prominent role in the 1998 embassy bombings, and who in 
2001 returned to East Africa at bin Laden‘s behest to prepare for the 2002 Mombasa 
bombings,63 offers one example.  Abdul Rahman Jabrah, a Kuwaiti-Canadian who 
participated in the 2003 bombing of residential compounds housing Westerners in 
Riyadh, offers another example.64 
 
4. Opaque squares of any color: all those individuals who were excluded from both al-
Qaida and JI.  Examples include the red squares to the right of Fazul Abdullah 
Mohammed, which represent the local support team, comprised primarily of first-time 
jihadists with no prior ties to terror groups, that Fazul had begun to assemble along the 
Kenyan coast by 2001.65 
 
5. Transparent squares of kelly-green: all those individuals modeled as members of JI 
because they held membership in the Newman group of Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir, who served 
as JI‘s emir in 2001.66  Members of this group were not modeled as members of al-Qaida.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Presented in Lieu of KSM's Testimony, date unknown; and Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), Unclassified, March 10, 2007. 
62 This reciprocity is an artifact of the data.  Ties are undirected (AB=BA), because the nature of the data 
precludes more finite determinations, as does the folding process used to infer agent x agent ties based on shared ties 
in two-mode networks.   
63 Nelly Lahoud draws extensively on a memoir that Fazul wrote in 2008 or 2009 in order to offer an ‗insiders‘ 
description of bin Laden‘s involvement in the 2002 Mombasa attacks.  Unfortunately, Fazul‘s memoir is not yet 
publically available, making a first person reading impossible.  See, Nelly Lahoud, ―Bin Laden‘s Death Through the 
Lens of Al-Qa‘ida‘s Confidential Secretary,‖ CTC Sentinel, May 1, 2011. 
64 USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), United States District Court Southern District of New York 
(Crim. No.: 02 Crim. 1560), Indictment, date unknown; USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), United 
States District Court Southern District of New York (02 Cr. 1560 (BSJ)), Sentencing Memorandum, May 7, 2007. 
65 For information on Fazul‘s support team, see: "Arrested Preacher Linked to Attacks," Associated Press, April 5, 
2003; Andrew England, "AP Exclusive: FBI's most wanted leader of al-Qaida cell indicted for U.S. embassy 
bombing escaped," Associated Press, June 10, 2004; "Statement Under Inquiry of Omar Said Omar," Recorded by 
Superintendant John Mulalulu, Kenya Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, n.d. (but almost certainly August, 2003), available 
from Appendix C-III of Al-Qaida's (mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa, Combatting Terrorism Center at West 
Point. 
66 For a concise description of the timing of leadership changes among JI emirs, see: Devi Asmarani, "Another JI 
chief nabbed," Straights Times (Singapore), June 16, 2007.  For more detailed information on Ba‘asyir‘s ascendency 
to JI‘s highest position, see: Lely T. Djuhari, "Three terror suspects name Muslim cleric Bashir as alleged terror 
head; one links him to bin Laden," Associated Press Worldstream, June 26, 2003; "White Paper: The Jemaah 
Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Singapore, January 7, 
2003; International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network 
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Examples include JI bomb-maker Azahari Husin67 and Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, who 
Singaporean authorities characterized as the leader of JI‘s regional shura and a direct 
lieutenant of Hambali.68 
 
6. Transparent triangles of kelly-green: All those individuals modeled as JI members 
because they held membership in the Ba‘asyir‘s Newman group, and who were also 
modeled as members of al-Qaida via the extension process. Examples include Hambali, 
whose close relationship with al-Qaida is well-documented,69 and Imam Samudra, who 
was heavily involved in the planning and orchestration of the 2000 bombings of Christian 
churches across Indonesia, an operation that, according to the sworn testimony of one of 
Samudra‘s many co-conspirators, was conducted at bin Laden‘s behest.70 
 
While the image described above demonstrates much of the complexity inherent to 
attempts at formal modeling of clandestine organizations, it is important to note that the graphic 
offers only a single snap-shot that describes membership as modeled in 2001, rather than a 
comprehensive assessment of membership patterns over time.  Since the data is annualized, the 
modeling process was conducted independently for every year in the data.  Two useful analytical 
distinctions emerged from this approach. 
First, each agent modeled as part of an organization has a clear ―start date‖ that marks the 
beginning of his tenure in a terrorist group.  In theory, this design should mitigate the sorts of 
conflation problems inherent to temporally flat models, which pose significant risks of false 
attribution by granting organizations credit (or blame) for attacks conducted by members before 
they joined the organization.  For example, by considering the impact of time, the model should 
avoid attributing culpability for the 2002 abduction and murder of American diplomat Lawrence 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Operates," December 11, 2002; "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of 
Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. 
67 For information on Azahari‘s role as a JI bomb-maker, see: "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," 
Indonesian Police Interview of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000; 
"Witness Interrogation Report of Imam Samudra," Detective Corps, The State Police of Republic of Indonesia 
(Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), January 23, 2003. 
68 Dan Murphy, "Filipino police uncover 1995 leads to Sept. 11 plot," Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 
2002; "White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Government of Singapore, January 7, 2003. 
69 See note 52. 
70 Alan Sipress, "Bin Laden named in Asian terror plots," Washington Post, June 27, 2003. 
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Foley to al-Qaida based on the participation of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,71 because these events 
occurred before Zarqawi formed meaningful operational ties with bin Laden or his closest 
followers.72  However, as discussed in greater detail in the section on testing the model, its 
timing distinctions have a somewhat fuzzy quality as a result of both terrorism‘s clandestine 
nature and this study‘s reliance on publically available data.  
 Second, many agents modeled as members of terror groups have clear ―end dates‖ that 
mark their separation from an organization. This design choice theoretically enables the analysis 
to avoid falsely attributing attacks to individuals who broke with their parent organization, as the 
founders of Jemaah Islamiyah did in the early 1990s, when a leadership dispute within the 
decades-old Darul Islam movement caused several its more radical members to walk-out and 
form their own new organization.73  However, the same issues alluded to in the previous 
paragraph make these determinations equally as hazy as the start dates.  Longitudinally modeling 
the data ultimately did as much to highlight the ambiguities inherent to determining membership 
in terror groups as it did to resolve them.   
Table 2.2 lists the 33 organizations that emerged in the data via the modeling process 
outlined above.  Groups were determined to be merged when one organization subsumed the 
other in the final modeling process, or, in more formal notation, when Group A  Group B.  In 
the interests of total clarity, it is also important to specify that the term ―organization‖ as used in 
the chart below is interchangeable with ―extended Newman group.‖  Consequently, the 
organizations listed below differ greatly in their capabilities and durability, but they all represent 
meaningful divisions in the data.  Naming was a somewhat subjective process, especially 
                                                          
71 Neil MacFarquhar, "Jordan sentences 8 militants, linked to al Qaeda, to death," New York Times, April 7, 2004. 
72 Dexter Filkins, "Wanted rebel vows loyalty to bin Laden, web sites say," New York Times, October 18, 2004; 
Mark MacKinnon, "Empty chairs, angry youths and ignominy," Globe and Mail (Canada), June 9, 2006. 
73 Nasir bin Abas, interview conducted August 2010, Jakarta, Indonesia. 
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considering that many recognized terror groups change their name over time,74 but every effort 
was made to reference organizations by the names which are commonly used to describe them.   
       
  
                                                          
74 For example, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, better known by its French-language acronym, GSPC, 
changed its name to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007.  U.S. Department of State, Country Reports 
on Terrorism 2007, April 2008, p. 7. 
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Table 2.2: Modeled Organizations Included in the Data 
Organization 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Organization 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Organization 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Abu Sayyaf 
Group 
ASG Islamic Group IG 
Palembang 
Group 
Plbg 
Asif Raza 
Commando 
Force 
ARCF 
Jaish-e-
Mohammed 
JeM al-Qaida AQ 
Bayaat al-
Imam 
BaI 
Jamaat al 
Muslimeen 
JAM 
al-Qaida in the 
Arabic 
Peninsula 
AQAP 
D-Company D-Com 
Jam'iyyat Ul-
Islam Is-
Saheeh 
JIS 
Rajah Solaiman 
Movement 
RSM 
Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad 
EIJ 
Jemaah 
Islamiyah 
JI Rawalpindi-9 Raw-9 
Fatah al-Islam FaI Jundallah Jund 
Riyadus-
Salakhin 
Reconnaissance 
and Sabotage 
Battalion of 
Chechen 
Martyrs 
RSBM 
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Organization 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Organization 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Organization 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
al-Fuqra Fuqra Laskar Jihad LJ 
Salafist Group 
for Preaching 
and Combat/Al-
Qaida in the 
Islamic 
Maghreb 
AQIM 
Gujarat 
Revenge group 
GRG 
Laskhar-e-
Taiba/Indian 
Mujahideen 
LeT 
Saudi 
Hizballah75 
SdHzb 
Haqqani 
Network 
HN 
Martyrs for 
Morocco 
MfM Sea of David SoD 
Harkat-ul-
Jihad-i-Islami 
HUJI 
Moroccan 
Islamic 
Combatant 
Group/ Salafia 
Jihadia 
GICM al-Shabaab Shbb 
Hofstad Group Hof 
Pakistani 
Taliban 
TTP 
Tanzim 
Qoidatul Jihad 
(Indonesia) 
TQJ 
 
                                                          
75 Although Saudi Hizballah is a Shiite group, this analysis modeled the organization in order to assess the 
possibility of al-Qaida‘s involvement in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombings, an attack in which some observers still 
claim that bin Laden‘s organization played an unspecified role.  For example, former U.S. Secretary of Defense 
William Perry stated in a 2007 interview that he believed al-Qaida was the driving force behind the Khobar 
bombing.  See: ―Perry: U.S. eyed Iran attack after bombing,‖ United Press International, June 6, 2007. 
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Because the analysis focuses on terrorism against civilian targets, the list of modeled 
organizations excludes Iraqi insurgent groups, the Afghan Taliban, Algeria‘s Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA), and other similar organizations primarily engaged in force-on-force conflicts 
against state militaries and international military coalitions.  However, the lines between 
insurgency and terrorism are rarely crystal clear, so it would be irresponsible for the analysis to 
exclude such organizations entirely.  Consequently, the data contains partial information, taken 
at face value from the source material, on seven insurgent groups.  Table 2.3 (below) lists these 
organizations: 
Table 2.3: Un-modeled Insurgencies Included in the Data 
Organization 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Organization 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Organization 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Afghan Taliban (Tal) 
Armed Islamic 
Group 
(GIA) 
Hezb e Islami 
Gulubbudin 
(HIG) 
Al-Qaida in 
Iraq 
(AQI) 
Free Aceh 
Movement 
(GAM) 
Lashkar-e-
Jahangvi 
(LeJ) 
        
Moro Islamic 
Liberation 
Front 
(MILF) 
 
Similarly, some terror groups exist on the edges of the global Sunni jihadist movement; 
they cooperate with al-Qaida and other groups in a limited capacity, but do not share their 
ideology or goals.  Therefore, the data also contains partial information on two such 
organizations, namely HAMAS and Lebanese Hizballah, but as with the insurgent groups, the 
analysis does not formally model these organizations because they lie outside of this inquiry‘s 
stated focus.  Although the individuals highlighted in figure 2.17 provide one illustration of the 
model‘s performance, broader testing is required in order to fully understand its applicability to 
the study of terror.    
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2.3 PROOF OF CONCEPT 
Unfortunately, the same issues that necessitate the use of a formal grouping model make 
fully testing its accuracy impossible: The available information on individual jihadists is 
inconsistent in both quantity and detail; theoretical disagreements about how and where to bound 
organizations cause widely divergent estimates of groups‘ membership, and some jihadists 
deliberately exaggerate their organizational affiliations, while others attempt to obscure such ties 
in the name of operational security.  The organizational affiliations that the vast majority of 
individuals involved in terrorism hold in the real world simply are not known.  Therefore, the 
most this analysis can do is to offer proof of concept by comparing the results of the grouping 
process to well-regarded expert judgments. 
Several features of the United Nations‘ terror sanctioning list make this resource a 
reasonable benchmark against which to compare.  First, a series of ―narrative summaries of 
reasons for listing‖ accompany the UN designations, making it easy to see why an individual was 
sanctioned, as well as to understand the nature of his relationship to known terror groups.76  
Second, the list draws on pools of data collected by the international intelligence community, and 
although this access is indirect, the list‘s judgments are supported by information unavailable to 
the general public.  Therefore, the list can be regarded as a high-quality source, and comparisons 
against it serve as a rigorous test of both the grouping process and the underlying open-source 
data.  Finally, from a purely methodological standpoint, this study deliberately excluded the list 
from the snowball sampling process, to enable a blind comparison between the list‘s designations 
and the results of the Newman-based grouping process. 
                                                          
76 These summaries are available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/individuals_associated_with_Al-
Qaida.shtml.   
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However, the UN list is far from flawless.  It does not aim to be comprehensive and, 
therefore, provides information on only a small percentage of the world‘s jihadists.  Moreover, 
the nomination process that underlies the list is somewhat schizophrenic; because any of the 
UN‘s member states can add to the list, it does not represent a single unified consensus regarding 
the definition of terrorism or the boundaries of organizations.77  Indeed, the extent and nature of 
countries‘ contributions to the list vary greatly.  Italy, for example, seems to forward the name of 
every individual that the country convicts on terrorism charges, no matter how minor.  Indonesia, 
by contrast, seems somewhat more lax, as the names of prominent jihadists like Noordin Mohd 
Top, who was regarded as South East Asia‘s most dangerous terrorist until his death in 2009,78 
are not mentioned in the UN sanctions documents.  It remains unclear why the list highlights 
some of the violent Islamist movement‘s bit players, while excluding some of its stars. 
Similarly, although the UN documents provide a superb reference for anyone interested 
in studying terrorism at the individual level, the depth of the narratives is limited.  They discuss 
only selective aspects of the listee‘s involvement in terrorism, and, as evidenced by the fact that 
the narrative on bin Laden does not reference his death, the summaries are not updated to include 
events that transpire after the listee‘s initial inclusion.  Consequently, much of the membership 
data embedded in the narrative summaries has a static feel, and it is often impossible to 
determine precisely when someone joined a terrorist organization.  Because the list cannot 
entirely overcome the ambiguities inherent to terrorism as subject matter, despite benefitting 
                                                          
77 Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and 
associated individual and entities, ―II. Composition of the List,‖ date unknown, available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml.   
78 Seth Mydans, ―A Terrorist Mastermind Whose Luck Ran Out,‖ New York Times, September 17, 2009.  For more 
detailed information on Top‘s role in Indonesian terror, see: For information on Noordin‘s role in Indonesian 
terrorism, see: International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks," ICG Asia Report No. 114, 
May 5, 2006; and International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base," ICG Asia Briefing No. 95, 
August 27, 2009. 
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from additional information not available to the general public, the size of the useable sample 
that can be derived from the list is significantly smaller than the list‘s overall size.  
Of the 254 individuals the United Nations has sanctioned as Islamist terrorists, 79 are 
unambiguously described in time-specific terms as members of the terror organizations that the 
Newman-based grouping process attempted to model.  The narrative summaries list specific 
membership start-dates for many; for example, the documents state: ―Sheikh Ahmed Salim 
Swedan was recruited to join Al-Qaida in 1996 by Mohammed Saddiq Odeh in Mombasa, 
Kenya.‖79  In the remaining cases, it was possible to infer a start-date with reasonable reliability 
based on the context of the narrative summary; for example, given that al-Qaida was founded in 
1988,80 it is possible to infer that Aly Soliman Massoud Abdul Sayed became a member of that 
organization around 1988, because the supporting UN narrative states that he ―has been a 
member of Al-Qaida since the 1980s and joined Al-Qaida‘s military committee in the 1990s.‖81   
The results of these qualitative judgments were then compared to the Newman-based 
grouping process‘ characterization of the same 79 individuals.  This evaluation provides a 
reasonable estimate of the process‘ propensity for false negatives, but the nature of the subject 
matter makes the equally thorny possibility of false positives impossible to assess with any 
reliability.  The data summarized by table 2.4 demonstrates that the grouping process placed 
individuals in the same organization as the UN‘s expert judgments over 78 percent of the time.   
 
 
                                                          
79 Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and 
associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.S.35.01. Sheikh Ahmed Salim 
Swedan,‖ October 17, 2001; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI3501E.shtml.  
80 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to 
September 10, 2001, (New York, NY: Penguin, 2004), p. 204.   
81 Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and 
associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:Q1.A.229.07. Aly Soliman Massoud 
Abdul Sayed,‖ April 6, 2009, available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI22907E.shtml.    
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Table 2.4: Estimating the Accuracy of the Newman-based Grouping Process 
 
Count Percent 
Omitted from Sample 3 3.80 
Never Assigned to Group Listed by UN 14 17.72 
Matched Group Listed by UN 62 78.48 
Total 79 100.00 
 
However, 3 of the 17 errors (17.65 percent) result from data omissions and are thus better 
attributed to the snowball sampling method than the grouping process.  Given that all of the 
individuals omitted from the sample are either minor terrorists or individuals who operate in 
parts of the world where open-source coverage is particularly opaque, these results generally 
speak to the reliability of the data acquisition process.  Indeed, as the characterizations below 
show, the UN was able to tie only one of the three omitted individuals to a specific attack, 
despite the organization‘s superior access to information. 
 Zaki Ezat Zaki Ahmed, who the UN narratives describe as a member of EIJ and al-
Qaida wanted for crimes against Egypt.  His name is not mentioned in reference to 
any specific events or locations.82 
 
 Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Eliwah, who the UN narratives also describe as a 
member of EIJ and al-Qaida wanted for crimes against Egypt.  As with Ahmed, 
Eliwah‘s name is not referenced in relation to specific events, though the UN 
documents do state that he trained in Afghanistan in the early 1990s.83 
 
 Tayeb Nail, who the UN narratives describe as a member of the branch of al-Qaida in 
the Islamic Maghreb commanded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar.  According to the 
                                                          
82 Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and 
associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:Q1.A.193.05 Zaki Ezat Zaki 
Ahmed,‖ September 29, 2005; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI19305E.shtml.   
83 Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and 
associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:Q1.A.195.05 Al Sayyid Ahmed 
Fathi Hussein Eliwah,‖ September 29, 2005; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI19505E.shtml.   
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documents, Nail participated in an attack on a Mauritanian military base in 2005, as 
well as several kidnappings, and assorted profit-generating crimes.84 
 
Data questions aside, placing individuals in the correct organization is only half of the 
battle; it is equally important to determine when they joined a terror group.  Comparing the first 
year that the Newman-based process attributed group membership to individuals with the time-
specific membership data obtained from the UN narratives offers a more detailed test of the 
model‘s performance.  Table 2.5, which compares membership statistics at the organizational 
level and across time, demonstrates that the modeling process performed well across a host of 
organizations by reliably placing individuals in the appropriate group, but also shows that the 
timing of these comparisons is sometimes problematic.  In order to highlight the grouping 
process to the greatest extent possible, the results do not include the five individuals omitted 
from the snowball sample.   
  
                                                          
84 Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and 
associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.N.280.10 Tayeb Nail,‖ April 
22, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI28010E.shtml.   
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Table 2.5: Estimating the Accuracy of the Newman-based Grouping Process Over Time 
 
AQ AQAP ASG 
 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
Perfect Match 8 18.18 1 12.50 0 0.00 
Matched 1 Year Early/Late 8 18.18 5 62.50 2 100.00 
Matched 2 Years Early/Late 5 11.36 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Matched 3 Years Early/Late 4 9.09 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Matched 4 or More Years Early/Late 13 29.55 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Never Assigned to Group Listed by 
UN 
6 13.64 2 25.00 0 0.00 
Total Ever Matched 38 86.36 6 75.00 2 100.00 
       
 
EIJ GSPC HUJI 
 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
Perfect Match 1 20.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Matched 1 Year Early/Late 2 40.00 0 0.00 1 100.00 
Matched 2 Years Early/Late 1 20.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Matched 3 Years Early/Late 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Matched 4 or More Years Early/Late 0 0.00 1 50.00 0 0.00 
Never Assigned to Group Listed by 
UN 
1 20.00 1 50.00 0 0.00 
Total Ever Matched 4 80.00 1 50.00 1 100.00 
       
 
JI RSM TTP 
 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
Perfect Match 1 9.09 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Matched 1 Year Early/Late 2 18.18 0 0.00 1 100.00 
Matched 2 Years Early/Late 1 9.09 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Matched 3 Years Early/Late 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Matched 4 or More Years Early/Late 4 36.36 1 100.00 0 0.00 
Never Assigned to Group Listed by 
UN 
3 27.27 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total Ever Matched 8 72.73 1 100.00 1 100.00 
 
However, much ambiguity surrounds these results.   Given that the sample represented in 
figure 2.20 contained exceptionally sparse data on several of the included organizations, it is 
difficult to assume that the results are generalizable beyond al-Qaida, Jemaah Islamiyah, and 
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perhaps also al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.  Within these organizations, false negatives were 
not an especially prominent problem; instead, attributions that took place four or more years 
removed from the UN characterization constituted the most worrisome issue.   It remains unclear 
if these timing discrepancies stem from inconsistencies in the grouping process, from coverage 
issues stemming from the snowball data sampling process, from data omissions that are inherent 
to all open-source inquiries into terrorism (regardless of method), or, as is most likely, from 
some combination of these factors.  Similarly, because reality remains unknown, it is not clear 
that the UN narratives‘ judgments are especially accurate.  It is at least theoretically possible that 
the modeled membership estimates are more accurate, or that both characterizations are entirely 
wrong.  Ultimately, ambiguity reigns supreme in all large-scale efforts to determine the precise 
nature and timing of individuals‘ membership in terror groups, but these results demonstrate 
broad congruence between the model‘s output and expert judgments.  
Given this unavoidable uncertainty and the timing inconsistencies between the model and 
the UN narratives, this study‘s subsequent analyses treat membership designations in a 
somewhat soft manner.  While it remains possible for individuals to sever connections and leave 
terror groups, gaps in involvement need to be fairly pronounced in order for determinations of 
severance to be valid.  The analysis considers any actions that an individual takes within a year 
of the model‘s characterization of his departure from an organization as still attributable to this 
parent organization.   
Why one year and not two, three, or four?  The choice is ultimately subjective, but 
evidence suggests that hit squads typically arrive in the country to be attacked sometime within 
the calendar year prior to conducting an attack.  For example, open-sources place Fazul Abdullah 
Mohammed, an African terrorist who played a principle role in the 2002 Mombasa attacks that 
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targeted an airliner and a hotel popular with Israeli tourists,85 in Somalia conducting terror 
training as late as the autumn of 2001, suggesting that he did not begin his in-country 
preparations for the Kenyan attack until sometime in early 2002.86  Similarly, Mohamed Atta, the 
acknowledged field commander of the 9/11 hijackers during their stay in the U.S. ahead of the 
2001 attacks, arrived in America in the summer of 2000.87  Thus, one year seems a large enough 
relaxation to encompass real-world interactions, while remaining small enough so as not to 
effectively render static the model‘s characterization of membership.   
This final determination serves as an example of a broader pattern that this chapter has 
tried to highlight, namely that the Newman grouping process is not a purely deterministic 
approach to assigning individuals to terror groups.  Human analysts must be in the loop at 
several phases between the collection of raw data and the final output.  Therefore, as figure 2.16 
summarizes visually, the process outlined by this chapter is semi-automated and combines the 
rigors of mechanistic formal modeling with determinations drawn from the theoretical literature 
on terrorism.     
  
                                                          
85 These sources include a memoir, which Fazul left behind prior to his death, describing his experiences in al-Qaida 
that has yet to enter the public domain.  For a brief secondary characterization of this document, see: Nelly Lahoud, 
―Bin Laden‘s Death Through the Lens of Al-Qa‘ida‘s Confidential Secretary,‖ CTC Sentinel, May 1, 2011.  
86 International Crisis Group, "Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?" ICG Africa Group Report 
No. 95, July 11, 2005. 
87 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 
p. 224; Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," The New Yorker, 
September 13, 2010. 
120 
 
Figure 2.16: From Raw Data to Final Grouping 
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3.0 ESTIMATING AL-QAIDA‘S ROLE IN TERRORISM WITHIN THE BALEIAN 
TYPOLOGY 
 
As the first chapter argued, most efforts to categorize terrorism have been overly 
theoretical in nature.  Authors have devoted considerable effort to creating typologies that 
describe the breadth of al-Qaida‘s involvement in Islamist terror, but have done little in the way 
of wide implementation.  Consequently, the relative frequency of al-Qaida‘s various patterns of 
involvement in terrorism remains unclear. 
 This chapter constitutes one effort toward this necessary broad-based empirical work, and 
discusses how network methodology is applied to the snowball data sample in an attempt to fill-
in the Baleian typology outlined in the first chapter‘s literature review.  Toward those ends, the 
chapter contains seven sections following this introduction.  The first describes how this study 
generates a continuous variable that estimates the extent of organizations‘ involvement in 
terrorist events using a novel implementation of a formal measure known as degree centrality.  
The second section revisits the distinction between strong and weak ties and explicitly defines 
how and why this study differentiates between the two, before the third section turns its attention 
towards questions of geography and explicitly defines ―the West‖ as a region, in order to enable 
the differentiation between events that are merely strongly tied to al-Qaida and those conducted 
by hit squads deployed to the West.  The fourth section considers time and examines the 
conditions that must be met in order for this study to determine that an individual made a clear 
break with al-Qaida, which in turn makes it possible to distinguish between events conducted by 
the organization‘s active members and events conducted by its former members.  The fifth 
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section discusses ideology and explains the conditions that must be met for this study to consider 
an event as ideologically-linked to al-Qaida.  The sixth section briefly considers events that have 
no ties to al-Qaida, before the seventh section presents the relative frequency of the Baleian 
categories and discusses broad trends within each of them.  Because the quantitative estimates 
presented by this chapter say little about variation within each of the categories, the trends 
outlined in the seventh section also serve as a metric to select the cases discussed in this study‘s 
remaining chapters. 
 
3.1 IMPLEMENTING NETWORK MEASURES IN THE ASSESSMENT OF TERROR 
THREATS 
Among the membership model‘s more useful implementations is the ability to estimate 
the extent and nature of organizations‘ involvement (or lack thereof) in terror incidents.  This 
section outlines a measurement process that uses network tools to make replicable, non-
subjective assessments of tie strength.  Because functional links, as defined by the first chapter, 
constitute the most meaningful form of involvement in an attack, the process outlined below is 
applied to this relationship type in order to estimate the extent of al-Qaida‘s culpability for 
Islamist-motivated plots and attacks conducted between 1993, when the organization first played 
a demonstrable functional role in an attack, and 2010, the last year included in this assessment. 
The process hinges on a formal network measure known as degree centrality.  As 
typically implemented in a single-mode network, degree determines agents‘ importance based on 
the number of links they hold; the more links an agent has, the greater their centrality.  
Consequently, this measure provides a superb measure of direct influence in a network, because 
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agents have the greatest capacity to influence the individuals with which they share immediate 
relationships.1 
However, the process of estimating functional organizational involvement in events is 
slightly more complex, because this technique involves implementing degree in a two-mode 
network that depicts agents and events, and which also scales actor‘s involvement by counting 
the total number of links he or she holds to an event over time.  For any event in the data, it then 
becomes possible to express agents‘ role in the event as a ratio, by dividing the number of links 
an agent holds to the event over time—the agent‘s cumulative degree—by the total number of 
ties that all agents hold to the event over time.  So, for example, if an agent ―A‖ held 5 ties to an 
event, agent ―B‖ held 3 ties to the same event, and all agents in the network held a combined 
total of 20 ties to that event, then the A‘s share of involvement would be 25 percent, and B‘s 
share of involvement would be 15 percent.  Because percentages are additive, moving from the 
individual level to the organizational level then becomes a simple matter of arithmetic.  To 
complete the example above, if the membership model classified A and B as members of the 
same organization, and no other members of their group held ties to the event under analysis, 
then the organization‘s share of involvement in the event would be 40 percent.   
The only real trick of the process comes in dealing with individuals that hold multiple 
memberships.  Because there is no a-priori reason to assume that dual members operated 
exclusively in the interests of one organization over another, the problem is easily resolved 
through simple division.  If, for example, agent A held membership in both al-Qaida and Jemaah 
Islamiyah, then the model would credit each organization with half of his share of involvement 
in the attack. 
                                                          
 
1 Wasserman and Faust, p. 100; See also, Linton C. Freeman, ―Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual 
Clarification,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1978/1979), pp. 215-239. 
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The primary advantage of this approach is its replicability, which mitigates the 
subjectivity inherent to qualitative determinations of the extent of al-Qaida‘s involvement in 
events.  However, this advantage does not come without cost.  Specifically, the method requires 
that the data contains substantial quantities of information on a given event in order to classify 
that event reliably.  When this requirement is not met, small changes in the data cause 
disproportionate swings in the model‘s output.    
Al-Qaida‘s involvement in the 2003 plot to attack Reunion Island, a French possession 
located in off of Africa‘s east coast in the Indian Ocean, offers a useful illustration.  In April 
2003, French police arrested Christian Ganczarski, a Polish-born German citizen who converted 
to Islam before training in bin Laden-funded Afghan camps and joining al-Qaida.2  Based on the 
testimony of other terror suspects, French authorities accused Ganczarski of being ―one of the 
organizers and the financier‖ of a plot to bomb the French island using a ―booby-trapped car.‖ 3  
While his affiliation with al-Qaida clearly grants the organization some measure of culpability 
for the plot, data paucity may exaggerate that scale of this involvement, because the snowball 
sample contains only three interactions that relate directly to the Reunion Island operation.  As 
two of these links belong to Ganczarski, the model estimates al-Qaida‘s involvement in the event 
at 66.67 percent.  However, if all other variables were held constant and a single interaction was 
added that did not involve a member of bin Laden‘s organization, then al-Qaida‘s estimated 
involvement in the Reunion plot would drop to 50 percent.  This sensitivity dictates that the 
model‘s estimates must be interpreted with a grain of salt for events that contain few known 
interactions.  
                                                          
2 Gregory Viscusi, "German jailed for Djerba Synagogue bomb  to appeal, lawyer says," Bloomberg, February 6, 
2009; "German linked to Synagogue bomb arrested," AP Online, April 5, 2003. 
3 "French detain Tunisian terror suspect," AP Online, June 11, 2003. 
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However, it is worth noting that this weakness is not unique to this approach.  Whether 
inquiries are quantitative or qualitative in nature, all attempts to study events about which little is 
known are remarkably sensitive to the revelation of new information.  The mathematical nature 
of this approach may, therefore, ultimately be an advantage, because this method makes the scale 
of its sensitivity transparent in ways that purely narrative approaches cannot.  Toward this 
transparency, Appendix G, which contains quantitative estimates of organizations‘ functional 
involvement in all terror events included in this analysis, lists the number of interactions specific 
to each event, so that readers can easily assess the reliability of each estimate. 
Figure 3.1 offers a visualization of the output obtained from this estimation process and 
summarizes the extent of al-Qaida‘s functional involvement in 129 plots and attacks, which were 
drawn from the larger snowball sample, and in which bin Laden‘s organization played some 
functional role.  The upper two charts depict this involvement in a static perspective that ranks 
results by score and provides a sense of overall patterns.  The left-hand graph is a simple 
histogram, in which each line represents a plot or attack, and the right-hand graph shows the 
same information as a count of events by quartile.  The lower two graphs repeat this format, but 
depict the information in an over-time perspective. 
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Figure 3.1: Continuous Estimation of al-Qaida’s Involvement in Events 
 
Minimum 2.08 Median 50.00 
Maximum 100.00 Mode 50.00 
Mean 57.12 Standard Deviation 31.53 
 
 
3.2 FROM THE CONTINUOUS TO THE CATEGORICAL: DEFINING STRONG AND 
WEAK TIES 
 With the values and limitations of the estimates listed in figure 3.1 in mind, it is 
necessary to revisit lingering questions regarding the relative values of strong and weak ties.  The 
statistical literature makes it clear that there is not an ideal means to divide continuous 
measurements into categorical variables.  When used in outcome-oriented studies, such as those 
that tie the efficacy of medical treatment to body mass index or age, cut-points can be 
determined empirically by finding the group that has ―the most significant relation with the 
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outcome,‖ but when determinations are made based on data alone, as they must be here because 
this analysis takes place outside the context of regression, categories are by definition arbitrary.4   
This unavoidable fact raises some specific concerns that must be explicitly addressed.  
Statisticians often question the legitimacy of arbitrary categorizations, because binning 
continuous variables mitigates the explanatory power of statistical regression by reducing the 
range of variation among observations.5  However, as this analysis is concerned with 
classification rather than causation, the potential pitfall of data categorization lies less in the loss 
of data and more in the selection of a poorly justified cut-point.  Indeed, given that data paucity 
often characterizes the available open-source information on terrorism, it would be somewhat 
disingenuous to claim that small, finite differences in al-Qaida‘s involvement in events were particularly 
meaningful; consequently, broad categorical characterizations are ultimately advantageous because they 
are more robust to data imperfections than continuous estimates.  Put differently, newly revealed 
information will change continuous estimates, but is less likely to shift an event between the ―weak‖ and 
―strong‖ categories.     
Still, the issue of where to draw boundaries is non-trivial, because events near the cut-
point are the exception to this conclusion.  David Krackhardt noted such boundary-crossing as an 
explicit concern in his critique of Granovetter‘s hypothesis on the value of weak ties and argued 
that the treatment of middling values, which occur near the cut-point, play a substantial role in 
                                                          
4 The statistical literature in medicine has arguably devoted the most attention to the categorization of continuous 
data, as studies often like to evaluate prognostic impacts on ―high risk,‖ ―moderate risk,‖ and ―low risk‖ groups.  
J.N. Mandrekar, S.J. Mandrekar, and S.S. Cha ―Cut-point Determination Methods in Survival Analysis Using SAS,‖ 
Proceedings of the 28th Annual SAS User’s Group International, 2003.  For a longer treatment, see: Brent A. 
Williams, Jayawant N. Mandrekar, Sumitha J. Mandrekar, Stephen S. Cha, and Alfred F. Furth, ―Finding Optimal 
Cut-points for Continuous Covariates with Binary and Time-to-Event Outcomes,‖ Department of Health Science 
Resaerch, Mayo Clinic, Technical Report Series #79, June 2006. 
5 David L. Streiner, ―Breaking Up is Hard to Do: The Heartbreak of Dichotomizing Continuous Data,‖ Canadian 
Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 2002), pp. 262-266. 
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determining the outcome of strong tie/weak tie analyses.6  Thus, it is insufficient to merely 
justify the process of categorization at a theoretical level; detailed attention must be paid to 
determining exactly where to draw the line between strong and weak ties.  
Sadly, the preceding literature offers little relevant guidance.  Terrorism scholars offer no 
specific advice on where to draw boundaries between strong and weak ties when relationship 
strength is characterized using continuous measurements, and, as the first chapter‘s literature 
review made clear, network analysts typically employ inapplicable survey methods when treating 
the strong tie/weak tie debate as an issue of categorization.  Therefore, common sense and simple 
mathematical measurements served as the ultimate arbiters of this analysis‘ differentiation.   
A two-tiered categorization of ties is explicit to the weak tie/strong tie characterization, 
so the relevant question centers on where to situate the dividing line between categories, rather 
than how many categories to define.  Three clear rationales emerge for setting the cut-point: (1) 
Use an absolute definition and set the cut-point to 50 percent, so that all events in which al-
Qaida‘s involvement was at least half of the theoretically possible maximum are considered 
―strongly tied‖ to the group.  (2) Use a relative definition and set the cut-point equal to al-
Qaida‘s mean level of involvement in events, 58.77 percent, so that only those events in which 
al-Qaida‘s role was of above average strength qualify as ―strongly tied‖ to the organization.  (3) 
Use a relative definition and set the cut-point equal to al-Qaida‘s median level of involvement in 
                                                          
6 Specifically, Krackhardt argues that because Granovetter‘s original argument hypothesizes a curvilinear predictive 
relationship between tie strength and access to information, there is an unknown point at which increasing the 
strength of the relationship decreases the tie-holders‘ access to new information.  Therefore, how and where analysts 
locate ties along a continuum greatly impacts the final analysis.  David Krackhardt, ―The Strength of Strong Ties: 
The Importance of Philos in Organizational Theory,‖ In N. Nohria and R. Eccles (eds.), Networks and 
Organizations: Structures, Forms, and Action, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 216-217; 
available online: 
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/krack/documents/pubs/1992/1992%20The%20Strength%20of%20Strong%20Ties.
pdf.  
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events, in this case also 50 percent, so that an equal number of events fall into the ―weak‖ and 
―strong‖ categories.   
Because this analysis considers multiple organizations, the absolute value makes the most 
sense to use, lest the conception of ―strong‖ ties differ from organization to organization.  A 
hypothetical example aptly illustrates the logic underlying this decision.  Consider an 
organization that typically plays small supporting roles in attacks.  Whether measured by mean 
or median, this organization‘s average involvement would be below 50 percent.  For the sake of 
argument, assume both measures of average were 30 percent.  Using either of the relative 
measures to determine if the organizations‘ ties to an event were ―strong‖ or ―weak‖ would then 
cause a conflicting characterization for events in which the organization partnered with al-Qaida.  
For example, if the hypothetical organization, al-Qaida, and a third group all played an equal role 
in an attack, the event would be strongly tied to the hypothetical group described above, but 
weakly tied to al-Qaida, even though each organization‘s involvement was 33.3 percent.  Thus, 
absolute cut-points are necessary in order to allow fair cross-comparison, and this analysis 
considered all events in which al-Qaida‘s functional involvement was estimated at 50 percent or 
greater as ―strongly tied‖ to the organization, while all events in which al-Qaida‘s functional 
involvement was estimated at greater than zero, but less than 50 percent, were considered 
―weakly tied‖ to the organization.  
 This determination yielded 56 plots and 34 attacks that were strongly linked to al-Qaida, 
as well as 17 plots and 22 attacks that were weakly linked to the organization.  However, because 
the Baleian typology differentiates between events conducted by hit squads in the West and those 
that are merely strongly tied to bin Laden‘s organization, it is necessary to first consider the 
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impact of geography in order to determine into which category many of these events fall.  
Therefore, the next section turns its attention to defining ―the West‖ as a region.   
 
3.3 CONSIDERING GEOGRAPHY 
Unfortunately, there is no unanimously agreed upon definition of ―the West;‖ the 
region‘s boundaries have shifted over both time and context.7  This reality introduces some 
subjectivity into this analysis‘ classification system, because different definitions of ―the West‖ 
will greatly affect the relative frequencies of the first and second categories in the Baleian 
typology.  It is, therefore, necessary to carefully evaluate the limitations of various definitional 
approaches.  
 Purely geographic definitions are too strict, because they exclude countries like Japan, 
South Korea, and Singapore, which have decidedly Western economies and Western-influenced 
political systems, despite their location in the geographic East.  However, it would also be a 
fallacy to assume that economic development is a perfect synonym for Westernization.  Indeed, 
the United Arab Emirates, which sits squarely in Islamists back yard by virtue of its proximity to 
Saudi Arabia, outranks the United Kingdom by nearly $3,500 in per capita GDP.8  The extent of 
democracy is a similarly flawed measurement, because it privileges political representation over 
economic and cultural measures of Westernization.  For example, according to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s widely-cited Democracy Index, the otherwise-Westernized Singapore ranks 
81st out of 167 countries and fails to even qualify as a ―flawed democracy.‖9  Some subjectivity 
is ultimately unavoidable, but because the Human Development Index (HDI) explicitly considers 
                                                          
7 James Kurth, ―Western Civilization, Our Tradition,‖ Intercollegiate Review, Fall 2003/Spring 2004, pp. 5-13. 
8 World Development Indicators, The World Bank. 
9 ―Democracy Index 2011,‖ Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011; available online: 
http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011.   
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social and economic development, it provides the most intuitively satisfying (though arguably 
culturally-centric) conceptualization of what it means to be Western.   
By and large, this study viewed an HDI ranking of ―very high‖ as synonymous with 
being part of the West.  However, five of the 47 nations with very high scores were excluded 
because they are heavily culturally influenced by Islam: the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 
Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, and Qatar.10  Difficult questions regarding how to treat many 
countries in Latin America, a region that some characterizations label as Western while others do 
not, were side-stepped, as none of the events determined to be strongly tied to al-Qaida occurred 
in this region.  Table 3.1 lists all of the countries determined to be ―Western‖ by the metric 
outlined above; countries where an al-Qaida hit-squad played a strong functional role in an attack 
or plot included in the snowball sample have been starred. 
 
Table 3.1: “Western” Nations 
 
                                                          
10 These determinations were made based on the CIA World Factbook‘s demographic breakdowns of religion in the 
countries.  Specifically, the UAE is 96 percent Muslim; Bahrain is 81.2 percent Muslim, Brunei Darussalam is 67 
percent Muslim, Cyprus is 18 percent Muslim, and Qatar is 77.5 percent Muslim.  Although Croatia played a role in 
the Bosnian War of the mid-1990s (a conflict with strong religious overtones), the region‘s Muslim population is 
largely confined to Bosnia.  According to the World Factbook, Croatia is only 1.3 percent Muslim, while Bosnia is 
40 percent Muslim.  Thus, there is no strong rationale for excluding Croatia from the list of Western countries.  
Moreover, none of the hit squad attacks occurred in Croatia, so its inclusion or exclusion have no immediate impact 
on this analysis.  
Andorra Estonia Japan Portugal
Argentina Finland South Korea Singapore*
Australia* France* Latvia Slovakia
Austria Germany Liechtenstein Slovenia
Barbados Greece Lithuania Spain
Belgium* Hong Kong, China (SAR) Luxembourg Sweden
Canada Hungary Malta Switzerland
Chile Iceland Netherlands United Kingdom*
Croatia Ireland New Zealand United States*
Czech Republic Israel* Norway*
Denmark* Italy Poland
Nations With an HDI Ranking of "Very High" and No Strong Islamic Influences
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Once used to filter an agent x event matrix depicting the 90 events strongly-tied to al-
Qaida, these HDI scores classified 64 events in the first Baleian category and 26 events in the 
second Baleian category.  In order to provide a sense of change over time, figures 3.2 through 
3.4 list event totals by year for the first three divisions in the Baleian typology, while Appendix 
G, located at the end of the study, provides a full listing of the events that fall in each category.  
However, it is necessary to include a final note on interpretation before presenting these figures: 
caution is merited because these statistics say nothing about the size of events.  The chart counts 
major events like the 9/11attacks in the same fashion as aborted plots, such as the strike against 
the 2000 Sydney Olympics that Hambali planned, but never executed,11 or the 2000 plot against 
the Israeli Embassy in Canberra that was initiated and then later abandoned by Jack Roche, a 
British-born convert to Islam who received explosives training at an al-Qaida camp in 
Afghanistan and met with bin Laden.12  Similarly, it is important to remember that this analysis 
attempted to exclude events conducted in the context of insurgency, so the counts are not 
representative of al-Qaida‘s total involvement in violence.   
                                                          
11 "Fed: man denies links to plans for Olympic terror attack," AAP Newsfeed, December 3, 2002; Cameron Stewart 
and Colleen Egan, "A word from the wise - 'They approached me and said this man wants to make some attacks on 
things . . . And what do you want to do about it?' -- Sheik Mohammed Omran," Weekend Australian, October 18, 
2003. 
12 Kate McGeown, "Jack Roche: The naïve militant," BBC News, June 1, 2004; Liza Kappelle and Karen Valenti, 
"Fed: Roche in court again over terror conspiracy," AAP Newsfeed, November 27, 2002. 
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Figure 3.2: Events in the First Category of the Baleian Typology 
 
 
  
134 
 
Figure 3.3: Events in the Second Category of the Baleian Typology 
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Figure 3.4: Events in the Third Category of the Baleian Typology 
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3.4 CONSIDERING TIME 
 In order to determine the quantity of events that fall into the fourth Baleian category, 
namely that containing attacks and plots tied to individuals who formerly held strong ties to al-
Qaida and now operate independent of the organization, it is necessary to begin by considering 
the impact of time and find all those individuals in the data who made clear breaks with al-Qaida.  
This study defines a ―clear break‖ as a minimum gap of two years since an individual last held 
modeled-membership in al-Qaida or trained in a bin Laden-funded camp.  Although in the real 
world two years without contact represents a substantial enough separation to consider ties with 
al-Qaida broken, the ambiguities inherent to the open-source data on terrorism and the resulting 
fuzziness of the model‘s ability to time organizational affiliations dictate cautious interpretation 
of these alumni‘s role in terrorism.  There is a possibility that some of the separations evident in 
the data are false and result because ties were well-hidden, rather than absent.   
 Consider Bilal Khazal as an example.  His historical ties to al-Qaida are clear; he trained 
in Afghanistan circa 1998 and met with both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Usama bin Laden.  Press 
reports even allege that CIA analysts described Khazal as an al-Qaida member.13  However, 
Khazal vanished from the data after these initial interactions and did not reemerge until 2002, 
when he played a role in the funding, logistical support, and possibly also the planning of a 
bombing perpetrated against a McDonald‘s franchise in Lebanon.14  Although the data contains 
no additional information on his interactions with members of bin Laden‘s organization in the 
four years between his training and the bombing, there is a strong chance that data paucity 
                                                          
13 Sally Neighbor, "Dangerous liaisons in two countries tied by blood and radical Islam," The Australian (Australia), 
July 2, 2007; Mark Coultan and Ellen Connolly, "The baggage of Bilal Khazal; Insight," Sydney Morning Herald 
(Australia), June 4, 2004. 
14 Specifically, Khazal‘s name reemerged in connection with Mohammed Yehia Kaaki and Saleh Jamal, an 
Australian citizen of Australian descent.  For details, see: "Australia to open way to extradite terrorist suspects to 
Lebanon," Agence France Presse, September 15, 2003; "Terror bombing financiers hiding in Sydney," The Daily 
Telegraph (Sydney), December 23, 2003; Catherine Taylor, "Botched McDonald's bomb plot exposed global chain," 
The Australian, September 22, 2003. 
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caused Khazal to seem falsely separated from al-Qaida.  Consequently, cautious interpretation is 
again necessary, because the timing and duration of individuals‘ membership in al-Qaida is 
sensitive to new information. 
With this caveat, al-Qaida‘s alumni were tied to a total of 61 events that do not otherwise 
involve active members of bin Laden‘s organization.  Unfortunately, data restrictions preclude a 
more nuanced characterization that considers the strength of this involvement.  The vast majority 
of these alumni events occur in regions characterized by poor media coverage and legal systems 
that lack transparency, making it impossible to obtain the detailed information necessary to 
reliably estimate the scale of former al-Qaida members‘ involvement in events. 
Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam (a.k.a. Abu Usama al-Kini) offers an example.  After 
training in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, he played a key logistical role in the 1998 bombing of 
the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, by helping other members of the attack team to acquire 
vehicles, safe houses, and explosive detonators.15  He then vanished to Pakistan and did not 
reemerge in an operational context until 2007, when he was involved in an assassination attempt 
on Benazir Bhutto, which failed to kill the Pakistani politician, but caused nearly 150 other 
deaths.16  However, the available information on Msalam‘s role in this attack is limited to two 
passing comments made in the news media following his death in a drone strike in 2009: 
(1) ―Kini was also thought to have been behind an unsuccessful attempt on the life of former 
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was later killed in a separate attack, US 
officials said.‖ (BBC News)17   
 
                                                          
15 USA v. Usama bin Laden, et al (Defendants), United States District Court Southern District of New York (S(7) 98 
Cr. 1023), Day 19 of testimony (March 19, 2001); Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Bombings of the Embassies of 
the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998," (Declassified 
Summary of FBI Investigation Report), November 18, 1998. 
16 For casualty statistics on the attack, see: Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the facts and 
circumstances of the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, April 15, 2010.  
For information on Msalam‘s involvement in the attack, see the two citations below. 
17 ―Pakistan al-Qaeda leaders 'dead,'‖ BBC News, January 9, 2009. 
138 
 
(2) ―Al-Kini was also linked to a failed assassination attempt on late Pakistani prime minister 
Benazir Bhutto when she returned to Pakistan in October 2007. She was killed two 
months later in a gun and suicide attack in Rawalpindi.‖ (Agence France Press)18 
 
Moreover, the only other accounts that provide any detailed information on the 
participants in the 2007 attack implied that Qari Saifullah Akhtar, a HUJI leader arrested on 
terror charges in 2004 and then released under mysterious circumstances the following year,19 
bore responsibility for the attack.  For example, the Washington Post stated: 
 ―Qari Saifullah Akhtar, who has been in Pakistani police custody before, was arrested Monday 
in the eastern city of Lahore for alleged involvement in the October suicide bombing in Karachi 
that hit Bhutto's homecoming parade when she returned from exile, Interior Minister Hamid 
Nawaz said.‖20 
 
Without additional information that is not currently in evidence, it would be unfair to draw 
detailed conclusions about the relative scale of Msalam and Akhtar‘s involvement, or to 
conclude that Msalam‘s ties to bin Laden‘s organization were ongoing.  Therefore, figure 3.5, 
which lists the number of events that fall into the fourth Baleian category, provides a rough 
approximation of the role that al-Qaida‘s alumni play in terrorism, rather than a refined estimate.   
  
                                                          
18 "Top al-Qaida operative in Pakistan set up major attacks: officials," Agence France Presse, January 9, 2009. 
19 "Top militant accused of bombing Benazir's Karachi rally arrested," Hindustan Times, February 27, 2008. 
20 "World in Brief," Washington Post, February 27, 2008. 
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Figure 3.5: Events in the Fourth Baleian Category 
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3.5 CONSIDERING IDEOLOGY 
Clive Williams, whose analysis of the nature of relationships among violent Islamists 
contributed greatly to the ontology this analysis used to classify link types, provides an excellent 
starting point for the discussion of plots and events tied to al-Qaida via ideological and uncertain 
ties.  Because links include ―anything serving to connect one part or thing with another,‖21 
Williams concluded that it is difficult to find any Salafist-motivated event that is not connected 
to al-Qaida by at least some measure of diffuse ideological overlap.  Consequently, bounding an 
inquiry into this class of events is exceptionally challenging. 
In order to avoid conflating al-Qaida, as an organization, with the broader Islamist terror 
movement, this analysis included in this category only those events that demonstrate explicit 
ideological ties to bin Laden‘s organization or its members, as demonstrated by statements of 
support for the organization or its leaders, documented possession of propaganda materials 
produced by the organization or its members, or documented online viewing of propaganda 
materials produced by the organization or its members.  However, two factors complicate this 
effort.  First, open-sources rarely, if ever, contain full information on terrorists‘ reading and 
viewing habits.  Consequently, the full extent of their adherence to al-Qaida‘s specific vision of 
jihad is often subject to debate. 
Shahawar Matin Siraj, a 24 year-old native of Karachi, Pakistan, arrested for plotting to 
bomb New York‘s Herald Square in 2004, offers an example.  As he was born into the Ismaili 
sect, a Shia group known for its secularism, he had no family history of Sunni extremism.22  He 
                                                          
21 The Macquarie Dictionary, quoted in Clive Williams M.G., ―The Question of ‗Links‘ Between Al Qaeda and 
Southeast Asia,‖ in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, eds., After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast 
Asia, (Singapore: World Scientific and the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 83. 
22 Amy Goodman, ―Police Entrapment in Terror Case?  NYC Subway Bomb Plotter Says He Was Set Up By Paid 
NYPD Informant,‖ an interview with Martin Stolar (Siraj‘s Attorney), January 10, 2007; available online: 
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/1/10/police_entrapment_in_terror_case_nyc 
141 
 
apparently became radicalized after immigrating illegally to the United States in 1999 and taking 
work in an Islamic bookshop, where he became an avid reader of fundamentalist literature.23  
Unfortunately, the record contains no information on the specific authors that he read.  It is 
impossible to judge how great an impact al-Qaida ideologues had on his thoughts, because Siraj 
both praised and criticized bin Laden‘s organization.  He reportedly told one undercover officer 
that bin Laden was ―a talented brother and a great planner‖ whom he hoped had ―planned 
something big for America,‖24 yet in conversations recorded by another informant, Siraj stated 
that al-Qaida planners‘ reliance on suicide bombers demonstrated a lack of talent25 and argued 
that bombings should cause ―No killing.  Only economic problems.‖26 Thus, labeling him as an 
―al-Qaida inspired terrorist‖ may overstate the case, but it is also easy to see how a lack of 
information on terrorists‘ specific reading habits or online activity could lead to an under-
estimation of al-Qaida‘s ideological role in other cases. 
A second related issue concerns the lack of nuance found in many estimations of al-
Qaida‘s ideological role in terror plots.  Observers, even those with access to detailed 
information on terrorists‘ personal histories, are often far too casual in their usage of al-Qaida‘s 
name.  They often attribute a role to the organization where none exists, thereby causing the very 
type of conflation that this analysis hopes to avoid. 
                                                          
23 Craig Horowitz, ―Anatomy of a Foiled Plot: Two would-be bombers of the Herald Square subway station find that 
three is a crowd,‖ New York Magazine, May 21, 2005; available online: 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/features/10559/; John Kreiser, ―The Cost of Cooperation,‖ CBS News, September 
10, 2009; available online: http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500690_162-
2012224.html?pageNum=2&tag=contentMain;contentBody; Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in 
the West: The Homegrown Threat, NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007; and U.S. Department of Justice, ―Shahawar 
Matin Siraj Sentenced to Thirty Years of Imprisonment for Conspiring to Place Explosives at teh 34 th Street Subway 
Station in New York,‖ January 8, 2007. 
24 Tom Hays, ―Jurors Asked to Name Bomb Plot Mastermind,‖ Associated Press Online, May 22, 2006. 
25 Rashbaum, ―Terror Jury Hears Talk of Bombing Subway Stop.‖ 
26 Harper’s Magazine reproduced excerpts of the conversations recorded by the informant; see: ―Band of Brothers,‖ 
Harper’s Magazine, October 2006; available online: http://harpers.org/archive/2006/10/0081216.  
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As an example, consider the 2007 plot against JFK airport.  Following the arrest of the 
key perpetrators, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a statement emphasizing that the plotters 
―attempted to enlist support from prominent international terrorist groups and leaders . . . . 
[including] Adnan El Shukrijumah, an al Qaeda leader.‖27   However, the details of the case 
suggest that the plotters had no affinity for al-Qaida‘s Sunni vision of Islam, much less that they 
attempted to enlist the organization‘s logistical support.   
Russell Defreitas, an American citizen of Guyanese birth who initiated the JFK plot, was 
apparently motivated by long-standing resentment over America‘s role in the Palestinian conflict 
and sympathized especially strongly with the plight of Hizballah, a Shia organization, in the 
2006 Lebanon War.28  Abdul Kadir, a former member of the Guyanese Parliament and the plot‘s 
other primary planner, had once used his elected position to spy for the benefit of Iran,29 and felt 
spiritually obligated to follow fatwas (religious decrees) issued by the Shia clerics who rule that 
country.30  He even sent two of his children to study Shia Islam in Tehran.31  Given this 
information, it seems a stretch to conclude that al-Qaida‘s vision of a global Sunni theocracy 
held any particular appeal for these Shia-motivated plotters.   
How then did Shukrijumah‘s name come-up in relation to the case?  It seems that the 
plotters discussed him somewhat in passing.  Because his father had been born in Guyana, 
Shukrijumah shared aspects of the plotters‘ ethno-national heritage,32 and they held him in 
                                                          
27 U.S. Department of Justice, ―Addul Kadir Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack 
at JFK,‖ December 15, 2010.  
28 USA v. Russel Defreitas, Kareem Ibrahim, Abdul Kadir, and Abdel Nur (Defendants), United States District 
Court Eastern District of New York, Complaint of Robert Addonizio, June 1, 2007. 
29 U.S. Department of Justice, ―Abdul Kadir Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack 
at JFK,‖ December 15, 2010. 
30 ―Abdul Kadir Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK.‖ 
31 Letta Tayler, ―Profile of Abdul Kadir: Disbelief in His Hometown,‖ Newsday (New York), June 4, 2007. 
32 ―Breaking News: Adnan el-Shukrijumah new head of al-Qaeda operations – FBI tells Associated Press,‖ Stabroek 
News (Guyana), August 6, 2010; available online: http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/archives/08/06/breaking-
news-adnan-el-shukrijumah-new-head-of-al-qaeda-operations-%E2%80%93-fbi-tells-associated-press/.  For a 
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fawning adoration as an example of what motivated Guyanese Muslims can accomplish in 
jihad.33  According to one law-enforcement official who held full access to the unedited 
recordings made by informants involved in the case against Defreitas and Kadir, Shukrijumah 
had ―no connection with the operation.‖34  While definitive assessments cannot be made until the 
transcripts of the recorded conversations become publically available, it seems quite likely that 
the justice department overstated the extent of the JFK plotters‘ ideological overlap with al-
Qaida when they suggested that the team led by Defreitas and Kadir actively sought the support 
of bin Laden‘s organization. 
Unfortunately, the JFK case is somewhat unique in the level of detail available from 
open-sources.  Researchers rarely have access to enough data to probe the accuracy of official 
characterization of events and must simply trust that the authorities are correct when they assert 
the existence of ideological links between a plot or attack and al-Qaida.  An over-estimation of 
the organization‘s role in Islamist terrorism may consequently result.  For all of the ambiguity 
inherent to estimating other aspects of al-Qaida‘s participation in terrorist events, determining 
the number of events with explicit ideological ties to the organization is likely the most difficult 
challenge of all.  Therefore, figure 3.6, which lists the number of plots and attacks that display 
demonstrable explicit ideological ties to al-Qaida without otherwise involving active members of 
the organization or its alumni, should be interpreted with according cynicism. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
detailed account of the life of Adnan‘s father, Gulshair Shukrijumah, see: Joe Kaufman and Belia Rabinowitz, 
―Father Knows Terrorism Best,‖ FrontPage Magazine, October 27, 2003; available online from the Militant Islam 
Monitor: http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/4.   
33 Nicole Bode, et al, ―CIA Tip Grounded Horror,‖ Daily News (NY), June 5, 2007. 
34 Quoted in Bode, et al. 
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Figure 3.6: Events in the Fifth Baleian Category 
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3.6 CONSIDERING THE REMAINDER 
Methodologically speaking, it is fairly easy to determine the events that fall into the 
remaining typological category, which deals with events that display no links of any kind to al-
Qaida.  All plots and attacks that appear in the snowball sample, but do not fall into any of the 
preceding categories belong here.  Because these events fall outside of this study‘s explicit focus 
on al-Qaida, they are not analyzed in any great detail.  Figure 3.7 lists the plots and attacks that 
fall into this category by year.  
 
Figure 3.7: Events in the Sixth Baleian Category 
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3.7 TRENDS 
Although this analysis does not conduct any detailed analysis of the events that fall into 
the sixth Baleian category, they provide an appropriate starting place for discussing overall 
trends in the data, because these events make it possible to scale the size of the other categories 
relative to the broader phenomenon of Islamist terrorism.  Simple arithmetic dictates that 
dividing the number of events in each category by the total number of events in the sample will 
yield comparative ratios that describe the categories‘ relative frequencies.  Moreover, if the 
snowball sample, which like all data samples is an incomplete approximation of a larger 
population, accurately represents the whole of Islamist terrorism, then these ratios describe the 
frequency with which these patterns exist in the real world.  The upper graph in figure 3.9 
provides a summary view that depicts these frequencies in a single static snapshot that captures 
all of the data, and the lower graphs in figure 3.9 provide a sense of how these patterns have 
shifted over time by presenting annualized totals.  The middle figure shows raw numbers and 
clearly depicts fluctuations in overall scale, and the bottom figure repeats the information in 
percent terms, in order to depict annual changes in the relative frequency of each category in the 
Baleian typology. 
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Figure 3.8 Overall Trends in al-Qaida’s Role in Islamist Terrorism 
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3.7.1 CATEGORY 1 
The number of terror events in which al-Qaida has played a strong role and that took 
place outside the West has fluctuated greatly over time, and fell off sharply after 2004.  As the 
paragraphs below outline in brief, these trends likely result from changes in al-Qaida‘s 
operational environment.  Given that this analysis largely excludes events conducted outside the 
context of insurgency, it would be premature to conclude that the organization has ceased to play 
a strong role in operations conducted outside the West; instead, al-Qaida‘s non-Western 
activities may have simply changed in type, as circumstances have forced the organization to 
engage in irregular warfare against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The first non-Western event in which al-Qaida played a strong role took place in 1990, 
when Abu Hafs al-Masry, a founding member of bin Laden‘s organization, orchestrated the 
murder of Rifaat al-Mahgoub, the speaker of the Egyptian parliament.35  Aside from this largely 
individual role, al-Qaida‘s first strong organizational role in an event took place in 1993, when 
the organization played a role in an attack in Yemen on a hotel housing U.S. servicemen 
preparing to deploy to the humanitarian conflict in Somalia.36  The following year, al-Qaida‘s 
activity spiked, largely as a result of the multi-national activities of Ramzi Yousef, who 
graduated from al-Qaida‘s Khaldan Camp,37 before heading to the Philippines for the first time, 
where he met Aburajak Janjalani,38 who was both the founder of ASG39 and a disciple of Abdul 
                                                          
35 Andrew Buncombe, "Bin Laden deputy killed in air strikes, claims US officials," The Independent (London), 
November 17, 2001. 
36 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 
p. 59. 
37 Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," The New Yorker, 
September 13, 2010. 
38 "Abdul Basit Balochi (Mahmoud Kareem), alias Ramzi Ahmed Yousef," Washingtonpost.com, September 12, 
2007. 
39 Robert H. Reid, "Government says Abu Sayyaf links extend through Afghanistan to Middle East," Associated 
Press Worldstream, April 9, 1995. 
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Rasool Sayyaf,40 an Afghan trainer whom bin Laden had funded since the mid-1980s41 and with 
whom Yousef‘s uncle, KSM, forged exceptionally close bonds.42   
Yousef was heavily involved in a host of daring plots in Manila in 1994 and 1995, 
granting al-Qaida a strong role in these events.  He considered assassinating President Bill 
Clinton and Pope John Paul II during their respective visits to the Philippines,43 and Yousef 
orchestrated the Bojinka plot, which sought to use timed, liquid-based explosive devices to 
simultaneously bring-down a dozen U.S.-flagged jetliners over the Pacific.44  However, Yousef 
also attempted to bomb the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1994 (the plot only failed because his 
driver crashed the bomb-truck en route to the attack site) and played a leading role in an attack 
on a Shiite shrine in Iran.45 
In 1996 and 1997, al-Qaida played no strong role in the conduct of attacks because of two 
factors.  First, Ramzi Yousef was captured in Pakistan, when a student he was attempting to 
recruit into jihad turned-in the terrorist to obtain the multi-million dollar reward the U.S. State 
Department had offered for his capture.46  Second, al-Qaida lost its sanctuary in the Sudan.  
Hassan al-Turabi, the nation‘s leader, bowed to Western pressure and formally expelled bin 
Laden.  The dissident Saudi‘s financial resources were greatly depleted by the move, because it 
                                                          
40 International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia 
Report No. 63, August 26, 2003. 
41 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to 
September 10, 2001, (New York: Penguin, 2004). 
42 McDermott. 
43 "Report: Bin Laden plotted to kill Clinton," United Press International, August 25, 1998; "Police in Philippines 
searching for Muslims in Yousef's cell," Associated Press, February 14, 1995; Robert H. Reid, "Philippines links 
Trade Center suspect to series of bizarre plots," Associated Press, March 27, 1995; James Bone and Alan Road, 
"Terror by degree," The Times (London), October 18, 1997. 
44 Chitra Ragavan, Nacy L. Bentrup, Ann M. Wakefield, Shelia Thalhimer, and Monica m. Ekman, "Tracing terror's 
roots," U.S. News and World Report, February 24, 2003; "Key World Trade bomb figure's trial set," United Press 
International, January 25, 1996; Dale L. Watson, "Prepared statement by Dale L. Watson, Section Chief, 
International Terrorism Operations Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Subcommittee Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information," Federal News Service, February 24, 1998. 
45 Reid, Bone and Rhode. 
46 Ragavan, et al; Greg Myre, "Police arrest friend of Yousef," Associated Press, February 10, 1995. 
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forced him to leave behind a host of businesses and properties in the greater Khartoum area.47  
Bin Laden found a new home in Afghanistan, but his initial relationship with the Taliban was 
shaky, and his organization did not yet have the same freedom of latitude it had enjoyed during 
the bulk of its time in the Sudan.48  Effectively, 1996 and 1997 were lean years for al-Qaida as an 
organization. 
The numbers partially belie the extent of al-Qaida‘s strong involvement in terror events 
outside the West over the next few years, because each of the organization‘s events was 
particularly large in scale.  In 1998, al-Qaida conducted a pair of large attacks in East Africa, 
where it targeted U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.49   That same 
year, the organization also plotted to use Stinger missiles against American targets in Saudi 
Arabia,50 and owing to ties between Usama bin Laden and Omar al-Khatab, a principle planner 
of the 1999 Moscow bombings, which injured more than 200,51 the model also attributes al-
Qaida with a strong role in that Russian attack. 
Similarly, in 2000, the organization attempted to bomb the U.S.S. The Sullivans when the 
ship was in port in Yemen, but the attack failed when the watercraft bearing the explosives sank 
under their weight.  This failure served as a learning experience, because later that year, the 
organization conducted a successful attack on the U.S.S. Cole using identical maritime tactics.52 
                                                          
47 USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 9 
48 9/11 Commission Report, p. 63. 
49 "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
August 7, 1998.‖ 
50 High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, avaialble online: 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/. 
51 "Campaign against terrorism: What became of his lieutenants?" The Independent (London), November 26, 2001. 
52 United State of America v. Jamal Ahmed Mohamed Ali Al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso, Defendants (Indictment 
S12 98 Cr. 1023), United States District Court Southern District of New York. 
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In 2001, the organization plotted against Israeli embassies in India, Azerbaijan, the 
Philippines, and Australia,53 and considered attacking the Panama canal, before abandoning the 
idea.54   The following year saw al-Qaida conduct more attacks in Eastern Africa, when members 
of the organization led attacks on a Mombasa hotel frequented by Israeli tourists and attempted 
to shoot-down an Israeli-owned jetliner as it departed Mombasa‘s airport.55  Moreover, al-
Qaida‘s prominent events for the year included an attack on U.S. Marines on Kuwait‘s Filika 
Island,56an attack against an historic synagogue in Tunisia,57 attacks against Afghanistan‘s 
newly-formed government,58 and a pair of additional maritime plots: one against the Limburgh, a 
French oil tanker operating in the waters around Yemen,59 and the other against ships in the 
Strait of Hormuz.60  Finally, in 2002, al-Qaida was strongly involved in the kidnapping and 
murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi; however, this event differed from 
al-Qaida‘s previous patterns in important ways.  Rather than planning and executing the attack, 
                                                          
53 Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), 
Unclassified, March 10, 2007 (Hereafter ―KSM Tribunal‖); Eric Shmitt, "Threat and Responses: Skirmish; U.S. 
Marine is killed in Kuwait as gunment strike training site," New York Times, October 9, 2002. 
54 Curt Anderson, "AP Exclusive: New al-Qaida leader knows US well," Associated Press, August 6, 2010; KSM 
Tribunal. 
55 "Statement Under Inquiry of Omar Said Omar," Recorded by Superintendant John Mulalulu, Kenya Anti-Terrorist 
Police Unit, n.d. (but almost certainly August, 2003), available from Appendix C-III of Al-Qaida's (mis) Adventures 
in the Horn of Africa, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. 
56 KSM Tribunal; Eric Shmitt, "Threat and Responses: Skirmish; U.S. Marine is killed in Kuwait as gunment strike 
training site," New York Times, October 9, 2002. 
57 Mark Hosenball, Steve Tuttle, and Michael Isikoff, "A war yet to be won," Newsweek, September 9, 2002; Terry 
Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," The New Yorker, September 13, 
2010; Pierre-Antoine Souchard, "Accused 9/11 plotter Mohammed faces a French trial," Associated Press Online, 
January 4, 2009. 
58 Phillip Robertson, "U.S. Airstrike near Asadabad," Salon.com, September 6, 2002; "Afghan government has 
'undeniable evidence' of bomb plot," Agence France Presse, April 6, 2002. 
59 High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, avaialble online: 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/. 
60 Eric Lipton, "U.S. grand jury indicts a Briton, charging he supported terrorists," New York Times, October 7, 
2004. 
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al-Qaida played a strong role in the attack because KSM reportedly purchased Pearl from the 
otherwise-independent kidnappers, before personally slitting the reporter‘s throat.61 
In 2003, the number of non-Western terrorist events in which al-Qaida played a strong 
role remained near the peak values of 2002, owing largely to the impact of several events that 
occurred along the fuzzy line between insurgency and terrorism.  As for plots, the organization 
considered shooting-down jetliners in Somalia,62 as well as El-Al flights leaving Bangkok.63  Al-
Qaida also plotted against American targets in South Korea,64 American interests in Pakistan, 
American diplomats in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia,65 and several additional targets in East 
Africa.66  The most prominent attacks were the bombing of housing compounds that catered to 
Westerners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,67 and a series of bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, that targeted 
synagogues, a Western-owned bank, and the British consulate.68  Moreover, al-Qaida members 
targeted civilians in several attacks that took place in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the car-
bombing of Shiites in Najaf69 and the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad.70  Finally, 
                                                          
61 KSM Tribunal; Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," The 
New Yorker, September 13, 2010; Al Goodman, "Spain convicts 3 on terror charges," CNN.com, May 29, 2007; 
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France Presse, February 25, 2002; "Pearl abduction mastermind identified in court by witness," Agence France 
Presse, March 6, 2002. 
62 High Value Detainee Biographies. 
63 KSM Tribunal; "Thwarted Attack Against El Al Flight," Ha'aretz, September 24, 2003 
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Presse, December 16, 2003. 
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escaped," Associated Press, June 10, 2004; Matthew Rosenberg, "AP Exclusive: Al-Qaida plotted to destroy U.S. 
Embassy in Kenya in June," Associated Press, October 24, 2003. 
67 High Value Detainee Biographies; "Saudi Bombing Deaths Rise," BBC News, May 13, 2003. 
68 Karl Vick, "Al-Qaida's Hand in Instanbul Plot," Washington Post, February 13, 2007. 
69 Edward Wong, "Iraqis report seizure of 2 aides to the most wanted militant," New York Times, January 25, 2005; 
"Najaf bombing kills Shiite leader, followers say," CNN.com, August 30, 2003. 
70 Jeffrey Gettleman, "Zarqawi's journey: From dropout to prisoner to an insurgent leader in Iraq," New York Times, 
July 13, 2004. 
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al-Qaida played a prominent role in a pair of assassination attempt on Pervez Musharraf, who 
then served as Pakistan‘s prime minister.71        
 The following year, 2004, saw a marked decline in the number of attacks on civilians in 
which al-Qaida played a strong role.  Individuals who received training in al-Qaida camps in 
Waziristan conducted a series of smaller-scale attacks in Pakistan, including an attack on a state-
sanctioned paramilitary force,72 in which the model deemed al-Qaida played a strong role.   
Several additional attacks that straddle the line between insurgency and terrorism took place in 
Iraq, such as the kidnappings and beheadings of American businessman Nicholas Berg73 and the 
suicide bombing of Ezzedine Salim, the president of the Iraqi governing council.74  In North 
Africa, al-Qaida was strongly linked to the truck-bombing of an Algerian electrical facility,75 and 
in Jordan, al-Qaida members were strongly involved in a plot to use chemical weapons.76 
 From 2005 through 2007, the data sample contains no events conducted outside the West 
in which al-Qaida played a strong role.  Although the data on non-Western attacks in not 
particularly robust for 2008, it suggests that al-Qaida played a strong role in two attacks that year 
that again straddled the line between insurgency and terrorism.  Specifically, the model states 
                                                          
71 "Thumbnails of the four al-Qaida operatives suspected to have been killed in Paksitan attack," Associated Press, 
January 19, 2006; Glen Owen, "Five guns at his head . . .  The Talibrum was seized, and back in Britain, the arrests 
began," Mail on Sunday (London), August 13, 2006. 
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75 Craig S. Smith, "North Africa feared as staging ground for terror," New York Times, February 20, 2007. 
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that al-Qaida members were strongly involved in the murder of a retired Pakistani general77 and 
the kidnapping of Pakistani police officers and state bank officials.78   
For the remaining two years in the data, the model attributes al-Qaida with a strong role 
in one non-Western event per yer.  In 2009, members of bin Laden‘s organization were strongly 
linked to a suicide bombing that used a double-agent to target American intelligence personnel 
operating in Afghanistan.79  Finally, in 2010, al-Qaida played an important role in a plot to 
conduct an armed rampage in European cities, using tactics that mirrored those that LeT adopted 
in its 2008 attack on hotels and other landmarks in southern Mumbai.80   
Given that the American-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) began in 2001 and 
assumed massive dimensions by 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq, counterterrorism efforts offer 
a plausible, if somewhat obvious, explanation for the marked decline in al-Qaida activity that 
began circa 2004.  Though the network data is quantitative in nature, the ambiguities inherent to 
both open-sources and the membership-modeling process dictate that it is ill-suited to regression; 
therefore, in order to more fully explore the nature and extent of changes to al-Qaida‘s 
operational capability, the fourth chapter will conduct three detailed case studies that explore the 
depth of training, operational capabilities, financial assistance, and logistical support al-Qaida 
made available to operatives involved in attacks that occurred at three different points in the 
organization‘s development.  Specifically, the chapter will examine (1) the 1998 bombings of 
U.S. Embassies in East Africa, which occurred prior to the GWOT; (2) the 2002 bombings in 
                                                          
77 USA v. Tahawwur Hussain Rana (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern 
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79 USA v. Hakimullah Mehsud (Defendant), United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Criminal 
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Mombasa, Kenya, which occurred during the early phase of the GWOT; and (3) a series of 
attacks that occurred in Pakistan in 2004, after the full effects of the GWOT had begun to impact 
bin Laden‘s organization. 
3.7.2 CATEGORY 2 
   Al-Qaida has deployed hit squads to the West fairly consistently since the millennium.  
According to the model‘s formal determination, the Islamic Group under the leadership of 
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman bore responsibility for the 1993 World Trade Center Bombings.81  
Similarly, the model found that al-Qaida was weakly involved (14.29 percent) in the plot to 
bomb LAX in 1999, just ahead of the millennium, with stronger roles going to the GIA and 
agents of unknown organizational membership (42.86 percent for each of these groups).82 
Therefore, al-Qaida‘s first strong involvement in a hit squad attack on the West took place in 
2000, when Iyam Farris, an Ohio-based truck-driver who also sent camping supplies to support 
al-Qaida‘s training operations in Afghanistan, plotted to attack a mall in Columbus, OH, before 
abandoning the plan.83     
The following year saw a drastic increase, as measured by both quantity and scale of 
events, in al-Qaida‘s use of hit squad attacks against the West.  Most notoriously, al-Qaida 
operatives attacked New York and Washington, DC, on September 11th.84  However, in 2001, 
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KSM also plotted to poison U.S. water supplies,85 and dispatched Richard Reid, who gained 
dubious renown as the failed ―shoe bomber,‖ to suicide-bomb an American-flagged jet as it 
traveled between Paris and the United States, using explosive devices hidden within his 
footwear.86  Other al-Qaida members plotted to attack the U.S. Embassy in Pairs, and Kleine-
Brogel Air Base in Belgium, before a series of arrests derailed their efforts.87 
The following year, al-Qaida was strongly involved in six additional plots conducted by 
hit squads.  KSM plotted to attack Heathrow Airport and other landmarks,88 and Jose Padilla‘s 
much publicized arrest in Chicago unveiled a KSM-linked plot to ―dirty bomb‖ the heartland by 
detonating a conventional explosive device wrapped inside of a layer of radioactive material.89  
Iyam Farris, the same operative involved in the Columbus plot, investigated the logistical 
requirements that would be needed to cut the cables supporting suspension bridges in New York 
City.90  Other KSM-affiliated operatives supported un-named plots by attempting to smuggle 
explosives into New York via textile shipments,91 and a fifth group linked to the infamous plotter 
explored operations against US Naval interests and shipping vessels operating in the Strait of 
Hormuz and Singapore.92  Finally, a sixth group of operatives, many of whom were drawn from 
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Southeast Asia in the belief that their non-Middle Eastern appearance would be less likely to 
rouse suspicions in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, plotted to emulate the events of September 
11, 2001, by hijacking jetliners and then crashing them into targets on America‘s West Coast.93  
For 2003, the model attributes a strong role to al-Qaida for only two events: a plot to 
bomb French-owned Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean,94 and a Baltimore-based plot to wreak 
havoc by detonating underground gasoline-storage containers.95  However, in 2004, al-Qaida 
began a series of hit-squad attacks against the city of London that stretched through 2006.  These 
events included an event widely known as the Crevice plot, in which a group of British-born 
Muslims, who had trained in al-Qaida camps, made preparations to bomb landmarks around the 
city using explosive devices constructed from nitrogen-based fertilizer, before a string of arrests, 
reportedly made after British intelligence intercepted a communique from the attack team‘s 
handlers abroad, disrupted the plot.96  Two participants in the Cerivce plot who managed to 
escape arrest were then among the suicide-bombers who perpetrated the July 7, 2005, attacks on 
London‘s mass transit system, 97 and individuals who shared diffuse links to the July 7th bombers 
attempted a nearly identical attack 14 days later, on July 21, 2005.98  Finally, in 2006, a third 
group of London-based plotters that had received training and planning help from al-Qaida were 
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arrested as they made preparations to bomb transatlantic flights leaving Heathrow airport using 
liquid-based explosives.99 
In the following year, al-Qaida was not strongly involved in any hit squad attacks on the 
West, but the model attributes al-Qaida with strong involvement in two plots that targeted 
Europe in 2008.  In the first, suicide-bombers sought to attack the mass transit system in 
Barcelona, Spain.100  In the the second, attackers planned to seek revenge against the Danish 
publishers of a series of cartoons that offended Muslims the world-over by offering satryrical 
depictions of the prophet Mohammed.101  
Finally, in 2009 and 2010, the model attributes al-Qaida with a strong role in one plot 
each year.  Specifically, in 2009, Al-Qaida deployed trainees to Queens, New York, to conduct 
bombings targeting the subway,102 and in 2010, bin Laden‘s organization played a strong role in 
a nascent plot to target American stadiums.  However, this effort toward terrorism was 
interrupted by arrests made during the course of the investigation into the previous plot against 
the Danish newspaper.103   
While this narrative suggests that al-Qaida has been fairly consistent in its efforts to 
target the West by deploying hit squads, it is important to consider more than just the number of 
operations.  The fifth chapter includes detailed case studies of the 9/11 attacks, the inter-related 
                                                          
99 Duncan Gardham, "Mystery bomb-maker 'linked three gangs,'" Daily Telegraph (London), September 9, 2008; 
Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, "Inside the terror plot that 'rivaled 9/11,'" MSNBC.com, 
September 8, 2009; Steve Bird, "Martyrdom video man thanked bin Laden for plane bomb inspiration," The Times 
(London), April 11, 2008; "Bomb materiels found buried in woods," The Times (London), April 16, 2008. 
100 Martin Hodgson, "Raids foiled Barcelona bomb plot, says judge," Guardian (London), January 24, 2008. 
101 USA v. David Headley (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division 
(No. 09 CR 830-3), Plea Agreement, March 18, 2010. 
102 Tom Hays and Matt Apuzzo, "US: NYC subway bomb plot linked to British cell," Associated Press Online, July 
7, 2010; "Rising Al-Qaeda leader spent youth in US: report," Agence France Presse, August 6, 2010; Adam 
Goldman and Brett J. Blackledge, "AP Sources: al-Qaida's Afghan head contacted Zazi," Associated Press, October 
14, 2009; USA v. Najibullah Zazi (Defendant), Affidavit in support of complaint and arrest, Garret Gumbinner, 
September 19, 2009. 
103 USA v. Raja Lahrasib Khan (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern 
Division, Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent David M. Glavach, March 25, 2010. 
159 
 
attempts to attack London in 2004 and 2005, and the 2009 plot against New York.  These studies 
demonstrate that the sophistication of al-Qaida‘s hit squad attacks and the quality of the 
operatives involved have declined steadily over time.  In short, the numbers described in the 
preceding sub-section do not tell the full story. 
3.7.3 CATEGORY 3 
 Throughout its operational history, al-Qaida has had weak functional involvement in a 
number of terrorist events.  Because al-Qaida has cooperated with a number of different regional 
organizations throught the course of this involvement, the events included in this category span a 
wide geographic area.  Relevant events have taken place in the Americas, Europe, the Middle 
East, Africa, South Asia, and East Asia. 
 Al-Qaida‘s weak functional involvement in terror events began circa 1994, when 
individuals holding ties to both EIJ and al-Qaida conducted a failed attack on Cairo‘s Khan al-
Khalili district, an area popular with Western tourists.104  That same year, al-Qaida members 
were involved alongside accomplices of unknown membership in an attempt to obtain uranium 
for an unspecified WMD attack, presumably against Western targets.105  Al-Qaida supported two 
additional EIJ attacks in 1995, namely the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad106 and 
a failed assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak that took place during a state visit to 
Ethiopia.107  Similarly, al-Qaida played a substantial (46.67 percent) role, though one that was 
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still weak according to the model‘s formal characterization, in the 1997 Luxor Massacre, in 
which gunmen slaughtered tourists visiting Egyptian archaeological sites.108 
 Al-Qaida was not weakly involved in any events in 1998, but when bin Laden‘s 
organization became active again in 1999, its focus moved beyond EIJ.  The organization 
supported two plots by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).  The first targeted sites frequented by U.S. Naval 
personnel in Singapore.109  The second targeted Megawati, the Indonesian vice president, but 
both plots were abandoned for unknown reasons.110  Beyond Southeast Asia, al-Qaida played a 
supporting role in 1999 in one plot against the United States, namely the LAX millennium plot, 
as well as in a second millennial plot that targeted Western hotels in Amman, Jordan.111 
 The following year, al-Qaida continued its support of Jemaah Islamiyah.  Bin Laden‘s 
organization played a supporting role in three attacks and one plot conducted by the Southeast 
Asian organization.  According to accomplice testimony, the 2000 Christmas Eve attacks, which 
targeted Christian churches in several cities across Indonesia in a string of nearly-simultaneous 
bombings, were undertake at bin Laden‘s behest, though JI planned and executed the attacks 
almost entirely on its own.112  Similarly, al-Qaida played a a very minor role in a string of 
bombings that JI, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front113—an Islamist 
                                                          
108 Melinda Henneberger, "A nation challenged: Italy; Men linked to al Qaeda rounded up at 2 mosques," New York 
Times, November 30, 2001; "World: Middle East: Bin Laden 'behind Luxor massacre," BBC News, May 13, 1999. 
109 Singapore White Paper. 
110 Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Indonesian Police Interview of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana 
(No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. 
111 High Value Detainee Biographies; see also, Kathy Gannon, "Camps, men tie bin Laden to plots; Investigators 
uncover details," Austin-American Statesman (Texas), March 5, 2000. 
112 Alan Sipress, "Bin Laden named in Asian terror plots," Washington Post, June 27, 2003; Verbatim Transcript of 
Open Session Combatant Status Review Tribunal for ISN 10019 (Hambali), U.S. Department of Defense 
(Unclassified), April 4, 2007. 
113 International Crisis Group, "Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process," ICG Asia 
Report No. 80, July 13, 2004; Maria Ressam, "September 11: The Asian blueprint," CNN.com, March 11, 2002; Dan 
Murphy, "Man 'most wanted' in Indonesia," Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 2002. 
161 
 
insurgent group fighting for an independent Muslim state in the Southern Philippines114—
conducted in partnership in Metro Manila on Rizal Day, a Philippine national holiday 
commemorating one of the most prominent fighters in that country‘s struggle for independence 
from Spain. Al-Qaida‘s role in JI‘s bombing of the Philippine Ambassador‘s residence in Jakarta 
in early August was slightly more substantial,115 and bin Laden‘s organization was 
approximately 1/3 culpable for a nascent plot against the Sydney Olympics that JI considered 
and then abandoned.116   
 A pattern of overlapping membership dictated that al-Qaida continued to play a role in JI 
operations in 2001 and 2002.  Specifically, the model attributes al-Qaida with weak involvement 
in a pair of inter-related plots, which initially targeted Western diplomatic facilities in Manila, 
before the plotters switched their focus to similar facilities in Singapore, when the Philippine-
based targets proved impractical.117  According to the model, al-Qaida also played a supporting 
role in JI‘s 2001 bombing of the Atrium mall in Jakarta,118 and in 2002, al-Qaida provided some 
vague support to JI-linked bombings and arsons that occurred in Indonesia and the southern 
Philippines,119 as well as to a plot against Western embassies in Cambodia.120  However, the 
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organizations‘ highest profile cooperation came in fall of the year, when al-Qaida provided some 
funding that earned the organization a minor role in JI‘s most notorious attack: the 2002 
bombings in Bali, Indonesia, which killed more than 200 and remains Southeast Asia‘s deadliest 
terrorist attack.121  
 The durable pattern of al-Qaida support for JI operations continued in 2003.  That year, 
bin Laden‘s organization played a weak, supporting role in the JI‘s 2003 bombing of J.W. 
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta,122 as well as a Hambali-led plot against western interests in Bangkok, 
Thailand.123  Finally, al-Qaida may have helped a JI splinter conduct an attack on the Australian 
Embassy in Jakarta in 2004.124 
However, al-Qaida‘s supporting role in attacks was by no means limited to JI operations.  
In 2003, al-Qaida played a weak role in a rocket attack on ISAF headquarters in Kabul, 
Afganistan—an attack that reportedly involved Hezbi e Islami Gulubuddin and the Taliban,125 as 
well as individuals of unknown membership.   Similarly, al-Qaida was weakly involved in 
several attacks that took place in and around Karachi in 2004,126 as well as in a WMD plot 
against U.S. financial targets that same year.127  Finally, the model attributes al-Qaida with a 
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weak role in the 2004 Madrid bombings, which targeted commuter rail lines and killed nearly 
200.128 
Although the model does not attribute al-Qaida with weak involvement in any attacks 
that took place between 2005 and 2007, it seems that bin Laden‘s organization saw a minor 
resurgence in its supportive role in 2008.  That year, al-Qaida was involved in the planning of a 
nascent plot against the commuter rail system that runs between New York City and Long 
Island.129  The model also suggests that al-Qaida may have played a weak role in Lashkar-e-
Toiba‘s assault on southern Mumbai, though this estimate likely results from the data‘s 
annualized nature.   
Specifically, David Headley, the American citizen who conducted the bulk of the 
surveillance in advance of the Mumbai assault, soured on LeT when the organization declined to 
support an additional operation he had begun to plan against the Danish publishers of the 
Mohammed cartoons.  Headley then began working alongside Ilyas Kashmiri, a militant whom 
some knowledgeable observers speculated might be in line for to head al-Qaida after bin Laden‘s 
death, in furtherance of the Danish plot.  Because both events took place in 2008, the model 
attributes Headley with functional membership in both LeT and al-Qaida for that year, which 
likely causes it to seem that al-Qaida played a role in the Mumbai attacks when none seems to 
have existed. 
Finally, as the result of training one member of an otherwise independent attack team, al 
Qaida played a weak role in one final plot.  It took place in Norway in 2010, when a multi-ethnic 
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attack-team comprised of immigrants from Iraq, the Uighur region of China, and Uzbekistan 
made preparations to use hydrogen peroxide-based explosives to target Oslo, only to have the 
plot unravel because one member of the team began working as a police informant.130 
 Given the wide range of organizations and regions included in this category, it is difficult 
to select representative cases.  However, the largest number of events with weak functional links 
to al-Qaida occurred in Southeast Asia, which indicates that this region offers the best 
representation of events displaying weak al-Qaida involvement.  Consequently, the sixth chapter 
explores the nature and extent of al-Qaida‘s role in five events that occurred in Indonesia 
between 2002 and 2009, in order to demonstrate how the organization‘s patterns of weak 
involvement have changed over time.  Specifically, this chapter considers patterns of planning 
help, financial assistance, logistical support, and terror training in relation to the 2002 Bali 
bombings, the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the 2004 bombing of the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2009 nearly-simultaneous 
bombing of the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta.   
3.7.4 CATEGORY 4 
 The fourth Baleian category, which contains events tied to individuals who made clear 
breaks with bin Laden‘s organization, contains 61 events.  Although a handful of these took 
place in the early 1990s, the vast bulk of events occurred between 2001 and 2010, and a 
pronounced increase began circa 2007, shortly after al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
established itself as an independent organization. 
 In terms of specifics, the majority of the early interactions took place in either New York 
or the Philippines. The model attributes al-Qaida alumni with a weak role in series of events 
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perpetrated by members of the Islamic Group, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombings 
and a follow-on plot to attack other prominent landmarks around the city.131  Similarly, given 
that Aburajak Janjalani, the founder of the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), left al-
Qaida‘s Afghan camps in the early 1990s,132 the model attributes alumni of bin Laden‘s 
organization with involvement in a pair of kidnappings that Janjalani helped to plan and execute 
in the Philippines in 1994 and 1995.133 
 The next events involving former members of al-Qaida take place in the early 2000s.  
The model attributed al-Qaida‘s alumni with a weak role in a 2000 plot to mount a gas-attack on 
the European parliament,134 as well as a strong role in another gas-plot, this one in 2001 and 
directed against un-named French targets.135 During this same period, the model attributes 
former members of al-Qaida with a measure of responsibility for two events JI conducted in 
Southeast Asia: a 2001 plot against an airbase in Singapore,136 and the 2001 bombing of 
churches in East Jakarta.137  
 Similarly, the model attributes al-Qaida‘s alumni with a measure of responsibility for 
several more kidnapping perpetrated by ASG in 2000 and 2001.  This characterization stems 
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from the involvement of Aburajak Janjalani‘s younger brother, Khadafi,138 who the model labled 
as a functional member of al-Qaida in the late 1980s because of his interactions with Mohamed 
Jamal Khalifa, one of bin Laden‘s brothers-in-law and a well-known financier of terrorism in his 
own right.139  
 In 2002, al-Qaida alumni were responsible for plots against the U.S. embassy in Rome 
and a McDonald‘s franchise in Lebannon, as well as two events that took place in 2003: the 
murder of British citizens working as teachers in Somalia,140 and a plot to crash jetliners into 
Singapore‘s Changi Airport.141  Beyond these releatively obscure events, former members of al-
Qaida also played a weak role in the 2003 Casablanca attacks, in which suicide-bombers targeted 
a host of Jewish and Western-affiliated sites around the Moroccan city.142  And the following 
year, al-Qaida alumni were involved in a second high-profile event: the 2004 plot against the 
Spanish courts, which hoped to target the trial of the surviving members of the attack-team that 
conducted the Madrid train bombings.143   
 Beginning in 2005, former members of al-Qaida played a role in a host of events 
conducted in North Africa by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, an organization 
better known by its French-language acronym, GSPC, and then later as al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM).   Most prominently, these events included a 2005 plot to attack oil refineries 
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in North Africa,144 a 2005 attack on a Mauritanian military camp,145 and a 2007 suicide-attack on 
Algiers.146 
 Although al-Qaida alumni continued to participate in attacks in locations as diverse as 
Afghanistan,147 Indonesia,148 and Somalia,149 former members of bin Laden‘s organization 
played their highest-profile role in a series of attacks involving AQAP, which formed as an 
organization when several inmates, who had been detained for their role in al-Qaida attacks, 
escaped from a Yemeni prison and began plotting events without the input of bin Laden‘s 
organization.150  Specifically, former members of al-Qaida were involved in the 2007 suicide-
bombing of Spanish tourists in Yemen,151 a 2009 suicide-bombing that targeted Saudi Prince 
Mohammed bin Nayef, but failed to kill him;152 the 2009 kidnapping of German and British 
nationals in Yemen,153 the 2009 failed ‗underpants‘ bombing, which occurred on Christmas Day, 
when a Nigerian jihadist attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden beneath his clothes 
onboard a Detroit-bound international flight;154 and a 2010 plot to remote-bomb American-
owned cargo planes in flight.155   
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In an effort to shed light on the nature and extent of former al-Qaida members‘ 
involvement in Islamist terrorism, the seventh chapter examines the events involving AQAP and 
AQIM.  Specifically, the chapter examines issues of attack planning, attack finance, attack 
logistics, and training in order to demonstrate the alumni‘s independence from al-Qaida.  
Moreover, the analysis posits that access to financial resources, in these cases revenue from 
smuggling and substantial ransoms obtained from kidnapping Westerners, enabled these 
organizations to operate without the benefit of al-Qaida‘s functional support.     
3.7.5 CATEGORY 5 
 In total, 32 events fall into the fifth Baleian category, which contains events that hold 
explicit ideological links to al-Qaida but are not otherwise tied to the organization.  A handful of 
these events, such as the 1990 murder of Rabbi Meyer Kahane by one of Sheikh Omar Obdel 
Rahman‘s followers and a hastily conducted bombing of a Grenwich Village gay bar by the same 
man, took place early in al-Qaida‘s history and were ideologically tied to bin Laden‘s 
organization because individuals outside of al-Qaida were influenced by radical clerics inside it.  
However, the majority of the events in this category occurred after 1998, when al-Qaida first 
rose to international prominence following the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa.  
Logically, this makes sense, as it is difficult for individuals to develop an ideological affinity for 
the beliefs of a group they do not know exists. 
 However, events to which to al-Qaida holds ideological ties without sharing any other 
sort of current or past functional relationship have been relatively infrequent.  The organization 
was ideologically linked to one event in 2000, namely a plot to bomb the Christmas market in 
Strasbourg, France, as well as an attack on the Indian Parliament the following year.  The model 
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found no relevant events in 2002, while 2003 and 2004 each contained one additional event.  
Respectively, they were a 2003 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, and the 2004 Leganes suicide, a 
massive blast that several of the men responsible for the 2004 Madrid train bombing conducted 
after attempting to phone Britain—likely to reach the radical clearic Abu Qatada—when police 
closed-in on the apartment the terrorists were using as a safehouse.156  
 In 2005, there were six events with explicit ideological links to al-Qaida.  These events 
ranged widely in terms of both their nature and their location.  For example, these events 
included the desecration of an Italian colonial cemetery, which was presumably Catholic, in 
Somalia; the bombing of Western hotels in Amman, Jordan; a nascent plot against Sydney‘s 
harbor bridge, which sought to emulate the tactics of 9/11 by flying a hijacked plane into the 
transportation artery; another suicide plot against un-named targets in the same Australian city; a 
nascent plot against a Christian school in East Java; and a plot to bomb U.S. piplelines and 
refineries, which a wanna-be mercenary named Michael Curtis Reynolds, who was upset about 
the Iraq War and aggrieved by the revocation of his passport, hoped to conduct for al-Qaida on a 
for-pay basis.157 
 The following year saw two unusual and entirely aspirational ‗plots‘ that displayed 
ideological ties to al-Qaida.  Both were conducted by the Sea of David, a cultish religious sect 
that practiced a syncretic blend of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism.  Although they were so 
lacking in resources that they asked the FBI informant who posed as their al-Qaida contact to 
provide them with combat boots and other basic equipment; although they had no terror training 
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beyond exercise sessions that the group held in an abandoned warehouse; and although the 
group‘s unusual religious practices would have been anathema to bin Laden‘s brand of 
fundamentalism, the Sea of David plotters hoped to bomb FBI buildings in Florida and 
Chicago‘s Sears‘ Tower in al-Qaida‘s name.  They believed that the two groups‘ shared hatred of 
the United States government was sufficient to ensure cooperation, and, like Reynolds, hoped to 
work for bin Laden‘s organization on a for-pay basis.158   
 In 2007, there were four additional events that fell into the fifth Baleian category, and 
like the events of 2005, these ranged widely in terms of context and location.  Two occurred in 
Indonesia: an aborted plot to generate terror funds by robbing Chinese-owned businesses in 
Lampung, and a plot to bomb a Café in Bukittingi, which the suicide bomber abandoned at the 
last minute.159  Two more events, both of them prominent, took place in Pakistan: the siege of the 
Red Mosque in Islamabad,160 and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi.161  Finally, 
a fifth event took place in the United States: the plot against Fort Dix, New Jersey, a largely 
botched attempt at terrorism led by three Albanian-born brothers.162   
 The following year, 2008, was far less active.  It saw only a single attack that fell into the 
fifth Baleian category, namely a suicide-attack conducted against an anti-Taliban tribal jerga that 
met in Afghanistan.  However, 2009 was a fairly prolific year for al-Qaida inspired extremists 
operating in the United States.  They were responsible for six total events.  Three of them were 
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inter-related and were conducted by the same man: Abdul Hakim Mujahid Muhammad, an 
African-American convert to Islam and former gang member, who attempted to fire-bomb a 
Rabbi‘s home in Nashville, TN, and plotted to attack an army recruiting station in Florence, KY, 
before shooting two soldiers outside of another recruiting station in Little Rock, AR.163  Another 
failed plot was conducted in Springfield, IL, by Michael C. Finton, another convert, who hoped 
to bomb federal buildings, but who never posed a meaningful threat, because his al-Qaida 
‗contact‘ was an undercover law enforcement officer.164 A similar plot took place in Dallas, TX, 
where Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a Saudi student studying in the US, plotted to bomb the 
Fountain Place skyskrapper, only to learn that he was also the target of an FBI sting.165  
However, 2009 also saw a particularly deadly al-Qaida inspired event: the Fort Hood shooting, in 
which Nidal Malik Hasan, a Major serving in the Army medical corps as a psychiatrist, 
committed fratricide at a Texas Army post, killing thirteen people and wounding another 29, 
before members of the post‘s security detail disabled him.166 
 By comparison, 2010 was a light year; it contained only two attacks that fell into the fifth 
Baleian category.  However, both of these continued the pattern of Western-based attacks 
evidenced in the pervious year.  The first of these events was a plot against the Washington, 
D.C., Metro Rail, which like the Finton and Smadi‘s efforts was another law enforcement sting, 
this time aimed at Farooque Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Pakistani birth, who was 
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aggrieved by the war in Afghanistan.167  The second event was the 2010 Stockholm bombing, in 
which Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an Iraqi-born resident of Luton, England, attempted to 
target sites around Stockholm in retribution for a Swedish satirist‘s role in creating the infamous 
Muhammad cartoons.  However, technical errors caused al-Abdaly‘s explosive devices to 
detonate early, killing him instead of his intended victims.168 
Given that Western events account for the majority of events in the fifth Baleian 
category, there is a temptation to assume that al-Qaida‘s ideological message has some sort of 
special resonance with Western Muslims.  However, such an assumption would be misplaced.  
Instead, the quality of data on events based in the West is typically of greater breadth and depth 
than that available on non-Western attacks.  This condition, which owes in no small part to the 
preponderance of court documents available from trials of those indicted for Islamist-motivated 
terrorism, dictates that it is often possible to code Western jihadists‘ ideological ties with a level 
of specificity that cannot be achieved when studying extremists hailing from othe parts of the 
world.  
These data limitations make it difficult to ascribe much meaning to quantitative 
characterizations of the fifth Baleian category.  Therefore, the eighth chapter uses case study to 
explore the nature and extent of ties that al-Qaida holds to so-called al-Qaida inspired attacks.  
Specifically, the chapter examines the paths to radicalism, the extent of planning, the sources of 
financial support, the sources logistical supplies, and the extent of training for individuals 
involved in three events that were conducted in the United States by individuals with ideological 
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ties to al-Qaida.  These events are: the 2007 plot against Fort Dix in New Jersey, the 2009 
shooting at an Army recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas, and the 2009 shooting at Fort 
Hood in Texas. 
With these broad trends in each category now established, the remainder of the analysis 
turns its attention to the cases singled-out by the preceding sections. 
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4.0 AL-QAIDA‘S DEVOLVING CAPACITY TO WAGE TERRORISM IN THE NON-
WESTERN WORLD 
 
 Because the frequency analysis conducted by the previous chapter does not consider the 
scale or nature of events, it is incapable of describing qualitative changes over time within each 
of the Baleian categories.  Therefore, this chapters adopts the perspective of structured-focused 
comparison to in an attempt to assess how al-Qaida‘s involvement in events in the first Baleian 
category, which contains non-Western attacks and plots in which al-Qaida played a strong 
functional role, has shifted between 1998, when bin Laden‘s organization first gained widespread 
notoriety by bombing a pair of U.S. embassies in East Africa, and 2004, the last year before the 
quantitative model attributed a sharp drop-off in the organization‘s strong role in a non-Western 
attacks.   
 A number of analysts have argued that al-Qaida has shown tremendous adaptive 
capability during this period.  For example, in 2004, Bruce Hoffman argued that the 
organization‘s leadership ―engineered nothing short of a stunning transformation of Al Qaeda 
from the more or less unitary, near bureaucratic entity it one had been to something more akin to 
an ideology.‖1  Similarly, in 2008, Reid Sawyer and Michael Foster, a pair of researchers 
affiliated with West Point‘s Combating Terrorism Center, concluded that ―Al Qaeda is stronger 
and more resilient than at any time since 2001 due to its ability to adapt, innovate, and 
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reconfigure its resources in response to a hostile counterterrorism environment.‖2  More recent 
assessments have seconded these opinions; for example, in 2011, Bruce Riedel of the Brookings 
Institute stated that ―Al Qaeda has always been a remarkably adaptive organization,‖ 3 and 
Norman Cigar, a Department of Defense Minerva Fellow at the Marine Corps University, 
concluded that ―Al-Qaida is an adaptive organization and has exhibited the ability to learn from 
experience.‖4   
While these authors are correct to note that the bin Laden‘s organization has 
fundamentally changed during the course of its history, evidence drawn from al-Qaida‘s non-
Western operations suggests that their shared viewpoint misstates the nature of the organization‘s 
transformation.  A comparison of the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, the 2002 Mombasa 
attacks on Israeli-linked targets, and a 2004 string of attacks conducted by a single operational 
group in-and-around Karachi suggest that al-Qaida‘s capabilities have devolved rather than 
adapted.  The average quality of the organization‘s operatives has waned over time, and in each 
subsequent case, al-Qaida has been able to provide demonstrably less organizational-level 
support to the operatives acting in the organization‘s name.  Consequently, al-Qaida‘s operatives 
have had to become more self-reliant to accomplish attacks, but the scale of their capabilities has 
declined in proportion to the extent of support they have received from al-Qaida. 
This chapter contains four sections following this introduction.  The first three discuss 
each of the cases mentioned above in succession, before the fourth offers some brief conclusions.  
In order to ensure even cross-comparison, each of the cases also follows the same internal 
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structure and contains subsections that assess the attack‘s planning, the attack‘s inter-related 
finances and logistics, and the training operatives underwent in preparation for the attack.  A 
brief comparative summation then closes each case.   
 
4.1 THE 1998 BOMBINGS OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN KENYA AND 
TANZANIA 
 
 On the morning of August 7, 1998, in Runda Estates, a comfortable suburb located north 
of Nairobi, Kenya,5 three men made final preparations to attack the U.S. Embassy located in the 
city‘s downtown.  Two of them, Jihad Mohammed Abdou Ali (a.k.a. Azzam) and Mohamed 
Rashed Daoud al-‗Owhali, were young Saudis who were slated to die in the attack as suicide-
bombers.  The third man, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (a.k.a. Harun), a native of the Comoros 
Islands, served in a supervisory capacity; his job was to make certain that Ali and al-‗Owhali 
followed through on the attack.6   
Their plan was fairly simple.  Fazul would guide the bombers from the safe house to the 
embassy by driving a lead-vehicle, a small white pick-up, through Nairobi‘s confusing streets.  
Ali and al-‗Owhali would follow in a Toyota box-delivery truck that had been filled with 
approximately one ton of ground TNT and aluminum powder.  When they reached the rear of the 
embassy, al-‗Owhali would leap from the truck‘s passenger seat with pistol in hand and would 
force the gate guard to lower the barricade blocking the embassy compound‘s rear entrance, so 
that Ali could drive the truck as close to the building as possible before detonating, thereby 
ensuring maximum damage.  If Ali was unable to trigger the explosion using the electric switch 
hidden in the cab of the vehicle, al-‗Owhali was supposed to throw open the truck‘s rear door 
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and use one of the several homemade grenades he carried with him to detonate the bomb 
manually.7  
In practice, the plan nearly fell apart.  Fazul led the team to the embassy without incident, 
but during the course of the ride from the safe house, al-‗Owhali had removed his jacket, and 
since his pistol was hidden in a coat pocket, he leapt from the bomb-truck without his primary 
weapon.  However, he was still able to scare away the gate guards by detonating one of the four 
pipe-bomb grenades he had stuffed into his belt.  With the plan back on track, he then lowered 
the barricade, allowing Ali, who used al-‗Owhali‘s left-behind pistol to fire wildly at the 
embassy from the driver‘s side window of the truck, to pass through the gate unimpeded.  
However, al-‗Owhali was unable to reunite with Ali in the melee.  The failed suicide-bomber 
escaped from the ensuing blast with minor injuries,8 but 213 others were no so lucky and 
perished9 when Ali‘s explosion reduced the embassy to a pile of rubble and scattered debris for 
nearly half a mile.10  Nearly 5,000 more were injured.11     
A similar scene unfolded 420 miles to the southeast, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.  In the 
city‘s Iala district, a working-class neighborhood of unpaved roads and cinder-block houses,12 
Hamden Khalif Allah Awad, an Egyptian who his compatriots had dubbed ―Ahmed the German‖ 
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because of his fair hair and blue eyes,13 readied himself to suicide-bomb a second American 
Embassy.  His weapon, which was hidden inside of a Nissan refrigerator-truck that had been 
specially modified for the operation, 14 was similar to the Nairobi device in terms of size, but 
differed in construction and contained several cylinders of explosive gas in addition to its 
payload of TNT.15  Moreover, unlike his counterpart in Kenya, Awad had no co-pilot or 
supervisor.   
His only help that morning came from Khalfan Khamis Mohammed, a Tanzanian 
graduate of al-Qaida‘s Afghan training camps, who served as one of the attack team‘s local 
fixers, and who had been tasked by the operation‘s now-departed leadership to stay behind and 
serve as Awad‘s translator in the days immediately preceding the attack, since the suicide-
bomber spoke no Swahili.  Perhaps because Awad made his final approach to the embassy alone, 
his bombing was not as effective as the Nairobi attack.  The gate guards prevented him from 
pulling his truck alongside the building as Ali had, and only 11 people, all of them Tanzanians, 
died when Awad detonated his weapon near the embassy‘s gate.16 
 Although al-‗Owhali‘s blunder and Awad‘s lack of support very nearly caused these twin 
bombings to fail at the last minute, the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam attacks ultimately tell the story 
of an organizational success that was years in the making.  Al-Qaida participated in every step of 
the long chain of events that preceded the events of August 7, 1998.  High-level members of the 
organization were involved in the strategic and tactical planning of the attacks, the distribution of 
funds to support the attacks, the requisition of logistical supplies needed to conduct the attacks, 
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and the training of the key personnel involved in the attacks.  A small handful of untrained locals 
served as low-level functionaries responsible for some of the unpleasant grunt work that 
preceded the attacks, but these individuals worked in ignorance of the impending bombings and 
were manipulated by members of bin Laden‘s organization.  In short, the team responsible for 
the first attacks that garnered al-Qaida wide-spread international attention displayed aspects of 
formal hierarchical structure, rather than a diffuse network structure. 
4.1.1 PLANNING 
 Al-Qaida began to conceptualize the embassy bombings as early as 1993, when bin 
Laden dispatched Ali Mohamed, a former Egyptian Army officer who had also served as an 
enlisted man in the U.S. Army since the 1980s,17 to conduct surveillance of a series of targets in 
Nairobi that, according to Mohamed, were chosen ―to retaliate against the United States for its 
involvement in Somalia.‖18  Mohamed sketched maps, took photographs, and even wrote a 
formal report describing the buildings that housed USAID‘s Kenyan offices, the U.S. 
Agricultural Office in Nairobi, and the American Embassy.  In early 1994, when he dropped-off 
the dossiers in Khartoum, where al-Qaida was then based, Usama bin Laden and Ali al-Rashidi, 
an Egyptian who commanded the logistical support cell al-Qaida already had in place in East 
Africa and who was better known by his nom de guerre Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri,19 reviewed the 
documents personally.  Mohamed claims that while studying photos of the embassy compound 
bin Laden even pointed ―to where a truck could go as a suicide bomber.‖20 
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The strength of the East African cell also began to grow during this period.  In addition to 
al-Banshiri, who was already living in Mwanza, Tanzania, under the name Adel Habib and who 
had married into a local family,21 a handful of other al-Qaida members were already established 
in Nairobi.  Bin Laden soon bolstered their numbers by dispatching an influx of new personnel to 
the region.  For example, Wadih el-Hage, a Lebanese-born American citizen who converted to 
Islam from Catholicism as a teen and worked alongside bin Laden to provide logistical support 
to foreign mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War,22 arrived in Nairobi in 1994 from 
Khartoum, where el-Hage had served as bin Laden‘s business secretary.23  Similarly, Fazul 
Abdul Mohammed, who guided Ali and al-‗Owhali to the embassy in 1998, first arrived in 
Kenya in 199424 and began working for el-Hage.25   
While these interactions demonstrate that al-Qaida was enhancing its strategic capacity in 
East Africa in the mid-1990s, the evidence suggests that bin Laden‘s organization had not yet 
decided to attack the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.  Indeed, al-Qaida was still 
scouting other targets.  In late 1994, during a meeting held in the back of el-Hage‘s Nairobi 
home, Muhammad Atef (a.k.a. Abu Hafs al-Masri), who was one of al-Qaida‘s founders26 and a 
high-ranking member the organization‘s military committee,27 instructed Ali Mohamed, the same 
                                                          
21 For information on al-Banshiri‘s alias and family ties, see: USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 5.  For his location in 
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man who conducted the earlier surveillance on American interests in Nairobi, to reconnoiter 
―American, British, French, and Israeli targets in Senegal.‖28 
 Beyond its indecisiveness, al-Qaida‘s efforts in East Africa were stalled when the 
organization suffered a series of misfortunes that greatly hampered the organization‘s 
capabilities.  In 1995, bin Laden‘s relationship with Hassan al-Turabi, the autocratic ruler of the 
Sudan, began to deteriorate, and al-Qaida lost its primary base of operations and suffered heavy 
financial losses when the organization was expelled from the Sudan the following year.29  Abu 
Ubaida al-Banshiri, who continued to head al-Qaida‘s East African operations, also died in 1996, 
when he drowned in a ferry accident on Lake Victoria, thereby depriving the organization‘s East 
African contingent of its primary leader.30  Early the following year, al-Qaida suffered its first 
known defection, when Madani al-Tayyib, who once sat on the organization‘s financial 
committee, turned himself in to Saudi authorities, sending the organization‘s leadership into a 
mild panic.31  In short, these factors locked the organization into a holding pattern, and al-Qaida 
was unable to make much progress on its East African operations between 1995 and early 1997. 
 However, during this period, al-Qaida‘s leadership also made an important strategic 
decision that served to focus the organization‘s long-simmering disdain for America.  
Specifically, in 1996, bin Laden issued a fatwa (religious decree) that openly declared war on the 
United States.  His rambling statement, which first appeared in a London-based Arabic 
newspaper, took particular offense to the deployment of American troops to protect Saudi Arabia 
from the Saddam Hussein regime.  Bin Laden called the presence of non-Muslim soldiers in the 
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birthplace of Islam ―one of the worst catastrophes to befall Muslims since the death of the 
Prophet,‖ and asked Muslims the world-over to join his followers ―in their jihad against their 
enemies and yours, the Israelis and the Americans.‖32  Thus, despite suffering setbacks, the 
organization had a clear long-term goal, namely eliminating American influence from the 
Muslim world.  
 This strategic policy soon trickled-down to the tactical level.  In February 1997, Wadih 
el-Hage traveled to Afghanistan to meet with Atef and bin Laden.  They instructed him to 
militarize al-Qaida‘s East African cell, which had previously served primarily in a logistical 
capacity that supported the broader organization.  When el-Hage returned to Nairobi, 
preparations for the embassy bombings began in earnest.  Initially, el-Hage played a leading role 
in organizing the attacks, but his involvement was short lived.33 
The U.S. intelligence community had grown concerned that bin Laden was a financier of 
terrorism, and soon began to suspect that el-Hage was the dissident Saudi‘s emissary to Kenya.  
Within several weeks of el-Hage‘s return from Afghanistan, the FBI tapped his phones.  The 
Bureau did not overhear any overt discussion of the forthcoming bombings, but el-Hage‘s 
conversations were suspicious enough to merit additional investigation, so agents conducted a 
search of el-Hage‘s Nairobi home in August of 1997.  Although they found nothing that spoke 
directly to the embassy plot, the incident spooked el-Hage.  He fled Kenya and returned to the 
United States alongside his American-born wife and their children, only to be subpoenaed to 
testify before a grand jury when he landed in New York.  El-Hage protected the operation by 
lying through his teeth about the extent of his involvement in jihad and the nature of his 
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relationship with bin Laden, but he was now effectively cut-off from the East African 
operation.34  Consequently, another man played the lead role in the tactical planning of the 
embassy bombings.   
According to the FBI, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (a.k.a. Saleh), an Egyptian who al-
Qaida had dispatched to Mogadishu in 1993 to advise Somali warlords in their fight against U.N. 
Peacekeepers,35 held overall authority for the East African bombings and was in close contact 
with bin Laden.36  He delegated significant responsibility for the logistics of the attacks to 
Fazul,37 K.K. Mohammed,38 and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan (a.k.a. Ahmed the Tall), a 
Kenyan native who had worked alongside Abdullah during the conflict in Somalia,39 but 
Abdullah also seems to have micro-managed several aspects of the attacks‘ tactical details.  For 
example, he set the attack for Friday morning, on the logic that observant Muslims would then be 
at the mosque for Friday prayers and thus would escape injury in the attack.40   
His subordinates had little say in this or other matters, because Abdullah seems to have 
practiced strict ―ned to know‖ protocols; for example, al-‗Owhali, who road shotgun in the 
Nairobi bomb truck, was not told of the existence of the Tanzanian bombing-team or his specific 
                                                          
34 USA vs. bin Laden, et al , Day 36 and day 37 of testimony (April 30 and May 1, 2001).  See also, Zill; and Steve 
Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to 
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target in Kenya until August 3, only four days prior to the attack.41  Then, shortly before 
Abdullah and the majority of al-Qaida‘s other personnel left the region in advance of the 
attacks,42 the team-leader guided al-‗Owhali though some last minute surveillance of the 
embassy in Nairobi, in order to ensure that the suicide-operative understood every detail of the 
plan.43  From that point forward, Fazul, Ali, and al-‗Owhali were essentially on their own in 
Nairobi, while Awad and K.K. Mohammed were in analogous circumstances in Dar es Salaam. 
4.1.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 Al-Qaida‘s logistical presence in East Africa preceded even Ali Mohamed‘s first 
reconnaissance trip.  As early as 1992, Khalid al-Fawwaz, who once headed the bin Laden-
funded Abu Bakr Sadeek training camp outside Khost, Afghanistan, had set-up shop in Nairobi.  
He established a car business and import firm named Asma Limited, after his daughter, and used 
the business to generate income to support al-Qaida‘s East African operations.  However, he also 
received regular transfusions of cash, which couriers dispatched by bin Laden delivered from 
Khartoum,44 so Asma Limited was likely equal parts legitimate business and front operation to 
launder these funds.  
 However, al-Fawwaz‘s involvement with the East African support cell was cut short 
when Kenyan authorities arrested him and another al-Qaida member on vague charges of 
passport violations in late 1994.  Given that Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri was able to secure their 
release by having a lawyer pay a $3,000 bribe to the police, it seems that the arresting officers 
may have just been fishing for a pay day.  Regardless of its underlying reasons, the arrest 
                                                          
41 Gaudin testimony. 
42 Anticev testimony. 
43 "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
August 7, 1998." 
44 For information on al-Fawwaz‘s association with the Abu Bakr Sadeek camp and Asma Limited, see: Kherchtou 
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spooked al-Fawwaz.  He departed for the Sudan shortly thereafter,45 and then ultimately made 
his way to London, where he was arrested on terrorism charges in late 1998.46 
 Wadih el-Hage, the same man who conveyed bin Laden‘s decision to militarize the East 
African cell, took al-Fawwaz‘s place.  After arriving in Nairobi in 1994, el-Hage established 
Help Africa People, a charity which provided identification cards, and likely also employment, to 
several of al-Qaida‘s operatives in the region.  Prior to his death, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri 
served on the organization‘s board of directors.47  Similarly, Fazul and Mohamed Odeh, a 
Jordanian graduate of al-Qaida‘s Afghan camps who served as yet another advisor to Somali 
warlords during the Mogadishu conflict before joining the embassy-bombing team in a logistical 
capacity,48 were listed as officers of the charity.49  Thus, a direct chain connected key members 
of the attack team to al-Qaida‘s earliest emissaries to East Africa, and the organization played a 
clear role in providing team members with a façade of legitimacy that justified these foreigners‘ 
presence in the region. 
 Al-Qaida also played a demonstrable role in generating the revenue streams that 
supported the attack-team.  Following the model that it had established by creating al-Fawwaz‘s 
now defunct Asma Limited, al-Qaida founded a business that generated profits which supported 
the organization‘s East African operations.50  Specifically, in 1997, Mohamed Odeh established a 
fishing business in Mombasa, Kenya, with donations he received from two sources: an 
unidentified charity, which was likely el-Hage‘s Help Africa People; and al-Haramain 
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Foundation,51 a Saudi-based charity that the U.S. Department of Treasury later sanctioned for its 
financial support of both al-Qaida52 and militants involved in the Chechen jihad.53  
 With plausible covers for its operatives in place and a source of revenue secured, al-
Qaida turned its attention toward the acquisition of the materiel necessary to conduct the 
bombings.  Fazul and Khalfan Khamis Mohammed secured the safe houses where the bombs 
were later constructed.  Fazul rented the house at 43 Runda Estates outside Nairobi in May 1998, 
for a cost of about 840 USD per month.  However, because he was not a Kenyan citizen, Fazul 
was unable to sign the lease and asked Sikander Juma, a friend of his who was also the brother of 
the deceased al-Banshiri‘s wife, to serve as his proxy.54  In June, in Dar es Salaam, K.K. 
Mohammed contacted a real estate broker who helped him to find the Iala house, which he and 
an associate—likely Awad, the suicide-operative in the Dar attack—rented for about 100 USD 
per month, paying the entire year‘s lease up-front in cash.55 
 These homes shared some similar characteristics.  Both were removed from the city 
center and sat in sleepy, unassuming neighborhoods, and both were surrounded by high walls, 
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52 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Additional Al-Haramain Branches, Former Leader Designated by Treasury as 
Al Qaida Supporters Treasury Marks Latest Action in Joint Designation with Saudi Arabia,‖ Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, June 2, 2004; available online: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/js1703.aspx.   
53 USA v. Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc., et al (Defendants), Indictment, United States District Court for the 
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which served to conceal the plotters‘ actions for public view.56  Indeed, K.K. Mohammed 
communicated his desire for a walled compound to the real estate broker who helped him to find 
the Iala house,57 but given that burglaries and home invasions are worryingly commonplace in 
East Africa, there was nothing overtly suspicious about Mohammed‘s requirements.  Even 
modest homes in Kenya and Tanzania boast high concrete walls, the tops of which are typically 
rimmed by razor wire or broken bottles cemented in place, to preclude prowlers from attempting 
to scale the barricade.58  Thus, finding safe houses that met the attack teams‘ needs for privacy 
was not an especially difficult challenge.     
After acquiring the safe houses, the team next secured the vehicles used to deliver the 
explosions to the embassies.  In July, Swedan purchased the Nairobi bomb-truck, a Toyota Dyna, 
second-hand from an acquaintance who used the vehicle to haul livestock and feed to his poultry 
farm outside Mombasa.  Swedan paid the equivalent of 10,000 USD for the vehicle, which was a 
curious price, since the owner had purchased the vehicle for approximately 3,100 USD only two 
months earlier.  As Swedan never turned-up to fill-out the paperwork necessary to transfer the 
vehicle‘s title and registration, it seems obvious that he was willing to pay a substantial premium 
to avoid routing his purchase through official channels.  Moreover, since Swedan initially 
attempted to pay the seller in U.S. currency, only to be rebuffed because the truck‘s owner was 
afraid the bills might be counterfeit,59 it seems clear that the plotters had an additional source of 
revenue beyond Mohammed Odeh‘s fishing business.  The record contains no specific 
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transactions, but given that al-Fawwaz received cash from bin Laden via courier during his time 
in Nairobi, it is reasonable to speculate that Swedan obtained funds in an analogous manner.     
These patterns largely repeated in Dar es Salaam, where later that July, Swedan was also 
involved in the purchase of the refrigerated Nissan truck that served as the delivery vehicle for 
the Tanzanian bomb.  Alongside Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian who served as a sort of 
local fixer, he negotiated to buy the truck for about 6,500 USD.  The al-Qaida operatives again 
used some U.S. currency in the transaction, paying the seller a $500 deposit in American bills, 
which suggests that this purchase also received some measure of financial support from abroad.  
As in Nairobi, the al-Qaida operatives again failed to turn-up to fill-out the paperwork necessary 
to officially transfer ownership.60   
However, the Dar truck differed from the Nairobi vehicle in at least one important way: it 
required modification to meet the operation‘s needs.  Specifically, the team was not satisfied 
with the refrigerator truck‘s payload specifications.  Swedan and Ghailani purchased it because it 
was apparently the only vehicle that they could acquire under anonymous circumstances, forcing 
the team to make-do.61  Towards those ends, K.K. Mohammed posed as a fish wholesaler who 
needed to reinforce and subdivide the interior compartment of the truck to allow him to carry 
bins of different fish to market and paid a local welder a small fee to modify the vehicle to 
accommodate the weight and design of the bomb.62    
 However, the bomb-trucks were not the only vehicles that the attack teams needed in 
order to complete their operation.  The operatives in Dar and Nairobi also used a pair of smaller 
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passenger vehicles as fleet cars that team members could use to complete errands in support of 
the operation.  In Dar, a white Suzuki Samurai, a small jeep-like SUV, filled this role.  K.K. 
Mohammed bought it in June, even before he had secured the Iala house.63  In Nairobi, the same 
white pick-up that Fazul drove as the lead-vehicle on the day of the bombings served as the 
team‘s fleet car.  It seems that the small truck was repurposed rather than purchased specifically 
in preparation for the attack.  Fahad Ally Msalam, a local Kenyan in his early 20s who assisted in 
the attacks‘ logistical preparations, had purchased the truck as his personal vehicle well before 
the operation began.64     
 The attackers‘ communication needs were similarly commonplace and were met using 
standard commercial technology.  In Dar, Ghailani, the same man who assisted in the purchase 
of the bomb-truck, acquired a mobile phone that the Tanzanian group used to communicate with 
their counterparts in Kenya.  Given that the last call made on the phone took place less than an 
hour prior to the coordinated strike on August 7, it seems fairly clear that Awad, the suicide-
operative in the Dar es Salaam strike, received his final orders via this device.65  Meanwhile, the 
Kenyan group communicated with individuals abroad by making collect calls from Runda 
Estates house.  The bulk of these routed to Ahmed al-Hazza, a friend of al-‗Owhali‘s who fought 
beside him in Afgahnistan.66  It remains unclear if these calls were purely social in nature, but al-
Hazza may have also served as a cut-out that communicated decisions made by al-Qaida‘s 
Afghanistan-based leadership to the Kenyan cell, which then relayed information to the 
Tanzanian group. 
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 Explosives, the most important resource in any bombing attack, are more difficult to 
trace.  In 1996, in an apparent effort to demonstrate his value to al-Qaida, Fahad Ally Msalam, 
the same young Kenyan who donated his pick-up to the Nairobi operation, gave Mohamed Odeh, 
one of the Afghan veterans who spent time in Somalia, a block of TNT and a blasting cap.  
Msalam then bragged that such materials were easy to obtain in Tanzania, and although Odeh 
remained somewhat mistrustful of the eager youngster, he relayed information on the availability 
of explosives in East Africa to al-Qaida‘s higher-ups.67  The organization‘s leadership must have 
approved, because in the latter part of the following year, Msalam was ordered to acquire larger 
quantities of TNT on al-Qaida‘s behalf.  With the help of Ghailani, the same local fixer who 
helped Swedan purchase the refrigerator truck, Msalam paid cash to buy large quantities of TNT 
from a mining firm in Arusha, Tanzania.  As the date of the attack approached, the pair 
augmented these supplies by purchasing the cylinders of oxygen and acetylene gas used in the 
Dar bomb from a commercial supplier,68 which likely had few, if any, restrictions on the 
materials‘ sale, as they are widely used in construction welding.  Msalam and K.K. Mohammed 
then spent the bulk of July shuttling these explosives and other supplies to the teams‘ safe houses 
in the fleet vehicles.69  
 It is also clear who played the attacks‘ most important logistical role: bomb-maker.  
Msalam, K.K. Mohammed, and other team members were involved in unskilled work, such as 
grinding TNT (the Dar team used a hand-cranked flour mill, which K.K. Mohammed cleaned 
and then presented to his sister as a gift),70 but the skilled electrical work necessary to connect 
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the bombs various components was largely the work of one man, an Egyptian named Muhsin 
Musa Matwalli Atwah (a.k.a. Abdel Rahman), who once served as an explosives instructor at al-
Qaida‘s Sadeek Camp near Khost, Afghanistan, and was also a veteran of al-Qaida‘s foray into 
Somalia in the early 1990s.71  With some assistance from Fazul, Atwah built the Nairobi bomb 
during a ten-day period that concluded about two weeks prior to the bombing.72  Atwah then 
traveled to Tanzania, where the attack team‘s less-skilled members had already loaded the 
refrigerator-truck with TNT and cylinders of gas, and completed the wiring of the Dar es Salaam 
bomb, before fleeing East Africa for Karachi.73 
4.1.3 TRAINING 
 As with logistics, al-Qaida‘s training ties to the embassy bombings began years earlier.  
The attacks‘ tactical leader, Abdullah, held the longest ties to bin Laden‘s organization of any of 
the men directly involved in the operational phase of the attack.  Following a brief career as a 
professional soccer player in Egypt, Abdullah became involved in Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and 
encountered several of the men who would later become al-Qaida members while fighting as a 
foreign mujahid during the later days of the Soviet-Afghan War.  It is not clear whether or not 
Abdullah was a founding member of bin Laden‘s organization in 1988, but by 1991, Abduallah 
held a formal position with the new group, serving as the head of al-Qaida‘s media committee.74  
When the Somali conflict broke-out in the early 1990s, he was also among the men that bin 
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Laden dispatched to Mogadishu.75  Therefore, Abdullah was already a well-seasoned jihadist by 
the time that he led the East African attack. 
 Two other members of the attack team had nearly comparable tenure in al-Qaida.  
Mohamed Odeh, whose fishing business provided some of the funding that underwrote al-
Qaida‘s operational expenses in East Africa, formally joined al-Qaida in 1992, but his path to 
radicalism began six years earlier, via audio cassette.  In 1986, while an engineering student at 
Far Eastern University in the Philippines, Odeh began listening to the recorded sermons of 
Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian preacher who served as one of bin Laden‘s early ideological 
mentors.  Odeh had become fully radicalized by the time he was preparing to graduate four years 
later, and when his father wired him a thousand dollars to help with expenses in his final 
semester, Odeh instead used the money to fund his way to Afghanistan.  He spent two months in 
basic training at al-Qaida‘s Farouq Camp and then briefly served as a medic on the front lines of 
the Afghan civil war, before obtaining more specialized training in urban assault tactics at al-
Qaida‘s Jihad Wal Camp.  In March 1992, Odeh swore bayat to bin Laden,76 and then received a 
third stint of training, this time at Sadeek Camp, where the new al-Qaida member studied 
explosives under Atwah, the bomb-maker who wired both the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi 
bombs.77  Thus, one of the attacks‘ key logistical supporters and the attacks‘ key technical expert 
had been part of bin Laden‘s organization for nearly as long the attacks‘ tactical leader.  
 Like Odeh, Fazul‘s experience with radicalism began at school and followed a similar 
timeline. While he was still a teenager living in the Comoros Islands, Fazul studied at a religious 
school funded by al-Haramain Foundation.  Based on his scholastic and religious acumen, he 
then won a scholarship to study in Pakistan in the early 1990s, at which point al-Qaida formally 
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recruited him.78  Fazul underwent training in the organization‘s Afghan camps in 1992, alongside 
Jihad Ali, the driver of the Nairobi bomb-truck, and under the tutelage of Ali Mohamed, the 
former Egyptian army officer who conducted the early surveillance of American targets in 
Nairobi.79 
 These trainees‘ paths then diverged.  Fazul returned to Africa in 1993 to help train the 
Somali fighters then targeting U.N. Peacekeepers in Mogadishu,80 and later that same year, he 
began reporting to Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri,81 the founding member of al-Qaida who served as 
the chief of the organization‘s East African operations until his untimely drowning.  However, 
Fazul‘s involvement with Somali militants seems to have continued beyond the initial battle for 
Mogadishu, because el-Hage sent the Comorian jihadist to Somalia multiple times in 1995 under 
the guises of ‗relief work‘ for Help Africa People.82  Thus, by the time preparations for the 
embassy bombings began in earnest, Fazul‘s experience rivaled that of attack team‘s other 
prominent members.   
Meanwhile, Jihad Ali bounced back and forth between Afghanistan and his native Saudi 
Arabia.  In 1997, while working as a medic of sorts in a bin Laden-affiliated guest house, Ali 
first encountered Mohammed al-‗Owhali, who would later ride shotgun when Ali drove the 
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bomb-truck to the embassy in Nairobi.  Al-‗Owhali had recently graduated from al-Qaida‘s 
Khaldan Camp, before receiving permission from bin Laden to fight for the Taliban, which was 
then losing the battle for the Afghan capital of Kabul to their rivals in the Northern Alliance.  
Perhaps because he had contracted the tuberculosis that brought him to the guesthouse while 
fighting on the front lines, al-‗Owhali was receptive when Ali told him that there were other, 
greater forms of jihad, such as martyrdom operations against the West.83   
However, Ali was not merely a cheerleader or a nurse; he made an active attempt at jihad 
the following year.  Alongside his cousin, Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, 
who later played a key role in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole,84 Ali attempted (and failed) 
to smuggle Stinger missiles across the Saudi border, ―for use against an unspecified military 
target.‖85  Thus, Ali and al-‗Owhali, who were both slated to die in the Nairobi attack, were also 
seasoned operatives who held practical, front-line experience in jihad.    
 Hamden Khalif Allah Awad, who served as the suicide-driver in the Tanzanian bombing, 
held comparable experience.  By the time that al-‗Owhali arrived in Afghanistan in 1997, Awad 
served as a trainer at the Jihad Wal Camp, another of the organization‘s training facilities near 
Khost.  As he had with Ali, al-‗Owhali formed a friendship with Awad.86  Thus, all of the men 
who were supposed to die in the East African attacks were bound not only by their experience in 
al-Qaida, but also by affinity bonds.   
 K.K. Mohammed, who played an important logistical role in the Tanzanian blast and 
served as Awad‘s translator in the days immediately preceding the attack, also first became 
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involved in al-Qaida in the mid-1990s.  His path to radicalism began in 1990, when he was still a 
teenager.  Although his family was not especially religious, Mohammed found solace in Islam 
when he moved from the tiny island of Pemba, which lies about 50 miles north of Zanzibar in the 
Indian Ocean, to urban Dar es Salaam to begin work in his brother‘s store.  A mutual friend soon 
introduced the newly-devout Mohammed to Fahad All Msalam, who later served as the embassy 
bombings‘ other key logistical procurer, and who was then visiting Tanzania from his native 
Kenya.  Msalam‘s religious zeal was apparently infectious; he convinced Mohammed that it was 
his duty to travel to Afghanistan to fight in support of the mujahideen who were fighting against 
other factions to establish a true Islamic state.87  Consequently, in 1994, K.K. Mohammed 
obtained training in Manakando Camp, before returning to East African the following year and 
becoming yet another instructor in al-Qaida‘s burgeoning Somalian operation.88 
 Interestingly, for all his zeal, Msalam did not immediately follow Mohammed to 
Afghanistan.  The aspiring Kenyan jihadists did not train until 1996, when he went through a 
basic course alongside Sheikh Ahmed Swedan, who had been recruited into al-Qaida earlier that 
year by Mohamed Odeh.89  Thus, like the attacks‘ suicide-operatives and the team‘s tactical 
leaders, three of the men responsible for acquiring the materiel necessary to conduct the embassy 
bombings were graduates of al-Qaida‘s Afghan training facilities.  
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, who assisted in the procurement of the explosives and the Dar 
vehicle, offers the sole exception to this pattern.  Prior to the bombings, he had spent no time in 
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the Afghan camps.90  He seems to have been brought into the plot by K.K. Mohammed, the other 
Tanzanian involved in the plot, with whom he had apparently formed a friendship during their 
overlapping stints in Dar es Salaam.91  However, as a reward for his assistance in the embassy 
bombings, Ghailani received training in Farouq Camp after the 1998 attacks, and then served as 
bin Laden‘s personal cook for a time, before receiving additional training in document forgery 
and beginning a career making false passports to facilitate al-Qaida operatives‘ clandestine 
travel.92  He continued to serve in this capacity until he was captured in 2004.93   
Ultimately, this evidence demonstrates that the vast bulk of the men involved in the 
embassy bombings had long association with al-Qaida.  All but one of the key team members 
involved in the East African attacks had spent time in the organization‘s Afghan camps as either 
a student or an instructor, and several of the men had gained practical experience by fighting on 
the front lines of the Afghan civil war or by advising Somali clansmen during their confrontation 
with U.N. Peacekeepers during the early 1990s.  In short, the attack team was comprised of 
seasoned jihadists. 
4.1.4 SUMMATION 
The patterns that existed within al-Qaida at the time of its first widely known attack can 
be stated succinctly.  Although there was some fluidity in reporting relationships, as exhibited by 
the persistent personnel turnovers the organization experienced in Nairobi throughout the mid-
1990s, al-Qaida was demonstrably hierarchical.  High-ranking leaders planned at the strategic 
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level by setting broad policies, as best demonstrated by bin Laden‘s 1996 declaration of war on 
the United States.  These strategic leaders also made decisions on target selection; bin Laden and 
Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri singled-out the American embassy in Nairobi as early as 1994.  Once 
broad resources were in place, middle-managers handled the bulk of the tactical details.  Until 
the FBI‘s probe scared him out of East Africa, el-Hage was responsible for some financial issues 
and for ensuring that the attack team appeared to have legitimate reasons to be in the country.  
Odeh and his fishing business were responsible for generating a substantial portion of the 
finances that supported the attack, and as demonstrated by his involvement with Swedan, Odeh 
also recruited on al-Qaida‘s behalf.  Swedan and Fazul seem to have taken responsibility for 
spending the money Odeh generated and met the bulk of the attacks‘ materiel requirements, 
often by delegating tasks to to K.K. Mohammed, Msalam, and Ghailani.  Abdullah planned how 
to use these resources at a tactical level and tightly managed information to ensure the security of 
the operation.  Atwah then served as the operations‘ technical specialist and used his unique 
expertise to wire the explosive devices, before Ali, Awadh, and al-‗Owhali served as the pointy 
end of al-Qaida‘s spear by filling (or, in al-‗Owhali‘s case, attempting to fill) the role of suicide-
operatives.  With the sole exception of Ghailani, all of these men had been formally trained by 
bin Laden‘s organization.  Thus, al-Qaida members were intimately involved in every aspect of 
the attack from its conceptual phase through its execution.  However, this pattern would not 
repeat when al-Qaida conducted its next large-scale attack on East Africa by bombing Israeli-
linked targets in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002.  
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4.2  THE 2002 MOMBASA ATTACKS 
 On the morning of November 26, 2002, two young men, Fumo Mohamed Fumo and 
Haruni Bamusa, readied themselves to die in a suicide-bombing.  Both were Kenyans and neither 
had any previous experience in jihad, but their target, the Paradise Hotel, spoke to the Islamist 
beliefs the men had adopted.  Because it was located in scenic Kikambala, a lush resort located 
along Kenya‘s Indian Ocean coast, and was just a short flight from Tel Aviv, the Paradise was 
popular with Israeli tourists seeking a tropical getaway.  Thus, Fumo and Bamusa believed that 
striking the hotel constituted a blow against the people who had usurped territory that rightfully 
belonged to Palestinian Muslims.  Armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and a Tokarev pistol to 
ward-off security guards, the men drove an explosives-laden Mitsubishi Pajero SUV alongside 
the hotel and detonated the bomb just before 10.00am local time.  The explosion killed 15 
people, only three of whom were Israelis, and injured approximately 80 more.94 
 Minutes earlier, two other young, Kenyan jihadists, Issa Osman Issa and Saleh Ali Saleh 
Nabhan, had launched a pair of shoulder-fired 9k32m Strela-2 surface-to-air missiles at a Boeing 
757 departing from nearby Moi airport, but both missed their target.  As the Tel Aviv-bound 
flight was operated by Israeli-owned Arkia Airlines, it seems clear that Issa and Nabhan shared 
the motivations of the hotel-bombers.95  Had the attack on the airline gone according to plan, 
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about 200 passengers would have died,96 to say nothing of casualties on the ground, and the 2003 
attacks would have caused a loss of life comparable to the 1998 bombings.    
 As with the embassy attacks, al-Qaida‘s hand was evident in the near-simultaneous 
strikes on the Paradise Hotel and Arkia Airlines.  High-ranking members of bin Laden‘s 
organization planned the attack, and it even involved some of the same operatives as the Nairobi 
bombing.  For example, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who had guided the Nairobi-bombers 
through the city‘s hectic streets as they made their way to the American embassy, played a 
leading role in recruiting the 2003 attack team and financing its attack.  However, the Mombasa-
Kikambala attacks also differed from the 1998 bombings in significant ways.  On average, the 
2003 operatives did not benefit from the same degree of formal terror training as their 
predecessors in Nairobi in Dar es Salaam.  Similarly, al-Qaida‘s organizational involvement in 
the finance of the 2003 operation was qualitatively different, and the Mombasa-Kikambala team 
did not benefit from the same type of al-Qaida-financed business that Mohamed Odeh ran to 
support the 1998 team.  Though still clearly working at bin Laden‘s behest, the 2003 attack team 
was more independent and far less tied al-Qaida‘s hierarchy.  In short, the organization‘s 
involvement in attacks was beginning to become more diffuse, even among those events in 
which al-Qaida played a strong role, and the quality of the operation suffered accordingly. 
4.2.1 PLANNING 
 Al-Qaida began conceptualizing the Mombasa attacks shortly before 9/11.  In September 
2001, as the airline hijackers made their final preparations in America, al-Qaida‘s leadership in 
Afghanistan gathered in celebration.  Bin Laden‘s 19 year-old son, Mohammed, was marrying 
the teenage daughter of Muhammad Atef, an influential Egyptian member of al-Qaida‘s military 
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committee.97  This event serves as a useful marker for the 2003 Mombasa attacks, because Fazul, 
who had been in hiding in South Asia since the embassy bombings, did not attend the wedding.  
Although bin Laden had invited him, the Comorian jihadist declined this honor because he 
believed it was more important for him to return to Africa to begin preparations for his next 
attack.98  It is not clear exactly how far ahead of the wedding Fazul left Afghanistan, but he was 
gone no later than the end of summer in 2001. 
 An accomplice of Fazul‘s, whom Kenyan police later arrested for his involvement in the 
Mombasa attacks, stated that the Comorian was ―in charge of the whole operation,‖99 but he may 
have had help planning the attack at the strategic level.  During the course of his Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed claimed that he was responsible for 31 
distinct terror plots and attacks, including ―the bombing of the hotel in Mombasa that is 
frequented by Jewish travelers via El Al airlines,‖ and ―for launching a Russian-made SA-7 
surface-to-air missile on El-Al or other Jewish airliner departing from Mombasa.‖100  To restate 
the obvious, the man who masterminded 9/11 claimed that he also conceptualized the 2002 
attacks on East Africa.   
However, it may be unwise to accept KSM‘s confession at face value; some pundits posit 
that KSM assumed responsibility for several terrorist plots in which he lacked meaningful 
involvement in order to protect co-conspirators still at large, to send American investigators on a 
wild goose chase, or perhaps simply to placate his own massive ego.101  Therefore, the full extent 
of KSM‘s involvement in the Mombasa operation is unknown, but no evidence has emerged 
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suggesting that he played an active role in the operation at the tactical level, and it is likely 
telling that he did not know that the target of the airport-attack was Arinka Airlines, not El-Al.  
At most, it seems that the KSM played a part at the strategic level and was one of the decision 
makers that selected Jewish interests in East Africa as a broad class of targets. 
 Beyond KSM‘s involvement, Abu Talha al-Sudani, who had been involved in al-Qaida 
since the early 1990s and who worked in a number of the businesses that bin Laden established 
during his time in the Sudan, may have played a substantial role in planning the Mombasa 
attacks.  Specifically, in an autobiography that was briefly available on jihadist websites in 2008, 
Fazul claimed that bin Laden had granted Abu Talha a sort of supervisory role in the attack.102  
However, other participants in the attack labeled Abu Talha as the operation‘s paymaster.103  
Ultimately, it is clear that Abu Talha was a crucial member of the Mombasa team, but without 
additional information on the specific nature of the vague supervisory role that bin Laden granted 
him, it would be premature to conclude that Abu Talha oversaw the entire operation at a strategic 
level. 
 On the tactical side, much of the planning seems to have been accomplished by the men 
who actively conducted the attack.  According to accomplice testimony, the suicide-bombers 
who attacked the hotel and the men who fired the rockets at the Israeli airliner all participated in 
surveillance, presumably of their respective targets.  However, beyond these individuals, Fazul 
seems to have compartmentalized information in much the same manner as Abdullah had during 
the embassy bombings.  For example, Omar Said Omar, who played an important logistical role 
in the Mombasa operation by hiring an escape boat that would take the surviving conspirators to 
Somalia after the attack‘s conclusion, knew only that ―there was a place which was to be 
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bombed,‖ but held no information on the specific attack sites or the exact timing of the operation.  
Indeed, he did not learn the full details of the attack until after it concluded, when he received a 
phone call from the airport attackers following their failed mission.104  
4.2.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
The money behind the attacks seems to have come from two sources: funds diverted from 
charity and crime.  As with the 1998 attacks, it is likely that al-Haramain Foundation played a 
role in funding the Mombasa attacks.  Specifically, the foundation distributed substantial funds 
to support the construction of three mosques in the region, but because Aboud Rogo, the local 
preacher designated as the recipient of the funds, was both a long-term associate of Fazul and a 
relative of the Comorian jihadist by marriage, it seems reasonable to assume that at least a 
portion of the funds were diverted to support the cost of the Mombasa operation.105  Given al-
Haramain‘s well-documented relationship with bin Laden‘s organization, these interactions 
demonstrate that al-Qaida likely provided some organizational-level support to the 2002 attacks.  
An unusual arrest demonstrated the role that crime played in funding the attacks.  A few 
months before the Mombasa attacks, Kenyan police detained a man for purchasing jewelry using 
a stolen credit card that he had acquired during a recent car-jacking.  The arresting officers led 
their suspect back to his apartment in search of more stolen goods, or given the corruption that 
Kenyan police had demonstrated by accepting a bribe to free al-Qaida members from jail in 
1994, they may have been in search of a quick bribe.  But regardless of the police‘s motivation, 
they found a scene of chaos when they arrived at the apartment the suspect claimed was his 
home.  Several women and one mentally handicapped man were inside, and they began a 
shouting match with the police.  The suspect, whom the arresting officers had neglected to 
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handcuff, took advantage of the momentary confusion; he slipped away and rapidly disappeared 
in the dense labyrinth of narrow alleyways that comprise Mombasa‘s older neighborhoods.  Only 
later did the arresting officers realize that their robbery suspect was Fazul, who had appeared on 
the FBI‘s list of most wanted terrorists since the 1998 attacks.106  Because jewelry purchased 
with a credit card is easily resold and converted into cash, this incident strongly suggests that a 
cycle of robbery (to acquire the cards) and fraud (to acquire items for resale) generated 
additional funds to support the 2002 Mombasa attacks, though the relative scale of Fazul‘s 
criminal exploits and al-Haramain‘s contributions are impossible to determine because currently 
available information does not describe these interactions in dollar terms.  
This second pattern represented a substantial departure from the funding patterns 
evidenced during the 1998 embassy bombings.  By the time of the Mombasa attacks, much of the 
financial and logistical infrastructure that al-Qaida held in East Africa during and mid 1990s had 
been dismantled.  Like Khalid al-Fawwaz before him, Wadih el-Hage, who led the 
organization‘s support network, had been chased out of Nairobi a year prior to the 1998 
bombings, and in the days immediately preceding those attacks, al-Qaida had removed its 
remaining personnel from the region.  The investigation that followed the bombings precluded 
bin Laden‘s organization from reestablishing itself in the region in the same largely public 
manner it had in advance of the embassy bombings, by perverting el-Hage‘s charitable 
organization and Mohamed Odeh‘s fishing business to provide cover and financial support to al-
Qaida‘s local operatives.  Without this veil of legitimacy, bin Laden‘s organization was forced to 
assume substantially greater risk in order to generate local funds to support the Mombasa 
operation.  Thus, crime was likely a financial tactic of last resort.  
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In addition to living expenses for the attack team‘s members,107 the monies generated by 
Fazul‘s criminal exploits went towards the purchase of weapons from neighboring Somalia‘s 
expansive black market.  The shoulder-fired rockets that the team used in the attempt on the 
Arkia Airlines flight traveled a circuitous route to end-up for sale in East Africa.  The missiles 
were part of the weapons surplus left-over from the Cold War and were manufactured in the 
Soviet Union in 1978, before being sold to Yemen in a larger arms deal in 1994.  The paperwork 
then becomes spotty, and the missiles arrived in Somalia either as the result of commercial arms 
dealers‘ smuggling efforts, or as part of a shipment that Yemen sold to the Government of 
Eritrea, which then consigned the weapons to Somali warlord Hussein Aideed in 1998.  If the 
missiles followed the former route, then the attack team could have purchased them in one of 
Somalia‘s numerous arms bazaars, and if the missiles followed the latter route, then they may 
have been purchased directly from Aideed‘s clan, or may have been a gift of sorts, made to 
reward the support that al-Qaida had shown by advising the clan throughout the early and mid-
1990s.  Regardless of the specifics, the attack team smuggled the missiles across the porous 
Kenyan border via a maritime route in the summer of 2002, alongside a pair of Bulgarian-made 
launchers, which were disguised by a hastily-applied coat of blue and white paint.108 
Detailed information on the source of the explosives used in the bombing of the Paradise 
Hotel has yet to emerge, but given the team‘s close association with Somalia and that country‘s 
preponderance of arms markets, it is reasonable to assume that the attack team simply purchased 
them in Mogadishu and smuggled them into Kenya via the same seaborne route as the missiles.  
Ultimately, none of the resources used in the Mombasa attack would have been particularly 
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difficult for individuals with ample funding and long experience in Somalia to obtain from 
regional sources.   
 The final materiel resource used in the attack was the blue Mitsubishi SUV that served as 
the bomb-vehicle.  It was acquired in much the same fashion as the vehicles used in the 1998 
bombings.  With money he acquired from Abu Talha, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who also served 
as trigger-man in the Moi airport attack, bought the car second-hand for cash from a local 
seller.109 
 However, in terms of manpower, the 1998 and 2003 attacks differed substantially.  While 
al-Qaida staffed embassy-bombing almost entirely with experienced jihadists recruiting from 
within the organization, al-Qaida assembled the Mombasa operation largely by recruiting novice 
jihadists from outside the organization.   Personal ties were the primary mechanism used to draw 
inexperienced accomplices into the conspiracy. 
Many of these links ran through blood and marriage.  About a year before the 2002 
attacks, Fazul moved to Lamu, in Kenya‘s costal district, and began working as an Islamic 
studies teacher under the alias of Abdul Karim.110  Aboud Rogo, a preacher that Fazul first met 
sometime around 1997111 and the same man who received al-Haramain funding, helped the 
Comorian terrorist to blend into the community by introducing him to extended family members.  
Fazul soon married Rogo‘s cousin, Amina Kubwa, and began living with her immediate family.  
These living arrangements proved conducive to recruiting; Amina‘s brother and father, both 
named Mohammed Kubwa, played supporting roles in the Mombasa attacks, as did Rogo.  
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Indeed, the data estimates that eight of the 14 individuals (57 percent) directly involved in 
Fazul‘s operational and financial network in 2002 also shared some sort of family connection.   
Other members of the team were recruited through friendship and business ties.  For 
example, Issa Osman Issa, an ethnic Somali with previous experience in that country‘s ethno-
religious conflict and who served as the second triggerman in the Moi airport attack, drew Omar 
Said Omar, the logistical supporter who arranged the attack team‘s escape boat to Somalia, into 
jihad while the two worked side-by-side.  The pair first met in Kenya, circa 1998, and began a 
financial partnership the following year, when they established a business wholesaling lobsters in 
Kismayo, Somalia.  At that time, Issa began to discuss jihad, and ultimately convinced his 
business partner that Muslims had a duty to defend their religion.  Following another move in 
November 2001, this time to Mogadishu, Issa introduced Omar to Fazul and Swedan.  Thus, the 
Mombasa operation did not benefit from the long-term, battled-forged bonds to the same extent 
as the 1998 bombings, which involved numerous Afghan veterans.  Those who provided 
logistical support to the 2002 attack were primarily locals who were drawn into the attack via 
Fazul‘s familial connections and diffuse friendship bonds, rather than pre-existing ties to al-
Qaida. 
Aside from the operation‘s leaders, Fazul and Abu Talha, there is one additional member 
of the team on-the-ground who may have had more durable ties to al-Qaida: Saleh Ali Saleh 
Nabhan.112 Another Kenyan, Nabhan would gain minor renown in later years as a member of the 
Somalia-based insurgent group al-Shabaab.  While the open-source record is clear regarding his 
post-Mombasa involvement in terrorism, it is less so regarding his early history.   
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Some sources claim that Nabhan played a role in the 1998 embassy attacks,113 but this 
seems fairly unlikely, since his name does not appear in the entire 8,700-plus page transcript of 
the trial of the defendants responsible for this attack.  Moreover, since Nabhan was born in 
1981,114 he would have been only about 17 years old at the time of the 1998 attacks, or roughly 
15 years younger than the average age of the individuals directly linked to the Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam bombings.115  Young terrorists are by no means unusual—Fahad was only in his early 
20s during the 1998 operation—but when taken alongside Nabhan‘s apparent absence from the 
trial transcripts, this evidence suggests that any role he might have played in the 1998 bombings 
was minor, and he more likely made his debut as an operational terrorist in the 2002 attacks, 
though as the section on training discusses in greater detail, he did benefit from al-Qaida training 
during the late 1990s. 
Ultimately, the differences between the pools of manpower used in the 1998 and 2002 
attacks likely represent a devolution of organizational capacity forced on al-Qaida by changes in 
the organization‘s circumstance.  Following the 1998 bombings and the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida‘s 
profile increased dramatically; it was far more difficult for known members of the organization 
to transit between countries, particularly after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 
eliminated the organization‘s primary sanctuary.  Consequently, al-Qaida may have relied 
heavily on local novices in Mombasa for the same reasons that the organization turned to crime 
to finance the 2002 operation: circumstances precluded the organization from establishing the 
infrastructure necessary to move large numbers of veteran members into the East African theater.    
                                                          
113 See, for example, "Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?" and "Al-Qaida vet 'takes over 
Somali jihadists,'" United Press International, March 11, 2010. 
114 "US troops raid Somali town controlled by fighters," Guardian Unlimited, September 14, 2009. 
115 This statistic was calculated using attribute data that listed individuals‘ dates of birth.  For the two dozen people 
the data labels as direct operational or financial participants in the 1998 bombings, the year of birth was subtracted 
from 1998, before a mean value was calculated.  
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While information on the attack‘s logistical supporters is fairly clear, few details have 
emerged regarding the bomb-maker.  There is no evidence that the Mombasa team benefited 
from the input of a specialized technician like Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah, who wired the 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombs.  Indeed, it seems likely that Fazul and Abu Talha built the 
bomb themselves. 
Both men were certainly capable of the feat.  Fazul had assisted Atwah in the 
construction of the Nairobi bomb, and Abu Talha was one of the handful of al-Qaida operatives 
that bin Laden dispatched to Lebanon in the early 1990s to receive explosives training with the 
Shia terror group Hizballah—a rare instance of cooperation among extremists from different 
branches of Islam.116  If this speculative argument proves true, then members of the Mombasa 
attack team were forced to be more functionally diverse and more self-reliant that their 
predecessors in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.  Al-Qaida lacked the ability to utilize true technical 
experts and had to rely on generalists with broader bases of terrorist knowledge. 
4.2.3 TRAINING 
 Given the nature of the manpower that al-Qaida used in the 2002 attack, it is not 
especially surprising that the bulk of the Mombasa team lacked training in Afghanistan.  Beyond 
Fazul and Abu Talha, the two triggermen who fired on the jetliner departing Moi Airport had 
demonstrable jihadist experience.  The evidence suggests that Issa was a veteran of the 
Mogadishu conflict,117 where, given Somali tribesmen‘s well-documented penchant for firing 
Stingers at American helicopters,118 he likely gained some experience with shoulder-fired rockets 
similar to the one he fired on November 26, 2002. 
                                                          
116 USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 2 of testimony (February 6, 2001); 9/11 Commission Report, p. 61. 
117 Omar statement. 
118 Blackhawk Down. 
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Nabhan, meanwhile, seems to have benefitted from Afghan training, which, it is worth 
noting, seems to have taken place during the same time period as the East African embassy 
bombings, and therefore likely precluded his participation in those attacks.  Specifically, he spent 
time in one of al-Qaida‘s camps in the Khost region in 1998, before briefly fighting alongside the 
Taliban in its struggle against the Northern Alliance.  He may have received some explosives 
training during this period, and therefore may have had the skills necessary to assist in the 
construction of the bomb used to target the Paradise Hotel.119  But regardless of the specifics of 
his training, it is clear that both he and Issa—the two individuals with the most active role in the 
airport-attack—were seasoned jihadists with comparable experience to the 1998 attackers.  
However, this pattern of experience did not extend to the remainder of the attack-team.  
Neither of the martyrs who died in the Paradise Hotel bombing nor the team‘s remaining 
support-personnel seem to have possessed similar backgrounds.  This stands in stark contrast to 
the 1998 embassy bombings, in which only a single member of the attack-team was a novice 
jihadist. 
 In order to mitigate the naïveté that characterized the bulk of the team, Fazul conducted 
his own mini-camp in Somalia.  Working primarily inside the house that the team rented in 
Mogadishu in the fall of 2001, Fazul and Issa put the team‘s greener members through some 
basic paramilitary training and schooled recruits on basic marksmanship, using AK-47 rifles and 
handguns purchased from local arms markets.  The team also had several hand grenades in its 
possession during its time in Somalia, but it is unclear how much, if any, training the recruits 
received with this or any other type of explosives.120    
                                                          
119 "Kenyan paper profiles Al-Qa'idah terrorist Saleh Nabhan," BBC Monitoring Africa - Political, June 22, 2009. 
120 Omar statement. 
210 
 
Ultimately, these circumstances reinforce conclusions about the nature of specialization 
within the Mombasa attack team.  While the men responsible for the 1998 embassy bombing 
were able to rely on the substantial organizational infrastructure that al-Qaida possessed in 
Afghanistan in the mid-to-late 1990s, the loss of sanctuary bin Laden‘s organization experienced 
with the U.S. invasion in the fall of 2001 forced the Mombasa team to be more autonomous, and 
the quality of training available to the team‘s greener members was briefer and more haphazard 
as a result.  Realistically, the leaders of the Mombasa operation could neither import pre-trained 
operatives from South Asia, nor send their local supporters abroad because the Afghan camps 
had been lost, and the facilities that al-Qaida now maintains in Pakistan were yet to be 
established.  It seems that the team was autonomous in terms of training for want of better 
options. 
4.2.4 SUMMATION 
 Al-Qaida clearly supported the 2002 Mombasa attacks at an organizational level, and this 
event mirrored the 1998 embassy bombing in several important ways.  Both were coordinated 
strikes that were planned and implemented over the course of several months.  As demonstrated 
by Aboud Rogo‘s receipt of al-Haramain funding, it is also exceptionally likely that the 2002 
attacks benefitted from one of the same types of organizational funding that supported the 1998 
bombings.  Similarly, KSM‘s possible involvement in the attacks‘ strategic planning and the 
relationship that existed between Fazul and bin Laden in the fall of 2001 strongly suggest that the 
highest echelons of al-Qaida‘s leadership initiated the Mombasa attacks, just as it had in regards 
to the embassy bombings.  
 However, this Mombasa attacks also deviated from the model of the 1998 attacks in 
important ways.  While the embassy bombing-teams followed a hierarchical model of 
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organization and were staffed almost entirely by experienced personnel with specialized areas of 
expertise, the Mombasa team was flatter, less specialized, and less experienced.  The leaders of 
the 2002 operation wore many different hats.  As demonstrated by Fazul‘s involvement in credit 
card fraud and car-jackings, these leaders independently financed a portion of their operation, 
without the benefit of the same organizational infrastructure that went into the establishment of 
Odeh‘s fishing business in the late 1990s.  Moreover, the leaders of the 2002 team served in a 
training capacity and conducted independent instructional courses instead of shipping recruits to 
study terrorism in South Asia.    
Finally, there is the nature of the team itself.  While the men involved in the embassy 
bombing were by and large seasoned operatives with long associations with al-Qaida, the 
Mombasa team contained a large number of novice jihadists who were recruited from the local 
population via friendship bonds and family ties, though on the day of the attack the job that 
required the most expertise, namely firing the rockets at the Israeli jetliner, fell to experienced 
men.  But the use of green recruits as suicide bombers in the Paradise Hotel attack and the 
general lack of experience that typified the operatives who provided logistical support to the 
Mombasa operation demonstrate that the nature of al-Qaida‘s involvement in terrorism had 
changed dramatically between 1998 and 2002.  The Mombasa attack team blended elements of 
formal organizational support with aspects of self-organizing network behavior, because a 
handful of seasoned operatives created, trained, and then supervised their own independent 
operational cell, rather than importing a full team of seasoned men as al-Qaida had in 1998.    
 The reasons underlying this structural shift were fairly obvious.  Although al-Qaida had 
successfully conducted large-scale attacks on U.S. Embassies in East Africa in 1998 and on the 
U.S.S. Cole while the American warship was in port in Yemen in 2000, the threat posed by bin 
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Laden‘s organization remained misunderstood, even among most specialists, until the events of 
September 11, 2001, focused the full attention of the public and policy-makers on the threat 
posed by al-Qaida.121  Following this shift in perception, bin Laden and his followers became 
truly notorious and received tremendous attention from the global counterterrorism community.  
The blended behavior exhibited by the Mombasa attack team represented an attempt to maintain 
the organization‘s strategic objectives, namely frightening Westerners into removing their 
influence from the domain Muslims sought to claim as their own, in a new and fundamentally 
different operating environment.  However, the attack that resulted from these efforts suffered 
because al-Qaida was simply unable to bring the same sort of resources to bear in the East 
African theater in 2002 as the organization had been able to muster during the 1990s.  
Ultimately, al-Qaida‘s hierarchical structure was a victim of its own success.  In 2004, the last 
year in which the quantitative model found a non-Western event in which al-Qaida played a 
strong functional role, this pattern again changed, and al-Qaida‘s involvement in terrorism 
became both more diffuse and demonstrably less dangerous. 
 
  
                                                          
121 For example, Richard A. Clarke, who served as a counterterrorism official during George W. Bush‘s first term in 
office, stated that ―most senior officials in the administration did not know the term (al-Qaida) when we briefed 
them in January 2001‖ (Against all Enemies, p. 31).  Similarly, in his journalistic account of the events preceding the 
September 11 attacks, Lawrence Wright described how shortly after the millennium, the FBI‘s hierarchy ―continued 
to view al-Qaeda as a distant and manageable threat‖ (The Looming Tower, p. 298).  Finally, the 9/11 Commission 
painted a similar, though more nuanced picture, by noting that members of the intelligence community had 
circulated several specialized reports on bin Laden by the fall of 2001, but noting that the intelligence community 
failed to provide ―an authoritative depiction of his organization‘s relationships with other governments, or the scale 
of the threat his orgnaiztaion posed to the United States‖ and explaining that neither the Clinton nor Bush 
administrations ―fully understood just how many people al Qaeda might kill, and how soon it might do it‖ (pp. 342-
343).     
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4.3 JUNDALLAH‘S 2004 ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN 
 In 2004, a terrorist group calling itself Jundallah, or soldiers of god, conducted a series of 
terror strikes in-and-around Karachi, Pakistan.122  Tactics varied from bombings to armed 
assaults, and targets included a Bible society, the city‘s Marina Club, a pair of Shiite religious 
sites, police targets around the city, and the Pakistan-American Cultural Center.123  Although 
Jundallah claimed these attacks in its own name, the quantitative model attributed al-Qaida with 
a strong role in some of these events, because Jundallah‘s two leaders, Atta-ur Rahman and 
Shahzad Bajwa, had received training in one of al-Qaida‘s Waziristan-based facilities 
immediately prior to initiating their campaign of terror.  Al-Qaida‘s trend toward diffuse 
functional involvement in terrorism, which began when al-Qaida blended unseasoned jihadists 
with experienced operatives during the Mombasa attacks, saw its next evolution in the events 
involving Jundallah, because instead of relying on an independent cell that operated under the 
supervision of a handful of experienced al-Qaida members, bin Laden‘s organization fomented 
jihad in 2004 by unleashing trainees of questionable competence to conduct attacks without any 
apparent organizational-level support from al-Qaida. 
4.3.1 PLANNING 
 Jundallah‘s attacks cannot be studied with the same level of detail as the 1998 embassy 
bombings of the 2002 Mombasa attacks because comparable information resources, such as 
detailed court transcripts or co-conspirator confessions, are simply not available.  However, the 
pace and nature of Jundallah‘s attacks says much about their planning.  Rather than large, 
                                                          
122 This organization should not be confused with the Iranian organization of the same name, which claims to fight 
for Sunni rights within the Shia state.  For introductory information on Iranian Jundallah, see: ―Profile: Iran‘s 
Jundullah militants,‖ BBC News, June 20, 2010.  
123 "Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases," Pakistan Newswire, September 28, 
2004; "Arrested Pakistani militants reveal plan of attacking US consulate, other target," BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, July 20, 2004; Paul Haven, "AP: Arrests damage al-Qaida network," Associated Press Online, August 
6, 2004. 
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coordinated strikes that were planned over the course of months, Jundallah initiated a rapid series 
of smaller, less sophisticated attacks. 
 Indeed, Jundallah‘s initial actions were truly amateurish and required little specific 
planning.  The organization‘s members hurled hand-grenades at a bible society located in 
Karachi‘s Sadar neighborhood in January 2004.124  Two months later, in the Ferozabad area of 
Karachi, the group shot-up a van filled with members of a government-aligned paramilitary 
organization, killing two and wounding several others, 125 and in April, the Jundallah again 
targeted law enforcement, shooting dead five officers inside Karachi‘s Gulistan-e-Johar police 
station in an attack that was more reminiscent of gangland drive-bys than the timed, coordinated 
strikes that characterized al-Qaida‘s efforts in East Africa in 1998 and 2002.126 
Later in the spring of 2004, the sophistication of Jundallah‘s attacks increased 
moderately, when the group car-bombed the Karachi Marina Club, but this advancement was not 
especially effective since the attack only killed one and injured nine.127  However, Jundallah 
apparently learned from this failure.  When the organization revisited the tactic of car-bombings 
in May, detailed planning was more evident and paid greater dividends for the organization.  
When Jundallah members simultaneously detonated a pair of explosive-laden vehicles in front of 
the Pakistan-American Cultural Center in Karachi, they managed to injure 37 people. 
Moreover, this attack demonstrated that the group‘s strategic vision of jihad had evolved 
alongside its tactics.  In accordance with al-Qaida‘s stated goals, Jundallah now targeted sites 
overtly linked to the West.  Indeed, in 2004, the organization had also planned to storm the U.S. 
                                                          
124 Ibid. 
125 "ATC hears ranger mobile attack case," Pakistan Newswire, June 2, 2005. 
126 "Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases." 
127 Ibid. 
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Consulate in Karachi using light machine guns,128 but before Jundallah could implement the plot, 
its evolution was cut short by a botched assassination attempt on the top-ranked general in 
Karachi, Ahsan Saleem Hayat.   
On June 10th, Jundallah reverted back to its previous mode of attack and targeted Hayat‘s 
motorcade in a poorly organized armed assault.  The general escaped unscathed, but 10 others 
died in the exchange of fire.  Police later found the now-bloodstained van that the terrorists had 
stolen to make their get-away, and its owner was able to provide good descriptions of the thieves.  
Within two days of the failed attack, the authorities arrested Rahman, Bajwa, and their 
immediate accomplices.  This action ostensibly eliminated the small organization the Pakistani 
extremists had founded.129 
4.3.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS  
 The unsophisticated nature of Jundallah‘s attacks dictates that they were inexpensive, and 
the wide availability of weapons in the region dictates that the supplies the attackers required 
were easy to obtain.  Indeed, by the millennium, automatic rifles had become so prevalent in 
Pakistan that journalists began characterizing the country as a ―Kalashnikov culture.‖130  
Estimates claim that some 2,000 families are involved in the small-scale production of guns in 
the Darra Adamkhel region of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) alone, and only a 
fraction of these manufacturers sell their arms abroad.131  Consequently, automatic rifles like 
those used in many of Jundallah‘s attacks sold for an average price of 280 USD in Pakistan circa 
                                                          
128 "Arrested Pakistani militants reveal plan of attacking US consulate, other target," BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, July 20, 2004. 
129 Paul Haven, "AP: Arrests damage al-Qaida network," Associated Press Online, August 6, 2004. 
130 Martin Regg Cohn, ―Kalashnikov Culture: Talking Tough on Guns in Pakistan,‖ Toronto Star, April 11, 2001; 
see also, Peter Wonacott, ―For Middle Class Pakistanis, a Gun Is a Must-Have Accessory,‖ Wall Street Journal, 
January 6, 2009; available online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123120431026355961.html.   
131 Aamer Ahmed Khan, ―Pakistan‘s flourishing arms bazaar,‖ BBC News, June 21, 2006; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5066860.stm.  See also, ―Pakistan‘s illicit arms trade thrives,‖ San Francisco Chronicle, 
November 16, 2007; available online: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/11/16/MNG4S3PBU.DTL.  
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2004,132 and hand grenades can be purchased throughout South Asia for only a few dollars 
apiece.133  Therefore, the logistical chains involved in Jundallah‘s attacks were far shorter than 
those supporting the 1998 and 2002 attacks in East Africa, and with the possible exception of the 
bombing of the Pakistan-American Cultural Center, the finance of Jundallah‘s attacks required 
little in the way of organizational support. 
4.3.3 TRAINING 
 Al-Qaida‘s role in Jundalla‘s attacks is clearly evident in the training histories of the 
small Pakistani group‘s leaders.  In November 2003, a few months before Jundallah‘s 2004 
campaign of terror began, Rahman and Bajwa trained in South Waziristan, near the village of 
Shakai, at a facility al-Qaida had constructed on the land of a tribal leader named Edia Khan.134  
Evidence which emerged following the Rahman and Bajwa‘s arrest also linked the camp to 
Masrab Arochi, another of al-Qaida planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammad‘s many nephews,135 and 
although the argument is speculative, it seems likely that Arochi instructed Rahman and Bajwa.  
Given that no evidence has emerged suggesting that al-Qaida played an active operational or 
financial role in Jundallah‘s largely amateurish attacks, it seems that bin Laden‘s organization 
provided the small Pakistani organization with minimal training, before sending its members out 
into the world to wreak unspecified havoc against the perceived enemies of Islam. 
  
                                                          
132 Clair McEvoy, et al, Small Arms Survey 2007, (Graduate Institute of International Studies: Geneva, Switzerland: 
2007), Annex 2. Available Kalashnikov Prices for Specific Countries and Periods, p. 278. 
133 Confidential informant in the employ of the U.S. military, interview conducted March 2012. 
134 "Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases," Pakistan Newswire, September 28, 
2004. 
135 Ibid; Sadaqat Jan, "Pakistan arrests 10 al-Qaida suspects," Associated Press Online, June 13, 2004. 
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4.3.4 SUMMATION 
 The diffuse role that al-Qaida played in the attacks that Jundallah conducted in 2004 did 
not spring from nowhere.  Instead, the pattern was a continuation of the organizational behavior 
witnessed in Mombasa in 2002.  While al-Qaida blended aspects of hierarchy with flat networks 
by tasking experienced operatives to build their own independent cell in East Africa in 2002, bin 
Laden‘s organization was farther removed from Jundallah‘s attacks in-and-around Karachi.  No 
evidence has yet emerged suggesting that Jundallah benefitted from financial, logistical, or 
planning assistance from al-Qaida.  Instead, al-Qaida trainers, likely Masrob Arochi, 
ideologically indoctrinated the Jundallah‘s leaders and taught them how to conduct jihad without 
outside assistance. Thus, between the 2002 Mombasa attacks and Jundallah‘s 2004 attacks in 
Pakistan, the nature of al-Qaida‘s involvement in terrorism morphed from a pattern of 
orchestrating jihad, by actively leading and supervising novice terrorists in the conduct of an 
operation, to a pattern of fomenting violence, by sending fresh trainees to conduct violence using 
their own independent resources and means.  The danger presented by al-Qaida devolved 
proportionally, because these green trainees lacked the ability to conduct jihad on the same scale 
as al-Qaida‘s seasoned members had in earlier attacks.  
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
These cases suggest that the means al-Qaida used to accomplish its strategic goals in the 
non-Western world changed dramatically between 1998, when the organization first gained 
widespread international attention with major attacks in East Africa, and 2004, when the 
quantitative model last attributed a major role in a non-Western terrorist event to the group.  In 
the most general sense, these changes were transformative in nature.  As summarized by table 
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4.1, bin Laden‘s organization progressed gradually from the direct conduct of attacks using a 
largely hierarchical model of structural organization to a diffuse network-based model, in which 
the organization trained and indoctrinated aspiring jihadists to conduct violence independently, 
without any demonstrable logistical or financial support from the main body of the organization.  
 
Table 4.1: Al-Qaida’s Declining Role in Terrorist Attacks and Plots Conducted Outside the 
West 
 
 
1998 Bombings of United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ Involvement Notes 
Planning Definite  
AQ leaders involved in planning the strategic 
and tactial details of the attack 
Finance Definite AQ provided all known financing 
Logistics Definite 
AQ members and funds involved in the 
acquisition of all key resources 
Training Definite 
All but one member of the attack team received 
AQ training prior to the attack 
   
2002 Mombasa Attacks  
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ Involvement Notes 
Planning Partial 
AQ leaders involved in strategic planning, but 
attack team responsible for tactical details 
Finance Partial  Attack also self-funded via crime 
Logistics Partial 
Attack team acquired materiel indpendently, 
using AQ funds and possible AQ contacts; some 
manpower obtained via personal networks 
Training Partial 
Attack team's leader received AQ training, but 
team members also trained in-house 
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Jundallah's 2004 Attacks on Pakistan 
 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ Involvement Notes 
Planning Unlikely No clear evidence of AQ involvement 
Finance Unlikely Low-cost of attacks suggests self-finance 
Logistics Unlikely 
Local availability of weapons/explosives 
suggests indpendent acquisition of materiel 
Training Partial  Jundallah's leadership received AQ training 
 
 
However, it would be misleading to construe this evolution as evidence of successful 
adaptation, because these cases also demonstrate a steady pattern of declining organizational 
capacity.  In 1998, bin Laden‘s group was able to support a full team of experienced operatives 
using quasi-legitimate means, as epitomized by the identification cards issued by el-Hage‘s 
charitable organization and the operational expenses partially paid for by Odeh‘s fishing 
business, but in 2002, al-Qaida made extensive use of novice jihadists to support the Mombasa 
attacks, and although the team likely still benefitted from some organizational funding, as 
demonstrated by Rogo‘s receipt of al-Haramain donations, Fazul was forced to turn to crime to 
augment the team‘s operating budget.  By 2004, al-Qaida‘s involvement had become limited to a 
training role, and Jundallah‘s team contained no individuals with demonstrable previous 
experience in jihad and did not demonstrably benefit from any sort of additional support from al-
Qaida at the organizational level.  Therefore, it ultimately seems that al-Qaida‘s ability to 
conduct terrorist attacks in a non-Western context has devolved significantly since the Global 
War on Terrorism began circa 2001.  
However, it would be premature to dismiss al-Qaida as a legitimate threat.  This chapter 
considers only the organization‘s involvement in terrorist attacks on civilians and does not 
discuss al-Qaida‘s involvement in the related phenomenon of insurgency.  It remains possible 
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that the organization‘s role in non-Western terrorism morphed because of a concurrent change in 
emphasis that privileged attacks on coalition troops in Iraq and Afghanistan over other forms of 
violence, but given that as of 2010, CIA director Leon Panetta estimated the total number of al-
Qaida members in Afghanistan at no more than 50 or 100,136 conclusions about the 
organizations‘ declining capabilities likely hold irrespective of a shift in al-Qaida‘s relative 
prioritization of insurgency and terrorism.   
That said, conclusions regarding the organization‘s declining capacity may still be 
premature, because this chapter has not considered hit squad attacks conducted in the West.  
Consequently, the next chapter turns its attention to this subject. 
                                                          
136 Evan Harris, ―CIA: At most, 50-100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,‖ ABC News, June 27, 2010; available online: 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/06/cia-at-most-50100-al-qaeda-in-afghanistan/.  
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5.0 ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT?  ASSESSING THE CHANGING 
CAPABILITIES OF AL-QAIDA HIT SQUADS DELPOYED TO THE WEST 
 
 
The hit squads al-Qaida has deployed to the West mirror the organization‘s non-Western 
attack-teams in many ways.  The evidence suggests that the quality of both classes of attackers 
has decreased substantially over time.  Indeed, circa 2001, when coordinated strikes by al-Qaida 
hit squads successfully toppled the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon, the 
organization‘s Western attack-teams were well-organized and well-trained; many operatives held 
highly specialized skill-sets, and senior al-Qaida leaders oversaw and administered operations 
with a degree of professionalism and bureaucracy reminiscent of legitimate corporations.  
However, by the end of 2005, this relatively formal structure had been replaced by one-off 
instances of cooperation that were almost ad-hoc in nature.  Given that this new pattern, which 
repeated again in 2009, was accompanied by a dramatic decrease in the caliber of al-Qaida‘s 
operatives, the extent and quality of their training, and their access to the organization‘s financial 
and logistical resources, it is difficult to support the oft-stated claim that al-Qaida is a 
successfully adaptive organization.1   
                                                          
1 For examples of theorists who extol al-Qaida‘s adaptive ability, see: Bruce Hoffman, ―The Changing Face of Al 
Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27 (2004).  Reid Sawyer and 
Michael Foster, ―The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of al Qaeda,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, June 12, 2008; available online: http://ann.sagepub.com/content/618/1/197.full.pdf.  Bruce 
Riedel, ―Al Qaeda Smells Blood,‖ Brookings, April 6, 2011; available online: 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0406_yemen_al_qaeda_riedel.aspx.  Norman Cigar, ―Al-Qaida, the Tribes, 
and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq‘s Unstable Triangle,‖ Marine Corps University, Middle East 
Studies Occasional Papers, Number Two, September 2011. 
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Although the evidence suggests that the rate of decline differed between al-Qaida‘s 
Western and non-Western attack teams, this chapter ultimately argues that the organization‘s 
shift toward flatter, less hierarchical structural forms was a failed experiment, not a successful 
adaptation.  As al-Qaida moved toward a more networked structure, the organization‘s 
capabilities declined substantially.  Today, al-Qaida is far less capable of conducting successful 
mass-casualty attacks in the West than was the case a decade ago. 
 This chapter contains six sections following this introduction.  The first discusses the 
most notorious example of an al-Qaida hit squad attack conducted in the West, namely the 
September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.  The second section begins a 
three-part discussion of al-Qaida‘s attempts to attack London and assesses a 2004 plot to destroy 
several sites around the city using fertilizer-bombs.  The third section continues this line of 
discussion by examining the July 7, 2005, suicide-attacks on the city‘s mass-transit system—an 
event related to the previous plot by shared personnel.  The fourth section concludes the 
chapter‘s discussion of London-based attacks with a discussion of the failed suicide-bombings 
that took place on July 21, 2005—an event related to the earlier July attack through overlapping 
training and shared technical planning.  In order to demonstrate that the trends evident in the 
latter 2005 attack extend into the contemporary period, the fifth section assess a failed 2009 plot 
to suicide-bomb the subway in New York City, before the sixth section offers some brief 
conclusions that speak to the need to amend the theoretical literature on al-Qaida.  In an effort to 
ensure even cross-comparison, the topical sections of this chapter follow the same internal 
structure used in the previous chapter and respectively discuss each event‘s planning, inter-
related logistics and finance, and training, before a brief summation compares the case to 
preceding events. 
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5.1 THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, ATTACKS ON NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, D.C.
 The events of September 11, 2001, are well known and require only the briefest 
recounting here.  At Boston‘s Logan Airport, five hijackers—Mohammed Atta, Abdul Aziz al-
Omari, Satam al-Suqami, Waleed al-Shehri, and Wail al-Shehri—boarded American Airlines 
flight 11, shortly before it departed for Los Angeles at 7.59am.  Fifteen minutes later, another 
Los Angeles-bound plane, United Airlines Flight 175, also departed from Logan and carried 
another five hijackers:  Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al-Shehri, Hamza al-
Ghamdi, and Ahmed al-Ghamdi.  Meanwhile, at Dulles International Airport outside 
Washington, D.C., a third Los Angeles-bound plane, namely American Airlines Flight 77, 
departed at 8.20am; onboard was a third group of hijackers: Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al-Hazmi, 
Khalid al-Mihdar, Majed Moqed, and Salem al-Hazmi.  Finally, at 8.42am, United Airlines 
Flight 93 left the Newark airport bound for San Francisco; its passengers included a fourth group 
of hijackers: Ziad Jarrah, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Haznawi, and Ahmed al-Nami.2 
Using box-cutters and utility knives, the hijackers took-over all four flights and murdered 
the flight crews.  Atta, al-Shehhi, Hanjour, and Jarrah placed themselves at the controls.  At 
8.46am, only four minutes after the Newark flight took-off, Atta piloted American Airlines 
Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Manhattan.  Seventeen minutes 
later, al-Shehhi piloted United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower of the same building.  
Then, at 9.37am, Hanjour piloted American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon, and just before 
10.00am, the South Tower of the World Trade Center collapsed.  Only three minutes later, 
                                                          
2 Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―American Airlines Flight #11: Penttbomb 265A-NY-280350,‖ (Law 
Enforcement Sensitive), April 19, 2002.  Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―Investigative Summary: United Airlines 
Flight #175 Boeing 767,‖ (Law Enforcement Sensitive), April 19, 2002.  Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
―Investigative Summary Penttbom: United Airlines Flight 93 256A-NY-280350,‖ (Law Enforcement Sensitive), 
April 19, 2002.  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), Final 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2004), pp. 1-46. (Hereafter ―9/11 Commission Report.‖) 
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Jarrah, who was likely bound for the White House, crashed United Airlines Flight 93 into a corn 
field outside Shanksville, PA, about 85 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, after passengers rose-up to 
confront the flight‘s other hijackers.  Twenty-five minutes later, at 10.28am, the North Tower 
collapsed.3  In addition to the hijackers, a total of 2996 people died in the 9/11 attacks,4 and 
thousands more were injured.  The coordinated strike remains the deadliest incident of non-state 
terrorism on record.5  
Al-Qaida‘s role in the 9/11 attacks is beyond question.  Despite conspiracy theorists‘ 
persistent efforts to introduce false debate,6 official inquiries and rigorous independent 
investigations have provided overwhelming evidence demonstrating that al-Qaida conducted 
every phase of the attacks.  To state the obvious: bin Laden‘s supporters acted as an organization 
to plan, finance, logistically support, and execute the 9/11 attacks.  Rather than offering new 
evidence to support a conclusion that existing narratives have already proven beyond any 
shadow of a doubt, the paragraphs below offer a summary that serves as a benchmark against 
which to compare subsequent examples of al-Qaida hit squad attacks on the West.  Essentially, it 
is necessary to understand the extent of organizational capability and formal structure that 
existed in al-Qaida at the highpoint that was 9/11 in order to scale the organizational devolution 
that occurred in subsequent years. 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 A comprehensive list of victims is available online from Project 2,996: http://project2996.wordpress.com/we-
remember/.  
5 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), ―Background Report: 9/11, 
Ten Years Later,‖ 2011; available online: 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/BackgroundReport_10YearsSince9_11.pdf.   
6 For examples of baseless conspiracy theories related to 9/11, see: ―The 9/11 Truth Movement,‖ available online: 
911truth.org; David Ray Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 
9/11, (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2004); and Alex Jones, 9-11 Descent into Tyranny: The New World 
Order’s Dark Plans to Turn Earth inot a Prios Planet, (Palm Desert, CA: Progressive Press, 2002). 
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5.1.1 PLANNING 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who claims to have managed ―the 9/11 operation, from A to 
Z,‖7 first considered using jetliners as improvised cruise missiles circa 1995, while working with 
his nephew, Ramzi Yousef, on the Bojinka Plot,8 an ambitious plan to simultaneously bomb a 
dozen American-flagged trans-Pacific flights using liquid-based explosives triggered by timed 
detonators.  When Philippine authorities interrupted Bojinka by arresting a pair of co-
conspirators who managed to start their Manila apartment on fire while mixing incendiary 
chemicals,9 KSM began to believe that explosives were an unreliable means of attack, especially 
given that his nephew‘s explosives-based operation against the World Trade Center in 1993 had 
failed to bring-down the twin towers.  KSM thought that perhaps planes could better serve as 
weapons in their own right, not just targets.10   
He then envisioned an attack that would use commercial airliners as improvised cruise 
missiles, but the initial draft of this ―planes operation‖ differed substantially from the attack that 
actually transpired in 2001.  KSM‘s original plan called for the hijacking of 10 jetliners, nine of 
which suicide-pilots would crash into targets on both of the United States‘ coasts, including 
CIA‘s headquarters in suburban Virginia, the FBI‘s headquarters in Northwest Washington, 
D.C., a handful of nuclear plants around the country, and skyscrapers in both California and 
Washington state, as well as the sites struck on 9/11.  KSM, who planned to be onboard the final 
plane, would then land and kill all of the adult men onboard, before delivering a speech to the 
                                                          
7 Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), 
Unclassified, March 10, 2007. (Hereafter ―KSM Tribunal‖). 
8 9/11 Commission Report, p. 153. 
9 Dale L. Watson, "Prepared statement by Dale L. Watson, Section Chief, International Terrorism Operations 
Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee Terrorism, 
Technology, and Government Information," Federal News Service, February 24, 1998. 
10 9/11 Commission Report, p. 153.  See also: Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 
9/11, (New York: Knopf, 2006), pp. 307-308.  
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global media condemning American policies in the Muslim world.11  When KSM presented this 
idea to bin Laden and other high-ranking al-Qaida leaders in the 1996, their response was tepid; 
they believed the operation was overly complex and unrealistic.12 
Then, in 1998, shortly after bin Laden demonstrated the depth of his commitment to 
battle the United States by ordering attack-teams to bomb American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania, the dissident Saudi began to reappraise KSM‘s ambitious plan.  After speaking with 
Muhammad Atef, bin Laden scheduled a meeting with KSM in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and 
offered the planner the opportunity to join al-Qaida.  Although KSM declined in an effort to 
preserve his independence—he did not formally swear bayat to bin Laden until after the 9/11 
attacks—he did agree to move his family to Kandahar, so that he could begin working with al-
Qaida to advance attacks against the United States.13 
 A watershed event in the planning of 9/11 occurred in the spring of the following year, 
when Atef and bin Laden formally decided to proceed with a scaled-down version of the planes 
operation.  KSM then began working closely with the pair to refine the target list.  According to 
KSM‘s version of events, the three of them were entirely responsible for these high-level 
planning decisions.  The operation then remained a closely guarded secret; no other al-Qaida 
members were yet permitted a role.14  
 Later in 1999, KSM had to make a substantial adjustment to his plan, because two of the 
men bin Laden had hand-picked for the operation were unable to obtain visas to the United 
States.  Consequently, KSM decided to split the operation and use the men who could not enter 
                                                          
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid, p. 153.  See also: ―Suspect ‗reveals 9/11 planning,‘‖ BBC News, September 22, 2003; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3128802.stm.   
13 USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria 
Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-A), Evidence Presented in Lieu of Testimony by KSM, date unknown.  See also: 
KSM Tribunal. 
14 Evidence Presented in Lieu of Testimony by KSM. 
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the country to conduct simultaneous hijackings in East Asia.  Although it relied on suicide-
operatives instead of timed-detonators, this revision was strongly reminiscent of the Bojinka 
Plot.  KSM planned for these hijackers to bomb the planes in mid-flight as they travelled across 
the Pacific, timing the explosions to coincide with crashes on the American east coast, in order 
―to maximize the psychological impact of the attack.‖15   
However, in April or May of 2000, bin Laden vetoed the operation‘s East Asian portion.   
His decision, which emphasized the hierarchical nature of authority with al-Qaida prior to 9/11, 
mirrored his earlier concerns regarding KSM‘s initial 10-plane vision of the attack: a joint-strike 
on the United States and East Asia was simply too complicated.  No reasonable means existed to 
coordinate the actions of attack-teams separated by 10 time zones.16  With this decision, bin 
Laden effectively determined that the final scope of the operation would be limited to America‘s 
eastern seaboard.   
 As the planning of the operation moved from the strategic level to the tactical level, al-
Qaida continued to be involved, and interactions continued to flow through a relatively 
hierarchical command structure.  For example, in contrast to the flat organizational structures 
used in later attacks, some vital planning tasks were assigned to specialists who were not part of 
the final attack-team. Specifically, KSM tasked two men with aspects of reconnaissance: Dihren 
Barot, an Indian-born British citizen who adopted the nicknamed Abu Musa al-Hindi when he 
converted to Islam from Hinduism; and Walid bin Attash, a Yemeni who played a planning role 
in the U.S.S. Cole bombing and who was considered as a possible hijacker in the planes 
operation until visa problems removed him from consideration very early in the attack‘s 
planning.   In August 2000, Barot reconnoitered targets in Washington, D.C., and in March of the 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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following year, he took a helicopter trip across Manhattan, conducted ground-level surveillance 
on several New York landmarks, and even shot video footage of the World Trade Center.17  
Attash, meanwhile, took a pair of flights on American-flagged jetliners in 1999 and 2000, so that 
he could report on airline security procedures.18     
 Finally, the hijackers became involved in planning the operational details of the attack in 
the final months preceding its execution.  For example, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah, who piloted 
three of the hijacked planes on 9/11, took cross-country reconnaissance flights in the spring of 
2001.  They traveled in first class, presumably to have the best possible view of cockpit 
operations and security procedures.  Then, in the early summer, Jarrah and Hanjour paid to take 
specialized low-altitude instructional flights through the Hudson River corridor with pilot-
trainers, so that the future hijackers would be as familiar with their routes to the World Trade 
Center as was possible.19  Finally, in mid-August, Atta, Hanjour, and the muscle-hijacker al-
Hazmi conducted a final round of trans-continental surveillance flights aboard Boeing 757s, the 
same model of plane the attack-teams targeted on September 11.20        
 Indeed, as the attacks approached the hijackers took responsibility for arguably the most 
important planning detail of the attack: the date of the strike.  According to KSM, bin Laden 
twice pressured the attack-team to conduct the operation before the hijackers were fully 
prepared.   Initially, bin Laden wanted the attacks conducted on May 12, 2001, exactly seven 
months after another squad of al-Qaida suicide-bombers attacked the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.  
                                                          
17 USA v. Dhiren Barot, et al (Defendants), Sealed Indictment, United States District Court Southern District of New 
York (05CRIM. 311), 2007; David Stringer, "Man to be sentenced in British Bomb plot," Associated Press Online, 
November 6, 2006. 
18 High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, available online: 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/. 
19 9/11 Commission Report, p. 242.  See also, ―Hijackers conducted surveillance flights ahead of 9/11,‖ CNN.com, 
September 27, 2002; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2002-09-27/us/hijackers_1_hijackers-hazmi-attack-
plan?_s=PM:US.   
20 Ibid, p. 248. 
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Then, in June or July, bin Laden heard that Ariel Sharon would be visiting the White House and 
urged the team to strike during the visit in the hopes of taking-out both the President of the 
United States and the Prime Minister of Israel.  However, on both occasions, KSM was able to 
persuade al-Qaida‘s emir that the hijackers were not yet ready, and ultimately delegated the 
authority to determine the exact timing of the attack to the hit squad‘s coordinator on-the-ground, 
Mohammed Atta.21   
In mid-August, Atta set the date of the attack by contacting Ramzi Binalshib, his former 
roommate in Hamburg and the man that KSM appointed to serve as the communications 
intermediary between the hijackers in America and al-Qaida‘s leadership in South Asia.   
Because the hijackers planned to strike the Capitol building if any of their other targets in the 
Washington, D.C.-area proved too difficult to strike, Atta set the date to September 11 in order to 
make certain that Congress was back in session after its summer recess, so as to be able to inflict 
maximal damage.22  Thus, even though the final timing of the attack was determined by the men 
on the ground, all information and planning decisions flowed through a clear chain of command. 
5.1.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 
 Issues of money and materiel were just as tightly controlled by al-Qaida‘s leadership as 
the attack‘s planning.  Indeed, bin Laden at times micro-managed decisions pertaining to the 
most important resource necessary to conduct the attack: manpower.  He forced KSM to include 
personal favorites on the attack team, even when they were less than ideally suited to missions in 
the West.  For example, shortly after giving the planes operation the go-ahead in 1999, bin Laden 
instructed KSM that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, two Saudis who had been involved with al-Qaida 
                                                          
21 9/11 Commission Report, p. 250. 
22 Ibid, p. 249.  See also: Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10013 (Ramzi 
Bin al Shibh), United States Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 9, 2007.  (Hereafter ―Binalshibh 
tribunal‖). 
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since at least the mid-1990s, should be sent to the United States for pilot training,23 even though 
neither of the pair spoke English.  They would spend some time studying English in San Diego 
in January 2000, but the men simply had no aptitude for language, which prevented them from 
learning to fly and ultimately relegated the pair to ‗muscle‘ roles in the planes operation.24  
Moreover, this micro-management of manpower was far from unusual; Walid bin Attash went so 
far as to suggest that bin Laden personally approved every member of the 2001 attack-team.25    
 While KSM was largely forced to accept the personnel he was given, he delegated final 
decisions regarding the implementation of manpower to Atta, who consulted with Binalshibh 
over the matter in early August, using coded language during a phone call, before determining 
the exact composition of the attack-teams.  Atta then traveled to New Jersey and met with al-
Hazmi, the bin Laden favorite who seems to have been granted a special role in the attack based 
more on his personal relationship with al-Qaida‘s emir than his qualifications, and then sent two 
of the muscle hijackers who had been under al-Hazmi‘s supervision to Miami to link-up with the 
other men who ultimately comprised their respective attack-teams.26 
 Beyond manpower decisions, other logistical issues were handled using al-Qaida‘s broad 
organizational capabilities.  For example, by the late 1990s, the organization had established 
impressive document forgery capabilities.  Rather than fashioning new documents from whole 
cloth, al-Qaida‘s forgers typically altered legitimate documents.  Sometimes, this forgery 
involved switching pictures, so that individuals could travel under false names,27 as Ramzi 
                                                          
23 9/11 Commission Report, p. 155. 
24 Ibid, pp. 217, 221-222. 
25 High Value Detainee Biographies. 
26 9/11 Commission Report, p. 248. 
27 Ibid, p. 169. 
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Binalshibh did when he flew to Malaysia at KSM‘s direction in June 2001 to meet with members 
of the hijacking team.28   
However, because the majority of al-Qaida‘s members were unknown to the international 
security community prior to 9/11, document forgery more often involved the addition and 
deletion of visas and immigration stamps in order to create false trails that obscured passport 
holders‘ travels to Afghanistan and other ‗red flag‘ locations.29  Although the 9/11 hijackers 
traveled on their own, legitimate Saudi and Egyptian passports, the evidence suggests that 
forgers doctored many of these documents to contain false travel histories.30  Thus, al-Qaida‘s 
organizational capabilities facilitated 9/11 not only by providing one of the attacks‘ key 
supporters with a false identity used in furtherance of the attacks, but also by increasing the 
pedigree of the travel documents the hijackers used to enter the United States. 
 Finally, the American-based attack-teams handled the remaining resource acquisitions 
necessary to complete the operation using standard consumer purchases.  For example, in mid-
August, the attackers bought the box-cutters and utility knives used in the hijacking from retail 
outlets, and later that month, Jarrah tried to buy aeronautical GPS units from a specialty shop 
catering to pilots.  He wanted four units, no doubt to help guide each of the novice pilots to their 
intended targets, but for reasons that remain unclear, he was able to secure only one device, and 
was forced to purchase less-sophisticated aeronautical charts for the remaining pilots.  The final 
logistical resources necessary to complete the attacks, namely the airline tickets for the targeted 
flights, were purchased by Atta and al-Hazmi between August 25 and September 5.31  
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30 Ibid, p. 235. 
31 Ibid, p. 248-249. 
232 
 
 Because the hijackers were entirely dependent on al-Qaida for funding, the organization 
played a crucial role every purchase made in furtherance of the 9/11 attacks.  Money flowed to 
the attack-team through three channels.  Prior to their arrival in the United States, the hijackers 
received some direct funding from al-Qaida.  For example, in late 1999 or 2000, when Atta and 
the other Hamburg-based members of the attack team traveled back to Germany from 
Afghanistan, they each received approximately $5,000 to pay their travel expenses.  Similarly, 
when the muscle hijackers traveled to Saudi Arabia to obtain travel documents in preparation for 
their entry into the United States, they each received about $2,000 in travel expenses, followed 
by another $10,000 payment, made through a combination of cash and traveler‘s checks, 
immediately before their departure for America.32 
 Although KSM provided some of these funds to the muscle hijackers before they left 
Pakistan, two Dubai-based paymasters made additional disbursements.  The first was Ali al-Azia 
Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi), a nephew of KSM‘s who was also brother-in-law to Ramzi 
Yousef.  Although he worked a profitable day-job for a computer wholesaler in Dubai‘s free 
trade zone, Ali had led a double-life since sometime in 1997, when he first volunteered his 
services to his uncle.  His role in terrorism took-on larger dimensions circa 2000, when KSM 
sent him well-over $100,000 in cash via courier.  These funds, which Ali reportedly kept stashed 
in a laundry bag in his home, were likely the source of some of the direct payments made to the 
hijackers.33 
                                                          
32 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena White, ―Monograph on Terrorist Financing,‖ National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, August 21, 2004, p. 132 (Appendix A).  Available online: 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/index.htm 
33 Ibid, p. 134; High Value Detainee Biographies. 
233 
 
 Ali‘s assistant in Dubai was Mustafa al-Hawsawi, a Saudi who had previously worked 
with KSM to generate jihadist propaganda.34  It is not entirely clear why al-Hawsawi became 
involved in the 9/11 operation.  The only explanation that has surfaced is somewhat surprising: 
Ali was apparently concerned that al-Qaida‘s demands on his time would negatively impact his 
performance at his computer job and asked his uncle to send some help.  Sometime in the spring 
of 2001, KSM dispatched Hawsawi, apparently to fulfill his nephew‘s request.  After May, Ali‘s 
role as logistical facilitator became secondary to his assistant‘s, and al-Hawsawi provided about 
$8,000 to the late-departing hijackers before they left the UAE for the United States.35 
 Similarly, al-Hawsawi made additional disbursements directly to the members of the 
attack-team when they travelled internationally in the run-up to the attack.  For example, in June 
2001, when Khalid al-Mihdhar traveled to Saudi Arabia via Dubai, al-Hawsawi provided the 
hijacker with nearly $5,000 in cash.  Al-Mihdhar then used the funds to purchase travelers‘ 
checks in Saudi Arabia, before returning to the U.S. in early July.36   
 Beyond these in-person cash payments, the 9/11 attackers also received significant funds 
via wire transfer.  Ali took the lead in these payments.  Between April and September of 2000, 
Ali made six transfers totaling approximately $120,000 to the hijackers.  The source of his funds 
was again the laundry bag of cash that KSM had provided earlier that year.  Although al-Qaida 
had a documented history of transferring funds via hawala, an informal system of money transfer 
native to South Asia, all of Ali‘s transactions flowed through the legitimate banking system.  
Even when Ali transferred $70,000 in a single payment, the transactions were apparently lost in 
the huge sea of transfers made by Dubai‘s busy commercial interests.  None the wire transfers 
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raised any suspicion among members of the banking community in either Dubai or the United 
States.37 
 Binalshibh also made additional wire transfers to the hijackers in America.  In total, he 
sent approximately $10,400 divided irregularly across four payments made between June and 
September of 2000.  Like Ali, Binalshibh made all of these transfers via the legitimate banking 
system, though the sources of funds differed.  Rather than Ali‘s bag of cash, Binalshibh obtained 
the monies from a bank account that he shared with al-Shehhi in Germany‘s Dresdner Bank.   
It seems likely that the account had been filled via legitimate means.  Until December 
2000, al-Shehhi received a stipend from the UAE military to fund the education that he had 
abandoned in Germany.38  Thus, it seems that, in small part, the 9/11 hijackers obtained funding 
by perverting legitimate sources of income. 
Binalshibh also made two transfers totaling $10,000 to Zacarias Moussaoui, using funds 
that he obtained from al-Hawsawi, who presumably drew the money from Ali‘s bag of cash 
before wiring the funds from the UAE to Germany.39  However, the extent to which these funds 
constituted an expenditure in furtherance of the 9/11 attacks is open to debate.  KSM has insisted 
that he never intended for Moussaoui to take part in the September attacks; instead, Moussaoui 
was slated to pilot an aircraft during a second wave of attacks against America‘s West Coast 
scheduled for sometime in 2002.  In an effort to circumvent airline security, KSM planned to use 
operatives that either held Western passports (Moussaoui was a French citizen) or that did not 
have a Middle Eastern appearance (KSM worked with Jemaah Islamiyah to select several East 
Asian hijackers from the organization‘s ranks).  However, the attack was scrapped as infeasible 
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when airports implemented stricter security protocols in the aftermath of 9/11.40  Though the 
difference may be excessively fussy, it seems that Binalshibh‘s transfers to Moussaoui supported 
this aborted ‗second wave‘ rather than the 9/11 attacks. 
Beyond wire transfers, the hijackers received a smaller amount of money via deposits 
made into overseas bank accounts.  Specifically, Hanjour received about $10,000 via two 
accounts he held with bank branches in the Middle East: one at the Saudi-British Bank in Saudi 
Arabia, and the other at Citibank in the UAE.  Ali provided start-up funds for these accounts and 
replenished them on at least one occasion, after Hanjour drew them down by withdrawing funds 
via US-based ATMs.41   
Similarly, Banihammad, one of the muscle hijackers onboard the flight that crashed into 
the south tower of the World Trade Center, opened a pair of accounts at the UAE‘s Standard 
Charter Bank.  He deposited the equivalent of about $30,000 in local currency.  Since 
Banihammadi had the money with him when he entered the UAE in June 2001, the funds 
presumably came directly from KSM.  Al-Hawsawi was a co-signer on the accounts and 
bolstered Banihammadi‘s funds on at least one occasion, depositing nearly $5,000 into the 
accounts in August 2001.  Like Hanjour, Banihammadi accessed these accounts via ATM, but he 
also had a Visa check-card linked directly to them; it was used to purchase two of the hijackers‘ 
plane tickets, as well as to pay a portion of the hotel expenses the hijackers incurred in the days 
immediately preceding the attacks.42   
With the partial exception of Nawaf al-Hazmi, who spent about a month working as a gas 
station attendant for a wage of six dollars per hour, none of the 9/11 hijackers worked during 
their time in the United States, in either the licit or illicit economies.  Similarly, except for the 
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student stipend that al-Shehhi drew from the UAE, none of the attackers received any monies 
from foreign governments.  Finally, there is no evidence to support the oft-cited assertion43 that a 
Madrid-based al-Qaida cell led by radical cleric Imad Barakat Yarkas (a.k.a. Abu Dahdah) 
provided any funding to the 9/11 hijackers.44  Thus, it seems that the entire cost of the 9/11 
attacks, which official inquiries estimate at between $400,000 and $500,000, was borne by the 
core of bin Laden‘s organization.45    
Although investigators know a fair amount about al-Qaida‘s means of financial support 
circa 2001, they have been unable to identify any revenue streams that specifically funded the 
9/11 attacks.  Briefly, the organization‘s budget in the years immediately preceding 9/11 was 
approximately $30 million annually,46 and these monies came almost entirely from the 
corruption of charitable donations.  In some cases, most notably al-Haramain Islamic 
Foundation, entire charities were complicit in terrorist finance from the top down.  In other 
instances, corrupt officers of charities acted at the local level to divert funds to al-Qaida.  
Similarly, imams of some radical mosques in the Middle East (and perhaps also elsewhere) 
diverted funds that congregants donated as zakat, a type of religious tithing obligatory for all 
devout Muslims.  Because Islamic charitable contributions increase dramatically during the holy 
month of Ramadan, al-Qaida‘s funding was somewhat cyclical.  This annual pattern required the 
organization to budget to a certain extent, but there is no evidence that it maintained large stores 
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Suspected leader of Al-Qaida in Europe Denies Accusations in Spanish Court," World Market Analysis, April 27, 
2005; Al Goodman, "Madrid charge for 9/11 suspect," CNN.com, May 6, 2005. 
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of surplus cash.  Instead, al-Qaida‘s finances were largely hand-to-mouth, and money went out 
the door soon after coming-in.47    
This reality stands in stark contrast to the enduring public conception that bin Laden, and 
by extension al-Qaida, held millions of dollars in savings.  Although bin Laden‘s family remains 
among the wealthiest in the world,48 the dissident Saudi lost his personal fortune years before the 
9/11 attacks.  The Saudi Government had forced his family to cut him off in 1994, and his 
remaining funds were lost two years later, when Hasan al-Turabi‘s government expropriated bin 
Laden‘s business interests in the Sudan after expelling al-Qaida from the country.49  Similarly, 
despite persistent rumors of al-Qaida involvement in illicit enterprises, including narcotics 
trafficking and diamond smuggling,50 official inquiries, which reviewed ―some of the most 
sensitive information held by the U.S. government,‖ ultimately concluded that ―such theories 
cannot be substantiated.‖51  Therefore, a fairly clear line, albeit a broken one, led from the 
systemic corruption of Islamic charities to the deaths caused by the 9/11 hijackers. 
5.1.3 TRAINING 
 
 As with planning, logistics, and finance, al-Qaida, as an organization, was responsible for 
training the men responsible for the 9/11 attacks.  Although several of the muscle hijackers had 
previous experience in jihad, they received additional specialized training in preparation for the 
9/11 attacks.  This stint of instruction began in the fall of 1999, when several men hand-picked 
by bin Laden attended what the 9/11 commission called, ―an elite training course at al Qaeda‘s 
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Mes Aynak camp in Afghanistan,‖52 but according to KSM this training was more of a slightly 
more rigorous version of the organization‘s standard boot camp, not a special training session for 
9/11.  Many Mes Aynak graduates would go-on to participate in prominent al-Qaida operations 
other than 9/11, including the U.S.S. Cole attack.53 
 For a handful of select graduates of the camp, more specialized training followed in 
Karachi, Pakistan, where KSM personally instructed trainees in preparation for the planes 
operation.  During a two-week course, he taught the trainees much of what they would need to 
know to survive in the West.  Topics included: rudimentary English, how to book travel 
reservations, and how to rent accommodations.  Most tellingly, the training also included 
instruction about how to conduct surveillance onboard flights, and KSM used video game-based 
flight simulators to try to familiarize the trainees with the layout and function of different types 
of commercial planes.54  However, visa problems precluded some of the graduates of these 
specialized training sessions from actually participating in the attacks.  The final attack-team was 
not set until mid-to-late 2000, at which point the muscle hijackers received even more 
specialized training. 
 After acquiring the necessary travel documents, the men who would actively conduct the 
9/11 attacks received instruction from Abu Turab al-Jordani, the son-in-law of Ayman al-
Zawahiri and one of the few men who knew the full details of the planned attack.55  Abu Turab‘s 
course emphasized specific techniques in close-quarters combat; he taught various means to 
neutralize armed opponents, in case the hijackers encountered any air marshals, and he instructed 
the men in weight-training, presumably so they would be strong enough to overpower most 
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airline passengers.  KSM claims that Abu Turab went so far as to make the trainees butcher 
camels and sheep to increase the men‘s comfort and familiarity with knives.56    
 Now in possession of the semi-specialized skills necessary to take-over an airplane, the 
muscle hijackers progressed to their last stop before the United States: Dubai.  In addition to his 
logistical and financial role, Ali gave the men one final shot of training on Western life before 
sending them onward.  He guided them through the process of buying airline tickets.  He taught 
them how to use traveler‘s checks, how to order at fast-food outlets, and how to wear Western-
style clothing.57  With these final interactions, the muscle hijackers were effectively trained—a 
process that involved al-Qaida at every turn. 
 Given the highly specialized knowledge required to pilot a plane, it is little surprise that 
the four men who assumed the controls on 9/11 followed a different training trajectory than the 
muscle hijackers.  Three of the pilots, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah, arrived in Pakistan in 
November 1999, from Hamburg, Germany, alongside Binalshibh.  The foursome‘s original 
intent had been to fight as mujahideen in Chechnya, but an al-Qaida facilitator in Germany 
convinced the men that heightened border controls had made it too difficult to cross into Russian 
territory and directed the men to South Asia instead.  After undergoing a standard vetting 
procedure, which included a questionnaire regarding the recruit‘s language skills and willingness 
to serve as a martyr, the men caught the eye of Muhammad Atef.  They stood-out because of 
their familiarity with the West and fluency in English.58  The men were soon introduced to bin 
Laden, who extended them an offer to serve as suicide-operatives, and after formally pledging 
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their loyalty to al-Qaida, they were sent to Karachi to meet KSM.  Shortly thereafter, they began 
to make preparations for pilot training.59 
 The most important step was obtaining travel documents.  Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah 
entered the U.S. on tourist visas in late June and early July of 2000, and quickly settled into 
flight-training programs.  Specifically, Atta and al-Shehhi studied at Huffman Aviation in 
Venice, Florida, while Jarrah studied at the Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC), another 
Venice-based instructional program.  Binalshibh had intended to join him at the FFTC, but 
proved unable to obtain the necessary entrance visas, despite repeated attempts.  Thus, given his 
close ties to the other three pilots, he settled into a logistical role almost by default and thereafter 
served as a go-between that facilitated contact between al-Qaida‘s leadership in South Asian and 
the American-based pilots.60 
 Meanwhile, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah continued their training, and by mid-August, all 
three had passed basic flight exams.  As they began to take the more advanced courses necessary 
to pilot multi-engine aircraft, Atta and al-Shehhi petitioned the State Department to convert their 
tourist visas to student visas and transferred to Jones Aviation, a school located about 20 miles 
north of Venince, in Sarasota, Florida.  However, the men performed poorly at Jones; instructors 
remember them as exceptionally rude and overly aggressive.  After failing a more advanced set 
of pilot examinations, they returned to Huffman for additional training.  In the interim, Jarrah 
had traveled back to Germany to visit his girlfriend—one of several such trips he made during 
run-up to the attack—but soon returned to Florida and continued his training.  By the end of 
November, Jarrah obtained his commercial pilot‘s license; Atta and al-Shehhi would follow suit 
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a month later, and as 2000 drew to a close, all three men began training to fly large commercial 
jets at various flight simulation centers in Florida.61  
 Although al-Qaida did not provide this training directly, the organization‘s hand in the 
process was evident in Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah‘s financial histories.  The three used monies 
wired from Ali to pay for both these initial training sessions, as well as for a handful of 
subsequent training flights.  For example, in addition to the instructor-assisted flights that the 
men made through the Hudson Valley Corridor in the summer of 2001, Atta and al-Shehhi also 
rented a single-engine plane in Decatur, Georgia, where they flew with a private instructor in 
January 2001.62  Given the clear financial links between Ali and KSM, there is no question that 
al-Qaida financed every aspect of these three men‘s pilot training. 
 The fourth pilot, Hanjour, was a serendipitous find for al-Qaida.  He followed a 
circuitous path to become a suicide-pilot.  After briefly working for an Afghan ‗relief‘ agency as 
a teenager during the last days of the Soviet-Afghan War, Hanjour applied to a Saudi flight 
school, but was rejected.  In 1996, he briefly studied at flight schools in Florida, California, and 
Arizona, only to return home unaccredited.  He made a more serious attempt the following year, 
and obtained his commercial license in April 1999.   However, he was apparently unable to find 
work, and after lying to his family about a new job with an Emirati airline, he returned to 
Afghanistan in the fall of 2000,63 only to be discovered when Atef reviewed a pile of the 
standard screening questionnaires al-Qaida used to evaluate potential recruits.64  Thus, 
circumstance provided a replacement for Binalshibh shortly after he failed to obtain the entrance 
visa necessary to train as a pilot in the United States, and with the exception of Hanjour, al-Qaida 
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was either directly or financially responsible for providing all of the direct participants in the 
9/11 attacks with the skill sets necessary to conduct the hijackings.   
5.1.4 SUMMATION 
 Although it is important to avoid hyperbole so that al-Qaida‘s members do not appear to 
have functioned with the ruthless efficiency of Professor Moriarty or a James Bond villain, it is 
clear that bin Laden‘s organization was both highly capable and well-organized circa 2001.  As 
demonstrated by Ali and Hawsawi‘s roles as financiers, Barot and Attash‘s roles as conductors 
of surveillance, and the respective roles of the pilots and muscle hijackers on the day of the 
attack, operatives held specialized functions.  They often received focused training in order to 
fulfill these roles, and a higher-level manager orchestrated and administrated over these 
specialists‘ actions.  In the 9/11 attacks, KSM filled this position with significant assistance from 
Binalshibh, who served as his go-between with the attack-team in the United States.  As best 
demonstrated by bin Laden‘s ability to impose his personnel decisions on KSM, top-level leaders 
held ultimate authority over the operation and closely managed several details of the operation.  
Although the field operatives held increasing autonomy as the operation neared execution—this 
fact is best demonstrated by the fact that Atta, not bin Laden, set the final date of the attack—
authority within al-Qaida was carefully and clearly delegated.  Moreover, as Atta‘s 
communications with Binalshibh demonstrate, communications continued to flow up a fairly 
clear chain-of-command throughout the operation.    
None of these conclusions should suggest that al-Qaida operated absent dysfunction.  
Indeed, bin Laden decreased the efficacy of the attack-team by insisting that it include several 
individuals who lacked the language skills necessary to excel in an American-based operation.  
But on the whole, the organization operated as a reasonably efficient, fairly hierarchical 
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bureaucracy at the time of the 9/11 attacks.  However, by 2004, when the organization began to 
deploy hit squads to attack London, this pattern would begin to devolve.     
 
5.2 THE 2004 FERTILIZER BOMB PLOT AGAINST LONDON 
In March 2004, British police made several arrests in London.  The suspects, all men of 
Pakistani origin, were accused of plotting to attack sites around London using fertilizer bombs.65 
It soon became evident that the scope of their plot was international.  Other arrests related to the 
plot were made in New York66 and Canada.67  Because the suspect detained in American soon 
began cooperating with the authorities, the full extent of al-Qaida‘s involvement in the plot 
rapidly became clear.68 
While bin Laden‘s organization had conceptualized, staffed, and supported the 9/11 
attacks in full, al-Qaida played a more limited, though still strong, role in the 2004 plot.  In terms 
of specifics, al-Qaida lacked a substantial role the plot‘s staffing, because the attack-team came 
to al-Qaida ready-made, when a group of like-minded British extremists showed-up en masse at 
a South Asian training camp.  Similarly, the idea for the attack seems to have originated with the 
plotters, who also orchestrated the attack‘s planning at the tactical level.  However, bin Laden‘s 
organization provided the 2004 plotters with the skills and materiel necessary to conduct the 
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bombing, by training the attack-team at a Waziristan-based camp and by acquiring key supplies 
on the attack-team‘s behalf.  Consequently, this case begins to suggest that al-Qaida‘s pattern of 
involvement in hit squad attacks on the West largely mirrored the diffusion and lack of direct 
control evident in non-Western attacks from 2002 forward.   
However, the parallels between al-Qaida‘s Western and non-Western attacks are limited. 
Although the 2004 team ultimately failed to complete its operation, it would be incorrect to 
assert that the quality of al-Qaida‘s Western hit squads had depreciated between 2001 and 2004 
to the same degree seen in the organization‘s operations in 1998 and 2002 in East Africa, 
because the 2004 plotters had all of the technical skills necessary to pull-off the attack.  
Therefore, this case suggests that the effects of the Global War on Terrorism were slower to take 
effect on al-Qaida‘s Western hit squads than on the organization‘s non-Western operations.      
5.2.1 PLANNING 
 It is difficult to determine precisely when the fertilizer plot against London was first 
conceptualized, because long before mission-based planning began, Omar Khyam, the plot‘s 
central leader, had several formative interactions with jihadists and spent years assembling a 
social-circle comprised of like-minded extremists.  This long path to jihad began in the early 
1990s, when Khyam was about 11 year-old, and his father walked-out on the family.  Although 
Khyam‘s household had previously been only nominally Muslim, the pressures of serving as ―the 
man of the house‖ led Khyam toward puritanical interpretations of morality.  For example, he 
soon forbade his brother, Shujah Mahmood, who was five years Khyam‘s junior, from attending 
the local swimming pool for fear that he would see women clad only in bikinis.69   
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By 1998, when Khyam was 17, his religious devotion was overt.  He prayed five times 
daily and began attending meetings of al-Muhajiroun, an organization that sought to establish an 
Islamic caliphate70 and which has since been banned in Britain for advocating violence.71  
During these initial forays into fundamentalism, Khyam first met Waheed Mahmood, a 26 year-
old British citizen of Pakistani descent who shared his affinity for al-Muhajiroun, and who would 
join Khyam‘s attack-team years later.72  
 Similarly, in 2000, a chance meeting during a religious lecture held at the Luton Mosque, 
about 25 miles north of London, caused Khyam to meet another of his future co-conspirators, 
namely Salahuddin Amin.  Then about 25 years old, Amin was a somewhat unlikely jihadist.  He 
had been born in London, but raised in Pakistan, before returning to the country of his birth at 
age 16 for post-secondary education, at which point he picked-up many of the local culture‘s 
‗bad‘ habits.  He drank alcohol, dated women, and played both cricket and soccer throughout his 
college years.  Amin started to lean toward fundamentalism only in 1999, after becoming angry 
about the treatment of Muslims in Indian-dominated Kashmir.73  Ultimately, it is clear that 
Amin, Khyam, and Mahmood shared a radical viewpoint by the turn of the millennium, but it is 
not clear that they had already begun to conceptualize a strike against London.   
Khyam‘s personal history suggests that other, more recent additions to his circle of 
friends were made with the idea of waging a terrorist attack specifically in mind.  In the summer 
of 2000, Khyam told his family that he was taking a school-related trip to France and then 
secretly journeyed to Pakistan instead.  He spent three months receiving training from Kashmiri 
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militants before returning home.74  A similar trip followed the next year, when Khyam headed-
off to Afghanistan and spent a brief time with the Taliban.75  He began to collect aspiring jihadist 
shortly after returning from this second trip. 
Specifically, at another radical lecture held in 2002, Khyam encountered Anthony Garcia, 
a 22 year-old who had been born Rahman Benouis in Algeria.  His family immigrated to Britain 
when Garcia was a child, and he changed his name in his teens in the hopes of advancing his 
male-modeling career.  Like Amin, Garcia eschewed religion during his teenage years, preferring 
to spend his time drinking and club-hopping with his predominantly white friends, until he 
followed his older brother into Islam in 1998 or 1999.76   
Also in 2002, one of Khyam‘s housemates introduced him to Mohammad Momin 
Khawaja,77 a Canadian computer engineer of Pakistani origin who later used his mastery of 
electronics to build explosive-detonators for the British team.78  The final addition to Khyam‘s 
circle of associates came the following year, when Khyam met Jawad Akbar, a Pakistani native 
who had lived in Italy at a child before moving to Britain with his family at age 8.  Now about 
20, Akbar studied mathematics and technical design at West London‘s Brunel University, while 
attending Islamist political groups in his spare time.79 Thus, Khyam had assembled a collection 
of like-minded fundamentalists before ever formally associating with al-Qaida, and given their 
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ideological persuasion, it seems likely that this social-circle at least toying explored the idea of 
martyrdom during ‗casual‘ conversations about politics and religion.   
 Their interest in the subject became explicit in the early spring of 2003.  By that time, the 
plotters had moved to Pakistan, and they re-assembled at the house where Waheed Mahmood 
had begun living in Gujar Khan, just outside of Indian-controlled Kashmir.  The host suggested 
that they could contribute to jihad by bombing London, and after agreeing to the idea, he and his 
friends decided to advance the nascent plan by undertaking terror-training.80  Thus, the plotters‘ 
decision to attack London seems to have caused them to fall into direct contact with al-Qaida, 
rather than the other way around, and Khyam‘s social circle shaped seems to have shaped its 
training to the mission, without the same type of active guidance that KSM and other senior 
members of bin Laden‘s organization provided to the 9/11 hijackers.    
Moreover, the evidence suggests that the British team was entirely responsible for 
selecting the specific targets of the attack, because audio surveillance tapes made by British 
police in February 2004 recorded the plotters as they debated where to strike.  Khyam favored 
bombing infrastructure targets in order to mitigate Londoners‘ access to critical supplies,81 and 
given that Mahmood once worked for a contractor that maintained Britain‘s national gas and 
electric grids,82 it seems likely that the team had the insider knowledge necessary to mount a 
legitimate strike on the country‘s utilities.  Meanwhile, Akbar favored bombing ‗immoral‘ 
targets like dance clubs, because it would be easy to gain access by taking a low-level job at a 
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club, and because, in his words, ―those slags dancing around‖ deserved to die for their 
indecency.83   
It remains unclear if the team ever reached a firm targeting decision before arrests broke-
up the plot, but since these debates took place after the team came back from South Asia, they 
clearly lacked specific tactical instructions from al-Qaida‘s leadership.  In short, the 2004 plot 
was conceived before the plotters trained with bin Laden‘s organization, and the details were 
planned at home, after the plotters returned from Pakistan.  It seems probably that bin Laden‘s 
organization shaped aspects of the attack during the plotters‘ training, but this role was 
qualitatively different and far less pronounced than al-Qaida‘s tight control over the planning of 
the 9/11 attacks.  
5.2.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 However, conclusions regarding the plotters‘ independent planning should not suggest 
that bin Laden‘s organization lacked an important role in the plot; the logistical support that 
Khyam‘s team received from al-Qaida demonstrates that London had become a priority target for 
the organization by 2003.  This support began with Nashwan ‗Abd al-Razzaq ‗Abd al-Baqi 
(a.k.a. Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi),84 a former major in the Iraqi army whose ties to al-Qaida extended 
to the organization‘s highest levels: prior to 9/11, he had served on al-Qaida‘s military 
committee, and he was so well-regarded within the organization that he was once personally 
tasked with Ayman al-Zawahiri‘s care and safe-keeping.85 Al-Baqi‘s specific role in Khyam‘s 
plot was to direct Mohammed Junaid Babar, a Pakistani-born American citizen who procured 
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materiel for al-Qaida in South Asia, to obtain ammonium nitrate fertilizer and aluminum powder, 
two common ingredients in improvised explosive devices, in preparation for the London attack.86  
Although Babar was unable to locate the fertilizer, he obtained the aluminum powder without 
incident,87 and British police later found it in the possession of Khyam, who apparently brought 
the material back to Britain in his luggage.88  Thus, the evidence demonstrates that a clear trail 
links high-ranking members of al-Qaida to one of the bomb-plot‘s key materiel inputs. 
 Individuals affiliated with al-Baqi also seem to have played a secondary logistical role, 
by introducing Khyam to other like-minded Londoners, who then provided the team with 
logistical assistance.  Specifically, Babar testified that al-Baqi gave orders to Mohammed 
Quayyum Khan (a.k.a. ―Q‖), a part-time cab driver based in near-by Luton, who was reportedly 
instrumental in bringing Omar Bakri Mohammed, the founder of al-Muhajiroun, to the Luton 
Mosque.89  Given Khyam and Mahmood‘s one-time connection to Omar Bakri‘s organization, 
Quayyum Khan may have played an early role in their indoctrination into fundamentalist Islam.   
It is, however, clearer that Quayyum Khan introduced Khyam to Mohammed Sidique 
Khan,90  a teacher‘s aide in the London schools, who shared Khyam‘s radical views, and who 
would gain dubious renown in 2005 for suicide-bombing the London Underground.91 Quayyum 
Khan claims to have known the pair only as the result of an unsuccessful effort to establish an 
                                                          
86 Babar allocution. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Khyam appeal. 
89 Ian Cobain and Jeevan Vasagar, ―Free – the man accused of being an al-Qaida leader, aka ‗Q,‘‖ The Guardian 
(London), April 30, 2007; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/01/politics.topstories3.  
90 Ibid.  See also, Duncan Gardham, ―Bomb plotters‘ al-Qa‘eda ‗link‘ still in Britain,‖ The Telegraph (London), May 
1, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1550210/Bomb-plotters-al-Qaeda-link-still-in-
Britain.html.   
91 House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, Report No.: HC 
1087, May 11, 2006. (Hereafter ―House of Commons Report‖).  See also, Hamida Ghafour, "Probe of British 
bombers provided little comfort; Suspects' backgrounds seemed 'unexceptional,'" Globe and Mail (Canada), June 6, 
2006, and Neville Dean, "The London Bombings - What we know so far," Press Association, July 19, 2005.  For 
information on the icepacks, see: The Rt. Hon Lady Justice Hallet DBE, Coroner‘s Inquest into the London 
Bombings of 7 July 2005, Report under Rule 43 of the Coroner‘s Rules 1984, May 6, 2011. (Hereafter ―Coroner‘s 
Report‖). 
250 
 
Islamic charity to benefit the needy in Pakistan, but the extent and nature of Sidique Khan‘s 
subsequent logistical interactions with Khyam belie this claim, though it is worth noting that 
British investigators were never able to pin any meaningful charges on Quayyum Khan.92 
 Specifically, in February 2004, Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, a 22 year-old British 
citizen of Pakistani origin who Sidique Khan had come to know through camping trips and other 
‗youth counseling‘ activities, and who would later serve as another of the suicide-bombers in the 
July 7, 2005, attacks on London,93 ran errands around the city alongside Khyam.  The trio‘s stops 
included an Internet café, where they downloaded jihadist propaganda, and a hardware store, 
where they presumably investigated the acquisition of supplies for the impending fertilizer 
bombing.94  That same month, Sidique Khan was also present at a meeting that Khyam, 
Mahmood, and Akbar held with the Canadian technical expert, Khawaja.95  In short, the evidence 
suggests that Sidique Khan and Tanweer logistically supported Khyam‘s bombing attempt. 
 With this pair‘s assistance, Khyam‘s team made significant progress toward conducting 
an attack.  Garcia had acquired nearly half a ton of fertilizer,96 which they stored in a storage unit 
that Akbar‘s step-cousin, Nabeel Hussain, unwittingly rented on Khyam‘s behalf.97  Moreover, 
the team was still in possessing of the aluminum powder they had acquired from Babar.  After 
receiving a telephone call from a suspicious employee at the storage unit, the police were able to 
surreptitiously replace the plotters‘ fertilizer with an inert substitute,98 but, even if only briefly, 
Khaym‘s team had acquired the majority of the components necessary to build a large bomb.  
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Thus, the logistics of the operation ultimately demonstrate that this was a viable plot that posed a 
meaningful threat to London. 
 The record has remained silent on the plot‘s specific sources of funding, but assessing the 
cost of fertilizer demonstrates that the plot, while dangerous, required little, if any, financial 
support from abroad.  Because different crops require different nourishment, the nitrogen content 
of commercially available fertilizers varies depending on purpose.  Cost varies accordingly, but 
none of the options are particularly expensive.99  Circa 2004, prices ranged between $160 per ton 
for fertilizer with a nitrogen concentration of 21 percent, to $250 per ton for fertilizer with a 
nitrogen concentration of 46 percent.100  Thus, if the plotters opted for the more expensive, more 
concentrated fertilizer, they would have been able to purchase the key chemical component of 
their bomb for approximately $125.  Given that the aluminum powder came to the team free of 
cost via Babar‘s efforts, and given that the team‘s other expenses, such as storage space, were 
minimal, the evidence suggests that the entire operation could have been conducted for under 
$1,000.   
Even if this estimate is off by a factor of five, the plotters would have been able to pay for 
the attack on their own using savings and lines of credit.  It is certainly possible that an al-Qaida 
leader handed the plotters a wad of cash before they departed Pakistan, but there is no reason to 
make a priori assumptions about al-Qaida‘s role in the plot‘s funding.  Ultimately, the low cost 
of the operation dictates that the plotters were likely financially independent of al-Qaida or any 
other outside organization. 
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5.2.3 TRAINING 
 As with aspects of the plot‘s logistics, al-Qaida‘s hand was evident in the team‘s training.  
When Khyam and Sidique Khan departed for Pakistan in 2003 (it is not clear if they traveled 
together or on separate occasions), Quayyum Khan, the British-based subordinate of al-Qaida 
leader Nashwan al-Baqi, reportedly arranged to have someone meet them at the airport in 
Karachi.101  Moreover, in 2003, Mohammed Junaid Babar, the fixer who also worked for 
Nashwan al-Baqi, helped to establish a training facility in Malakand, Pakistan, where Khyam, 
Garcia, Mahmood, Amin, and Akbar trained after deciding to attack the United Kingdom during 
the planning meeting at Mahmood‘s home.102   
They were soon joined by Khawaja and Sidique Khan, as well as Shujah Mahmood, 
Khyam‘s now 16 year-old brother, who was so naïve that he expected that jihadist training 
―would be marshmallows and the whole camping thing,‖ and so ill-prepared for the rigors of the 
experience that he spent every night in tears, literally crying for his mother.103   Therefore, 
although Khyam had training ties to other organization by virtue of his earlier time in Kashmir 
and Afghanistan, and although Tanweer did not attend the Malakand camp, it is abundantly clear 
that al-Qaida provided the 2004 plotters with the knowledge necessary fulfill their vision of 
jihad.    
5.2.4 SUMMATION 
Although the 9/11 attacks were successful and the 2004 plot failed when police 
interrupted it, there are no grounds to conclude that Khyam‘s team was of appreciably lower 
quality than its predecessor.  Shujah Mahmood, who British courts ultimately acquitted of all 
                                                          
101 Gardham, ―Bomb plotters‘ al-Qa‘eda ‗link‘ still in Britain.‖ 
102 Ibid.  See also, Perlez and Sciolino. 
103 Quoted in, ―Profile: Shujah Mahmood,‖ BBC News, April 30, 2007; available online: 
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terror charges,104 was admittedly hapless, but then the limited language skills of several of the 
9/11 hijackers demonstrate that they were poorly equipped for a mission in the West, and 
Khyam‘s associates also include a mathematician and a computer engineer.  Simply put, 
Khyam‘s team had the technical skills and the materiel necessary to complete the attack.  Rather 
than the sort of degradation of quality evidenced in the differences between the 1998 embassy 
bombing-team and the 2002 Mombasa team, the 2004 attempt to bomb London failed because 
alert staff members at the storage center where the team stashed their fertilizer became concerned 
and phoned the police, thereby initiating the chain of events that led to the plotters‘ arrest.105  
 While the quality of the teams used in the 2001 and 2004 operations did not degrade, the 
nature of their respective relationships to al-Qaida did.  Al-Qaida provided direct logistical and 
training support to Khyam‘s team and thus remained strongly involved in the 2004 plot, but the 
extent of this role was less than in the 9/11 attacks.  Khyam‘s attack-team demonstrated 
significant aspects of self-organization and attempted the attack without the same degree of high-
level guidance bin Laden and KSM provided to the 9/11 hijackers by personally planning several 
aspects of the 2001 attack.  Thus, Khaym‘s plot suggests that al-Qaida‘s control over its Western 
hit squad had begun to break down; al-Qaida was no longer the bureaucratic hierarchy that 
existed circa 2001.    
Moreover, the nature of the 2004 plotter‘s relationship with al-Qaida was fundamentally 
different than that of their predecessors.  Like the 1998 embassy-bombers, the 9/11 hijackers 
largely took direction from a hierarchical chain of command.  The 2004 team, by comparison, 
seems to have viewed al-Qaida more as a means to an end.  Khyam, who assembled and led the 
team, already had existing relationships with other extremist groups, by virtue of his time with 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 
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Kashmiri militants and the Taliban, so it seems a stretch to assert that he found the ideology of 
bin Laden and al-Qaida uniquely appealing.  Moreover, the plot‘s key strategic decision, namely 
the resolution to attack the United Kingdom, seems to have taken place independent of al-
Qaida‘s direct influence.  Therefore, the relationship between Khyam‘s team and bin Laden‘s 
organization was ultimately somewhat akin to that between a contractor and a client.  However, 
because Sidique Khan and Tanweer, both of whom escaped arrest when investigators dismissed 
them as minor hangers-on rather than dangerous terrorists,106 went-on to complete a suicide-
attack against London that was more closely linked to al-Qaida, this case also demonstrates that 
bin Laden‘s organization was capable of stubborn strategic resolve, even as the extent of al-
Qaida‘s control over operatives waned. 
 
5.3 THE JULY 7, 2005, LONDON BOMBINGS 
 A little after 7.30 on the morning of July 7, 2005, four young men entered the Luton 
railway station and boarded a train bound for London, about 30 miles to the south.  Three of 
them, 30 year-old Mohammed Sidique Khan, 22 year-old Shehzad Tanweer, and 18 year-old 
Hasib Hussain, were British-born Muslims of Pakistani descent.  The fourth man, 19 year-old 
Jermaine Lindsay, was a Jamaican-born British citizen of African descent, who converted to 
Islam only five years earlier.  Because the men were dressed casually and carried backpacks, 
which later events would reveal were filled with explosive-devices and icepacks to keep the 
bombs cool, the four stood-out from the suit-wearing commuters that comprised the bulk of the 
                                                          
106 Paul Murphy (Chairman), Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 
July 2005, March 30, 2006, pp. 13-15. (Hereafter ―Intelligence and Security Committee Report‖).  See also, Duncan 
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train‘s passengers, but not enough to cause alarm.  Passengers would later state that the men 
looked like they were leaving town on a weekend camping trip.107 
 Because of delay on the line, the men did not reach King‘s Cross, the main train depot in 
London, until nearly an hour later, when CCTV cameras captured images of the four smiling 
happily, and witnesses reported that the men hugged on the platform before heading toward 
separate lines of the London Underground.  At about 8.50am, three nearly simultaneous 
explosions took place.  Tanweer was the first to attack; he detonated his bomb on a Circle Line 
train as it transited between Aldgate and Liverpool Stations, northeast of downtown London, 
killing himself and seven others, while wounding another 170.  Sidique Khan, who was seated on 
another Circle Line train, detonated his bomb moments later, near Edgware Road station in 
Westminster, northwest of downtown, killing himself and six victims, as well as wounding 
nearly 165 people.  Meanwhile, Lindsay bombed a third train on the Piccadilly Line as it traveled 
between King‘s Cross and Russell Square Station in Camden, just north of central London.  
Because Lindsay‘s train car was particularly crowded, his death toll was higher.  In addition to 
himself, Lindsay killed 26 people and injured approximately 340.108 
 As his friends exploded, Hussain ambled out of King‘s Cross and onto nearby Euston 
Road.  He used his mobile to make repeated calls to the other bombers, but to no avail.  His next 
move suggests that he suffered technical difficulties; he reentered the station and bought a nine 
volt battery from a drugstore located on the main concourse.  He then spent a few minutes in a 
nearby McDonalds, before catching a bus toward Euston Station, where he transferred to the No. 
30 line, which was serviced by London‘s iconographic double-decker busses.  At 9.47am, nearly 
                                                          
107 House of Commons Report.  See also, Hamida Ghafour, "Probe of British bombers provided little comfort; 
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an hour after the train bombings, Hussain detonated his weapon from the upper deck of the bus, 
killing himself and 13 others, while wounding more than 110 people.109  The explosion took 
place on the edge of Tavistock Square, an urban green-space that until the day of the bombings 
was best known for containing monuments to non-violence, including a statue of Mahatma 
Gandhi and a memorial to conscientious objectors to war.110 
 Given the logistical ties that Sidique Khan and Tanweer held to Khyam, it is hardly a 
stretch to suggest that the July 7 bombings were an extension of the 2004 plot.  However, the 
nature al-Qaida‘s involvement in the two operations‘ differed slightly.  Because an al-Qaida 
bomb-maker seems to have closely choreographed the technical details of the 2005 attack, 
Sidique Khan‘s team benefitted from more direct planning support that Khyam‘s.  The situation 
was reversed when it came to logistics; the 2005 bombers acquired all of their supplies 
independently and did not benefit from the type of direct logistical support that Khyam received 
when Babar provided aluminum powder.  In terms of finance, the two operations seem to have 
been similarly independent; there is little evidence to suggest that either attack-team benefitted 
from the sort of direct cash transfers that sustained the 9/11 hijackers.  Similarly, both teams 
benefitted from comparable levels of al-Qaida training.  Although the details of al-Qaida‘s 
involvement in Sidique Khan‘s attack were not identical to its role in Khyam‘s failed plot, bin 
Laden‘s organization played an analogous role in both operations.  Ultimately, both the 2004 
fertilizer bomb-plot and the July 7 bombings blended aspects of self-organizing terrorism with 
unambiguous organizational support from al-Qaida. 
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5.3.1 PLANNING 
Given the extent and nature of Sidique Khan and Tanweer‘s involvement in the failed 
2004 plot, it is hardly a stretch to conclude that the 2005 bombings were a strategic extension of 
the decision to strike London made at Waheed Mahmood‘s home in the spring of 2003.  Thus, it 
would be mistaken to attribute the conceptualization of the 2005 attack to al-Qaida, because it 
seems that Sidique Khan and Tanweer were like promising young athletes, who began playing 
on the varsity squad after injuries removed starting players from the line-up.  In short, it seems 
that the men were merely carrying on where their friends had failed. 
Even though the idea to attack London does not seem to have originated with al-Qaida, 
the organization‘s involvement in both operations demonstrates that attacking London had been a 
priority the terror group since at least 2003.  To mix metaphors, al-Qaida‘s strategic involvement 
in the July 7 attack was somewhat akin to venture capitalism.  The organization did not generate 
the goal, but provided substantial support to an objective that leaders believed would provide 
substantial returns.   
Given this context, it seems most likely that specific operational planning for the July 7 
attacks began in earnest following the demise of the fertilizer-bomb plot.  In November 2004, a 
few months after the dust had settled from Khyam‘s arrest, Sidique Khan returned to Pakistan.  
This time, he brought Tanweer along; a CCTV camera in Karachi‘s airport even captured images 
of the pair as they deplaned from the same Turkish Airlines flight.111  The contacts the pair made 
while abroad suggest that they made the trip in the hopes of acquiring the skill and knowledge 
necessary to succeed where Khyam‘s team had failed.  
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 Sidique Khan and Tanweer‘s most telling interactions were with Abu Obaidah al-Masri, 
an innovative Egyptian bomb-maker who is credited with designing the types of detonators used 
in the July 7 attacks.112  It is difficult to overstate the significance of this technical innovation; an 
official British inquiry into the bombings would later conclude that at the time of the attacks the 
design of the detonators ―was unique in the UK and possibly worldwide.‖113  Since members of 
the US intelligence community identified Abu Obaidah as one of al-Qaida‘s senior operational 
commanders and a close confidant of Ayman al-Zawahiri,114 there is little doubt that bin Laden‘s 
organization created new technology in furtherance of the July 7 bombings.  In short, even 
though al-Qaida did not come-up with the idea to bomb London, the organization was 
responsible for the most important technical aspect of the attacks‘ planning. 
 However, the evidence suggests that the suicide-operatives planned the tactical details of 
the attack on their own.  For example, in December 2004, Jermaine Lindsay reconnoitered 
possible targets in London; he spent more than 40 minutes walking around King‘s Cross Station, 
before he met Hasib Hussain and two other friends for a day of ‗sightseeing,‘ that included stops 
at attractions such as the Eye of London, the British Museum of Natural History, and the London 
Aquarium.115  But since Lindsay and Hussain‘s friends were later acquitted of conspiring with 
the July 7 bombers, while being simultaneously convicted for conspiring to receive terror 
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training,116 it is difficult to judge exactly who was involved in the reconnaissance work, and 
precisely when this process began. 
 The date of the final planning preparations is comparatively clearer.  Nine days before the 
July 7 bombers launched their attack, they conducted a dry run of the operation.  After analyzing 
footage obtained from more than 80,000 CCTV cameras, investigators unearthed images dating 
from June 29 of the team at both the Luton train station, from which they would depart on the 
morning of the bombings, and King‘s Cross in London.  The obvious conclusion is that they 
were familiarizing themselves with the layout of King‘s Cross and investigating to see if any 
security measures had been put in place since Lindsay‘s earlier trip to the station.117    
Despite the preparation evidenced by this reconnaissance trip, it is important not to 
overstate the quality of the tactical planning.  None of the sites that the July 7 bombers targeted 
were critical pieces of infrastructure, and with the partial exception of Lindsay, none of the 
bombers struck particularly crowded locations.  Consequently, Richard Barnes, who headed 
London‘s police board before serving as the city‘s deputy mayor, argued that bombers were 
―totally incompetent.‖118  If they had known what they were doing, Barnes believes they would 
have caused a much higher death toll and would have chosen ―strategic points in London that 
would have ground the city to a halt for months, rather than hours.‖119  Ultimately, the potential 
impact of the new technology that al-Qaida created in advancement of the July 7 attacks was 
mitigated by flawed tactical planning. 
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5.3.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 Because a great deal of information on the July 7 attack died with the suicide-bombers, it 
is impossible to fully reconstruct the finances underlying the attack.  With this caveat, it seems 
that Sidique Khan used two means to provide for the bulk of his team‘s expenses.  Some of the 
money came from Sidique Khan‘s legitimate income, which he obtained working as a well-liked 
teacher‘s aide as a primary school in Leeds.120  However, a larger share of the money seems to 
have been obtained via bank fraud.  Specifically, Sidique Khan borrowed the equivalent of about 
18,000 USD in cash from HSBC Bank, with no intention of every repaying the debt.121  Given 
that the attack was a low-cost affair—some media sources put the total expenditures as low as a 
900 USD,122 while open-source ‗forensic‘ inquiries estimate the cost at the equivalent of about 
13,000 USD123—Sidique Khan‘s funds likely met the needs of the attack without additional 
supplement.  However, it is worth noting that the team may have had substantially greater 
financial resources at its disposal; a man who appears in the open-source record on as ―Ausman,‖ 
and who purportedly trained with Sidique Khan and Tanweer in 2004, obtained the equivalent of 
41,000 USD in fraudulent loans, by posing as the owner of a construction firm,124 but it is not 
known how much, if any, of these funds went towards the July 7 operation. 
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Saudi authorities posited a third (and less likely) possible source of funding: direct 
transfers from al-Qaida.  Younis Mohammed Ibrahim al-Hayari and Abdel Karim al-Mejati, a 
pair of Moroccan jihadists who died in separate gunfights with the Saudi police in 2005, 
purportedly transferred money to the bombing-team in the months preceding the attacks.125  
Even if this allegation proves true—it is worth noting that none of the official British inquiries 
into these attacks make matching claims—then the financial patterns of the July 7 attacks still 
differed significantly from those witnessed in the 9/11 attacks, because the British team received 
fewer transfers and provided some of their own funding, while the 9/11 hijackers were entirely 
dependent on disbursements from al-Qaida paymasters.  In short, any role that al-Qaida played in 
funding Sidique Khan‘s attack was limited. 
 While the extent of al-Qaida‘s role in financial role in the July 7 attacks is still open to a 
modicum of debate, it is clear that the organization played no role in assembling the bombing-
team.  Like Khyam before him, Sidique Khan presented bin Laden‘s organization with a ready-
made attack-team, assembled from individuals with whom he had previous association.  He met 
all of the other bombers before he and Tanweer departed for South Asia and began planning the 
attack in earnest.  Moreover, Sidique Khan‘s relationships also likely predate his training with 
Khyam in 2003, though the timeline is less clear regarding this second point in relation to 
Hussain and Lindsay.    
Sidique Khan‘s relationship with Tanweer had the longest histroy.  Shiv Malik, a BBC 
journalist who conducted extensive interviews with Sidique Khan‘s surviving relatives, asserts 
that the pair ―are thought to have known each other since childhood.‖126  By 2001, the 
                                                          
125 Toby Harden and Andrew Alderson, "UK terrorists got cash from Saudi Arabia before 7/7," Sunday Telegraph 
(London), August 7, 2005. 
126 Shiv Malik, ―My brother the bomber,‖ Prospect, June 30, 2007; available online: 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/06/mybrotherthebomber/. 
262 
 
relationship also had a functional dimension, because Sidique Khan, who had been using the 
basement of Leeds‘ Hardy Street Mosque as a youth center and gymnasium, moved his Islamic 
outreach program into empty attic space above the Tanweer family‘s fish-and-chip shop 
following a dispute with the Mosque‘s board of trustees.127  Given that Sidique Khan was 
concurrently involved in recruiting young Muslims from the Manchester area to serve as 
mujahideen in Afghanistan—his partners in this endeavor would later suicide-bomb a tavern in 
Tel Aviv128— Tanweer‘s role in the youth center‘s relocation demonstrates that he was likely 
actively involved in jihadist recruiting approximately four years prior to the 2005 attacks.   
 Sidique Khan‘s relationship with Hasib Hussain, the Tavistock bus-bomber, dated to no 
later than 2003 and also flowed through Tanweer.  Hussain‘s older brother, Imran, regularly 
played cricket with Tanweer—they even had a game the day before the 2005 bombing—and 
younger brother Hasib sometimes joined them.  Thus, Hussain had known Tanweer since 
childhood, and after Tanweer made introductions to Sidique Khan, Hussain began to take part in 
the pair‘s ‗youth outreach‘ activities.  Moreover, Sidique Khan began to visit the Hussain family 
home regularly.  However, the family asserts that Sidique Khan was somewhat covert in his 
radicalization of Hussain.  Imran was present during many of Sidique Khan‘s visits and asserts 
that ―he was doing all of that brainwashing and not uttering a word about it,‖ though Imran‘s 
characterization may simply be an attempt to distance himself from his brother‘s radicalism.129  
Regardless, it is clear that Hussain found his way into jihad because of interactions that he had 
on the cricket field and in his family‘s living room, rather than as the result of al-Qaida‘s direct 
influence.  
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 The nature of Jermaine Lindsay‘s relationship with Sidique Khan remains somewhat 
enigmatic.  Unlike the other bombers, Lindsay was not from Leeds.  Since immigrating to Britain 
with his mother as a toddler, he had lived in Huddersfield, about 20 miles to the southeast.  
Moreover, Lindsay was a Jamaican of African descent and had not converted to Islam until 
2000.130  Consequently, he was not part of the same Pakistani community as the other bombers 
and lacked the overlapping friendship circles evident in Hussain‘s recruitment.  Instead, a radical 
preacher named Abdullah al-Faisal seems to have introduced Lindsay to Sidique Khan.131   
Al-Faisal shared many aspects of Lindsay‘s background.  For example, both were black, 
both were Jamaican-born, and both were converts from Christianity.  Consequently, Lindsay 
found al-Faisal‘s message, which included exhortations to kill all non-Muslims,132 uniquely 
appealing, especially after Lindsay‘s mother moved abroad in 2002 and left her son feeling 
abandoned and alone.133  Although al-Faisal was jailed in 2003 on charges of inciting murder,134 
he preached twice in Leeds before his detention.135  Given Sidique Khan‘s prominence among 
that city‘s Islamists, it is hardly far-fetched to conclude that their paths crossed.   Therefore, if al-
Faisal introduced Lindsay to Sidique Khan, it occurred no later than 2003—about a year before 
the specific planning of the July 7 attacks began.  Even if al-Faisal lacked a role in the 
introductions, Lindsay‘s relationship to Khan can still be dated to this period, because, in 2003, 
Lindsay and his pregnant wife relocated to the Leeds area from Huddersfield, and he then 
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became a fixture in the youth center that the other July 7 bombers frequented.136  While it is clear 
that Sidique Khan had a long history of involvement in radical Islam, it ultimately seems that he 
had recruited the other bombes to his cause before he began operating in close association with 
al-Qaida. 
Beyond manpower, Sidique Khan‘s team was also independent of bin Laden‘s 
organization in the acquisition of materials.  The bombers began collecting supplies as early as 
February 2005, when Hasib Hussain and Shehzad Tanweer purchased 5 liter drums of ―Growth 
Technology Liquid Oxygen,‖ a hydrogen peroxide-based solvent used to clean hydroponic 
systems, from a pair of specialized horticulture stores in York.137  By early April, the team had 
acquired its first safe house, and in late May, Jermaine Lindsay used a false name to sub-let an 
apartment at 18 Alexandra Grove, a dwelling that soon became the team‘s primary bomb-
factory.138   
 Because police found all four of the suicide-bombers‘ fingerprints in the Alexandra 
Grove apartment, it seems clear that bomb-making was a team affair.  Moreover, the police also 
found a few electric hotplates, an assortment of pots and pans, and four respirators, which were 
necessary because the explosives-manufacturing process produced fumes so caustic that they 
bubbled paint inside the apartment and killed shrubbery outside the window used as a vent.  
When viewed in sum, the evidence suggests that the men likely took turns stirring the pot to boil-
down the Liquid Oxygen to explosive concentrations.139  
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However, Sidique Khan seems to have played a leading role in the bomb-making process.  
Handwriting analysis showed that he was the one who wrote the recipe that described the correct 
quantity of chemicals to mix with organic filler material (the bombers chose black pepper) in 
order to produce an incendiary explosion.140  He also likely had some outside advice; 
investigators determined that Sidique Khan used a disposable cell phone to make several calls to 
Pakistan during the explosives-manufacturing phase of the team‘s preparations.141  The logical 
inference is that he spoke to master bomb-maker Abu Obaidah about the technical details of the 
process.  Even with this guidance, it is clear that the July 7 team conducted the most important 
logistical task necessary to complete the bombing, namely the construction of explosive devices, 
with a high degree of independence. 
5.3.3 TRAINING 
 Al-Qaida‘s clearest role in the July 7 bombings came in the instruction of the attack-
team.  It seems clear that Abu Obaidah not only planned the technical aspects of the attack, but 
also that he trained Sidique Khan and Tanweer in bomb-making.  And if Abu Obaidah was 
ultimately the recipient of the calls Sidique Khan made from his burner phone during the bomb-
making process, as the context of the evidence suggests, then this training extended well after the 
July 7 bombers left Pakistan.  
Moreover, Hasib Hussain, the Tavistock bus-bomber, also likely trained alongside 
Tanweer and Sidique Khan.  When his compatriots arrived in Pakistan in the fall of 2004, 
Hussain had already been in the country for about three months.142  There is no direct evidence 
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that he joined his friends at the same training camp,143 but given the trio‘s preexisting ties, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the men would have made every effort to train together. 
 While the evidence of Hussain‘s direct training ties to al-Qaida is mildly speculative, it is 
clear that Lindsay had no comparable experience.  The open-source record contains no evidence 
that he ever trained abroad.  Ultimately, it is darkly ironic that the least experienced member of 
the July 7 team was the most successful suicide attacker; half of the attack‘s 52 fatalities resulted 
from Lindsay‘s bomb.          
5.3.4 SUMMATION 
It is difficult to gauge the quality of the attack-team in comparison to its predecessor.   
Gone are the mathematician and computer engineer that were present in 2004, but then again, 
also gone are hapless individual like Shujah Mahmood.  Indeed, until their involvement in 
radical Islam, the July 7 bombers‘ lacked outstanding features.  In its official inquiry into the 
bombings, the British House of Commons best summarized the four‘s backgrounds, calling them 
―largely unexceptional‖ and noting that with the partial exception of the convert Lindsay, ―Little 
distinguishes their formative experiences from those of many others of the same generation, 
ethnic origin and social background.‖  In short, it seems that average men comprised the July 7 
attack-team. 
However, the team had some experience in jihad.  Tanweer and Sidique Khan not only 
trained abroad, but also participated in Khyam‘s failed attack in 2004.  Though a newcomer in 
comparison to this pair, Hussain also likely trained with al-Qaida.  Therefore, even though 
Lindsay lacked formal instruction in terrorism, the team‘s training ties to al-Qaida dictate that 
bin Laden‘s organization played a strong role in the bombing, especially when viewed alongside 
Abu Obaidah al-Masri‘s involvement in the technical planning of the attack.   
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 Yet, it would inaccurate to state that al-Qaida directed this operation with the same 
degree of hierarchical control that the organization exhibited in the 9/11 attacks.  Overlaps in 
personnel suggest that this plot was an extension of Khyam‘s self-conceived plot to bomb 
London, rather than a ‗new‘ idea conceptualized by al-Qaida leaders.  Though the slight 
possibility of al-Qaida funding remains, it is clear that Sidique Khan‘s team self-financed the 
majority of the attack, and lacked even the small amount of direct logistical support that 
Khyam‘s team received, much less the comprehensive backing that al-Qaida provided to the 9/11 
hijackers.  However, the July 7 bombers received a greater degree of technical planning 
assistance than Khyam‘s team, while both groups of plotters were responsible for (poorly) 
planning the tactical details of their operations.  Therefore, the details of al-Qaida‘s involvement 
in the plots differ, but the scale of the organization‘s involvement in these events was broadly 
equivalent.   
Ultimately, both Khyam and Sidique Khan‘s teams self-organized several aspects of their 
attack, while simultaneously benefitting from aspects of organizational support provided by al-
Qaida.  Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that the July 7 bombings would never have come 
to fruition without both of these structural components: Sidique Khan‘s informal, pre-existing 
relationships provided the operation with manpower and local knowledge, while al-Qaida 
provided organizational resources in the forms of technical expertise and training.  While this 
blended structure might suggest an impressive organizational adaptation if viewed in isolation, 
subsequent events serve to demonstrate that the July 7 bombings are better viewed as a point on 
devolutionary timeline, because later al-Qaida-linked hit squads that targeted the West continued 
to lack access to al-Qaida‘s financial and logistical resources, and were comprised of low-caliber 
personnel, who on average received less training and had less experience than their predecessors.       
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5.4 THE JULY 21, 2005, FAILED BOMBING OF LONDON 
As Londoners attempted to return to normal life in the aftermath of the July 7 bombings, 
another attack-team prepared to strike the city.  On July 21, 2005, just 14 days after Sidique 
Khan‘s bombing, a group of young Muslims, most of them East Africans who had lived in 
Britain for years, targeted five sites around London, four of which again involved the city‘s mass 
transit system.  Specifically, Yasin Hassan Omar, a 24 year-old Somali who first arrived in 
Britain thirteen years earlier as a refugee,144 attempted to detonate a hydrogen peroxide-based 
explosive device, hidden inside of a backpack, on a train at the Warren Street station of the 
London Underground, fairly near the terminal where Hasib Hussain had transferred to the 
Tavistock Square-bound bus on the morning of July 7.145   
Two of Omar‘s co-conspirators made almost identical bombing attempts on other trains.  
CCTV cameras captured images of Ramzi Mohammed,146 a 24 year-old Somali who fled to 
Britain via Kenya in 1998 to escape Somalia‘s civil war,147 as he attempted to suicide-bomb a 
train at the Stockwell station, in the heart of inner London.148   Meanwhile, Hussein Osman, a 28 
year-old Ethiopian, whose real name was Hamdi Adus Isaac and who had adopted the name 
Osman in the hopes of achieving refugee status when he arrived in Britain in the 1990s,149 
attempted to detonate a bomb while onboard a train at the station in Shepherd‘s Bush, a bustling 
residential neighborhood in West London.   
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As in the July 7 attack, this group of plotters also sought to target London‘s famous 
double-decker busses.  Muktar Said Ibrahim, a 27 year-old Eritrean-born British citizen, who had 
been living in England since 1992,150 tried to suicide-bomb the No. 26 bus in Hackney, in the 
northeast corner of inner London.151 
The fifth and most enigmatic member of the July 21 team seems to have gotten cold feet 
and abandoned his bomb in the brush of Little Wormwood Scrubs, an urban green-space located 
in West London.152  This bomber called himself Manfor Kwaku Asiedu and was about 32 years 
old, but the details of his background are exceptionally difficult to pin-down, because he used 
multiple false identities.  His attorney claims the bomber‘s real name is Sumaila Abubakhari, but 
when the bomber arrived in Britain in late 2003, he used a passport bearing the name Georges 
Nanak Marquye.  After losing this document in a house fire, the bomber assumed the name 
Asiedu as a matter of practicality and convenience; he needed an identity, and the real Asiedu 
had previously lived at the same address, before being involuntarily confined to a psychiatric 
hospital, placing him in a position where he was unlikely to learn of the identity theft.153  Like 
his identity, Asiedu‘s reasons for abandoning the attack at the last minute remain unclear, 
because he was heavily involved in other stages of the operation, most notably the acquisition of 
materials. 
 The vagaries of Asiedu‘s involvement notwithstanding, the attack-team attempted a 
coordinated strike.  Their bombs were intended to detonate between 12.30pm and 1.00pm, 
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during London‘s busy lunch hour,154 and while the detonators successfully exploded, the mix of 
hydrogen peroxide and chapatti flour that constituted the main explosive charge of the bomb 
failed to ignite.155  London was saved from another dramatic loss of life only by the poor 
chemistry skills of the members of the July 21 team; they failed to concentrate the hydrogen 
peroxide-mixture to the level necessary to make it explosive.156 
 Although British officials initially stressed that ―July 7 and July 21 seem not be 
related,‖157 the currently available evidence demonstrates that these two attacks were linked by 
planning and training ties.  More specifically, the two groups of attackers adopted identical 
methodologies because they shared links to Abu Obaidah al-Masri.  But despite this prominent 
similarity, there are also substantial differences between the two attack-teams.  Most glaringly, 
only a single member of the July 21 team trained abroad, though other members of the team 
received some exceptionally rudimentary experience from British-based training.  Moreover, the 
July 21 team‘s general lack of experience showed; the group was sometimes buffoonish in its 
efforts toward terrorism.  Therefore, although the attacks of July 7 and July 21 were separated by 
only two weeks, and although both events shared ties to al-Qaida, tremendous gaps existed in the 
quality of the respective attack-teams.  Ultimately, the latter event marks the point at which the 
devolutionary trends that began in the aftermath of 9/11 overwhelmed al-Qaida‘s efforts to attack 
the West using hit squads.  From this attack forward, the odds that al-Qaida will successfully 
conduct a true mass-casualty attack in the West have been substantially reduced, though not 
completely eliminated. 
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5.4.1 PLANNING 
 It is difficult to pin-down the planning details of the July 21 attacks, primarily because 
the operation‘s key members lied persistently during their trial.  For example, Ibrahim repeated 
claimed that the team never intended to detonate the bombs.  According to his account, the entire 
operation was an elaborate hoax designed to protest Britain‘s participation in the Iraq War.  
Ibrahim never wavered from this story, even after prosecutors noted that there would have been 
no need for the team to use viable explosive materials, like concentrated hydrogen peroxide, if 
the weapons were not intended to detonate.158  Owing to the ambiguities created by the bombers‘ 
deliberate attempts at deception, many facets of the operation remain somewhat obscure. 
 For example, it remains unclear when the July 21 team first conceptualized the idea to 
bomb Britain.  Unlike Sidique Khan and Tanweer, none of the July 21 bombers had any overt 
links to Khyam‘s failed 2004 attack; therefore, the July 21 attack does not seem to have been a 
continuation of this earlier plot.  However, this should not suggest that the July 21 attack was 
entirely independent of the earlier operations, because in the fall of 2004, Ibrahim was in 
Pakistan at the same time as Sidique Khan and Tanweer.  Given that the bombs used on July 7 
and July 21 shared the same unique detonator design and that the two attacks were the first 
known usages of hydrogen peroxide-based bombs in the United Kingdom, it is almost certain 
that Abu Obaidah, the enigmatic al-Qaida bomb-maker, planned the technical details of both 
attacks.159  Ultimately, it seems that the two July 2005 attacks on London were independently 
inspired, before coming together in Pakistan under Abu Obaidah. 
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  The tactical planning of the July 21 attack is similarly ambiguous.  No information has 
emerged regarding if and when the bombers conducted specific surveillance on the transportation 
sites they attacked.  However, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the July 21 bombings were 
not a simple copy-cat attack.  Ibrahim‘s team clearly began planning its strike well ahead of the 
July 7 bombings, because its members began to amass bombing materials in the spring of 2005, 
several months before Sidique Khan‘s attack.   
Moreover, the July 21 bombers apparently lacked any advanced knowledge of the timing 
of Sidique Khan‘s attack.  They apparently learned of the event from the same source as the rest 
of London: the news.  Ibrahim‘s team may have adjusted their plans after witnessing the details 
of the July 7 attack, but the only planning detail that is crystal clear in relation to the failed July 
21 attacks is that the bombers had decided to target London long before July 7.160 
5.4.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 The manpower necessary to conduct the bombing was assembled long before a specific 
plot ever began.  Ibrahim, who played the most important role in the plot, found his way to 
radical Islam in the late 1990s, after spending his youth pursuing a life of petty crime and drug 
use.  In 1996, he was part of a gang that British prosecutors convicted of a series of knife-point 
robberies.  Ibrahim was exceptionally angry that, as the only member of the gang older than 18, 
his five year sentence was harsher than those handed-down to his co-defendants.  Friends 
speculate that this bitterness made him an easy mark for prison jihadists, who apparently 
recruited Ibrahim to their cause, because when he emerged from detention on an early parole in 
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1998, he had become a fundamentalist, who wore traditional Muslim headdress and facial 
hair.161 
 He began attending radical mosques, and was reportedly a devoted follower of Abu 
Hamza al-Masri, the hook-handed preacher who presided over London‘s infamous Finsbury Park 
Mosque in the late 1990s.162  Ibrahim soon fell under the influence of Atilla Ahmet, who served 
as Abu Hamza‘s deputy imam, and Mohammed Hamid, a former crack addict and occasional 
member of the Finsbury Park congregation, who became radicalized during his recovery and 
frequently preached on the street at London‘s Speaker‘s Corner.  More specifically, by 2003, 
Ibrahim had become a regular attendee of the fundamentalist study sessions Hamid conducted at 
his East London home, where Ahmet served as a frequent guest-lecturer.  It was through this 
group that Ibrahim formed relationships with four of the other men involved in the failed July 21 
bombing.163   
Ramzi Mohammed and Hussein Osman were already members of the study-circle when 
Ibrahim began attending.164  Although a native of Somalia, Mohammed was only nominally 
Muslim when he arrived to Britain with his family in 1998.  He drank and chased women as a 
teenager, but developed a more serious interest in Islam circa 2003, reportedly after hearing 
Hamid preach at Speaker‘s Corner,165 and soon began attending the street-preacher‘s study 
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sessions.166  Osman‘s path to radicalization followed a similar trajectory; as a teenager, he was a 
devotee of hip-hop music and favored himself a ladies‘ man.167  Circa 2000, he and Adel Yahya, 
a high school friend who would later help the bombing-team acquire chemicals, developed a 
deeper interest in religion,168 and the pair soon began attending services at Finsbury Park 
mosque,169 and then Hamid‘s study sessions.170    
In time, Yassin Omar also joined this group.171  However, his involvement with radical 
Islam seems to have predated that of his co-conspirators, because Omar was drawn to 
fundamentalism while still an impressionable high school student.  Although a Somali, he was 
raised by white, Christian foster parents after arriving in Britain, but his guardians state that he 
was ―not comfortable with boundaries and rules‖ that they set.172  Former high school classmates 
stated that Omar had supported Palestinian causes since he first arrived in Britain.173  Thus, it 
seems that some combination of teenage rebellion and preexisting affinity for Islamic causes 
combined to push him toward radicalism, and by 2000 Omar ideologically supported the 
Taliban.174  Concurrently, Omar began attending Finsbury Park mosque, and eventually fell into 
Hamid and Atillah‘s orbit.175 
The depth of Hamid‘s involvement in the team‘s recruitment seems difficult to overstate.  
His ties to Ibrahim, in particular, were exceptionally close.  The men were even arrested together 
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in October 2004, when Hamid became aggressive to pedestrians passing by the Islamic 
bookstand that the pair ran on London‘s Oxford Street.  After insulting the police officer 
dispatched to the scene, Hamid claimed to have a bomb in his possession and refused to provide 
police with his real name, instead referring to himself as ―Osama bin London.‖176 
While this event serves to demonstrate the depth of the bond that existed between 
Ibrahim and Hamid, it also demonstrates the flamboyance with which the plotters sometimes 
voiced their support for radical Islam.  It was not a single isolated incident.  In the spring of 
2005, during a Friday prayer session, Omar got into a screaming match with an imam who 
preached that Palestinian suicide bombings were a violation of Islam.177  Equally telling were the 
claims made by Hamid‘s preaching partner, Ahmet, who reportedly bragged widely that he was 
―the number one al-Qaida [member] in Europe,‖178 and who once told TV reporters that he loved 
bin Laden ―more than himself,‖ before stating that the casualties of the 9/11 attacks were a ―drop 
in the ocean.‖  Indeed, he was so proud of these performances that he burned copies of the 
interviews to DVD and distributed them to friends and family.179  In short, the plotters and their 
associates were indiscrete in voicing their support for al-Qaida. 
Despite Ahmet‘s claims to the contrary, his personal history suggests that he lacked any 
direct interactions with the organization‘s operational leaders.  A Londoner born of Turkish-
Cypriot heritage, Ahmet went by ―Alan‖ and made his living as a youth-league soccer coach 
throughout the bulk of the 1990s.  Moreover, he was nominally Christian until 1998, when he 
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converted to Islam.180  The record contains no evidence that he trained abroad or interacted 
operationally with members of bin Laden‘s organization.  In short, it is clear that Ahmet was a 
committed Islamist, but it remains to be proven that he held membership in al-Qaida, much less 
that he was the organization‘s top European member.  Consequently, the currently available 
evidence suggests that it would be exaggerative to attribute bin Laden‘s organization with a 
direct role in the recruitment of the July 21 bombers. 
The only member of the team who lacked known ties to Ahmet and Hamid was Asiedu.  
The evidence is somewhat vague regarding his recruitment, but since he did not enter Britain 
until 2003, it seems that he was a later edition to the bombing team.   Because Asiedu made his 
living as a handyman at the Finchley Mosque, where Ibrahim and Omar sometimes worshipped, 
the pair appears to have directly recruited the Ghanaian.  Within a few weeks of the trio‘s first 
interaction, Asiedu was invited to move into 58 Curtis House, the eighth-floor, government-
subsidized apartment where Omar lived in the north London borough of Enfield.181 
 While the absence of a detailed open-source history of Ahmet‘s life dictates that a 
modicum of ambiguity continues to surround al-Qaida‘s role in procuring manpower for the July 
21 bombings, it is exceptionally clear that bombers acquired the materiel necessary to conduct 
the attack on their own.  Given Ibrahim‘s interactions with Abu Obaidah, it is unsurprising that 
the July 21 team‘s acquisitions followed a similar trajectory to those of Sidique Khan‘s team, 
though Ibrahim‘s group was at times less discrete in their purchases.  The process of acquiring 
supplies began with Adel Yahya, the same 23 year-old Ethiopian whom Yasin Omar had 
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befriended in high school.  Yahya made a pair of trips to cosmetics suppliers in May and June of 
2005, in order to investigate the best source of hydrogen peroxide.  After speaking with store 
owners, he pegged hair bleach as the best choice, and the team soon began making purchases.182   
By the time that Sidique Khan‘s team struck in early July, Ibrahim‘s team had acquired 
443 liters—more than 115 gallons—of beauty products that contained 18 percent hydrogen 
peroxide.  The vast bulk of the purchases were made by Asiedu, though other team members 
often accompanied him to the stores.  Moreover, it seems he always frequented the same sellers; 
court documents stipulate that all of the chemicals were obtained ―from three shops in north 
London.‖183  If these repeat purchases did not raise eyebrows—Asiedu reportedly tried to divert 
suspicion by claiming that he was a decorator who needed the supplies to bleach wood184—store 
owners should have been concerned when Asiedu and Ibrahim inquired during the course of one 
shopping trip about the possibility of buying hydrogen peroxide that was already concentrated to 
60 or 70 percent.185  In short, the July 21 team was as indiscreet in its acquisitions as it was about 
publically voicing its support for al-Qaida. 
 After acquiring the supplies, the July 21 followed manufacturing procedures that were 
almost identical to those employed by the Sidique Khan‘s team.  At 58 Curtis House, the July 21 
team converted a basic kitchen into a bomb factory186 and used saucepans and electric stoves to 
boil-down their hair-care products in an effort to concentrate the peroxide to 70 percent, before 
mixing it with combustible organic material.  In lieu of the black pepper Sidique Khan‘s team 
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had used, the July 21 bombers chose chapatti flour,187 which Ramzi Mohammed and Hussein 
Osman purchased on July 18.188   
The police found fingerprints and other clues that proved that all of the July 21 bombers 
were involved in the manufacturing process, though a note containing instructions for an 
experiment to test the concentration of peroxide was found in Ibrahim‘s handwriting, suggesting 
that he may have led the bomb-making process.189  In short, the means employed by the two 
London teams were almost indistinguishable, but this is hardly surprising given that they shared 
the same technical planner in Abu Obaidah al-Masri.        
 Why then did one team succeed where they other failed?  The different material inputs 
that the two teams selected made no difference.  Hydrogen peroxide concentrated from hair-care 
products is just as explosive as hydrogen peroxide concentrated from horticultural solvents, and 
the organic composition of chapatti flour versus ground pepper had no effect on the viability of 
the two teams‘ bombs.190  Instead, the July 21 team‘s bombs failed to detonate because they were 
poor chemists.  Ibrahim miscalculated during an experiment to determine the concentration of 
hydrogen peroxide, leaving the team‘s chemical product 12 percent shy of the threshold 
necessary to ensure detonation.191  Given that he reportedly failed the General Certificate of 
Secondary Education in Maths, a standardized accreditation test given to British high school 
students, he may have been less than ideally suited to serve as the team‘s bomb-maker.192  Some 
combination of ignorance and simple human error ultimately undermined the July 21 attack. 
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5.4.3 TRAINING 
 As with the July 7 attacks, al-Qaida‘s most direct role in the July 21 bombings took the 
form of training.  In addition to planning the technical details of the failed attack, Abu Obaidah 
appears to have trained Ibrahim in bomb-making.193  However, al-Qaida‘s involvement in the 
training of the July 21 bombers was less substantial than in both Khyam‘s 2004 plot and Sidique 
Khan‘s 2005 attack, because Ibrahim was the only member of his team who has been definitively 
linked to bin Laden‘s organization.   
Other issues also mitigated the extent of al-Qaida‘s training ties to the July 21 attacks.  
For example, Ibrahim had vague training ties to other violent Islamists; he claimed to have 
trained with jihadists in the Sudan in 2003, though no one has been able to independently verify 
with whom.194  More tellingly, Ibrahim‘s team self-trained in ways that previous attack-squads 
had not.   
 Like much of the recruitment and radicalization process, this training ran through Hamid.  
In May 2004, he took Ibrahim, Omar, Mohammed, Yahya, Osman, his young son, and several 
other men to the Lake District, in England‘s northwest corner, for what the Metropolitan Police 
Department called ―military-style exercising.‖195  Police photographed the men as they spent a 
couple of days drilling to prepare for jihad, but the value of this training is open to question, 
because it occurred without weapons.  One member of the surveillance team testified that the 
men held ―branches or sticks as though they were carrying rifles.‖196   
                                                          
193 See note 95. 
194 ―Timeline: 21 July bomb plot,‖ BBC News, July 10, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6251294.stm.   
195 Metropolitan Police Department, ―Operation Overamp: R v Hamid and others,‖ Directorate of Public Affairs, 
date unknown.  For information on the participation of Osman‘s son, see: ―Wife ‗knew about 21/7 bomb plot,‘‖ BBC 
News, February 27, 2008; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7267055.stm.   
196 Quoted in Duncan Gardham, ―July 21 bombers ‗trained at Cumbria camp,‘‖ The Telegraph (London), October 
16, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1566281/July-21-bombers-trained-at-Cumbria-
camp.html.   
280 
 
Prior to the July 21 bombings, Hamid conducted at least two more training sessions in the 
region.  The attack team did not participate in these to the same extent as they had the May 2004 
trip, but Ibrahim did attend the final camping trip of that year, which was held in mid-August.197  
While Hamid continued to train aspiring jihadists even after the capture of the July 21 bombers, 
the single session of unarmed drilling that occurred in May 2004 constituted the only known 
training for four of the plot‘s participants.198 Moreover, Asiedu had no demonstrable 
involvement in training of any type.  Consequently, it is fair to conclude not only that al-Qaida 
played a substantially smaller role in preparing the July 21 bombers than it had in Khyam and 
Sidique Khan‘s operations, but also that the July 21 team was substantially less prepared for 
jihad that its predecessors.   
5.4.4 SUMMATION 
 Although clearly linked to both Sidique Khan‘s bombing on July 7 and al-Qaida bomb-
maker Abu Obaidah al-Masri, the July 21 differed substantially from previous attacks.  Al-
Qaida‘s involvement was less significant, and the quality of Ibrahim‘s team was demonstrably 
lower.  Indeed, if not for the seriousness of their goals, the July 21 bombers would have had 
more in common with the Keystone Cops than with battle-hardened extremists: the bombers 
botched basic calculations during the explosives-manufacturing process; they trained with tree-
branches in lieu of proper weapons; they were anything but covert and loudly proclaimed their 
allegiance to bin Laden; and they attracted tremendous attention to themselves while acquiring 
supplies by asking shopkeepers about the purchase of highly-concentrated hydrogen peroxide.  
Ultimately, the most surprising detail of the July 21 attack is that it nearly succeeded. 
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 While the gap in quality and preparation between this attack-team and previous al-Qaida 
hit squads is self-evident and profound, the problems endemic to the July 21 bombers did not 
spring from nowhere.  Instead, they represented an admittedly large step in a downward 
progression from the specialized, fairly well-trained operatives that participated in the 9/11 
attacks and the highly-educated, technically-skilled members of Omar Khyam‘s team, to the 
average men who perpetrated the July 7 bombings.  In short, although the devolutionary patterns 
were slower to take shape among al-Qaida‘s Western hit squads than its non-Western attackers, 
by 2004 bin Laden‘s organization had hit a new low by supporting Ibrahim‘s ill-equipped, poorly 
staffed operation.  Moreover, subsequent evidence suggests that patterns evident in al-Qaida‘s 
relationship with the failed July 21 bombing were not an aberrant incident involving an 
otherwise successfully adaptive organization, because they repeated in 2009, when al-Qaida 
supported Najibullah Zazi, the leader of another largely inept hit squad, in his attempt to attack 
New York.   
 
5.5 THE 2009 PLOT AGAINST NEW YORK‘S MASS TRANSIT SYSTEM 
 In 2009, Najibullah Zazi, a 24 year-old Afghan-American immigrant, plotted to attack 
New York City‘s subway system with the help of two high school friends:199 Adis Medunjanin, a 
naturalized U.S. citizen of Bosnian birth who first came to New York at the age of 10 in 1994,200 
and Zarien Ahmedzay, an Afghan-born American citizen who also arrived in the country in the 
1990s.201  The men planned to simultaneously suicide-bomb three locations using homemade 
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hydrogen peroxide-based explosives that they would carry onboard subway trains hidden inside 
of backpacks.  However, the plot unraveled when Zazi fell under FBI surveillance and the attack 
team was forced to abandon their bombing just a few days prior to their planned mid-September 
strike.202 
 As the details of the case emerged, it became clear that Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay 
comprised an al-Qaida hit squad that had been sent to attack New York using tactics that 
mirrored those of the London bombers.  However, the American team was far from capable.  
Although its members received training from al-Qaida, its quality was not particularly high, and 
the plotters received no demonstrable logistical or financial support from bin Laden‘s 
organization after returning to the U.S.  Consequently, the attempt on New York constituted a 
minor threat that demonstrates the limited, but legitimate, danger that unsupported hit squads 
pose to the West. 
5.5.1 PLANNING 
 At a strategic level, al-Qaida had been attempting to recruit a New York-based jihadist to 
attack the city since at least 2007 or 2008.  For example, Bryant Neal Vinas, a native of Queens 
who converted to Islam in 2004,203 left the United States in the fall of 2007 with the intention of 
joining the Afghan jihad and fighting against coalition forces in South Asia, but al-Qaida soon 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Post, April 23, 2010; available online: 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/zarein_ahmedzay_statement_when_he_ECm9fYgzMCuq9JTvBApBjN/1.  
(Hereafter ―Ahmedzay statement‖).  See also, U.S. Department of Justice, ―Zarein Ahmedzay Pleads Guilty to 
Terror Violations in Connection with Al-Qaeda New York Subway Plot,‖ Office of Public Affairs, April 23, 2010.  
Details of Ahmedzay‘s birth and citizenship can be found in Edith Honan, ―Second man pleads guilty in plot to 
bomb NY subway,‖ Reuters, April 23, 2010; available online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/23/us-usa-
security-zazi-idUSTRE63M4AY20100423.   
202 Zazi allocution; Ahmedzay statement. 
203 Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, "A young American's journey into Al Qaeda," Los Angeles Times, July 24, 
2009. 
283 
 
recruited him with the intention of attacking his home state.204  The al-Qaida operatives with 
whom Vinas conspired included:  
 Rashid Rauf,205 a British citizen206 and disciple of master bomb-maker Abu Obaidah al-
Masri;207  
 
 Abu Yahya al-Libi,208 a radical Libyan cleric who became a prominent al-Qaida 
spokesman209 after he and three other prisoners escaped from detention at America‘s 
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan in July 2005;210 and  
 
 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid,211 an Egyptian extremist whose involvement in jihad dates to at 
least 1981, when he took part in the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and whose 
involvement with al-Qaida dates to the early 1990s, when he served as an accountant for 
some of bin Laden‘s Khartoum-based businesses.212     
Even as Vinas participated in attacks on coalition troops, these leaders probed him for 
information on the commuter rail line that runs between New York City and Long Island, a piece 
of transportation infrastructure that Vinas knew well because he had ridden it countless times as 
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a commuter.213  However, this initial plan was cut short when coalition troops captured Vinas in 
November 2008.214 
 Because Zazi‘s 2009 plot also involved at least one of the same planners and also aimed 
at New York City, it was essentially a continuation of the Vinas plot.  Specifically, Zazi and his 
coconspirators met with Rauf and two other al-Qaida planners, Saleh al-Somali and Adnan G. el 
Shukrijumah, in September 2008,215 shortly before Vinas‘ capture.  Given that some media 
sources also allege that Vinas and Zazi co-attended at least one planning meeting with unnamed 
al-Qaida leaders,216 the circumstantial evidence suggests that two New York-based plots were 
linked rather closely. 
 Moreover, Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay closely followed Vinas‘ path to al-Qaida.  
Like their predecessor, the trio of aspiring jihadists arrived in Pakistan in the hopes of fighting as 
insurgents for the Taliban and had to be actively recruited to al-Qaida.  Zazi and his friends 
became convinced that they could best serve the Salafist cause by committing suicide-attacks in 
the West only after spending significant time with Rauf, al-Somali, and al-Shukrijumah.217  
Thus, in stark contrast to the self-conceived British plots, al-Qaida planners were the driving 
force that initiated these interlinked plots against New York.  Zazi and his friends would likely 
have served the Taliban analogously to enlisted infantrymen if not for the influence of bin 
Laden‘s organization.  
 However, it is important not to overstate the extent of al-Qaida‘s organizational 
involvement in the planning of the 2009 subway plot.  Some scholars, most notably Bruce 
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Hoffman, have assumed that bin Laden personally signed-off on the Zazi operation.218  Available 
open-source information contains no explicit evidence to support this claim.  There are no 
demonstrable direct links between the planners of the 2009 plot and bin Laden, and given that at 
the time of the plot‘s planning, bin Laden communicated only intermittently through couriers in 
a deliberate attempt to isolate himself from al-Qaida‘s senior and mid-level members in the name 
of operational security,219 it would have been logistically challenging, if not entirely infeasible, 
for the dissident Saudi to have directed the attack.   
Moreover, since Hoffman‘s assessment of bin Laden‘s role in the Zazi plot appeared in 
an article titled ―The Leaderless Jihad‘s Leader,‖ Hoffman seemed more concerned with 
mocking Sageman‘s competing (and equally problematic) ―leaderless‖ characterization of 
Salafist terrorism than with conducting impartial analysis.  To be blunt, Hoffman viewed the 
available evidence through rose colored lenses in an attempt to justify his long-held beliefs about 
the primacy of bin Laden‘s role in the global jihad.  Al-Qaida clearly played an organizational 
role in the planning of the attack, but conclusions attributing a direct role to the highest echelons 
of the organization are premature and likely exaggerate the extent of hierarchy that existed 
within al-Qaida circa 2008.  The planning of the Zazi plot cannot be traced beyond Rauf, al-
Somali, and el-Shukrijumah.  
Even more importantly, these operatives‘ shared role did not extend beyond high-level 
strategy; instead, al-Qaida relied on Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay‘s knowledge of New 
York to plan the attack at a tactical level.  Indeed, the men who recruited the trio to serve as 
suicide-bombers lacked the local knowledge necessary to effectively target the city.  With the 
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possible exception of el-Shukrijumah, who lived in Brooklyn for a few years in his very early 
childhood, when his father served as an assistant imam at Brooklyn‘s Farooque Mosque under 
the Blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman,220 there is no evidence to suggest that the al-Qaida men 
who initiated the plot had spent any significant time in the five boroughs.  Ahmedzay even 
claims that the strategists took a special interest in him because he had particularly detailed 
knowledge of the city, obtained from years spent working as a cab driver, and was thus in an 
ideal position to plan the practical details of the operation.  Ultimately, the al-Qaida strategists 
offered little specific guidance to the American recruits and simply told them ―to hit well-known 
structures and to maximize the number of casualties.‖221    
Toward those ends, Ahmedzay reconnoitered several targets after the attack-team 
returned from training in South Asia in early 2009.  Then, without any apparent input from al-
Qaida leaders abroad, he and Zazi made the decision to target the subway.222  Their reasoning 
was simple: they wanted to conduct the attack by the end of Ramadan, which concluded on 
September 21, 2009, and they believed that Zazi, who played the role of bomb-maker, simply did 
not have time enough to manufacture sufficient quantities of explosives to allow the team to 
target a larger structure without altering the schedule of their attack.223  Thus, al-Qaida provided 
a general strategic vision, but the Queens-based plotters exercised tremendous latitude at the 
tactical level and used their local knowledge to select specific targets.  Much, if not all, of the 
detailed planning was the work of Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay, rather than established 
members of al-Qaida. 
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5.5.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 For reasons that remain unclear, the three American plotters split-up when they returned 
to the United States in January 2009.  Ahmedzay and Medunjanin returned to Queens, but Zazi 
left New York for Aurora, Colorado, a suburb of Denver where his aunt and uncle were already 
living, and took work driving a van for an airport shuttle service.  None of the available court 
documents mention that he or any of the other plotters received cash payments from any of the 
al-Qaida leaders they met, so it seems that Zazi, relied primarily, if not entirely, on his meager 
earnings from the limo company to purchase the chemicals he used to concoct explosives.  As he 
paid no living expenses while at his aunt and uncle‘s home (they eventually threw Zazi out for 
failure to pay rent), and because the supplies used in the construction of the bomb were all 
inexpensive,224 the lack of financial support from al-Qaida did not represent a substantial barrier 
for the attack team to overcome.  The bombing was ultimately well within the American team 
members‘ independent means.  
 In terms of specifics, Zazi acquired the precursor chemicals necessary to manufacture 
explosives from beauty supply warehouses located near his Colorado home.  He obtained six 16 
oz. bottles of Clairol‘s ―Liquid Developer Clairoxide,‖ a hydrogen peroxide-based hair 
lightening product, in late July.  About a month later, he purchased a dozen 32 oz. bottles of a 
similar product, namely ―Ms. Kay 40 Volume Liquid Developer,‖ from the same retailer and was 
captured on the store‘s security cameras on both occasions.225  As a young, heavily-bearded 
Afghan, Zazi was hardly the stereotypical buyer of large quantities of hair bleach, and the store‘s 
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employees took notice of his unusual purchases.  When they asked why he needed so much 
hydrogen peroxide, he reportedly quipped that he ―had a lot of girlfriends.‖226    
Perhaps leery of attracting more suspicion, Zazi obtained additional materials through 
straw purchases.  In July, an individual who court documents have yet to identify by name 
―purchased a one-gallon container of a product containing 20% hydrogen peroxide‖ and ―an 
eight ounce bottle of acetone.‖227  A second accomplice purchased another acetone-based 
product in early September, and a third man bought 32 oz. bottles of another brand of peroxide-
based hair product, namely ―Ion Sensitive Scalp Developer,‖ three times for Zazi in July and 
August.228 
 By examining the going prices of these products, it is easy to obtain a fairly accurate idea 
of just how affordable homemade explosives are.  Acetone, which manicurists use to remove nail 
polish, sells in beauty stores for about $2.19 per 8 oz. bottle.229  Similarly, online retailers list the 
Clairoxide developer at between $2.35230 and $5.95231 per 16 oz. bottle.  Though the 32 oz. bottle 
of Ms. Kay developer is of identical concentration and is twice the size, it sells for comparable 
prices and can be obtained for $4.95 per bottle.232  Nor is the Ion product prohibitively priced; it 
sells for around $5.49 per 32 oz. bottle.233  Therefore, on average, the precursor chemicals that 
Zazi required sold for about 22 cents per ounce, and all of the chemicals that the plotters are 
known to have purchased could have been obtained for approximately $140. 
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 Beyond hydrogen peroxide and acetone, industrial-strength acid was the only remaining 
ingredient that Zazi needed to manufacture explosives.  However, it seems that he had planned to 
obtain this ingredient after meeting-up with his co-conspirators in Queens.  On September 8, just 
one day before he began the long drive from Denver to New York, he searched the Internet for 
home improvement merchants located in Flushing, Queens.  After locating a store, he scoured its 
retail webpage for a product that would meet his needs, ultimately settling on ―Klean Strip Green 
Safer Muriatic Acid,‖ a product that was supposed to produce fewer fumes and be safer to handle 
than conventional acids.234  Given that this product retails online for about $28 per gallon,235 it 
would not have added much to the cost of the operation. 
 Indeed, the plotters‘ likely spent far more on everyday items, like transportation costs and 
lodging, than they did on explosives.  For example, Zazi twice rented motel rooms with 
kitchenettes in order to concentrate the hydrogen peroxide content of the hair supplies by boiling 
them, and in early September, he spent money on a rental car and gasoline to transport his 
homemade explosives cross-country from Denver to New York.236  Since the supplies purchased 
by Zazi‘s co-conspirators in New York included only the backpacks the plotters were to use to 
conceal the bombs, some batteries, an electronic scale, and a few other commonly-available 
items,237 the total cost of the operation could have been no higher than a couple of thousand 
dollars.  Given this low cost, it is exceptionally likely that the 2009 attack-team received no 
financial or logistical assistance from bin Laden‘s organization.  Indeed, Zazi claims to have 
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donated money and computers to al-Qaida during his initial training,238 suggesting that the 
recruits supplied al-Qaida with funding, rather than the other way around. 
5.5.3 TRAINING   
 The same is not, however, true of the American plotters‘ training.  Zazi, Medunjanin, and 
Ahmedzay knew nothing about the conduct of terrorism prior to their recruitment by al-Qaida.  
During the course of small arms training, which took place in Waziristan in the fall of 2008, 
Rauf and the other al-Qaida members convinced the trio of New Yorkers to abandon their initial 
intentions toward insurgency and to attack the United States at the behest of bin Laden‘s 
organization.  Once this initial training concluded, Medunjanin returned to New York, while Zazi 
and Ahmedzay visited with family members in Afghanistan and Pakistan.239   
The plan was for the two remaining New Yorkers to return to Waziristan for some 
additional specialized instruction in explosives, but Ahmedzay got cold feet and never made the 
trip.240  Zazi lacked his friend‘s compunction and spent another month in Waziristan under the 
tutelage of al-Qaida bomb-makers.241  The nature of this instruction placed him in the same 
intellectual lineage as the London bombers before him. 
However, the path was somewhat convoluted.  After training Siddiqui Khan in 2005,242 
Abu Obaidah worked closely with Rashid Rauf, one of the men who recruited Zazi and his 
friends to attack Manhattan at al-Qaida‘s behest, in another London-based plot, which sought to 
use liquid-based explosives to down trans-Atlantic jetliners departing Heathrow.  Abu Obaidah 
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then died of a long-lingering hepatitis infection sometime in the spring of 2008,243 roughly nine 
months before Zazi‘s explosives training.  However, given the Egyptian bomb-maker‘s previous 
association with Rauf and the similarities between Zazi‘s plot and Siddiqui Khan‘s attack, it 
seems exceptionally likely that Rauf transmitted Abu Obaidah‘s knowledge to Zazi. 
Court documents also suggest that Ferid Imam, an Ethiopian-born Canadian citizen,244 
may have played a role in Zazi‘s bomb-training.  Prosecutors filed a superseding indictment in 
July 2010 that charged Imam with providing material support to terrorism and aiding and 
abetting Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay ―in receiving military-type training‖ on behalf of al-
Qaida.245  Given that Imam was in the process of finishing an advanced degree in biochemistry at 
the University of Manitoba when he and two classmates pulled-up stakes and departed for the 
Afghan jihad in 2007,246 he certainly had the knowledge necessary to teach Zazi the basic 
scientific techniques involved in the manufacture of explosives.  However, currently available 
documents neglect to specify the exact nature of Imam‘s role in the subway plot. 
Regardless of who trained him, it seems clear that Zazi was a poor student.  In general, 
his scholastic aptitude was questionable.  Zazi failed to graduate high-school247 and spent his 
entire professional career in unskilled jobs, such as selling coffee from a cart in southern 
Manhattan and driving a shuttle van at the Denver airport,248 neither of which did anything to 
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247 Zazi allocution. 
248 Michael Wilson, ―From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect,‖ New York Times, September 25, 2009; 
available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?pagewanted=all.   
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hone the chemistry skills necessary to manufacture explosives.  His specific mastery of bomb-
making techniques was similarly debatable.  Although Zazi obtained hands-on experience in 
bomb-making while Waziristan, and although he possessed a digital copy of the bomb-making 
manual al-Qaida had used to train him, he sent frantic email messages—all of which apparently 
went unanswered—to his contacts abroad seeking information on the ―correct mixtures of 
ingredients to make explosives.‖249  Zazi did not know how much combustible organic material, 
namely flour and butterfat (ghee), to add to the concoction.  In short, there were some clear holes 
in Zazi‘s training.  He was hardly a master bomb-maker and may simply have lacked the 
intellectual capacity to produce explosives on his own.  
5.5.4 SUMMATION 
 Though Zazi‘s team was far less flamboyant than Ibrahim‘s, the two groups had much in 
common.  Both teams seem to have undertaken their own tactical-level planning; both teams 
seem to have been self-sufficient in terms of finance, and both teams had explicit training ties to 
al-Qaida.  Although Abu Obaidah‘s death precluded the teams from sharing the same trainer, 
Rauf‘s ties to Abu Obaidah and subsequent involvement in Zazi‘s instruction even place both 
attacks in the same specific training lineage  
Similarly, the same criticisms apply to both the July 21 attack-team and the attack team 
which Zazi led in 2009.  Ibrahim and Zazi both possessed educational backgrounds suggesting 
their intellectual capabilities were below average, and neither man had an employment history 
suggesting that they had developed practical skills in chemistry.  It seems somewhat surprising 
that al-Qaida selected them to play crucial roles in the organization‘s larger strategy against the 
West.  Clearly, al-Qaida had either abandoned or simply chose to ignored the screening 
questionnaires Atef once used to evaluate the 9/11 hijackers.   
                                                          
249 Zazi detention memo. 
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In combination with the organization‘s apparent inability to provide attack-teams with 
much, if anything, in the way of financial or logistical support, these personnel quality issues 
have greatly mitigated the scale of the threat posed by hit squads.  While it would be premature 
to dismiss the possibility of a resurgence in al-Qaida‘s capabilities, the quality of the hit squads 
al-Qaida has deployed to the West have devolved substantially in the decade following 9/11.  
The security threat that such attack-teams pose today is an order of magnitude smaller than it was 
at the height of al-Qaida‘s prowess in 2001.    
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
When viewed in tandem with the non-Western cases discussed in the previous chapter, 
the five events discussed above suggest that al-Qaida was not a successfully adaptive 
organization between 2001 and 2009.  Table 5.1 demonstrates that, at the organizational level, 
both the extent and nature of al-Qaida‘s involvement in Western hit squad attacks declined over 
time.  Circa 2001, when al-Qaida conducted the 9/11 attacks, the organization tightly controlled 
virtually every aspect of attacks on the West, but as event progressed through the various 
attempts on London, bin Laden‘s organization became increasingly more distant from events.  
By the time that Najibullah Zazi and his associates attempted to bomb the New York City 
subway in 2009, al-Qaida‘s role was limited to the provision of training and a measure of 
strategic guidance. 
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Table 5.1: Al-Qaida’s Declining Role in Hit Squad Attacks 
 
September 11, 2001, Attacks New York and Washington, D.C. 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Definite  AQ members involved at all levels of planning 
Finance Definite AQ provided all known financing 
Logistics Definite 
AQ members and funds involved in the acquisition of all 
key resources  
Training Definite 
All members of the attack teams received specialized AQ 
training prior to the attack 
   
2004 Fertilizer Bomb Plot Against London 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Partial  
AQ shaped attack's strategic goals, but lacked clear role 
in tactical planning 
Finance Unlikely  Low cost of attack sugests self-finance 
Logistics Partial  
AQ provided aluminum powder; manpower acquired via 
Khyam's personal network 
Training Definite 
All members of the attack team received training in 
South Asia 
   
July 7, 2005, London Bombings 
 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Partial  
AQ provided technical planning; attack likely a strategic 
continuation of fertlizer plot 
Finance Unlikely  Attack self-funded via crime and participants' savings 
Logistics Unlikely  
Attackers independently acquired all peroxide; 
manpower acquired via Siddique Khan's personal 
network 
Training Definite 
All but one member of the attack team received AQ 
training prior to the attack 
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July 21, 2005, Failed Bombing of London 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Partial  AQ provided technical planning, other details unknown 
Finance Unlikely Low-cost of attack suggests self-finance 
Logistics Unlikely 
Attackers independently acquired all peroxide; 
manpower obtained via Hamid and Ibrahim's ideological 
network 
Training Partial Bomb-maker received training from AQ 
   
2009 Plot Against New York's Mass Transit System 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Partial  Strategic shaping, but no clear tactical component 
Finance Unlikely Attack self-funded via participants' savings 
Logistics Unlikely Attackers independently acquired all peroxide 
Training Definite 
All members of the attack team received training in 
South Asia 
 
Similar trends were also evident at the individual level.  The quality of al-Qaida‘s 
personnel, their training, their access to logistical resources, and their access to external funding 
all devolved rather than evolved.  Admittedly, the organization‘s many attempts to utilize 
outsiders and novice jihadists in the years after 2001 suggest that al-Qaida attempted to 
compensate for the tremendous attention it received from the global security community in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks by consciously shifting from a hierarchical bureaucratic structure to 
a flatter, less formal structure, but a preponderance of evidence demonstrates that a concomitant 
decline in the organization‘s ability to recruit, train, and support quality personnel also took 
place.  Indeed, the post-9/11 hit squads made numerous and often egregious mistakes, such as: 
Sidique Khan‘s poor tactical planning, Hamid, Ahmet, and Omar‘s flamboyant support of radical 
Islam, Ibrahim‘s inability to perform basic math, and Zazi‘s inability to remember his training, 
despite owning a copy of al-Qaida‘s bomb-making manual.  Consequently, al-Qaida is aptly 
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described as an experimental organization, but the many theorists who extol the group‘s ability 
to successfully innovate and reorganize greatly overstate the case. 
While this conclusion strongly suggests that the probability that al-Qaida will conduct a 
successful mass-casualty attack is substantially lower than it was a decade ago, this finding 
applies only to those events in which the organization played a strong functional role.  In order to 
fully evaluate the scale of the threat the organization poses, it is necessary to examine instances 
in which al-Qaida has acted almost via proxy, by supporting attacks and plots primarily 
conducted by other organizations.  Consequently, the next chapter examines terrorist events to 
which bin Laden‘s organization has been weakly linked.        
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6.0 ENTREPRENEURSHIP, EVOLUTION, AND THE FLUCTUATION OF 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG TERRORISTS WITH WEAK FUNCTIONAL TIES TO AL-
QAIDA 
 
 
 Analysts often discuss al-Qaida‘s relationships with other terrorist organizations in terms 
of grand strategy.  For example, in 2011, Barak Mendelsohn argued that al-Qaida sought to 
expand ―on a much broader geographic scale‖ by establishing ―a public and permanent presence 
in the form of [regional] branches carrying the al-Qaeda name.‖1  Similarly, Bill Braniff and 
Assaf Moghadam, of West Point‘s Combatting Terrorism Center, argued in 2011 that al-Qaida 
deliberately completed a structural transition into ―a multi-polar organization with a central hub 
in North Waziristan and a small number of autonomous regional nodes.‖2  
 These authors are correct in suggesting that al-Qaida plans for the future; however, they 
likely overstate the extent of the organization‘s control over the nature of its relationships with 
other terror groups.  This chapter, which explores over-time patterns among events that display 
weak functional ties to al-Qaida, suggests that changes to inter-organizational relationships are 
exceptionally incremental and reflect gradual evolutionary trends, rather than discrete strategic 
decisions about the nature and extent of cooperation.  As evidence of this pattern, this chapter 
considers five cases involving al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah: (1) the 2002 Bali bombings, (2) 
the 2003 bombing of the Jakarta Marriott hotel, (3) the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy 
                                                          
1 Barak Mendelsohn, ―Al-Qaeda‘s Franchising Strategy,‖ Survival, Vol. 53, No. 3 (June-July 2011), pp. 19-25. 
2 Bill Braniff and Assaf Moghadam, ―Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda‘s Strategic, Ideological, and Structural 
Adaptations since 9/11,‖ Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2011); available online: 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/braniff-towards-global-jihadism/html.   
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in Jakarta, (4) the 2005 Bali bombings, and (5) the 2009 near-simultaneous bombings of the 
Jakarta Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton hotels.  When viewed in sequence, these cases demonstrate 
that al-Qaida held the greatest strategic influence over Southeast Asian terror at the time of the 
2002 Bali bombings, but this influence degraded steadily and incrementally over time, as 
Hambali and other key operatives that bound JI to al-Qaida were lost, and as the influence of 
Noordin Mohd Top gradually rose, until he became regarded as Southeast Asia‘s most dangerous 
terrorist and began operating largely independent of both al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah.3 
 Following this introduction, this chapter contains eight sections.  Since this chapter 
focuses extensively on Noordin, the first section briefly outlines his background and early 
involvement in terrorism.  The second through sixth sections then discuss each of the cases 
mentioned above in sequence, before the seventh section presents some network measurements 
that offer additional evidence demonstrating that the charismatic leadership of Noordin and his 
primary partner, the bomb-making expert Azahari bin Husin, held-together the loose network 
responsible for conducting the best-known Islamist-motivated terror attacks perpetrated in 
Indonesia after the 2002 Bali bombings.  Finally, the eighth section offers some broad 
conclusions regarding the nature and extent of al-Qaida‘s involvement in events displaying weak 
functional ties to the organization.  In order to ensure even comparison, each of the qualitative 
cases also follow the same internal structure and contain sub-sections discussing the attack‘s 
planning, logistics and finance, and training, as well as a brief summation that compares the 
event to preceding cases.  
 
  
                                                          
3 For the characterization of Noordin as Southeast Asia‘s most dangerous terrorist, see: Seth Mydans, ―A Terrorist 
Mastermind Whose Luck Ran Out,‖ New York Times, September 17, 2009. 
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6.1 BACKGROUND 
Noordin‘s involvement with Islamist terrorism began not with al-Qaida, but with Jemaah 
Islamiyah.  His first affiliation was ideological; while a master‘s student at Malaysia Technical 
University in the mid-1990s, Noordin began taking religious classes at Luqmanul Hakiem 
Pesantren, an Islamic school in Johor, Malaysia, that functioned analogously to more-familiar 
South Asian madrassas.  The school was run by veteran members of JI; for example, Ali 
Ghufron (a.k.a. Mukhlas), of Bali-bombing infamy, served as the school‘s headmaster.  By 1998, 
Noordin had become a full-fledged member of JI, and when the organization decided that 
Luqmanul might draw-in more local students if it were headed by a Malaysian, he took-over Ali 
Ghufron‘s directorship, at least in name.4 
Noordin‘s formal terror training, little of it that there was, also took place within Jemaah 
Islamiyah.  Unlike many of JI‘s other high-ranking members, Noordin did not participate in the 
Soviet-Afghan War, nor train in an al-Qaida camp.  Instead, he completed a short, two week 
course at Camp Hudiabiyah, a JI training facility that was located on the southern Philippine 
island of Mindanao in territory controlled by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an 
Islamist insurgent group that had a long-standing cooperative relationship with JI.5  Given this 
scant training and his role as Luqmanul‘s headmaster, it is little surprise that Noordin‘s initial 
role in the organization was primarily logistical and ideological in nature.  
However, when the Malaysian government cracked-down on extremists following the 
9/11 attacks, Noodin‘s circumstances began to change.  He and many other individuals affiliated 
with Luqmanul were forced to flee to Indonesia.  By mid-2002, several of them, including 
Noordin, were living in Bukittinggi, on the island of Sumatra, where they ran a small repair shop 
                                                          
4 International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks," ICG Asia Report No. 114, May 5, 2006. 
(Hereafter, ―Noordin‘s Networks.‖) 
5 Nasir bin Abas, interview conducted August 2010, Jakarta, Indonesia. 
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together.  The group soon grew to include the bomb-maker Azahari Husin, another Malaysian, 
who Noordin had first met years earlier when the two had overlapping stints at Malaysia 
Technical University, where Azahari once taught classes in statistics and housing policy.6  
Operationally speaking, the two men would brush past al-Qaida in the course of the 2002 Bali 
bombings, before initiating a more direct relationship with bin Laden‘s organization that briefly 
spiked in 2003, and then gradually degraded during the course of Noordin‘s multi-year campaign 
of terror. 
 
6.2 THE 2002 BALI BOMBINGS: NOORDIN‘S FIRST BRUSH WITH AL-QAIDA 
 Just after 11.00pm, on October 10, 2002, a young Indonesian named Iqbal detonated a 
backpack filled with explosives inside Paddy‘s Pub, a nightclub popular with Australian tourists 
located in Kuta‘s busy commercial district on the island of Bali, killing himself and a handful of 
patrons in the process.  The survivors immediately fled into the street, where a powerful 1,000kg 
car-bomb laid waiting hidden inside of a white Mitsubishi van.  Dulmatin, an Indonesian 
graduate of al-Qaida‘s Afghan camps, used a cell phone to trigger the massive device just a few 
seconds later, causing the bulk of the coordinated attack‘s 202 fatalities.  At the gates of the U.S. 
Consulate in Denpassar, located several miles away from the other attack sites, Idris, another 
Indonesian with experience in Afghanistan, remotely-triggered a third bomb, hidden inside of a 
backpack that had purportedly been filled with excrement to inflict ―moral damage.‖  However, 
this final explosion injured only a single gate guard and caused some minor property damage.7 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 For an official count of the victims of the Bali attack and several official photos of the aftermath, see: Australian 
Federal Police, ―Bali bombings 2202,‖ date unknown, available online: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060618005353/http://afp.gov.au/international/operations/previous_operations/bali_bo
mbings_2002.  For a superb journalist summary of the attack, see:  Sally Neighbor, In the Shadow of Swords: On the 
Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia, (Sydney, Australia: Harper Collins, 2004). 
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 A number of sources have alleged that al-Qaida played an important role in these 
bombings.  For example, American government sources claim that KSM played an as-yet 
unspecified part in planning the attack,8 and media outlets publicized a claim of responsibility 
that al-Qaida made in the attack‘s aftermath.9  However, evidence drawn primarily from first-
person accounts of the terrorists involved in the Bali attacks demonstrates that al-Qaida‘s role in 
the 2002 Bali bombing was less substantial.  Bin Laden‘s organization played a strategic role, as 
members of al-Qaida helped to shape JI‘s grand vision of jihad, and bin Laden likely provided 
one stream of revenue that supported the attacks, but given that the attackers had two other 
substantial pools of funding from which to draw, it remains impossible to definitively prove that 
the dissident Saudi‘s money directly funded the Bali blast.  Al-Qaida did, however, play a 
demonstrable indirect role, by training several of the operation‘s key participants years earlier, 
during the tail-end of the Soviet-Afghan War.  Given these ties, this attack was weakly tied to 
bin Laden‘s organization according to the strict formal cut-points used in the classification 
analysis, but was strongly tied to Jemaah Islamiyah. 
 Noordin‘s role in the Bali bombings was even less substantial.  Like al-Qaida, he helped 
to shape the grand strategy that motivated the Bali bombings, but his role in their specific 
planning was negligible, if it existed at all.  Similarly, he played no role in the attack‘s funding, 
logistics, or operations.  As the Bali bombings represented his first demonstrable active 
involvement in a terrorist event, his initial interaction with al-Qaida was truly fleeting. 
  
                                                          
8 Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed); 
see also, Maria Ressa, "Philippines: U.S. missed 9/11 clues years ago," CNN.com, July 26, 2003. 
9 Specifically, al-Qaida claimed to have targeted ―nightclubs and whorehouses‖ in Bali because they were part of a 
―Jewish-Crusader alliance.‖  For additional details, see: ―Sari Club: Al Qaeda admits Bali blasts on Web,‖ CNN 
World, November 7, 2002; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2002-11-
07/world/bali.bombings.qaeda_1_jewish-crusader-alliance-nightclubs-and-whorehouses-bali-bomb?_s=PM:asiapcf.   
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6.2.1 PLANNING 
 The idea of bombing nightclubs that cater to Westerners seems to have originated at a 
meeting that Hambali held in Bangkok, Thailand, in early 2002.  However, the evidence suggests 
that these early discussions took place primarily at the strategic level.  The meeting‘s participants 
agreed to focus on ―soft targets,‖ like bars and nightclubs, but had not yet singled-out Bali as 
their first target, much less selected Paddy‘s Pub and the Sari Club as specific attack sites.  As 
Noordin took part in these discussions, he helped to set the grand strategy that led to the Bali 
bombings.10  Al-Qaida‘s analogous role stemmed from the attendance and participation of 
Mohamed Mansour Jabarah,11 a Kuwaiti-born Canadian citizen who swore bayat to bin Laden in 
2001 and held exceptionally close ties to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.12  
An additional strategic refinement to the soft-target strategy took place in May, when 
another meeting was held, this time in Solo, Indonesia, at the home of Dulmatin,13 a Jemaah 
Islamiyah member who had been involved in radical Islam since training in al-Qaida‘s Sada 
Camp on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late 1980s.14  The four-man 
meeting was headed by Ali Ghufron, who had mentored Noordin at Luqmanul, and was attended 
by Ali Imron, who was one of Ghufron‘s younger brothers; Imam Samudra, who alongside 
                                                          
10 The exact timing of this meeting is in minor dispute; it is referenced as having occurred in both January and 
February.  Raymond Bonner, "Threats and Responses: Southeast Asia; Qaeda meeting in Thailand reportedly plotted 
attacks on tourists," New York Times, November 8, 2002; Four Corners, "The Bali Confessions: Chronology," 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2011. 
11 Bonner.  Hambali and Jabarah also met in Butterworth, Malaysia, in early 2002.  See: Kimina Lyall, "Trail cold 
on Asia's most wanted - TERROR HITS HOME," The Australian, November 12, 2002.    
12 Jabarah‘s brother, who died in shootout with Saudi authorities in the aftermath of al-Qaida‘s 2003 Riyadh 
bombings, and Jabarah‘s childhood friend, Anas al Kandari, who died during the conduct of the 2002, KSM-planned 
assault on U.S. Marines at Filika island, in Kuwait, also serve to demonstrate the depth of Jabarah‘s ties to al-Qaida. 
USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), United States District Court Southern District of New York 
(Crim. No.: 02 Crim. 1560), Indictment, date unknown; USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), United 
States District Court Southern District of New York (02 Cr. 1560 (BSJ)), Sentencing Memorandum, May 7, 2007. 
13 "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Imam Samudra (No. Pol.: 
BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. (Hereafter, ―Samudra Interview‖). 
14 International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia 
Report No. 63, August 26, 2003. (Hereafter, ―Damaged But Still Dangerous.‖) 
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Hambali had served as a sort of field commander during JI‘s 2000 bombing of Christian 
churches across Indonesia on Christmas Eve; and Dulmatin, the host.  Specifically, the men 
discussed how the Christmas Eve bombings had been poorly received by Indonesia‘s Muslim 
community, and decided that the next attack should specifically target ―America and its allies.‖15  
Neither Noordin, nor any al-Qaida men were present and, thus, played no role in this strategic 
refinement. 
This gathering‘s conclusions were then validated by JI‘s emir, Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir, at a 
third strategic-level meeting.  At Ba‘asyir‘s home in Solo, Indonesia, Ghufron, Imron, and 
Samudra gathered again, and were joined by Ba‘asyir and two other high-ranking members of 
Jemaah Islamiyah.  The Christmas Eve bombings were again criticized as ineffective, and 
Ba‘asyir instructed the men to proceed against Westerners as they had previously decided.16  
While this event irrefutably links JI‘s highest leader to the attack, it also demonstrates the small, 
marginal role that Noordin, as an individual, and al-Qaida, as an organization, played in planning 
JI‘s largest attack to date, because neither he nor any of bin Laden‘s representatives were present 
at this gathering. 
Finally, specific planning for the attack began in August, when Ghufron and Samudra 
met at another JI member‘s home in Solo.  At this meeting, Ali Ghufron suggested Bali as the 
target, and Samudra agreed.  Ghufron then suggested that Samudra should lead the operation on 
the ground, no doubt because of the experience he had gained by coordinating the Christmas Eve 
bombings, and Samudra agreed to the arrangement.17  From this point forward, Samudra took the 
lead at the tactical level, and would manage issues of materiel and attack site-selection, while 
Ghufron continued to support the bombing at a more strategic level, and provided Samudra with 
                                                          
15 Samudra Interview. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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the resources he needed to accomplish specific tasks.  Both men would be involved in staffing 
decisions about which personnel to involve in the attack. 
 Toward fulfilling his role as field-commander, Samudra convened a more tactically-
oriented meeting later that month in Paleban, Indonesia.  While sitting inside the car of Amrozi, 
another of Ali Ghufron‘s brothers, Samudra assigned specific tasks to the men present.  Amrozi 
would be the attack‘s primary logistical procurer; his most important task would be to secure 
explosives.  Idris, another veteran of the Soviet-Afghan War and a graduate of bin Laden-
affiliated Afghan training camps,18 would assist Amrozi and was tasked with taking care of the 
attacks more mundane logistical needs, like transportation and accommodations in Bali.  
Dulmatin, the al-Qaida-trained extremist who hosted one of the earlier strategic level meetings, 
would serve as bomb-maker.  The men convened again a few days later in Solo‘s Klewer market, 
and reaffirmed these roles.  Thus, the primary team responsible for the Bali attack was set by late 
August 2002, and it included neither Noordin, nor any al-Qaida members.19 
The four participants in the late-August meetings soon departed for Bali, where the 
remaining tactical planning for the attack took place.  Masykur Abdul Kadir, a Balinese Muslim 
who served as the team‘s local fixer, drove Samudra, Amrozi, Idris, and Dulmatin around the 
island in early September 2002, to scout potential attack-sites.  They were joined by two 
additional men: Ali Imron, who was another of Ali Ghufron‘s brothers, and Utomo Pamungkas 
                                                          
18 Specifically, Idris ‗graduated‘ from Sada Camp in 1987.  While this precedes al-Qaida‘s founding by about a year, 
Sada Camp‘s chief trainer, Abdul Rasooly Sayyaf, began receiving money from bin Laden as early as 1986.  For 
information on Idris‘s training in Afghanistan, see: ―Damaged But Still Dangerous.‖ For information on the timing 
and extent of bin Laden‘s funding to Sayyaf, see: Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, 
Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 153-
154. 
19 "Witness Interrogation Report of Imam Samudra," Detective Corps, The State Police of Republic of Indonesia 
(Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), January 23, 2003.  (Hereafter, ―Samudra Interrogation.‖) 
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(a.k.a. Mubarok),20 who was another veteran of the Christmas Eve Bombings.21  Following this 
initial scouting, a more detailed survey of the targets was conducted by Agus Hidayat, a young 
Indonesian who Samudra brought onto the attack team.22  With the targets selected, Ali Ghufron 
arrived in Bali a few days later, and received a ‗tour‘ of Paddy‘s Pub and the Sari Club from 
Idris.23  Thus, the specific attack sites had been chosen, scouted, and approved at the strategic 
level about a month before the attack took place. 
Beyond his early role in setting JI‘s grand strategy, Noordin‘s only role in this attack‘s 
planning was passing and brief; it happened largely by accident.  In September, after target-
selection had been accomplished, Noordin and Dr. Azahari Hussin, his longtime friend and 
operational partner, traveled from Bukittinggi and showed-up unannounced and unexpected at 
Ghufron‘s home in Solo.  Given that Azahari was an experienced bomb-maker, who purportedly 
helped to build some of the devices used in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings,24 Ghufron took 
advantage of the situation and briefed his unexpected houseguests on the operation.  Azahari 
went-on to assist in the design and construction of the bombs, but Noordin received no specific 
tasking.  It is reasonable to speculate that he offered his advice on the plot, but his role does not 
seem to have gone any farther.25   
  
                                                          
20 Summary of Bali Persons of Interest in the 2002 Bali Bombings, Australian Federal Police, Date Unknown. 
(Hereafter, ―Bali POIs.‖) 
21 "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Ali Imron (No. Pol.: 
BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. 
22 International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," 
December 11, 2002 (Hereafter, ―How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates‖); Eric Ellis, "Countdown 
to a bombing," Globe and Mail (Canada), May 12, 2003. 
23 "Witness Interrogation Report of Ali Ghufron," Detective Corps, The State Police of Republic of Indonesia 
(Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), December 5, 2002. (Hereafter, ―Ghufron Interrogation.‖) 
24 "Malaysian authorities worried over Jemaah Islamiyah fugitives," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 23, 
2004. 
25 Ghufron Interrogation. 
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6.2.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 The money to conduct the 2002 Bali attacks came from three sources: Abu Bakar 
Ba‘asyir, Hambali, and crime.  Ba‘asyir‘s contribution was the earliest of the three.  During the 
strategic meeting that took place at his home in Solo, JI‘s emir handed Ghufron the equivalent of 
several thousand U.S. dollars, but the funds were split across three currencies: about $6,000 was 
in U.S. bills; an amount equivalent to approximately 9,700 USD was in Singaporean dollars, and 
the equivalent of another roughly 4,000 USD was in Malaysian Ringgit.26  The available 
information does not stipulate how Ba‘asyir obtained the money in the first place, but given his 
position within the organization, and given that JI taxed its members‘ incomes at a rate of five 
percent as a type of membership dues,27 it is reasonable to speculate that these monies came from 
the organization‘s internal revenue stream. 
 Hambali‘s contribution was roughly equivalent in size; he provided Ghufron with 
$25,000 late in the summer of 2002.  The source of the funds has never been definitively proven, 
but Ghufron believed that the money ―originated from Afghanistan and might be from Syihk 
[sic] Usama Bin Laden.‖ 28  Thus, at first blush, it seems that reasonably strong circumstantial 
evidence suggests that al-Qaida played a role in funding the 2002 Bali bombings. 
  Finally, a robbery conducted in Banten in on August 22 provided approximately $40,000 
of additional funding.29  Using guns provided by Samudra, Agus Hidayat, who also conducted 
some surveillance in support of the Bali operation, led a small team in the armed robbery of 
―Elita Gold Jewelers,‖ a Chinese-owned business that the attackers justified targeting on the 
                                                          
26 Samudra Interview. 
27 ―Damaged But Still Dangerous,‖ p. 12. 
28 Ghufron Interrogation.  For information on the timing of Ghufron‘s payments to Samudra, see: Samudra 
Interrogation. 
29 Ellis quotes the figure at $60,000, but as he was writing in a Canadian paper, it seems logical to assume his figure 
was in Canadian currency.  The 40,000 USD figure stems from the conversion of Ellis original value at the US-
Canadian exchange rate that prevailed in 2002, at the time of the robbery. 
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grounds that the store‘s non-Muslim owners were a pollutant that poisoned Indonesia‘s Islamic 
culture.30  Thus, the total funds available for the 2002 Bali attacks seems to have been in the 
neighborhood of $110,000. 
  During his later interrogation by police, Ghufron was kind enough to provide a rough list 
of expenditures incurred during the course of the Bali operation, but his totals do not square with 
the amount of money that was placed at attack team‘s disposal.  Ghufron‘s budget included:31 
 Approximately $3,300 for the purchase of explosives; 
 Approximately $5,500 for the purchase of automobiles; 
 Approximately $1,700 for the purchase of motor-scooters (a necessity for navigating 
some sections of Kuta‘s tourist district that are too crowded for cars to pass easily); 
 
 Approximately $6,600 for housing accommodations and communications equipment; and 
 Approximately $6,600 that Ghufron held aside, though it remains unclear if these monies 
represented a contingency fund, or if he simply skimmed a few thousand dollars for his 
own use. 
 
As these line items total to only $23,700, they could have been covered by any one of the three 
revenue streams that purportedly funded the attack.  Ghufron claims the remaining money, some 
$86,000 if the revenue estimates are accurate, went to support the insurgency that Islamists were 
then fighting against Christians on the island of Ambon, in the eastern portion of the Indonesian 
archipelago.32  Thus, while the transfer that likely took place between bin Laden (or his 
emissaries), Hambali, and Ghufron shows demonstrable financial ties between JI and al-Qaida, 
the fungible nature of money and the fairly low cost of the Bali operation dictate that it is unclear 
how much, if any, of al-Qaida‘s money went toward the 2002 bombing.  
                                                          
30 ―How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates.‖ See also, Bali POIs. 
31 The Ghufron Interrogation provided the figures in Indonesian Rupiah; they have been converted at the US-
Indonesian exchange rate that prevailed in late summer, 2002. 
32 Ibid. 
308 
 
 Nor did al-Qaida play any demonstrable role in the procurement of supplies.  Amrozi 
ultimately took the lead in this regard.  He acquired the explosives used in the attack from 
Silvester Tendean, the somewhat corrupt owner of chemical supply outlet in Surbaya, Indonesia, 
who filed false invoices to hide the purchase of nitrogen-based fertilizer simply because Amrozi 
bribed him to do so.33  Amrozi also acquired the Mitsubishi van that served as the attack‘s bomb-
vehicle, buying it second-hand and then personally modifying it to support the weight of the 
1,000kg bomb,34 before Utomo Pamungkas transported it to Bali via ferry in early October.35  
Other members of the attack team on the ground in Bali purchased motor-scooters and some 
communications equipment, so it is safe to conclude that all of the requisitioning necessary to 
complete the Bali bombings took place entirely within Jemaah Islamiyah. 
   Manpower, the final logistical resource needed to complete the attack, was obtained in 
two ways.  Ali Ghufron recruited most of the key members from within JI‘s existing 
infrastructure.  As demonstrated by the inclusion of his brothers Ali Imron and Amrozi, as well 
as the inclusion of his long-time associates Imam Samudra, Idris, and Utomo Pamungkas, 
Ghufron drew heavily on personal ties to build the attack team.   
Samudra completed the recruiting process.  In the year prior to the attack, he worked as a 
teacher in Malimping, Indonesia, and used his position to draw some of his students into jihad.  
For example, Agus Hidayat, who conducted some surveillance of the Bali targets and led the 
group responsible for the gold store robbery, and Iqbal, who also participated in the robbery 
before being selected to serve as the operation‘s martyr, had both studied under Samudra and had 
                                                          
33 Martin Chulov, "Hambali's finger on the trigger - Terror hits home," The Weekend Australian, November 9, 2002; 
Bali POIs; "Witness Interrogation Report of Amrozi," Detective Corps, State Police of Republic of Indonesia 
(Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), February 24, 2003. 
34 Chulov; "The Bali bombing plotters," BBC News, March 10, 2010; Bali POIs; Ellis. 
35 Bali POIs. 
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no other apparent ties to JI.36  Suffice it to say, neither Noordin nor al-Qaida played an apparent 
role in staffing the Bali operation. 
6.2.3 TRAINING 
 Al-Qaida‘s operational role in the 2002 Bali bombings was indirect and stems primarily 
from training.  Several members of the attack team trained in Afghanistan in camps linked to bin 
Laden, but many of these interactions took place a decade or more earlier.  For example, 
although Ghufron and Idris trained in a bin Laden-funded camp, their training began circa 1986, 
roughly two years before al-Qaida‘s formal establishment.37  Dulmatin, Samudra, Utomo 
Pamunkas, and Imron‘s training was slightly more recent and was more directly attributable to 
al-Qaida as an organization, because they studied in Afghan camps at various points between 
1989 and 1991.38  Neither Masykur, who served as the attacker‘s local connection in Bali; 
Amrozi, who assumed responsibility for many of the attack‘s logistical needs; Agus Hidayat, the 
young disciple of Samudra‘s who assisted in the surveillance of the attack sites and led the team 
that robbed the gold store in Banten; nor Iqbal, the operation‘s martyr, had formal training of any 
type.  Azahari, who assisted Dulmatin in making the explosive devices used in the Bali attacks, 
offers the closest connection between al-Qaida and the 2002 bombings, because he trained in 
Afghanistan circa 2000.39 
  
                                                          
36 ―How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates;‖ Ellis. 
37 ―Damaged But Still Dangerous.‖ 
38 Ibid. 
39 "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Ali Ghufron (No. Pol.: 
BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000; see also: "Malaysian authorities worried over Jemaah Islamiyah fugitives," 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 23, 2004; Jasbant Singh, "With Hambali caught, search for top Southeast 
Asian terrorist turns to bespectacled Malaysian bomber," Associated Press Worldstream, August 15, 2003. 
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6.2.4 SUMMATION 
 Notwithstanding al-Qaida‘s claims of responsibility, the 2002 Bali bombings were 
weakly tied to bin Laden‘s organization and strongly tied to Jemaah Islamiyah.  As demonstrated 
by Mohammed Mansour Jabarah‘s participation in Hambali‘s early strategic meetings, al-Qaida 
helped to shape the grand strategy that guided the attack, but the organization‘s lack of 
demonstrable participation in any subsequent meetings, most especially those that discussed the 
specifics of the Bali operation, suggests that the real planning for 2002 bombing was conducted 
within Jemaah Islamiyah.  Al-Qaida‘s financial ties to JI are fairly well established at the 
organizational level by the $25,000 transfer that passed from bin Laden to Hambali made to 
Ghufron; however, it is not clear that these funds directly supported the Bali blasts, because the 
size of the other revenue streams at Ghufron‘s disposal far exceeded the reported cost of the 
operation, even if the itemized budget that he provided to investigators far understated the 
attack‘s total cost.  Training constitutes al-Qaida‘s most direct role in the attack, but given that 
many of these interactions were historical and occurred more than a decade prior to the bombing, 
it is difficult to state that they constitute evidence of al-Qaida‘s organizational involvement in the 
same way that near-term training ties do in regards to the hit-squad attacks discussed in the fifth 
chapter.  Put more simply, organizations at some point lose control over the people they that they 
train.  This same logic applies to estimations of al-Qaida‘s role in the most active portion of the 
attack, the triggering of the explosive devices.  Indeed, the only individual who sacrificed his life 
in the conduct of the attacks seems to have never left Indonesia. 
Noordin‘s role in the bombing was similarly weak.  He also helped to formulate the 
strategy that guided the attack, but his role in the specific planning was negligible.  He played no 
part in the attack‘s finance or logistics, and he did not participate in its operational phase.  Thus, 
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as it regards the Bali bombings, Noordin‘s overlap with al-Qaida was exceptionally weak.  They 
participated together only in the vague strategic phase of the attack, but their respective 
involvements were otherwise confined to different spheres, with Noordin playing an 
exceptionally minute role in planning, and al-Qaida playing a larger, though somewhat vague, 
role in the attack‘s finance and a historical role training several of the Bali operatives.  However, 
this pattern would not repeat the following year, when Noordin led the team that bombed the 
Jakarta Marriott hotel in August of 2003. 
 
6.3 THE 2003 JAKARTA MARRIOTT BOMBING 
On August 5, 2003, Asmar Latin Sani drove a mini-van into the horseshoe-shaped 
driveway of the Jakarta Marriott, but his vehicle was so laden with explosives that it struggled up 
the slight incline that separated the hotel‘s elevated entrance from the street.  The van‘s difficulty 
was substantial enough to draw the attention of the hotel‘s security guards, several of whom 
began to approach the suspicious vehicle.  Asmar then panicked and detonated his bomb before 
the truck was fully in position.40  A dozen people died in the blast, and another 150 were 
injured.41  However, knowledgeable observers speculate that the damage would have been on the 
scale of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which destroyed a federal building, if Asmar had 
driven alongside the lobby before triggering the explosion.42 
 This event represented Noordin‘s first strong operational role in a terrorist attack; he 
effectively functioned as JI‘s field commander during the bombing.  Although Noordin seems to 
have planned the attack without much assistance from JI‘s senior leadership, he received their 
                                                          
40 ―Noordin's Networks.‖  See also, "Al Qaeda 'trained' Jakarta bombers," CNN.com, August 9, 2003; Joe Cochrane 
with Peter Janssen, "Illusions of security," Newsweek, August 18, 2003. 
41 ―Indonesia considers measures after attack,‖ Reuters, August 14, 2003. 
42 Sources quoted in Cochrane and Janssen. 
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direct operational and logistical support, thereby demonstrating that the broader organization 
played an incredibly strong role in the attack.  Al-Qaida‘s role was substantially weaker.  The 
organization provided some, but not all, of the attack‘s funding, and does not seem to have 
shaped the attack‘s planning in the same indirect way implied by Jabarah‘s participation in the 
first strategy meeting that preceded the 2002 Bali bombings. 
6.3.1 PLANNING 
 Noordin exhibited a fair amount of independence in his attack planning.  Without the 
apparent input of higher-ranking JI leaders, he recruited his own team, drawing heavily on 
Luqmanul Hakiem‘s pool of alumni, with whom he was intimately familiar from his time as the 
school‘s headmaster.  Azahari, whose bomb-making skills had been demonstrated in the Bali 
attacks, worked alongside Noordin and doubtlessly assisted with the technical details,43 of which 
Noordin was likely ignorant as a result of the exceptionally short duration of his formal training.  
Although some sources hypothesize Hambali‘s involvement in the Marriott Bombing‘s 
planning,44  JI‘s larger organization does not seem to have imposed the same level of managerial 
control as it did in the Bali bombings.  A protracted series of grand strategy meetings with the 
organization‘s senior leadership did not precede the 2003 attack, which is not entirely surprising 
as many JI members had been on the run since the Indonesian authorities made the organization 
a primary target of investigation in the aftermath of Bali.  Whatever the reasons, the locus of 
decision making was far smaller in the 2003 bombing than in the previous year‘s attack. 
 Consequently, there was not much division of labor in the detailed tactical planning that 
took place once the attack team decided to focus its efforts on Jakarta.  Team members split-up 
to examine specific targets.  Working alongside Mohamed Ikhwan (a.k.a. Ismail), a Luqmanul 
                                                          
43 ―Noordin's Networks.‖ 
44 "Hambali was 'plotting APEC attack,'" CNN.com, August 14, 2003. 
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alumnus that had been recruited into the plot, Azahari conducted initial surveillance on the hotel 
and a local Citibank branch.  Meanwhile, Noordin and Masrizal bin Ali Umar (a.k.a. Tohir), 
another Luqmanul alumnus, conducted surveillance on the American International School and 
the Australian International School.  Ultimately, the hotel won-out as the target because Noordin 
believed it provided the greatest brand recognition, and because it was deemed to have relatively 
lax security, making it more accessible than the other potential targets.45  
6.3.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 Explosives, the most crucial logistical requirement of any bombing campaign, had 
already been acquired when Noordin and Azahari began to conceptualize the bombing.  
Following the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, JI found itself with a surplus, and placed the 
excess materials in storage with a member named Toni Togar.  However, the investigation that 
followed the Bali blasts unnerved him, and he was no longer willing to store the explosives.  He 
called Noordin to tell him he was planning to throw them out, so, in a jihadist twist on supply-
side economics, the existence of excess explosives caused the demand for a bombing, and 
Noordin designed the Jakarta operation to prevent the surplus material from going to waste.  
After receiving the explosives from Togar, who shipped them to an intermediary as 
unaccompanied luggage on an inter-city bus, Noordin turned his attention towards the requisition 
of the remaining supplies.46 
 He tasked Asmar and Masrizal to rent a house in Jakarta and to purchase a van for the 
explosion.  Both were easily accomplished, and at moderate cost.  They acquired the van, a 
                                                          
45 ―Noordin's Networks.‖ 
46 Ibid. 
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Toyota Kijang, second-hand from a local business man, for a cost of approximately $3,000.47  
Information on the cost of accommodations has been lost to history, but if the expenses Ghufron 
incurred during the Bali operation are representative, then Noordin‘s team would have been able 
to acquire space to live and work for around $6,600.  Given the ‗free‘ explosives, this places the 
total cost of the attack just below $10,000. 
 Money to support these expenses came from many of the same sources as they had in the 
2002 Bali bombings.  In a turn of events reminiscent of the gold store robbery, Noordin‘s 
immediate team provided a substantial share of the money for the attack through crime.  In May 
2003, Toni Togar, who was apparently less worried about being arrested for armed robbery than 
for possession of explosives, held-up a bank in Medan, and the ill-gotten funds went toward the 
bombing‘s expenses, though the size of Togar‘s haul remains unclear.48   
However, the plot‘s finances also involved the larger networks of both al-Qaida and JI.  
Ali al-Azia Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi), who also handled cash disbursements and logistical 
issues for the 9/11 attacks at the direction of his uncle KSM, provided the Marriott bombers with 
approximately 50,000 USD.  The transfer occurred through a convoluted series of cut-outs.  
Hambali dispatched his younger brother, Rusman Gun-Gun Gunawan, then a religious student in 
Pakistan, to collect the funds from Ali and deliver them to Bangkok.  Mohammed Nazir bin Lep 
(a.k.a. Lillie), who traveled with Gun-Gun to Thailand, facilitated contact with another man, 
Mohd Farik bin Amin (a.k.a. Zubair), who had been slated to participate as a suicide attacker in 
the aborted follow-on plot to the 9/11 attacks that would have targeted buildings on America‘s 
                                                          
47 The source lists the amount as 25.75 million Indonesian Ringgit.  The conversion to USD was made at exchange 
rates that prevailed in August 2003.  ―Al-Qaeda singles out Australia: report,‖ Sydney Morning Herald, August 12, 
2003; available online: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/12/1060588349256.html.   
48 ―Noordin's Networks.‖ 
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west coast.49  From Zubair, the money eventually found its way to Mohamed Ikhwan (a.k.a. 
Ismail), the same Luqmanul alumnus who participated in surveillance in support of the attack.  
He picked-up the cash, now wrapped in paper bundles, from an un-named man in nearby Dumai, 
Indonesia.50  Although circuitous, the money‘s path shows that Noordin‘s budding autonomy 
was still limited at the time of the 2003 Marriott Bombings; he was operationally independent, 
but his funding network involved members of al-Qaida‘s core, stand-alone members of JI, and 
Hambali, who held simultaneous membership in both organizations.51  
6.3.3 TRAINING 
 Beyond Azahari‘s experience in the Afghan camps and Noordin‘s short training course in 
the southern Philippines, little information has emerged regarding how and where the members 
of the 2003 bombing team learned their trade as terrorists.  Masrizal, who helped procure the 
Toyota van and the team‘s safe house, spent a year at Camp Hudiabiyah between 1998 and 
1999.52  Although the radical beliefs of Asmar, the operation‘s martyr, and Toni Togar, who 
provided the explosives and helped to finance the attack through crime, can be traced to the years 
the men spent al-Mukim Islamic Boarding School, a pesantren run by Ba‘asyir,53 nothing is 
known about their training history.  However, since suicide-driving and armed robbery are not 
particularly specialized skillsets, the men simply may not have required any specialized 
instruction in order to contribute to jihad.   
                                                          
49 Verbatim Transcript of Open Session Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10021 (Mohd Farik bin 
Amin), U.S. Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 13, 2007. 
50 ―Noordin's Networks.‖ 
51 For characterizations of Hambali as a dual JI/AQ member that are not provided by this analysis‘ formal model, 
see, for example: Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.1.87.03. 
Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin,‖ available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI08703E.shtml; Rohan 
Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (New York: Berkley Books, 2002), pp. 258-262; and Sally 
Neighbor, In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia, (Sydney, Australia: 
Harper Collins, 2004), p. 167.  
52 "Another alleged terrorist goes on trial for deadly hotel bombing," Agence France Presse, May 6, 2004. 
53 ―Noordin‘s Networks.‖ 
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6.3.4 SUMMATION 
As was the case with the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 Jakarta Marriott attack was 
strongly connected to Jemaah Islamiyah and weakly tied to al-Qaida.  Unlike the Bali bombings, 
this attack was strongly tied to Noordin, who, in turn, remained strongly tied to JI.  Although 
Noordin displayed a fair amount of independence in the planning and recruitment phase of the 
operation, he still staffed his operation with individuals with long-standing ties to the 
organization, as demonstrated by his reliance on the alumni of Luqmanul and al-Mukim.  
Moreover, a past JI attack, specifically the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, filled the long pole in 
Noordin‘s logistical tent by giving him immediate, cost-free access to the most crucial resource 
necessary to conduct a bombing.   
The plots‘ finances were, however, more of a blend between self-reliance and 
organizational support.  Noordin benefitted directly from Toni Togar‘s exploits in armed 
robbery, as well as from money that can be traced directly back to al-Qaida through a circuitous 
chain of intermediaries involving members of both JI and bin Laden‘s organization.  The little 
information that exists regarding the attack team‘s training history suggests that al-Qaida‘s role 
was largely absent, except of course in regards to the bomb-maker Azahari.  But given that 
bomb-making is the key skillset necessary to complete attacks like the Marriott bombing, this 
role should not be entirely dismissed.  However, it is also remains unknown how much of the 
expertise that Azahari brought to bear in the 2003 attack stemmed from his time in Afghanistan, 
and how much of it resulted from practical experienced gained during previous attacks.  In the 
end, it seems fair state that al-Qaida was not crucially involved in the training of the 2003 
bombing‘s operatives.    
317 
 
As regards Noordin‘s interactions with al-Qaida, they were of a qualitatively different 
type than in the 2002 bombing.  Rather than ships passing in the night, Noordin and al-Qaida 
were now moored in the same harbor.  He benefitted directly from monies provided by the same 
paymaster who wired funds to the 9/11 hijackers, placing Noordin in reasonably close financial 
proximity to the core of bin Laden‘s organization.  However, the Malaysian mastermind was 
otherwise independent of al-Qaida.  Thus, the overall extent of Noordin‘s relationship with al-
Qaida remained weak, but was far closer to the cut-point between weak and strong than had been 
the case a year earlier in 2002.  However, as the following discussion of the 2004 bombing of the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta will show, this pattern was just as ephemeral as the one that 
characterized Noordin‘s organizational affiliations at the time of the 2002 Bali bombings.   
Noordin‘s evolution was beginning to take a decidedly entrepreneurial path. 
 
6.4 THE 2004 BOMBING OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN JAKARTA 
The 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta unfolded in almost identical 
fashion to the previous year‘s attack on the Marriott hotel.  On September 9, 2004, Heri Golun, a 
young man with no previous experience in jihad, drove up to the fortress-like building‘s gates in 
a van and detonated the powerful explosive device hidden within.  No one inside the building 
was hurt, but nine people on the street died in the blast, most of them locally-hired security 
guards.  An additional 150 people were injured, and the property damage was massive.  The 
nearby Greek and Chinese embassies were partially gutted, and office buildings several blocks 
away suffered broken windows.54    
                                                          
54 ―Target Australia: Jakarta bomb kills 11,‖ Sydney Morning Herald, September 9, 2004; Paul Dillon, ―Blast rocks 
Jakarta near Australian Embassy,‖ USA Today, September 8, 2004; Simon Jeffery and Mark Oliver, ―Australian 
embassy bomb kills nine,‖ The Guardian (London), September 9, 2004. 
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Despite the operational similarities between the embassy bombing and the previous 
year‘s attack, the 2004 bombing represented a devolution in Noordin‘s relationship with al-Qaida 
and Jemaah Islamiyah.  His relationships with both organizations waned.  Al-Qaida‘s financial 
ties to this attack are far less clear, and Noordin‘s operational team contained a number of 
individuals with no previous connections to JI.  Indeed, he drew team members and resources 
from a diverse collection of formal organizations, and also included a number of rookie jihadists, 
who had no previous experience in terrorism.  However, it would also be a mistake to state that 
Noordin had complete operational independence from JI at the time of the embassy bombing.  
He continued to rely on the organization for some of his logistical needs and also to indoctrinate 
the individuals selected to serve as suicide-bombers.   Therefore, 2004 was a period of transition, 
during which Noordin would make strides toward independence, while remaining strongly tied 
to JI. 
6.4.1 PLANNING 
 In planning this attack, Noordin relied on experienced jihadists to fill several key roles.  
His stalwart companion Azahari Husin continued to serve as chief bomb-maker and assisted in 
the technical aspects of planning.  Similarly, Agus Hidayat, the Samudra disciple who conducted 
surveillance in support of the 2002 Bali bombings and led the team responsible for the gold-store 
robbery, was tasked with procuring explosives.55  However, Noordin also began to look beyond 
the ranks of JI.  Usman bin Sef (a.k.a. Fahim), an Afghan veteran and a JI leader in Eastern Java, 
and Iwan Dharmawan (a.k.a. Rois), an Islamist with no previous involvement with JI, assumed 
the job of recruiting.  Working through personal relationships, they placed Noordin in contact 
with a pool of new recruits who existed entirely outside of JI.  The widespread use of these green 
                                                          
55 International Crisis Group, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing," 
ICG Asia Report No. 92, February 22, 2005. (Hereafter, ―Recycling Militants in Indonesia.‖) 
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recruits in the embassy bombing would constitute a substantial strategic change from the 
previous year‘s attack on the Marriott. 
 Surprisingly, Noordin seems to have delegated much of the tactical level planning.  Rois 
was tasked with conducting surveillance on the embassy—it remains unclear whether or not the 
team ever even considered any other targets—and Azahari was in charge of planning the team‘s 
escape route.56  Thus, Noordin led at a strategic level, rather than micro-managing every aspect 
of the attack. 
 
6.4.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 In contrast to the 2003 hotel attack, which Noordin easily staffed with long-time friends 
and associates, manpower presented a substantial logistical hurdle in the 2004 embassy bombing.  
Noordin overcame this challenge and gained access to a new pool of recruits via two 
intermediaries.  The first was Iwan.    
Noordin met Iwan through Bagus Budi Pranoto (a.k.a. Urwa or Urwah), a veteran JI 
member whose involvement with the organization dates to at least 1998, when he took part in 
planning meeting alongside JI luminaries like Utomo Pamungkas, Ali Imron, and quite likely 
Noordin.57  During the course of a conversation with Noordin about the need to find more 
fighters committed to jihad, Bagus suggested that a friend of his, Iwan Dharmawan, might be 
able to help.   
Noordin was immediately enamored of Iwan‘s Islamist pedigree.  Iwan held vague 
connections to Darul Islam, the Islamist insurgency that had spawned JI in the early 1990s.  He 
was also an alumnus of jihadist training camps based in the Southern Philippines, and, like his 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Ali Imron (No. Pol.: 
BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. 
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friend Bagus, Iwan was an alumnus of Universitas an-Nur, an Islamic college of sorts favored by 
many Indonesian extremists.  After being welcomed into Noordin‘s budding organization, Iwan 
became an important recruiter in his own right, by tapping into his own friendship and family 
networks.  He drew Kang Jaya, his uncle by marriage and an experienced Darul Islam member, 
into the plot, as well as another former student of Universita an-Nur. 58 
However, Noordin‘s manpower issues were not entirely resolved by Iwan‘s contributions.  
To obtain new recruits, he also relied on a second intermediary, Usman (a.k.a Fahim).  He drew 
recruits into Noordin‘s network in much the same manner as Iwan had, by using personal 
connections.  The primary difference in their two patterns is that Usman seems to have at least 
partially relied on deception.  
Specifically, he contacted a friend and former Afghan alum to inquire if his son would be 
interested in learning to program computer viruses that would wreak havoc on the United States.  
Although the son, Heri Golun, stated that he would prefer to fight in the conflict simmering 
between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia‘s Sulawesi province, he reluctantly agreed.  
However, when he turned up, he and another young man, presumably recruited under similar 
pretenses, were introduced to Noordin and Azahari, who soon began to groom Heri to become 
the suicide-driver in the embassy bombing.59  
Thus, Iwan and Usman solved Noordin‘s manpower issues, and the attack team was an 
amalgam that contained Noordin‘s long-time supporters and new recruits drawn from Iwan and 
Usman‘s personal networks.  Indeed, 10 of the 15 men (66.7 percent) who held direct operational 
or financial links to the 2004 attacks were rookies in their first year of demonstrable active 
involvement in violent jihad.  For point of comparison, consider the 2003 Marriott attacks, which 
                                                          
58 ―Recycling Militants in Indonesia.‖ 
59 Noordin‘s Networks, p. 6. 
321 
 
were conducted by a team that included 23.1 percent rookies—less than one-third the rate of the 
Australian embassy bombing team.   
Moreover, the 2004 team was not just inexperienced, they were also exceptionally young.  
The differences between the suicide bomber involved in the 2003 and 2004 attacks are 
illustrative.  Noordin selected Asmar Latin Sani to serve as the ‗martyr‘ in the Marriott 
bombings.  At 28 years of age and as a 1995 graduate of Ba‘asyir‘s pesantren, Asmar was well-
steeped in Islamist theology and had long association with JI.60  Heri Golun, who Noordin 
selected to die in the attack on the Australian embassy, lacked comparable credentials.  The 
evidence suggests that he was barely out of high-school when he died.61  
Ultimately, the composition of Noordin‘s 2004 attack-team strongly suggests that he had 
drifted even farther from the control of JI‘s central leadership, a pattern no doubt amplified by 
the fact that Hambali, who had funneled JI‘s organizational resources to Noordin in the previous 
year‘s attack, had been arrested in Thailand in August 2003, less than a week after the execution 
of the Marriott bombing, as the result of an independent line of investigation that tracked 
Hambali‘s efforts to implement attacks in Phnom Penh and Bangkok, rather than as a direct 
result of his support for Noordin.62      
Beyond manpower, explosives were the other logistical resource most vital to the attack.  
Noordin‘s team seems to have cobbled together a large quantity from several smaller sources.  
Usman also helped with this aspect of the attack.  He funneled 25 kilograms of potassium 
chlorate, 10 kilograms of sulfur, and 30 kilograms of TNT to Noordin shortly after introducing 
                                                          
60 See note 40. 
61 ―Recycling Militants in Indonesia.‖ 
62 "Hambali was 'plotting APEC attack.'"  See also, Rob Taylor, "ASIA: Hambali accused of plotting foiled LA 
attack," AAP Newsfeed, February 10, 2006; Uamdao Noikorn, "Hambali lived quietly in one-room blue apartment 
on Buddhist temple city's outskirts," Associated Press Worldstream, August 15, 2003; Ellen Nakashima and Alan 
Sipress, "Tips, traced call led to capture of Al Qaeda suspect; Hambali tracked through 4 countries," Washington 
Post, August 16, 2003; Nirmal Ghosh, "Money row led to capture of  Hambali, says news report," Straits Times 
(Singapore), August 18, 2003. 
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him to Heri.  Members of the insurgent group KOMPAK, which fought against Christians in 
Sulawesi, provided additional supplies.   
These logistical ties ran through a militant known only as Usman the Mouse.  He visited 
Surabaya in April 2004 in connection with a commercial trading company that he ran, and was 
introduced to Noordin by a mutual friend.  Unable to fill his need for explosives from existing 
sources, Noordin asked the Mouse if he would be willing to serve as his intermediary to 
KOMPAK‘s leadership.  The Mouse agreed, and KOMPAK soon began to funnel supplies to 
Noordin.  At a minimum, the Malaysian militant received 10 kilograms of TNT and a supply of 
detonation cord from the Mouse, before Noordin‘s relationship with KOMPAK soured, amid 
concerns from that organization‘s leadership that Noordin was usurping their authority.63  
 Beyond explosives, information is sparse regarding the acquisition of the other supplies 
that Noordin‘s team required to complete the 2004 bombing.  However, as the previous 
discussions of the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 Marriott bombing showed, safe houses, 
automobiles, and communications equipment were readily and cheaply available.  There is no 
reason to assume that Noordin‘s team experienced any great difficulty acquiring such resources 
in advance of the embassy bombing. 
 The sources of money that Noordin used to pay for this attack remain somewhat of a 
mystery.  It is possible that he was able to carry-over some leftover funds from the 2003 attack, 
but given that Noordin asked his friends in KOMPAK to find some young men willing to 
commit robbery in support of jihad shortly before his relationship with the organization went 
bad,64 it seems likely that Noordin‘s coffers were low.   
                                                          
63 Ibid. 
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Iwan posited another source of funds: al-Qaida.  Following his arrest, he told police that 
Azahari received bundles of Australian dollars via courier.  When Iwan inquired about their 
source, he was told that they came from bin Laden.65   
The provenance of this information is, however, debatable.  Iwan knew only what 
Azahari told him, so there is no assurance that this information was the truth.  Moreover, the 
methods that the Indonesian police used to extract the information likely included physical 
punishment, so it is quite possible that Iwan simply told them what they wanted to hear in order 
to stop the pain.  Thus, the source of the money behind the embassy bombing remains 
ambiguous, but if Iwan‘s claim proves true, it would require a re-evaluation of Noordin‘s entire 
relationship with al-Qaida, because this information would demonstrate that the arrest of 
Hambali, who served as the primary link between Noordin‘s network and bin Laden‘s 
organization, did not sever Noordin‘s financial ties to al-Qaida.  
6.4.3 TRAINING 
Rather than JI or al-Qaida, Noordin‘s untested recruits received in-house training from 
other participants in the plot.  Some of this was fairly formal in nature.  For example, Iwan and 
his uncle, Kang Jaya, operated a short-lived training camp at Cisolok, Indonesia, where some 
members of the team received instruction that echoed Iwan and Kang‘s own earlier experiences 
in the southern Philippines.66  Similarly, Azahari instructed Heri, the operation‘s martyr, in a 
month-long bomb-making course, before he and two other potential suicide-bombers spent 
several weeks being ideologically ‗ripened‘ at a pesantren located in Cikampek by Baharudin 
Soleh (a.k.a. Abdul Hadi), an old friend of Noordin‘s and a graduate of Ba‘asyir‘s religious 
                                                          
65 ―Bin Laden ‗funded‘ Australian embassy bombing,‖ Sydney Morning Herald, August 1, 2005. 
66 ―Recycling Militants in Indonesia.‖ 
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school.67  However, Noordin and Azahari also had a direct role in this ripening process; in the 
days immediately preceding the attack, Heri moved-in with the duo and even slept in the same 
room as Azahari and Noordin, so that he could receive last-minute religious instruction.68  
Finally, Iwan also conducted some vital last minute training; he taught Heri to drive in the days 
just before the attack.  Otherwise, the operation‘s martyr would have been unable to deliver the 
bomb to the gate of the embassy—an anecdote that says a great deal about the general naivety 
that characterized many members of Noordin‘s 2004 team.  
Thus, in 2004, the training infrastructure on which Noordin drew was, like his network 
itself, a blend of old and new.  Noordin‘s team still had historical training ties to al-Qaida via 
Azahari‘s time in Afghanistan, as well as historical ties to the camps JI had run in the southern 
Philippines in the late 1990s.  However, the green recruits received a mix of ideological 
instruction from individuals with long-standing ties to JI and some in-house training, much of it 
conducted under the instruction of Iwan and Kang, who never considered themselves members 
of JI.  Although Noordin‘s training apparatus was becoming increasingly distinct from JI‘s, he 
remained partially reliant on the organization‘s existing infrastructure.     
6.4.4 SUMMATION 
Ultimately, 2004 seems to have been a period of transition for Noordin‘s network.  It had 
lost an important conduit to al-Qaida with the arrest of Hambali, but the ultimate impact of his 
absence is difficult to judge in light of the claims of bin Laden-linked funding that Iwan made 
after his arrest.  Absent additional evidence to support these assertions, it therefore seems that 
both the embassy bombing, as an event, and the attack team surrounding Noordin, as an 
organization, had weak ties to al-Qaida.   
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Noordin was still strongly tied to JI in 2004; he relied on members of the organization to 
indoctrinate his suicide bombers and to provide some of the explosives used in the attack.  Yet, 
at the same time, Noordin‘s planning seems to have taken place entirely outside of JI‘s larger 
command structure, and he was increasingly reliant on individuals who lacked previous 
association with JI, including members of KOMPAK, members of Darul Islam, and several 
individuals with no previous experience in jihad.  At the time of the 2004 attack on the 
Australian embassy in Jakarta, Noordin‘s network was not yet fully independent, but the group 
seems to have had one foot out of JI‘s door.  This budding autonomy would increase moderately 
by the following year, when Noordin conducted his next major attack, the 2005 Bali bombings, 
and first adopted a new organizational moniker, Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad (TQJ).   
 
6.5 THE 2005 BALI BOMBINGS 
On the evening of October 1, 2005, three suicide-bombers, Aip Hidayat, Misno, and Salik 
Firdaus, walked into cafes on the island of Bali during the busy dinner rush and detonated 
explosive hidden inside backpacks, killing themselves and two dozen victims.  One of the 
targets, Raja Bar and Grill, sat in Kuta, on the edge of the same busy tourist district where 
Paddy‘s Pub and the Sari Club had been located.  The other bomb-site was Jimbarong beach, 
near the Four Seasons Hotel and the southwestern tip of Bali, where tourists liked to gather at the 
waterside warang, a sort of open-air food court popular throughout Indonesia, to eat and watch 
the sunset.69 
                                                          
69 Much of the contextual information is based on a site visit to Bali.  For the names of the attackers, see: Noordin‘s 
Networks.  For a description of the damage and casualties, see: ―Bali bomb attacks claim 26 lives,‖ BBC News, 
October 2, 2005; ―Bali bombs ‗were suicide attacks,‘ BBC News, October 2, 2005; Raymond Bonner and Jane 
Perlez, ―Bali Bombings Kill at Least 25 in Tourist Spots,‖ New York Times, October 2, 2005.   
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Noordin would later claim responsibility for the attack, stating in the process that he was 
the head of a new organization, Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad for the Malay Island Group.70  Given that 
similar phraseology appears in the Arabic-language names of al-Qaida in Iraq and al-Qaida in the 
Arabian Peninsula,71 and given that Noordin concurrently adopted the pseudonym ―Aiman‖ in 
homage to Ayman al-Zawahiri,72 the Malaysian jihadist was making powerful claims about the 
extent of his international connections.  Simply put, Noordin claimed to head al-Qaida‘s 
Southeast Asian branch.  While the evidence demonstrates that Noordin was largely independent 
of JI by the time of the 2005 Bali bombings, it seems that he exaggerated his connections to al-
Qaida.  Ultimately, Noordin‘s connections to bin Laden‘s organization had become primarily 
ideological by the time of the second Bali bombings, while his ties to JI remained vaguely 
operational in nature, but were now largely historical.  
6.5.1 PLANNING 
 The planning patterns of the 2005 attack differed little from those of the previous year.    
Noordin and Azahari filled their familiar roles and again initiated the attack without obtaining 
permission from JI‘s titular leaders.  However, Noordin could no longer rely on Iwan or Usman 
(Fahim) to serve as recruiters and logisticians, because the men had been arrested in separate 
incidents the previous year.73   
                                                          
70 The spelling of the name is subject to disagreement; it also sometimes appears as ―Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad.‖ 
Noordin‘s Networks; ―Bali bomber ‗heads new group,‘‖ BBC News, January 30, 2006; available online: 
http://www.seasite.niu.edu/indonesian/islam/BBC%20NEWS%20%20Asia-
Pacific%20%20Bali%20bomber%20%27heads%20new%20group%27.htm.   
71 AQI uses the name ―Tanzim Qa‘idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn.‖ AQAP uses the name ―Tanzim Qa‘idat al-
Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab.‖  Differences in spelling between these organizations and Noordin‘s group are easily 
attributable to transliteration inconsistencies that stem from placing an Arabic name into the Bahasa language.  
United States Department of Treasury, ―Specially Designated Nationals List,‖ September 15, 2011; available online: 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx. 
72 ―Noordin's Networks.‖ 
73 Usman‘s arrest actually predated the Australian embassy bombing, but does not seem to have affected the pace of 
operations.  For details, see: "Detained terror suspect helped plan Bali blasts, Indonesian police say," Agence France 
Presse, July 12, 2004.  Iwan‘s arrest came in the aftermath of the embassy bombing.  For details, see: John 
Aglionby, "Four arrested over Australia embassy bomb," The Guardian (London), November 25, 2004. 
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Subur Sugiarto, who had been involved in JI activities in central Java since at least 2003, 
would partially fill their roles.  He served as both a logistical procurer, who helped Noordin to 
obtain money and materiel through crime, and a recruiter, who used personal ties to draw a 
number of individuals with no previous jihadist experience in into the attack team.74  
Mohammad Cholily, a JI member who had been active in the organization since the late 1990s, 
but who remained unknown to Azahari and Noordin until May 2005, also assisted in the 
logistics, by obtaining explosives.75  Thus, as it had been during the embassy bombing, 
Noordin‘s attack team was a mix of established JI members who had grown dissatisfied with the 
organization‘s perceived lack of action and novice jihadists who had no previous experience.  
 In terms of planning, the most obvious difference between the second Bali bombings and 
Noordin‘s previous attacks occurred at the tactical level.  While Noordin‘s 2003 and 2004 
attacks used large vehicle-born explosive devices, the 2005 bombing used man-portable 
explosive devices.  One of the more interesting possibilities is that this change represented a 
deliberate shift in tactics, made because the 2003 and 2004 bombings expended significant 
quantities of resources, but failed to achieve significant casualties.   
However, the reasons behind this tactical shift, as well as many of the 2005 attacks‘ other 
tactical details, are likely to remain unknown, since those in the best position to provide 
information all died before they could be taken into custody.  For example, the Bali suicide-
bombers perished during the course of the operation.  Azahari died alongside two of his bomb-
making students in a November 2005 confrontation with Indonesian police,76 and in September 
2009, Noordin died in a gun battle in Solo, Indonesia, alongside five of his remaining disciples, 
                                                          
74 ―Noordin's Networks.‖ 
75 "Militants jailed for role in 2005 Bali bombings," Global Insight, September 7, 2006; Stephen Fitzpatrick, "Bomb 
expert gets 18 years over Bali," The Australian (Australia), September 8, 2006. 
76 "'Bali bomb maker' believed dead," BBC News, November 10, 2005; Amy Chew, "Azahari Dead," New Straits 
Times (Malaysia), November 10, 2005. 
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including Bagus Budi Pranoto, the associate who introduced Noordin to the key recruiter in the 
2004 embassy bombings.77 
 The organizational structure that Noordin employed has rendered the accounts of the 
remaining team members virtually useless.  According to Mohammad Cholily, who has been in 
police custody since November 2005, Noordin practiced strict segregation between different 
portions of the attack team.  Although Cholily interacted closely with Azahari, effectively 
serving as the master bomb-maker‘s apprentice, he never even met the three martyrs.  Azahari 
repeatedly told the inquisitive Cholily that he had no need to know anything about them, since 
the suicide-bombers did not affect his portion of the mission.78  Given this strict adherence to 
―need to know‖ practices and the deaths of the team‘s remaining key members, it seems that 
substantial ambiguity will continue to surround many of the particulars of the attack‘s planning. 
6.5.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 With the 2004 arrests of team members Usman and Iwan, to say nothing of Heri‘s death 
by suicide in the embassy attack, Noordin faced many of the same manpower issues in the 
second Bali attack that he had in the previous year.  He solved them in similar fashion, by relying 
on an intermediary to recruit on his behalf using personal connections.  Specifically, Subur 
Sugiarto brought several friends with no previous experience in jihad into the group, and a large 
percentage of the 2005 team was consequently comprised of rookie jihadists.79  Though the 
levels were not quite as high as they had been on the embassy-bombing team, a total of five of 
the nine individuals with direct links to the 2005 attacks (55.6 percent of the team) were rookie 
jihadists in their first year of demonstrable active involvement in terrorism.   
                                                          
77 "DNA tests in Indonesia confirm death of terrorist Noordin Top," Asian News International, September 19, 2009; 
International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh," ICG Asia Report No. 189, April 20, 2010.  
78 ―I want to die, says Bali bombing suspect,‖ Sydney Morning Herald, May 16, 2006; available online: 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/i-want-to-die-says-bali-bombing-suspect/2006/05/16/1147545326359.html.   
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Beyond satisfying his need for manpower, the rookies met Noordin‘s logistical needs in 
another way; they helped him to obtain vital communications gear by robbing a mobile phone 
shop.80  Although it is unclear whether or not the robbery also garnered any cash for Noordin‘s 
network, it is reasonable to speculate that the team resold some of the stolen electronics in order 
to generate partial funding for the 2005 Bali bombings, especially considering that the record has 
remained mute regarding other financial transactions that may have supported the attack.  If 
Noordin received any support from abroad or any direct transfers from JI‘s leadership, they have 
remained hidden.  At the very least, he was, as had long been, partially financially independent. 
The record has also been largely silent on the subject of the attack‘s remaining key 
resource: explosives.  Open-source accounts of the attack stipulate that Mohamed Cholily 
provided the explosives, but they provide no additional information on where he obtained the 
materials or from whom.81  Given Noordin‘s falling-out with KOMPAK and the arrest of Usman 
(Fahim), it seems unlikely that the 2005 attack-team relied on the same suppliers as the embassy-
bombing team had, unless of course the explosive devices used in the second Bali attack were 
fashioned from surplus materials.  It is perhaps telling that the explosive power of the bombs 
used in this attack were an order of magnitude smaller than the van-bombs used in the 2004 
embassy bombing and the 2003 Marriott bombing, but as discussed in regards to planning, the 
decision to use smaller man-portable devices could also just as easily have been dictated by 
tactics as by the availability of materials.  Additional research into the source and quantity of 
explosives at the 2005 attack team‘s disposal would be incredibly valuable, as it would clarify 
the otherwise ambiguous nature of Noordin‘s operational relationship with JI and other 
organizations at the time of the second Bali bombing. 
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6.5.3 TRAINING     
While much about the logistics and finance of the 2005 attack remain unknown, 
Noordin‘s involvement in training is clear.  Instead of relying on a third party to train his cadets, 
as he had in the previous year‘s embassy attacks, Noordin played a hands-on role with Subir‘s 
friends.  Working in the cramped space above the Selera Restaurant in Semarang, Noordin taught 
four recruits to become suicide bombers. Three of them would martyr themselves in the second 
Bali bombings, but the fourth man, Anif Solchanudin, was denied this ‗honor,‘ because he was a 
veteran of the sectarian conflict in Ambon between Christians and Muslims.  Noordin felt Anif‘s 
expertise could be better used by training other recruits.  So long as Noordin continued to favor 
suicide attacks, he would apparently always be in need of new recruits, because he seemed to see 
them as the most expendable martyrs.82   
Similarly, Azahari continued to provide the network with in-house training in bomb-
making.  Cholily served as his apprentice during the run-up to the bombings, but he was not 
Azahari‘s only student.  Gempur Budi Angkoro (a.k.a. Jabir), who was first-cousin to JI 
luminary Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi,83 also trained under Azahari during this period, but received 
few chances to implement his craft.  He was killed in a police raid in early 2006, after which 
investigators found in Gempur‘s rented home a bomb similar to the explosive devices used in the 
second Bali bombing, strongly suggesting that the preparations for the 2005 attack served to 
provide him with hands-on training, as well as suggesting that Gempur‘s death may have 
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interrupted an additional plot by Noordin‘s network.84  Fortunately, Gempur‘s death, Cholily‘s 
arrest, and the death of the two apprentices who perished alongside Azahari in November 2005 
seem to have largely extinguished Azahari‘s training legacy.  
6.5.4 SUMMATION 
When viewed in total, the evidence suggests that although there was likely some overlap 
with JI in 2005, nearly all of the conditions for Noordin‘s independence were set by this time.  
His newly named organization, TQJ, was not reliant on the larger JI network for bomb-making 
expertise and preferred instead to rely on Azahari Husin, Noordin‘s friend and confidant of many 
years.  Because Noordin was willing to work with novice jihadists and in fact seemed to prefer to 
use them as suicide-operatives rather than ‗wasting‘ seasoned veterans, TQJ required few 
durable members.   
Nor was the new organization dependent on JI‘s larger training structure, or, for that 
matter, al-Qaida‘s training resources.  Instead, Noordin ran independent camps.  As required by 
the situation, he and Azahari were willing to work with members of organizations other than JI, 
or to assume a hands-on role.   
Finally, TQJ does not seem to have relied on JI‘s larger structure or al-Qaida ‗donations‘ 
to provide funding.  TQJ‘s repeated involvement in robberies demonstrates that it was willing to 
steal the cash and sometimes also the equipment needed to conduct operations.  However, it is 
difficult to be especially firm in this conclusion because of the tremendous ambiguity that 
surrounds so many aspects of the second Bali bombings.   
Ultimately, in 2005, a complex web of personal connections, ideological affiliations, and 
past functional ties still existed between members of Noordin‘s network and other jihadist terror 
                                                          
84 Benteng Reges, ―Bomb similar to explosive of Bali 2005 attack found,‖ Asia News, March 5, 2006; available 
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332 
 
groups, but it seems that by this time TQJ was likely an independent organization, rather than an 
al-Qaida cell or a branch of Jemaah Islamiyah.  Although the personnel losses that TQJ suffered 
in the immediate aftermath of the 2005 attack greatly affected the organization‘s capabilities, its 
independence remained largely unchanged by the time of its next and final attack, the near-
simultaneous bombings of Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in 2009. 
 
6.6 THE 2009 BOMBING OF THE JAKARTA MARRIOTT AND RITZ-CARLTON HOTELS
 On the morning of July 17, 2009, a pair of suicide-bombers attacked two western-owned 
luxury hotels in Jakarta: the J.W. Marriott, which had also been the target of Noordin‘s 2003 
van-bombing, and the Ritz-Carlton, located less than two-hundred yards away.  As they had in 
the second Bali bombings, the terrorists relied on man-portable explosive devices, rather than 
vehicle-bombs, and both attackers targeted areas where guests were most likely to congregate.  
Specifically, the Marriott bomb was detonated in the hotel‘s second-floor restaurant, where 
westerners were known to frequently hold breakfast meetings, and the Ritz bomb was detonated 
in the hotel‘s main lobby.  The explosions were nearly simultaneous, occurring just a few 
minutes apart, but killed only nine people and injured just a few dozen more.85 
 Broadly speaking, this attack repeated many of the patterns established in 2005.  The 
weapons used were virtually identical.  Noordin‘s organization remained largely independent in 
terms of planning and training, but likely received some logistical assistance from JI.  Moreover, 
the 2009 team continued to rely heavily on novice jihadists, and demonstrated no clear 
functional ties to al-Qaida.  However, owing to the organizational losses that TQJ suffered in the 
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immediate aftermath of the 2005 bombings, there was little continuity between the 2009 hotel 
attack and the second Bali bombing in terms of specific personnel. 
6.6.1 PLANNING 
 In terms of planning, the 2009 attack represents an evolution of the second Bali bombing.  
Noordin again played the part of grand strategist and delegated a number of important tasks to 
other members of the team.  A man known only as Ibrohim played a particularly important role. 
He effectively functioned as TQJ‘s ―inside man‖ and conducted the bulk of the 
reconnaissance necessary to plan the operation.  Four years earlier, in 2005, Ibrohim had left a 
higher-paid position to take a job working in the flower shop located in the Ritz-Carlton‘s 
lobby.86  Because the Marriott apparently contracted with this florist, Ibrohim‘s vantage point 
allowed him to conduct long-term surveillance on both hotels.87  Consequently, he seems to have 
taken the lead on planning many of the attack‘s tactical details, with Noordin acting in more of 
an advisory capacity. 
 The attack‘s technical details were the responsibility of TQJ‘s new bomb-maker, Eko 
Joko Sarjono.  The evidence suggests that he was drawn into the network via personal 
connections to one of Noordin‘s long-time supporters.  Specifically, Eko was a high-school 
friend of Air Setyawan, who police had briefly arrested ahead of the 2004 embassy bombings on 
strong suspicion of ties to Noordin‘s organization, but were forced to release a few months later, 
when the tight-lipped suspect refused to divulge any details that could be used as evidence of his 
participation in jihad.  Moreover, events that took place in the aftermath of the attack suggest 
that Air and Eko shared a particularly close bond.  Not only were the men friends since high-
school and partners on the 2009 Marriott/Ritz-Carlton attack; the pair‘s operational relationship 
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continued after the hotel bombing.  They actually died in the same police encounter, which took 
place on August 8, when officers raided the house Air and Eko were using as a bomb-factory in 
an affluent Jakarta suburb.   
Nor was Noordin actively involved in recruiting for the 2009 bombings.  Because 
Indonesian jihadists then regarded him as an ―all-star,‖ Noordin‘s prestige certainly granted him 
an indirect role in recruiting, as would-be jihadists must have jumped at the opportunity to work 
alongside a luminary figure, but Ibrohim used personal connections to find the team‘s primary 
recruiter.  His brother-in-law, an Islamic cleric named Syaifudin Jaelani, played the largest role 
in securing manpower for the operation; he used his position of authority and influence to recruit 
naïve young men with no previous experience in jihad to serve as suicide-bombers.88 
At a tactical level, the 2009 attack represented a slight planning refinement to the second 
Bali bombing.  Both attacks relied on suicide-bombers carrying backpack-bombs to 
simultaneously target multiple attack-sites, but in the 2009 bombings, Noordin‘s team tried to 
increase the death toll by adding an additional component.  Specifically, the attackers wired a 
timed device, hidden in a room on one of the Marriott‘s upper floors, to detonate a few minutes 
ahead of the planned suicide attacks, on the logic that the hotel‘s guests, and possibly also those 
at the nearby Ritz, would empty into the lobby after the initial explosion, thereby placing more 
potential victims in proximity to the suicide-attackers.  However, the plan failed and the attack‘s 
death-toll was low, because the timed device never went-off.89    
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6.6.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
In the 2009 bombings, manpower was again a crucial logistical need, which Syaifudin 
met by perverting his role as an Islamic cleric.  From his congregation, he drew the two young 
men that would go-on to serve as martyrs in the hotel bombings: 18 year-old Dani Dwi Pertama, 
and 28 year-old Nana Ikhwan Maulana.  After grooming them ideologically, Syaifudin then 
introduced the young men to his brother-in-law, Ibrohim.90 
As a result of these recruitment patterns, the 2009 bombings, like TQJ‘s previous two 
attacks, relied heavily on novice jihadists.  Of the 14 individuals who had direct operational or 
financial ties to the attacks, 9 men (64.3 percent) were rookies with no previous demonstrable 
involvement in violent extremism.  Moreover, at least one of the 2009 bombers seems to have 
been incredibly naïve.  One official involved in the investigation of the hotel attacks claimed that 
mess left behind in the bathroom of the Marriott hotel room used to stage the attacks‘ final 
preparations made it clear that Dani, the young suicide bomber who targeted the Marriott, was so 
unsophisticated that he did not understand how to use the room‘s Western-style toilet.91 
Beyond manpower, the record has remained silent on many of the logistical details of the 
attack.  For example, there is scant information on the source of the explosives.  Because police 
later discovered a large cache of materials in the back yard of Noordin‘s father-in-law, 
Baharudin Latif (a.k.a. Baridin),92 it is reasonable to suspect that Noordin used family 
connections to secure explosives.  However, there is no information on how or where Baharudin 
obtained the materials, but given that he held independent connections dating to the late 1990s to 
                                                          
90 "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base." 
91 Confidential informant, interview conducted August 2010 in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
92 "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base." 
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Bagus Budi Pranoto, who played an important role in the 2004 embassy bombing,93 it is 
reasonable to speculate that Baharudin‘s stash was a surplus left-over from the 2004 attack.  
Regardless of the ultimate source of Noordin‘s explosives, many of the 2009 operation‘s 
more mundane logistical needs were met by Amir Ibrahim (a.k.a. Amir Abdillah).  For example, 
he rented the Marriott hotel room used to stage the final preparations for the attack—the same 
room where police would later find the time-bomb that failed to explode.  Though this 
contribution suggests a fairly small role in the attack, he was a full member of the attack team 
and held substantial knowledge about his co-conspirators.  For example, the August 8 showdown 
that resulted in Air and Eko‘s deaths followed Amir‘s arrest by only three days, strongly 
suggesting that he provided the intelligence that led police to his compatriots‘ door.94   
Funding for the attack seems to have come from abroad and flowed through a convoluted 
set of overlapping relationships.  Specifically, Saefudin Zuhri, who was distantly related to 
Noordin through marriage—the two men apparently wed first cousins95—arranged a meeting 
between the infamous terrorist and Muhamad Jibril Abdurahman (a.k.a. Muhamad Ricky Ardan 
bin Mohammad Iqbal), an Indonesian with long-standing, multi-faceted ties to terrorism.  
Abdurahman was the son of Muhammad Iqbal,96 a radical preacher whose influence radicalized 
prominent JI members including Hambali and Yazid Sufaat.97  Moreover, Abdurahman had spent 
time in Pakistan alongside Hambali‘s younger brother, Rusman Gun Gun Gunawan, and once 
                                                          
93 Ibid. 
94 "Malaysia: National police to cooperate with Indonesia to arrest Noordin Top," and "Indonesia: Noordin Top's 
Support Base." 
95 Ali Kotarumalos, ―Indonesia: Terror chief‘s relative gets 8 years,‖ Associated Press, April 20, 2010. 
96 Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and 
Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.295.11 Muhammad Jibril 
Abdul Rahman,‖ August 12, 2011; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI29511E.shtml. 
(Hereafter, ―Abdulrahman Listing.‖)  
97 "Unmasking radical preachers," Straits Times (Singapore), February 10, 2002. 
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held financial ties to Imam Samudra, the field commander of the first Bali bombings.98  
However, it remains unclear whether or not Noordin and Abdurahman had a previous 
relationship, and the meeting that Zuhri brokered may have been the pair‘s first direct 
interaction.  With the relationship established (or reinforced), Abdurahman then arranged for Ali 
Muhammad bin Abdullah, a contact in Saudi Arabia who is sometimes also referenced as 
Abdurahman‘s brother, to transmit 10,000 USD to Noordin.99 
Despite the Saudi connection, it remains to be proven that al-Qaida played any direct role 
in the funding of the 2009 hotel bombing.  However, Abdurahman‘s ties to the organization raise 
the possibility of its involvement.  While studying in Pakistan, he purportedly interacted with 
members of al-Qaida and the Taliban, and given that in 2003 his classmate, Gunawan, held direct 
links to KSM‘s nephew, Ali al-Azia Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi), these assertions seem 
exceptionally credible.  However, Abdurahman‘s later interactions with bin Laden‘s organization 
are somewhat speculative.  He reportedly returned to Pakistan at least briefly in 2007, and 
renewed these connections,100 but detailed evidence on the specifics of these interactions with al-
Qaida has yet to emerge.  Therefore, it would be premature to conclude that bin Laden‘s 
organization orchestrated the attack‘s funding, especially if the alleged family ties between 
Abdurahman and Ali Muhammad bin Abdullah prove true.   That said, al-Qaida‘s financial role 
in the 2009 attacks remains an intriguing possibility that merits additional investigation as new 
evidence emerges into the open-source. 
  
                                                          
98 Abdulrahman Listing. 
99 The Abdulrahman Listing specifies only that his foreign contact was his brother, but lists no name, while media 
portrayals list the Saudi contact by name, but do not specify that he held a family ties to Abdurahman.  See, for 
example: Dicky Christanto, ―Jibril, Ali cooperated in funding hotel bombings,‖ Jakarta Post, September 2, 2009; 
available online: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/02/jibril-ali-cooperated-funding-hotel-
bombings.html.   
100 Abdulrahman Listing. 
338 
 
6.6.3 TRAINING 
Beyond the influence that he exerted from the pulpit, Syaifudin Jaelani appears to have 
played a role in the ideological component of the training that preceded the 2009 attack.  
Specifically, his role seems to have been to ‗ripen‘ prospective suicide-bombers, whom he 
groomed for jihad under the guise of youth counseling.  For example, in the months preceding 
the attacks, he took Dani, the Marriott bomber, and a handful of other teenage boys on otherwise 
unsupervised camping trips southeast of Jakarta.101   
At a more technical level, Azahari still dominated the training of the operation‘s bomb-
makers, despite his death.   The Indonesian police assert that Eko‘s bomb-designs were entirely 
based on the schematics that Azahari had created for the backpack-bombs used in the 2005 Bali 
attacks.102  Because the record does not specify that Eko ever trained directly under Azahari, the 
bomb-maker in the 2009 attacks may have been somewhat akin to a home cook who tries to 
recreate a restaurant-chef‘s recipes by following a cookbook, without the benefit of the tacit 
knowledge that instructors pass-on through hands-on tutorials.  The attendant drop-off in 
experience inherent to this type of training may go a long way toward explaining why the time-
bomb left on the Marriott‘s upper floors failed.  Unless additional information emerges 
suggesting that Eko studied bomb-making more formally with individuals outside of TQJ, it 
seems safe to conclude that neither al-Qaida nor JI played a direct training role in the 2009 hotel 
bombings.     
  
                                                          
101 Stephen Fitzpatrick, "Preacher groomed boys for jihad," The Australian, August 12, 2009. 
102 Berni Moestafa and Bambang Djanuarto, ―Jakarta Hotel Bombers Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah, Police Say,‖ 
Bloomberg, July 19, 2009; available online: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aslTMQuj6g4U.   
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6.6.4 SUMMATION 
 As in the 2005 Bali bombing, TQJ seems to have functioned largely independently in the 
2009 hotel attacks.  There is no clear evidence that al-Qaida orchestrated the attack‘s funding, 
nor is there any clear evidence that any active members of the attack team ever received training 
in an al-Qaida camp.  Given the ambiguity that surrounds many aspects of the attack, it is 
difficult to be overly firm in these conclusions, but it seems that bin Laden‘s organization was, at 
best, weakly tied to the 2009 hotel attacks.   
JI‘s role in the attacks is slightly more complex.  Several members of the attack team, 
most notably Noordin, held historical membership in the organization, and in the absence of 
other explanations, the most likely source of explosives used in the 2009 attack was a surplus 
that JI stored with Noordin‘s father-in-law.  Effectively, it seems that these logistical supplies 
followed Baharudin Latif from JI into TQJ.  However, JI played no direct role in training the 
2009 team; its members either relied on the organization‘s existing knowledge resources, as 
epitomized by Eko‘s use of Azahari‘s bomb-designs, or they received instruction from other 
members of TQJ, as demonstrated by Syaifudin Jaelani‘s involvement in the ripening process.  
Ultimately, it seems that the 2009 attack was also weakly tied to JI.   
 
6.7 NETWORK MEASURES 
 Because this chapter considers a series of events that not only occupy the same Baleian 
category populated by events in which al-Qaida played a weak functional role, but which also 
consistently involve some common actors, namely Noordin and Azahari, this chapter‘s cases are 
similar enough to ensure that formal comparisons between the networks that perpetrated the 
events under analysis meet the standards of construct validity.  These quantitative measurements, 
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which are outlined in the section below, tell the same story as the qualitative narrative and 
demonstrate that although that Noordin and Azahari were of no particular structural importance 
in the network that perpetrated the 2002 Bali bombings, the networks which conducted the 2003 
bombing of the Jakarta Marriott, the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the 
2005 bombings in Jimbarong Beach and Kuta on Bali, and the 2009 bombings of the Jakarta 
Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels were structurally dependent on these men.  Put more simply, the 
2002 Bali bombings would have taken place with or without Noordin and Azahari, but the 
networks which perpetrated every well-known Islamist-motivated terror attack in Indonesia from 
2003 to 2009 would never have existed without the pair. 
 The simplest way to view the events in this chapter is as a single-mode network depicting 
the entire period of analysis as a single snap-shot.  Figure 6.1 offers a visualization of a static 
agent x agent network containing functional connections between individuals involved in the 
2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 Jakarta Marriott bombing, the 2004 Australian Embassy 
bombings, the 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2009 bombings of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-
Carlton Hotels.103  Visual interpretation of this graph makes two things immediately apparent.  
First, the information surrounding Indonesian extremism is imperfect, because the presence of 
two isolate nodes demonstrates that nothing is known about some Indonesian jihadists’ 
relationships or the nature of their involvement in violence, other than that they played some 
vague functional role in one of the same attacks as Noordin.  Consequently, it is clear that the 
values of any measures derived from the network depicted in Figure 6.1 would change with 
                                                          
103 Because participation in the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 bombing of the Jakarta Marriott, the 2004 bombing of 
the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the 2005 bombings in Jimbarong Beach and Kuta on Bali, and the 2009 
bombings of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels served as the selection criteria for inclusion in this network, 
it would be inappropriate to include in the network ties inferred from participation in these events.  Indeed, doing so 
would create perfect cliques for each event, because every participant would be linked to every other.  Therefore, the 
agent x agent connections displayed in Figure 6.1 and analyzed in subsequent graphs exclude such ties. 
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perfect information.  With the significant caveats implicit to this finding, the second conclusion 
that can be obtained from visual interpretation of the graph is that Noordin and Azahari, who 
have been highlighted in blue, play important roles in binding the network together. 
 
Figure 6.1: Agent x Agent Network Depicting Relationships Between Individuals Involved 
in Terror Attacks Involving Noordin Mohd Top, 2002-2009 
 
 
 
  
Formal measures of centrality offer a means to quantify the extent of this importance.  
Figure 6.2 summarizes betweenness, closeness, and total degree scores for the same flat agent x 
agent network depicted above.  Owing to discussions in the second and third chapters, 
betweenness and degree are familiar concepts, but as this analysis has not previously discussed 
closeness, this measurement merits a brief definitional note.  Closeness offers an index 
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measurement of the geodesic distance between an actor and all other nodes in the graph.  
Consequently, it serves as a measurement of reachability; those with high closeness scores can 
most easily reach (and be reached by) other members of the network. 104  
 The graphs in Figure 6.2 demonstrate that although other agents hold more ties than 
Noordin and Azahari, and although other agents are far more reachable than Noordin and 
Azahari—a factor largely attributable to the pair‘s relatively light involvement in the 2002 Bali 
bombings and consequent isolation from many of that attack‘s participants—the pair scored 
exceptionally high in betweenness.  Noordin ranked first in this measurement, while Azahari 
ranked fourth, coming in behind Ali Ghufron and Imam Samudra, whose shared organizational 
duties in the 2002 Bali bombings, the attack with the largest network of participants, granted 
them high betweenness scores, despite their lack of participation in any subsequent attacks.  
Thus, even when the period of Noordin‘s functional involvement in terrorism is viewed in a 
static, one-mode perspective, it is clear that Noordin and Azahari held Indonesia‘s community of 
Islamist terrorist together throughout the bulk of the first decade of the new millennium.       
  
                                                          
104 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, (Cambridge (UK): 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 184-185.  See also, Linton C. Freeman, ―Centrality in Social Networks 
Conceptual Clarification,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1978/1979), pp. 215-239. 
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Figure 6.2: Centrality Scores for Individuals Involved in Terror Attacks Involving Noordin 
Mohd Top, 2002-2009 
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 Introducing a two-mode perspective drives home the importance of Noordin and 
Azahari‘s shared role in linking prominent Indonesian-based terror attacks between 2002 and 
2009.  Figure 6.3 contains two panels.  The upper one shows agents‘ known connections to 
attacks; the lower panel shows the same information, only with Noordin and Azahari removed 
from the network.  If not for this pair, the 2005 Bali bombings and the 2009 bombings of the 
Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels would have been entirely disconnected from the 
remaining attacks, and the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta would have been 
connected only though Agus Hidayat, a disciple of Imam Samudra‘s who participated in the gold 
store robbery that supported the 2002 Bali bombings and who helped to secure explosives in 
support of the 2004 attack.  The obvious conclusion is that Noordin and Azahari were the 
primary architects of the broader campaign of terror that took place in Indonesia in the years 
following the first Bali bombings.   
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Figure 6.3: Agent x Event Networks Depicting Prominent Terror Attacks in Indonesia, 
2002-2009 
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 While the preceding assessments demonstrate Noordin and Azahari‘s strategic role in 
orchestrating terror attacks in Indonesia in the 2000s, they say little about the nature of the pair‘s 
involvement organizing the teams responsible for each attack individually.  This aspect of 
Noordin and Azahari‘s leadership is perhaps best demonstrated by examining fragmentation, a 
measurement that examines both the percentage of disconnected nodes that exist in a given 
network and the relative cohesion of the connected components.105  Figure 6.4 summarizes a 
simulation-based approach to estimating Azahari and Noordin‘s role in organizing each of the 
attacks discussed in this chapter.  The graphs compare fragmentation scores for agent x agent 
networks depicting functional relationships among each attacks‘ known participants.  The blue 
bars depict scores for the complete network as it appears in the data.  The maroon bars depict 
scores that would have resulted if Noordin and Azahari had not participated in the attacks.  
Finally, the green bar represents a special case, depicting the score that would have resulted if 
Ibrohim, the florist who conducted much of the tactical planning of the 2009 bombings of the 
Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels, had not participated in Noordin‘s final attack.  
  
                                                          
105 Stephen P. Borgatti, ―The Key Player Problem,‖ in Dynamic Social Network Modeling and Analysis: Workshop 
Summary and Papers, (Washington, D.C.: National Academic Press, 2003), p. 242. 
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Figure 6.4: Fragmentation Scores 
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 Like the other formal network measures presented in this section, fragmentation scores 
provide a quantitative estimate that mirrors previously presented qualitative interpretations.  The 
numbers demonstrate that Noordin and Azahari‘s removal from the 2002 Bali bombings would 
have done little to fracture the network responsible for that attack—hardly a surprising finding 
given that Noordin‘s role was limited to participation in a single early strategy meeting and that 
Azahari became involved in the attack‘s tactical details almost by accident, when the pair arrived 
at Ali Ghufron‘s house unannounced and unexpected.  However, Noordin and Azahari were 
lynchpins that held together the network that perpetrated the 2003 Jakarta Marriott bombing, as 
demonstrated by the roughly 300 percent increase in fragmentation that resulted from their 
simulated removal from that network.  Though the numbers are not quite as profound for the 
2004 Australian Embassy bombings and the 2005 Bali bombings, the pattern is the same: the 
respective attack networks would have been 1.5 times more fragmented without Noordin and 
Azahari‘s participation.  It seems clear that the networks responsible for these attacks would 
have lacked the structure necessary to act as a team without the pair‘s leadership. 
 However, at a tactical level, this is not true of the 2009 bombing of the Jakarta Marriott 
and Ritz-Carlton hotels.  Although Noordin served as a bridge that tied this event to earlier 
attacks, he was far less structurally important to the 2009 attack network than he had been to 
previous teams in 2003, 2004, and 2005.  Instead, Ibrohim, the florist who had been observed the 
hotels since taking work in a flower shop in the lobby of the Marriott in 2005 and was thus in the 
best position to plan tactical details, held the attack team together.  Azahari was dead by the time 
of the 2009 attacks and was thus irrelevant to the attack team‘s structure; Noordin‘s removal 
would have barely impacted the attack team‘s structural cohesion, but the team would have been 
nearly 50 percent more fragmented without Ibrohim.  Thus, the evidence suggests that near the 
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end of his life, Noordin was becoming increasingly willing to allow others to assume tactical 
responsibility for attacks, while simultaneously positioning himself to design grand strategy.      
 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
 Like most durable organizations, al-Qaida certainly plans for the future.  However, the 
five cases discussed in this chapter demonstrate that minor evolutionary shifts play at least as 
large a role as high-level strategic visions in determining the nature of inter-organizational 
cooperation within the broader jihadist movement.  Beginning in 2003, Noordin began a journey 
toward organizational independence that would take roughly two years to complete.  By viewing 
his attacks in sequence, it becomes clear that TQJ‘s emergence as an independent organization 
that served as al-Qaida‘s ideological standard bearer in Southeast Asia was the result of 
Noordin‘s incrementally increasing entrepreneurialism, rather than any sort of strategic vision 
orchestrated by al-Qaida.  Indeed, by the time that he claimed to be working in al-Qaida‘s name, 
his functional connections to bin Laden‘s organization had reached their nadir.  Therefore, as 
summarized by table 6.1, the events in which Noordin participated suggest that al-Qaida‘s 
regional partnerships may largely exist in name only. 
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Table 6.1: Al-Qaida’s Declining Role in Events Involving Noordin Mohd Top 
 
2002 Bali Bombings  
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Partial  Strategic shaping, but no clear tactical component 
Finance Partial  
Attack also self-funded via crime and JI membership 
dues 
Logistics Unlikely 
JI independently acquired materiel for attack; manpower 
drawn from JI's membership 
Training Definite 
Several of the bombers received AQ training in 
Afghanistan 
   
2003 Jakarta Marriott Bombing  
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Unlikely 
Noordin and Azahari led the attack's strategic and tactical 
planning 
Finance Partial  Attack also self-funded via crime 
Logistics Unlikely 
Explosives acquired from JI surplus; manpower drawn 
from Luqmanul's alumni network 
Training Partial  
Azahari was AQ trained, but little information available 
on attackers training histories 
   
2004 Bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Unlikely 
Noordin and Azahari led the attack's strategic and tactical 
planning 
Finance Unlikely 
Claims of AQ involvment lack credibility in light of 
Hambali's capture 
Logistics Unlikely 
Explosives provided by JI and KOMPAK; manpower 
obtained via Iwan and Usman 
Training Historical  
Azahari was AQ trained, but new recruits received no 
training from AQ 
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2005 Bali Bombings 
 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Unlikely 
Noordin and Azahari led the attack's strategic and tactical 
planning 
Finance Unlikely  Attack partially self-financed via crime 
Logistics Unlikely 
Some materiel obtained via robbery; manpower obtained 
via Subur's personal network 
Training Historical  
Azahari was AQ trained, but new recruits trained in-
house 
   
2009 Bombing of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Unlikely 
Noordin and Ibrahim led the attack's strategic and tactical 
planning 
Finance Possible  
Interactions may flow through Abdurahman's contacts in 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 
Logistics Unlikely 
Explosives possibly obtained from surplus remaining 
after 2004 Jakarta bombings; some manpower obtained 
via Syaifudin's ideological network 
Training Unlikely 
New recruits received some in-house training; bomb-
making likely relied on manuals penned by Azahari prior 
to his death 
 
These conclusions suggest that the theories of organizational cooperation advanced by 
Mendelsohn, Braniff, and Moghadam need to be revised to include the perspective of the al-
Qaida‘s prospective collaborators alongside al-Qaida‘s strategic aims.  Put more simply, theory 
must recognize that organizational cooperation is a two-way street that requires the consent of 
both parties.  Unfortunately, neither Noordin nor his primary operational partner, Azahari Husin, 
can be questioned regarding their reasons for choosing to operate under al-Qaida‘s name, as both 
men died before they could be taken into custody.  Consequently, this chapter cannot offer an 
empirically-based revision to existing theory, but at a minimum, future studies should rigorously 
explore three possible causal mechanisms that lead independent organizations to adopt al-
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Qaida‘s name: (1) organizations may choose to operate under al-Qaida‘s banner because they 
fully adhere to the organization‘s ideological vision; (2) organizations may choose to operate 
under al-Qaida‘s banner because they receive greater media attention and notoriety than they 
would if they operated under their original name; and (3) organizations may choose to operate 
under al-Qaida‘s banner because they receive some sort of tangible rewards from bin Laden‘s 
organization for doing so, such as better access to al-Qaida‘s training infrastructure, logistical 
resources, or operational funds.  
Beyond theories of cooperation within the violent Islamist movement, this chapter‘s 
conclusions also have broader implications for the literature that discusses the formation of 
splinter groups.  The history of political extremism is replete with cases in which a radical 
splinter group formed because the main body of a terrorist organization entered into a peace 
agreement with the existing state authorities.  Ireland offers the clearest illustration: the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) gave birth to the Continuity Irish Republican Army 
(CIRA) in 1994, when a minority faction objected to a cease-fire with the British government, 
and in 1997, the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) formed when another break-away faction 
of PIRA members opposed the organization‘s pledge to pursue independence only through 
democracy and non-violence.106  Noordin‘s example suggests that this literature needs to be 
amended to make clear that splinters can also form gradually, as the result of a budding leader‘s 
entrepreneurialism.  However, additional broad-based research is necessary to determine the 
relative prevalence of the patterns suggested by Noordin‘s experience.  
                                                          
106 U.S. Department of State, ―2010 Country Reports on Terrorism: Foreign Terrorist Organizations‖ (Chapter 6), 
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, August 18, 2011; available online: 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm.  See also, David McKittrick, ―Sinn Fein ready to accept Mitchell 
principles,‖ The Independent (London), May 21, 1996; available online: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/sinn-
fein-ready-to-accept-mitchell-principles-1348380.html. 
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In combination with the preceding two chapters‘ discussion of events that display strong 
functional ties to al-Qaida, this evaluation concludes this study‘s inquiry into al-Qaida‘s direct, 
active involvement in Islamist terrorism.  Subsequent chapters turns their attention towards more 
diffuse forms of involvement, an assessment that begins by examining events perpetrated by 
former members of bin Laden‘s organization.
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7.0 AL-QAIDA‘S ALUMNI: THE HISTORICAL NATURE OF RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN BIN LADEN‘S ORGANIZATION AND ITS REGIONAL AFFILIATES 
 
 
 A handful of prominent academics continue to argue that al-Qaida continued to maintain 
hierarchical control over the violent Islamist movement throughout the organization‘s history.  
For example, writing in 2011, Hoffman implicitly attributed the organization with a functional 
role in regional operations by arguing that, ―Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and perhaps parts of 
North Africa remain key operational areas where al Qaeda‘s strength has yet to dissipate.‖1  
Similarly, analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have argued that 
al-Qaida‘s regional affiliates currently show greater coordination than ever before.2  Indeed, in 
2011, they continued to describe the organization as ―a terrorist ‗Hydra‘ with global reach,‖ 
whose appeal to some segments of the Muslim population continued to widen.3 
 Yet others theorists and some members of the intelligence community are incredibly 
skeptical of such assertions.  Writing in 2011, Fawas Gerges labeled such assessments 
―unconvincing‖ and argued that the statements about al-Qaida‘s role in regional operations were 
                                                          
1 Bruce Hoffman, ―Bin Laden‘s Death Shatters Conventional Wisdom,‖ The National Interest, May 2, 2011; 
available online: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/bin-ladens-death-shatters-conventional-wisdom-5249.   
2 Rick ―Ozzie‖ Nelson, quoted in  Din Temple-Raston, ―Al-Qaida, Affiliates Show Greater Coordination,‖ National 
Public Radio, November 11, 2010; available online: 
http://www.kqed.org/news/story/2010/11/11/38130/alqaida_affiliates_show_greater_coordination?source=npr&cate
gory=world.   
3 Rick ―Ozzie‖ Nelson, Thams M. Sanderson, Amrit Bagia, Ben Bodurian, and David A. Gordan, ―A Threat 
Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011,‖ Center for Strategic & International Studies, 
February 2011, p. 24; available online: 
http://csis.org/files/publication/110203_Nelson_AThreatTransformed_web.pdf.   
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―based more on risk assessment and speculation than hard facts.‖4  Even more damningly, a 
senior intelligence official with knowledge of the treasure-trove of documents captured from the 
Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was killed claimed the dissident Saudi had become 
largely marginalized by the time of his death, arguing that in latter years Islamists viewed bin 
Laden ―like the cranky old uncle‖ whose opinion was heard out of respect, and then promptly 
ignored.5   
 In short, the nature of al-Qaida‘s interactions with regional affiliates remains an open 
question, because there is no consensus among reputable analysts.  However, this analysis 
presents evidence that broadly refutes assertions that al-Qaida currently controls or directs the 
actions of its regional affiliates.  Indeed, case studies of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) suggest that the relationships between 
the core of bin Laden‘s organization and its regional affiliates have waned over time.  Several 
members of AQIM and AQAP once held enough functional ties to the highest echelons of al-
Qaida‘s leadership to be considered members of bin Laden‘s organization in their own right, but 
some combination of time, distance, and, in some cases, incarceration broke these bonds.  A 
measure of ideological congruity exists between these regional groups and al-Qaida—it seems 
especially profound in the case of AQAP—but the operating environments that exist in the 
Sahara and Yemen suggest that there are scant reasons to suspect that bin Laden‘s organization 
contributes to the logistics or finance or AQIM or AQAP.  Indeed, these organizations‘ financial 
and logistical independence offers one likely explanation for AQIM and AQAP‘s increasing 
                                                          
4 Fawaz A. Gerges, ―Al-Qa‘eda in the Arabian Peninsula: Does It Pose a Threat to Yemen and the West?‖ Institute 
for Social Police and Understanding, February 2011, p. 16; available online: 
http://ispu.org/pdfs/514_ISPU_Report_al-Qaeda_Yemen_Gerges_WEB.pdf.   
5 Saeed Shah, ―At end, bin Laden wasn‘t running al Qaida, officials say,‖ McClatchy Newspapers, June 28, 2011; 
available online: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/28/116666/at-end-bin-laden-wasnt-
running.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_term=news.   
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functional distance from al-Qaida.  Historical training relationships ultimately constitute the 
strongest links between these groups and al-Qaida. 
 This chapter contains three sections following this introduction.  The first two each 
discuss one of the regional affiliates mentioned above, before the third section offers some brief 
conclusions.  The internal structure of the cases also follows the same format as previous 
chapters and contains break-outs on planning, finance and logistics, and training, followed by 
brief comparative summations.  However, data limitations preclude this chapter from adopting 
the events-oriented perspective that dominates the other qualitative chapters of this analysis; the 
open-source record simply does not contain enough information on individual attacks conducted 
by AQIM and AQAP to allow the organizations to be studied with the same level of granularity.  
Consequently, this chapter‘s level of analysis is the organization, not the event.  Because many 
facets of the analysis must also be made by proxy, this chapter‘s conclusions are less robust than 
those offered by the other, more detailed chapters.        
 
7.1 AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB 
 AQIM has deep roots in Algeria‘s insurgency.  In the late 1980s, the Algerian 
government introduced political reforms that allowed for a multi-party system, but when the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a religiously-inspired political party, gained worrying levels of 
support in the early 1990s, the military delayed and then ultimately cancelled parliamentary 
elections to preclude what the nation‘s ruling elites feared would be an extremist take-over of the 
government.  A military crack-down on FIS ensued, and when the organization‘s supporters 
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fought back, the situation quickly escalated into a wide-spread insurgency.6  Within this context, 
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emerged in the early 1990s; the organization‘s expressed goal 
was to overthrow Algeria‘s secular government and impose Sharia law.7  However, by the late 
1990s, the tide had turned against the Islamist group, when the military regained territory,8 and a 
civil concord granted pardons to thousands of former insurgents, thereby depleting GIA‘s ranks.9 
 However, hardliners refused to lay-down their arms, and the GIA continued to widely 
target civilians in an attempt to perpetuate the conflict.  In disagreement with this tactic, Hassan 
Hattab formed a splinter-group in 1998 that was dedicated to attacking government targets; he 
dubbed the new organization the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).10  By 2003, 
Hattab proved too moderate for his followers, who ousted him in favor of Nabil Sahrawi, an 
adherent to the Salafist vision of global Sunni theocracy.  With this leadership change, the GSPC 
abandoned Hattab‘s prohibition on civilian attacks—in practice, the organization never adhered 
to this principle—and attempted to forge closer ties to al-Qaida.11  Sahrawi‘s death the following 
year prevented him from realizing a partnership with bin Laden‘s organization,12 but in 2006, his 
successor, Abdelmalik Droukdal, announced that the GSPC had ‗merged‘ with al-Qaida and 
would henceforth be known as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).13   
                                                          
6 CIA, ―Africa: Algeria,‖ The World Factbook, April 3, 2012; available online: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html.  See also: ―Algeria profile,‖ BBC News, 
January 10, 2012; available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14118856.   
7 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ―Terrorist Organizations‖ in Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, 
U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010; available online: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm.   
8 ―Africa: Algeria.‖ 
9 ―Algeria profile.‖ 
10 Algerian Salafi founder Hattab calls for laying down arms," BBC Monitoring International Reports, October 18, 
2005. 
11 Ibid; Pamela Sampson, "AP Enterprise: Algerian group moves to establish stronger al-Qaida ties," Associated 
Press Worldstream, March 9, 2004. 
12 "Algeria kills militant leader," United Press International, June 20, 2004; "Algerian armed Islamist leader killed 
by armed forces: report," Agence France Presse, June 20, 2004. 
13 Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and 
Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.D.232.07 Abelmalik 
Droukdel,‖ August 27, 2007; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI23207E.shtml.   
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However, a great deal of evidence belies this apparent unity.  Bin Laden‘s organization 
seems to lack a direct role in AQIM‘s planning, though a small handful of events suggest that al-
Qaida may have influenced the strategic trajectory of the North African organization.  Yet, 
AQIM is entirely independent in terms of finance and logistics, and it seems that training ties 
between the two organizations have become largely historical.  A small number of AQIM 
members once held demonstrable membership in al-Qaida, but these relationships have waned.  
Therefore, the evidence strongly suggests that despite AQIM‘s name change, any ongoing 
functional ties between the organization and al-Qaida are exceptionally weak.  
7.1.1 PLANNING 
The available evidence is hardly conclusive, but it suggests that AQIM‘s planning 
decisions flow through a fairly hierarchical structure.  According to Abdelmalek Droukdal, who 
has served at the organization‘s titular emir since 2004,14 major strategic decisions are made by 
―an advice council and senate‖ that first conducts after-action reviews of previous attacks, before 
setting new objectives.15  According to Droukdal‘s version of events, decisions then flow 
downward to regional commanders who head divisions known as katibats, the boundaries of 
which roughly align with the six military districts established by the Algerian government.16   
Statements offered by Wolfgang Ebner, an Austrian tourist who witnessed AQIM first-
hand after the organization kidnapped him from the Sahara in March 2008, suggest that the 
organization‘s hierarchical structure extends with the katibats.  Ebner describes small attack-
                                                          
14 "Algerian Salafi founder Hattab calls for laying down arms," BBC Monitoring International Reports, October 18, 
2005. 
15 ―An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,‖ New York Times, July 1, 2008; available online: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?pagewanted=all.  
16 ―Terrorist Salafi Group Reportedly Set Up New Structures in Algeria,‖ BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 27, 
2006.  It is important to note that these military districts are not synonymous with the government‘s internal 
administrative divisions, because Algeria contains 48 provinces, and it remains unclear how the military structure 
overlays with these political distinctions.   For information on the country‘s provinces, see: Central Intelligence 
Agency, ―The World Factbook: Algeria,‖ February 15, 2012; available online: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html.   
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teams that exist at the bottom-end of ―a completely hierarchical system,‖ and which follow 
orders issued by ―The leader of AQIM in the mountains of Algeria.‖ 17  However, the United 
Nations has suggested that senior leaders of the organization are often intimately involved in the 
tactical planning of attacks.  For example, in April 2007, Droukdal, who began his career as a 
bomb-maker, allegedly personally supervised car-bombings that targeted government and police 
facilities in Algiers.18  Thus, despite the organization‘s apparent hierarchy, AQIM‘s senior 
leaders seem prone to micro-managing events on the ground. 
A measure of dysfunction has also mitigated the clarity of AQIM‘s command structure.  
Circa 2004, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas), who has commanded a katibat in 
south-Saharan Algeria since the mid-1990s,19 began to operate with increasing disregard for 
AQIM‘s central leadership.  The reasons for Belmokhtar‘s disobedience were clear: because his 
Saharan operations provided the bulk of AQIM‘s financial revenue, he believed that he should 
have been named the organization‘s emir20 when Nabil Sahrawi‘s death in June 2004 vacated the 
position.21  Belmokhtar‘s split with AQIM‘s leadership was profound enough that some regional 
media outlets began referring to him as a ―former leader‖ of the organization,22  and in 2011, 
                                                          
17 A published interview with Ebner and his fellow Austrian hostage, Andrea Kloiber, originally appeared in 
German.  The quotation is a translation of his original comments.  For full information in the original German, see: 
―Die sehen Osterreich als muslimishes Land‖ (They see Austria as a Muslim Country), The Standard (Austria), 
November 7, 2008; available online: http://www.algeria-watch.org/de/artikel/2008/itv_ex_geiseln.htm 
18 ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.D.232.07. Abdelmalek Droukdel.‖   
19 Belmokhtar conducted an interview in Arabic with Nouakchott News, a Mauritanian paper, in the fall of 2011.  
The news outlet has since posted versions of the interview in both Arabic and French online.  For the original, see: 
―Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass, alias Belaouar: L‘armee de Ould Abdel Aziz au Mali n‘a jamais ete 
un obstacle devant nous pour arriver a nos objectifs en Mauitanie,‖ Agence Noukchott d’Information, November 
2011; available online: http://www.ani.mr/?menuLink=9bf31c7ff062936a96d3c8bd1f8f2ff3&idNews=15829.  See 
also: Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and 
Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.B.136.03. Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar,‖ November 11, 2003; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI13603E.shtml.   
20 "Algerian jihadists seek to expand," United Press International, June 18, 2009. 
21 For information on the timing of Sahrawi‘s death, see: "Algeria kills militant leader" and "Algerian armed Islamist 
leader killed by armed forces: report." 
22 "Algerian 'terrorist' Belmokhtar spotted in northern Mali," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 28, 2004. 
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Belmokhtar admitted that he had had, in his words, ―a dispute of diversity‖ with AQIM‘s 
leadership.23   
However, he stressed that the disagreement was conducted with ―Islamic manners and 
ethics and mutual respect,‖24 and his split with the organization was never complete, because the 
disgruntled commander continued to cooperate with AQIM-proper when it was to his benefit.25  
Though the information is of debatable provenance because it comes from within the 
organization, Belmokhtar‘s recent comments stress that the organization is now fully unified.26  
On balance, Belmokhtar‘s on-again-off-again relationship with Droukdal‘s central committee 
suggests that regional leaders direct the actions of attack-teams, without seeking approval from 
their supposed superiors within the AQIM hierarchy. 
This conclusion has fairly clear implications for the nature of the broader organization: 
AQIM seems more like a collection of loosely affiliated sub-regional groups than like a single 
cohesive organization.  Internally, katibats likely have the sort of hierarchical structure described 
by AQIM‘s former captives, but each of these geographic divisions seems to function as a 
regional commander‘s personal fiefdom.  It seems that the organization‘s central leadership rules 
by consensus and influence, rather than autocratic decree.  Put differently, the evidence suggests 
that AQIM is more of an umbrella organization, in which the emir and the central committee are 
somewhat constrained in their ability to plan organization-wide strategy and operations.   
AQIM‘s international components further muddy the waters of the organization‘s already 
murky command structure and planning apparatus.  In addition to its Algerian-based katibats, 
                                                          
23 ―Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass.‖ 
24 Ibid. 
25 "Algerian jihadists seek to expand." "Six more German tourists missing in Algerian desert: diplomats," Agence 
France Presse, April 1, 2003; "Ransom demands received for 31 Europeans missing in Algeria: press," Agence 
France Presse, May 11, 2003; "Spanish daily details how Al-Qa'idah collects ransoms in Mali," BBC Monitoring 
Europe - Political, February 9, 2010; "Behind the Mauritanian coup," Mideast Mirror, August 12, 2005. 
26 ―Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass.‖ 
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AQIM also seems to maintain a small European presence.  For example, in the early 2000s, the 
Italian government imprisoned several alleged members of the organization on charges of 
document forgery and provision of material support to terrorism.27  However, Droukdal 
disavowed these operatives by stating that European governments‘ collective claim to have 
detained members of his organization ―is a lie, and deception, and injustice.‖28  While he went-
on to claim that AQIM had other sympathizers based ―in Europe and elsewhere,‖29 and although 
AQIM has been linked to a small handful of failed plots in Europe,30 the organization has yet to 
successfully complete an attack outside of North Africa.  Thus, AQIM‘s overseas presence is 
likely quite small, and it remains unclear to whom, if anyone, AQIM members abroad report.   
The bulk of the organization‘s capabilities outside of Algeria exist in the border regions 
of the country‘s Saharan neighbors.  Specifically, AQIM operatives have frequently stashed 
kidnapping victims in Northern Mali to place them beyond the reach of Algerian authorities.31  In 
2005 and 2008, AQIM also conducted attacks on Mauritanian military outposts,32 and in 2008, 
                                                          
27 See, for example: Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.60.02. 
Mohamed Ben Belgacem Ben Abdallah al-Aouadi,‖ April 24, 2002; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI06002E.shtml.  Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 
1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries 
of Reasons for Listing: Q1.E.64.02. Sami Ben Khamis Ben Saleh Elsseid,‖ April 24, 2002; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI06402E.shtml.   
28 ―An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal.‖ 
29 Ibid. 
30 For example, the perpetrators of a bizarre plot to attack London using Ricin—a plot that was much publicized at 
the time of the plotters‘ arrests, but which later review revealed was largely aspirational—held links to Nabil 
Sahrawi.  Kim Senguputa and Jason Bennetto, "Ricin plot: Police made 100 arrests to smash al-qa'ida network; The 
most active group had sent thousands of members to train in," The Independent (London), April 14, 2005.  See also, 
Sean O'Neill, "Was ricin the last act of terror cell?" The Times (London), April 15, 2005; Severin Carrell and 
Raymond Whitaker, "Special Report: Terror in the UK - Ricin the plot that never was; A deadly poison said to be at 
the heart of a terrorist conspiracy," Indpendent on Sunday (London), April 17, 2005. 
31 "Algerian armed Islamist group rejects general amnesty - paper," BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political, 
January 8, 2005; "Algerian 'terrorist' Belmokhtar spotted in northern Mali," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
October 28, 2004. 
32 "Mauritania claims proof of Algerian radical group behind attack," Agence France Presse, June 10, 2005; 
"Algerian Islamist group leader reveals details of his life, military operations," BBC Monitoring Middle East - 
Political, September 14, 2006; "Website statement claims Al-Qaeda link to Mauritanian ambush," Agence France 
Presse, September 18, 2008. 
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the organization kidnapped a pair of Canadian diplomats in Niger.33  The robustness of AQIM‘s 
non-Algerian operations is, however, subject to debate, because the incidents in Mauritania and 
Niger may have indicated that the organization conducts brief cross-border raids, rather than 
maintaining sustainable capabilities outside of Algeria.  Moreover, if AQIM does possess 
divisions in non-Algerian portions of the Sahara, the nature of their reporting relationships with 
Droukdal‘s central committee, or, for that matter, their relationship to any of the organization‘s 
more-established regional leaders, is unknown.  Given these uncertainties, as well as the fact that 
all of the men reported to be high-level AQIM leaders have been Algerian,34 it would be 
somewhat disingenuous to characterize the group as a true regional concern.  Although AQIM‘s 
name references the whole of the Islamic Maghreb, the organization is primarily Algerian. 
Moreover, the nature of the organization‘s strategic relationship to al-Qaida and its 
broader global agenda remain ambiguous.  According to Belmokhtar, he has been in 
communication on AQIM‘s behalf with high-ranking members of bin Laden‘s organization since 
sometime in 2000,35 and Droukdal claims that in 2004 he began trading emails with Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi,36 the Jordanian jihadist who led al-Qaida in Iraq‘s insurgency against coalition 
                                                          
33 Geoffrey York, "Deep in the Sahara, Fowler's abductor creates safe haven for terrorist kidnappings; 'The 
Untouchable' ringleader has powerful government and al-Qaeda links in Mali," Globe and Mail (Canada), October 
14, 2009; "Spanish daily details how Al-Qa'idah collects ransoms in Mali," BBC Monitoring Europe - Political, 
February 9, 2010. 
34 For example, Hassan Hatab, who founded the organization, was born in Beni Mourad, Algeria.  Nabil Sahrawi, 
who replaced Hatab as AQIM‘s top leader circa 2003, originally hailed from Constantie, Algeria.  Meanwhile, 
Droukdal, who took over as emir following Sahrawi‘s death in 2004, is a native of Meftah, Algeria, while Mokthar 
Belmokhtar, who provides the bulk of the organization‘s finances via his smuggling and kidnapping operations is 
from Ghradieh, Algeria, and Ammari Saifi, an important AQIM regional commander, hails from Kef Rih, Algeria.  
For information on Hatab‘s birth, see: "Algerian Salafi founder Hattab calls for laying down arms," BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, October 18, 2005.  For information on Sahrawi‘s birth, see: "Algeria: GSPC leader Hattab 
replaced by man 'close' to Al-Qa'idah," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 10, 2003.  For information on 
Droukdal‘s birth, see: "Treasury Designates AQIM Emir," U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 4, 2007.  For 
information on Belmokhtar‘s birth, see: "Behind the Mauritanian coup," Mideast Mirror, August 12, 2005.  Finally, 
for information on Saifi‘s birth, see: Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 
Persons," U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 10, 2010. 
35 ―Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass.‖  
36 ―An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal.‖   
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forces until his death in 2006.37  Later that year, AQIM, formally changed its name from ―the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat‖ to reflect an allegiance with bin Laden‘s 
organization38 and has since made several statements that mirror al-Qaida‘s stridently anti-
American rhetoric.39  Thus, the two organizations‘ strategic objectives at least partially overlap, 
but it would be premature to conclude that a true operational merger has taken place, because the 
nature of AQIM‘s attacks has remained largely consistent throughout the organization‘s history. 
By and large, AQIM has undertaken armed assaults against Algerian government 
targets40 and conducted profit-motivated kidnappings.41  In recent years, the organization has 
begun to bargain hostages for the release of group members held in Algerian and Malian prisons 
in lieu of cash payments,42 but three incidents merit closer examination because they set 
precedents that may indicate AQIM has become more closely engaged with bin Laden‘s 
organization.  Ultimately, the evidence suggests that links between the two organizations require 
                                                          
37 Joel Roberts, "What's next after Zarqawi's death? Leaders call terror chief's death a victory, but say violence may 
not abate," CBS News, June 8, 2006; Mark MacKinnon, "A severe blow to al-Qaeda; Twin 225-kilogram bombs 
bring an end to three-year U.S. hunt for Iraq's most-wanted insurgent," Globe and Mail (Canada), June 9, 2006. 
38 ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.D.232.07 Abelmalik Droukdel.‖   
39 See for example, ―Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass,‖ and ―Al-Qaida‘s Committee in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM): Claim of Responsibility for the Killing of the American Christopher Leggett,‖ translation 
available from the NEFA Foundation, June 24, 2009; available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqimleggett0609.pdf.  
40 Boubker Belkadi, "Algerian army pursues crackdown on Muslim extremists, nine die," Agence France Presse, 
February 1, 2000; "Eighteen dead in ambush of Algerian security patrol: report," Agence France Presse, January 5, 
2005; "Algerian Salafi group attacks army unit, rejects amnesty offer," BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political, 
January 8, 2005; "Algerian armed Islamist group rejects general amnesty - paper," BBC Monitoring Middle East - 
Political, January 8, 2005; "Algerian peace charter helps more than 2,000: president," Agence France Presse, April 
8, 2006; "Algerian forces kill suspected militants in reprisal for ambush," Agence France Presse, April 9, 2006; 
"Algerian authorities abort arms deal - paper," BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political, April 1, 2009. 
41 "Desert bandits suspects after 31 tourists vanish," Ottawa Citizen, April 22, 2003; Hassane Meftahi, "Helicopters 
and camels used to search for nearly two dozen tourists vanished in Sahara," Associated Press Worldstream, April 3, 
2003; "Fears grow for 11 European tourists missing in Sahara," Agence France Presse, March 30, 2003; "Ransom 
demands received for 31 Europeans missing in Algeria: press," Agence France Presse, May 11, 2003; "Spanish 
daily details how Al-Qa'idah collects ransoms in Mali," BBC Monitoring Europe - Political, February 9, 2010. 
42 See, for example: ―Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): The Mujahideen‘s Demand to Release the French 
Hostage,‖ translation available from the NEFA Foundation, January 10, 2010; available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org//file/AQIMHostages0110.pdf.   
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careful monitoring, but it would be premature to conclude that AQIM takes formal direction 
from al-Qaida.  
The first incident occurred in 2007, when AQIM conducted its first known martyrdom 
operation by suicide-bombing a pair of government targets in Algiers.  Many analysts hailed this 
event as evidence that AQIM had begun to take its cues directly from bin Laden‘s organization,43 
and indeed AQIM has since made regular use of suicide-bombings as a means of attack.  Exact 
counts vary by source, but range in the neighborhood of 15 incidents.44   
However, other Algerian organizations perpetrated suicide-attacks long before AQIM 
claimed to have ties to bin Laden‘s organization.  For example, in 1995, the GIA—the 
organization from which AQIM ultimately descended—suicide-bombed a police station in 
Algiers,45 and in 1998 suicide-bombers killed half a dozen civilians in Medea Province.46  Thus, 
it would be inaccurate to infer that al-Qaida necessarily brought this tactic to AQIM, because a 
limited tradition of suicide-bombing already independently existed in Algeria.  Moreover, since 
2007, the bulk of AQIM‘s operations have continued to utilize other modes of attack, so it 
remains to be proven that the nature of the North African organization‘s strategy and tactics have 
fundamentally changed since it formally affiliated with al-Qaida.   
                                                          
43 Craig Whitlock, "Suicide attacks mark turn in Algeria; Insurgents seen taking cues from global Al-Qaeda," 
Washington Post, April 13, 2007. 
44 For example, START estimates the total attacks at 16, but concludes its coverage at the end of 2010, while Roggio 
estimates the number at 15, but extends his coverage through August 2011.  For details, see: National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database (GTD), available 
online: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search.  Results filtered by country (Algeria) and Attack Type (Suicide).  Last 
accessed April 2, 2012.  Bill Roggio, ―Suicide bombers kill 18 in attack on Algerian military academy,‖ The Long 
War Journal, August 26, 2011; available online: 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/suicide_bombers_kill_6.php.   
45 Given that the attack occurred long ago in a distant location, English-language media accounts of it are somewhat 
rare.  For one example, see: ―Urgent,‖ Agence France Presse, February 13, 1995.  For a brief secondary account of 
the event, see: Carlos Echeverria Jesus, ―Radical Islam in the Maghreb,‖ Open University-UNED, Madrid, 2005; 
available online: http://www.fpri.org/pubs/200510.echeverria.radicalislammaghreb.pdf.   
46 "Algeria: Six Civilians Killed in Medea Province,‖ BBC News, October 31, 1998. 
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The second precedent-setting event occurred in 2009, when AQIM attempted to exchange 
the hostage Edwin Dyer, an Englishman, for Abu Qatada, an al-Qaida-affiliated Islamist cleric 
held in Britain on terror charges.47  Although AQIM has typically treated hostages as a valuable 
commodity worth protecting—Belmokhtar once even brought-in a physician to treat a hostage‘s 
injuries48—the organization ultimately executed Dyer when the British government refused to 
negotiate.49  This event constitutes a worrying example, but since other Western hostages have 
since been released when AQIM‘s ransom demands were met,50 the Dyer execution hardly 
represented a sea-change in AQIM‘s treatment of abductees.  Put differently, the Dyer execution 
seems to have represented an aberrant event rather than a tipping-point in the nature of AQIM 
kidnappings. 
The final precedent-setting event also took place in 2009, when AQIM killed Christopher 
Legget, an American teacher, in an ambush-style shooting in Mauritania.51  The organization 
cited Legget‘s ―Christianization activities‖ as the reason for the killing,52 thereby demonstrating 
that AQIM is willing to back-up its rhetoric regarding America‘s participation in a Zionist-
Crusader alliance.  However, it is necessary to consider the scale of this action.  The shooting 
was conducted by three men, who operated without much, if any, support from AQIM‘s broader 
                                                          
47 ―Al-Qaida‘s Committee in the Islamic Maghreb: A Communiqué Regarding the British Hostage,‖ translation 
available from the NEFA Foundation, May 20, 2009; available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqimbritishhostage0509.pdf. ―Al-Qaida‘s Committee in the Islamic 
Maghreb: A Statement Regarding the Killing of British Hostage Edwin Dyer,‖ translation available from the NEFA 
Foundation; available online: http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqim0609.pdf. 
48 "Spanish daily details how Al-Qa'idah collects ransoms in Mali," BBC Monitoring Europe - Political, February 9, 
2010. 
49 ―A Statement Regarding the Killing of British Hostage Edwin Dyer.‖ 
50 For example, in 2010, a pair of Spanish aid workers, who were kidnapped from the Sahara the previous year, were 
allowed to return home after Mauritania released an AQIM member.  Tracy Rucinski and Mathieu Bonkoungou, 
―Freed al Qaeda hostages arrive back in Spain,‖ Reuters, August 23, 2010; available online: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/24/idUSLDE67M1V2.   
51 ―Christopher Leggett killing: Mauritania death penalty,‖ BBC News, March 16, 2011; available online: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12750853.   
52 ―Al-Qaida‘s Committee in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Claim of Responsibility for the Killing of the American 
Christopher Leggett,‖ translation available from the NEFA Foundation, June 24, 2009; available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqimleggett0609.pdf.   
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organization.53  Moreover, none of the currently available evidence suggests that bin Laden‘s 
organization played any role in the attack.  A single murder carried out by operatives working in 
isolation is a far cry from a coordinated, multi-organizational assault on American interests in the 
region.   
These events may suggest that AQIM has begun to adopt al-Qaida‘s strategic objectives, 
but this trend ultimately seems limited, because the bulk of AQIM‘s attacks continue to follow 
historical patterns.  In short, AQIM seems to plan the majority of its attacks not to advance a 
pan-Islamist agenda, but instead to bloody the nose of the Algerian government, to achieve small 
specific goals such as hostage exchanges, or to obtain financial reward.  Assertions that AQIM 
has fully merged with al-Qaida, or that members of bin Laden‘s organization play a direct role in 
the planning of AQIM attacks, likely overstate the case.       
7.1.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 Nor does al-Qaida have a demonstrable role in AQIM‘s logistics.  For example, AQIM 
staffs the kidnapping gangs that comprise its best known and most active component without 
assistance.  Former hostages claim that the most junior members of the attack-teams are teenage 
boys, many of whom hail from the Western Sahara.  Even their hostages characterize these boys 
as victims, who were abandoned by families that were unable to provide for their care.54  Thus, 
AQIM acquires some of its personnel by serving as a surrogate family that provides shelter and 
sustenance to the disenfranchised, but lest the organization seem benevolent, it is important to 
note that former captives have also spoken about vague ―sexual problems‖ among these boys,55 
which suggests that some of AQIM‘s more predatory members likely treat their younger 
subordinates as playthings that can be molested at will.  
                                                          
53 ―Christopher Leggett killing: Mauritania death penalty.‖ 
54 ―Die sehen Osterreich als muslimishes Land.‖ 
55 Ibid. 
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 Beyond the teenagers, the kidnapping gangs also contain several older men who former 
hostages describe as ―mercenaries.‖  Victims allege that senior kidnappers were primarily 
interested in generating revenue to support families living in their home villages.56  Therefore, 
like the teenage boys, these attackers‘ primary motivation for participation seems to be 
economic, rather than ideological.57 
 This trend is also evident in a third group that participates in AQIM kidnappings: the 
Toureg tribe, an ethnic group that controls territory in the Sahara stretching from Eastern 
Morocco to Western Libya.58   According to the North African media, Belmokhtar married into 
this ethnic group,59 and several of his new kinsmen then began to work indirectly in the interests 
of AQIM.  Without the organization‘s advanced consent, they abducted tourists from the desert 
and then attempted to sell their victims to Belmokhtar.  Edwin Dyer, the British hostage that 
AQIM executed when the British government refused to release Abu Qatada, was reportedly 
abducted this way.60  Similarly, the Touregs accidentally killed a group of Saudis falconers 
during a botched speculative-kidnapping in late 2009.61  While the Touregs seem to have 
functioned more as AQIM‘s outside business partners than dedicated members of the 
organization, their example serves to reinforce the role that economic concerns play in staffing 
AQIM operations.  
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 Rosenthal has documented similar profit-driven motives among Philippine terrorists.  She argues that terror 
groups often become involved in crime because ―opportunities for financial gain (can become) so great that they 
subsume ideological motives‖ and states that for profit terrorists‘ ―grand strategic vision is to create lawless regions 
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58 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ―The Transatlantic Cocaine Market,‖ April 2011, p. 37; available 
online: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Transatlantic_cocaine_market.pdf. 
59 "Algerian armed Islamist group rejects general amnesty - paper," BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political, 
January 8, 2005; "Killed Saudis were meant to be abducted for Al-Qa'idah - sources," BBC Monitoring Middle East 
- Political, December 30, 2009. 
60 "Algerian jihadists seek to expand." 
61 "Killed Saudis were meant to be abducted for Al-Qa'idah – sources." 
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However, it would be somewhat disingenuous to suggest that radical ideology lacks a 
role in the organization, because a fourth and final contingent of members seems to have been 
directly recruited from religious schools operating in North Africa.  AQIM‘s former hostages 
described several of their captors as exceptionally devout twenty-somethings, who prayed 
regularly and were so unwilling to cast their eyes upon Western women that they always turned 
their gaze away from the ‗indecency‘ of their female captives.62  Unfortunately, it remains 
impossible to scale the relative roles that economics and religion play in AQIM‘s recruitment 
strategy, because both factors likely motivate many members, and because the total size of the 
organization remains unknown.63  But regardless of the breakdown, it seems clear that al-Qaida 
lacks a direct role, since even AQIM‘s most devout members hail from local sources. 
 AQIM‘s persistent participation in kidnapping also speaks to the organization‘s financial 
independence.  The exact amount of revenue AQIM has derived from kidnapping remains 
unknown, but David S. Cohen, the U.S. Treasury Department‘s Under Secretary for Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence, approximated the value at ―tens of millions of dollars‖ as of the fall of 
2011.64  Moreover, AQIM also reaps proceeds from other forms of crime.  For example, the 
organization frequently extorts money from the Algerian citizenry by taxing travelers for passage 
through illegal road blocks,65 and AQIM has a well-documented history of informally taxing 
goods smuggled through the Sahara.66  
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available online: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1293.aspx.    
65 "Algeria: Two armed civilians killed in bogus roadblock in east of country," BBC Monitoring Middle East - 
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66 ―The Transatlantic Cocaine Market,‖ p. 37.  See also: "Al-Arabiya reports on Algerian Al-Qa'idah's links with 
Sahara drugs mafia," BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political, July 14, 2009; and "Behind the Mauritanian coup."  
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Some sources allege that AQIM has also become actively involved in smuggling of a host 
of illicit commodities, most notably arms and tobacco.67  Purportedly, Belmokhtar‘s role in 
cigarette trafficking had become so widespread that by 2003, he was known regionally as the 
―Marlborough Godfather.‖68  Along similar lines, there are persistent allegations that portions of 
AQIM have also become involved in narcotics trafficking,69 though the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime remains skeptical that that the Sahara has become a drug-smuggling route, 
stating flatly that ―there have been few seizures to support this claim.‖70  Moreover, Belmokhtar, 
the AQIM member whose name surfaces most often in regards to narcotics, unequivocally denies 
his participation in this trade, stating that ―the illegitimacy of drugs or trafficking of it . . . even to 
the land of the Kuffar (nonbelievers) is from the most obvious haram (prohibition) in the Sharia 
(religious law) of Allah Almighty.‖71  Thus, even though the data on AQIM‘s role in the drug 
trade is exceptionally speculative, the organization‘s many other criminal pursuits dictate that 
some katibats function largely as criminal enterprises, rather than hardcore violent Islamist cells 
bent on the destruction of the West.    
Moreover, AQIM‘s illicit exploits say a great deal about the nature of the organization‘s 
logistical relationship to al-Qaida.   Belmokhtar‘s Saharan smuggling concerns and the group‘s 
broader participation in profit-motivated kidnappings provide not only revenue ample enough to 
ensure the organization‘s financial independence, but also the criminal contacts necessary to 
ensure independent access to weapons.  In short, there is little reason to assume that AQIM relies 
on bin Laden‘s organization for any sort of financial or logistical assistance. 
                                                          
67 David Sharrock, "'Pimpernel of the Sahara' brokered release of other tourists; The suspect Mokhtar Belmokhtar," 
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7.1.3 TRAINING 
 Beyond AQIM‘s vague ideological overlap with al-Qaida, training ties offer the clearest 
evidence of a relationship between the organizations.  For example, the United Nations alleges 
that European-based members of the GSPC, the forerunner to AQIM, funneled recruits to bin 
Laden-affiliated camps in the late 1990s.72  Similarly, detainees captured by American forces 
have admitted that an ―Algerian Center‖ existed within al-Qaida‘s Khaldan Camp at that time.73   
However, the evidence suggests that the vast majority of these ties have become 
historical, while others were always somewhat indirect.  Italian authorities dismantled GSPC‘s 
European operations with a wave of arrests in 2001,74 to say nothing of Droukdal‘s disavowal of 
those operatives.  Moreover, many of the Algerians who trained at Khaldan never returned to 
their home country and instead worked for al-Qaida in either South Asia75 or Bosnia.76  
Therefore, although training ties clearly exist between al-Qaida and AQIM, they are neither 
particularly strong nor especially current.   
Belmokhtar, AQIM‘s most notable al-Qaida trainee, offer a complimentary example that 
also demonstrates that the training relationship between AQIM and al-Qaida has likely waned.  
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75 See, for example, Bel Bacha.  
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Belkacem, Bensayah,‖ December 28, 2005.  Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy 
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According to an account he provided to the Algerian media, Belmokhtar trained in al-Qaida‘s 
Jihad Wal and Khaldan Camps in 1991, and then spent an additional year operating in 
Afghanistan alongside members of bin Laden‘s organization, before returning to Algeria 
sometime in 1993, and taking-up arms on behalf of the insurgent group GIA.77  Circa 1994, his 
superiors in this organization tasked him to make contact with his former colleagues in al-Qaida, 
who had since relocated to the Sudan,78 but whether as the result of the difficulties bin Laden‘s 
organization subsequently faced when its relationship with Hassan al-Turabi deteriorated, or as 
the result of turmoil that accompanied the split within GIA that led to the foundation of the 
GSPC, Belmokhtar apparently lost contact with al-Qaida for about half a decade.  He claims that 
his first attempt ―to unite the ranks of [Algerian] mujahidin with [their] brothers in Al-Qaeda‖ 
took place in 2000.79  Thus, Belmokhtar‘s own statements regarding his personal history suggest 
that AQIM‘s training relationship with al-Qaida devolved over time, despite the unity implied by 
the North African group‘s 2006 name change. 
Iraq may provide a partial exception to this conclusion.  The Sinjar Records, comprised 
of documents captured from Islamist insurgents in October 2007, contained country-of-origin 
data on 595 foreign-fighters in Iraq, 49 of whom (8.1 percent) hailed from Algeria.80  However, 
the strength of the relationship between violent Islamists operating in Iraq and bin Laden‘s 
organization is subject to debate, because prominent leaders in Iraq displayed tremendous 
operational independence, even when they operated under al-Qaida‘s banner.  For example, 
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although Abu Musab al-Zarqawi swore formal allegiance to bin Laden in 2004,81 the Jordanian 
openly ignored al-Qaida‘s efforts to sew unity among the diverse elements of the Iraqi 
insurgency, when he undertook a prolonged campaign of violence against Iraqi Shiities that 
detracted from al-Qaida‘s larger organizational goal of expelling coalition forces from the 
region.82  Thus, it would be premature to conclude that Iraqi groups who provided Algerian 
insurgents with training and experience were part-and-parcel of bin Laden‘s organization, and 
since the record has remained silent on the fate of the 49 men mentioned in the Sinjar Records, it 
would also be foolish to assume that all Algerian participants in the Iraqi jihad eluded death and 
capture to return home.  A handful of Algerians may have received some meaningful training 
from bin Laden‘s organization in Iraq, but context suggests that any such interactions were few 
in number. 
Moreover, AQIM has always had several sources of training other than al-Qaida‘s camps.  
A number of AQIM members received formal military training from the very government the 
organization opposes, by serving as conscripts in the Algerian military.83  Some AQIM members 
even served in elite units; for example, Ammari Saifi, who was arrested in 2004 for his 
participation the kidnapping of European hostages from the Sahara,84 earned the nickname 
―Abderrezak al-Para‖ because he once served as a paratrooper.85  Given that Algeria‘s civil 
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conflict has simmered for decades, other members of the organization have benefitted from 
training and practical experience derived from serving on the front lines with the insurgent forces 
that oppose the government.  Ultimately, it is unclear how large a percentage of AQIM‘s 
membership received instruction from various sources, but the context suggests that there is little 
reason to assume strong or continuing training ties to bin Laden‘s organization. 
7.1.4 SUMMATION 
 The evidence demonstrates that there is some manner of relationships between al-Qaida 
and AQIM.  Aspects of this relationship are surface-level and primarily ideological, as best 
demonstrated by AQIM‘s name change in 2006.  A handful of precedent-setting events 
demonstrate that the nature of the two groups‘ interactions requires continuous monitoring, but 
contrary to popular belief, the most substantive interactions between the groups are historical in 
nature.  Individuals like Belmokhtar once held enough ties to bin Laden‘s organization to be 
considered members of al-Qaida, but these relationships have clearly faded over time.  In 
Belmokhtar‘s case, the causes of this decline also seem fairly self-evident.  The multi-million 
dollar revenues that he derives from kidnapping, illegal road blocks, cigarette smuggling, and 
perhaps even narcotics trafficking, have made him self-sustaining.  He has the money to recruit, 
arm, and maintain a fighting-force without relying on material support from AQIM‘s central 
committee, much less bin Laden‘s organization.  In short, Belmokhtar‘s money allows him to 
operate with as much independence as he chooses.  
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7.2 AL-QAIDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
For point of comparison, it is useful to evaluate AQIM alongside another of al-Qaida‘s 
regional affiliates, namely al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  However, establishing 
AQAP‘s founding date is somewhat difficult, because the core of bin Laden‘s group has also 
conducted operations in the Arabian region.  Most notably, in 2000, several al-Qaida members 
orchestrated a suicide-bombing against the U.S.S. Cole while the ship was in port at Aden, 
Yemen.86  However, 2007 marks a useful distinction between the organizations, because that 
year, two recently-escaped convicts, whose relationship with al-Qaida was interrupted by their 
time in prison, announced the formation of a new al-Qaida cell operating in Yemen.87  The 
following year, this new endeavor received al-Qaida‘s official blessing, when Ayman al-
Zawahiri issued a statement describing the emir of the regional group as al-Qaida‘s top emissary 
in Yemen,88 and AQAP adopted its current name in January 2009, when the Yemeni group 
announced a ‗merger‘ with its Saudi Arabian counterpart,89 which had become largely defunct 
following a prolonged series of raids by the Kingdom‘s police and intelligence services.90  Given 
this context, it appears at first blush that AQAP is part and parcel of al-Qaida. 
However, the evidence suggests that AQAP exhibits the same sort of waning relationship 
to bin Laden‘s organization as AQIM.  Members of the Yemeni organization were once clearly 
members of al-Qaida, but there is scant evidence to suggest that these individuals continue to 
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hold functional ties to bin Laden‘s group.  Owing largely to involvement in the same sort of 
criminal activities that typified AQIM‘s experience in the Sahara, AQAP is currently financially 
self-reliant, though the organization does continue to receive revenue from other means.  
Similarly, Yemen‘s general lawlessness and thriving arms markets ensure that the organization 
has independent access to the weaponry necessary to conduct terror attacks.  Definitive 
statements regarding al-Qaida‘s participation (or non-participation) in the planning of AQAP 
attacks are impossible to make because tremendous ambiguity surrounds this aspect of AQAP, 
but when viewed alongside the organization‘s financial and logistical independence, there is little 
reason to assume that bin Laden‘s organization plays any direct role in setting the tactics or 
strategies employed by AQAP.  There is clear ideological congruity between al-Qaida and 
AQAP, but a historical training relationship ultimately offers the strongest functional tie between 
the two organizations. 
7.2.1 PLANNING 
 Little is definitively known about AQAP‘s internal planning structure.  Official 
characterizations stress key leaders‘ roles within an organizational hierarchy.  For example, Nasir 
al-Wahishi, a Yemeni with strong historical ties to bin Laden, is invariably listed as AQAP‘s top 
leader, while Said al-Shihri, a Saudi who was once detained at Guantanamo Bay, is invariably 
listed as al-Wahishi‘s chief deputy.91  Similarly, the United Nations alleges that Qasim al-Rimi, 
another Yemeni with historical ties to bin Laden‘s organization, serves as AQAP‘s ―senior leader 
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for terrorist operations,‖ 92 while two men have at various times been cited as AQAP‘s chief 
ideologue: Ibrahim al-Rubaish,93 another Saudi veteran of Guantanamo Bay;94 and Anwar al-
Awlaki, a now deceased95 American-born preacher of Yemeni descent, who pledged loyalty to 
al-Wahishi in 2008 or 2009,96 and who used his fluency in English to appeal to young Muslims 
in the West by issuing radical statements on a host of social media platforms.97 
 However, the true extent of hierarchy within AQAP is subject to debate, because the loss 
of individuals hailed as ―key operatives‖ has done little to hinder the organization‘s operational 
capabilities.  For example, in June 2009, Yemeni authorities announced the arrest of Hassan 
Hussein bin Alwan with much fanfare, claiming that the detainee was AQAP‘s ―biggest and 
most influential‖ financier and that his arrest would be ―instrumental in understanding the system 
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of global terrorism financing.‖98  Although Alwan purportedly knew all of AQAP‘s secrets, no 
massive round-up of Yemeni terror suspects followed in the wake of his capture, and AQAP 
managed to stage an innovative, though ultimately unsuccessful, attack on a US-flagged jetliner 
only six months later, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian student indoctrinated by al-
Awlaki, attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underpants while onboard a 
Detroit-bound flight on Christmas day.99   
These events may indicate that the Yemenis merely oversold Alwan‘s value to AQAP, 
but it is equally probable that the organization is decentralized to the point that tactical-level 
leaders operate in smaller, largely autonomous structures that interface only sporadically with 
AQAP‘s official hierarchy.100  In short, the currently available data on AQAP‘s planning 
structure is inconclusive, and any definitive pronouncements regarding its nature would be both 
biased and premature.  All that can be definitively stated regarding al-Qaida‘s role in AQAP 
planning is that American-centric operations like the failed underpants bombing show that the 
organizations share the same strategic and ideological goals. 
7.2.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 Yemen‘s cash culture makes it exceptionally difficult to track the exact sources of 
AQAP‘s funding.  Less than four percent of Yemenis have a bank account of any type, so nearly 
all of the funds that support AQAP are handled, quite literally, in bags of cash.  Tracking illicit 
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(Defendants), United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civ. A. No. 10-cv-1469 (JDB)), Opposition 
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100 Drawing on different evidence, Barak Barfi reached a similar conclusion in his assessment of AQAP.  See: Barak 
Barfi, ―Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen,‖ New American Foundation, pp. 5-6; available 
online: http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Barfi.pdf.    
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transfers from account-to-account is a difficult task even in countries that fully participate in the 
modern banking system, but in Yemen‘s largely traditional economy, the task is truly 
herculean.101 
With the substantial caveat implicit to the circumstances described above, much of 
AQAP‘s money seems to come from Saudi Arabia.  Charitable donations account for one 
revenue stream, because although Saudi authorities have curtailed religious organizations‘ ability 
to collect cash payments from anonymous donors, the practice has not been entirely eliminated.  
Violent Islamist groups continue to collect money from wealthy individuals, especially during 
the hajj, when an influx of religious pilgrims brings Muslims from the world-over into Saudi 
Arabia.102  While this pattern is broadly reminiscent of al-Qaida‘s diversion of zakat funds, there 
is little reason to assume that bin Laden‘s organization plays a direct role.  Instead, AQAP 
members seem to collect on their own behalf, before shuttling the money across the porous 
border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.103 
Indeed, despite efforts by Saudi authorities to construct a physical barrier between the 
two countries, the border remains a veritable smugglers‘ paradise, and illicit cross-border 
enterprises constitute a likely second source of revenue for AQAP.  For example, in 2008, media 
reports claimed that ―thousands of Yemenis and Africans are believed to have been leaking 
through the borders to Saudi Arabia daily.‖104  Thus, migrant smuggling is a large and lucrative 
business on the Arabian Peninsula.  If the trade is as ample as media sources suggest, it seems 
somewhat inevitable that AQAP would become involved.  The lure of easy money is, after all, 
difficult to turn down, especially for an organization that already operates illicitly.    
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However, Yemen‘s illicit markets are hardly limited to human smuggling.  Arms seizures 
are a near-daily occurrence on the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen,105 and each year 
Yemeni smugglers also traffic an estimated $1.75 million worth of qat, a leaf that is widely 
chewed throughout the Arabian Peninsula and portions of East Africa for its mild amphetamine-
like effects, into Saudi Arabia, where qat is banned.106  Consequently, AQAP is not only able to 
bring cash donations into Yemen without difficulty, but also likely reaps a share of income by 
participating in the region‘s thriving smuggling trade or informally taxing those who do.  
 Beyond charitable donations and illicit commerce, AQAP earns money through a third 
revenue stream: kidnapping for ransom.  For example, in November 2011, three French hostages, 
who were abducted three-and-a-half months earlier by gunmen affiliated with high-ranking 
AQAP member Fahd al-Qusso, were released after their abductors received an undisclosed 
amount of money from an undisclosed source.  Given that the kidnappers‘ original ransom 
demand was for $12 million,107 it seems reasonable to infer that final payment was at least in the 
seven figure range.  Thus, even a single kidnapping provides AQAP with a fairly sizeable 
operating budget, though it is worth noting that the organization more often seems interested in 
making a statement by killing Western captives than by ransoming them back to their home 
countries.108 
 Questions of intent aside, attributing responsibility for kidnappings to AQAP is often 
exceptionally difficult, because abductions are disturbingly common in Yemen.  Tribes routinely 
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kidnap foreigners and Yemenis alike in order to force concessions from the government or 
regional rivals.109  Exact statistics remain elusive, but in 2010, AKE Limited, a British insurance 
underwriter that keeps careful tabs on the situation because the firm is among the world‘s leading 
providers of kidnapping and ransom insurance, estimated that one to two foreigners and three to 
four Yemeni nationals were kidnapped per month.110  Given this volume, and the fact that tribal 
elements are often involved in events alongside AQAP members,111 it remains unclear exactly 
how much income the terror group derives from this source.  But regardless of the ambiguities, it 
seems clear that AQAP‘s many revenue streams grant the organization financial independence 
from bin Laden‘s organization. 
 Similarly, Yemen‘s robust illicit arms markets dictate that AQAP can meet all of its 
weapons needs through local sources.  Experts on the region‘s culture argue that weapons 
ownership is ―a matter of honor‖ among Yemenis;112 consequently, gun ownership rates in the 
country are the highest in the region.  A house-to-house study conducted in 2009 estimated that 
private citizens owned roughly 8 million small arms,113 and given that Yemen‘s population is 
just under 25 million,114 there is one privately-owned gun for roughly every 3.125 people in the 
country, to say nothing of the worryingly large arms stockpiles maintained by the Yemeni 
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government.115  In recent years, when rebel campaigns and mass protests have gripped Yemen, 
the government has attempted to mitigate the availability of weapons in an effort toward self-
preservation, but these efforts have failed almost completely.  Guns of all varieties remain 
cheaply and easily available; merchants now simply tend to sell weapons from their homes rather 
than in open market stalls.116  Thus, the average Yemeni faces about as many challenges in 
acquiring the materiel necessary to conduct a terrorist attack as the average Americans faces in 
obtaining auto parts—a circumstance which allows AQAP to remain logistically independent of 
bin Laden‘s organization.    
7.2.3 TRAINING 
 As with AQIM, the clearest evidence of non-ideological ties between bin Laden‘s 
organization and AQAP lies in the training histories of some of the organization‘s prominent 
leaders.  For example, Nasir al-Wahishi, who has served as the organization‘s titular emir since 
co-founding a Yemen-based terror cell in al-Qaida‘s name in 2007,117 first formed ties to al-
Qaida in 1995, when he was only 19 years-old.  After studying briefly in a Yemeni religious 
school, al-Wahishi departed for Afghanistan in the hopes of helping to establish a ‗true‘ Islamic 
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state.  He soon became bin Laden‘s personal secretary and held this position until leaving 
Afghanistan circa 2001.118   
However, al-Wahishi‘s direct ties to al-Qaida ended only two years later, when he was 
arrested in Iran and deported to Yemen, where he served time in prison on terror charges.119  His 
career in terrorism then reignited in February 2006, when he and 22 other prisoners tunneled out 
of the prison using homemade shovels constructed from broomsticks and fan blades.120  Al-
Wahishi has since had some ideological interactions with bin Laden‘s organization; for example, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri formally recognized the escapee as al-Qaida‘s highest-ranking representative 
in Yemen during a statement made in November 2008.121  However, there has been no evidence 
that active members of bin Laden‘s organization played a direct role in any of the attacks which 
al-Wahishi helped to plan after his escape, such as a suicide-attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa 
in September 2008,122 a pair of suicide-bombings against South Korean tourists in March 2009, 
the kidnapping of nine foreign nationals in June 2009 (three of whom were later executed), and a 
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suicide-bombing that attempted (and failed) to kill Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayif in August 
2009.123 
 Qasim al-Rimi offers an almost identical example.  In the early 2000s, he played a role in 
al-Qaida‘s attempt to bomb the French oil-tanker Limburg, though the exact nature of his 
involvement remains somewhat unclear.124  Then, in 2005, al-Rimi was sentenced to prison for 
plotting to assassinate the US Ambassador to Yemen,125 but he too was able to reignite his 
terrorist career after escaping in the same 2006 jailbreak that freed al-Wahishi.126  Indeed, al-
Rimi joined his compatriot in announcing the foundation of an al-Qaida cell in Yemen,127 before 
planning a string of independent attacks that included the suicide-bombing of Spanish tourists in 
2007, 128 the kidnapping of British and German nationals in 2009,129 and the failed suicide-
operation against Prince Nayif.130  
 Nor are the pair unique.  They were joined in the escape by Jamal al-Badawi,131 an 
extremist who first trained with al-Qaida in 1998, and who was arrested in 2004,132 for his 
playing a key logistical role in the U.S.S. Cole bombing by acquiring important resources, such 
as the safe-house where the explosives were prepared and the attack-boat used to deliver the 
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suicide-bombers to the warship.133  Although al-Badawi then turned himself into authorities in 
2007, he was released to unmonitored house arrest only a few weeks later, after pledging his 
loyalty to the president of Yemen.134  This soft-confinement seems to have done little to restrict 
al-Badawi‘s involvement in terrorism, because as of September 2008, he was rumored to be in 
contact with al-Wahishi.135 
 However, this information should not suggest that all of AQAP‘s al-Qaida-trained 
members participated in the 2006 jailbreak.  For example, the man named as al-Wahishi‘s chief 
deputy, Said al-Shihri, came into the organization via detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.136  
Al-Shihri‘s involvement in terrorism began sometime in 2001, when he left his home in Riyadh 
for Afghanistan.  After training in urban warfare at al-Qaida‘s ―Libyan Camp‖ near Kabul, al-
Shihri played the role of logistical facilitator, by helping to smuggle other Saudis into 
Afghanistan from neighboring Iran, and provided some low-level funding to bin Laden‘s 
organization by diverting small charitable donations to al-Qaida.137  Al-Shihri was wounded and 
captured in the early days of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan; he subsequently spent time at 
Guantanamo Bay, before being repatriated to Saudi Arabia, where he was released from 
detention in February 2008.  Shortly thereafter, he crossed into Yemen and formed ties to al- 
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Wahishi and al-Badawi.138  At last reporting, al-Shihri‘s role in AQAP included ―identifying 
targets; recruiting new members; assisting with training and attack planning; and tasking others 
in the preparation of attacks.‖139  However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that he has 
rekindled his contacts with members of al-Qaida‘s core group. 
 The personal history of Ibrahim al-Rubaish, the AQAP ideologue, largely mirrors al-
Shihri‘s.  In 2001, at the age of 22, al-Rubaish departed Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan, where he 
hoped to obtain the training necessary to allow him to fight the Russian forces oppressing 
Chechen Muslims.  He spent time learning basic marksmanship skills at al-Qaida‘s Farouq 
Camp, but his training was apparently cut short when the camp‘s instructors evacuated it in the 
immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  Al-Rubaish then spent a short time on the front lines in 
Tora Bora, where elements of al-Qaida and the Taliban battled the Northern Alliance, before 
Pakistani forces captured him in late 2001 as he attempted to flee the region when the American 
invasion began in full.140  After being transferred to American custody, al-Rubaish eventually 
ended-up in Guantanamo Bay, but was released into the custody of Saudi authorities in 
December 2006.141  It remains unclear when—and why—the Saudis released al-Rubaish, but he 
found his way into Yemen and AQAP by 2008. 
 As with AQIM, additional AQAP members have more diffuse instructional ties to bin 
Laden‘s organization that stem from participation in the Iraqi insurgency.  According to the 
Sinjar Records, 49 of the 595 people included in the documents (8.1 percent) hailed from 
                                                          
138 McDougall. 
139 Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and 
Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.275.10 Said Ali al-Shihri,‖ 
January 19, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI27510E.shtml.   
140 ―Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Arbaysh, Ibrahim 
Sulayman Muhammad.‖  See also: Combatant Status Review Board, Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal – Detainee Ibrahim Sulayman Muhammad Al Rubaysh,‖ Department of Defense (Unclassified), 
August 8, 2004. 
141 Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants, ―Consolidated Chronological List 
of GTMO Detainees Released, Transferred, or Deceased,‖ Department of Defense (Unclassified), October 9, 2008. 
386 
 
Yemen.142  As in the Algerian case, it would be presumptive to assume that all of these men 
interacted with members of bin Laden‘s organization and then survived the conflict to return to 
Yemen, but there is additional contextual evidence suggesting that veterans of the Iraqi conflict 
provided AQAP with new skills. 
Members of the Yemeni security community allege that the sophistication of the 
September 2008 suicide-bombing on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa demonstrated that the terrorists 
responsible for the attack trained in Iraq, where similar coordinated strikes had become 
commonplace.  On the morning of the bombing, one group of attackers, armed with AK-47s and 
rocket propelled grenades, engaged the Yemeni guards who manned a checkpoint outside the 
embassy, so that a second car, which carried the suicide-bombers, could make it through the 
embassy‘s outer security perimeter.  However, the coordination was hardly flawless.  A second 
ring of concrete barricades prevented the bombers from breaching the compound, and in order to 
avoid capture, they were forced to detonate their weapons before additional security personnel 
could respond.  Consequently, the attack killed only ten victims, all of them Yemeni, and most of 
them drawn from the embassy‘s security detail.143   
While the similarities between this strike and attacks in Iraq are somewhat compelling, 
they are not conclusive.  The embassy attack may have simply drawn planning inspiration from 
the Iraqi insurgency.  Therefore, until definitive evidence emerges showing that these or other 
AQAP attackers have returned from Iraq bearing new skills, it would be premature to 
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definitively conclude that AQAP has received a direct training benefit from the insurgency, 
though such ties seem probable.  
 Finally, other members of AQAP lack any demonstrable training ties to bin Laden‘s 
organization or its Iraqi affiliate.  According to regional media reports, AQAP now reportedly 
runs its own camps in Southern Yemen,144 and other recruits likely benefit from experience 
gained though service in the Yemeni military.  For example, in the summer of 2010, the Yemeni 
army summarily suspended some 800 soldiers without pay,145 and regional experts have opined 
that these disenfranchised troops ―could make an excellent talent pool for AQAP to target in 
future recruitment campaigns.‖146  However, the number of AQAP recruits which have since 
been drawn from this pool remains unknown.  Therefore, while it is clear that several high-
ranking AQAP leaders benefitted directly from al-Qaida training and, indeed, once held active 
membership in bin Laden‘s organization, it remains impossible to determine what percentage of 
AQAP members hold training ties to al-Qaida.   
7.2.4 SUMMATION 
 On balance, the evidence suggests that AQIM and AQAP are exceptionally similar in 
their ties to bin Laden‘s organization.  Members of both the North African and Yemen-based 
groups once held active ties to al-Qaida, but these bonds faded over time and the regional groups 
began (or continued) independent operations.  In AQAP‘s case, the severance of functional ties is 
far sharper, because four of the group‘s highest-ranking operational leaders, as well as one of 
AQAP‘s primary ideologues, re-emerged into jihad only after prolonged detention in either 
Yemeni prison or American military custody. 
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 Moreover, both organizations share aspects of al-Qaida‘s ideology and attendant strategic 
aims, though the ideological parallels between bin Laden‘s organization and AQAP are far 
clearer than those between al-Qaida and AQIM.  Indeed, while many of AQIM‘s attacks seem 
designed with economic concerns largely, if not entirely, in mind, events such as the 2008 attack 
on the American embassy in Sanaa and the following year‘s failed underpants bombing 
demonstrate that al-Qaida‘s religiously-motivated brand of anti-Americanism continues to drive 
many of AQAP‘s actions.  Ultimately, the varying extent of AQIM and AQAP‘s ideological 
congruity with bin Laden‘s organization constitutes the primary difference in the two regional 
organizations‘ respective relationships with al-Qaida. 
 Ideological differences aside, it seems that exceptionally similar reasons underlie AQIM 
and AQAP‘s waning functional relationships with bin Laden‘s organization.  Both regional 
groups participate extensively in criminal activities and thus have independent access to 
substantial revenue streams.  Consequently, there is little reason to suspect that al-Qaida provides 
money to either organization, which prevents bin Laden‘s organization from exerting influence 
by pulling AQIM and AQAP‘s respective purse strings.  And along similar lines, the criminal 
contacts that AQIM and AQAP hold as a result of their participation in smuggling, as well as the 
generally lawless climates of Yemen and the South Sahara, provide both organizations with 
independent access to arms and explosives.  Thus, they are not dependent on bin Laden‘s 
organization to provide the materiel necessary to conduct terrorism. 
 Full evidence on the regional groups‘ training histories remains elusive, making it 
impossible to know how large a share of AQIM and AQAP‘s respective memberships benefitted 
directly from al-Qaida training.  However, it is clear that both regional groups have other training 
sources at their disposal, and as these groups continue to mature, it seems likely that they will 
389 
 
become increasingly self-reliant in terms of training.  Indeed, AQAP already has an independent 
camp in South Yemen, and given that AQIM continues to participate in an insurgency against the 
Algerian and (to a lesser degree) Mauritanian governments, it seems likely that the group 
maintains similar facilities, though the open-source record remains mute on the specific details.  
These facts dictate that if and when the current generations of AQIM and AQAP leaders are 
removed from power, there is little reason to assume that these regional groups will continue to 
hold any non-ideological ties to bin Laden‘s organization.  
 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to be overly firm in any assessment of AQIM or AQAP, because even in 
comparison to other Islamist terror groups, this pair of organizations operates in environments 
characterized by the absence of the sort of reliable individual-level data necessary to understand 
the intricacies of events and organizations.  While this reality creates a significant caveat to this 
chapter‘s findings, the open source record currently contains little evidence to support the 
findings of Hoffman, the analysts at CSIS, and other theorists who argue that al-Qaida‘s 
functional relevance to its regional affiliates is substantial or increasing.  Instead, the evidence 
presented by this chapter, which table 7.1 summarizes, broadly supports Gerges assertion 
regarding the alarmist nature of conclusions positing the existence of ongoing, widespread 
functional linkages between al-Qaida and regional organizations that have adopted its name.  
Although AQIM and AQAP share some of al-Qaida‘s strategic goals, both organizations seem 
financial and logistically independent.  The closest associations between al-Qaida and these 
regional groups are historical in nature and stem from historical training ties that members of 
AQIM and AQAP shared with bin Laden‘s organization.  
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Table 7.1: Al-Qaida’s Relationship With Prominent Regional Terror Organizations 
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Indirect  
Some strategic influence, no evidence of direct 
participation 
Finance Unlikely  AQIM self-funded via crime 
Logistics Unlikely  AQIM recieves access to weapons via criminal contacts 
Training Historical 
Belmokhtar's example demonstrates the existence of 
some non-current ties; little evidence suggesting new 
AQIM members train in South Asia 
   
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Planning Unknown  
Substantial overlap in strategic goals, but little available 
information decision-making within AQAP 
Finance Unlikely  AQAP self-funded via donations and crime 
Logistics Unlikely  
AQAP receives access to weapons via criminal contacts 
and Yemen's robust arms market 
Training Historical 
Several AQAP leaders were once AQ members; little 
evidence suggesting new AQAP members train in South 
Asia 
 
However, this chapter does more than simply weigh-in on the debate regarding the extent 
of al-Qaida‘s control over the broader Islamist terror movement.  This assessment also 
hypothesizes that regional organizations‘ access to financial and logistical resources is a primary 
determinant of the extent of their functional partnership with al-Qaida.  Given that this analysis is 
qualitative in nature and examines only two cases, the results are somewhat speculative in nature, 
but suggest that organizations‘ access to independent revenue streams, especially highly lucrative 
pools of money obtained through criminal means, is inversely related to the extent of their 
partnership with al-Qaida.  Thus, this analysis also has clear implications for future research, 
because as more information trickles into the open-source, it may become possible to test the 
391 
 
range of this theory by considering organizations other than AQIM and AQAP.  Similarly, the 
revelation of new information may make it possible to utilize rigorous formal methods that are 
capable of scaling the impact of resource access on the extent of partnership.   
While these findings indicate that al-Qaida‘s indirect influence over the broader Islamist 
terror movement will continue to fade as counterterrorism initiatives remove more and more 
former members of the organization from active participation in violence, this evaluation is 
incomplete because it does not consider forms of indirect influence other than historical ties.  In 
an effort to rectify this shortcoming, the following chapter turns its attention toward what is 
potentially al-Qaida‘s most dangerous form of indirect influence: ideological inspiration of 
independent acts of terror. 
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8.0 ASSESSING THE THREAT THAT TERRORISTS WITH NON-FUNCTIONAL TIES TO 
AL-QAIDA POSE TO THE AMERICAN MILITARY AT HOME 
 
 
 
 The sheer breadth of Islamist extremism as an ideological phenomenon makes bounding 
an inquiry into al-Qaida‘s inspirational role exceptionally challenging.  Rather than selecting 
cases using random choice or following the worryingly common practice of opportunity 
sampling, which implicitly assumes that the cases about which the most is known accurately 
represent an otherwise clandestine phenomenon, this chapter ensured fair cross-comparison by 
employing additional theoretical constraints.   Specifically, it examines only those events that (1) 
took place within the United States, and (2) targeted U.S. military personnel.  The cases that 
emerge within the period under study1 are the 2007 plot against Fort Dix in New Jersey, the 2009 
shooting at an Army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, and the 2009 shootings at Fort 
Hood in Texas.   
With the obvious caveat that the generalizability of this assessment may not extend 
beyond al-Qaida‘s role in attacking service members stationed in the American homeland, these 
cases suggest that although events with weak non-functional ties to al-Qaida remain of concern, 
both the threat that they pose and their connections to bin Laden‘s organization are typically 
exaggerated.  The oft-cited influence of online jihadist propaganda remains an important factor 
                                                          
1 As this analysis considers attacks that took place before the end of 2010, a 2011 bomb-plot by Jason Naser Abdo, 
an AWOL soldier who also sought to target Fort Hood, falls outside of the this study by a year.  For an outline of the 
events involving Naser Abdo, see: Peter Finn and Alice Fordham, ―Naser Abdo, AWOL soldier, charged in Fort 
Hood bomb plot,‖ Washington Post, July 29, 2011; available online: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/awol-soldier-naser-abdo-charged-in-fort-hood-bomb-
plot/2011/07/29/gIQAFKAUhI_story.html.  
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in the radicalization process and accounts many of these plots‘ diffuse, non-functional 
connections to al-Qaida, but the consumption of Internet propaganda seems to harden radical 
viewpoints, rather than causing them, because the evidence suggests that Islamists typically 
begin viewing extremist web pages after adopting jihadists’ creed.  This analysis posits that first-
person social interactions with existing extremists, who often lack meaningful connections to al-
Qaida, likely play the greatest role in triggering radicalization.  Given the small sample size 
employed by this chapter, the results require additional research to validate, but these findings 
generally support previous findings regarding the sociological nature of radical indoctrination,2 
while suggesting that theories which posit the existence of a direct causal relationship between 
the viewing of online propaganda and participation in violent jihad require amendment.3 
Four sections follow this introduction; each of the first three discusses one of the cases 
listed above, before the fourth offers some broader theoretical conclusions.  Broadly speaking, 
the topical sections also follow the same now-familiar internal structure used in previous 
chapters and include sub-sections that discuss: the nature and extent of planning that took place 
prior to the event‘s execution (or attempted execution); the logistical and financial support that 
the event received; and the nature and extent of the plotters‘ training.  However, this chapter‘s 
explicit focus on ideology requires a slight deviation from the standard format.  Each section also 
includes a break-out that provides detailed background information on the plotters in order to 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Javier Jordan, ―Jihadist Radicalization Processes in Spain: Sociopolitical Analysis at Three 
Levels,‖ Revista de Psicologia Social, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May 2009), pp. 197-216; Paul R. Baines, Nicholas J. 
O‘Shaughnessy, Kevin Moloney, et al, ―The Dark Side of Political Marketing: Islamist Propaganda, Reversal 
Theory, and British Muslims,‖ European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 44, No. 3-4 (2010), pp. 478-495; John Horgan, 
Walking Away From Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 10, 41-44, and 65-66. 
3 See, for example: Sven Eiffler, ―Jihadist Propaganda on the Internet: Impact and Challenges for the Security 
Community,‖ NATO Science for Peace and Security Studies, Vol. 67 (2010); available online: 
http://www.booksonline.iospress.nl/Content/View.aspx?piid=18158. Gabriel Weimann, ―Al-Qa‘ida‘s Extensive Use 
of the Internet,‖ CTC Sentinel, January 15, 2008; available online: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-
qaida%E2%80%99s-extensive-use-of-the-internet; Sajjan M. Gohel, ―The Internet and its Role in Terrorist 
Recruitment and Operational Planning,‖ CTC Sentinel, December 3, 2009; available online: 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-internet-and-its-role-in-terrorist-recruitment-and-operational-planning.     
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establish their state-of-mind prior to participation in terrorism, as well as a break-out that 
examines how the plotters‘ ideological views changed during the radicalization process.  Finally, 
each section closes with a brief comparative summation.        
 
8.1 THE FORT DIX SIX 
In early May 2007, the Department of Justice announced the arrest of six men in relation 
to a plot against Fort Dix, an Army installation southwest of Trenton, New Jersey.  Five of the 
men plotted ―to kill as many soldiers as possible in an armed assault‖ on the post, and the sixth 
supplied them with illegal weapons.4  From the very beginning, it was clear that the men 
operated in isolation, without the benefit of operational or logistical support from al-Qaida or any 
other Islamist terror group.  They attempted to prepare for the attack by self-training and 
attempted to use personal connections to fulfill their need for weapons.  Consequently, the 
plotters‘ efforts were amateurish unrealistic.  Their only connection to al-Qaida, or, for that 
matter, any other established terror group, came via the Internet.  The plotters were avid viewers 
of online jihadist videos, but this propaganda seems to have played only a secondary role in the 
plotter‘s indoctrination.  First-person interactions, both among the group‘s members and with 
existing extremists from outside the group, seem to have played the larger role in their 
radicalization.  
8.1.1 BACKGROUND 
 In January 2006, the investigation into the Fort Dix plot began in an unusual location: a 
Circuit City in Mt. Laurel, New Jersey.  A young clerk named Brian Morganstern viewed some 
worrying footage in the process of converting a customer‘s hand-shot 8mm film to DVD.  The 
                                                          
4 Christopher J. Christie, ―Five Radical Islamists Charged with Planning Attack on Fort Dix Army Base in New 
Jersey,‖ United States Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney, District of New Jersey, May 8, 2007. 
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tape showed a group of young men dressed in fatigues, who fired pistols and semi-automatic 
rifles as they conversed excitedly in a language that Morganstern did not recognize (it turned out 
to be Albanian).  When the clerk picked-out words like ―jihad‖ and ―Allahu akbar,‖ he became 
concerned and brought the tape to the attention of local police, who in turn informed the FBI.5  A 
federal investigation ensued; it soon began to center on group of immigrant men in their 20s, 
many of whom had been friends since attending high-school together in Cherry Hill, a New 
Jersey community just out Philadelphia. 
 Three of the men on the tape were brothers.  Dritan, Eljvir, and Shain Duka had come to 
America from the former Yugoslavia as toddlers.  In October 1984, when Dritan was 5, Eljvir 
was 3, and baby-brother Shain was barely 1, the family entered the US illegally through Mexico 
and settled briefly in Texas.  However, the Dukas were destined for the New York area, where 
dozens of members of their large extended family resided.  They spent enough in Brooklyn‘s 
ethnic Albanian community for the brothers to pick-up New York accents, before moving to 
New Jersey when the boys were in their teens.6 
 After the move, the younger two brothers attended Cherry Hill West High School.  Their 
ties to two of the other Fort Dix plotters likely date to this period, because Eljvir and Shain‘s 
time at Cherry Hill West overlapped with the enrollment of Mohamad Shnewer, a Jordanian 
immigrant whose family ran a local convenience store, and Serdar Tatar, a Turkish immigrant 
whose father ran a pizza shop near Fort Dix.7  Like the Duka brothers, Shnewer and Tatar spent 
                                                          
5 Hannity & Colmes, ―Exclusive! Brian Morgenstern Breaks His Silence on Blowing the Whistle on the Ft. Dix 6,‖ 
Transcription of Interview with Brian Morgenstern, May 30, 2007; available online: 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,276414,00.html.  See also, ―Fort Dix tipster shrugs off ‗hero‘ title,‖ 
CNN.com, May 29, 2007; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2007-05-29/us/fort.tipster_1_real-heroes-fort-dix-
military-personnel?_s=PM:US.   
6 John Appezzato, ―Father of Fort Dix Suspects Arrested on Immigration Charges,‖ Star-Ledger, May 10, 2007; 
Amanda Ripley, ―The Fort Dix Conspiracy,‖ Time, December 6, 2007. 
7Kareem Fahim and Andrea Elliott, ―In Large Immigrant Family, Religion Guided 3 Held in Fort Dix Plot,‖ New 
York Times, May 10, 2007.  
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the bulk of their lives in the U.S.  Shnewer‘s family had immigrated in 1987, when he was 2,8 
and Tatar‘s family had come to the country in 1992, when he was about 9.9   
 Argon Abdullahu, the logistical supporter arrested in connection with the Fort Dix plot, 
also had a relationship with the Dukas that dated to his teens.  Another ethnic Albanian born in 
the former Yugoslavia, Abdullahu had immigrated as a refugee from Kosovo in 1999, when he 
was 16 years old.  It is unclear whether or not he attended Cherry Hill West, but Abdullahu 
developed a friendship with the Dukas during the course of pick-up games of basketball and 
soccer.10  The fact that all of the boys spoke Albanian could not have hurt their relationship. 
8.1.2 RADICALIZATION  
 Information on the radicalization of the Fort Dix plotters is somewhat vague, but the 
available data suggests that it was a gradual process that began sometime after the plotters left 
high school.  Indeed, the Duka brothers were anything but radical when they arrived in New 
Jersey.  They seemed to work hard at assimilating.  Dritan once played a small role in an episode 
of Law and Order; Eljvir acted in a rock video, and Shain appeared in a commercial for the 
World Wrestling Federation.11  It seems that the boys were somewhat obsessed with being as 
American as possible. 
 This pattern continued when the two younger Dukas entered Cherry Hill West.  Eljvir 
went by the name ―Elvis‖ in high school, and the brothers were regulars at the keg parties that 
broke-out whenever anyone‘s parents left town.  The Dukas were also avid basketball fans, and 
although they did not play on the school‘s varsity team, they regularly participated in pick-up 
games in local parks.  They also tried to promote themselves as Brooklyn tough-guys, rather than 
                                                          
8 George Anastasia, ―A Radical Shift in Reputation for 6 Men,‖ Philadelphia Inquirer, May 13, 2007. 
9 Fahim and Elliott. 
10 Geoff Mulvihill, ―Man Sentenced in Fort Dix Plot Case,‖ Associated Press, March 31, 2008; Troy Graham, ―Gun 
Supplier to Fort Dix 5 Is Sentenced,‖ Philadelphia Inquirer, April 1, 2008. 
11 Ripley. 
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Islamist radicals, by telling fanciful stories about street-fighting during their time in New York.  
Thus, like many teens—especially those in Jersey—the Dukas spent their childhood trying to 
look cool.12  
Little is known about the remaining plotters‘ early views on radical Islam, but nothing 
suggests that they were born into extremism.  The Shnewer family‘s convenience store doubled 
as a halal butcher shop,13 so it seems likely that the family was at least moderately devout, but 
Shnewer followed Islamic guidelines only selectively in his day-to-day life.  He refused to eat 
foods that came into contact with pork, but while working at a local restaurant, he served alcohol 
to customers and did not break from work to pray.14  Tartar‘s background was even more 
secular; his father self-described as ―not a religious person‖ and later openly chastised his son for 
making religion the focal point of his life.15  
 As for Abdullahu, a great deal of mystery surrounds his background.  The Duka brothers 
believed he had served as a sniper in the Kosovo conflict,16 suggesting that he held radical views 
even before he immigrated to the United States.  However, given that Abdullahu was only 16 at 
the time of his arrival in New Jersey, he would have been only 14 or 15 when the Kosovo 
conflict broke-out in 1998.17  It is not impossible that he was an exceptionally youthful sniper, 
but it seems somewhat unlikely.  Moreover, Abdullahu‘s attorney later vociferously and 
                                                          
12 Jason Laughlin, ―Suspects in Terror Case Fought Hard to Fit In,‖ Courier-Post (Cherry Hill, NJ), May 14, 2007. 
13 Anastasia. 
14 Fahim and Elliott.  
15 Quoted in Fahim and Elliott.  
16 USA v. Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer (Defendant), Criminal Complaint FBI Special Agent John J. Ryan 
(Magistrate No. 07-M-2045[JS]), United States District Court of New Jersey, May 7, 2007.  (Hereafter ―Ryan 
complaint‖). 
17 For general background on the timing and causes of the Kosovo conflict, see: ―NATO‘s role in relation to the 
conflict in Kosovo,‖ NATO, date unknown; available online: http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B.  
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categorically denied that his client was ever a belligerent in the Kosovo conflict.18  In all 
likelihood, the Dukas believed a fiction put forth by a teenage boy trying desperately to fit into 
an unfamiliar environment by impressing his new friends with tall-tales of military glory.  As 
additional information discussed in relation to the plot‘s logistics will make clearer, there is scant 
evidence to suggest that Abdullahu was ever a radical Muslim, even during the course of his 
involvement in the Fort Dix plot, and though likely not a sniper, he was apparently a life-long 
gun enthusiast. 
 Meanwhile, the Dukas‘ indoctrination into radical Islam seems to have begun at home.  
Members of New York‘s Albanian community, of which the Duka family was part, claim that 
one of the brothers‘ uncles became radicalized while serving prison time in the early 1990s and 
passed his new views onto his nephews.19  Thereafter, the brothers became more outwardly 
devout.  In the years after high school, they stopped drinking; they grew beards; they began 
attending mosque regularly.20  In religious ceremonies not sanctioned by the state, Eljvir and 
Dritain married 15 year-old brides.  Eljvir‘s wife was one of Shnewer‘s five sisters; Dritain‘s was 
an American-born convert to Islam. 21  Religion had become the focus of the brothers‘ lives. 
A concomitant change took place in Tatar and Shnewer, as rifts developed between the 
young men and their respective families.  Tatar‘s father attributed his son‘s radicalism to the 
Duka‘s influence.  When his son brought one of the brothers by the pizzeria that the Tatar family 
owned and operated, Tatar‘s father told him ―I don‘t like this kid.  I don‘t want you together.‖22  
But Tatar ignored his father; he continued to associate with the Dukas and was soon beyond his 
                                                          
18 Joe Ryan, ―Lawyer: Ft. Dix Suspect Not a Sniper, Had No Role in Plot,‖ Star-Ledger (New Jersey), May 15, 
2007. 
19 Kareem Fahim and Andrea Elliott, ―In Large Immigrant Family, Religion Guided 3 Held in Fort Dix Plot,‖ New 
York Times, May 10, 2007. 
20 Ripley. 
21 Ripley.  
22 Fahim and Elliott. 
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family‘s control.  In 2005, his father‘s persistent criticism of his burgeoning religious views 
caused Tatar quit the pizza shop, where he had worked as a driver making frequent deliveries to 
Fort Dix.  He moved to nearby Philadelphia and began working at a 7-Eleven franchise, but 
according to the Russian-born Muslim convert that Tatar married shortly after the move, he 
attended the mosque only infrequently.23  Thus, it seems that once separated from the Dukas by 
geography, Tatar‘s radicalism may have waned.  
The evidence is unclear, but Shnewer seems to have travelled a similar path to 
fundamentalism, and it is likely that the Dukas played a role in the transformation.  Shnewer‘s 
family portrays him as immature and impressionable.  Even after graduating high school, he 
apparently favored children‘s programing on the Nickelodeon network and spent long hours 
playing video games.  His mother stated he was ―like a baby.‖24  In combination with Shnewer‘s 
affinity bonds to the Dukas, which date to high school, and his familial ties to the brothers, which 
stem from Eljvir‘s marriage to Shnewer‘s teenage sister, these characterizations suggest that 
Shnewer was likely influenced by the brothers‘ worldview.  Though the argument is speculative, 
network effects offer a moderately-compelling explanation for Shnewer‘s radicalization. 
The timing of Shewer‘s radicalization is, however, clearer.  After graduating from Cherry 
Hill West in 2003, he enrolled in classes at a nearby Camden Community College and continued 
to work in the family‘s store.  But he soon dropped out of school, ostensibly so that he could 
work more in order to help the family pay a pair of burdensome mortgages.  Although he 
continued to live at home until his arrest, Shnewer‘s relationship with his father became 
increasingly strained and rather than continuing to work in the family business, Shnewer began 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Quoted in Ripley. 
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driving a cab at nights in nearby Philadelphia. 25  According to his mother, Shnewer did little 
besides work, sleep, and pray in the year preceding his arrest.26   Family friends began describing 
Shnewer as ―lost,‖ and his father complained that ―in this country, you can't tell your own son 
what to do." 27  Thus, by 2006, Shnewer had, like Tatar, shed his family‘s values.  
The evidence suggests that from this point forward the five key plotters‘ views on 
radicalism co-evolved, as the men fed off of each other‘s beliefs, but the now radicalized 
Shnewer seems to have taken the lead.  The authorities were ideally positioned to document this 
evolution, because a pair of informants witnessed the plotters‘ ideological hardening first-hand.  
In March 2006, Mahmoud Omar, an Egyptian immigrant who worked as a car salesman and 
once served time on charges of bank fraud, began hanging around the Shnewer family‘s shop at 
the bureau‘s direction.  He seemed lonely and made conversation with anyone who would listen.  
Although he was in his 30s, he soon made friends with the 22 year-old Shnewer, who in turn 
introduced Omar to Tatar and the Dukas.  The six often discussed politics and religion as they 
shot pool together.28   
 By late April, Shnewer trusted Omar enough to initiate a conversation about ―something 
that can lead to prison‖ and began to discuss terrorism in detail.29  Moreover, the young taxi 
driver shared his large collection of jihadist videos, which he had downloaded to his laptop, with 
the informant.  According to federal documents, the clips included the video wills of two of the 
9/11 hijackers and ―images of Osama Bin Laden and other Islamic extremists making various 
speeches in which the speakers call the viewer to join the jihadist movement.‖30 
                                                          
25 Anastasia. 
26 Fahim and Elliott. 
27 Anastasia. 
28 Ripley.  See also, Ryan complaint.  
29 Quoted in the Ryan complaint. 
30 Ryan complaint. 
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Similarly, in July, the plotters screened jihadist videos for Besnik Bakalli, an Albanian 
immigrant in his mid-30s, who served as the FBI‘s second informant and gained entry into the 
group on the pretense that he was a recently-divorced man with a violent past and a desire to 
martyr himself in a suicide-bombing.31   Wearing grins so pronounced as to merit mention in the 
FBI‘s official complaint, Shnewer and the Dukas showed Bakalli footage of insurgent attacks on 
American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.32    
These interactions took place several months after the ‗training‘ video first brought the 
Fort Dix plotters to the authorities‘ attention.  Although it is not known precisely when the men 
began downloading their collection of videos, the plotters first documented (virtual) ideological 
ties to al-Qaida took place after the plotters were already demonstrably radicalized.  In light of 
the Dukas‘ reported interactions with their fundamentalist ex-convict uncle and Tatar‘s father‘s 
description of the brothers‘ role in his son‘s ideological transformation, it seems likely that the 
plotters began to watch jihadist videos because they were already fans of violence in the name of 
Islam.  Thus, al-Qaida‘s propaganda may have helped to maintain and harden the plotters‘ views, 
but casual arguments suggesting that videos triggered the plotters‘ extremism seem exaggerative.  
8.1.3 PLANNING 
 As August 2007 dawned, the plotters began to conceptualize how to implement their 
conception of violent Islam at a local level.  Shnewer took the lead in planning, but from the very 
beginning, the plotters‘ aspirations far outstripped their capabilities and resources.  The plot that 
ultimately took shape was amateurish and probably would not have caused much in the way of 
damage if it had been implemented before the authorities disrupted the attempt at jihad. 
                                                          
31 John Meyer, ―‘Ft. Dix Six‘ Informants in Hot Seat Too,‖ Los Angeles Times, October 19, 2008. 
32 Ryan complaint.  According to press accounts, Eljvir also maintained a stash of similar videos on his computer.  
For details, see: ―Attorneys make final arguments in US terrorism case,‖ Guardian, December 17, 2008.  
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 Shnewer selected Fort Dix as a target because he believed that Tatar knew the post ―like 
the palm of his hand‖ from delivering pizzas to quarters housing.33  This inside knowledge 
would allow the team to find ―areas where there are 100-200 individuals,‖ which teams of ―6-7 
persons‖ could attack using mortars, automatic rifles, and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs).34  
In Shnewer‘s vision, the Dukas would finance the attack, because Eljvir and Dritan had ―a lot of 
money,‖35 presumably from the roofing business that they ran out of Eljvir‘s home,36 but 
Shnewer also planned to contribute and had ―been saving money for this plan for some time.‖37     
However, Shnewer also considered targets other than Fort Dix and conducted some 
preliminary surveillance of these targets.  In August, with the informant Omar in tow, Shnewer 
made trips to an army installation at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; an Air Force Base in Dover, 
Delaware; and a Coast Guard building in Philadelphia.  Fort Dix ultimately won-out over these 
other possible targets in late November 2006, when Tatar swiped a delivery map of the post from 
his father‘s pizzeria. 
 This action represented Tatar‘s first meaningful commitment to the Fort Dix endeavor.  
He had participated in the early pool-hall discussions of religion and politics, but of the five key 
participants, he displayed the least outward commitment to jihad and had not been part of the 
earlier screening of jihadist videos.  Tatar was clearly on the fence regarding his participation in 
terrorism, because just a few days before turning the map over to Shnewer, Tatar contacted the 
Philadelphia Police Department and reported to detectives that ―he had been approached by an 
                                                          
33 Surveillance recordings quoted in the Ryan complaint.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. 
36 The Dukas used three different company names: Qadr Inc., Colonial Roofing, and National Roofing.  However, as 
all three businesses were roofing companies and all three list Eljvir‘s home as their mailing address, it seems likely 
that they were a single concern.  ―Fort Dix Six: Eljvir Duka,‖ CBS News, available online: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2316-100_162-2786025-4.html.   
37 Surveillance recordings quoted in the Ryan complaint. 
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individual who had pressured him to acquire maps of Fort Dix.‖38  He was even explicit that he 
―was fearful that the incident was terrorism-related.‖39  Although the police placed a phone call 
to the FBI in Tatar‘s presence, the incident somehow galvanized young Turkish immigrant‘s 
commitment to the plot, and he took the only documented planning action that was not initiated 
by Shnewer by providing the map to his co-conspirators.  However, it remains unclear why Tatar 
believed that it was safe to proceed after alerting authorities to the broad outlines of the plot.  
8.1.4 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
Questions of the teams‘ planning skills aside, weapons were a bit of a problem.  As 
Shnewer told one of the informants during a recorded conversation, the team would have to 
purchase weapons ―from the street as you cannot buy a machine gun from a store.‖40  The Dukas 
took the lead on overcoming this logistical hurdle.  In mid-August, Bakalli recorded a 
conversation with Dritain, Eljvir, and Shain, in which the eldest Duka brother stated that he was 
in search of two or three fully-automatic Kalishnikovs.  By December 2006, the brothers had 
acquired a magnum .357 revolver, a shotgun, and ―a small automatic weapon‖ on the black 
market.  By January, the team‘s arsenal had grown to include a 9mm handgun and a semi-
automatic assault rifle.41 
 Many of these weapons, as well as a supply of ammunition, were provided by Abdullahu, 
who simply lent the team some items from the gun cabinet he kept at home.  Because the Dukas 
were all undocumented aliens, they were incapable of legally purchasing arms and had to rely on 
loans and straw purchases to acquire items that they could not find (or perhaps could not afford) 
                                                          
38 Ryan complaint. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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on the black market.42  At first blush, Abdullahu‘s role in these acquisitions suggests that he was 
a key participant in the Fort Dix plot.  However, he did not attend any of the planning meetings 
and seems to have become involved only out of a sense of obligation to the Dukas.  Abdullahu 
was clearly aware of his friends‘ statements about the necessity of jihad, but ultimately 
dismissed their tough talk as idle boasting—a decision that seems rash in retrospect, but which 
probably made a great deal of sense given that he and the Dukas had a long history of sharing 
exaggerated stories in a bid to impress one another.  Therefore, Abdullah seems to have been a 
somewhat unwitting (and somewhat foolish) accomplice, rather than a dedicated member of the 
attack-team. 
 Unsatisfied with the quantity of arms that Abdullahu could provide, the Dukas continued 
their efforts to acquire weapons right up until their arrest.  The manner in which they went about 
the process says a great deal about the team‘s capabilities or, more aptly, lack thereof.  During a 
chance encounter at a convenience store, the brothers happened upon an FBI agent who had been 
part of a surveillance team that watched the plotters as they shot targets at a gun range.  The 
Dukas immediately recognized the man, and instead of being spooked by the encounter, assumed 
that the agent was a gun enthusiast and asked him for help in acquiring automatic weapons.43   
Specifically, they wanted to buy Russian-made AK-47s, because they believed these 
weapons to be superior to the Chinese-made model.  Dritan later attempted to buy a Kalishnakov 
from a man in Camden, New Jersey, but backed-out of the deal at the last minute because he 
believed the seller was a federal agent.  It remains unclear if this event stemmed from 
convenience store run-in, but in mid-March Dritan made another attempt to purchase heavier 
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weaponry, including RPGs and M-16 automatic rifles, this time through a fictitious source that 
the informant Omar supposedly knew from his native Egypt.  Clearly, the plotters wanted to 
acquire as much fire-power as they could; they simply had no realistic idea how to go about 
doing so.44 
 
8.1.5 TRAINING 
The team‘s training regimen fit the same amateurish patterns as the Duka‘s efforts toward 
weapons acquisition and consisted entirely of weekend trips to the Poconos and small-scale 
paintball games played in the New Jersey woods.  The first of these outings, which sparked the 
investigation when footage of it made its way to Circuit City, took place months before 
Schnewer began to formulate a specific plan and may have been more of a recreational get-away 
than a dedicated training mission.  In addition to the scene at the firing range, the tape showed 
the Dukas and their friends ―skiing, hiking, and joking around.‖ 45  Given the timing and context 
of this outing, it is difficult to argue that the first Pocono trip constituted meaningful preparation 
for jihad.  The initial shooting session was probably less of a training tool and more a means to 
enable the plotters to become comfortable with the idea of an attack.  Or, as the Dukas later 
claimed, it may have simply been vacation footage of young men who enjoyed shooting.46 
In February 2007, the plotters made another trip that was a far clearer example of terror 
training.  Absent Tatar, the plotters returned to the Poconos, with the informant Omar and 
Abdullahu in tow.  They practiced shooting shotguns, small caliber rifles, and handguns at a state 
game land near Gouldsboro, Pennsylvania.  Abduallahu played the role of firearms instructor; 
several of the other men were so inexperienced with guns that they did not even know how to 
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properly shoulder a weapon.  It remains unclear how much the men were able to learn, because 
Abduallahu left early.  According to his rendition of events, he did so because he could not 
stomach his friends‘ persistent discussion of violence.47 
However, this outing also helped to reinforce the plotters‘ ideological commitment to 
jihad.  Absent the early departing Abduallau, the remaining men spent the evenings engaged in 
group social activities that likely helped to desensitize the team to violence.  Specifically, they 
‗relaxed‘ by watching terror training and Islamist propaganda videos, and reportedly chuckled at 
the image of a Marine who lost his arm in an IED attack.48  
 The team‘s final training exercises before the arrest were truly hapless.  In late February, 
Eljvir and Shain played paintball with the informant Omar in the woods near Eljvir‘s house.  
They played again in mid-March, around the same time that Dritan ordered the weapons, and this 
time included the Duka‘s pre-teen brother in the game.  The FBI argues that the excursions 
constituted ―tactical training,‖49 but this characterization seems overly ambitious.  While a 
number of police and military units have used paintball to help simulate a live-fire experience,50 
it remains to be seen how games involving only three or four players, one of whom was a young 
boy, could have realistically prepared the plotters to ambush the groups of 100 to 200 soldiers 
specified in their original plan.  At best, the games were confidence building measures that 
bolstered the Duka‘s morale, but, like most civilian paintball experiences, the games may have 
been little more than an exercise in fantasy. 
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8.1.6 SUMMATION 
 Ultimately, al-Qaida‘s role in inspiring the Fort Dix plot seems secondary.  The jihadist 
videos that the plotters watched enthusiastically were certainly a contributing factor, but the 
direct influence that the Dukas‘ radicalized uncle exerted on his nephews seems to have been the 
trigger that pushed the brothers toward fundamentalism, and, in turn, their influence pushed the 
somewhat reluctant Tatar, and possibly also the impressionable and immature Shnewer, down 
the same path.  Moreover, the plotters often viewed jihadist propaganda as a group, so it is 
difficult to separate the videos‘ influence from that of the social interactions that surrounded the 
viewing experience.  In short, the Fort Dix plotters were largely self-radicalized as the result of 
reciprocal friendship ties, and al-Qaida‘s links to the plot were only of the most diffuse and 
indirect type imaginable.   
While the plotters clearly desired to commit violence in the name of Islam, they lacked 
the resources and training necessary to act on this inspiration.  None of the plotters had the 
contacts necessary to obtain the weapons that they needed to implement their plan.  They 
borrowed weapons from a friend and relied on a fictitious supplier created by a government 
informant, who gave the plotters just enough rope to hang themselves through self-incrimination.   
Consequently, by the time of their arrests, they had acquired few guns, most of which were ill-
suited to an armed assault because they had a low capacity for ammunition.  Moreover, none of 
the available materials suggests that the plotters obtained the multiple magazines that would have 
been necessary to enable the sort of rapid reloading necessary to maintain a high enough rate of 
fire to meet their stated goal of killing a hundred or more troops.  Given that the plotters‘ training 
consisted of a pair of trips to the Poconos and a pair of half-hearted paintball games, it seems that 
they lacked not only the materiel to implement Shnewer‘s plan, but also the necessary skills.  
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The plan itself was also far from perfect.  Even with the map that Tatar provided, it 
remains unclear how the plotters could have accessed the post.  Had they attempted to enter the 
installation on the pretense of a pizza delivery, as their plan suggested they might, they would 
likely have been discovered at the gate, because it is standard practice for the Army to search all 
visitors‘ vehicles, event those of familiar delivery people.  Ultimately, the Fort Dix plotters were 
amateur terrorists, whose aspirations far outstripped their abilities. 
  However, this should not suggest that they were entirely harmless.  Despite their 
difficulties in planning, logistics, and training, the Fort Dix plotters would likely have caused 
casualties, probably among the post‘s gate guards, if government efforts had not undermined 
their attack.  The simple truth is that people are easy to kill, especially if the attacker is willing to 
die in the process.  The point is that the Fort Dix plotters would never have met their original 
goals, not that they would have been unable to achieve some level of violence.  Thus, despite the 
plotters‘ almost total incompetence, this case illustrates the inherent dangers of radical 
ideologies, because even the least capable terrorists can cause minor damage. 
 
8.2 THE 2009 LITTLE ROCK SHOOTINGS: AL-QAIDA IN THE ARABIAN OZARKS? 
Abdul Hakim Mujahid Muhammad, an African-American convert to Islam who was 24 
years old at the time of his 2009 arrest, offers a case in point demonstrating the limited threat 
posed by incompetent jihadists.  On June 1, police in Little Rock, Arkansas, responded to a 911 
call.  Shots had been fired at a U.S. Army Recruiting station.  Two soldiers were down with 
multiple gunshot wounds; one man was dead and another was critically wounded.51  Surviving 
witnesses described the assailant as ―a black male, driving a black Ford Explorer Sport Track,‖ 
                                                          
51 Detective Tommy Hudson, ―Officer‘s Report: Arrest of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad,‖ Little Rock Police 
Department, June 1, 2009. 
409 
 
and the officers on scene immediately broadcast this description on a city-wide alert.52  A few 
miles away, near the Interstate, patrol officers conducted a felony stop on a vehicle matching the 
bulletin.  The driver, Muhammad, surrendered without incident, but had a loaded revolver and a 
well-stocked ammunition belt on his person.  Based on this evidence, Police obtained quickly 
obtained a search warrant for the vehicle, where they discovered additional ammunition, 
Molotov cocktails, and the assault rifle used in the shooting.  At Muhammad‘s home, they found 
jihadist propaganda and materials used in the construction of crude liquid-based explosive 
devices.53  In short, the police caught Muhammad red-handed. 
When the case went to trial a few months later, he decided to plead guilty.  In a letter to 
the presiding judge, Muhammad justified his actions as legitimate ―according to Islamic Laws 
and the Islamic Religion.‖54  Moreover, he claimed to be ―affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula‖ and argued that the shooting ―was a Jihadi Attack [sic] on infidel forces.  
That didn‘t go as plan [sic].‖55  These claims implied that one of the few jihadist groups with 
ongoing active ties to the core of bin Laden‘s organization had used an American citizen to 
execute an attack on the American military in the middle of the American heartland.   
However, the evidence suggests that Muhammad greatly exaggerated his ties to the 
global jihadist community.  Despite unequivocally supporting militant ideology, Muhammad 
seems to have lacked meaningful operational, financial, or training ties to any violent Islamist 
group.  Ultimately, the Little Rock shooting was the culmination of a poorly conceived, poorly 
executed campaign of terror conducted in isolation by a single man of questionable competency, 
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who found Islamist ideology broadly appealing and would have fought on behalf of any Islamist 
terror group that would have taken him. 
8.2.1 BACKGROUND 
Muhammad was born Carlos Bledsoe in Memphis, Tennessee, and raised in a Baptist 
household, but his behavior in high school demonstrated that Muhammad was never particularly 
devout in his original faith.  He received several suspensions from school for fighting, was a 
member of the M.O.B. gang,56 and was arrested on at least one occasion for an incident 
involving brass knuckles.57  However, he managed not only to graduate, but also to be accepted 
to college.   
Muhammad spent a year and a half at Tennessee State, in Nashville, before a self-
described ―two blunt a day‖ marijuana habit and pattern of binge drinking ended his scholastic 
career.58  It seems that he may also have continued his involvement in gang violence during this 
period, because in 2004, police in Knoxville, Tennessee, arrested a 19 year-old Muhammad and 
three friends for possession of marijuana and possession of illegal weapons, including an SKS 
automatic rifle and a sawed-off shotgun.  Muhammad‘s later statements to the press indicate that 
several of the weapons were intended for re-sale.  After his conviction, he received a plea deal 
that stipulated he would receive 14 years in prison on the original charges if convicted of another 
crime, no matter how minor, so he endeavored to change his life.59   
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8.2.2 RADICALIZATION 
Toward this goal of self-improvement, Muhammad began a process of religious 
exploration that set his path toward radicalism in motion.  Although Islam ultimately proved to 
be his salvation from substance abuse and gang life, it was not the first religion he explored.  He 
evaluated Christianity, but abandoned the religion of his birth because he found the concept of 
the holy trinity incomprehensible.  He explored Orthodox Judaism, but felt that synagogues were 
excluding him because of his race.  However, he found a warm welcome at a Nashville mosque, 
where according to Muhammad‘s later recollection, the ―brothers shouted ‗Allahu Akbar (god is 
great)‖ when he mentioned he might be interested in their religion and embraced him like he was 
a ―long lost brother.‖60  Although the record does not speak to Muhammad‘s online habits at the 
time of these religious explorations, it seems fairly clear that first-person social interactions 
greatly shaped his religious destiny. 
  After formally converting to Islam in December 2004, Muhammad stopped using drugs 
and alcohol and began to study his new religion more seriously.  His progression from convert to 
Islamist radical seems to have then proceeded over the course of a few years.  After dropping out 
of college, he worked a series of menial jobs, including a yearlong stint as a bellman at the 
Opryland Hotel and a lengthy period as a temp assigned to various warehouses.61  In 2007, a 
little over two years after his conversion, Muhammad, who had now legally changed his name to 
reflect his new faith,62 packed-up and moved to Yemen to pursue Islamic studies.  Though 
clearly devout at this point, his family alleges that he was not yet radical; just before departing 
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for Yemen, Muhammad apparently told his sister not to worry because he was ―not one of those 
Muslims.‖63  
He spent more than two years abroad, supporting himself with a series of itinerant jobs 
teaching English, purportedly in camps for Afghan refugees, and married a local woman in 
February 2009.64  About two months later, Yemeni authorities stopped him at a roadside 
checkpoint and arrested him because his travel documents were in disarray.  Muhammad had no 
visa to be in the country and carried both a fake Somali passport, which he had acquired in hopes 
of joining forces with jihadist groups operating on the Horn of Africa, and his now-expired 
American passport.65   
In short, the documents in Muhammad‘s possession at the time of his arrest demonstrate 
that he transformed from a hard-partying, gang-affiliated college drop-out to an aspiring mujahid 
within the span of five years.  It is hardly a stretch to suggest that first-person contact with some 
of Yemen‘s more fundamentalist mosques helped to harden his ideological devotion to jihad, 
but, as the section on training discusses in more detail, it would be presumptive to assume that 
Muhammad had much, if any, direct contact with known violent extremists.  It is, however, 
worth noting that Muhammad claims to have met several jihadists while briefly incarcerated in 
Yemeni prison after the passport dust-up.66  If true, these assertions, which seem plausible, 
suggest that a man already suffering from the symptoms of Islamist radicalism may have been 
injected with one final shot of religious extremism before returning to the United States.       
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8.2.3 PLANNING 
Yemeni authorities held Muhammad for about two and half months following his arrest, 
before deporting him back to the United States.  According to his own account, he began to 
conceptualize his jihad during this detention.  From the very beginning, he wanted to target 
―different Army recruiting centers and Jewish organizations‖ because of ―what they‘re doing in 
Palestine . . . years of killing Muslims.‖67  Muhammad envisioned a multi-city jihad that would 
target ―Little Rock, Memphis, Nashville, Florence, KY, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and D.C.‖68  
However, he made no immediate efforts to implement this grand vision upon returning to the 
U.S. and instead spent about three months living quietly with his parents in Memphis, before 
moving to Little Rock in April to take a job with his father‘s tour-bus company.  
Once in Arkansas, Muhammad did little more in the way of planning and nothing in the 
way of target-surveillance.  The Army Recruiting Center in Little Rock was not his initial target; 
instead, Muhammad wanted to attack out-of-state.  His sole planning activity consisted of a 
single online research session, during which he found the addresses of two targets: the home of 
an orthodox rabbi in Nashville, Tennessee, which he selected to retaliate for Israel‘s conduct in 
the Palestinian conflict; and an Army Recruiting Center in Florence, Kentucky, which he 
selected to get back at the United States for, in his own words, ―pissing on the Koran.‖69  He did, 
however, put a small amount of thought into tactical considerations and selected the Florence site 
over other potential targets because it was near an Interstate and the Ohio border, which 
Muhammad believed would facilitate his get-away by, respectively, enabling him to flee the 
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scene rapidly and precluding any local law enforcement from crossing jurisdictional lines to 
follow him.70 
8.2.4 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
Muhammad‘s materiel preparations for jihad began in earnest after his move to Arkansas.  
He used the meager earnings from his job to slowly acquire ammunition and second-hand 
weapons.  He deliberately avoided retail purchases because he was concerned that the FBI might 
be tracking him, and he was likely knowledgeable about how to acquire guns on the black 
market from his involvement in illicit weapons sales during his time in the M.O.B. gang.  
However, shortly before the Little Rock shooting, Muhammad decided to buy a .22 caliber rifle 
over the counter from Walmart in order to test how closely the federal government was 
monitoring his movements.  When he was able to walk out of the super-store unmolested, he 
decided he could proceed with an attack because ―The FBI had not put a hold or checked.‖71   
Given that his other weapon of choice was the Molotov cocktail, Muhammad‘s additional 
logistical needs, beyond his vehicle, were commonly available items: glass bottles, gasoline and 
oil to fill them, and cloth rags to serve as primitive wicks.  Indeed, other than the purchase of 
guns, the greatest expense that Muhammad incurred during the course of the operation was the 
cost of the fuel that he burned by driving to designated attack sites out-of-state.  After his 
capture, Muhammad would even lament that he might have been able to accomplish more, if gas 
had not been nearly four dollars per gallon.72  Clearly, a jihadist who purchased small-caliber 
weapons from Walmart and worried about the cost of a tank of gasoline did not benefit from any 
outside financial or logistical support.     
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8.2.5 TRAINING 
Despite Muhammad‘s claim to have held some vague ties to violent Yemeni Islamist 
groups, his training was as haphazard as his planning and his logistical preparation.  Muhammad 
claims that ―people from the US embassy‖ interviewed him during his detention abroad, because 
he had ―literature, contact, cell, videos, and people‘s numbers on [his] phone that were wanted in 
Saudi Arabia.‖73  However, if Muhammad‘s contacts with jihadists were as significant as he 
claims, it seems unlikely that the government of Yemen, which human rights organizations have 
repeatedly accused of arbitrarily detaining and torturing terror suspects,74 would have released 
Muhammad so swiftly, or that the U.S. government, which has prosecuted several other 
American citizens on conspiracy charges for receiving terror training abroad,75 would have taken 
no legal action against him upon his return to American soil.  It seems that Muhammad 
exaggerated the significance of his interactions with foreign extremists.  Evidence irrefutably 
demonstrating that he had received any sort of formal training in Yemen or elsewhere would be 
truly surprising. 
On the domestic side, Muhammad‘s only other training took place in the weeks 
immediately preceding the attack, when he shot targets at a handful of deserted construction sites 
near his home in Little Rock.  Like his limited planning exercise, these practice sessions seem to 
have been solo affairs.  There is absolutely no evidence that any organization or individual 
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helped Muhammad to prepare for his jihad.76 To be blunt: Muhammad‘s escapades made the 
Fort Dix plotters‘ training experience in the Poconos seem comparatively rigorous. 
8.2.6 OPERATIONS 
Given his almost complete lack of preparation and training, it is not surprising that 
Muhammad‘s efforts in jihad were ultimately haphazard and amateurish.  Indeed, they were 
largely impromptu affairs.  He did little more than mix a batch of Molotov cocktails and load his 
weapons into his vehicle before setting-off down the highway in pursuit of Islamic vengeance.77   
Muhammad‘s first attempt at violence was to firebomb the rabbi‘s house in Nashville, but 
the attack, which took place just a few hours before the Little Rock shooting, was an utter failure.  
Because Muhammad had conducted no reconnaissance, he did not know that the home‘s 
windows were made of Plexiglas, so when he hurled a Molotov cocktail against one, the bomb 
bounced harmlessly into the yard without damaging the house.  Muhammad hurried quickly from 
the scene in order to avoid capture and proceeded to his second pre-determined target, but his 
lack of preparation caught-up with him again in Kentucky.  Muhammad was unable to stage an 
attack in Florence because the recruiting center was closed; the would-be terrorist had apparently 
neglected to determine the center‘s schedule of operation.78   
Crestfallen, Muhammad returned home to Little Rock to plan for another attack, when, 
by happenstance, he spotted ―two guys in Army fatigues smoking‖ in a parking lot and decided 
on a spur-of-the-moment attack.  Using tactics that echoed his gang background rather than time 
spent in a desert training camp, Muhammad drove casually through the parking lot, as if looking 
for a space, and used an SKS assault rifle to conduct a drive-by on the unsuspecting soldiers.  He 
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panicked in the get-away and got lost in some nearby road construction; police captured 
Muhammad before he even reached the Interstate.79   
8.2.7 SUMMATION 
Given Muhammad‘s near-continual incompetence, he paints the picture of an imitator 
who sought to replicate the sort of violence committed by well-known Islamist terror groups, 
rather than the AQAP-trained mujahid he claimed to be in his letter to the judge who presided 
over his criminal case.  Muhammad‘s failed attempt to enter Somalia and his repeated claims of 
affiliation with prominent Middle Eastern terror groups demonstrate that he subscribed to a 
broadly defined Salafist ideology, but despite his best efforts, it seems he never made any 
significant end-roads into the terrorist community.   
At best Muhammad‘s connections to established jihadists were vague, loose, and non-
operational; at worst, these connections were entirely imagined.  Indeed, Muhammad‘s father 
believed that his son made-up the AQAP connections in the hopes that they would anger the 
judge presiding over his case enough to impose the death penalty, thereby martyring the 
incompetent gunman.80  Regardless of any relationships that Muhammad formed in Yemen, it is 
clear that he did not benefit from formal training, outside financial assistance, or any sort of 
logistical support in the immediate run-up to the attacks.  Muhammad also conducted the little 
planning that preceded the attack on his own.   
As no information is available on his Internet activity, it is impossible to assess the role 
that online propaganda may have played in his early indoctrination, but it seems clear that his 
first-hand experience at the Nashville mosque brought him into Islam, while his first-hand 
experience living in fundamentalist-influenced Yemen hardened Muhammad‘s ideology.  
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Though the difference may be excessively fussy, he is, therefore, most aptly characterized as a 
homegrown AQAP-inspired terrorist, rather than a homegrown al-Qaida inspired terrorist.  But 
regardless of how observers choose to classify Muhammad‘s organizational aspirations, his 
ineptitude should dominate any descriptions. 
Ultimately, Muhammad‘s case demonstrates just how easy it is to conduct rudimentary 
terror attacks.  Working in isolation, a man who forensic psychiatrists would later describe as ―at 
the low end of the Average range of intelligence‖ was able to attempt three separate attacks in 
the course of a single day.81  Two of them failed completely, and the third caused few casualties.  
However, the shooting in Little Rock still killed one American serviceman and severely 
wounded another.  Had Muhammad been even passably competent as a terrorist, he could have 
inflicted substantial loss of life and damage to property.     
Despite Muhammad‘s failings, it seems clear in retrospect that federal law enforcement 
erred in its treatment of him, because events demonstrate that the young deportee should have 
been placed under the type of surveillance that he feared after returning from Yemen.  
Muhammad‘s specific attack was likely preventable, but other such rudimentary assaults are not, 
because few members of the radicalized Muslim community are likely to pass through similar 
deportation controls.  So long as American society remains open, radical ideologies will continue 
to constitute a diffuse security threat, because Muhammad‘s peers need not have any operational, 
financial, logistical, or training ties to organizations like al-Qaida, nor any particular aptitude for 
planning or familiarity with the arts of war, in order to take-up arms in furtherance of their 
perception of the Islamist cause.  While the Fort Dix plotters‘ amateurish efforts toward jihad 
and Muhammad‘s bumbling attacks both suggest that the scale of this threat is almost negligible, 
the final case in this chapter demonstrates that individuals with loose, non-operational 
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connections to existing jihadist groups can cause moderate damage if they are competent in their 
planning and preparation.   
 
8.3 THE 2009 FORT HOOD SHOOTING 
On November 5, 2009, Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army major and a medical doctor 
specializing in psychiatry, shot and killed 13 people and wounded another 32.  Most of his 
victims were fellow soldiers.  Like Muhammad, Hasan acted alone, without the benefit of 
outside logistical, financial, training, or planning support.  Also like Muhammad, Hasan held 
ideological ties to AQAP.  Although many of these interactions involved online activity, Hasan‘s 
interactions with foreign Islamists were both more detailed and more personal than the online 
activities of the Fort Dix plotters.  Specifically, he exchanged emails with Anwar al-Awlaki, a 
Yemeni-American cleric who served as AQAP‘s mouthpiece until his death in 2011.82  While 
these exchanges demonstrate that the Internet figured prominently in Hasan‘s connections to the 
broader jihadist movement, the full context of his ideological history suggests that even in this 
case, first-person social interactions played the larger role in radicalization. 
8.3.1 BACKGROUND  
 The evidence suggests that Hasan spent his childhood in a largely secular household, 
rather than a hotbed of Islamist sentiment.  In 1970, Hasan was born in Alexandria, Virginia, to 
Muslim parents who made their living as restaurateurs after immigrating to the United States 
from a small Palestinian town outside Jerusalem.  By the time Hasan entered high school in the 
mid-1980s, his parents owned and operated the Capitol Restaurant, a greasy spoon in Roanoke, 
Virginia, that the local paper remembered fondly as ―a blue-collar beer hall‖ where ―patrons 
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enjoyed greasy blue-plate specials and sipped on Old Milwaukees in the worn wooden booths 
while a jukebox played Motown.‖83  The family later parlayed the success of the Capitol into a 
series of other ventures, including a hot dog stand, a grocery, and a Mediterranean-themed 
restaurant known for its selection of imported beers.  The local Imam does not remember the 
Hasans, suggesting that they attended the mosque infrequently, and Nidal lacked fluency in 
Arabic, suggesting that the family spoke English even at home.  In combination with the family‘s 
consistent willingness to profit from alcohol, it seems clear that Hasan was raised in a household 
that emphasized assimilation and material success more than strict Koranic values.84  
 If Hasan held any radical views that diverged from the values suggested by his parents‘ 
behavior, they remained well-disguised behind a veil of anonymity throughout his youth.  His 
high school classmates remember him as bright and laid-back, but not particularly involved.  
Hasan took advanced placement classes, but did not participate in any clubs or sports.  Against 
the wishes of his parents, he enlisted in the Army immediately after graduating in 1988, and then 
underwent basic training at Fort Sam Houston, in Texas, before landing at Fort Irwin, in San 
Bernardino County, California, and enrolling part time at nearby Barstow Community College.  
Hasan made no impressions, positively or negatively, on the school‘s faculty; his transcripts 
show that he made high grades, but none of the teachers still on staff at the time of Hasan‘s 2009 
shooting remembered him.85   
In 1990, Hasan, who was still in uniform, moved back to Roanoke, presumably to be 
close to his family, and transferred to Virginia Western Community College.  He continued his 
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pattern of anonymity and scholastic achievement, graduating summa cum laude with an 
Associate‘s Degree in science in 1992, but failing to make a lasting impression on anyone at the 
school.  Hasan then advanced to Virginia Tech, where in 1995, he earned a Bachelor‘s of 
Science in biochemistry, graduating with honors, but again failing to participate in any activities 
outside the classroom.  In short, Hasan was not an Islamist firebrand in his youth; instead, the 
future terrorist was a bookworm who blended quietly into the background.86 
8.3.2 RADICALIZATION 
 Hasan‘s extremism began to manifest publically in the early 2000s, during his medical 
residency.  In 1997, he received an officer‘s commission, and based on the strength of his earlier 
academic achievements, the Army decided to send him to medical school at the highly-selective 
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), in Bethesda, Maryland.  When 
Hasan graduated in 2003, he began an internship in Psychiatry at Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center, and according to statements that a fellow intern made to investigators after the shooting, 
―Hasan openly questioned whether he could engage in combat against other Muslims‖ during the 
early part of this program.87  One of his supervisors became so concerned about Hasan‘s views 
that he attempted to convince the young doctor to leave the military on two different occasions 
during his third year in the program, bluntly telling Hasan that he should ―just say goodbye‖ 
because he and the military just did not fit.  The same officer even helped Hasan to explore 
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whether or not he qualified for conscientious objector status, but this effort to find a back-door 
out of the military failed.88   
Then, in 2006, during the final year of Hasan‘s residency at Walter Reed, his radicalism 
reached alarming levels during his presentation at ―Grand Rounds,‖ a formal meeting at which 
residents must present a detailed scholarly talk on a psychiatric issue in order to graduate.  
Hasan‘s presentation consisted of little more than Koranic references and did not cite any 
medical or psychological literature.89 Among the more worrying aspects of the presentation was 
Hasan‘s emphasis on the idea of Abrogation, a theological perspective that Islamists use to 
ignore inconvenient portions of the Koran by arguing that the Prophet Mohammed‘s later 
revelations supersede earlier teachings.90  Consequently, Hasan concluded that ―peaceful verses 
[of the Koran] no longer apply,‖91 and ―Fighting to establish an Islamic State to please God, even 
by force, is condoned by the Islam.‖92  Hasan‘s supervisors forced some revisions, yet owning to 
a lack of established academic criteria for evaluating Grand Rounds presentations and amid 
concerns that failing a Muslim might be perceived as politically incorrect, the review committee 
ultimately signed-off on this non-clinical project and pushed the budding extremist through the 
program.93  
 After graduating from his residency, Hasan received a post-doctoral fellowship at 
USUHS, during which he exhibited behavior that demonstrated that his extremist views had 
solidified.  He applied for the position in order to avoid a combat deployment to a Muslim 
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country, and was accepted for the worst of reasons: Hasan was the only Army applicant for the 
position, and the program‘s director was concerned that leaving the fellowship vacant would 
result in its elimination the following year.  Thus, Hasan‘s advancement said more about 
bureaucratic politics within the Army than it did about his promise as a mental health 
professional. 
 Indeed, Hasan seemed more concerned with advancing Islamist theology than providing 
psychiatric care.  According to Hasan‘s co-fellows, who were officers drawn from other 
branches of the military, he displayed ―fixed radical beliefs about fundamentalist Islam‖ and 
shared them ―at every possible opportunity.‖94  For example, during an August 2007 meeting, 
Hasan gave a presentation which argued that ―U.S. Military operations are a war against Islam 
rather than based on non-religious security considerations.‖95  Audience members were so 
offended that they broke the norms of academic politeness and shouted their objections at the 
podium, forcing the moderator of the panel to stop the presentation two minutes after it began.   
Rather than an isolated incident, this presentation was indicative of broader patterns.  In 
another classroom setting, Hasan argued in defense of suicide-bombers and stated that his faith 
as a Muslim took precedence over the patriotic oaths that he swore as an Army officer.  Finally, 
in June 2008, Hasan began a research project, which he couched in more clinical language than 
his previous ‗studies,‘ that sought to measure the extent of Islamist sympathies among Muslim 
soldiers.  The project included a survey that a Senate investigation later described as ―slanted to 
favor the violent Islamist extremist views that he had previously expressed,‖ and in an ominous 
foreshadowing of events to come, Hasan listed concerns over ―fratricide by Muslim-American 
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servicememebers [sic]‖ as his project‘s central motivation.96  In short, Hasan was no longer the 
quiet, studious young man that he had been when he graduated from Virginia Tech.  By 2007, he 
had become a dedicated Islamist who believed that his religious beliefs trumped all other 
obligations.  
 What caused Hasan to change so drastically?  The available evidence suggests that a 
combination of innate susceptibility and traumatic personal losses made Hasan uniquely 
vulnerable to radical influences.  According to family members, Hasan was deeply sensitive.  His 
uncle recounted that Hasan once tried to save a baby bird, by placing it in his mouth so that it 
could eat pre-masticated food, and that when his efforts failed, Hasan ―mourned for two or three 
months, dug a grave for it (the bird) and visited it.‖97  Similarly, Hasan chose psychiatry as his 
medical specialty because he had difficulty with the sight of blood, and actually fainted the first 
time he observed child birth as a medical student.98  Thus, it seems that Hasan was ill-equipped 
to deal with emotional trauma.    
However, he received a pair of crippling emotional blows during medical school.  In 
1998, Hasan‘s father died of a massive heart attack at age 52, and in 2001, his mother, only age 
49, followed her husband into the grave.99  Hasan turned to the Koran for comfort and delved 
into books on Islam instead of interacting with friends.100  Islam is not inherently violent, so 
Hasan‘s renewed interest in his religion did not necessarily presage his involvement in terrorist 
violence; instead, chance intervened by placing the Army officer in contact with a radical 
preacher during a period of increased emotional vulnerability. 
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Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American preacher who later gained fame as an AQAP 
ideologue, came to northern Virginia in January 2001, and assumed the position of Imam at the 
Dar al-Hijra Mosque in Falls Church, where Hasan often worshipped.  By that time, al-Awlaki 
had already begun to preach interpretations that appealed to Islamists.  Nawaf al-Hazmi and 
Khalid al-Mihdhar, two of the terrorists onboard American Airlines Flight 77 when it crashed 
into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, had frequented al-Awlaki‘s sermons during their brief 
stint in San Diego in early 2000, when the preacher still worked at the Rabat Mosque in the 
city‘s near-suburbs.  Similarly, in March of 2001, al-Hazmi, who was now located on the east 
coast, began to attend services at Dar al-Hijra and brought with him Hani Hanjour, another of the 
Pentagon-bound hijackers. 101  Although the FBI doubts that al-Awlaki had direct knowledge of 
the 9/11 attacks,102 the preacher‘s repeated interactions with the hijackers suggest that his beliefs 
were already ideologically congruent with al-Qaida‘s worldview.  Therefore, it seems safe to 
assume that Hasan came in direct, first-person contact with radical ideology when al-Awlaki 
presided over the funeral services of the Army officer‘s mother in 2001.103  Ultimately, the 
evidence suggests that fate created a perfect storm that initiated Hasan‘s radicalism by placing 
the exceptionally sensitive and increasingly devout Army officer in contact with an influential 
radical ideologue during a period of extreme emotional crisis. 
The first-person interactions that Hasan had with soldiers returning from Iraq and 
Afghanistan in his capacity as an Army psychiatrist then cemented the views that al-Awlaki had 
planted.  According to family members, Hasan was ―mortified‖ by the stories of violence against 
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Muslims that traumatized soldiers recounted during clinical sessions.104  One fellow officer at 
Fort Hood, where Hasan was posted after completing his USUHS fellowship in 2008, claimed 
that the doctor even petitioned the Army to prosecute some of his patients for war crimes based 
on revelations they made during confidential counseling sessions.105  Even if such claims are 
exaggerated, it seems clear that Hasan‘s job afforded him the opportunity to cherry-pick and re-
interpret evidence that supported the biased vision of American-Muslim relations that al-Awlaki 
previously helped to instill.   
 Moreover, al-Awlaki continued to wield influence over Hasan via the Internet, but the 
preacher followed a circuitous route to online prominence.  Spooked by an FBI inquiry into his 
activities that followed in the wake of 9/11, al-Awlaki fled the US for London in 2002.  In 
Britain, he conducted a series of lectures for crowds of young Muslims, but without any viable 
means of financial self-support in Britain, al-Awlaki returned to his ancestral home of Yemen in 
2004, and began lecturing at al-Imam University, a radical Sunni institution headed by Abdul-
Majid al-Zindani, a cleric who appears on U.S. terrorist sanctioning lists and who once tutored 
the ―American Taliban,‖ John Walker Lindh.  Beginning in 2006, al-Awlaki spent 18 months in 
a Yemeni prison in connection with a plot to kidnap an American military attaché.  When he 
emerged, he hid among his tribe, the Awaliq, and began distributing his radical message using a 
wide range of media, including audio CDs, booklets, and a worryingly popular Facebook page.  
By the time that Hasan neared completion of his USUHS fellowship, al-Awlaki had become one 
of the violent Islamist movement‘s most prominent spokesmen, in no small part because he 
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frequently disseminated his message in English, thereby making it accessible to non-Arabic 
speakers like Hasan.106  
The timeline of Hasan‘s actions suggest that the Army doctor was an avid reader of al-
Awlaki‘s online posts.  For example, in early December 2008, al-Awlaki issued a statement 
condemning any Muslim who would seek a religious ruling ―that would allow him to serve in the 
armies of the disbelievers and fight against his brothers.‖107  Hasan emailed the radical cleric a 
few days later.  It was the pair‘s first known contact since their shared time in the D.C. area, but 
over the next six months Hasan and al-Awlaki traded an additional 17 messages.  In one of the 
most worrying, Hassan alluded to his intent to conduct a suicide-attack, telling al-Awlaki that 
―he couldn‘t wait to join him in the discussions they would have over non-alcoholic wine in the 
afterlife.‖108  Then, in mid-July 2009, al-Awlaki offered a harsh rebuke to Muslim soldiers 
serving in the American military in an online post stating that ―the blame should be placed on the 
soldier who is willing to follow orders . . . who sells his religion for a few dollars.‖ 109  Two 
weeks later, Hasan purchased the handgun he used in the Fort Hood shooting. 
Ultimately, Hasan‘s path to radicalism did traverse the Internet, but as with the Fort Dix 
plotters, his online radical ties seem to have taken place after he already subscribed to a militant 
interpretation of Islam.  His first-person interactions with al-Awlaki and then with battle-fatigued 
psychiatric patients fostered and cemented Hasan‘s belief system, before al-Awlaki‘s online 
posts and email messages gave it a more specific shape.  While Hasan‘s history demonstrates 
that he had direct contact with radical Islam, it is necessary to close this section with an 
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important clarification regarding the extent of Hasan‘s ties to known terrorists: The evidence has 
demonstrated only that he attended the same mosque as two of the 9/11 hijackers, not that he 
ever had any direct interactions with them.  Hasan‘s ideological relationship with al-Awlaki 
constituted the Army major‘s only demonstrable interactions with an established jihadist. 
8.3.3 PLANNING 
While the timing of Hasan‘s actions relative to al-Awlaki‘s published statements suggests 
that the Army major unquestioningly followed the cleric‘s broad decrees, it remains to be seen 
that al-Awlaki provided any specific guidance regarding the conduct of the Fort Hood shooting.  
However, it is difficult to have complete confidence in this assessment, as the full contents of the 
pairs‘ email exchanges have never been publically released.  Therefore, with this caveat, it seems 
that Hasan planned the operation in isolation, and, based on the timing of al-Awlaki‘s polemic 
against Muslims serving in the American military, that Hasan first began to conceive of the 
operation sometime in mid-July, about two and a half months before the shooting took place. 
It is difficult, and perhaps even unnecessary, to assess any specific reconnaissance that 
Hasan conducted on the attack-site between this mid-summer inspiration and the date of the 
shooting in early November, because his was an insider attack.  He clearly knew the location 
exceptionally well.  The shooting took place at an Army processing facility through which all 
troops leaving for (or returning from) active deployments must pass in order to receive medical 
treatment and where Hasan, as one of Fort Hood‘s physicians, worked frequently.110   Thus, 
Hasan was intimately familiar with the facility‘s layout and traffic flow and likely had no need to 
conduct any additional surveillance in specific preparation for his attack.  Needless to say, no 
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members of outside terror groups played a role in helping the Army doctor to familiarize himself 
with the processing center. 
8.3.4 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS 
 The logistics of Hasan‘s attack took place in similar isolation.  He had no need for 
outside funding, because his operation required only the purchase of a handgun and 
ammunition—items that were easily within the budget of the major‘s $92,000 per year income.  
Indeed, financial ties between Hasan and the global jihadist movement ran in the other direction, 
albeit indirectly.  Hasan lived exceptionally modestly in an off-post apartment so that he could 
make significant zakat (Islamic tithing) contributions; estimates claim that he donated 
approximately one-third of his annual income to Islamic charities, many of which held implicit 
financial ties to terror groups.111 
As regards the choosing of specific supplies, Hasan was methodical and selective.   On 
August 1, about two weeks after al-Awlaki‘s condemnation of Muslim-American soldiers, Hasan 
entered ―Guns Galore‖ in Killeen, Texas, and sought the advice of salesmen and customers to 
find ―the most high-tech handgun‖ on the market.  He then purchased an FN Five-Seven semi-
automatic pistol, because of its light weight and 30 round capacity ammunition clip, as well as an 
expensive laser sight to make the weapon easier to aim.112  At some point prior to the attack—the 
timing of the event is unknown—Hasan also acquired a Smith and Wesson .357 magnum 
revolver, which police found on his person, loaded but unfired, in the aftermath of the attack.113   
In the several weeks preceding the attack, the major slowly stockpiled both ammunition 
and spare magazines, so that he could reload quickly on the day of the attack by simply 
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swapping-out empty clips for pre-loaded replacements.114  The pace of his acquisitions suggests 
that Hasan wanted to avoid raising suspicion by purchasing too many items at once.  In short, it 
seems that from his choice of gun to the manner in which he bought bullets, everything Hasan 
did was in careful preparation for a shooting spree. 
8.3.5 TRAINING 
Like the Fort Dix plotters and Muhammad, Hasan self-trained by shooting at a firing 
range.  However, the major was more methodical in his preparation.  In lieu of intermittent trips 
to the Poconos or impromptu practice sessions at abandoned construction sites, Hasan visited the 
range more than once a week for roughly two months.115  Moreover, as a former enlisted soldier 
and a current Army officer, Hasan benefitted from experience that was the plotters discussed in 
the previous cases never had.  Simply put, Hasan may not have needed much in the way of 
training beyond what he had already learned from the very organization he was about to attack. 
8.3.6 OPERATIONS 
On November 5, the attack began a little after 1.30pm, when Hasan, who had been 
quietly sitting at a table in the middle of the processing center, rose and shouted ―Allahu Akbar 
(god is great),‖ before firing at a crowd of soldiers who had queued awaiting medical 
examination.  Witnesses described his actions as cool and methodical; Hasan passed-up several 
opportunities to shoot civilians and instead concentrated his fire on those in uniform.  Indeed, the 
only civilian to die in the attack was a civilian psychiatrist, who charged Hasan in an attempt to 
disarm him.116  The extra rounds and magazines Hasan had purchased allowed him to reload so 
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swiftly that his rate of fire was almost continuous; one staff sergeant, who was waiting to receive 
an anthrax vaccination-booster in another room of the processing facility when the shooting 
began, initially though that someone had opened fire with an M16.117   
When Hasan left the processing facility in search of more targets, he encountered two 
members of Fort Hood‘s civilian police department, who felled him in an exchange of fire that 
left both officers wounded and the gunman paralyzed from the chest down.  According to a count 
of the spent bullet casings found at the scene, Hasan fired 214 rounds during his 10-minute 
rampage, and when police searched the crippled attacker, they found an additional 177 rounds in 
extra magazines, as well as the loaded .357 magnum revolver.  Thus, Hasan would have been 
able to cause several more casualties, if police had not halted his fratricidal attack.118 
8.3.7 SUMMATION 
 Like the preceding discussion of the 2009 Little Rock shootings, Hasan‘s case suggests 
that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has begun to play an especially worrying role in the 
promulgation of radical ideology among homegrown American Islamists.  It was to this 
organization, rather than the core group of al-Qaida, that Hasan held ties.  Although these links 
were direct, personal, and comparatively strong, the currently available evidence suggests that 
they were entirely of a non-operational character.  Al-Awlaki fomented the shooting by inspiring 
Hasan, but the radical preacher does not seem to have directed the major‘s actions.  To be blunt, 
it seems that Hasan planned the specifics of the event in isolation.  Moreover, Hasan took care of 
his own logistics and finance, as well as the little training that he required beyond the knowledge 
he already possessed from his time in uniform.  Thus, like the Little Rock shooting, Hasan‘s 
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rampage is also best described as an AQAP-inspired attack, albeit one that was planned and 
executed with considerably greater skill. 
The Fort Hood shooting is also similar to the Little Rock attack in another important way: 
both were ultimately preventable.  Hasan‘s superiors at USUHS and Walter Reed share some 
culpability for his attack, because although Hasan consistently ranked in the lowest 25 percent of 
his residency and fellowship programs, he received positive performance reviews that stressed 
the value of his ‗research‘ into Islamist extremism.  Not only did these assessments facilitate 
Hasan‘s promotion from captain to major—the promotion that landed the Army doctor at Fort 
hood—they  also had the second-order effect of discouraging federal investigators assigned to a 
San Diego-based Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) from adequately investigating Hasan‘s 
background when they became aware of his email exchange with al-Awlaki, who had been on 
the FBI‘s radar since the preacher‘s association with the 9/11 hijackers first came to light in 
2002.  Based on the Army‘s official assessment of Hasan, investigators concluded that his 
communications must be part of legitimate research on terrorism, and closed their inquiry in a 
single day.119  Had they conducted even the most cursory examination of Hasan‘s finances, they 
would have had cause for concern, because this inquiry would have revealed his association with 
Islamist ‗charities.‘120  Therefore, hasty police work also contributed to the failure. 
 However, Hasan‘s attack differs from the Little Rock shooting in another very key way: 
in terms of impact.  The Fort Hood shooting ultimately demonstrates the extent of damage that 
jihadists whose only ties to existing terror groups are ideological in nature can cause.  Despite 
struggling during portions of his medical training, Hasan‘s overall pattern of scholastic 
achievement demonstrates that he was exceptionally bright, if perhaps a touch unstable.  Thus, 
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his planning and careful preparations are quite likely near the high-end of what any aspiring 
jihadist could initiate without substantive assistance from an outside group.   
Similarly, as an American citizen and a resident of Texas (a state with notoriously liberal 
gun laws), Hasan did not face the same logistical hurdles that plagued the weapons-acquisition 
efforts undertaken by the Duka brothers, who as undocumented immigrants had no ability to 
purchase arms on the legitimate market.  Therefore, Hasan‘s case also offers an example of 
logistical conditions that are nearly ideal for jihadists.  The major could have acquired virtually 
any pistol or rifle on the market with relative ease.   
His level of training was also reasonably high.  As a former Army enlisted man and a 
serving Army officer, Hasan had received professional firearms instruction at various points in 
his military career.  Nothing suggests that Hasan was an expert marksman, but his weapons 
proficiency was far higher than levels self-trained terrorists would be likely to obtain on their 
own.  
Finally, Hasan‘s nearly six figure income demonstrates that he could have met the 
financial and logistical requirements of a much larger attack with relative ease, especially if he 
had been willing to bankrupt himself in the process, because, after all, martyrs have little need of 
material things.  Therefore, the relatively unsophisticated nature of his attack cannot be written-
off to financial constraints as could be done in relation to Muhammad‘s amateurish efforts at 
jihad.  Put differently, Hasan‘s method of attack is likely indicative of broader trends not only 
because the Fort Dix plotters and the Little Rock shooter employed (or attempted to employ) 
similar approaches, but also because Hasan‘s finances did not constrain him to this approach.   
More destructive scenarios than the Fort Hood shooting remain a possibility, but given 
that a smart, well-financed, reasonably well-trained jihadist with fairly broad access to weapons 
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was able to cause only moderate casualties, it seems unlikely that other terrorists operating 
without organizational support will fare much better.  Hasan‘s case, therefore, suggests that 
homegrown terrorists with loose non-functional connections to established radical groups remain 
a threat, but a limited one.  It seems that al-Qaida (or AQAP) inspired terrorists are fairly 
unlikely to cause more than two or three dozen serious casualties in any single attack.  To be 
blunt: homegrown Islamist terrorism does not even come close to representing an existential 
threat to the United States.  
 Finally, beyond threat assessments, Hasan‘s experience says a great deal about the role 
that first-hand interactions play in the indoctrination process, especially when this case is viewed 
alongside this chapter‘s other two cases.  Although the Internet played an important role in 
radicalization in at least two of the three cases, timing is everything.  Both Hassan and the Fort 
Dix plotters seem to have consumed the bulk of their online jihadist propaganda after they 
already subscribed to radical ideologies, much the way that new golfers often begin to watch 
PGA events on television in the hopes of emulating tour professionals.  While this consumption 
almost certainly helped to harden these jihadists’ radical views, first-person interactions with 
other existing fundamentalists seem to have been the initial trigger in both cases, as 
demonstrated by Hasan‘s interaction with al-Awlaki in Virginia in 2001, and the Duka brothers‘ 
purported interactions with their radicalized ex-convict uncle and their subsequent influence over 
the other Fort Dix plotters.  Though the open-source record has remained mute on Muhammad‘s 
consumption of online propaganda, the Little Rock case also demonstrates the importance of 
first-person interactions, because the social treatment he respectively received from Jewish and 
Muslim congregations ultimately determined which religion he selected, and his time in 
fundamentalist-influenced Yemen changed him from a devout Muslim into a radical Islamist.   
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8.4 CONCLUSION 
Although it may be inappropriate to draw conclusions about the overall extent of al-
Qaida‘s ideological role in the global violent Islamist movement based solely on three cases, the 
similarities between the events discussed in this chapter make it possible to draw reasonable 
conclusions about the nature of the al-Qaida‘s involvement in plots and attacks conducted by 
―homegrown‖ American jihadists.  As table 8.1 summarizes, al-Qaida has had a small and often 
indirect ideological role in such attacks, but has not played a demonstrable functional role.  
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Table 8.1: Al-Qaida’s Role in Plots and Attacks by Homegrown American Jihadists 
 
 
2007 Fort Dix Plot 
  
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Ideology Partial  
Dukas also likely influenced by prison-
radicalized uncle 
Planning Unlikely 
Plotters planned all aspects of attack 
independently 
Finance Unlikely  
Plotters self-financed the attack with personal 
savings 
Logistics Unlikely 
Plotters indpendently acquired weapons via 
personal connections and black market 
Training Unlikely Plotters 'trained' independently 
   
2009 Little Rock Shootings  
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Ideology Indirect  Muhammad was AQAP-inspired 
Planning Unlikely 
Muhammad planned all aspects of attack 
indpendently (and badly) 
Finance Unlikely  
Muhammad self-financed the attack with 
personal savings 
Logistics Unlikely 
Muhammad independently acquired weapons via 
black market and legitimate purchases 
Training Unlikely Muhammad 'trained' independently 
   
2009 Fort Hood Shooting 
 
Nature of AQ 
Involvement 
Extent of AQ 
Involvement 
Notes 
Ideology Indirect  Hasan was AQAP-inspired 
Planning Unlikely 
Hasan planned all aspects of attack indpendently, 
with strategic inspiration from al-Awlaki 
Finance Unlikely  
Hasan self-financed the attack with personal 
savings 
Logistics Unlikely 
Hasan acquired weapons via legitimate 
purchases 
Training Unlikely 
Hasan received U.S. Army training and practiced 
shooting skills independently 
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Moreover, the theoretical implications of these cases are fairly clear and help to resolve 
the existing debate regarding the nature of the Internet‘s role in the radicalization process.  While 
these cases demonstrate that online jihadist propaganda remains a worrying phenomenon 
because it helps to harden radical viewpoints, the evidence suggests that theories which argue 
that the consumption of online propaganda leads to the adoption of radical views are deeply 
flawed.  Indeed, it seems that such arguments may have reversed the direction of causality, 
because several of the individuals included in these cases began to view large quantities of 
propaganda only after becoming radicalized.  Repeated interactions with individuals who already 
held radical views seem to have played the largest role in the indoctrination process, suggesting 
that radicalization is a socio-cultural process that requires first-person involvement, rather than 
virtual participation.   
However, the limited scope of this inquiry dictates that additional research is required 
both to establish the frequency of these patterns and to measure the scale of interactions between 
variables.  Given that it seems unlikely that all radicals follow the same trajectory in their 
adoption of extremist viewpoints, additional research must also assess the existence and 
regularity of other pathways to radicalization.  Ultimately, this chapter raises as many questions 
as it answers.   
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
At the broadest level, this analysis has shown that al-Qaida‘s involvement in Islamist-
motivated terror devolved in the decade following the 9/11 attacks.  The modified snowball data, 
the Newman-based modeling process, and the Baleian typology combined to demonstrate that 
after 2001 the number of plots and attacks in which al-Qaida played a strong functional role 
spiked briefly in 2002 and 2003, before falling in 2004.  By 2005, al-Qaida was strongly 
involved in only a small handful of annual Islamist-motivated terror attacks and plots, and as of 
2010, the organization had not regained a more prominent role.   Al-Qaida‘s weak functional 
involvement in events followed a similar pattern, and tailed-off dramatically after reaching a 
high in 2004.  In recent years, former members of al-Qaida have conducted an increasingly large 
share of the total number of Islamist-motivated terror plots and attacks, owing in no small part to 
the efforts of AQAP.  Indeed, al-Qaida‘s alumni were responsible for roughly 30 percent of the 
terror events included in the snowball sample in 2010.  Meanwhile, the share of ―al-Qaida 
inspired‖ plots and attacks has never been especially large and has comprised more than 10 
percent of the total events in a given year.  Since the middle of the decade, a majority of Islamist-
motivated terror events have not involved bin Laden‘s organization in any way.  Thus, the 
numbers suggest that today‘s al-Qaida is far from the global terrorist juggernaut that some 
observers assume it to be. 
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As table 9.1 summarizes, the nature of al-Qaida‘s involvement in terror attacks has also 
degraded substantially over time.  The quality and capability of attack-teams closely associated 
with the organization are far lower today than they were in the late-1990s and early-2000s, when 
al-Qaida respectively bombed U.S. Embassies in East Africa and conducted the 9/11 attacks on 
New York and Washington, D.C.  Regardless of whether attacks and plots were conducted on al-
Qaida‘s ―home turf‖ or in the Western world, the teams responsible for these events have 
become progressively less trained, while simultaneously receiving decreased access to al-Qaida‘s 
financial and logistical resources.  Given these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the amount 
of support al-Qaida has been able to offer to partner organizations has also waned tremendously.  
For example, Jemaah Islamiyah‘s experience suggests that organizations that once received 
limited operational and financial backing from bin Laden‘s organization now operate without the 
benefit of al-Qaida‘s strategic, tactical, logistical, or financial support.  The evidence suggests 
that by the mid-2000s, even the historical training relationship that existed between JI and bin 
Laden‘s organization had dissipated. 
 However, the data also suggests that there is some variance in the nature of regional 
organizations‘ respective relationships to al-Qaida.  Neither AQIM nor AQAP appear to have 
ever benefited from the type of financial support that JI formerly enjoyed, yet the training 
relationship between these organizations and al-Qaida, while still historical, continues to 
influence AQIM and AQAP to a greater extent that JI, quite likely because these organizations 
have yet to fully experience the sorts of effects that JI suffered when counterterrorism initiatives 
eliminated Hambali, Azahari Husin, and other prominent individuals with al-Qaida ties.  Still, it 
is important not to overstate the case: although regional organizations‘ adoption of names 
featuring the term ―al-Qaida‖ implies tremendous unity with bin Laden‘s organization, the 
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evidence ultimately suggests that al-Qaida‘s functional ties to its regional affiliates have actually 
waned in recent years.  Thus, both quantitative and qualitative methodologies point toward the 
same conclusion: although the threat posed by violent Islamists continues to merit the sustained 
attention of the global security community, the fight against al-Qaida as an organization has been 
largely won.  
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Table 9.1: Summarizing al-Qaida’s Involvement in Terrorism Within the Baleian Typology 
 
Event Nature of al-Qaida Involvement Category 
  Planning Finance Logistics Training   
1998 East Africa Definite Definite Definite Definite 
BaleCat1: Attacks and plots 
with strong functional and/or 
training links to al-Qaida 
2002 Mombasa Partial Partial Partial Partial 
2004 Jundallah Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Partial 
9/11 Definite Definite Definite Definite 
BaleCat2: Attacks and plots 
conducted by al-Qaida "hit 
squads" deployed to the West 
2004 London Partial Unlikely Partial Definite 
7/7 London Partial Unlikely Unlikely Definite 
21/7 London Partial Unlikely Unlikely Partial 
2009 NYC Partial Unlikely Unlikely Definite 
2002 Bali Partial Partial Unlikely Definite 
BaleCat3: Attacks and plots 
with weak functional and/or 
training connections to al-
Qaida 
2003 Marriott Unlikely Partial Unlikely Partial 
2004 Embassy Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Historical 
2005 Bali Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Historical 
2009 Marriott/Ritz Unlikely Possible Unlikely Unlikely 
AQIM Events Indirect Unlikely Unlikely Historical 
BaleCat4: Attacks and plots 
tied to individuals who 
formlerly held strong ties to al-
Qaida, but now operate 
independent of the organization 
AQAP Events Unknown Unlikely Unlikely Historical 
2007 Fort Dix Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
BaleCat5: Attacks and plots 
with explicit ideological ties to 
al-Qaida 
2009 Little Rock Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
2009 Fort Hood Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
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 These macro-level conclusions have implications for both terrorism research and 
counterterrorism policy; the three sections following this introduction examine these subjects in 
detail.  The first section discusses the implications this analysis has to the theoretical discourse 
on Islamist-motivated terrorism and posits that contemporary Islamist terrorism is best 
understood as a multi-polar threat.   The second section discusses the implications this analysis 
has for future research on Islamist terrorism and summarizes how the methodological 
contributions of this analysis may benefit subsequent researchers.  Finally, the third section turns 
its attention towards policy and offers several specific recommendations to augment the already 
well-designed counterterrorism strategy the Obama administration unveiled in June 2011. 
    
9.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORETICAL DISCOURSE ON ISLAMIST-MOTIVATED 
TERRORISM 
 
 The most important theoretical contribution of this analysis is to refute the hypothesis 
that al-Qaida‘s central leadership continued to direct global terrorist operations even after the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) came into full swing.  Although the proposition that al-Qaida 
exhibited a strong measure of control over the Islamist terror movement experienced a degree of 
intellectual resurgence when American authorities discovered documents related to several terror 
plots at the Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was killed in 2011, a detailed review of the 
organization‘s involvement in plots and attacks clearly demonstrates al-Qaida‘s waning 
involvement in the tactical planning of events.  Moreover, al-Qaida‘s ability to provide attack-
teams with high-caliber training has been tremendously constrained, and the organization‘s role 
in the funding and logistical support of attacks has evaporated almost completely.  Simply put, 
the evidence suggests that al-Qaida‘s functional role in terrorism has been greatly curtailed, and 
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that those jihadists who continue to operate as part of bin Laden‘s organization are less capable, 
less experienced, less trained, and less able to access al-Qaida‘s ever-shrinking financial and 
logistical resources than their predecessors in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  It would be 
premature to dismiss the possibility of al-Qaida‘s resurgence, but it seems that the organization 
which surrounded bin Laden until his death in 2011 has been largely defeated.  
The fact that that the dissident Saudi possessed documents regarding past attacks does not 
constitue evidence that he or his top lieutenants played prominent roles in these events‘ planning, 
preparation, or finance.  Indeed, many analysts with access to the Abbottabad documents suggest 
that they demonstrate that al-Qaida members increasingly ignored bin Laden in the years 
preceding his death.  It will be quite some time before the full truth of the matter can is 
definitively established, because it will take years for the Abbottabad documents find their way 
into the open-source, and still more time before the expert community reaches a meaningful 
consensus regarding their interpretation.  Thus, definitive pronouncements on either side of the 
debate regarding al-Qaida‘s role in directing the Islamist terrorism are premature, but with this 
substantial caveat, the currently available evidence simply does not support the view that bin 
Laden or al-Qaida continued to lead the Islamist terror movement in any capacity beyond a 
vague ideological role.   
However, these criticisms of the al-Qaida-centric view of Islamist terrorism should not be 
interpreted as support for a leaderless characterization of the jihadist threat.  Only about seven 
percent of the attacks and plots included in the snowball sample were categorized at ―al-Qaida 
inspired,‖ and although there has been a significant upward trend in the frequency of such attacks 
since 2005, the absolute number remains low.  Indeed, the maximum number of ―al-Qaida 
inspired‖ attacks conducted in a single year never exceeded half a dozen.  Moreover, al-Qaida‘s 
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inspiration role within the broader violent Islamist movement is subject to question, because the 
examples of Abdul Hakim Muhammad and Nidal Hasan, who respectively conducted the 2009 
Little Rock shooting and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, demonstrate that many individuals drew 
religious motivation from members of regional groups like AQAP, rather than from members of 
bin Laden‘s organization.  In short, the evidence suggests that al-Qaida‘s oft-cited ideological 
role in terrorism may also be exaggerated.1129 
There are also tremendous problems with the quality of leaderless attacks.  Though it 
may be premature to generalize to an entire phenomenon based on only three cases, the examples 
offered by Muhammad and the Fort Dix plotters suggest that many jihadists who act without 
organizational support or training are exceptionally hapless.  Hasan‘s example, meanwhile, 
suggests that even bright, well-funded terrorists can cause only moderate damage when they act 
in isolation.  More lethal scenarios remain a possibility, but it seems clear that ‗inspired‘ 
terrorists who act in isolation are not the preeminent extremist threat facing the United States.  
Ultimately, leaderless theories of jihad and theories which argue that al-Qaida somehow controls 
the Islamist terror movement are equally flawed.    
Rather than merely critiquing existing theories that attempt to explain the breadth of the 
jihadist threat, this analysis offers its own explanation and theorizes that the contemporary 
Islamist terror movement is multi-polar.  It contains a diverse collection of functionally 
autonomous organizations that make independent decisions on strategy and tactics, and that have 
independent access to substantial logistical and financial resources.  Some training partnerships 
have existed between these independent organizations and al-Qaida in the past, and though the 
                                                          
1129 In her work on Islamists terrorism in Europe, Alison Pargeter independently reached a similar conclusion, 
arguing that although ―it is widely assumed that these Islamists are somehow linked to or share the same ideology as 
Al-Qa‘ida and Osama Bin Laden . . . . in many cases these links and perceived aspirations are often more tenuous 
than is suggested and the particularities of the various groups and movements are regularly overlooked.‖  The New 
Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. vii. 
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evidence of ongoing training ties is shaky, they may continue to the present at a low frequency.  
However, to the limited extent that regional terror groups hold functional ties to al-Qaida, 
devolutionary trends characterize the long-term relationships.  Fewer and fewer al-Qaida trainees 
and former al-Qaida members remain active after each successive counterterrorism strike, and 
regional organizations‘ independent access to considerable financial, logistical, and training 
resources mitigates these groups‘ need for access to al-Qaida‘s steadily waning organizational 
assets.     
 Moreover, this analysis posits an explanation for the extent of organizations‘ 
independence.  AQIM‘s experience in the Sahara and AQAP‘s brief history in Yemen both 
suggest that the extent of regional terror groups‘ engagement with al-Qaida is inversely causally 
related to their access to financial resources.  Given that both AQIM and AQAP seem to derive  
 the vast majority of their revenue through crime, there is some evidence to support an even more 
specific theory positing an inverse causal relationship between regional organizations‘ 
involvement in crime and the extent of their functional partnership with al-Qaida.  Because 
Noordin Mohd Top also relied heavily on criminal means of fundraising as he began to operate 
with increasing independence from Jemaah Islamiyah‘s titular leadership, this theory may be 
more broadly generalizable to groups beyond al-Qaida.  Involvement in crime likely plays a 
significant role in determining the extent of fractures within the Islamist terror movement, by 
granting entrepreneurially-inclined jihadists the financial freedom and independent access to 
weapons necessary to conduct operations without support from a parent organization.  However, 
the inchoate nature of open-source data on terrorist finance in North Africa, the Arabian 
Peninsula, and Southeast Asia dictates that this theory is speculative in nature and requires 
additional testing. 
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 Beyond macro-level theoretical interpretations, this analysis also weighs in on a pair of 
smaller debates within the existing literature on terrorism.  First, theories which describe the 
formation of splinter groups in terms of sharp, acrimonious splits require amendment.  While 
cases including the history of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and its successor 
organizations demonstrate that new groups often form as the result of pronounced intra-
organizational fractures, Noordin Mohd Top‘s experience shows that gradual processes can also 
characterize the formation of new groups.  Indeed, the organization that Noordin led, namely 
Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad in Indonesia, emerged slowly from Jemaah Islamiyah over the course of 
several years, as Noordin acted with increasing independence and autonomy in each attack that 
he conducted between 2003 and his death in 2009.      
 Finally, this analysis contributes not only to theories of group formation and terrorist 
finance, but also to the literature which studies the process of radicalization.  Specifically, case 
studies of the 2007 Fort Dix plot, the 2009 Little Rock shooting, and the 2009 Fort Hood 
massacre refute the hypothesis that online jihadist propaganda causes its viewers to adopt 
extremist views.  As other theorists have previously argued, network effects seem to be the 
primary cause of radicalization, because the evidence suggests that the men responsible for the 
three efforts against American military facilities described above became radicalized as the result 
of first-person interactions with individuals who already adhered to extremist viewpoints.  
Moreover, this analysis partially reconciles this socio-cultural view of radicalization with the 
literature regarding the dangers of online propaganda by positing that repeated viewings of 
jihadist Internet content hardens and reinforces views initially established via person-to-person 
interactions.  Though the argument is somewhat speculative, it also seems reasonable to infer 
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that repeated viewings of violent Islamist web-pages play an important role in desensitizing 
aspiring jihadists to the gory realities of terrorism prior to the conduct of attacks. 
 
9.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 
 Given that both the quantitative and qualitative portions of this assessment are based 
exclusively on open-source data, a pool of information that is by its very nature is both 
incomplete and potentially inaccurate, this study‘s implications for additional research can be 
summarized incredibly succinctly: the theories generated by this analysis require additional 
testing as more data and additional cases materialize.  However, the methodological 
contributions of this analysis speak to the means that can be used to analyze any new data that 
emerges on al-Qaida‘s role in Islamist terrorism. 
 First and foremost, the modified snowball sampling method provides a rigorous and 
replicable means to acquire large pools of data on any clandestine topic and should be of value to 
researchers of both quantitative and qualitative persuasions, because regardless of the 
methodology researchers use, terrorism must ultimately be investigated at the individual level in 
order to obtain the detailed information necessary to accurately assess organizations‘ roles in 
terrorism.  The ontology of relationship types, which this study generated by reviewing the 
broader literature on terrorism and clandestine networks, is also useful for researchers hailing 
from different methodological traditions, because it provides a systematic means to reconcile the 
conflation that results when analysts neglect to consider the nature of interactions between 
violent Islamists.  Put differently, the ontology is both comprehensive enough and specific 
enough to allow researchers to differentiate meaningful functional ties from affinity bonds that 
exist between friends, family members, and adherents of the same worldview.   
448 
 
Similarly, the Baleian typology provides a system of classification useful for 
operationalizing a multi-relational characterization of the Islamist terror movement.  By 
distinguishing events in which al-Qaida played a strong functional role from events in which the 
organization played a weaker supporting role, events perpetrated by former members of al-
Qaida, and events to which the organization is tied only by ideology, this typology can help 
mitigate analysts‘ all-too-common tendency to describe events and organizations as vaguely ―al-
Qaida linked.‖  Although this analysis implemented a system of quantitative measurements to 
classify events, the typology may also be of use to researchers who view evidence in qualitative 
terms, as it can be easily modified to accommodate softer forms of evidence.  Indeed, Bale relied 
exclusively on narrative in order to locate a case in his original typology, on which this analysis 
drew heavily to create a more comprehensive system of classification.      
Finally, quantitatively-minded researchers may also find utility in several of the processes 
used within this analysis.  The Meadian-Additive Projection Process (MAPP) has clear 
applications beyond terrorism research.  It would be appropriate to MAPP virtually any multi-
modal network dataset derived from the historical record, because most such datasets contain the 
sort of ambiguous dates of interaction that routinely problematize information on violent 
Islamists. 
The network-based processes this analysis used to determine the extent of organizations‘ 
involvement in terror events and the Newman-based grouping method this analysis used to 
determine the boundaries of Islamist terror groups may also prove useful to scholars studying 
terrorism from a quantitative perspective.  However, both of these methodologies require 
tremendous amounts of reliable data to produce meaningful outputs; any results obtained from 
their use should be interpreted with extreme caution if this precondition is not met.  The 
449 
 
grouping method suffers from a second even more daunting limitation that plagues all efforts to 
assign terrorists to specific organizations: membership characterizations remain impossible to 
test, because even within the terror groups, few—if any—people actually know where the 
boundaries of these organizations lie.  Consequently, while this study‘s Newman-based method 
for assigning group membership is far more rigorous and replicable than previous studies‘ highly 
subjective ―this guy feels like an al-Qaida member‖ approach, evaluation methods that 
specifically address grouping tests among clandestine organizations constitute one especially rich 
area for future research in the broader methodological community. 
 
9.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY 
Given the clandestine and amorphous nature of the violent Islamist movement, 
counterterrorism officials do not have the luxury of waiting for complete evidence before 
enacting policies to mitigate the threat of jihadist terrorism.  Therefore, this analysis uses its 
tentative conclusions to inform policy recommendations aimed at enhancing the already well-
designed National Strategy for Counterterrorism released by the Obama administration in June 
2011.  The subsections below discuss these recommendations as they apply to seven specific 
goals the strategy outlines in its overarching plan to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle the threat 
posed by Islamist terrorsim.1130 
9.3.1 PROTECT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, HOMELAND, AND AMERICAN INTERESTS 
 The National Strategy for Counterterrorism brackets much of its discussion of protecting 
the homeland in terms of ―hardening‖ the country.  The document‘s discussion of the need to 
build a ―culture of preparedness and resiliency‖ correctly stresses that the hardening process is as 
                                                          
1130 Office of the President of the United States, ―National Strategy for Counterterrorism,‖ June 2011, p. 8; available 
online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.   
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much about the nation‘s need to recognize that terrorism can never be completely eliminated as it 
is about building bunker-like infrastructure.1131  However, the cases included in this analysis 
suggest that physical security measures are among the most effective uses of money and 
resources to mitigate the threat of Islamist terrorism.   
 For example, low-cost concrete walls and security bollards can virtually eliminate the 
threat that vehicle-based bombs pose to key buildings.  In the 1998 embassy bombings, the 
Nairobi attack was effective because Hamden Awad (a.k.a. Ahmed the German) was able to 
drive the bomb-truck alongside the building before detonating, while the Dar es Salaam bomb 
was far less lethal because the Tanzanian security guards heroically stopped the vehicle at the 
gate at the expense of their own lives.  Similarly, the 2003 Marriott bombing failed to destroy the 
hotel because the security guards‘ reactions cause Asmar Latin Sani to detonate his weapon 
before he was able to place the weapon alongside the building.  These cases not only speak to the 
specific value of well-trained security personnel, but also to the more general conclusion that 
measures which keep vehicles even a short distance from key facilities greatly reduce the 
potential for casualties. 
 Moreover, a pair of additional examples speak to the specific value of barricades.  The 
perpetrators of the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, failed to meet 
their desired goal of leveling the embassy because the bomb-vehicle was unable to pass through 
the building‘s fortified security gate.  Similarly, the 2008 attack on the United States embassy in 
Sana‘a, Yemen, failed to kill even a single American because a concrete barricade prevented the 
suicide-bombers from entering the compound.  In short, public buildings can improve their 
security from terror by erecting inexpensive concrete walls and security bollards, which skilled 
architects should be able to unobtrusively incorporate into both new and old designs.  Indeed, 
                                                          
1131 Ibid. 
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government buildings have made far wider use of such barricades since the violent Islamist 
threat first rose to prominence in the late 1990s, but privately-owned structures have been slow 
to follow suit.  Therefore, this study ultimately recommends that office towers, high-rise 
apartment buildings, prominent hotels, and other similar structures build the sort of security 
barricades that have become commonplace among federal buildings. 
 However, it would be foolish to suggest that this simple improvement provides flawless 
security.  Security barricades are impractical for many buildings located in dense urban areas; for 
example, short of the impractical solution of closing the streets, it is difficult to imagine how to 
prevent large vehicles from pulling alongside many of the skyscrapers in downtown Manhattan 
or Chicago‘s Loop.  Moreover, one reasonable explanation for Noordin‘s transition from large 
vehicle-bombs, such as those used in the 2003 Marriott attack and the 2004 Australian embassy 
attack, to smaller man-portable explosive devices, such as those used in the 2005 Bali bombings 
and the 2009 Marriott-Ritz bombings, is as a response to physical security measures that 
mitigated the lethality of car-bombings.  Thus, not only are there areas where security barricades 
cannot be installed, but their construction may simply cause terrorists to adopt other means to 
attack the same targets.   
To an extent, physical security improvements can be undertaken iteratively, in response 
to changes in terrorists‘ tactics.  However, this strategy has clear limitations, because when taken 
to its logical extreme, physical security measures assume Orwellian dimensions, in which 
protection from terrorism takes precedence over freedom of movement.  Therefore, unobtrusive 
measures, like security barricades to prevent car-bombings, should be as widely implemented 
among large privately-owned structures as they have among government buildings, but the most 
that the physical hardening of targets can hope to achieve is to mitigate terrorists‘ ability to 
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employ specific and especially dangerous tactics.  Put differently, physical security measures can 
force terrorists toward less efficient means of attack, but can do little to reduce the overall 
likelihood of terrorism. 
9.3.2 PREVENT TERRORIST DEVELOPMENT, ACQUISITION, AND USE OF WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
 The importance of preventing terrorists from acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) is difficult to overstate, because, as Allison noted in his assessment of nuclear terrorism, 
WMD offer the only means by which terrorism can become an existential threat to Western 
society.1132  However, the cases included in this analysis suggest that efforts at securitization 
need to take a broader approach.  Obvious solutions, such as monitoring the whereabouts of 
weapons scientists and securing global stockpiles of chemical and nuclear weapons, remain 
important, but because violent Islamists have made repeated attempts to transform mundane 
items into weapons that threaten hundreds of lives instead of hundreds of thousands, it is equally 
necessary to monitor everyday items that can be converted to lethal purpose.  
 Within the last 12 months, federal regulators have made some positive strides in this 
direction.  In August 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced new 
reporting requirements for nitrogen-based fertilizers, which constituted the primary explosive 
component in Ramzi Yousef‘s 1993 World Trade Center bombing, several of Noordin Mohd 
Top‘s attacks in Southeast Asia, Omar Khyam‘s failed plot against London in 2004, and 
numerous improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan—to say nothing of ammonium-
nitrates‘ use by terrorists motivated by ideologies other than Islamist extremism, such as 
Timothy McVeigh, who used a mixture of fuel oil and fertilizer to bomb the Murrah Federal 
                                                          
1132 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, (New York: Times Books, 2004). 
453 
 
building in Oklahoma City in April 1995.1133  The proposed regulations, which were still under 
review at the time of this writing, would require merchants to register fertilizer sales of 25 
pounds or more, a threshold that regulators deemed meaningful because explosives experts claim 
that a bomb capable of leveling an average single-family home could be manufactured from just 
25 pounds of fertilizer.1134  Implementation of this reporting system represents an important step, 
but because terrorists will still be able to amass chemical stockpiles by either making several 
small purchases in lieu of a single large one, or by smuggling fertilizer into the United States 
from neighboring countries, this system will mitigate, not solve, the threat posed by nitrogen-
based fertilizer. 
Moreover, other household materials can be repurposed toward destructive intent.  A host 
of attacks, including the London bombings of July 7, 2005; the failed attempt on the same city 14 
days later; and Najibullah Zazi‘s plot against the New York City subway system in 2009, all 
demonstrate that hydrogen peroxide has also been a favorite base-chemical among Islamist 
bomb-makers.  Although federal regulators have worked to secure concentrated variants of the 
chemical, which the food safety and agricultural industries use in a host of disinfecting 
applications, merchants are not currently required to report the sale of hydrogen peroxide in 
concentrations below 35 percent.1135  There are small hints that the FBI has used provisions of 
                                                          
1133 Andrew Seidman, ―Homeland Security plans to regulate bomb fertilizer,‖ Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2011; 
available online: http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/02/nation/la-na-ammonium-nitrate-20110803.  See also, 
―Pakistan fertilizer fuels Afghan insurgents‘ bombs,‖ Associated Press, September 2, 2011; available online from 
The National (UAE): http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/pakistani-fertiliser-fuels-afghan-insurgents-
bombs.      
1134 Ibid.  See also, Department of Homeland Security, ―Am onium Nitrate Security Program, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking,‖ September 14, 2011; available online: http://www.dhs.gov/files/laws/gc_1288878991345.shtm.   
1135 Department of Homeland Security, ―Appendix to Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards; Final Rule,‖ 
Federal Register, November 20, 2007; available online: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_appendixafinalrule.pdf.   
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the Patriot Act to surreptitiously monitor retail purchases of hydrogen peroxide at lower 
concentrations,1136 but the specifics of the operation—if one exists at all—remain unclear.   
In lieu of clandestine programs, policy makers should consider implementing a 
transparent nation-wide system to monitor retail sales of hydrogen peroxide.  Because the 
chemical has applications that stretch across a wide assortment of industries, ranging from 
horticulture to hair-dressing,1137 the same sort of monitoring system DHS has designed to 
monitor fertilizer sales at comparatively specialized farm-supply retailers is likely unworkable.  
Given the diversity of hydrogen peroxide‘s uses, monitoring efforts must reference other systems 
which have been designed to monitor chemicals of concern that are sold in small quantities at a 
wide assortment of retail outlets. 
 Consequently, efforts to stop the production of methamphetamine may offer a useable 
model.  The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (CMEA) included several 
provisions to regulate the retail sale of pseudoephedrine and other chemicals that are commonly 
available in over-the-counter medications, but which ―cooks‖ can also convert into 
methamphetamine using fairly simple chemical processes.  On the customer‘s side of the 
equation, CMEA limits the amount of pseudoephedrine that anyone can purchase in a single day, 
as well as in any given month.  Meanwhile, CMEA requires retailers to place products 
containing pseudoephedrine ―out of direct customer access,‖ to maintain detailed logbooks 
registering sales, and to validate customers‘ government-issued identification documents prior to 
                                                          
1136 Josh Gerstein, ―Mueller hints FBI used PATRIOT Act to track hydrogen peroxide purchases,‖ Politico, February 
17, 2011; available online: 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0211/Mueller_hints_FBI_used_PATRIOT_Act_to_track_hydrogen_per
oxide_purchases.html.   
1137 American Chemical Council, ―Fact Sheet: Q&A Regarding Hydrogen Peroxide,‖ date unknown; available 
online: http://www.americanchemistry.com/ProductsTechnology/Hydrogen-Peroxide/QA-Regarding-Hydrogen-
Peroxide.pdf.   
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completing any sale.1138  In short, the law effectively balances consumers‘ legitimate need for 
pseudoephedrine-based products with the risks inherent to drug-production.   
Given that consumers have similar legitimate needs for products containing large 
amounts of hydrogen peroxide, and given that both cold medication and hydrogen peroxide-
based products are sold in retail outlets ranging from tiny neighborhood convenience stores to 
massive big-box stores, it seems exceptionally feasible for legislators to implement a CMEA-like 
law to address the threat posed by hydrogen peroxide.  Moreover, as CMEA contains financial 
penalties for retailers who violate the legislation, the effort to monitor pseudoephedrine is largely 
self-financing.1139  Thus, there is little reason to expect that a well-planned effort to monitor 
hydrogen peroxide would impose an additional burden on the already strained federal budget.     
 However, it is important to note that monitoring regimes are, by their very nature, 
imperfect.  They make it more difficult, but not impossible, to obtain substances.  Fortunately, 
the transparent nature of the systems offers an ancillary benefit: publicity.  If people are aware 
that items are closely monitored, it is reasonable to assume that individuals will be dissuaded 
from attempting such products‘ illicit acquisition and will devote increasing attention to 
alternative materials, which may be more poorly suited to lethal purpose.  In short, the publicity 
inherent to monitoring regimes will likely help force terrorists toward the difficult task of 
innovation. 
 In turn, the likelihood that monitoring regimes will cause jihadists to adopt new means of 
attacks speaks to two additional recommendations, both of which must involve industry as well 
                                                          
1138 Office of Diversion Control, ―Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (Title VII of Public Law 109-
177),‖ Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, July 10, 2007; available online: 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/meth/q_a.htm#7_procure.   
1139 Specifically, individual fines can range up to $250,000 and organizational fines can range up to $500,000.  
Attorney General of North Dakota, ―Retailer‘s Guide to State and Federal laws combating Methamphetamine,‖ 
April 26, 2007; available online: http://www.ag.state.nd.us/methwatch/methwatch2006/combatmethact.pdf.  
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as government.  The first recommendation is to conduct a more proactive review of unrestricted 
commercial goods which terrorists could repurpose for use in attacks.  Aspects of this review 
have already been conducted within the government,1140 but many top chemists and engineers 
work in academia and industry, where the pay is typically higher.  Including civilian researchers‘ 
input would significantly broaden the pool of expertise and would allow regulators to compile a 
more comprehensive list of things that could be used to conduct an attack, in lieu of the current 
list, which is more reactive and focuses primarily on items that have already been used.  
However, it also seems likely that including civilian researchers‘ input might help to winnow the 
monitoring lists by removing from consideration any substances that effectively serve as false 
positives and constitute incredibly improbable means of attack.  Put most simply, subjecting 
monitoring lists to outside review would strengthen the monitoring process by adding rigor. 
 The second recommendation is to push for technical solutions that will confound 
terrorists‘ efforts toward repurposing commonly available chemicals.  To an extent, this effort 
has also already begun.  For example, in 2008, the manufacturer Honeywell International 
debuted a nitrogen-based fertilizer specially designed to remain inert even when mixed with fuel 
oil.1141  The discussion of specific chemical processes is beyond the scope of this inquiry, but it 
hardly seems a stretch to suggest that American industry has the capacity to create similarly non-
explosive alternatives to hydrogen peroxide and many other potentially lethal products.  While 
encouraging such innovations should be a relatively simple affair because such products would 
likely generate a windfall of cash for patent-holders in safety conscious America, there are clear 
limits to the advances technical solutions can offer.  It is, for example, difficult to envision the 
invention of an inert alternative to the gasoline Abdul Hakim Muhammad used in the Molotov 
                                                          
1140 See, for example: ―Appendix to Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards; Final Rule.‖ 
1141 ―Company creates hard-to-ignite fertilizer to foil bomb-makers,‖ Associated Press, September 23, 2008; 
available online via the webcite archive: http://www.webcitation.org/5xGXduu1Y.  
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cocktail he hurled during his failed attempt to firebomb a rabbi‘s home in Nashville, Tennessee.  
Thus, all efforts to mitigate the threat of Islamist terrorism by securing dual-use goods are 
ultimately imperfect.   
 One other policy change that would mitigate terrorists‘ access to weapons within the 
United States is politically infeasible: gun control.  The NRA Foundation vociferously defends 
unregulated gun ownership on second amendment grounds.1142  Given that the organization ranks 
among the top-ten tax-exempt organizations (501c) in terms of political spending in the current 
election cycle—its total contributions are more than $340,000 and climbing1143—any efforts to 
change gun policy, even in the name of counterterrorism policy, are unlikely to meet with 
success.  Indeed, attempts to resurrect the Federal Assault Weapons Ban (AWB), which 
prohibited the manufacture of some types of semi-automatic rifles for civilian use between 1994 
and 2004, have all failed even to reach the floor of Congress for a vote.1144  Efforts at gun control 
simply burn political capital that is better spent improving other aspects of counterterrorism 
policy.    
Moreover, the efficacy of gun control measures remains problematic because they do a 
poor job of defining terms like ―assault weapon‖ and cannot address the weapons-acquisition 
efforts of first-time terrorists with clean criminal records.  For example, although Nidal Hasan 
                                                          
1142 The NRA Foundation, ―About,‖ date unknown; available online: http://www.nrafoundation.org/about/.   
1143 Center for Responsive Politics, ―2012 Outside Spending, by Groups,‖ April 16, 2012; available online: 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=A.  Note: given that 
the 2012 election cycle is ongoing, both the NRA‘s total expenditures and rank among 501c organizations may 
change. 
1144 See, for example: House Resolution 2038, Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2003, 
2003; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.2038:.  House Resolution 3831, To 
extend the sunset on the assault weapons ban for 10 years, 2004; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.3831:.  House Resolution 5099, To reinstate the repealed criminal provisions relating to 
assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices, 2004; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.5099:.   House Resolution 1312, Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection 
Act of 2005, 2005; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:H.R.1312:.  House Resolution 
1022, Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2007, 2007; available online: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:H.R.1022:.  House Resolution 6257, Assault Weapons Ban 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, 2008; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:H.R.6257:.   
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made use of high-capacity magazines that would have been prohibited by the AWB during the 
Fort Hood shooting,1145 the act would have done nothing to prohibit him from purchasing the 
gun used in the attack.  As a fairly standard semi-automatic pistol, it would not have qualified as 
an assault weapon, and because Hasan had never been convicted of a felony—indeed, he was a 
serving officer in the United States Army at the time of the Fort Hood shooting—there would 
have been no grounds to preclude him from buying any legally-available gun he wanted.   
Similarly, although gun control measures may reduce the total number of new weapons in 
production, these initiatives do little to stop terrorists who are willing to result to illicit means to 
obtain arms. For example, the Duka brothers and Abdul Hakim Muhammad respectively 
acquired weapons through straw purchases and the black market.  Thus, it remains to be seen 
how anything short of an unrealistic and unwanted total ban on guns could have prevented the 
Fort Hood shooter, the Little Rock shooter, or the Fort Dix plotters‘ attempts to gain weapons.  
In combination with the political climate of the United States, these considerations preclude this 
analysis from recommending additional gun control measures as a viable means of reducing the 
risk Islamist terrorism poses to the United States. 
9.3.3 ELIMINATE SAFEHAVENS 
 The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is correct to prioritize efforts to eliminate 
physical sanctuaries which permit terrorists ―to travel, train, and engage in plotting.‖1146  Indeed, 
the evidence strongly suggests that repeated first-person interactions are necessary to transmit the 
tacit knowledge needed to successfully replicate many tasks that are vital to terrorists, thereby 
making the physical spaces where such interactions occur among jihadists’ most valuable 
                                                          
1145 Specifically, the AWB prohibited the sale of any ammunition feeding devices which held more than 10 rounds.  
See: Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Sec. 110103 (Ban of Large Capacity Ammunition 
Feeding Devices), sub-paragraph b (Definition of Large Capacity Ammunition Feeding Device); available online: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c103:1:./temp/~c103SJ9kia:e644150:.   
1146 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, p. 9. 
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resources.  Bomb-making provides the clearest example.  Even after receiving some brief 
training abroad, Muktar Said Ibrahim and Najibullah Zazi, who respectively served as bomb-
makers in the failed attack on London‘s mass transit system on July 21, 2005, and the disrupted 
plot against the New York City subway system in 2009, were unable to successfully follow 
written instructions regarding the manufacture of hydrogen peroxide-based explosives.1147   
Assuming that written instructions were the only training resource available, it seems likely that 
aspiring bomb-makers who lack the pair‘s experience in South Asia would fare even worse.1148   
The existence of Internet training resources demonstrate that it is at least theoretically possible 
for novice jihadists to acquire the information necessary to conduct an attack without visiting a 
                                                          
1147 There are numerous examples that highlight the importance of tacit knowledge to the successful completion of 
technical undertakings like bomb-making.  Gormley describes the difficulty non-state actors face in acquiring the 
tacit knowledge necessary to build weapons that are widely avaialbe even to impoverished militaries in his 
discussion of  the difficulties faced by Bruce Simpson, a New Zealand-based engineer, when he attempt (and failed) 
to construct a cruise missile using commercially available components.  Collins discusses the importance of tacit 
knowledge in the conduct of experiements in material sciences by highlighting the difficulties western researchers 
working in the late 1990s faced in replicating a test of the resonance characteristics of sapphire originally conducted 
by Soviet scientists 20 years earlier. Finally, Vogel discusses the importance of tacit knowledge to the field of 
biotechnology and argues that the threat of bioweapons may be exaggerated because the open dissemination of 
explicit knowledge of biotechnology does not, in and of itself, enable would-be proliferators to establish bioweapons 
programs, without the participation of an individual already steeped in the field‘s tacit expertise by virtue of 
participation in biotechnology‘s community of scientific practice.  Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise 
Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institue Press, 2008), pp. 85-
89.   See also, Dennis M. Gormley, ―Silent Retreat: The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,‖ The Nonproliferation 
Review, Vol. 14 No. 2 (July 2008), pp. 200-201; available online: 
http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo10/doc/Gormley_SilentRetreat.pdf.  H.M. Collins, ―Tacit Knowledge, Trust 
and the Q of Sapphire,‖ Social Studies of Science, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 2001), pp. 71-85.  Kathleen M. Vogel, 
―Framing biosecurity: an alternative to the biotech revolution model?‖ Science and Public Policy, Vol. 35, No. 1 
(February 2008), pp. 45-54.  For additional examples of the importance of tacit knowledge and a more thorough 
review of the literature on tacit knowledge, see: Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, ―Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible 
Obstacles to Proliferation,‖ International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 80-114. 
1148 Kenney draws similar conclusions in his assessment of organizational learning among violent Islamists in 
Britain and Spain.  He is generally skeptical regarding the value terrorists derive from written instructions and other 
forms of explicit knowledge, because the dissemination of explicit knowledge via webpages and other technical 
means has not enabled violent extremists to acquire the practical knowledge necessary to conduct successful attacks.  
Indeed, Kenney takes the argument one step farther and criticizes the content of the hands-on training terrorists 
typically receive, because there are often profound gaps in the expertise students acquire during the process, as 
evidenced by the prevalence of ―mistakes and poor tradecraft‖ (p. 5) among terrorists.  Michael Kenney, 
―Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy,‖ National Institute of Justice, May 2009; available online: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226808.pdf.   
460 
 
terrorist safehaven,1149 but Ibrahim and Zazi‘s examples ultimately suggest that reducing the 
amount of physical space available to terrorists will effectively reduce the amount of knowledge 
at the disposal of future generations of violent Islamists. 
 Moreover, the national strategy identifies several of the regions on which 
counterterrorism initiatives must focus if they are to eliminate jihadist safehavens: South Asia, 
Central Asia, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, the Sahara, Indonesia, the Philippines, et al.  Indeed, it very 
nearly seems that any developing country with a large Muslim population has substantial 
potential to serve as a safehaven for violent Islamists.  Thus, it is somewhat unrealistic to expect 
that American counterterrorism initiatives can and should address the still imperfectly 
understood social, cultural, and economic conditions that cause states to become jihadist 
safehavens.  Efforts to do so constitute nothing short of a call to remake at least one-third of the 
globe.   
 There are also tremendous problems with viewing terrorists‘ need for physical operating 
space at the regional or national levels, because the evidence suggests that terror training 
facilities require only a small, impermanent footprint.  For example, although the content of the 
July 21 bombers‘ instruction was somewhat laughable, they prepared for jihad at a temporary 
‗camp‘ established inside of a British national park.  Similarly, Noordin conducted aspects of the 
2005 Bali bombers‘ training in the cramped loft-space above a restaurant.  The history of 
America‘s right-wing militias shows the privately-held lands in developed nations can also be 
                                                          
1149 Indeed, Weimann suggests that terrorists‘ ability to post tactical information (much of which is admittedly 
dangerous) to the Internet is synonymous with online training.  Specifically, he states that in addition to serving as a 
―tool for indoctrination and recruitment‖ the Internet can serve ―as a location for virtual training camps‖ (p. 110).  
While his research into the content of terrorist webpages is incredibly detailed, he ultimately fails to examine how 
this online presence translates into the real world and does not, for example, show that large numbers of successful 
bombers learned their trade via online training classes.  See, Gabriel Weimann, ―Virtual Training Camps: Terrorists‘ 
Use of the Internet,‖ in James J.F. Forest (ed.), Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist 
World, (Oxford, UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), pp. 110-132. 
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used in preparation for violence against the state,1150 and jihadists have shown periodic interest 
in purchasing land for similar purposes, as best demonstrated by the efforts that three ideological 
followers of Abu Hamza al-Masri made to establish a terrorist training center near Bly, Oregon, 
circa 1999.1151  In short, even if it were practicable to eliminate the Muslim world‘s ungoverned 
regions, terrorists would continue to find physical operating space, because much as the balloon 
effect dictates that ‗successful‘ initiatives against narcotics production merely squeeze drug 
crops from large open fields into smaller hidden enclaves and neighboring countries,1152 terror 
training will not disappear as traditional safehavens evaporate.  Instead, terrorists will simply 
shift their instructional efforts to new, smaller locations.    
 Because terror groups face inherent costs and difficulties each time they are forced to 
move, eliminating established training bases remains a sound policy suggestion, despite its innate 
limitations.  However, the largest security benefits can likely be obtained by combining this 
policy with one that focuses on removing the individuals who serve as the primary repositories 
of terrorist knowledge, namely trainers and bomb-makers.1153  Indeed, the efficacy of Noordin‘s 
attack-network declined precipitously after the elimination of master bomb-maker Azahari bin 
                                                          
1150 See, for example: Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―Project Megiddo,‖ October 20, 1999, pp. 21-23; available 
online: http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3578/www.fbi.gov/library/megiddo/megiddo.pdf.  Kevin Johnson, ―As 
Okla. City date nears, militias seen as gathering strength,‖ USA Today, April 16, 2010; available online: 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-04-16-militia-movement-on-the-rise_N.htm.   
1151 USA v. Oussama Kassir (Defendant), United States District Court District of Southern New York, Complaint of 
FBI Agent Michael S. Butsch, May 5, 2004.  "Terror suspects face possible abuse, court told," Guardian Unlimited, 
July 11, 2006; Don Van Natta, Jr., et al, "British seeking cleric's top aide in July 7 attack," New York Times, July 21, 
2005. 
1152 See, for example, Frank O. Mora, ―Victims of the Balloon Effect: Drug Trafficking in the U.S. Policy in Brazil 
and the Southern Cone of Latin America,‖ Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, Vol. 21 No. 2 (1996), 
pp. 115-122.  For the application of the balloon effect to areas beyond narcotics production (e.g. money laundering), 
see: Phil Williams, ―Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation,‖ Strategic Insights, Vol. 4 
No. 1 (January 2005); available online: 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Jan/williamsJan05.html.   
1153 Jackson, et al, independently reached similar conclusions in their assessment of organizational learning among 
both Islamist and non-Islamist terror groups.  Their policy recommendations included the suggestion that 
counterterrorism efforts should ―Identify and target terrorist groups‘ ‗learning leadership.‘‖ Brian A. Jackson, with 
John C. Baker, et al, Aptitude for Destruction: Organiztaional Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for 
Combating Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2004), p. 52. 
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Husin, as demonstrated by the fact that the time-bomb the 2009 Marriott attackers hid on the 
hotel‘s upper floors failed to detonate.  Similarly, it seems likely that al-Qaida‘s campaign of 
hydrogen peroxide-based bombings could have been entirely avoided if the enigmatic bomb-
maker Abu Obaidah al-Masri had been killed prior to the 2005 July bombings.  Thus, 
decapitation campaigns that focus on members of terror groups who hold specialized knowledge, 
rather than on titular heads of organizations, can maximize the damage to terror groups‘ 
capabilities by forcing jihadists to continually re-learn and re-invent the skills necessary to 
succeed in terrorism.  In short, the capture and killing of highly skilled terrorists should take just 
as great a priority as the elimination of the spaces in which they train new recruits.    
 However, this recommendation is not a silver bullet, since much of the technical and 
military knowledge to succeed in terrorism can be diverted from legitimate sources.  For 
example, Ali Mohamed, who conducted both training and surveillance on al-Qaida‘s behalf in 
preparation for the 1998 embassy bombings, learned his skills while serving as an officer in the 
Egyptian Army and later as an enlisted man in the United States Army.  Similarly, Yazid Sufaat, 
a Malaysian member of JI who worked on al-Qaida‘s behalf in a failed bid to create chemical 
weapons,1154 learned his technical skills at the California State University in Sacramento, from 
which he graduated with a degree in biochemistry in 1987.1155  Given that future members of the 
Islamist movement are likely to enter it holding similar skills, the removal of terror groups‘ key 
intellectual nodes should be viewed as an ongoing and iterative process, but one that can never 
entirely purge the jihadist movement of the knowledge necessary to successfully conduct 
terrorist attacks.    
                                                          
1154 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 
p. 151. 
1155 Maria Ressa, ―Reports: Al Qaeda operative sought anthrax,‖ CNN.com, October 10, 2003; available online: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/10/alqaeda.anthrax/.   
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9.3.4 DEGRADE LINKS BETWEEN AL-QAIDA AND ITS AFFILIATES AND 
ADHERENTS 
 The recommendations that the National Strategy for Counterterrorism makes in regards 
to severing links between al-Qaida and the rest of the Islamist terror movement constitute the 
weakest portion of the report‘s generally strong policy plan.  Analytic error lies at the root of the 
problem. Because the document neglects to realize that a host of different relationships types 
may (or may not) connect bin Laden‘s organization to regional Islamist terror groups, the 
strategy inevitably discusses these relationships in exaggerative terms, stressing that ―Al-Qa‘ida 
senior leaders in Pakistan continue to leverage local and regional affiliates and adherents 
worldwide through formal and informal alliances to advance their global agenda.‖1156  
 This overly al-Qaida-centric view of the violent Islamist threat has worrying policy 
implications.  Placing al-Qaida at the movement‘s rhetorical center fails to adequately recognize 
that the independent organizations typically referenced as al-Qaida affiliates are dangers in their 
own right.  Indeed, the evidence suggests that there is little reason to suspect that AQIM or 
AQAP, two of al-Qaida‘s best known regional affiliates, receive any meaningful support from 
bin Laden‘s organization, and since historical training ties constitute AQIM and AQAP‘s 
primary non-ideological connection to al-Qaida, it seems that the relationship between these 
groups becomes more distant each time a counterterrorism strikes removes a former al-Qaida 
member or former al-Qaida trainee.  Therefore, continual targeting of the organization bin Laden 
founded will do little, if anything, to mitigate these regional groups‘ access to the resources 
necessary to conduct terrorism.  Simply put, the threat regional terror groups pose to the United 
States is determined more by their financial and logistical capacity than by the extent of their 
connection to al-Qaida.   
                                                          
1156 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, p. 9.  
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 If the threat of Islamist terrorism is, as this study‘s conclusions strongly suggest, a multi-
polar phenomenon, then counterterrorism strategy must evolve beyond its almost single-minded 
focus on al-Qaida.  Part of this necessary adjustment is rhetorical in nature.  When scholars and 
government officials use terms like ―al-Qaida linked‖ and ―al-Qaida inspired‖ haphazardly, they 
often attribute bin Laden‘s organization with ownership over people and events with which it has 
had little to no actual involvement.  The term ―al-Qaida affiliate‖ is also often misleading, as the 
evidence suggests that the extent of regional terror groups‘ functional involvement with al-Qaida 
is often miniscule, despite these groups‘ decision to name themselves in reference to bin Laden‘s 
organization.  It seems clear that a shift toward more neutral vocabulary is necessary.  Terms like 
―Islamist-motivated‖ need to be used in lieu of the largely inaccurate references to bin Laden‘s 
organization, but if analysts insist on continuing to describe people, groups, and events as ―al-
Qaida linked,‖ then an explicit and detailed discussion of the nature and depth of the relationship 
must accompany such references—a task that can be accomplished using the multi-relational 
ontology outlined in this study.  
 Concerns over the language currently used to describe the violent Islamist threat are more 
than pedantic objections.  Making continual reference to al-Qaida in descriptions of the jihadist 
movement supports and advances the narrative violent Islamists want the world to believe, 
namely that they are part of a single unified front with vast resources, rather than members of 
distinct organizations whose ability to target the West is frequently constrained by their local 
access to weapons, personnel, and money.  In other words, analysts propagandize on al-Qaida‘s 
behalf when then describe unrelated portions of the violent Islamist movement as ―linked‖ to bin 
Laden‘s organization.  Moreover, this worryingly common practice confuses the security picture, 
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by making it seem that a diverse threat can be stopped by eliminating a single, now largely 
defunct, organization based in South Asia. 
 Therefore, a concomitant shift in counterterrorism strategy must accompany changes to 
the language used to describe the violent Islamist threat.  Policy makers need to explicitly 
recognize that defeating al-Qaida is not synonymous with eliminating the threat posed by 
jihadists.  Many of the same strategies that have proven effective against al-Qaida, including 
decapitation strategies that focus on key nodes within the organization and efforts to eliminate 
the means the organization has historically used to access key resources, should now be applied 
to other terror groups.  However, the types of costly and potentially counterproductive ground 
wars the United States implemented to combat al-Qaida must be avoided, as the nation has 
neither the will nor the resources to enter into another decade of large-scale armed conflict.   
Thus, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism is correct to suggest that a ―whole-of 
government‖ approach is the most appropriate means to combat the threat posed by Isalmist 
terrorism,1157 but it is important to explicitly stress that the military‘s role in counterterrorism 
should be limited.  Given its experience in lethal operations such as drone attacks and Special 
Forces raids, the Armed Forces should take the lead in eliminating the small number of 
established violent terrorists who can only be dealt with using kinetic means.  Intelligence, law 
enforcement, and the courts must play the dominant roles in the far-larger analytic and 
prosecutorial aspects of counterterrorism, as continuing to use the military as the primary means 
to deal with the terrorist threat falsely elevates the violent Islamist threat to the status of a peer 
competitor to the United States and detracts from the military‘s ability to secure the nation 
against traditional state-based threats, which other portions of the government lack the means 
                                                          
1157 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, p. 7. 
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and ability to combat.1158  However, as the next two sections discuss in greater detail, 
cooperative multi-national approaches are also vital to counterterrorism.  
9.3.5 COUNTER AL-QAIDA IDEOLOGY AND ITS RESONANCE AND DIMINISH 
SPECIFIC DRIVERS OF VIOLENCE THAT AL-QAIDA EXPLOITS 
 The National Strategy for Counterterrorism couches its discourse on counter-
radicalization in terms of social, economic, and political development.  The crux of the strategy‘s 
argument is that by advancing universal human rights (as subjectively defined by the West), 
applying focused economic aid, and expanding individual political rights through the 
advancement of democracy, the United States will be able to alleviate the broad factors which 
underlie the appeal of radicalism.1159  Such sentiments are popular with policy makers at the 
highest levels of both political parties; for example, in 2002, George W. Bush argued that ―We 
fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror,‖ 1160 and while campaigning in 2007, 
Barak Obama vowed to ―roll back the tide of hopelessness that gives rise to hate,‖ by making 
―poverty reduction a key part of helping other nations reduce anarchy.‖1161  However, the 
empirical evidence supporting such propositions is shaky. 
                                                          
1158 The suggestion that the military‘s role in counterterrorism should be smaller than those played by other portions 
of government has been widely voiced.  For a small, non-representative sample of the relevant citations, see: Paul B. 
Stares and Mona Yacoubian, ―Unconventional Approaches to and Unconventional Threat: A Counter-Epidemic 
Strategy,‖ in Mapping the Jihadist Threat: The War on Terror Since 9/11, a publication by the Aspen Institute, (June 
2006); article available online: http://www.usip.org/files/stares_yacoubian_threat.pdf; Geraint Hughes, The 
Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies, The Letort Papers, 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011); available online: 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1066.pdf.  Bruno S. Frey, Dealing With Terrorism: Stick 
or Carrot? (Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar, 2004).  
1159 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, pp. 5-6 (―Adhering to U.S. Core Values‖), 9-10. 
1160 George W. Bush, ―Speech before the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, 
Mexico,‖ (March 22, 2002); available online: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/march02/bush_3-22.html.  The 
Bush Administration also repeated these sentiments again in the 2002 National Security Strategy, which is available 
online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.  See, especially, pages 17-23.   
1161 Barak Hussein Obama, ―Remarks of Senator Obama: The War We Need to Win,‖ A Speech Before the Wilson 
Center (August 1, 2007); available online: 
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/01/the_war_we_need_to_win.php. 
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Admittedly, a host of academics support the viewpoint espoused by Presidents Bush and 
Obama.  For example, following the 9/11 attacks, Richard Sokolosky and Joseph McMillian, 
both of the National Defense University, wrote an op-ed for the New York Times, which stated 
that US could improve national security by providing the Islamic world with ―the kind of foreign 
aid that helps strengthen civil society, provides food and development help, and finances 
programs for education and health.‖1162  Similarly, in 2003, Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, both of 
the RAND Corporation, concluded that social and economic development can reduce terrorist 
recruitment and shrink the size of terrorists‘ support networks, especially when development 
initiatives are designed in consultation with community members, so that programs can meet 
local needs, and these programs are implemented impartially, to prevent dominant socio-cultural 
groups from advancing themselves at the expense of the politically weak.1163  Since that time, 
this viewpoint has become popular; in 2004 Joseph Nye, the Dean of Harvard‘s Kennedy School 
of Government, called on the U.S. to use soft power (i.e. non-military aspects of national power) 
to mitigate support for terrorism by providing masses of disenfranchised Muslims with ―such 
things as jobs, education, health care and dignity as they practice their faith,‖1164 and in 2006 
Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacobian, both of the U.S. Institute of Peace, argued for social and 
economic reforms designed to create jobs that will ―help to ease popular disaffection, particularly 
among the (Middle East) region‘s disproportionately young population.‖1165 
Yet, a number of the terrorists featured in this analysis came from comfortable 
backgrounds and were well-educated.  Most famously, Usama bin Laden was a member of one 
                                                          
1162 Richard Sokolsky and Joseph McMillian, ―Foreign Aid in Our Own Defense,‖ New York Times (February 12, 
2002); available online: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CEFDC113CF931A25751C0A9649C8B63.  
1163 Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003). 
1164 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ―A Dollop of Decent American Values; Why ‗Soft Power‘ Matters in Fighting Terrorism,‖ 
Washington Post (March 30, 2004), p. A19. 
1165 Stares and Yacoubian. 
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of the wealthiest families in Saudi Arabia.  It is similarly well-known that Ayman al-Zawahiri 
hails from a prominent Egyptian family and holds a medical degree.  Moreover, Azahari bin 
Husin earned a PhD in housing policy, taught classes at Malaysia Technical University, and 
wrote text books on statistical method, while Yazid Sufaat was a biochemist.   
Critics may assert that these individuals are among a small handful of exceptions that 
prove the broader rule, but a number of statistically-minded researchers conducted broader 
inquiries that concluded that a nexus between the lack of development and terrorism does not 
exist.1166  There are construct validity problems with many of the variables included in these 
analyses,1167 but their conclusions still serve to highlight that the true relationships between 
development and terrorism is unknown.  It seems likely that the long-term results of the ongoing 
Arab Spring are likely to resolve this debate, but since the democratic reforms stemming from 
this movement are still in their infancy, it would be absurd to draw any conclusions, positively or 
negatively, regarding their impact to the region‘s stability or its citizens‘ propensity to participate 
in the violent Islamist movement.      
Moreover, religion also holds a special appeal for many people that secular 
considerations are unlikely to replace.  Indeed, true Salafists argue that democracy is an affront 
to their religion, because it attempts to replace god‘s perfect law, namely Sharia, with man‘s 
self-serving innovations.1168  Thus, there is a substantial likelihood that, at least in the short term, 
efforts to replicate Western political systems in the Islamic world will exacerbate the likelihood 
                                                          
1166 Examples include: Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 23-52; Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malecova, ―Education, 
Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4 
(Autumn 2003), pp. 119-144; and Alberto Abadie, ―Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,‖ 
American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 50-56. 
1167 Luke M. Gerdes, ―Constructing Terror: How Issues of Construct Validity Undermine the Utility of Terror 
Databases and Statistical Analyses of Terrorism,‖ Paper Presented to the 50th Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, New York, NY, February 2009.  
1168 Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2006). 
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that those on edge of violent extremism will trend toward violent organizations because, 
somewhat paradoxically, efforts at democratization alienate such fence-sitters from the political 
discourse.   
 Given that a global pro-development, pro-democracy agenda is one of the few issues on 
which the two major political parties are in complete agreement, it is a foregone conclusion that 
American will continue to attempt to advance western economic and political systems in the 
Islamic world.  However, this effort cannot take place in a cultural vacuum that ignores local 
religious and cultural traditions.  Aside from the rather obvious recommendation that foreign 
leaders must play significant roles in efforts to design political structures that are well-adapted to 
individual countries‘ circumstances,1169 the United States must find ways to partner with 
individuals whose religious views explicitly eschew violence, but nonetheless remain inherently 
appealing to individuals on the fringes of radical Islam.1170   
A number of Salafist preachers fit this bill.  They agree with violent Sunni Islamists‘ 
stated desire to create an Islamic caliphate where they can live in strict emulation of the Prophet 
Mohammed, but also argue that it is illegitimate to use violence in this pursuit, except under very 
specific conditions that do not include the killing of civilians or the targeting of governments that 
preside over Muslim-majority countries.1171  Thus, the U.S. would be well-advised to give voice 
to these non-violent Salafis, as their message is far more likely to resonate with those currently 
                                                          
1169 This line of reasoning pre-dates the emergence of the Islamist threat.  See, for example, Philippe C. Schmitter 
and Terry Lynn Karl, ―What Democracy Is—and Is Not,‖ Journal of Democracy, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 75-88. 
1170 Robert Lambert‘s research into violent Islam in London independently reached similar conclusions.  
Specifically, he argues in favor of partnerships ―with Muslim groups conventionally deemped to be subversive to 
democracy‖ on the logic that non-violent Islamists are in the best position to understand and discredit the ideological 
arguments of violent Islamists.  Robert Lambert, ―Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London 
Counterterrorism Case Study,‖ Political Science and Politics, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 31-35.  
1171 For discussion of the factors which distinguish non-violent Salafis from their more blood-thirsty brethren, see 
Quintan Wiktorowicz, ―Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29 (2006), pp. 
207-238.  See also, International Crisis Group, ―Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly 
Don‘t Mix,‖ ICG Asia Report No. 83, September 13, 2004; available online: 
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considering jihad than is secular democracy.  After all, the ideological distance between violent 
Salafism and non-violent Salafism is far shorter than the distance between violent Salafism and 
the norms of Western political discourse.   
But as with most things, the devil of this recommendation lies in the details.  Because 
jihadist fence-sitters typically hold stridently anti-American views, the United States cannot play 
an overt role in the support of non-violent Salafi ideologues, lest these preachers‘ religious 
authority become tainted via affiliation with a country prospective Islamists see as their mortal 
enemy.  Indirect, even clandestine, avenues of support must be adopted, and America‘s Muslim 
partner-nations may ultimately be better positioned to exert this type of influence. 
9.3.6 BUILD ENDURING COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIPS AND CAPABILITIES 
 The ideological considerations discussed in the previous section and the multi-polar 
nature of Islamist terrorism both dictate that the United States must work cooperatively with a 
wide assortment of nations in order to effectively combat the terrorist threat.  The National 
Strategy for Counterterrorism explicitly recognizes this need, stating that ―Foreign partners are 
essential to the success of our CT efforts.‖1172  However, the policy document glosses over the 
difficult topic of foreign partners‘ widely divergent capabilities and speaks only of vague needs 
to expand governance and strengthen the rule of law.1173 
 This characterization greatly understates the degree of difficulty associated with these 
recommendations.  Many of the nations in the best position to confront Islamist terror groups lie 
in the developing world.  Owing to their poverty, these nations‘ militaries, intelligence services, 
and law enforcement communities are typically underpaid, under-staffed, under-equipped, and 
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under-trained.  Systemic corruption frequently results and subsequently undermines a host of 
policy initiatives, including counterterrorism.  
The Nairobi police‘s dealings with Khalid al-Fawwaz, the al-Qaida member who played 
a key role in the organizations‘ logistical efforts in East Africa in the early 1990s, offer an 
archetypical example of the difficulties inherent to partnering with corrupt organizations.  Al-
Fawwaz and a compatriot were arrested on vague charges in 1994, and then released a few days 
later, after an attorney paid a bribe equivalent to several thousand dollars to the police.  Had the 
police been as concerned with investigating their detainees as they were with lining their 
pockets, they might have uncovered al-Qaida‘s activities in East Africa years prior to the 1998 
embassy bombings.   
Yet, countries like Kenya cannot be abandoned in the fight against terrorism.  Indeed, 
Kenya‘s large Muslim population and proximity to Somalia make it a key counterterrorism ally, 
but until the country‘s corruption problems are resolved, the efficacy of Kenyan law enforcement 
is subject to question, as amply demonstrated by the fact that Kenyan cops briefly held the 
notorious Comorian terrorist Fazul Abdullah Mohammed in custody ahead of the 2002 Mombasa 
attacks, only to lose him in a bizarre escape.  Given that Kenya is by no means unique in its level 
of corruption, there are substantial practical limitations to the vague efforts at global capacity 
building outlined by the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 
The United States simply lacks the resources necessary to build counterterrorism 
capabilities across the whole of the developing world, especially given the current economic 
climate.  It is valid to suggest that counterterrorism could be improved by providing training 
assistance and limited amounts of equipment to foreign police, intelligence services, and 
militaries, but given that global partnerships are necessary to manage the threat posed by Islamist 
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terrorism, it would be unrealistic for the United States to expect to achieve true capacity building 
by acting in isolation.  Therefore, efforts to build counterterrorism coalitions must be two-tiered.  
The United States must convince other wealthy, fully-developed nations to work not only as 
direct partners in counterterrorism, but also as partners in the provision of training and material 
support to the less-capable developing nations that play such a vital role in combating terrorism.  
The scale of the challenge is so great that efforts to elicit support from the developed world need 
to look beyond America‘s most obvious partners, such as Britain, Australia, and Canada, and 
must include secondary powers, such as the Scandinavian countries.  In other words, it will take 
a fairly broad financial coalition to build a truly inclusive counterterrorism coalition.     
9.3.7 DEPRIVE TERRORISTS OF THEIR ENABLING MEANS 
As it does in regards other aspects of the violent Islamist threat, the National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism offers sound, but ultimately incomplete, strategies to combat terrorist finance.  
Specifically, the strategy emphasizes that jihadists receive funding from donations collected 
primarily in the Gulf region, the exploitation of local economies, and kidnapping for ransom.1174  
All of these elements are vital, but the evidence strongly suggests that terrorists will continue to 
have the ability to finance attacks even if all of these major funding sources are eliminated. 
The first mitigating factor is the low cost of most terror attacks.  Although the 9/11 
attacks cost somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000, the upper estimate for the cost of the 
July 7, 2005, London bombings was $8,500.   Zazi‘s 2009 attempt on the New York City subway 
likely cost no more than a few thousand dollars; the 2009 Little Rock shootings were financed on 
a shoe-string budget using only the wages earned from a low-paying job with a tour-bus 
company, and even the massive 2002 Bali bombings were less than $25,000.  It will remain 
impossible to stop terrorists from saving or otherwise acquiring the fairly small sums of money 
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necessary to conduct the type of attacks which have become commonplace in the decade since 
9/11, particularly if the attackers plan to use suicide-tactics.  After all, those who plan to die as 
‗martyrs‘ have no reason to avoid ruining their credit and bankrupting themselves in order to 
conduct an operation. 
 Moreover, small-scale crimes play an under-recognized role in the finance of terrorism.  
Although the cases discussed in this analysis were not selected with crime in mind, revenue 
generated by illegal means other than kidnapping featured prominently across the categories of 
the Baleian typology, suggesting that criminal finance is an incredibly common feature of the 
contemporary jihadist threat.  Fazul‘s participation in robbery and credit card fraud to support 
the 2002 Mombasa attacks and Siddique Khan‘s fraudulent obtainment of bank loans to finance 
the July 7, 2005, London bombings demonstrate that events strongly tied to al-Qaida have 
benefitted from criminal finance, regardless of if the events occurred inside or outside of the 
West.  Similarly, Noordin‘s accomplices in Indonesia robbed banks and stores to support 
operations including the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing, and the 
2005 Bali bombings.  Clearly, the proceeds of crime also supported events weakly tied to al-
Qaida.  AQIM‘s exploits in smuggling show that the same conclusion applies to former members 
of bin Laden‘s organization, and although all of the individuals this analysis discussed in relation 
to al-Qaida-inspired attacks financed their attacks using personal savings, it is fairly easy to find 
other examples which demonstrate that jihadists who lack functional ties to established terror 
groups also frequently self-finance through crime.  For example, in 2005, police in California 
captured a small group of extremists who followed the teachings of Kevin James, an inmate at 
California‘s Folsom prison who invented his own Islamist theology,1175 after they robbed several 
                                                          
1175 Strictly speaking, James and his followers were not inspired by al-Qaida.  James produced a theological 
manifesto based on his own interpretation of the Koran and Islamic scholarship.  Bin Laden‘s name does not appear 
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gas stations in-and-around Los Angeles to generate funds for attacks they were planning against 
military and Jewish targets in southern California.1176  In short, there is strong evidence 
demonstrating that terrorist finance is intimately tied to moderately-organized crime.  
 Given that police already make tremendous efforts to eliminate crime for its own sake, 
there is little sense in making the bland recommendation to increase anti-crime initiatives in the 
name of counterterrorism, especially considering the limitations imposed by the current 
budgetary climate.  Thus, efforts to mitigate terrorists‘ access to criminally-generated funds must 
be about doing more with currently available resources.  The most realistic solution is ultimately 
a simple one: increase awareness at all levels of American and international law-enforcement 
regarding the nexus between terrorism and criminal-finance.  If police officers the world over 
know that some suspects who appear to be petty criminals are actually terrorists who committed 
their crime in an effort to generate funding for an attack, then investigators are more likely to 
pursue lines of inquiry that may head-off prospective attacks early in their development.1177   
However, the utility of this recommendation is still likely limited, because even police 
who are fully aware of links between crime and terrorism must first catch those responsible for 
the crimes for this knowledge to be of any use—an especially difficult challenge considering that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in this document, though it is worth noting that James heavily sites Ibn Tamiyyah, a 12th century theorist who also 
appears frequently in al-Qaida‘s theological pronouncements.  Ultimately, James and al-Qaida independently arrived 
at similar conclusions after reviewing overlapping sources.  For the specifics of James‘s beliefs, see: Kevin James, 
The JIS Protocol, 1997 (revised 2002); available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_James_JISManifesto.pdf. 
1176 "Second man involved in domestic terrorism plot targeting military, Jewish facilities sentenced to prison," U.S. 
Department of Justice, Press Release, July 21, 2008; USA v. Kevin James, et al (Defendants), United States District 
Court Central District of California, Grand Jury Indictment, October 2007. 
1177 Hamm‘s research, which considered patterns of criminal involvement among terrorists subscribing to a host of 
religious and political ideologies, reached similar conclusions.  Specifically, he argued that ―the most successful 
method of both detecting and prosecuting cases of terrorism is through the pursuit of conventional criminal 
investigations. . . . the best practices of investigators should be directed to crimes that facilitate the operation of 
complex organizations . . . . (because) all terrorist organizations require money, material, trainsportation, identity 
documents, communication systems, and safe havens to accomplish their aims.‖  Mark S. Hamm, ―Crimes 
Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research and Prevention,‖ Final Report Submitted to the National Institute 
of Justice, Washington, D.C, September 2005; available online: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211203.pdf.   
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only a tiny share of the billions of small crimes committed around the world each year will be 
linked to terror.  In short, jihadists‘ increasing involvement in crime dictates that the finance of 
terrorism is a fairly intractable problem.  
 
9.4 THE LIMITS OF COUNTERTERRORISM 
 Although the recommendations offered by this analysis touch on several diverse domains, 
they are share a common trait: all of them can mitigate, rather than solve, the threat of Islamist 
terrorism.  Indeed, perfect solutions to the problem of terrorism do not exist, especially not in 
open societies that prize freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and other personal liberties 
that extremists can pervert to advance their illegitimate ends.  Therefore, this analysis closes by 
echoing a conclusion reached by virtually every serious inquiry into terrorism, namely that some 
level of non-state violence against civilians is unavoidable.  Americans must recognize that 
although Islamist terrorism can be greatly curtailed, it can never be entirely defeated.  
  
476 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
―21 July suspect ‗linked to 7/7,‘‖ BBC News, March 23, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6484317.stm. 
 
―21/7 bombers failed to kill dozens as ‗mastermind‘ could not do maths,‖ Evening Standard 
(London), July 9, 2007; available online: http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/217-bombers-
failed-to-kill-dozens-as-mastermind-could-not-do-maths-6596420.html. 
 
―21/7: Was it linked to 7/7?‖ BBC News, July 11, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6249118.stm. 
 
―7 July bomber ‗phoned accused,‘‖ BBC News, January 20, 2009; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7840285.stm. 
 
―7/7 bomber linked to Israel pair,‖ BBC News, July 9, 2006; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5161390.stm. 
 
Abadie, Alberto, ―Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,‖ American Economic 
Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 50-56. 
 
Abbas, Mazhar, ―Militant to remain with police as Pakistan probes Pearl murder,‖ Agence 
France Presse, February 25, 2002. 
 
―Abdul Basit Balochi (Mahmoud Kareem), alias Ramzi Ahmed Yousef,‖ Washingtonpost.com, 
September 12, 2007. 
 
Abraham, Alex, ―Paintballs simulate bullets at urban assault course,‖ South Dakota National 
Guard Public Affairs Office, June 16, 2008; available online: 
http://www.nationalguard.mil/features/SDGC/news/080616-Story-Units.pdf. 
 
―Abu Sayyaf strikes again, kidnaps trader in Jolo, Sulu,‖ Manila Times (Philippines), January 
31, 2008. 
 
Abuza, Zachary, ―Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages,‖ Institute of Defence 
and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), March 7, 2003. 
 
―Afghan government has 'undeniable evidence' of bomb plot,‖ Agence France Presse, April 6, 
2002. 
477 
 
 
―Afghan peacekeepers say rocket attacks will not deter them,‖ Agence France Presse, 
September 14, 2003. 
 
Aglionby, John, ―Four arrested over Australia embassy bomb,‖ The Guardian (London), 
November 25, 2004. 
 
AKE Group, ―Kidnap Report: Q2 2010 Hotspots, 2010. 
 
AKE Group, ―Kidnap Report: Q4 2010 Hotspots,‖ 2010. 
 
―Al Qaeda 'trained' Jakarta bombers,‖ CNN.com, August 9, 2003. 
 
―Al Qaeda‘s Anwar al-Awlaki killed in Yemen,‖ CBS News, September 30, 2011; available 
online: http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20113732.html. 
 
―Al Qa'idah leader urgers Uighurs to launch jihad against China,‖ BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 
- Political, October 8, 2009. 
 
―Al-Arabiya reports on Algerian Al-Qa'idah's links with Sahara drugs mafia,‖ BBC Monitoring 
Middle East - Political, July 14, 2009. 
 
―Algeria kills militant leader,‖ United Press International, June 20, 2004. 
 
―Algeria profile,‖ BBC News, January 10, 2012; available online: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14118856. 
 
―Algeria: GSPC leader Hattab replaced by man 'close' to Al-Qa'idah,‖ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, October 10, 2003. 
 
―Algeria: Six Civilians Killed in Medea Province,‖ BBC News, October 31, 1998. 
 
―Algeria: Two armed civilians killed in bogus roadblock in east of country,‖ BBC Monitoring 
Middle East - Political, December 15, 2001. 
 
―Algerian armed Islamist group rejects general amnesty - paper,‖ BBC Monitoring Middle East 
- Political, January 8, 2005. 
 
―Algerian armed Islamist leader killed by armed forces: report,‖ Agence France Presse, June 
20, 2004. 
 
―Algerian authorities abort arms deal - paper,‖ BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political, April 1, 
2009. 
 
―Algerian forces kill suspected militants in reprisal for ambush,‖ Agence France Presse, April 
9, 2006. 
478 
 
 
―Algerian Islamist group leader reveals details of his life, military operations,‖ BBC Monitoring 
Middle East - Political, September 14, 2006. 
 
―Algerian jihadists seek to expand,‖ United Press International, June 18, 2009. 
 
―Algerian paper views links between Al-Qa'idah, drug trade in Sahel region,‖ BBC Monitoring 
Middle East - Political, February 7, 2010. 
 
―Algerian peace charter helps more than 2,000: president,‖ Agence France Presse, April 8, 
2006. 
 
―Algerian Salafi founder Hattab calls for laying down arms,‖ BBC Monitoring International 
Reports, October 18, 2005. 
 
―Algerian Salafi group attacks army unit, rejects amnesty offer,‖ BBC Monitoring Middle East - 
Political, January 8, 2005. 
 
―Algerian suspected in terrorist plot pleads guilty,‖ Agence France Presse, March 9, 2001. 
 
―Algerian 'terrorist' Belmokhtar spotted in northern Mali,‖ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
October 28, 2004. 
 
―Algerian 'terrorist' chief apologizes for past actions in letter from jail,‖ BBC Monitoring 
Middle East - Political, May 11, 2009. 
 
al-Haj, Ahmed, ―Hassan Hussein Bin Alwan, Al Qaeda‘s Biggest Financier in Saudi Arabia, 
Arrested in Yemen,‖ Huffington Post, June 14, 2009; available online: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/14/hassan-hussein-bin-alwan-_n_215403.html. 
 
al-Hakimi, Abdulsalam al-Dar, Small Arms in Yemen, Sheba Center, 2010; available online: 
http://www.shebacss.com/en/publications.php?action=viewPub&id=45. 
 
al-Kibsi, Mohammed, ―Saudi authorities erect barriers on Yemeni border,‖ Yemen Observer, 
January 12, 2008. 
 
Allison, Graham, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, (New York: 
Times Books, 2004). 
 
―Al-Qaeda calls for revenge over death of moneyman,‖ Agence France Presse, July 30, 2010. 
 
―Al-Qaeda operative praises Red Mosque ―‗martyrs,‘‖ Agence France Presse, July 31, 2007. 
 
―Al-Qaeda scouted US terror targets in South Korea -- intelligence reports,‖ Agence France 
Presse, December 16, 2003. 
 
479 
 
―Al-Qaeda singles out Australia: report,‖ Sydney Morning Herald, August 12, 2003; available 
online: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/12/1060588349256.html. 
 
―Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): The Mujahideen‘s Demand to Release the French 
Hostage,‖ translation available from the NEFA Foundation, January 10, 2010; available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org//file/AQIMHostages0110.pdf. 
 
―Al-Qaida makes a move on troubled Nigeria,‖ United Press International, June 17, 2010. 
 
―Al-Qaida says it fund raiser killed by Yemeni forces,‖ Xinhua News, March 14, 2010. 
 
―Al-Qaida vet ‗takes over Somali jihadists,‘‖ United Press International, March 11, 2010. 
 
―Al-Qaida‘s Committee in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Claim of Responsibility for the 
Killing of the American Christopher Leggett,‖ translation available from the NEFA Foundation, 
June 24, 2009; available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqimleggett0609.pdf. 
 
―Al-Qaida‘s Committee in the Islamic Maghreb: A Communiqué Regarding the British 
Hostage,‖ translation available from the NEFA Foundation, May 20, 2009; available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqimbritishhostage0509.pdf. 
 
―Al-Qaida‘s Committee in the Islamic Maghreb: A Statement Regarding the Killing of British 
Hostage Edwin Dyer,‖ translation available from the NEFA Foundation; available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqim0609.pdf. 
 
Al-Rubaish statement, available online from Islamic Awakening: 
http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/why-muhammad-ibn-naif-shaykh-ibrahim-al-28847/. 
 
al-Shishani, Murad Batal, ―Ibrahim al-Rubaish: New Religious Ideologue of al-Qaeda in Saudi 
Arabia Calls for Revival of Assassination Tactic,‖ Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7 No. 36 
(November 2009), available online: 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35771. 
 
American Chemical Council, ―Fact Sheet: Q&A Regarding Hydrogen Peroxide,‖ date 
unknown; available online: 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/ProductsTechnology/Hydrogen-Peroxide/QA-Regarding-
Hydrogen-Peroxide.pdf. 
 
―An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,‖ New York Times, July 1, 2008; available online: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?pagewanted=all. 
 
Anastasia, George, ―A Radical Shift in Reputation for 6 Men,‖ Philadelphia Inquirer, May 13, 
2007. 
 
Anderson, Curt, ―AP Exclusive: New al-Qaida leader knows US well,‖ Associated Press, 
480 
 
August 6, 2010. 
 
―Another alleged terrorist goes on trial for deadly hotel bombing,‖ Agence France Presse, May 
6, 2004. 
 
 
Application for a warrant to seize personal property subject to civil forfeiture, Case No.: 1:10-
sw-569 (Farooque Ahmed), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia, October 
26, 2010. 
 
Appezzato, John, ―Father of Fort Dix Suspects Arrested on Immigration Charges,‖ Star-Ledger, 
May 10, 2007. 
 
―Arms smugglers use satellite phones to make deals in KSA,‖ The Saudi Gazette, February 22, 
2012; available online: 
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2012022211809. 
 
 Armstrong, Karen, The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism, (New York: Ballentine 
Books, 2000). 
 
Arnold, David, ―Yemen has Guns Galore, Protestors Refuse to Use,‖ Voice of America News, 
November 4, 2011; available online: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-
east/Yemen-Experiments-With-Right-to-Bear-Arms--133255713.html. 
 
―Arrested Pakistani militants reveal plan of attacking US consulate, other target,‖ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, July 20, 2004. 
 
―Arrested Preacher Linked to Attacks,‖ Associated Press, April 5, 2003. 
 
ARTIS Research, ―Attributes.xls,‖ available online: 
http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/attributes.php. 
 
ARTIS Research, ―Nodes Codebook – Public,‖ (2009); available online: 
http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/files/Nodes_CodeBook_Public_Version2.pdf. 
 
ARTIS Research, ―REL Codebook – Public,‖ June 2009, available online: 
http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/files/Relations_Codebook_Public_Version2.pdf. 
 
Asmarani, Devi, ―Another JI chief nabbed,‖ Straights Times (Singapore), June 16, 2007. 
 
―ATC hears ranger mobile attack case,‖ Pakistan Newswire, June 2, 2005. 
 
Atkinson, R. and J. Flint, ―Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball 
Research Strategies,‖ Social Research Update, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2001). 
 
Atran, Scott, Robert Axelrod, Richard Davis, and Marc Sageman, ―Terror Networks and Sacred 
481 
 
Values: Synopsis of Report from Madrid – Morocco – Hamburg – Palestine – Israel – Syria,‖ 
Delivered to NSC Staff, March 28, 2007; available online: 
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/synopsis_atran-sageman_nsc_brief_28_march_2007.pdf. 
 
Attorney General of North Dakota, ―Retailer‘s Guide to State and Federal laws combating 
Methamphetamine,‖ April 26, 2007; available online: 
http://www.ag.state.nd.us/methwatch/methwatch2006/combatmethact.pdf. 
 
―Attorneys make final arguments in US terrorism case,‖ The Guardian, December 17, 2008. 
 
Auger, James, ―Suspected leader of Al-Qaida in Europe Denies Accusations in Spanish Court,‖ 
World Market Analysis, April 27, 2005. 
 
―Australia to open way to extradite terrorist suspects to Lebanon,‖ Agence France Presse, 
September 15, 2003. 
 
―Australia to open way to extradite terrorist suspects to Lebanon,‖ Agence France Presse, 
September 15, 2003. 
 
Australian Federal Police, ―Bali bombings 2002,‖ date unknown, available online: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060618005353/http://afp.gov.au/international/operations/previous
_operations/bali_bombings_2002. 
 
Australian Federal Police, Summary of Bali Persons of Interest in the 2002 Bali Bombings, date 
unknown. 
 
Baines, Paul R., Nicholas J. O‘Shaughnessy, Kevin Moloney, et al, ―The Dark Side of Political 
Marketing: Islamist Propaganda, Reversal Theory, and British Muslims,‖ European Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 44, No. 3-4 (2010), pp. 478-495. 
 
Bale, Jeffrey M. ―Jihadist Cells and ‗I.E.D.‘ Capabilities in Europe: Assessing the Present and 
Future Threat to the West,‖ Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2010, pp. 28, 62-63. 
 
―Bali bomb attacks claim 26 lives,‖ BBC News, October 2, 2005. 
 
―Bali bomber ‗heads new group,‘‖ BBC News, January 30, 2006; available online: 
http://www.seasite.niu.edu/indonesian/islam/BBC%20NEWS%20%20Asia-
Pacific%20%20Bali%20bomber%20%27heads%20new%20group%27.htm. 
 
―Bali bomber links self to other bombing,‖ Associated Press Online, September 1, 2003. 
―‗Bali bomb maker‘ believed dead,‖ BBC News, November 10, 2005. 
 
―Bali bombs ‗were suicide attacks,‘‖ BBC News, October 2, 2005. 
 
―Band of Brothers,‖ Harper’s Magazine, October 2006; available online: 
http://harpers.org/archive/2006/10/0081216. 
482 
 
 
Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It 
Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life, (New York: Plume, 2003), pp. 25-40. 
 
Barfi, Barak, ―Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen,‖ New American 
Foundation, pp. 5-6; available online: 
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Barfi.pdf. 
 
Barnes, Richard, Interview conducted June 2010, London. 
 
Barta, Patrick and Reuben Carter, ―Police Say Bombers Sought Higher Toll,‖ Wall Street 
Journal, July 25, 2009. 
 
Bartholomew, Dana, ―Cops use paintball to learn ambush skills,‖ Contra Costa Times 
(California), January 19, 2010; available online: 
http://www.contracostatimes.com/california/ci_19779990. 
 
―Beauty Secrets Pure Acetone Manicurist Solvent 8 oz.,‖ available from sallybeauty.com. 
 
―Behind the Mauritanian coup,‖ Mideast Mirror, August 12, 2005. 
 
Belkadi, Boubker, ―Algerian army pursues crackdown on Muslim extremists, nine die,‖ Agence 
France Presse, February 1, 2000. 
 
Benassi, Mario, Arent Greve, and Julia Harkola, ―Looking for a Network Organization: The 
Case of GESTO,‖ Journal of Market Focused Management, Vol. 4 (1999), pp. 205-229. 
 
Bender, Bryan and Farah Stockman, ―Officials: Group tying self to blasts may not be real,‖ 
Boston Globe, March 13, 2004. 
 
Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against 
America, (New York: Random House, 2003). 
 
Bennetto, Jason, ―Terror in London: Predicted bomb attack reveal intelligence gaps on al-
Qa'ida,‖ The Independent (London), July 8, 2005. 
 
Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia, ―Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to 
Proliferation,‖ International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 80-114. 
 
Bhattacharya, Suryatapa, ―American woman kidnapped in Yemen tells of her ordeal,‖ The 
National (UAE), May 31, 2010; available online: http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-
news/american-woman-kidnapped-in-yemen-tells-of-her-ordeal#page2. 
 
bin Abas, Nasir, interview conducted August 2010, Jakarta, Indonesia. 
 
―Bin Laden ‗funded‘ Australian embassy bombing,‖ Sydney Morning Herald, August 1, 2005. 
483 
 
 
―Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans,‖ in Compilation of Usama bin Laden’s Statements 
1994-January 2004, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), January 2004. 
 
bin Sallam, Mohammed, ―21 killed in confrontations in Abyan,‖ Yemen Times, August 23, 
2010. 
 
Bird, Steve, ―Martyrdom video man thanked bin Laden for plane bomb inspiration,‖ The Times 
(London), April 11, 2008. 
 
Blau, Judith R., ―Paradoxical Consequences of Excess in Structural Complexity: A Study of a 
State Children‘s Psychiatric Hospital,‖ Sociology of Health and Illness, Vol. 2 No. 3 (1980), p. 
279-285. 
 
Bode, Nicole, et al, ―CIA Tip Grounded Horror,‖ Daily News (NY), June 5, 2007. 
 
―Boeing Marks Completion of its 757 Commercial Airline Program,‖ Boeing, October 28, 
2004; available online: http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2004/q4/nr_041028g.html. 
 
―Bomb materials found buried in woods,‖ The Times (London), April 16, 2008. 
 
―Bomb may have flown on passenger planes,‖ CNN.com, October 31, 2010. 
 
―Bombings police search seized car,‖ BBC News, July 26, 2005; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4716535.stm. 
 
Bone, James and Alan Road, ―Terror by degree,‖ The Times (London), October 18, 1997. 
 
Bonner, Raymond and Jane Perlez, ―Bali Bombings Kill at Least 25 in Tourist Spots,‖ New 
York Times, October 2, 2005. 
 
Bonner, Raymond and Jane Perlez, ―Threats and Responses: Jakarta; Indonesia links Muslim 
group with terrorism,‖ New York Times, October 17, 2002. 
 
Bonner, Raymond, ―Qaeda meeting in Thailand reportedly plotted attacks on tourists,‖ New 
York Times, November 8, 2002. 
 
Bonner, Raymond, ―Threats and Responses: Southeast Asia; Qaeda meeting in Thailand 
reportedly plotted attacks on tourists,‖ New York Times, November 8, 2002. 
  
484 
 
 
Borgatti, Stephen P., ―The Key Player Problem,‖ in Dynamic Social Network Modeling and 
Analysis: Workshop Summary and Papers, (Washington, D.C.: National Academic Press, 
2003), pp. 241-252. 
 
Borgatti, Stephen P., Kathleen M. Carley, and David Krackhardt, ―On the robustness of 
centrality measures under conditions of imperfect data,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 28 (2006), pp. 
124-136. 
 
Boureston, Jack and Charles Mahaffey, ―Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the 
Threat,‖ Strategic Insights, Vol. 2, No. 10 (October 2003). 
 
Bowden, Mark, Blackhawk Down: A Story of Modern War, (Berkley, CA: Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1999. 
 
Braniff, Bill and Assaf Moghadam, ―Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda‘s Strategic, 
Ideological, and Structural Adaptations since 9/11,‖ Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, No. 2 
(2011); available online: 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/braniff-towards-global-
jihadism/html. 
 
―Breaking News: Adnan el-Shukrijumah new head of al-Qaeda operations – FBI tells 
Associated Press,‖ Stabroek News (Guyana), August 6, 2010; available online: 
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/archives/08/06/breaking-news-adnan-el-shukrijumah-new-
head-of-al-qaeda-operations-%E2%80%93-fbi-tells-associated-press/. 
 
Brown, Bob, ―Girl Born With Eight Limbs Thrives in India,‖ ABC News, June 13, 2008; 
available online: http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=5055673&page=1#.TyHNtvl-e-c. 
 
Buchanan, Michael, ―London bombs cost just hundreds,‖ BBC News, January 3, 2006; available 
online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4576346.stm. 
 
Bukay, David, ―Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam,‖ Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2007, pp. 3-
11; available online: http://www.meforum.org/1754/peace-or-jihad-abrogation-in-islam. 
 
Burgonio, TJ, ―Another Abu captive owns up to beheadings,‖ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
February 26, 2002. 
 
Bush, George W. ―Speech before the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in 
Monterrey, Mexico,‖ (March 22, 2002); available online: 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/march02/bush_3-22.html. 
  
485 
 
 
"Campaign against terrorism: What became of his lieutenants?" The Independent (London), 
November 26, 2001. 
 
Candiotti, Susan, ―Two New Yorkers questioned in Zazi investigation, attorney say,‖ CNN 
Justice, October 9, 2009; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-
09/justice/us.terror.probe_1_najibullah-zazi-ahmad-wais-afzali-zarein-
ahmedzay?_s=PM:CRIME. 
 
Carley, Kathleen M., Dave Columbus, Michael Bigrigg, and Frank Kunkel, ―AutoMap User‘s 
Guide,‖ Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software 
Research, Technical Report, CMU-ISR-11-108, 2011. 
 
Carley, Kathleen M., ―Destabilizing Terror Networks,‖ Proceedings of the 8th International 
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Conference held at the National 
Defense War College, Washington DC. Evidence Based Research, Track 3, Vienna, VA (2003). 
 
Carley, Kathleen M. and Ju-Sung Lee, ―Destabilizing Networks,‖ Connections, Vol. 24, No. 3 
(2001). 
 
Carley, Kathleen M., ―Dynamic Network Analysis,‖ in Dynamic Social Network Modeling and 
Analysis: Workshop Summary and Papers, (Washington, D.C.: National Academic Press, 
2003). 
 
Carley, Kathleen M., ―ORA User‘s Guide 2012,‖ Carnegie Mellon University, School of 
Computer Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical Report CMU-ISR-12-105, 2012. 
 
Carley, Kathleen M., ―Smart Agents and Organizations of the Future,‖ in Leah Lierouw and 
Sonia Livingstone (eds.), The Handbook of New Media, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), pp. 
206-220. 
 
Carrell, Severin and Raymond Whitaker, ―Special Report: Terror in the UK - Ricin the plot that 
never was; A deadly poison said to be at the heart of a terrorist conspiracy,‖ Independent on 
Sunday (London), April 17, 2005. 
 
Casciani, Dominic, ―Top extremist recruiter is jailed,‖ BBC News, February 26, 2008; available 
online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7231492.stm. 
 
Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS), 
Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA), (Pittsburgh, PA: Institute for Software Research at 
Carnegie Mellon University, 2010); available online: www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora. 
 
Center for Responsive Politics, ―2012 Outside Spending, by Groups,‖ April 16, 2012; available 
online: 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=A
. 
486 
 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, ―Africa: Algeria,‖ The World Factbook, April 3, 2012; available 
online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, ―Middle East: Yemen,‖ The World Factbook, March 12, 2012; 
available online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html. 
 
Cherry, Paul, ―Montreal man wants extradition,‖ The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), June 26, 
2002. 
 
Chew, Amy, ―Azahari Dead,‖ New Straits Times (Malaysia), November 10, 2005. 
 
Christanto, Dicky, ―Jibril, Ali cooperated in funding hotel bombings,‖ Jakarta Post, September 
2, 2009; available online: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/02/jibril-ali-cooperated-
funding-hotel-bombings.html. 
 
Christie, Christopher J., ―Five Radical Islamists Charged with Planning Attack on Fort Dix 
Army Base in New Jersey,‖ United States Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney, District of New 
Jersey, May 8, 2007. 
 
―Christopher Leggett killing: Mauritania death penalty,‖ BBC News, March 16, 2011; available 
online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12750853. 
 
―Chronology-The British fertilizer bomb plot,‖ Reuters, April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/30/us-britain-trial-chronology-
idUSL2559097320070430. 
 
Chulov, Martin, ―Hambali's finger on the trigger - Terror hits home,‖ The Weekend Australian, 
November 9, 2002. 
 
Cigar, Norman, ―Al-Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq‘s 
Unstable Triangle,‖ Marine Corps University, Middle East Studies Occasional Papers, Number 
Two, September 2011. 
 
―Clairol Clairoxide 40 Volume Clear Liquid Developer,‖ available from fouryoursalon.com. 
 
―CLAIROL Professional 40 Clairoxide Maximum Lift 40 Volume Clear Developer 16 oz/473 
ml,‖ available from hairproducts.com. 
 
Clark, Robert M., Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach, (Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press, 2004), pp. 107-108. 
 Clarke, Richard A., Glenn P. Aga, Roger W. Cressey, Stephen E. Flynn, Blake W. Mobley, Eric 
Rosenback, Steven Simon, William F. Wechsler, and Lee S. Wolosky, Defeating the Jihadists: 
A Blueprint for Action, A Century Foundation Task Report, (New York: Century Foundation 
Press, 2004). 
487 
 
 
Clarke, Richard A., Against all Enemies, (New York: Free Press, 2004). 
 
Cobain, Ian and Jeevan Vasagar, ―Free – the man accused of being an al-Qaida leader, aka ‗Q,‘‖ 
The Guardian (London), April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/01/politics.topstories3. 
 
Cochrane, Joe with Peter Janssen, ―Illusions of security,‖ Newsweek, August 18, 2003. 
 
Cohen, David S., ―Remarks by Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David 
S. Cohen at Treasury‘s Counter-Terrorist Financing Symposium,‖ U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, September 8, 2011; available online: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg1293.aspx. 
 
Cohn, Martin Regg, ―Kalashnikov Culture: Talking Tough on Guns in Pakistan,‖ Toronto Star, 
April 11, 2001. 
 
Cole, Matthew, ―The David Rohde Puzzle,‖ New York Magazine, January 22, 2009. 
 
Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the 
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York: Penguin, 2004), p. 204. 
 
Coll, Steve, The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century, (New York: 
Penguin, 2008). 
 
Collins, H.M.,  ―Tacit Knowledge, Trust and the Q of Sapphire,‖ Social Studies of Science, Vol. 
31, No. 1 (February 2001), pp. 71-85. 
 
―Company creates hard-to-ignite fertilizer to foil bomb-makers,‖ Associated Press, September 
23, 2008; available online via the webcite archive: http://www.webcitation.org/5xGXduu1Y. 
 
Confidential informant employed in the agricultural consulting industry, interview conducted 
February 2012, Moline, IL. 
 
Confidential informant in the employ of the U.S. federal government, interview conducted 
December 2011. 
 
Confidential informant in the employ of the U.S. military, interview conducted March 2012. 
 
Confidential informant in the employ of Densus-88, interview conducted August 2010 in 
Jakarta, Indonesia. 
 
Cooper, Kenneth J., ―Afghan leaders face toughest foe; Kabul pacifies 3 militias as fourth group 
makes major territorial gains,‖ Washington Post, September 15, 1996. 
  
488 
 
 
Coredesman, Anthony H. and Nawaf Obaid, ―Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats 
and Islamist Extremists,‖ Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 26, 2005. 
 
Coroner‘s Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005, Testimony of DC Richard 
Reynolds, February 1, 2011. Specifically, see evidentiary document INQ10097-4. 
 
Coroner‘s Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005, Testimony of Colonel Peter 
Francis Mahoney, February 1, 2011. 
 
Coultan, Mark and Ellen Connolly, ―The baggage of Bilal Khazal; Insight,‖ Sydney Morning 
Herald (Australia), June 4, 2004. 
 
―Court shown dramatic 21 July film,‖ BBC News, January 24, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6291943.stm. 
 
―Courting the Cham; Cambodia and Islamism,‖ The Economist, October 2, 2010. 
 
Cowell, Alan, ―Al Jazeera video links London Bombings to al Qaeda,‖ New York Times, 
September 2, 2005. 
 
Cragin, Kim and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003). 
 
Craig, Larry E. and Jade West, ―A Decade of Terrorist Attacks,‖ United States Senate 
Republican Policy Committee, October 2, 2001; available online: 
http://rpc.senate.gov/releases/1999/fr100201.htm. 
 
Crenshaw, Martha, ―Assessing the Al-Qa‘ida Threat to the United States,‖ CTC Sentinel, 
January 13, 2010; available online: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/assessing-the-al-qaida-
threat-to-the-united-states. 
 
Crowley, Philip J., ―Designations of Al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Senior 
Leaders,‖ United States Department of State, January 19, 2010; available online: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/01/135364.htm. 
 
Cuomo, Chris, Emily Friedman, Sarah Netter, and Richard Espositio, ―Alleged Fort Hood 
Shooter Nidal Malik Hasan Was ‗Calm,‘ Methodical During Massacre,‖ ABC News, November 
6, 2009. 
 
Curtis, S., W. Gesler, G. Smith, and S. Washburn, ―Approaches to Sampling and Case Selection 
in Qualitative Research: Examples in the Geography of Health,‖ Social Science and Medicine, 
Vol. 50, No. 7/8 (2000), pp. 1001-1014. 
 
Dao, James, ―A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial and Many Questions,‖ New York Times, February 
16, 2010. 
 
489 
 
Dao, James, ―Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,‖ New York Times, January 21, 
2010. 
 
Dao, James, ―Suspect Was ‗Mortified‘ About Deployment,‖ New York Times, November 5, 
2009. 
 
Dao, James, ―Suspect‘s Lawyer Outlines Defense in Killing of Soldier,‖ New York Times, June 
4, 2009. 
 
Davis, George B. and Kathleen M. Carley, ―Clearing the FOG: Fuzzy Overlapping Groups for 
Social Networks,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July 2008), pp. 201-212. 
 
De Montesquiou, Alfred, ―Official: Al-Qaeda like a fast food franchise for terrorism,‖ USA 
Today, June 7, 2009; available online: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-06-07-al-
qaeda_N.htm. 
 
Dean, Neville, ―Suicide bombers staged 'dry run' before day of carnage,‖ Press Association, 
September 20, 2005. 
 
Dean, Neville, ―The London Bombings - What we know so far,‖ Press Association, July 19, 
2005. 
 
Dekker, D.D., D. Krackhardt, and T.A.B. Snijder, ―Sensitivity of MRQAP Tests to Colinearity 
and Autocorrelation Conditions,‖ Psychometrika, Vol. 72 (2007), pp. 563-581. 
 
―Democracy Index 2011,‖ Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011; available online: 
http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011. 
 ―Desert bandits suspects after 31 tourists vanish,‖ Ottawa Citizen, April 22, 2003. 
 
―Detained terror suspect helped plan Bali blasts, Indonesian police say,‖ Agence France Presse, 
July 12, 2004. 
 
Detective Corps, ―Witness Interrogation Report of Ali Ghufron,‖ The State Police of Republic 
of Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), December 5, 2002. 
 
Detective Corps, ―Witness Interrogation Report of Amrozi,‖  State Police of Republic of 
Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), February 24, 2003. 
 
Detective Corps, ―Witness Interrogation Report of Amrozi,‖ State Police of Republic of 
Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), November 14, 2002. 
 
Detective Corps, ―Witness Interrogation Report of Imam Samudra,‖ The State Police of 
Republic of Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), January 23, 2003. 
  
490 
 
 
―Die sehen Osterreich als muslimishes Land‖ (They see Austria as a Muslim Country), The 
Standard (Austria), November 7, 2008; available online: http://www.algeria-
watch.org/de/artikel/2008/itv_ex_geiseln.htm 
 
Diesner, Jana and Kathleen M. Carley, ―Using Network Text Analysis to Detect the 
Organizational Structure of Covert Networks,‖ Proceedings of the NAACSOS 2004 Conference, 
Pittsburgh, PA, 2004. 
 
Dillon, Paul, ―Blast rocks Jakarta near Australian Embassy,‖ USA Today, September 8, 2004. 
 
Djuhari, Lely T., ―Three terror suspects name Muslim cleric Bashir as alleged terror head; one 
links him to bin Laden,‖ Associated Press Worldstream, June 26, 2003. 
 
―DNA tests in Indonesia confirm death of terrorist Noordin Top,‖ Asian News International, 
September 19, 2009. 
 
Dombroski, Mathew, Paul Fishbeck, and Kathleen Carley, ―Estimating the Shape of Covert 
Networks,‖ Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and 
Technology Symposium. Conference held at the National Defense War College, Washington 
DC. Evidence Based Research, Track 3, Vienna, VA, 2003. 
 
Duffy, Brian, and Ancel Martinez, ―The tower bombing: Following the money,‖ U.S. News and 
World Report, March 22, 1993. 
 
Duraphe, Ashok T., Final Form/Report (Under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) In the Court of Addl. Ch. 
M.M., 37th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai, February 25, 2009. 
 
Eccles, Robert G. and Dwight B. Crane, ―Managing Through Networks in Investment 
Banking,‖ California Management Review, Fall 1987, p. 183. 
 
Edwards, Richard, ―Trio ‗scouted targets for July 7 bombers,‘‖ The Telegraph (London), April 
11, 2008; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584716/Trio-scouted-
targets-for-July-7-bombers.html. 
 
Egerton, Brooks, ―Fort Hood Captain: Hasan Wanted Patients to Face War Crimes Charges,‖ 
Dallas Morning News, November 17, 2009; available online: 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/20091117-Fort-Hood-captain-Hasan-wanted-9439.ece. 
 
Egerton, Brooks, ―Imam‘s e-mails to Fort Hood suspect Hasan tame compared to online 
rhetoric,‖ Dallas Morning News, November 29, 2009. 
 
Eiffler, Sven ―Jihadist Propaganda on the Internet: Impact and Challenges for the Security 
Community,‖ NATO Science for Peace and Security Studies, Vol. 67 (2010); available online: 
http://www.booksonline.iospress.nl/Content/View.aspx?piid=18158. 
 
491 
 
―Eighteen dead in ambush of Algerian security patrol: report,‖ Agence France Presse, January 
5, 2005. 
 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette and Calvert Jones, ―Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,‖ 
International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 7-44. 
 
Ellis, Eric, ―Countdown to a bombing,‖ Globe and Mail (Canada), May 12, 2003. 
 
England, Andrew, ―AP Exclusive: FBI's most wanted leader of al-Qaida cell indicted for U.S. 
embassy bombing escaped,‖ Associated Press, June 10, 2004. 
 
England, Andrew, ―Authorities Search for Terror Suspect,‖ Associated Press, March 20, 2003. 
 
 
England, Andrew, ―Investigators believe suspect in Nov. 28 attacks on Kenyan coast was 
connected to the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings,‖ Associated Press, March 21, 2003. 
 
―Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass, alias Belaouar: L‘armee de Ould Abdel Aziz au 
Mali n‘a jamais ete un obstacle devant nous pour arriver a nos objectifs en Mauitanie,‖ Agence 
Noukchott d’Information, November 2011; available online: 
http://www.ani.mr/?menuLink=9bf31c7ff062936a96d3c8bd1f8f2ff3&idNews=15829. 
 
―Exiled Afghan warlord threatens to return if US sends ground troops,‖ Agence France Presse, 
October 17, 2001. 
 
―Fahim Ansari‘s acquittal challenged,‖ Times of India, October 4, 2011. 
 
Fahim, Kareem and Andrea Elliott, ―In Large Immigrant Family, Religion Guided 3 Held in 
Fort Dix Plot,‖ New York Times, May 10, 2007. 
 
―Fatal blasts hit Jakarta hotels,‖ BBC News, July 17, 2009. 
 
―Fazul Adullah Mohammed‘s death celebrated in Kenya and Somalia,‖ The Guardian 
(London), June 12, 2011. 
 
―Fears grow for 11 European tourists missing in Sahara,‖ Agence France Presse, March 30, 
2003. 
 
―Fed: man denies links to plans for Olympic terror attack,‖ AAP Newsfeed, December 3, 2002. 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―American Airlines Flight #11: Penttbomb 265A-NY-280350,‖ 
(Law Enforcement Sensitive), April 19, 2002. 
  
492 
 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of America 
at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998,‖ (Declassified Summary of 
FBI Investigation Report), November 18, 1998; available online from PBS Frontline: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html. 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―Investigative Summary Penttbom: United Airlines Flight 93 
256A-NY-280350,‖ (Law Enforcement Sensitive), April 19, 2002. 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―Investigative Summary: United Airlines Flight #175 Boeing 
767,‖ (Law Enforcement Sensitive), April 19, 2002. 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―New Agent Training,‖ date unknown; available online: 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/training/sat. 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, ―Project Megiddo,‖ October 20, 1999, pp. 21-23; available 
online: http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3578/www.fbi.gov/library/megiddo/megiddo.pdf. 
 
Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman, ―Al-Qa‘ida‘s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the 
Sinjar Records,‖ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2008; available online: 
http://tarpley.net/docs/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf. 
Filkins, Dexter, ―Iraq tape shows the decapitation of an American,‖ New York Times, May 12, 
2004. 
 
Filkins, Dexter, ―On bus, bicycle, and foot, suicide bombers aim at Shiite holy day,‖ New York 
Times, February 20, 2005. 
 
Filkins, Dexter, ―Top insurgent in Iraq adopts lower profile,‖ New York Times, March 25, 2006. 
 
Filkins, Dexter, ―Wanted rebel vows loyalty to bin Laden, web sites say,‖ New York Times, 
October 18, 2004. 
 
Finn, Peter and Alice Fordham, ―Naser Abdo, AWOL soldier, charged in Fort Hood bomb 
plot,‖ Washington Post, July 29, 2011; available online: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/awol-soldier-naser-abdo-charged-in-
fort-hood-bomb-plot/2011/07/29/gIQAFKAUhI_story.html. 
 
Finn, Peter, ―Four acquitted in bomb plot against U.S. embassy in Paris; Terror probe skirted 
normal procedures, Dutch panel rules,‖ Washington Post, December 19, 2002. 
 
Fischer, Ian, ―Suicide bomber kills president of Iraqi council,‖ New York Times, May 18, 2004. 
 
Fitzpatrick, Stephen, ―Bomb expert gets 18 years over Bali,‖ The Australian (Australia), 
September 8, 2006. 
 
Fitzpatrick, Stephen, ―Preacher groomed boys for jihad,‖ The Australian, August 12, 2009. 
493 
 
 
―Five suspects in Morocco attacks have al-Qaeda links: Spanish judiciary,‖ Agence France 
Presse, September 22, 2003. 
 
―Foreign workers: Yemen says 3 female hostages killed,‖ CNN.com, June 15, 2009; available 
online: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-15/world/yemen.hostages_1_houthi-rebels-yemeni-
government-saba?_s=PM:WORLD. 
 
Forest, James J.F., ―Training Camps and Other Centers of Learning,‖ in James JF Forest (ed.), 
Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, pp.  69-109. 
 
―Fort Dix Six: Eljvir Duka,‖ CBS News, available online: http://www.cbsnews.com/2316-
100_162-2786025-4.html. 
 
―Fort Dix tipster shrugs off ‗hero‘ title,‖ CNN.com, May 29, 2007; available online: 
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-05-29/us/fort.tipster_1_real-heroes-fort-dix-military-
personnel?_s=PM:US. 
 
Four Corners, ―The Bali Confessions: Chronology,‖ Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
2011. 
 
Frankel, Bruce, ―Sheik indicted in bombing,‖ USA Today, August 26, 1993. 
 
Frantz, Terrill L. and Kathleen M. Carley, ―A Formal Characterization of Cellular Networks,‖ 
CASOS Technical Report, Carnegie Mellon University, September 2005. 
 
Frantz, Terrill L., Marcelo Cataldo, and Kathleen M. Carley, ―Robustness of centrality measures 
under uncertainty: Examining the role of network topology,‖ Computational Mathematics and 
Organizational Theory, Vol. 15 (2009), pp. 303-328. 
 
Freeman, Linton C., ―Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification,‖ Social Networks, 
Vol. 1, No. 3 (1978/1979), pp. 215-239. 
 
―French detain Tunisian terror suspect,‖ AP Online, June 11, 2003. 
 
―Frenchman convicted on terrorism charges surrenders to Dutch police,‖ Associated Press 
Worldstream, June 24, 2004. 
 
Frey, Bruno S., Dealing With Terrorism: Stick or Carrot? (Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar, 
2004). 
 
Friedkin, Noah E., ―A Guttman Scale for the Strength of an Interpersonal Tie,‖ Social 
Networks, Vol. 12 (1990), pp. 239-252. 
  
494 
 
 
Gannon, Kathy, ―Camps, men tie bin Laden to plots; Investigators uncover details,‖ Austin-
American Statesman (Texas), March 5, 2000. 
 
Gardham, Duncan, ―7/7 inquest: Mohammed Sidique Khan on MI5‘s radar before 9/11,‖ The 
Telegraph (London), May 6, 2011; available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8497204/77-inquest-Mohammed-
Sidique-Khan-on-MI5s-radar-before-911.html. 
 
Gardham, Duncan, ―Airline bomb plot: investigation ‗one of biggest since WW2,‖ The 
Telegraph (London), September 8, 2009. 
 
Gardham, Duncan, ―Bomb plot Muslims were under police surveillance, court told,‖ The 
Telegraph (London), January 16, 2007; available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1539639/Bomb-plot-Muslims-were-under-police-
surveillance-court-told.html. 
 
Gardham, Duncan, ―Bomb plotters‘ al-Qa‘eda ‗link‘ still in Britain,‖ The Telegraph (London), 
May 1, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1550210/Bomb-
plotters-al-Qaeda-link-still-in-Britain.html. 
 
Gardham, Duncan, ―July 21 bombers ‗trained at Cumbria camp,‘‖ The Telegraph (London), 
October 16, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1566281/July-21-
bombers-trained-at-Cumbria-camp.html. 
 
Gardham, Duncan, ―July 7 plot trial shown bombers meeting at McDonald‘s,‖ The Telegraph 
(London), April 21, 2008; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1896850/July-7-
plot-trial-shown-bombers-meeting-at-McDonalds.html. 
 
Gardham, Duncan, ―Mystery bomb-maker 'linked three gangs,'― Daily Telegraph (London), 
September 9, 2008. 
 
Gardham, Duncan, ―Suspect ‗dubbed himself Osama bin London.‘‖ The Telegraph (London), 
October 10, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1565744/Suspect-
dubbed-himself-Osama-bin-London.html. 
 
Gardham, Duncan, ―Terrorists turned kitchen into bomb factory,‖ The Telegraph (London), 
February 3, 2007; available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1541473/Terrorists-turned-kitchen-into-bomb-
factory.html. 
 
Gardiner, Beth, ―British judge orders three terror suspects held; lawyers, Blair's office deny 
report of subway attack plan,‖ Associated Press, November 18, 2002. 
 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 22-25. 
495 
 
 
Gerdes, Luke M. and Kathleen Carley, ―Learning What We Don‘t Know: An Estimation of the 
Accuracy of Media Sources Used in Network Analyses of Terror,‖ Paper Presented to the 29th 
Annual International Sunbelt Social Network Conference of the International Network for 
Social Network Analysis (INSNA), San Diego, CA, 2009. 
 
Gerdes, Luke M., ―Codebook for Network Data on Individuals Involved with Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism,‖ Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science, Institute for 
Software Research, Technical Report CMU-ISR-08-136, October 10, 2008; available online: 
http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers.php. 
 
Gerdes, Luke M., ―Constructing Terror: How Issues of Construct Validity Undermine the 
Utility of Terror Databases and Statistical Analyses of Terrorism,‖ Paper Presented to the 50th 
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, NY, February 2009. 
 
Gerges, Fawaz A., ―Al-Qa‘eda in the Arabian Peninsula: Does It Pose a Threat to Yemen and 
the West?‖ Institute for Social Police and Understanding, February 2011; available online: 
http://ispu.org/pdfs/514_ISPU_Report_al-Qaeda_Yemen_Gerges_WEB.pdf. 
 
Gerges, Fawaz A., The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
 
Gerges, Fawaz A., Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy, (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 
2006). 
 
―German Daily: Bin-Laden's sons have assumed command of Al-Qa'idah,‖ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, July 30, 2002. 
 
―German linked to Synagogue bomb arrested,‖ AP Online, April 5, 2003. 
 
―German special forces in Algerian tourist manhunt: report,‖ Agence France Presse, April 8, 
2003. 
 
―Germany: Algerian terrorist caught,‖ CNN.com, May 18, 2004. 
 
Gerstein, Josh, ―Mueller hints FBI used PATRIOT Act to track hydrogen peroxide purchases,‖ 
Politico, February 17, 2011; available online: 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0211/Mueller_hints_FBI_used_PATRIOT_Act_to_
track_hydrogen_peroxide_purchases.html. 
 
Gettleman, Jeffrey, ―Zarqawi's journey: From dropout to prisoner to an insurgent leader in 
Iraq,‖ New York Times, July 13, 2004. 
 
Ghafour, Hamida, ―Probe of British bombers provided little comfort; Suspects' backgrounds 
seemed ‗unexceptional,‘‖ Globe and Mail (Canada), June 6, 2006. 
 
496 
 
Ghosh, Nirmal, ―Money row led to capture of Hambali, says news report,‖ Straits Times 
(Singapore), August 18, 2003. 
 
―Gkgm 75006 1g Safe Muriatic Acid,‖ available online: 
http://www.thehardwarecity.com/products/Gkgm75006-1g-Safe-Muratic-Acid/6273999. 
 
Gladwell, Malcolm, ―N.Y. bomb plotters sentenced to long terms; Sheik gets life,‖ Washington 
Post, January 18, 1996. 
 
Gladwell, Malcolm, ―Sheik, 9 others, convicted in N.Y. bomb; 10 convicted in N.Y. conspiracy 
case, Washington Post, October 2, 1995. 
 
Glendinning, Lee and Matthew Weaver, ―Eight dead as bombers target western-owned Jakarta 
hotels,‖ The Guardian (London), July 17, 2009. 
 
Goetz, Kristinia, ―Muslim who shot soldier in Arkansas says he wanted to cause more death,‖ 
Knoxville News Sentinel, November 13, 2010. 
 
Gohel, Sajjan M., ―The Internet and its Role in Terrorist Recruitment and Operational 
Planning,‖ CTC Sentinel, December 3, 2009; available online: 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-internet-and-its-role-in-terrorist-recruitment-and-
operational-planning. 
 
Goldman, Adam and Brett J. Blackledge, ―AP Sources: al-Qaida's Afghan head contacted Zazi,‖ 
Associated Press, October 14, 2009. 
 
Goldman, Adam and Matt Apuzzo, ―For al-Qaida, Detroit was just the cheapest flight,‖ 
Associated Press Online, March 24, 2011. 
 
Goldman, Adam, and Brett J. Blackledge, ―AP Sources: al-Qaida's Afghan head contacted 
Zazi,‖ Associated Press, October 14, 2009. 
 
Goodchild, Sophie, ―Iraq and Terror: Five remanded on terrorism charges return to court this 
week,‖ Independent on Sunday, April 11, 2004. 
 
Goodman, Al, ―Madrid charge for 9/11 suspect,‖ CNN.com, May 6, 2005. 
 
Goodman, Al, ―Spain convicts 3 on terror charges,‖ CNN.com, May 29, 2007. 
 
Goodman, Amy, ―Police Entrapment in Terror Case? NYC Subway Bomb Plotter Says He Was 
Set Up By Paid NYPD Informant,‖ an interview with Martin Stolar (Siraj‘s Attorney), January 
10, 2007; available online: 
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/1/10/police_entrapment_in_terror_case_nyc 
 
Gormley, Dennis M., Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to 
International Security, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institue Press, 2008). 
497 
 
 
Gormley, Dennis M., ―Silent Retreat: The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,‖ The 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14 No. 2 (July 2008), pp. 200-201; available online: 
http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo10/doc/Gormley_SilentRetreat.pdf. 
 
Graham, Troy, ―Gun Supplier to Fort Dix 5 Is Sentenced,‖ Philadelphia Inquirer, April 1, 2008. 
 
Granovetter, Mark S., ―The Strength of Weak Ties,‖ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, 
No. 6 (May 1973), pp. 1360-1380. 
 
Gray, R. Clint, M.D., ―Opinion on Fitness to Proceed, Criminal Responsibility and Diagnosis of 
Defendant (Abdul Hakim Muhammad),‖ Arkansas Department of Human Services Division of 
Mental Health Services Arkansas State Hospital Forensic Report, examination conducted July 
12, 2010. 
 
Greenberg, Richard, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, ―Inside the terror plot that ‗rivaled 
9/11,‘‖ MSNBC.com, September 8, 2009. 
 
Griffin, David Ray, The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush 
Administration and 9/11, (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2004). 
 
Griffin, Jennifer and Justin Fishel, ―Two U.S.-Born Terrorists Killed in CIA-Led Drone Strike,‖ 
Fox News, September 30, 2011; available online: 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/30/us-born-terror-boss-anwar-al-awlaki-killed/. 
 
―Group‘s Responsibility Claims Doubtful,‖ Associated Press, July 22, 2005; available online: 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,163395,00.html. 
 
Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (New York: Berkley Books, 
2002). 
 
Habeck, Mary, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2006). 
 
Halimos, Paul and Mark Tran, ―21 guilty, seven cleared over Madrid train bombings,‖ The 
Guardian, October 31, 2007; available online: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/31/spain.marktran. 
 
Hallet , the Rt. Hon Lady Justice DBE, Coroner‘s Inquest into the London Bombings of 7 July 
2005, Report under Rule 43 of the Coroner‘s Rules 1984, May 6, 2011. 
 
―Hambali was ‗plotting APEC attack,‘‖ CNN.com, August 14, 2003. 
 
Hamm, Mark S.,  ―Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research and Prevention,‖ 
Final Report Submitted to the National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C, September 2005; 
available online: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211203.pdf.   
498 
 
 
Hammack, Laurence, Amanda Codispoti, and Tonia Moxley, ―Fort Hood Shooting Suspect 
Hasan Left Few Impressions in the Schools He Attended,‖ The Roanoke Times, November 7, 
2009; available online: http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/225422. 
 
Hammer, Michael A. Jr., Letter to Richard Coughlin Re: Plea Agreement with Agron 
Abdullahu, October 22, 2007. 
 
Hannity & Colmes, ―Exclusive! Brian Morgenstern Breaks His Silence on Blowing the Whistle 
on the Ft. Dix 6,‖ Transcription of Interview with Brian Morgenstern, May 30, 2007; available 
online: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,276414,00.html. 
 
Harden, Toby and Andrew Alderson, ―UK terrorists got cash from Saudi Arabia before 7/7,‖ 
Sunday Telegraph (London), August 7, 2005. 
 
Harding, Luke and Rosie Cowan, ―Pakistan militants linked to London attacks: Two bombers 
travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to have visited Israel,‖ The 
Guardian (London), July 19, 2005. 
 
Harding, Luke, and Rosie Cowan, ―Pakistan militants linked to London attacks: Two bombers 
travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to have visited Israel,‖ The 
Guardian (London), July 19, 2005. 
 
Harris, Edward, ―AP Exclusive: Al-Qaida fugitives found diamonds, shelter in Liberia, U.N. 
court says,‖ Associated Press, June 1, 2004. 
 
Harris, Evan, ―CIA: At most, 50-100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,‖ ABC News, June 27, 2010; 
available online: http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/06/cia-at-most-50100-al-qaeda-in-
afghanistan/. 
 
―Hasan Hearing: Tuesday Oct. 19, 2010,‖ KWTX.com; available online: 
http://www.kwtx.com/news/misc/105303923.html. 
 
Hasan, Nidal Malik, The Koranic World View as It Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military, 
―Example: Jihad-rule of Abrogation.‖ 
 
Haven, Paul , ―AP: Arrests damage al-Qaida network,‖ Associated Press Online, August 6, 
2004. 
 
Haven, Paul, ―AP: Arrests damage al-Qaida network,‖ Associated Press Online, August 6, 
2004. 
 
Hays, Tom, ―Jurors Asked to Name Bomb Plot Mastermind,‖ Associated Press Online, May 22, 
2006. 
  
499 
 
 
Hays, Tom, and Matt Apuzzo, ―US: NYC subway bomb plot linked to British cell,‖ Associated 
Press Online, July 7, 2010. 
 
Helfstein, Scott and Dominick Wright, ―Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the 
Dimensions of Al Qaeda,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2011), p. 369. 
 
Hendawi, Hamza, ―Atop Yemen al-Qaida, a militant who vows to hit US,‖ Associated Press 
Online, November 3, 2010. 
 
Hendricks, V.M., P. Blanken, and N. Adriaans, Snowball Sampling: A Pilot Study on Cocaine 
Use, (Rotterdam: IVO, 1992). 
 
Henneberger, Melinda, ―A nation challenged: Italy; Men linked to al Qaeda rounded up at 2 
mosques,‖ New York Times, November 30, 2001. 
 
Hess, Pamela, ―Al-Qaida No. 3 says CIA attack was revenge killing,‖ United Press 
International, January 7, 2010. 
 
Higgins, Dave, ―Bus bomber 'must have been brainwashed,' say family, Press Association, 
August 2, 2005. 
 
High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, date unknown, available 
online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/. 
 
―Hijackers conducted surveillance flights ahead of 9/11,‖ CNN.com, September 27, 2002; 
available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2002-09-27/us/hijackers_1_hijackers-hazmi-attack-
plan?_s=PM:US. 
 
Hirschkorn, Phil, ―Four embassy bombers get life,‖ CNN.com, October 21, 2001; available 
online: http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/10/19/embassy.bombings/. 
 
Hodgson, Martin, ―Raids foiled Barcelona bomb plot, says judge,‖ Guardian (London), January 
24, 2008. 
 
Hoffman, Bruce, ―Bin Laden‘s Death Shatters Conventional Wisdom,‖ The National Interest, 
May 2, 2011; available online: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/bin-ladens-death-shatters-
conventional-wisdom-5249. 
 
Hoffman, Bruce, ―The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism,‖ Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27 (2004). 
 
Hoffman, Bruce, ―The Leaderless Jihad‘s Leader: Why Osama Bin Laden Mattered,‖ Foreign 
Affairs, May 13, 2011. 
  
500 
 
 
Hoffman, Bruce, ―The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,‖ 
Foreign Affairs 87:3 (May-June 2008), pp. 133-8. 
 
Honan, Edith, ―Second man pleads guilty in plot to bomb NY subway,‖ Reuters, April 23, 2010; 
available online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/23/us-usa-security-zazi-
idUSTRE63M4AY20100423. 
 
Horgan, John, ―Interviewing the Terrorists: Reflections on Fieldwork and Implications for 
Psychological Research,‖ Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, (in 
press). 
 
Horgan, John, ―The Case for Firsthand Research,‖ in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on 
Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 30-56. 
 
Horgan, John, Walking Away From Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2009). 
 
Horowitz, Craig ―Anatomy of a Foiled Plot: Two would-be bombers of the Herald Square 
subway station find that three is a crowd,‖ New York Magazine, May 21, 2005; available online: 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/features/10559/. 
 
Hosenball, Mark, ―Terror: The family business,‖ Newsweek, August 12, 2002. 
 
Hosenball, Mark, Steve Tuttle, and Michael Isikoff, ―A war yet to be won,‖ Newsweek, 
September 9, 2002. 
 
House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 
2005, Report No.: HC 1087, May 11, 2006. 
 
House Resolution 1022, Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2007, 
2007; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:H.R.1022:. 
 
House Resolution 1312, Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2005, 
2005; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:H.R.1312:. 
House Resolution 2038, Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2003, 
2003; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.2038:. 
 
House Resolution 3831, To extend the sunset on the assault weapons ban for 10 years, 2004; 
available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.3831:. 
 
House Resolution 5099, To reinstate the repealed criminal provisions relating to assault 
weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices, 2004; available online: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.5099:. 
 
House Resolution 6257, Assault Weapons Ban Reauthorization Act of 2008, 2008; available 
online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:H.R.6257:. 
501 
 
 
Hranjski, Hvroje, ―Philippine court hands down terror convictions,‖ Associated Press Online, 
January 23, 2009. 
 
Hudson, Tommy (Detective ), ―Officer‘s Report: Arrest of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad,‖ 
Little Rock Police Department, June 1, 2009. 
 
Hughes, Geraint, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for 
Liberal Democracies, The Letort Papers, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011); 
available online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1066.pdf. 
 
Human Rights Watch, ―Yemen,‖ in World Report 2010; available online: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87738. 
 
Hunt, Emily, ―Al-Qaeda‘s North African Franchise: The GSPC Regional Threat,‖ (Policy 
Watch #1034), The Washington Institute, September 8, 2005 
 
Husain, Ed, The Islamist: Why I Became and Islamic Fundamentalist, What I Saw Inside, and 
Why I Left, (New York: Penguin Books, 2007). 
 
Hussain, Zahid, ―Benazir Bhutto says Ramzi Yousef tried to kill her in '93,‖ Associated Press, 
March 18, 1995. 
 
―I want to die, says Bali bombing suspect,‖ Sydney Morning Herald, May 16, 2006; available 
online: http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/i-want-to-die-says-bali-bombing-
suspect/2006/05/16/1147545326359.html. 
 
―Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases,‖ Pakistan Newswire, 
September 28, 2004. 
 
―Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,‖ Indonesian Police Interview of Ali 
Ghufron (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. 
 
―Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,‖ Indonesian Police Interview of Ali Imron 
(No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. 
 
―Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,‖ Indonesian Police Interview of Faiz bin 
Abu Bakar Bafana (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. 
 
―Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,‖ Indonesian Police Interview of Imam 
Samudra (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. 
 
―Indonesia considers measures after attack,‖ Reuters, August 14, 2003. 
 
―Indonesia: Police identify men killed in Central Java as Ibrohim,‖ BBC Monitoring Asia 
Pacific - Political, August 12, 2009. 
502 
 
 
International Crisis Group, ―Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?‖ ICG 
Africa Group Report No. 95, July 11, 2005. 
 
International Crisis Group, ―Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist 
Network Operates,‖ December 11, 2002. 
 
International Crisis Group, ―Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly 
Don‘t Mix,‖ ICG Asia Report No. 83, September 13, 2004. 
 
International Crisis Group, ―Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh,‖ ICG Asia Report No. 189, 
April 20, 2010. 
 
International Crisis Group, ―Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base,‖ ICG Asia Briefing No. 
95, August 27, 2009. 
 International Crisis Group, ―Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still 
Dangerous,‖ ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003. 
 
International Crisis Group, ―Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian 
Embassy Bombing,‖ ICG Asia Report No. 92, February 22, 2005. 
 
International Crisis Group, ―Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace 
Process,‖ ICG Asia Report No. 80, July 13, 2004. 
 
International Crisis Group, ―Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks,‖ ICG Asia Report 
No. 114, May 5, 2006; 
 
INTERPOL, ―AL-WAHISHI, NASIR ‗ABD-AL-KARIM ‗ABDULLAH,‖ January 19, 2010; 
available online: http://interpol.int/en/UN/%28un_id%29/2012-2761. 
 
INTERPOL, ―Imam, Ferid Ahmed,‖ date unknown; available online: 
http://www.interpol.int/@en/Wanted-Persons/%28wanted_id%29/2011-17152. 
 ―Ion Sensitive Scalp 40 Volume Crème Developer 32 oz.,‖ available from sallybeauty.com. 
 
Isikoff, Michael and Mark Hosenball, ―Deadly Training Ground: Are Al Qaeda fighters 
returning from Iraq to launch new attacks against U.S. targets?‖ Newsweek, September 17, 
2008. 
 
―Italian network was recruiting for bin Laden: police,‖ Agence France Presse, November 30, 
2001. 
 
Jackson, Brian A., with John C. Baker, et al, Aptitude for Destruction: Organiztaional Learning 
in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 
2004), p. 52. 
503 
 
 
James, Kevin, The JIS Protocol, 1997 (revised 2002); available online: 
http://nefafoundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_James_JISManifesto.pdf. 
 
Jan, Sadaqat, ―Pakistan arrests 10 al-Qaida suspects,‖ Associated Press Online, June 13, 2004. 
Jeffery, Simon and Mark Oliver, ―Australian embassy bomb kills nine,‖ The Guardian 
(London), September 9, 2004. 
 
Jesus, Carlos Echeverria, ―Radical Islam in the Maghreb,‖ Open University-UNED, Madrid, 
2005; available online: http://www.fpri.org/pubs/200510.echeverria.radicalislammaghreb.pdf. 
 
Joffe, Lawrence, ―Fazul Abduallah Mohammed obituary,‖ The Guardian (London), June 12, 
2011; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/12/fazul-abdullah-
mohammed-obituary. 
 
Johnson, Chris, ―Australian official feared dead in blasts,‖ The Age (Australia), July 17, 2009. 
 
Johnson, Kevin, ―As Okla. City date nears, militias seen as gathering strength,‖ USA Today, 
April 16, 2010; available online: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-04-16-militia-
movement-on-the-rise_N.htm. 
 
Jones, Alex, 9-11 Descent into Tyranny: The New World Order’s Dark Plans to Turn Earth into 
a Prison Planet, (Palm Desert, CA: Progressive Press, 2002). 
 
Jordán, Javier, ―Jihadist Radicalization Processes in Spain: Sociopolitical Analysis at Three 
Levels,‖ Revista de Psicologia Social, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May 2009), pp. 197-216. 
 
Jordán, Javier, Fernando M. Mañas, and Nicola Horsburgh, ―Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Grassroots Jihadist Networks: The Madrid Bombings,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 
31 (2008), p. 18. 
 
Kappelle, Liza and Karen Valenti, ―Fed: Roche in court again over terror conspiracy,‖ AAP 
Newsfeed, November 27, 2002. 
 
Kappelle, Liza, and Karen Valenti, ―Fed: Roche in court again over terror conspiracy,‖ AAP 
Newsfeed, November 27, 2002. 
 
Kaufman, Joe and Belia Rabinowitz, ―Father Knows Terrorism Best,‖ FrontPage Magazine, 
October 27, 2003; available online from the Militant Islam Monitor: 
http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/4. 
 
Kedar, Mordechai, ―Fertile Ground for Al Qaeda,‖ New York Times, September 18, 2008; 
available online: http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/yemen/. 
 
Kelli Arena and Pam Benson, ―Top al Qaeda leader in custody,‖ CNN.com, June 17, 2002. 
 
504 
 
Kenney, Michael, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government 
Bureaucracies, and Competitive Advantage, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2007). 
 
Kenney, Michael, ―Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy,‖ National Institute of 
Justice, May 2009; available online: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226808.pdf. 
 
―Kenyan court releases vehicle seller held over anti-Israeli attack,‖ Agence France Presse, 
December 18, 2002. 
 
―Kenyan paper profiles Al-Qa'idah terrorist Saleh Nabhan,‖ BBC Monitoring Africa - Political, 
June 22, 2009. 
 
―Kenyan police say 'key' suspect in Mombasa attack has Yemeni links,‖ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, December 27, 2002. 
 
―Key World Trade bomb figure's trial set,‖ United Press International, January 25, 1996. 
 
Khan, Aamer Ahmed, ―Pakistan‘s flourishing arms bazaar,‖ BBC News, June 21, 2006; 
available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5066860.stm. 
 
Khan, Habibullah and Maddy Sauer, ―Pakistan Computer Expert With Alleged Al Qaeda Ties 
Released,‖ ABC News, August 21, 2007. 
 
Khan, Zarar, ―Al-Qaida suspect slain in Pakistan,‖ Chicago Sun-Times, September 27, 2004. 
 
―Khawaja: The Canadian connection,‖ BBC News, March 12, 2009; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6152440.stm. 
 
―Killed Saudis were meant to be abducted for Al-Qa'idah - sources,‖ BBC Monitoring Middle 
East - Political, December 30, 2009. 
 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 128-
137. 
 
Knickmeyer, Ellen, ―Attack Against U.S. Embassy in Yemen Blamed on Al-Qaeda,‖ 
Washington Post, September 18, 2008; available online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/17/AR2008091700317.html. 
 
Knoke, David and Song Yan, Social Network Analysis (2nd Edition), #154 in the Quantitative 
Applications in the Social Sciences Series, (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2008). 
 
Koschade, Stuart, ―A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 6 (2006), 
pp. 559-575. 
505 
 
 
Kotarumalos, Ali, ―Indonesia: Terror chief‘s relative gets 8 years,‖ Associated Press, April 20, 
2010. 
 
Krackhardt, David and Kathleen M. Carley, ―A PCANS Model of Structure in Organizations,‖ 
in Proceedings of the 1998 International Symposium on Command and Control Research and 
Technology, Conference held June 1998, Monterrey, CA. 
 
Krackhardt, David and Martin Kilduff, ―Structure, Culture, and Simmelian Ties in 
Entrepreneurial Firms,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2002), pp. 279-290. 
 
Krackhardt, David, ―QAP Partialling as a Test of Spuriousness,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 9, No. 2 
(1987), pp. 171-186. 
 
Krackhardt, David, ―The Strength of Strong Ties: The Importance of Philos in Organizational 
Theory,‖ In N. Nohria and R. Eccles (eds.), Networks and Organizations: Structures, Forms, 
and Action, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 216-217; available online: 
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/krack/documents/pubs/1992/1992%20The%20Strength%20of
%20Strong%20Ties.pdf. 
 
Krebs, Valdis E., ―Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,‖ Connections, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2002); 
available online: http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/Connections-Web/Volume24-
3/Valdis.Krebs.web.pdf 
 
Krebs, Valdis E., ―Uncloaking Terrorist Networks,‖ First Monday, Vol. 7, No. 4 (April 2002); 
available online: 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/941/863. 
 
Kreiser, John, ―The Cost of Cooperation,‖ CBS News, September 10, 2009; available online: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500690_162-
2012224.html?pageNum=2&tag=contentMain;contentBody. 
 
Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Malecova, ―Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal 
Connection?‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 119-
144. 
 
Krueger, Alan B., What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 23-52. 
 
Kurczy, Stephen, ―Five key members of Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP),‖ Christian Science 
Monitor, November 2, 2010. 
 
Kurth, James, ―Western Civilization, Our Tradition,‖ Intercollegiate Review, Fall 2003/Spring 
2004, pp. 5-13. 
  
506 
 
 
―Kuwaiti daily publishes interrogations of Al-Qa'idah intelligence chief,‖ BBC Monitoring 
Middle East - Political, November 6, 2010. 
 
Laessing, Ulf, ―Fight vs al Qaeda funding faces tough obstacle: cash,‖ Reuters, November 10, 
2010; available online: http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/11/10/idINIndia-52814020101110. 
 
Lahoud, Nelly, ―Bin Laden‘s Death Through the Lens of Al-Qa‘ida‘s Confidential Secretary,‖ 
CTC Sentinel, May 1, 2011. 
 
Lambert, Robert, ―Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London 
Counterterrorism Case Study,‖ Political Science and Politics, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 2008), 
pp. 31-35. 
 
Laughlin, Jason, ―Suspects in Terror Case Fought Hard to Fit In,‖ Courier-Post (Cherry Hill, 
NJ), May 14, 2007. 
 
Leeman, Sue, ―Man pleads guilty in U.K. shoe-bomb plot,‖ Associated Press Online, February 
28, 2005. 
 
―LexisNexis Fast Facts,‖ available online: http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/fast-facts.aspx. 
 
Lichfield, John, ―European police hold 76 suspects in World Cup anti-terrorism swoop,‖ The 
Independent (London), May 27, 1998. 
 
Lieberman, Joseph I. (Chairman) and Susan M. Collins (Ranking Member), ―A Ticking Time 
Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons From the U.S. Government‘s Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood 
Attack,‖ U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, 
D.C., February 2011. 
 
Lipton, Eric, ―U.S. grand jury indicts a Briton, charging he supported terrorists,‖ New York 
Times, October 7, 2004. 
 
―List of bombing plots linked to Hambali,‖ Agence France Presse, August 15, 2003. 
 
―London bombers staged ‗dummy run,‘‖ BBC News, September 25, 2005; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4263176.stm. 
 
―London club ‗bombing plan‘ taped,‖ BBC News, May 25, 2006; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5016274.stm. 
 
―London-based Islamists view death of Al-Qa'idah's Abu-Khabab al-Masri,‖ BBC Monitoring 
Middle East - Political, August 5, 2008. 
 
Low, Valentine and Ben Leapman, ―From schoolboy to a bus bomber,‖ Evening Standard 
(London), July 27, 2005. 
507 
 
 
Lumpkin, John H., ―Morocco arrests al-Qaida operative,‖ Associated Press, June 19, 2002. 
 
Lyall, Kimina, ―Asian trek took al-Qa'ida cash to JI - War on Terror,‖ The Weekend Australian, 
December 14, 2002. 
 
Lyall, Kimina, ―Trail cold on Asia's most wanted - TERROR HITS HOME,‖ The Australian, 
November 12, 2002. 
 
MacFarquhar, Neil, ―Jordan sentences 8 militants, linked to al Qaeda, to death,‖ New York 
Times, April 7, 2004. 
 
MacKinnon, Mark, ―A severe blow to al-Qaeda; Twin 225-kilogram bombs bring an end to 
three-year U.S. hunt for Iraq's most-wanted insurgent,‖ Globe and Mail (Canada), June 9, 2006. 
 
MacKinnon, Mark, ―Empty chairs, angry youths and ignominy,‖ Globe and Mail (Canada), 
June 9, 2006. 
 
MacKinnon, Mark, ―Suicide bombers rip through Amman hotels; Co-ordinated attacks kill 
dozens, injure scores in Jordan's capital,‖ Globe and Mail (Canada), November 10, 2005. 
 
―Maghreb branch of Al-Qa'idah said planning suicide attacks in Spain,‖ BBC Monitoring 
Europe - Political, September 16, 2010. 
 
Maier, Scott, ―Getting It Right? Not in 59 Percent of Stories,‖ Newspaper Research Journal, 
Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 2002). 
 
―Malaysia: National police to cooperate with Indonesia to arrest Noordin Top,‖ BBC 
Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, August 18, 2009. 
 
―Malaysian authorities worried over Jemaah Islamiyah fugitives,‖ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, June 23, 2004. 
 
Malik, Shiv, ―My brother the bomber,‖ Prospect, June 30, 2007; available online: 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/06/mybrotherthebomber/. 
 
Mandal, Sujoyini, ―Financial Investigation and Counter Terrorism: Case Study: 7 July 2005, 
London Bombings,‖ International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 2006; 
available online: 
http://www.pipvtr.com/pipvtr/files/LONDON%20CT%20FINANCE%20CASE%20STUDY.pd
f. 
 
Mandrekar, J.N., S.J. Mandrekar, and S.S. Cha ―Cut-point Determination Methods in Survival 
Analysis Using SAS,‖ Proceedings of the 28th Annual SAS User’s Group International, 2003. 
 
Maria Ressa, ―Philippines: U.S. missed 9/11 clues years ago,‖ CNN.com, July 26, 2003. 
508 
 
 
Marsden, Peter V. and Karen E. Campbell, ―Measuring Tie Strength,‖ Social Forces, Vol. 63, 
No. 2 (December 1984), pp. 482-501. 
 
Masood, Salman and Talat Hussain, ―Suspect in reporter's death is wanted in attacks on 
Musharraf,‖ New York Times, May 29, 2004. 
 
Masood, Salman, Mohammed Khan, and Somini Sengupta, ―Pakistan Reports Arrest of Senior 
Al Qaeda Leader,‖ New York Times, May 5, 2005. 
 
―Mauritania claims proof of Algerian radical group behind attack,‖ Agence France Presse, June 
10, 2005. 
 
Mazzetti, Mark, Eric Schmitt, and Robert T. Worth, ―Two Year Man Hunt Led to Killing of 
Awlaki in Yemen,‖ New York Times, September 30, 2011. 
 
McCants, Will, ―Smackdown! Sageman vs. Hoffman,‖ Jihadica, June 8, 2008, available at 
www.jihadica.com/smackdown-sageman-vs-hoffman/. 
 
McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko, ―Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways 
Toward Terrorism,‖ Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20 No. 3 (2008). 
 
Mcdermott, Terry, ―The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11,‖ The 
New Yorker, September 13, 2010. 
 
McDougall, Dan, ―The new Al-Qaeda chiefs bringing terror to the world; Former Guantanamo 
prisoners have moved to Yemen to rejoin the fight against the west,‖ Sunday Times (London), 
January 3, 2010. 
 
McDougall, Ian, ―Norway 'bomb plot' underscores al-Qaida pitfalls,‖ Associated Press, August 
29, 2010. 
 
McDougall, Ian, Matt Apuzzo, and Adam Goldman, ―Norway bomb arrests linked to US, 
British plots,‖ Associated Press, July 8, 2010. 
 
McEvoy, Clair, et al, Small Arms Survey 2007, (Graduate Institute of International Studies: 
Geneva, Switzerland: 2007), Annex 2. Available Kalashnikov Prices for Specific Countries and 
Periods, p. 278. 
 
McGeown, Kate, ―Jack Roche: The naïve militant,‖ BBC News, June 1, 2004. 
 
McKinley, James C., Jr. and James Dao, ―Fort Hood Gunman Gave Signals Before His 
Rampage,‖ New York Times, November 8, 2009. 
  
509 
 
 
McKittrick, David, ―Sinn Fein ready to accept Mitchell principles,‖ The Independent (London), 
May 21, 1996; available online: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/sinn-fein-ready-to-accept-
mitchell-principles-1348380.html. 
 
McLean, C.A. and C.M. Campbell, ―Locating Research Informants in a Multi-Ethnic 
Community; Ethnic Identities, Social Networks, and Recruitment Methods,‖ Ethnicity and 
Health, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2003), pp. 41-61. 
 
Meftahi, Hassane, ―Helicopters and camels used to search for nearly two dozen tourists 
vanished in Sahara,‖ Associated Press Worldstream, April 3, 2003. 
 
Mendelsohn, Barak, ―Al-Qaeda‘s Franchising Strategy,‖ Survival, Vol. 53, No. 3 (June-July 
2011), pp. 19-25. 
 
Metropolitan Police Department (London), ―Operation Overamp: R v Hamid and others,‖ 
Directorate of Public Affairs, date unknown. 
 
Meyer, John ―‗Ft. Dix Six‘ Informants in Hot Seat Too,‖ Los Angeles Times, October 19, 2008. 
 
―Militants jailed for role in 2005 Bali bombings,‖ Global Insight, September 7, 2006. 
 
Ministry of Home Affairs, ―White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of 
Terrorism,‖ Government of Singapore, January 7, 2003. 
 
Mintzberg, Henry, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1983). 
 
Moestafa, Berni and Bambang Djanuarto, ―Jakarta Hotel Bombers Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah, 
Police Say,‖ Bloomberg, July 19, 2009; available online: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aslTMQuj6g4U. 
 
Moon, Il-Chul and Kathleen M. Carley, ―Modeling and Simulation of Terrorist Networks in 
Social and Geospatial Dimensions,‖ IEEE Intelligent Systems, Special Issue on Social 
Computing, Vol. 22 (Sep/Oct 2007), pp. 40-49. 
 
Moore, Matthew and Duncan Gardham, ―July 21 ‗fifth bomber‘ jailed for 33 years,‖ The 
Telegraph (London), November 20, 2007; available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1569913/July-21-fifth-bomber-jailed-for-33-
years.html. 
 
Mora, Frank O., ―Victims of the Balloon Effect: Drug Trafficking in the U.S. Policy in Brazil 
and the Southern Cone of Latin America,‖ Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 
Vol. 21 No. 2 (1996), pp. 115-122. 
 
Morselli, Carlo, Inside Criminal Networks, (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 44-45. 
510 
 
 
Moss, Michael and Squad Mekhennet, ―Rising leader for next phase of al Qaeda's war,‖ New 
York Times, April 4, 2008. 
 
Moss, Michael, ―An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers,‖ New York Times, October 15, 2007. 
 
―Ms. Kay 40 Volume Liquid Developer (32 oz),‖ available from frendsbeautysupply.com. 
 
Muhammad, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, ―To Judge Wright Jr, From Abdul Hakim Muhammad,‖ 
January 12, 2010. Copy filed with the Sixth Judicial Circuit Forth Division, January 14, 2010. 
 
Mukinda, Fred, ―Wanted terror suspect arrested in city swoop,‖ The Nation (Nairobi), August 
23, 2010. 
 
Mulvihill, Geoff, ―Man Sentenced in Fort Dix Plot Case,‖ Associated Press, March 31, 2008. 
 
Murphy, Dan, ―Filipino police uncover 1995 leads to Sept. 11 plot,‖ Christian Science Monitor, 
February 14, 2002. 
 
Murphy, Dan, ―Man 'most wanted' in Indonesia,‖ Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 2002. 
 
Murphy, Paul (Chairman), Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London 
Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, March 30, 2006. 
 
Mydans, Seth, ―A Terrorist Mastermind Whose Luck Ran Out,‖ New York Times, September 
17, 2009. 
 
Myre, Greg, ―Police arrest friend of Yousef,‖ Associated Press, February 10, 1995. 
 
―Naeem was top terror planner,‖ The Pakistan Newswire, August 4, 2004. 
 
―Najaf bombing kills Shiite leader, followers say,‖ CNN.com, August 30, 2003. 
 
Nakashima, Ellen and Alan Sipress, ―Tips, traced call led to capture of Al Qaeda suspect; 
Hambali tracked through 4 countries,‖ Washington Post, August 16, 2003, 
 
Nasiri, Omar, Inside the Jihad: My Life With Al Qaeda, A Spy’s Story, (New York: Basic 
Books, 2006). 
 
Nasser al-Aulaqi (Plantiff) v. Barrack H. Obama, Robert M. Gates, and Leon E. Panetta 
(Defendants), Opposition to Plantiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia (Civ. A. No. 10-cv-1469 (JDB)), September 25, 2010. 
  
511 
 
 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), Final 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2004). 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
―Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later,‖ 2011; available online: 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/BackgroundReport_10YearsSince9_11.pdf. 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
―Frequently Asked Questions,‖ Global Terrorism Database (GTD), date unknown; available 
online: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/faq/. 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
―Terrorist Organization Profile: Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades,‖ date unknown, available online: 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3903 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), available online: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search. 
 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), ―Criteria: Methodology Utilized to Compile 
NCTC‘s Database of Terrorist Incidents,‖ date unknown, available online: 
http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/wits_subpage_criteria.html; 
 
―NATO‘s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo,‖ NATO, date unknown; available online: 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B. 
 
Neighbor, Sally, ―Dangerous liaisons in two countries tied by blood and radical Islam,‖ The 
Australian (Australia), July 2, 2007. 
 
Neighbor, Sally, In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to 
Australia, (Sydney, Australia: Harper Collins, 2004). 
 
Nelson, Rick ―Ozzie,‖ Thams M. Sanderson, Amrit Bagia, Ben Bodurian, and David A. 
Gordan, ―A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011,‖ Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, February 2011; available online: 
http://csis.org/files/publication/110203_Nelson_AThreatTransformed_web.pdf. 
 
Neumeister, Larry, ―Trade Center bombers resentenced to life terms,‖ Associated Press, 
October 14, 1999. 
 ―New Video Shows AQIM Attack Using False Road Block,‖ CBS News, November 14, 2008; 
available online: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-502684_162-4604373-502684.html. 
 
Newman, M.E.J., ―Scientific collaboration networks. II. Shortest Paths, weighted networks, and 
centrality,‖ Physical Review E, Vol. 64 (2001), 016132.   
512 
 
 
Newman, M.E.J. and M. Girvan, ―Finding and Evaluating Community Structure in Networks,‖ 
Physics Review E, Vol. 69 (2004). 
 
―Nine foreign hostages killed in Yemen,‖ The National (UAE), June 15, 2009; available online: 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/nine-foreign-hostages-killed-in-yemen. 
 
Noikorn, Uamdao, ―Hambali lived quietly in one-room blue apartment on Buddhist temple 
city's outskirts,‖ Associated Press Worldstream, August 15, 2003. 
 
 Noorani, A.G., Islam & Jihad: Prejudice Versus Reality, (New York: Zed Books, 2002). 
 
―Nosair possessed bomb plans, formula,‖ Washington Post, May 28, 1993. 
 
NRA Foundation, ―About,‖ date unknown; available online: 
http://www.nrafoundation.org/about/. 
 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr., ―A Dollop of Decent American Values; Why ‗Soft Power‘ Matters in 
Fighting Terrorism,‖ Washington Post, March 30, 2004, p. A19. 
 
Obama, Barak Hussein, ―Remarks of Senator Obama: The War We Need to Win,‖ A Speech 
Before the Wilson Center (August 1, 2007); available online: 
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/01/the_war_we_need_to_win.php. 
 
―Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki,‖ BBC News Middle East, September 30, 2011; available online: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11658920. 
 
Obreza, Thomas, et al, ―Nitrogen Fertilizer Sources: What does the future hold for citrus 
producers?‖ Soil and Water Science Department, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, 
Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, February 2009; available 
online: http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/ss457. 
 
Oellig, Keith, Testimony before the Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Minerals, United 
States House of Representatives, November 17, 2005; available online from the Pennsylvania 
Farm Bureau: http://naturalresources.house.gov/UploadedFiles/OelligTestimony11.17.05.pdf. 
 
Office of the President of the United States, ―National Strategy for Counterterrorism,‖ June 
2011, p. 8; available online: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. 
 
―One boy's journey to jihad; A former London student, inspired by radical clerics, managed to 
slip through the intelligence net and launch a suicide mission that nearly brought carnage to 
America,‖ Sunday Times (London), January 3, 2010. 
 
―One of Saudi Arabia's most wanted believed linked to bomb plot,‖ CNN.com, October 31, 
2010. 
513 
 
 
Opsahl, Tore, ―Triadic closure in two-mode networks: Redefining the global and local 
clustering coefficients,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 34 (2012). 
 
―Outside view: Focus on Pakistan's jihadis,‖ United Press International, August 9, 2004. 
 
Owczarski, Mark, ―Nidal Malik Hasan‘s Connection with Virginia Tech,‖ Virginia Tech News, 
November 6, 2009. 
Owen, Glenn, "Five guns at his head . . .  The Talibrum was seized, and back in Britain, the 
arrests began," Mail on Sunday (London), August 13, 2006. 
 
Padrón, Benigno, Manuel Nogales, and Anna Traveset, ―Alternative approaches of transforming 
bimodal into unimodal mutualistic networks: The usefulness of preserving weighted 
information,‖ Basic and Applied Ecology, Vol 12 (2011), pp. 713-721 
 
―Pakistan agencies pinpoint visits of London blast suspects,‖ BBC Monitoring South Asia - 
Political, July 18, 2005. 
 
―Pakistan al-Qaeda leaders ‗dead,‘‖ BBC News, January 9, 2009. 
 
―Pakistan fertilizer fuels Afghan insurgents‘ bombs,‖ Associated Press, September 2, 2011; 
available online from The National (UAE): http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-
asia/pakistani-fertiliser-fuels-afghan-insurgents-bombs. 
 
―Pakistan: Afghan al-Qaida link to plot,‖ Guardian Unlimited, August 11, 2006. 
 
―Pakistan: US seeks Harakat chief for Khost CIA attack,‖ Daily Pak Banker, January 6, 2010. 
 
―Pakistan‘s illicit arms trade thrives,‖ San Francisco Chronicle, November 16, 2007; available 
online: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/11/16/MNG4S3PBU.DTL. 
 
Palmer, James, ―Co-ordinated blasts kill at least 60 in Iraq; Latest bombings viewed as first 
wave of increased terror in run up to key vote,‖ Globe and Mail (Canada), September 30, 2005. 
 
Pargeter, Alison, The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe, (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
 
―Pearl abduction mastermind identified in court by witness,‖ Agence France Presse, March 6, 
2002. 
 
Perlez, Jane and Elaine Sciolino, ―5 Britons guilty in Bomb plot; Tied to 2005 London 
Attackers,‖ New York Times, May 1, 2007. 
 
Perlez, Jane, and Elaine Sciolino, ―5 Britons guilty in Bomb plot; Tied to 2005 London 
Attackers,‖ New York Times, May 1, 2007. 
 
514 
 
―Perry: U.S. eyed Iran attack after bombing,‖ United Press International, June 6, 2007. 
 
Petróczi, Andrea, Tamás Nepusz, and Fülöp Bazsó, ―Measuring tie-strength in virtual social 
networks,‖ Connections, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2007), pp. 39-52. 
 
―Philippine military suspects Abu Sayyaf has ‗leadership problem,‘‖ BBC Monitoring South 
Asia - Political, June 22, 2008. 
 
―Philippines warns of plans to repeat 2000 New Year's Eve bombings,‖ BBC Monitoring Asia 
Pacific - Political, December 27, 2006. 
 
―Phone call by Kuwaiti courier led to bin Laden,‖ Associated Press, May 3, 2011. 
 
―Police in Philippines searching for Muslims in Yousef's cell,‖ Associated Press, February 14, 
1995. 
 
―Police officers describe Fort Hood gunfight,‖ Los Angeles Times, October 21, 2010. 
 
Popper, Karl, The Poverty of Historicism, Chapter 29, (1957). 
 
―Prayers said in Britain for Ken Bigley,‖ United Press International, October 10, 2004. 
 
―Profile: Adel Yahya,‖ BBC News, November 13, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634965.stm. 
 
―Profile: Anthony Garcia,‖ BBC News, April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149798.stm. 
 
―Profile: Germaine Lindsay,‖ BBC News, May 11, 2006; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762591.stm. 
 
―Profile: Hussain Osman,‖ BBC News, July 9, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm. 
 
―Profile: Hussein Osman,‖ BBC News, July 9, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm. 
 
―Profile: Iran‘s Jundullah militants,‖ BBC News, June 20, 2010. 
 
―Profile: Jawad Akbar,‖ BBC News, April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149788.stm. 
 
―Profile: Manfo Kwaku Asiedu,‖ BBC News, November 9, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634913.stm. 
  
515 
 
 
―Profile: Nabeel Hussain,‖ BBC News, April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149792.stm. 
 
―Profile: Omar Khyam,‖ BBC News, April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149794.stm. 
 
―Profile: Ramzi Mohammed,‖ BBC News, July 9, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm. 
 
―Profile: Salahuddin Amin,‖ BBC News, April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149790.stm. 
 
―Profile: Shehzad Tanweer,‖ BBC News, July 6, 2006; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762313.stm. 
 
―Profile: Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal,‖ BBC News, May 25, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6692243.stm. 
 
―Profile: Shujah Mahmood,‖ BBC News, April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149796.stm. 
 
―Profile: Waheed Mahmood,‖ BBC News, April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149800.stm. See also: ―The Canadian Connection.‖ 
 
―Profile: Yassin Omar,‖ BBC News, July 9, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm. 
 
―Profiles: The terror gang members,‖ The Independent (London), February 26, 2008; available 
online: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/profiles-the-terror-gang-members-
787469.html. 
Project 2,996: http://project2996.wordpress.com/we-remember/. 
 
―Prosecution to Rest in Ft. Hood Massacre Trial,‖ Associated Press, November 5, 2010. 
 
―Prosecution Wraps Up in Fort Hood Hearing,‖ United Press International, October 21, 2010. 
 
―Qaeda planner of London bombings dead: US official,‖ Agence France Presse, April 9, 2008. 
 
―Qaeda wants revenge over Pakistani held by US,‖ Agence France Presse, December 15, 2010. 
 
―Qaida 'chameleon' seen behind bombings,‖ United Press International, July 14, 2010. 
 
R Core Team, R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing, (Vienna, Austria: R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing, 2012), ISBN 3-900051-07-0; available online: 
http://www.R-project.org. 
516 
 
 
R v. el-Faisal, Appeal, Supreme Court of Judicature, Royal Courts of Justice, March 4, 2004. 
 
R v. Girma and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: B3/2008/3988), Appeal, May 15, 
2009. 
 
R v. Ibrahim and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: 2007/04146/B5), Appeal, April 23, 
2008. 
 
R v. Khyam and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: 2007/02682 C5), Appeal, July 23, 
2008. 
 
R v. Sherif and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: 200801030), Appeal, November 11, 
2008. 
 
Raedler, John, ―Kabul peacekeepers on ‗red alert,‘‖ CNN.com, March 31, 2003. 
 
Ragavan, Chitra, Nacy L. Bentrup, Ann M. Wakefield, Shelia Thalhimer, and Monica m. 
Ekman, ―Tracing terror's roots,‖ U.S. News and World Report, February 24, 2003. 
 
Ramakrishna, Kumar, ―The Making of the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist,‖ in James JF Forest 
(ed.), Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, pp. 223-260. 
 
RAND Corporation, ―Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents: Database Definitions,‖ date 
unknown, available online: http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-
incidents/about/definitions.html. All sites last accessed January 27, 2012. 
 
Randawah, Kiran, ―7/7 bombings cost only pounds 500 to carry out,‖ Evening Standard 
(London), January 3, 2006. 
 
Randolph, Eleanor and Pierre Thomas, ―Bomb tapes put agents' role at issue; Clerics knowledge 
is also questioned,‖ Washington Post, August 4, 1993. 
 
―Ransom demands received for 31 Europeans missing in Algeria: press,‖ Agence France 
Presse, May 11, 2003. 
 
―Rebels behead Philippine troops,‖ BBC News, July 11, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6290302.stm. 
 
Reeves, Phil, ―The threat of war: Fifteen killed in attack blamed on al-Qa'ida; Afghanistan,‖ The 
Independent (London), February 1, 2003. 
 
Reges, Benteng, ―Bomb similar to explosive of Bali 2005 attack found,‖ Asia News, March 5, 
2006; available online: http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Bomb-similar-to-explosive-of-Bali-
2005-attack-found-6056.html. 
517 
 
 
Reid, Robert H., ―Government says Abu Sayyaf links extend through Afghanistan to Middle 
East,‖ Associated Press Worldstream, April 9, 1995. 
 
Reinares, Fernando, ―The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism,‖ Survival, Vol. 52, No. 2 
(April-May 2010), 83-104. 
 
Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the 
assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, April 15, 2010. 
 
―Report: Bin Laden plotted to kill Clinton,‖ United Press International, August 25, 1998. 
 
Ressa, Maria, ―September 11: The Asian blueprint,‖ CNN.com, March 11, 2002. 
 
Ressa, Maria, ―Reports: Al Qaeda operative sought anthrax,‖ CNN.com, October 10, 2003; 
available online: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/10/alqaeda.anthrax/. 
 
―Ressam targeted Los Angeles airport: US prosecutor,‖ Agence France Presse, June 28, 2001. 
 
Richey, Warren, ―Canadian charged with helping Najibullah Zazi in New York bomb plot,‖ 
Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 2011; available online: 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0315/Canadian-charged-with-helping-Najibullah-
Zazi-in-New-York-bomb-plot. 
 
Riedel, Bruce, ―Al Qaeda Smells Blood,‖ Brookings, April 6, 2011; available online: 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0406_yemen_al_qaeda_riedel.aspx. 
 
Ripley, Amanda, ―The Fort Dix Conspiracy,‖ Time, December 6, 2007. 
 
―Rising Al-Qaeda leader spent youth in US: report,‖ Agence France Presse, August 6, 2010. 
 
Robert H. Reid, ―Phil ppines links Trade Center suspect to series of bizarre plots,‖ Associated 
Press, March 27, 1995. 
 
Roberts, Joel, ―What's next after Zarqawi's death? Leaders call terror chief's death a victory, but 
say violence may not abate,‖ CBS News, June 8, 2006. 
 
Robertson, Phillip, ―U.S. Airstrike near Asadabad,‖ Salon.com, September 6, 2002. 
 
Robertson, Nic and Paul Cruickshank, ―American's odyssey to al Qaeda's heart,‖ CNN.com, 
July 30, 2009. 
 
Robertson, Nic, and Paul Cruickshank, ―American's odyssey to al Qaeda's heart,‖ CNN.com, 
July 30, 2009. 
 
518 
 
Robson, Colin, Real World Research, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 41-42. 
 Rodriguez, Jose A., ―The March 11th Terrorist Network: In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength,‖ 
Working Papers EPP-LEA, Study Group on Power and Privilege, Department of Sociology, 
University of Barcelona, December 2005. 
 
Roggio, Bill, ―Suicide bombers kill 18 in attack on Algerian military academy,‖ The Long War 
Journal, August 26, 2011; available online: 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/suicide_bombers_kill_6.php. 
 
Rosenberg, Matthew, ―AP Exclusive: Al-Qaida continues to siphon money from Islamic 
charities to fund attacks despite U.S., Saudi crackdown,‖ Associated Press, June 6, 2004. 
 
Rosenberg, Matthew, ―AP Exclusive: Al-Qaida plotted to destroy U.S. Embassy in Kenya in 
June,‖ Associated Press, October 24, 2003. 
 
Rosenthal, Justine A., ―For-Profit Terrorism: The Rise of Armed Entrepreneurs,‖ Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, No. 6 (June 2008), pp. 481-498. 
 
Ross, Brian, ―Major Hasan‘s E-Mail: ‗I Can‘t Wait To Join You in Afterlife,‖ ABC News, 
November 19, 2009. 
 
Rotella, Sebastian and Josh Meyer, ―A young American's journey into Al Qaeda,‖ Los Angeles 
Times, July 24, 2009. 
 
Rotella, Sebastian, ―U.S. sees homegrown Muslim extremism as rising threat,‖ Los Angeles 
Times, December 7, 2009; available online: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/07/nation/la-
na-us-radicalization7-2009dec07/2. 
 
Rotella, Sebastian, ―Who Guided London‘s Attackers?‖ Los Angeles Times, March 6, 2006. 
 
Roth, John, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena White, ―Monograph on Terrorist Financing,‖ 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, August 21, 2004; available 
online: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/index.htm. 
 
Rucinski, Tracy and Mathieu Bonkoungou, ―Freed al Qaeda hostages arrive back in Spain,‖ 
Reuters, August 23, 2010; available online: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/24/idUSLDE67M1V2. 
 
Ryan, Joe ―Lawyer: Ft. Dix Suspect Not a Sniper, Had No Role in Plot,‖ Star-Ledger (New 
Jersey), May 15, 2007. 
 
Ryan, Joe, ―Lawyer: Ft. Dix Suspect Not a Sniper, Had No Role in Plot,‖ Star-Ledger (New 
Jersey), May 15, 2007. 
 
Sageman, Marc and Bruce Hoffman, ―Does Osama Still Call the Shots? Debating the 
519 
 
Containment of al Qaeda‘s Leadership,‖ Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008; available online: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-
still-call-the-shots. 
 
Sageman, Marc, ―The Reality of Grass-Roots Terrorism,‖ Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008, 
pp. 163-5. 
 
Sageman, Marc, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
 
Sampson, Pamela, ―AP Enterprise: Algerian group moves to establish stronger al-Qaida ties,‖ 
Associated Press Worldstream, March 9, 2004. 
 
Sapstead, David and Duncan Gardham, ―Lost years of the ‗nice boy‘ who killed 25,‖ Daily 
Telegraph (London), July 16, 2005; available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1494120/Lost-years-of-the-nice-boy-who-killed-
25.html. 
 
―Sari Club: Al Qaeda admits Bali blasts on Web,‖ CNN World, November 7, 2002; available 
online: http://articles.cnn.com/2002-11-07/world/bali.bombings.qaeda_1_jewish-crusader-
alliance-nightclubs-and-whorehouses-bali-bomb?_s=PM:asiapcf. 
 
―Saudi Arabia puts 50 Al Qaeda suspects on trial,‖ Reuters, April 8, 2012. 
 
Saunders, Doug ―Al-Qaeda raid in Pakistan led to arrests in London; British officials say 
information gathered is not enough to raise terror alert levels,‖ The Globe and Mail (Canada), 
August 6, 2004. 
 
Sawyer, Reid and Michael Foster, ―The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of al Qaeda,‖ Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, June 12, 2008; available online: 
http://ann.sagepub.com/content/618/1/197.full.pdf. 
 
Schmid, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 
1988), p. 179. 
 
Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry Lynn Karl, ―What Democracy Is—and Is Not,‖ Journal of 
Democracy, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 75-88. 
 
Schrader, Katherine, ―Al-Qaida chief apparently did orchestrate some plots but less linked to 
others,‖ Associated Press, March 16, 2007. 
 
Schuster, Henry, ―Soccer balls, broomsticks aid Yemen jailbreak,‖ CNN.com, February 28, 
2006; available online: http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/27/yemen.tunnel/. 
  
520 
 
 
Sciolino, Elaine, ―Morocco Connection Is Emerging as Sleeper Threat in Terror War,‖ New 
York Times, May 16, 2004. 
 
Scott, John, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook (2nd Edition), (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 
2000). 
 
Scroggins, Deborah, ―The most wanted woman in the world,‖ Vogue, March 2005. 
 
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning 
Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, ―II. Composition of the List,‖ date unknown, 
available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning 
Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: 
Q1.A.255.06. Abd al Hamid Sulaiman Muhammad al-Mujil,‖ August 4, 2006; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI22506E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning 
Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: 
Q1.N.280.10 Tayeb Nail,‖ April 22, 2010; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI28010E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning 
Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: 
Q1.S.35.01. Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan,‖ October 17, 2001; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI3501E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning 
Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing:Q1.A.193.05 Zaki Ezat Zaki Ahmed,‖ September 29, 2005; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI19305E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning 
Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing:Q1.A.195.05 Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Eliwah,‖ September 29, 2005; available 
online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI19505E.shtml. 
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning 
Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing:Q1.A.229.07. Aly Soliman Massoud Abdul Sayed,‖ April 6, 2009, available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI22907E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning 
Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing:Q1.C.300.12 Monir Chouka,‖ January 25, 2012; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI30012E.shtml. 
521 
 
 
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning 
Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing:Q1.C.301.12 Yassin Chouka,‖ January 25, 2012; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI30112E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.1.87.03. Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin,‖ available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI08703E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.A.274.10 Nasir ‗Abd-al-Karim ‗Abdullah al-Wahishi,‖ January 19, 2010; available 
online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI27410E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.A.275.10 Said Ali al-Shihri,‖ January 19, 2010; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI27510E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.A.282.10. Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi,‖ May 11, 2010; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI28210E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.A.283.10. Anwar Nasser Abdulla al-Aulaqi,‖ July 20, 2010; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI28310E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.A.295.11 Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman,‖ August 12, 2011; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI29511E.shtml.[1] 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.A.60.02. Mohamed Ben Belgacem Ben Abdallah al-Aouadi,‖ April 24, 2002; 
available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI06002E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.B.136.03. Mokhtar Belmokhtar,‖ November 11, 2003; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI13603E.shtml. 
 
522 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.B.62.02. Mohamed Aouani,‖ April 24, 2002; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI06202E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.C.70.02. Yassine Chekkouri,‖ September 3, 2002; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI07002E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.D.232.07 Abelmalik Droukdel,‖ August 27, 2007; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI23207E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.E.64.02. Sami Ben Khamis Ben Saleh Elsseid,‖ April 24, 2002; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI06402E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: Q1.S.35.01. Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan,‖ October 17, 2001; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI3501E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: QI.M.33.01. Fazul Abdullah Mohammed,‖ October 17, 2001; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI03301E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing: QI.M.34.01 Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam,‖ October 17, 2001; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI3401E.shtml. 
 
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing:QI.G.28.01. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani,‖ October 17, 2001; available online: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI02801E.shtml. 
 
Seidman, Andrew, ―Homeland Security plans to regulate bomb fertilizer,‖ Los Angeles Times, 
August 2, 2011; available online: http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/02/nation/la-na-
ammonium-nitrate-20110803. 
  
523 
 
 
Selsky, Andrew, ―Spain Probes Casablanca Blast Link: al-Qaeda Connection: Moroccan 
Suspects May Be Tied to Groups Behind Both Attacks,‖ National Post (Canada), March 16, 
2004. 
 
―Senior Al-Qaeda militant eulogizes slain companion: report,‖ Agence France Presse, March 3, 
2008. 
 
Seper, Jerry, ―Somali indicted in al Qaeda bomb plot,‖ Washington Times, June 15, 2004. 
 
Shah, Pir Zubair and Jane Perlez, ―Taliban in Pakistan threaten to kill hostages unless 4 of their 
comrades are freed,‖ New York Times, July 19, 2008. 
 
Shah, Saeed, ―At end, bin Laden wasn‘t running al Qaida, officials say,‖ McClatchy 
Newspapers, June 28, 2011; available online: 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/28/116666/at-end-bin-laden-wasnt-
running.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_term=news. 
 
Shah, Saeed, ―World's 'most dangerous' woman a cause célèbre,‖ Globe and Mail (Canada), 
January 20, 2010. 
 
Shahzad, Syed Saleem ,‖Al-Qaeda's guerilla chief lays out strategy,‖ Asia Times Online, 
October 15, 2009. 
 
Shannon, Elaine, ―Al-Qaeda Moneyman Caught,‖ Time, May 1, 2003. 
 
Sharrock, David, ―'Pimpernel of the Sahara' brokered release of other tourists; The suspect 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar,‖ The Times (London), June 4, 2009. 
 
Sherwell, Philip and Alex Spillius, ―Fort Hood Shooting: Texas Army Killer Linked to 
September 11 Terrorists,‖ The Telegraph (London), November 7, 2009; available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6521758/Fort-Hood-shooting-
Texas-army-killer-linked-to-September-11-terrorists.html. 
 
Shmitt, Eric, ―Threat and Responses: Skirmish; U.S. Marine is killed in Kuwait as gunment 
strike training site,‖ New York Times, October 9, 2002. 
 
 
Shultz, Richard J. Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler, ―Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in 
al-Qaida Operations,‖ MERIA Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004); 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue2/jv8n2a6.html. 
 
―Sicilian, Colombian, Russian mafia in league with Al-Qa'idah Maghreb - paper,‖ BBC 
Monitoring Middle East - Political, July 11, 2009. 
  
524 
 
 
Silber, Mitchell D. and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, 
NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007. 
 
Silke, Andrew, ―The Devil You Know,‖ in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, 
Achievements and Failures, (London (UK): Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 57-71. 
 
Simpson, John, ―Battling the al-Qaeda franchise,‖ BBC News, October 3, 2005; available 
online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4304516.stm. 
 
Singh, Jasbant, ―With Hambali caught, search for top Southeast Asian terrorist turns to 
bespectacled Malaysian bomber,‖ Associated Press Worldstream, August 15, 2003. 
 
Sipress, Alan, ―Bin Laden named in Asian terror plots,‖ Washington Post, June 27, 2003. 
 
Sisters‘ Arab Forum for Human Rights, ―The Status of Torture in Yemen: Second Parallel 
Report by Yemeni Civil Society Organizations on Yemen‘s Compliance with the Convention 
against All Forms of Torture and Other Forms of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment,‖ 
Submitted to the 43rd CAT Session, October 12, 2009; available online: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/SAF_Yemen43.pdf. 
 
―Six more German tourists missing in Algerian desert: diplomats,‖ Agence France Presse, April 
1, 2003. 
 
Slackman, Michael, ―Investigating attacks, Jordan focuses on insurgent in Iraq,‖ New York 
Times, November 13, 2005. 
 
Smiles, Sarah and Eamonn Duff, ―No extradiction leaves brothers free,‖ The Sun Herald 
(Sydney, Australia), January 11, 2004. 
 
Smith, Craig S., ―North Africa feared as staging ground for terror,‖ New York Times, February 
20, 2007. 
 
Smith, Craig S., ―U.S. training African forces to uproot terrorists,‖ New York Times, May 11, 
2004. 
 
Sokolsky, Richard and Joseph McMillian, ―Foreign Aid in Our Own Defense,‖ New York Times 
(February 12, 2002); available online: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CEFDC113CF931A25751C0A9649C8B63. 
 
Somaiya, Ravi and William K. Rashbaum, ―British Anger Over Release of Man Linked to 
Bombs,‖ New York Times, February 15, 2011; available online:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/world/europe/16babar.html?_r=1. 
 
Sontag, Deborah, ―Terror suspects path from streets to Brig,‖ New York Times, April 25, 2004. 
 
525 
 
Souchard, Pierre-Antoine, ―Accused 9/11 plotter Mohammed faces a French trial,‖ Associated 
Press Online, January 4, 2009. 
 
―Spanish authorities tie suspects to key figures in U.S. hijackings,‖ CNN.com, November 20, 
2001. 
 
―Spanish daily details how Al-Qa'idah collects ransoms in Mali,‖ BBC Monitoring Europe - 
Political, February 9, 2010. 
 
Sparrow, Malcolm K., ―The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: An 
assessment of the process,‖ Social Networks, Vol. 13 (1991), pp. 251-274. 
 
―Special Report: Yemeni arms bazaars move underground,‖ United Press International, 
February 15, 2010; available online: 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/02/15/Yemeni-arms-bazaars-move-
underground/UPI-50061266250861/. 
 
Sprinzak, Ehud, ―Rational Fanatics,‖ Foreign Policy, No. 122 (Sep/Oct 2000), p. 69. 
 
Stares, Paul B. and Mona Yacoubian, ―Unconventional Approaches to and Unconventional 
Threat: A Counter-Epidemic Strategy,‖ in Mapping the Jihadist Threat: The War on Terror 
Since 9/11, a publication by the Aspen Institute, (June 2006); article available online: 
http://www.usip.org/files/stares_yacoubian_threat.pdf; 
 
Starr, Barbara and Terry Frieden, ―Second terrorist ID'd in Yemen jailbreak,‖ CNN.com, 
February 8, 2006. 
 ―Statement Under Inquiry of Omar Said Omar,‖ Recorded by Superintendant John Mulalulu, 
Kenya Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, n.d. (but almost certainly August, 2003), available from 
Appendix C-III of Al-Qaida's (mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa, Combating Terrorism 
Center at West Point. 
 
Stewart, Cameron and Colleen Egan, ―A word from the wise - 'They approached me and said 
this man wants to make some attacks on things . . . And what do you want to do about it?' -- 
Sheik Mohammed Omran,‖ Weekend Australian, October 18, 2003. 
 
Stewart, Cameron, and Colleen Egan, ―A word from the wise - 'They approached me and said 
this man wants to make some attacks on things . . . And what do you want to do about it?' -- 
Sheik Mohammed Omran,‖ Weekend Australian, October 18, 2003. 
 
Streiner, David L., ―Breaking Up is Hard to Do: The Heartbreak of Dichotomizing Continuous 
Data,‖ Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 2002), pp. 262-266. 
 
Stringer, David, ―Man to be sentenced in British Bomb plot,‖ Associated Press Online, 
November 6, 2006. 
 
526 
 
Sullivan, Kevin and Karla Adam, ―Trial Opens in London Transit Bombing Plot,‖ Washington 
Post, January 16, 2007; available online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/15/AR2007011501264.html. 
 
Summers, Chris and Dominic Casciani, ―Bomb would have been ‗devastating,‘‖ BBC News, 
July 9, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6687311.stm. 
 
Summers, Chris and Dominic Casciani, ―Fertiliser bomb plot: The story,‖ BBC News, April 30, 
2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6153884.stm. 
 
Summers, Chris, ―Defendants ‗attracted to Islam,‘‖ BBC News, January 17, 2007; available 
online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6272847.stm. 
 
―Suspect ‗reveals 9/11 planning,‘‖ BBC News, September 22, 2003; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3128802.stm. 
 
―Suspected associates of Osama bin Laden to go on trial in Egypt,‖ Agence France Presse, 
January 31, 1999. 
 
Swami, Praveen, and Allan Hall, ―Al-Qaeda plotted to take hostages in Mumbai-style attack on 
Britain,‖ Daily Telegraph (London), October 29, 2010. 
 
―Swiss woman kidnapped in western Yemen,‖ BBC News, March 16, 2012; available online: 
http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17399703. 
 
Tafrov, Stefan (chairman), Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1474 (2003), November 4, 2003, pp. 29-30. 
 
―Taliban ally warns US of long guerilla war,‖ Agence France Presse, November 13, 2001. 
 
Tang, Alisa, ―AP Exclusive: Libyan in al-Qaida blamed for bombing attack at Afghan base 
during Cheney visit,‖ Associated Press, May 3, 2007. 
 
―Target Australia: Jakarta bomb kills 11,‖ Sydney Morning Herald, September 9, 2004. 
 
Tavernise, Sabrina and Robert F. Worth, ―Relentless rebel attacks test Shiite endurance,‖ New 
York Times, September 19, 2005. 
 
Tawashi, Taha, ―Arms markets crucial,‖ The Saudi Gazette, November 9, 2009; available 
online: 
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2009110953990. 
 
Tawil, Camille, ―How Bin Ladin‘s Death Will Affect Al-Qa‘ida‘s Regional Franchises,‖ 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 1, 2011. 
  
527 
 
 
Tayler, Letta, ―Profile of Abdul Kadir: Disbelief in His Hometown,‖ Newsday (New York), 
June 4, 2007. 
 
Taylor, Catherine, ―Botched McDonald's bomb plot exposed global chain,‖ The Australian, 
September 22, 2003. 
 
Taylor, Rob, ―ASIA: Hambali accused of plotting foiled LA attack,‖ AAP Newsfeed, February 
10, 2006. 
 
Temple-Raston, Din, ―Al-Qaida, Affiliates Show Greater Coordination,‖ National Public Radio, 
November 11, 2010; available online: 
http://www.kqed.org/news/story/2010/11/11/38130/alqaida_affiliates_show_greater_coordinati
on?source=npr&category=world. 
 
Terrill, W. Andrew, The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2011). 
 
―Terror bombing financiers hiding in Sydney,‖ The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), December 23, 
2003. 
 
―‗Terror camp plot‘ trial begins,‘‖ BBC News, October 10, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7037525.stm. 
 
―Terror charges laid against former Winnipeggers,‖ CBC News (Canada), March 15, 2011; 
available online: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2011/03/15/mb-terrorism-
charges-winnipeg.html. 
 
―Terror Quartet Plots al-Qaida Attacks,‖ United Press International, February 23, 2011. 
 
―Terror suspect stocked up beauty supplies,‖ CNN Justice, September 24, 2009; available 
online: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-24/justice/terror.indictment_1_mohammed-wali-zazi-
najibullah-zazi-ahmad-wais-afzali?_s=PM:CRIME. 
 
―Terror suspects face possible abuse, court told,‖ Guardian Unlimited, July 11, 2006. 
 
―Terrorist Salafi Group Reportedly Set Up New Structures in Algeria,‖ BBC Monitoring Middle 
East, March 27, 2006. 
 
 
―Thai authorities hunt missiles smuggled from Cambodia - dispatch,‖ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, October 1, 2003. 
 
―The 9/11 Truth Movement,‖ available online: 911truth.org. 
 
―The Bali bombing plotters,‖ BBC News, March 10, 2010. 
528 
 
 
―The Canadian Connection,‖ Globe and Mail (Canada), May 1, 2007. 
 
―The Endurance of Yemen‘s Al Qaeda Franchise,‖ STRATFOR, November 2, 2010. 
 
―The four guilty July 21 bombers,‖ The Telegraph (London), July 10, 2007; available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1557000/The-four-guilty-July-21-bombers.html. 
 
―The hydra bites; al-Qaeda,‖ The Economist, March 20, 2004. 
 
―The Kevin Bacon Game,‖ available online: http://www.thekevinbacongame.com/. 
 ―The Oracle of Bacon,‖ available online: http://oracleofbacon.org/. 
 
―The Pilot,‖ CBC News: The Fifth Estate, January 19, 2005; available online: 
http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/thepilot/story.html. 
 
―They heard Hamza‘s sermons,‖ The Telegraph (London), January 16, 2007; available online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1539641/They-heard-Hamzas-sermons.html. 
 
―Three charged in London with plotting to develop chemical weapon,‖ Associated Press, 
February 26, 2003. 
 
―Three Filipino sailors kidnapped in Yemen,‖ Manila Times, March 21, 2012; available online: 
http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/news/breaking-news/19754-three-filipino-sailors-
kidnapped-in-yemen. 
 
―Three French hostages freed in Yemen head for home,‖ Agence France Presse, November 13, 
2011. 
 
―Three men remanded amid reports of London 'gas attack' plot,‖ Agence France Presse, 
November 18, 2002. 
 
―Three Spaniards held by 'less radical' Al-Qaeda branch: report,‖ Agence France Presse, 
December 4, 2009. 
 
―Thwarted Attack Against El Al Flight,‖ Ha'aretz, September 24, 2003. 
 
―Timeline: 21 July bomb plot,‖ BBC News, July 10, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6251294.stm. 
 
―Timeline: Operation Crevice,‖ BBC News, April 30, 2007; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6207348.stm. 
 
―Top al-Qaeda Leaders at Large in Pakistan,‖ Press Trust of India, August 28, 2002. 
 
529 
 
―Top al-Qaida operative in Pakistan set up major attacks: officials,‖ Agence France Presse, 
January 9, 2009. 
 
―Top militant accused of bombing Benazir's Karachi rally arrested,‖ Hindustan Times, February 
27, 2008. 
 
Topping, Alexandra and Vikram Dodd, ―MI 5 missed 7/7 ringleader despite links with earlier 
terror plot, inquest told,‖ The Guardian (London), February 2, 2011; available online: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/02/mohammad-sidique-khan-july-7-inquest. 
 
―Trial opens of Algerian accused of European kidnapping,‖ Agence France Presse, March 18, 
2007. 
 
―Tunisian planned raid on air base: Targeted U.S. munitions in Belgium,‖ Calgary Herald 
(Alberta, Canada), November 16, 2002. 
 
―Two suspects detained in terror plot,‖ Associated Press Online, June 22, 2002. 
 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), A Military Guide to Terrorism in the 
Twenty-First Century, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) Handbook No. 1, 
(August 15, 2007), p. 3-1. 
 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Field Mannual 100-20 – 
Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, December 5, 1990; available online: 
http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fm-100-20-military-operations-in-low-intensity-
conflict.shtml. 
U.S. Department of Defense, Biographical Notes on ‗Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, April 2007; available 
online: http://www.defense.gov/news/Apr2007/d20070427hvd.pdf, 
U.S. Department of Defense, Combatant Status Review Board, Summary of Evidence for 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal – Detainee Ibrahim Sulayman Muhammad Al Rubaysh,‖ 
(Unclassified), August 8, 2004. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, ―Consolidated Chronological List of GTMO Detainees Released, 
Transferred, or Deceased,‖ Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy 
Combatants, (Unclassified), October 9, 2008. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-24 – Counterinsurgency Operations, October 
5, 2009; available online http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf  
 
U.S. Department of Defense,  ―Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review 
Board in the Case of Abdelrahman, Adelrazak Ali,‖ Office for the Administrative Review of the 
Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, July 27, 2005. 
 
530 
 
U.S. Department of Defense,  ―Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review 
Board in the Case of al Shihri, Sa id Ali Jabir al Khathim,‖ Office for the Administrative 
Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,  
March 31, 2006. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, ―Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review 
Board in the Case of Arbaysh, Ibrahim Sulayman Muhammad,‖ Office for the Administrative 
Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
January 20, 2006. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, ―Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review 
Board in the Case of Bel Bacha, Ahmed Bin Saleh,‖ Office for the Administrative Review of 
the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, March 29, 
2005. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense,  ―Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review 
Board in the Case of Belkacem, Bensayah,‖ Office for the Administrative Review of the 
Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,  December 28, 
2005. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, ―Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review 
Board in the Case of Boumediene, Lakhdar,‖ Office for the Administrative Review of the 
Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, December 14, 
2007. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense,  ―Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review 
Board in the Case of Sa id Ali Jabar al Khathim al Shihri,‖ Office for the Administrative 
Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, June 
16, 2005. 
 U.S. Department of Defense, Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), Unclassified, March 10, 2007. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
Hearing for ISN 10013 (Ramzi Bin al Shibh), (Unclassified), March 9, 2007 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
Hearing for ISN 10015 (Abd al-Rahim al-Nasheri), (Unclassified), March 14, 2007. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
Hearing for ISN 10016 (Zubaydah), (Unclassified), March 27, 2007. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
Hearing for ISN 10022 (Lillie), (Unclassified), March 20, 2007. 
  
531 
 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, Verbatim Transcript of Open Session Combat Status Review 
Tirbunal Hearing for ISN 10014 (Walid bin Attash), (Unclassified), March 12, 2007. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, Verbatim Transcript of Open Session Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal for ISN 10012 (Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani), (Unclassified), March 17, 2007. 
 U.S. Department of Defense, Verbatim Transcript of Open Session Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal for ISN 10019 (Hambali), (Unclassified), April 4, 2007. 
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ―Ammonium Nitrate Security Program, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking,‖ September 14, 2011; available online: 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/laws/gc_1288878991345.shtm. 
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ―Appendix to Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards; Final Rule,‖ Federal Register, November 20, 2007; available online: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_appendixafinalrule.pdf. 
 
U.S. Department of Justice, ―Abdul Kadir Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit 
Terrorist Attack at JFK,‖ December 15, 2010. 
U.S. Department of Justice, ―Addul Kadir Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit 
Terrorist Attack at JFK,‖ December 15, 2010. 
U.S. Department of Justice, ―Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (Title VII of 
Public Law 109-177),‖ Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. 
Department of Justice, July 10, 2007; available online: 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/meth/q_a.htm#7_procure. 
U.S. Department of Justice, ―Founding member of Abu Sayyaf Group Pleads Guilty to 1995 
Hostage Taking Involving U.S. and Philippine Citizens,‖ DOJ Press Release, July 28, 2010. 
U.S. Department of Justice, ―Second man involved in domestic terrorism plot targeting military, 
Jewish facilities sentenced to prison,‖ Press Release, July 21, 2008. 
U.S. Department of Justice, ―Shahawar Matin Siraj Sentenced to Thirty Years of Imprisonment 
for Conspiring to Place Explosives at teh 34th Street Subway Station in New York,‖ January 8, 
2007. 
U.S. Department of Justice, ―Zarein Ahmedzay Pleads Guilty to Terror Violations in 
Connection with Al-Qaeda New York Subway Plot,‖ Office of Public Affairs, April 23, 2010. 
U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, 2010 Report on Terrorism, April 30, 2011; available 
online: http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2010_report_on_terrorism.pdf. 
532 
 
 
U.S. Department of State, ―2010 Country Reports on Terrorism: Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations‖ (Chapter 6), Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, August 18, 2011; 
available online: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm. 
U.S. Department of State, ―Designations of AQAP Leaders Qasim al-Rimi and Nayif al-
Qahtani,‖ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, May 11, 2010; available online: 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143206.htm. 
U.S. Department of State, ―Terrorist Organizations‖ in Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, 
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, August 5, 2010; available online: 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm. 
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, April 2008. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Additional Al-Haramain Branches, Former Leader 
Designated by Treasury as Al Qaida Supporters Treasury Marks Latest Action in Joint 
Designation with Saudi Arabia,‖ Office of Foreign Assets Control, June 2, 2004; available 
online: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js1703.aspx. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Recent OFAC Actions,‖ Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
January 19, 2010; available online: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/Pages/20100119.aspx. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Snow announces designation of 10 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
terrorists,‖ FDCH Federal Department and Agency Documents, September 5, 2003. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons,‖ 
Office of Foreign Assets Control, February 10, 2010. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons,‖ 
Office of Foreign Assets Control, March 2, 2012. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Treasury Designates AQIM Emir,‖ Press Release, December 
4, 2007. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Treasury Designates Seven Member of the Rajah Solaiman 
Movement,‖ Press Release, June 16, 2008. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Treasury targets Somali terrorists,‖ Press Release, November 
20, 2008. 
―Urgent,‖ Agence France Presse, February 13, 1995. 
  
533 
 
 
―US embassy cables: US fears Yemen arms purchases could end up on the black market,‖ The 
Guardian (London), December 5, 2010; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-
embassy-cables-documents/241318. 
 
―US troops raid Somali town controlled by fighters,‖ Guardian Unlimited (London), September 
14, 2009. 
 
USA v. Adis Medunjanin, Abid Nasser, Adnan el Shukrijumah, Tariq Ur Rehman, and FNU 
LNU, Superseding Indictment, United States District Court Eastern District of New York (Cr. 
No.: 10-019 (S-3) (RJD)), 2010. 
 
USA v. Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc., et al (Defendants), Indictment, United States 
District Court for the District of Oregon (No. Cr 05-60008-HD), 2004. 
 
USA v. Ali al-Timmi, Indictment (Criminal No. 1:04cr), United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, September 2004. 
 
USA v. Ali Mohamed (Defendant), Allocution, United States District Court Southern District of 
New York, October 20, 2000. 
 
USA v. Bryant Neal Vinas (Defendant), Indictment, United States District Court Eastern 
District of New York (Cr. No.: 08-823 (NGS) (S-1)), July 22, 2009. 
 
USA v. Bryant Neal Vinas (Defendant), Sealed Pages of Transcript of Proceedings before 
Nicholas G. Garaufis, January 28, 2009. 
 USA v. David Headley (Defendant), Plea Agreement, United States District Court Northern 
District of Illinois Eastern Division (No. 09 CR 830-3), March 18, 2010. 
 
USA v. Dhiren Barot, et al (Defendants), Sealed Indictment, United States District Court 
Southern District of New York (05CRIM. 311), 2007. 
 
USA v. Enaam M. Arnaout, Plea Agreement (No. 02 CR 892), United States District Court, 
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, February 11, 2003. 
 
USA v. Ferid Imam, et al (Defendants), Superseding indictment (Cr. No. 10-019 [S-3] [RJD]), 
United States District Court Eastern District of New York, July 7, 2010. 
 
USA v. Goba, et al, Criminal Complaint of Edward J. Needham, United States District Court for 
the Western District of New York, September 13, 2002. 
 
USA v. Hakimullah Mehsud (Defendant), Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent Thomas O. Krall, 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, August 20, 2010. 
  
534 
 
 
USA v. Iyam Faris, Plea agreement, United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia, 2003. 
 
USA v. Jamal Ahmed Mohamed Ali Al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso (Defendants), Indictment 
(S12 98 Cr. 1023), United States District Court Southern District of New York, 2003. 
 
USA v. John Doe (Defendant), Corrected Final Transcript of Criminal Cause for Motion to 
Close Courtroom Before the Honorable Nicholas G. Garaufis United States District Judge (08-
CR-823 [NGG]), United States District Court Eastern District of New York, January 28, 2009. 
USA v. Kevin James, et al (Defendants), United States District Court Central District of 
California, Grand Jury Indictment, October 2007. 
 
USA v. Michael C. Finton (Defendant), United States District Court Central District of Illinois 
(Case No.: 09-3048-m), Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent Trevor S. Stalets, September 24, 
2009. 
 
USA v. Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer (Defendant), Criminal Complaint FBI Special Agent John 
J. Ryan (Magistrate No. 07-M-2045[JS]), United States District Court of New Jersey, May 7, 
2007. 
 
USA v. Mohammed Junaid Babar (Defendant), Allocution, United States District Court 
Southern District of New York, June 3, 2004. 
 
USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), Indictment, United States District Court 
Southern District of New York (Crim. No.: 02 Crim. 1560), date unknown. 
 
USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), Sentencing Memorandum, United States 
District Court Southern District of New York (02 Cr. 1560 (BSJ)), May 7, 2007. 
 
USA v. Najibullah Zazi (Defendant), Affidavit in support of complaint and arrest, Garret 
Gumbinner, September 19, 2009. 
 
USA v. Najibullah Zazi (Defendant), Allocution, United States District Court Eastern District of 
New York (Docket No.: 09 CR 663[S-1]), February 22, 2010. 
 
USA v. Najibullah Zazi (Defendant), Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government‘s 
Motion for a Permanent Order of Detention (09-CR-663 [RJD]), United States District Court 
Eastern District of New York, submitted by Jeffrey W. Knox, September 24, 2009. 
 
USA v. Oussama Kassir (Defendant), United States District Court District of Southern New 
York, Complaint of FBI Agent Michael S. Butsch, May 5, 2004. 
  
535 
 
 
USA v. Ressam (Defendant), Complaint, December 1999. 
 
USA v. Raja Lahrasib Khan (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of 
Illinois Eastern Division, Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent David M. Glavach, March 25, 
2010. 
 
USA v. Richard Colvin Reid (Defendant), United States District Court District of Massachusetts 
(Cr. No.: 02-10013-WGY), Sentencing Memorandum, January 17, 2003 
 
USA v. Russel Defreitas, Kareem Ibrahim, Abdul Kadir, and Abdel Nur (Defendants), United 
States District Court Eastern District of New York, Complaint of Robert Addonizio, June 1, 
2007. 
 
USA v. Tahawwur Hussain Rana (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of 
Illinois Eastern Division, Amended Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent Lorenzo Benedict, 
October 21, 2009. 
 
USA v. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District 
of Michigan (Cr. No.: 2:10-cr-20005), Indictment, December 15, 2010. 
 
USA v. Usama bin Laden, et al (Defendants), Indictment (S[9] 98 Cr. 1023 [LBS]), 2001. 
 
USA v. Usama bin Laden, et al (Defendants), Trial Testimony, United States District Court 
Southern District of New York (S(7) 98 Cr. 1023), 2001. 
 USA v. Usama bin Laden, et al (Defendants), Sentencing Hearing, Owens statement, October 
18, 2001. 
 
―USS Cole plotter freed by Yemen,‖ BBC News, October 27, 2007. 
 
Van Natta, Don Jr., et al, ―British seeking cleric's top aide in July 7 attack,‖ New York Times, 
July 21, 2005. 
 
Vick, Karl, ―Al-Qaida's Hand in Istanbul Plot,‖ Washington Post, February 13, 2007. 
 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Sec. 110103 (Ban of Large Capacity 
Ammunition Feeding Devices), sub-paragraph b (Definition of Large Capacity Ammunition 
Feeding Device); available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/F?c103:1:./temp/~c103SJ9kia:e644150:. 
 
Viscusi, Gregory, ―German jailed for Djerba Synagogue bomb to appeal, lawyer says,‖ 
Bloomberg, February 6, 2009. 
 
Vogel, Kathleen M., ―Framing biosecurity: an alternative to the biotech revolution model?‖ 
Science and Public Policy, Vol. 35, No. 1 (February 2008), pp. 45-54. 
536 
 
 
Wasserman, Stanley and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 
(Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
 
Watson, Dale L. ―Prepared statement by Dale L. Watson, Section Chief, International Terrorism 
Operations Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Subcommittee Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information,‖ Federal News Service, 
February 24, 1998. 
 
Watts, Duncan J., Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age, (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2003), pp. 69-100. 
 
―Website statement claims Al-Qaeda link to Mauritanian ambush,‖ Agence France Presse, 
September 18, 2008. 
 
Wee, Darwin T., ―Business airs concern over rising criminality,‖ Businessworld (Philippines), 
February 4, 2008. 
 
Weimann, Gabriel, ―Al-Qa‘ida‘s Extensive Use of the Internet,‖ CTC Sentinel, January 15, 
2008; available online: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida%E2%80%99s-extensive-use-of-
the-internet. 
 
Weimann, Gabriel, ―Virtual Training Camps: Terrorists‘ Use of the Internet,‖ in James J.F. 
Forest (ed.), Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, (Oxford, 
UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), pp. 110-132. 
 
West, Togo Dennis, Jr. and Vern Clark (co-chairs), ―Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort 
Hood,‖ Report of the DoD Independent Review, January 2010, pp. 9-10. 
 
Whitaker, Brian, ―Saudi security barrier stirs anger in Yemen,‖ The Guardian (London), 
February 16, 2004; available online: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/feb/17/saudiarabia.yemen. 
 
Whitlock, Craig and Munir Ladaa, ―Al-Qaeda‘s New Leadership,‖ Washington Post, 2006; 
available online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/masri.html. 
 
Whitlock, Craig, ―Suicide attacks mark turn in Algeria; Insurgents seen taking cues from global 
Al-Qaeda,‖ Washington Post, April 13, 2007. 
 
―Wife ‗knew about 21/7 bomb plot,‘‖ BBC News, February 27, 2008; available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7267055.stm. 
 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ―Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
Vol. 29 (2006), pp. 207-238. 
 
Williams, Brent A., Jayawant N. Mandrekar, Sumitha J. Mandrekar, Stephen S. Cha, and Alfred 
537 
 
F. Furth, ―Finding Optimal Cut-points for Continuous Covariates with Binary and Time-to-
Event Outcomes,‖ Department of Health Science Research, Mayo Clinic, Technical Report 
Series #79, June 2006. 
 
Williams, Clive M.G., ―The Question of ‗Links‘ Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia,‖ in 
Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, eds., After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast 
Asia, (Singapore: World Scientific and the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003). 
 
Williams, Phil, ―Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security,‖ 
International Relations and Security Network, ETH Zurich, 2008. 
 
Williams, Phil, ―Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation,‖ Strategic 
Insights, Vol. 4 No. 1 (January 2005); available online: 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Jan/williamsJan05
.html. 
 
Williams, Rachel, ―7/7 bombers‘ friends jailed over terror training camp plans,‖ The Guardian 
(London), April 29, 2009. 
 
Wilson, Michael, ―From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect,‖ New York Times, 
September 25, 2009; available online: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?pagewanted=all. 
 
 
 
―Witness in terror plot tells court chemicals seized with defendants were explosives,‖ AP 
Worldstream, June 15, 2005. 
 
―Witnesses examined in corps commander convoy attack trial,‖ Pakistan Newswire, July 30, 
2005. 
 
Wonacott, Peter, ―For Middle Class Pakistanis, a Gun Is a Must-Have Accessory,‖ Wall Street 
Journal, January 6, 2009; available online: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123120431026355961.html. 
 
Wong, Edward, ―Iraqis report seizure of 2 aides to the most wanted militant,‖ New York Times, 
January 25, 2005. 
 
World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2012. 
 
―World in Brief,‖ Washington Post, February 27, 2008. 
 
―World: Middle East: Bin Laden 'behind Luxor massacre,‖ BBC News, May 13, 1999. 
 
Worth, Robert F., ―Is Yemen the Next Afghanistan?‖ New York Times, July 6, 2010; available 
online: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/magazine/11Yemen-t.html?pagewanted=all. 
538 
 
 
Wright, Kevin B. and Claude H. Miller, ―A Measure of Weak-Tie/Strong-Tie Support Network 
Preference,‖ Communication Monographs, Vol. 77, No. 4 (2010), pp. 500-517. 
 
Wright, Lawrence, ―The man behind Bin Laden,‖ The New Yorker, September 16, 2002. 
 Wright, Lawrence, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2006). 
 
―Yemen and Saudi al-Qaeda arms merge: New al-Qaeda group vows to carry out attacks across 
the Arabian peninsula,‖ Aljazeera, January 28, 2009; available online: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/01/2009128115142980866.html. 
 
―Yemen detains two of main suspects in Cole bombing,‖ Agence France Presse, March 19, 
2004. 
 
―Yemen: 6 al-Qaida militants killed in airstrike,‖ MSNBC, January 15, 2010; available online: 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34880103/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/. 
 
―Yemen: Six al-Qaeda members killed,‖ Albawaba, January 16, 2010. 
 
York, Geoffrey, ―Deep in the Sahara, Fowler's abductor creates safe haven for terrorist 
kidnappings; 'The Untouchable' ringleader has powerful government and al-Qaeda links in 
Mali,‖ Globe and Mail (Canada), October 14, 2009. 
 
Yousafzai, Sami, Ron Moreau, and Christopher Dickey, ―The New Bin Laden,‖ Newsweek, 
October 23, 2010. 
 
―Zarien Ahmedzay‘s statement when he pleaded guilty to terrorist charges,‖ New York Post, 
April 23, 2010; available online: 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/zarein_ahmedzay_statement_when_he_ECm9fYgzMCuq9
JTvBApBjN/1. 
 
Zemljic, Barbara and Valentina Hlebec, ―Reliability of measures of centrality and prominence,‖ 
Social Networks, Vol. 27 (2005), pp. 73-88. 
 
Zengerle, Patricia and Alister Bull, ―Bin Laden was found at luxury Pakistan compound,‖ 
Reuters, May 2, 2011. 
 
Zill, Oriana, ―A Portrait of Wadih el-Hage, Accused Terrorist,‖ PBS Frontline, September 12, 
2001; available online: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.html. 
 
Zucchino, David, ―Suspect in Ft. Hood Rampage Sought High-Tech Gun, Salesman Says,‖ Los 
Angeles Times, October 21, 2010. 
539 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Note: This questionnaire was administered to Richard Barnes, the Deputy Mayor of London and 
the former deputy chairman of London‘s Metropolitan Police Authority, on the subject of the 
July 2005 London Bombings.  
 
1. Prior to 2005, what threats did the city construe as the primary dangers to London in 
terms of security? 
 
2. Has this perception changed since 2005? 
 
3. Where did terrorism rank among these threats prior to 2005? 
 
4. Do you believe that the ranking of terrorism among security threats to London has 
changed since 2005? How? 
 
5. Prior to 2005, what, if any, specific terror groups or ideologies were of greatest concern 
to the city of London? 
 
6. How much information on Islamist groups did law enforcement or intelligence 
communicate to the city of London government prior to the 2005 attacks? 
 
7. The next section deals with some of your individual beliefs about terrorism.  Prior to the 
2005 attacks, how did you personally perceive the threat that terrorism posed to London? 
 
8. Prior to 2005, what were your personal views about the relative dangers posed by the 
threats the City of London faced? 
 
9. What organizations, if any, do you think bear responsibility for the actions of the 2005 
bombers? Why? 
 
10. The report that you chaired focuses quite a bit on communications technology in the 
response to disaster.  Can you comment on the status of the updates you recommended? 
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11. Specifically, can you discuss the ―Connect Project‖? 
 
12. The report that you chaired did not discuss much about preventive measures, and how 
they could mitigate the potential impact of attacks.  Are there any improvements to 
physical security for mass transit, public buildings, land marks, etc. that you would 
recommend be implemented in the name of anti-terrorism? 
 
13. How effective is London‘s CCTV network at preventing attacks? 
 
14. How effective is CCTV for determining responsibility for attacks after the fact, as an 
investigative tool? 
 
15. Where do you strike the balance between security and privacy? 
 
16. Do you think that there are any other lessons that my questions haven‘t touched on, that 
you believe should be learned from 7/7?
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APPENDIX B: AGENTS AND ALIASES 
 
 
A Note on Interpretation: The lack of clear naming conventions for those involved with violent 
Islamism makes it impossible to list the individuals included in the dataset alphabetically.  
Several individuals are more widely known by their alias than their real name; the Indonesian 
extremist Hambali, whose given name is Nurjaman Riduan bin Isamuddin, offers one example.  
Those searching for him under the letter ―H‖ would have a great difficulty finding him if he were 
listed under his given name, and vice versa.  Conversely, other individuals are known to Western 
observers by their given name, rather than an alias, which may be more popular among the 
subject‘s Islamist peers.  There are also individuals who are widely referenced by multiple 
aliases; for example, some analysts prefer to reference Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the 
Comorian extremist who played a key role in the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2002 
Mombassa attacks, as ―Fazul,‖ while others prefer ―Harun‖ or ―Harun Fazul.‖  In other cases, an 
individual‘s given name is entirely unknown, as is the case with the Egyptian bomb-maker Abu 
Obaidah al-Masri, the man who trained several individuals involved in attacks on London in the 
mid-2000s.   
 Aliases are also difficult because there are few rules regarding their assignment.  Some 
names resonate with Islamist extremists because of their prominence in the history of the Muslim 
religion; consequently, a number of individuals adopt the name in an effort to demonstrate their 
piety.  Moreover, Muslim parents often adopt a new pseudonym with the birth of their first child.  
―Abu,‖ meaning ―father of,‖ and ―Um,‖ meaning ―mother of‖ are often prefixed to the name of 
the child in order to create a non-distinct, culturally derived nickname.  Given the commonality 
of the name ―Mohammed,‖ one shudders to think how many Muslim men have adopted ―Abu 
Mohammed‖ as a pseudonym.  However, at other times, an ―Abu name‖ is adopted as an alias in 
its own right, without reference to the parenting of a child.  In concert, these factors dictate 
cautious interpretation of the data; several different individuals may use the same alias.  Context 
is incredibly important in determining whether or not two people with the same name are 
actually distinct agents. 
Adding yet another level of complexity to the seemingly simple task of alphabetizing 
names is the problem of transliteration.  There are no hard-and-fast rules about how to spell 
Arabic-language names in English.  Although the name ―Mohammed‖ has a single spelling in 
the original Arabic (ﺩﻡﺡﻡ), the name can also come into English as ―Muhammad‖ or ―Mohamed.‖  
Other letters, such as jeem (ﺝ), come into English quite differently depending on the translator‘s 
regional accent.  Egyptians pronounce jeem as a ―G,‖ while speakers hailing form the Levant 
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typically pronounce the same letter as ―J.‖  Since most transliterations are based on the 
translator‘s attempt to use the Roman alphabet to emulate the sound of the word in the original 
language, the translator‘s accent ultimately determines spelling.   
In combination with the extensive practice of aliasing and the ambiguity inherent to data 
on the subject of terrorism, these factors dictate that the choice and spelling of the primary name 
used to reference individuals in the data is somewhat arbitrary.  They are provided in this 
appendix to make the data ―human readable,‖ and in lieu of an impossible alphabetical listing, 
the individuals listed below are ordered according to their unique identification number.  Gaps in 
the sequencing of identification numbers are meaningless, as the numbers merely provide a 
unique identifier on which to reconcile the various names used to reference agents.  Those 
searching for specific individuals are advised to conduct a ―control f‖ search on the desired term.  
It may also be necessary to conduct searches on alternate spellings, and it is worth mentioning 
that ―control f‖ searches process hyphenated and un-hyphenated terms differently. 
Finally, space limitations preclude a recounting of the thousands of sources used to 
reconcile names and aliases.  As the list of aliases was generated by deductive observation of the 
sources listed in Appendix H, which lists the interactions associated with each individual in the 
data, a reasonable approximation of the sourcing underlying the alias list can be derived from 
that appendix. 
 
 
Table 10.1 Listing of Agents and Aliases 
 
 
ID No. PRIMARY NAME KNOWN ALIASES 
Ag00001 FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED 
 
FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMED | ABDALLA FAZUL | ABDALLAH 
FAZUL | ABDALLAH MOHAMMED FAZUL | ABU AISHA | ABU 
LUQMAN | ABU SEIF AL SUDANI | FADEL ABDALLAH MOHAMMED 
ALI | FADHIL HAROUN | FADIL ABDALLAH MUHAMAD | FAZHL 
ABDULLAH | FAZHL KHAN | FAZUL ABDALLA | FAZUL ABDILAHI 
MOHAMMED | FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMED | FAZUL ADBALLAH 
| FAZUL MOHAMMED | FOUAD MOHAMMED | HAROON | HAROON 
FAZUL | HARUN | HARUN | HARUN FAZHL | HARUN FAZUL | HARU 
AL QAMAR | HARUN AL KAMARI | ABDUL KARIM 
Ag00005 ADEL ABDEL BARY 
ABBAS | ABDEL BARY | ABU DIA | ADEL | ADEL MOHAMMED 
ABDUL ALMAGID ABDEL BARY | ADEL ABDEL BARRY | ADEL 
ABDEL AL BARI 
Ag00006 ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH 
ABU MARIAM | ABU MOHAMED AL-MASRI | SALEH | ABU 
MOHAMMED EL MASRY | ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH EL ALFI 
Ag00009 ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI 
ALI AL-RASHIDI | AADIL HABIB | JALAL | ADEL HABIB | SHEIK ABU 
BANSHIRI | KARIM | ADEL HADIB | ABU UBAYDA 
Ag00013 AHMED KHALFAN GHAILANI 
"AHMED THE TANZANIAN" | "FOOPIE" | "FUPI" | ABU BAKR | ABU 
BAKR AHMAD | ABU KHABAR | ABUBAKAR AHMED | ABUBAKAR 
K. AHMED | ABUBAKAR KHALFAN AHMED | ABUBAKARY K. 
AHMED | ABUBAKARY KHALFAN AHMED GHAILANI | 
ABUBAKARY KHALFAN AHMED GHAILANI | AHMAD AL TANZANI 
| AHMAD KHALAFAN GHILANI | AHMED GHAILANI | AHMED 
KHALFAN | AHMED KHALFAN AHMED | AHMED KHALFAN ALI | 
AHMED, A. | FUPI | MAHAFUDH ABUBAKAR AHMED ABDALLAH 
HUSSEIN | SHARIFF OMAR MOHAMMED | HAYTHAM AL-KINI 
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ID No. PRIMARY NAME KNOWN ALIASES 
Ag00014 AHMED MOHAMED HAMED ALI 
ABU FATIMA | ABU ISLAM | ABU ISLAM AL SURIR | ABU ISLAM 
AL-SURIR | ABU KHADIIJAH | AHMAD AL-MASRI | AHMED AHMED 
| AHMED HAMED | AHMED HEMED | AHMED MOHAMMED 
ABDUREHMAN | AHMED MOHAMMED ALI | AHMED SHIEB | 
AHMED THE EGYPTIAN | AHMED THE EGYPTIAN | HAMED ALI | 
SHUAIB | SHUAIB | SHUAIT | ABU ISALM MASRY | ABU ISALM 
MASRY THE YOUNGER | ABU ISLAM SALIN AL SURIR | AHMED AL 
SAGHIR | AHMED MOHAMMED HAMED ALI 
Ag00015 RIFA'I AHMAD TAHA MUSA 
ABD-AL-HAI AHMAD ABD-AL-WAHAB | 'ABD-AL-'IZ | ABU YASIR | 
AHMED REFAI TAHA | 'ISSAM 'ALI MUHAMMAD 'ABD ALLAH | 
RIFA'I AHMAD TAHA MUSA | SALAH 'ALI AL-KAMEL | THABIT 'IZ | 
RIFAI AHMED TAHA 
Ag00016 HAMDEN KHALIF ALLAH AWAD 
AHMED THE GERMAN | AHMED ABDALLAH | HAMDAN KHALIF 
ALAL | HAMDEN KHALIF AL AWAD 
Ag00019 ZAKARIA   
Ag00023 ANAS AL LIBY 
ANAS AL SEBAI | NAZIH AL RAGHIE | ANAS AL-LIBY | ANAS AL-
LIBI | NAZIH AL-RAGHIE | NAZIH ABDUL HAMED AL-RAGHIE | 
ANAS AL-SABAI 
Ag00024 
OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL 
OMAIRAH               
Ag00025 IBRAHIM MOHAMMED KHALIL               
Ag00026 MUHSIN AL-FADHLI               
Ag00027 MUHAMMAD AL-HAMATI 
MUHSIN FADHIL `AYYID AL FADHLI | MUHSIN FADIL AYID 
ASHUR AL FADHLI | ABU SAMIA             
Ag00028 ABD AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI ALI SAYYID MUHAMED MUSTAFA AL-BAKRI  
Ag00030 AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI 
DR. ABDEL MOEZ AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI | ABDEL MOEZ | ABDEL 
MUAZ | ABU MOHAMMED | ABU MOHAMMED NUR AL-DEEN | DR. 
ABDEL MOEZ | DR. ABDEL OMEZ | DR. AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI | 
NUR | THE DOCTOR | USTAZ | DR. AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI | AYMAN 
AL-ZAWAHIRI | AHMAD FUAD SALIM | AIMAN MUHAMMAD RABI 
AL-ZAWAHIRI | ABU MUAZ EL MASRY | AIMAN MUHAMMED RABI 
AL-ZAWAHIRI 
Ag00031 JIHAD MOHAMMED ABDOU ALI 
ABU OBAIDA | AZZAM | AZZAM | JIHAD ALI | JIHAD MOHAMMAD 
ALI AL MAKKI | JIHAD MUHAMMED AL HARAZI | JIHAD 
MUHAMMAD ABU ALI 
Ag00032 NUR AL-DIN AL-DIBISKI 
SALEM NOR ELDIN AMOHAMED AL-DABSKI | SALIM NUR AL-DIN 
AL-DABSKI | SALIM NUR AL-DIN AL-DABASKI | ABDALLAH RAJAB 
| ABDULLAH RAGAB | ABU AL-WARD | `ABD AL-WARD | ABU AL-
WURUD | ABU NAIM  
Ag00033 
ABD ALLAH MOHAMED RAGAB 
ABDEL RAHMAN 
              
Ag00034 
`ALI SULAYMAN MAS'UD `ABD AL-
SAYYID 
ALY SOLIMAN MASSOUD ABDUL SAYED | MOHAMED OSMAN | 
IBN AL-QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYAH | IBN AL-QAYYIM | IBN EL QAIM | 
AL-ZAWL           
Ag00048 CO-CONSPIRATOR 2 CO-CONSIRATOR 2 
Ag00049 CO-CONSPIRATOR 5 CO-CONSIRATOR 5 
Ag00050 CO-CONSPIRATOR 1   
Ag00051 CO-CONSPIRATOR 3   
Ag00052 CO-CONSPIRATOR 4   
Ag00053 CO-CONSPIRATOR 6   
Ag00090 SADDIQ AL MAHDI SADIQ AL-MAHDI 
Ag00091 
FAHID MOHAMMED ALLY 
MSALAM 
FAHAD M. ALLY | FAHID MOHAMMED ALI MSALAM | FAHID 
MUHAMAD ALI SALEM | MOHAMMED ALLY MSALAM | USAMA 
AL-KINI | FAHAD ALLY MSALAM | FAHID MOHAMMED ALLY | 
FAHID MOHAMMED ALI MUSALAAM | FAHAD | FAHAD 
MOHAMMED ALLY | ALLY | ABU USAMA AL-KINI | AZMARAY | 
LION 
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ID No. PRIMARY NAME KNOWN ALIASES 
Ag00121 MOHAMED BELKALEM               
Ag00122 
SUHAYL FATILLOEVICH 
BURANOV 
SUKHAIL FATILLOEVICH BURANOV | SUHAIL BURANOV | 
MANSUR BURANOV | SOHAIL MANSUR | SUHAIL MANSUR | ABU 
HUZAIFA           
Ag00124 IBRAHIM DAOUD ABU ABDULLA   
Ag00125 IBRAHIM EIDAROUS 
ABU ABDULLAH | DAOUD | IBRAHIM | IBRAHIM HUSSEIN 
ABDELHADI EIDAROUS | IBRAHIM HUSSEIN ABDEL HADI 
EIDAROUS | IBRAHIM HUSSEIN ABDELHADI EIDAROUS | 
MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM 
Ag00165 KHALFAN KHAMIS MOHAMED 
K.K. MOHAMED | KHALFAN KHAMIS | KHALFAN MOHAMED | 
ZAHRAN NASSOR MAULID | KHAMIS 
Ag00166 KHALID AL FAWWAZ 
ABU OMAR | HAMAD | KHALED ABDUL RAHMAN HAMAD AL 
FAWWAZ | KHALID ABD AL-RAHMAN HAMD AL-FAWAZ | 
KHALED AL-FAUWAZ | KHALED A. AL-FAUWAZ | KHALID AL-
FAWWAZ | KHALID AL FAWWAZ | KHALED AL FAWWAZ | 
KHALED AL-FAWWAZ | KHALID ABDULRAHMAN H. AL FAWAZ | 
ABU OMAR AL SEBAI | KHALID FOAD | HAMAD AL FAUWAS | 
KHALID AL-FAWWAZ  
Ag00181 MAMDOUH MAHMUD SALIM 
ABU HAJER | ABU HAJER AL IRAQI | ABU IBRAHIM AL IRAQI 
HAJER | MAMDOUH SALIM | ABU IBRAHIM | SHEIK ABU HAJER | 
ABU HAJIR (MAHMOUD SALIM) 
Ag00199 
MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL-
'OWHALI 
ABDUL JABBAR ALI ABDEL-LATIF | KHALID SALIM SALEH BIN 
RASHED | MOATH | MOHAMED AL-'OWHALI | MOHAMED RASHED 
DAOUD  
AL-'OWHALI | MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL-‗OWHALI | 
MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL'OWHALI | MOHAMMED RASHED 
DAOUD AL-OWHALI | KHALID SALEH | MOHAMMED AKBAR | 
KHALID SALIM SALEH | BIN RASHID | ABDUL JABAR ALI ABDUL 
LAHIT | MOWAT | KHALID SALIM 
Ag00200 MOHAMED SADEEK ODEH 
ABDULBASIT AWADH MBARAK ASSAYID | ABDULLBAST 
AWADAH | ABU MOATH | HYDAR | MARWAN | MOHAMED ODEH | 
NOURELDINE | ABU YASSER | ABU BASIT AWAD | ABDUL BASSIT | 
MOHAMMED SADEEQ ODEH | MOHAMED SADEEQ ODEH | 
MOHAMMED SADIQ HOWAIDA | MUHAMMED SADIQ ODEH 
Ag00208 ABU HAFS AL MASRY 
ABU FATIMA | ABU HAFS | ABU HAFS AL MASRY AL KHABIR | ABU 
HAFS AL MASRY EL KHABIR | ABU HAFS EL KHABIR | ABU HAFS 
EL MASRY | ABU HAFS EL MASRY AL KHABIR | ABU HAFS EL 
MASRY EL KHABIR | ABU KHADIJA | SHEIKH TAYSIR ABDULLAH | 
TAYSIR | MUHAMMAD ATEF | MUHAMMAD ATIF | SUBHI ABU 
SITTA | MOHAMED ATIF | ABU HAHS AL-MASRI | SHEIK ABU HAFS 
| KHAEIK ABU FATIM | TAYSIR EL MASRY | ABU HAFS AL KHABIR 
| MOHAMED ATEF | SOBHI ABD AL AZIZ MOHAMED EL GOHARY 
ABU SINNA 
Ag00209 
MUHSIN MUSA MATWALLI 
ATWAH 
ABDEL RAHMAN | ABDUL RAHMAN | ABDUL RAHMAN AL-
MUHAJIR | MOHAMMED K.A. AL-NAMER | ABDU RACHMAN | 
MUHSIN MOUSSA MATWALLI ATWAH DEWEDAR 
Ag00210 MUSTAFA MOHAMED FADHIL 
ABU JIHAD | HASSAN ALI | HUSSEIN | KHALID | MUSTAFA ALI 
ELBISHY | MUSTAFA FADHL | MUSTAFA MOHAMMED | ABD AL 
WAKIL AL MASRI | ABU ANIS | ABU YUSSRR | NU MAN | ABU AL-
NUBI | HUSSAIN 
Ag00244 SAIF AL ADEL 
SAIF | SAIF AL ADEL | SAYF AL-ADL | SAIF AL-'ADL | MUHAMMAD 
IBRAHIM MAKKAWI | IBRAHIM AL-MADANI | OMAR AL-SOMALI 
Ag00253 SHEIK OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN BLIND SHEIK | OMAR AHMED ALI 
Ag00254 SHEIKH AHMED SALIM SWEDAN 
AHMED ALLY | SHEIKH BAHAMADI | SHEIKH AHMAD SALEM 
SUWEIDAN | SHEIKH AHMED SALEM SWEDAN | SHEIKH SWEDAN | 
SHEIKH BAHAMADI | AHMED ALLY | BAHAMAD | SHEIK 
BAHAMAD | AHMED THE TALL | AHMED TAWHIL | AHMED 
SHEIKH ADEN | TAWHILI | SHEIKH AHMED SWEDAN | SHEIK 
AHMED SALIM SWEDAN | SKEIK BAHAMAD | SHEIK | AHMAD 
TAWHIL | SHAYKH AHMAD SALIM SUWAYDAN 
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ID No. PRIMARY NAME KNOWN ALIASES 
Ag00272 USAMA BIN LADEN 
ABDALLAH | ABDUL HAY | ABU ABDULLAH | AL QAQA | HAJJ | 
MUJAHID SHAYKH | SHAYKH USAMAH BIN-LADIN | THE 
CONTRACTOR | THE DIRECTOR | THE SUPERVISOR | USAMA BIN 
LADEN | USAMAH BIN-MUHAMMAD BIN-LADIN | USAMA BIN 
MUHAMMAD BIN AWAD BIN LADIN | OSAMA BIN MUHAMMAD 
BIN AWAD BIN LADIN | OSAMA BIN LADIN | OSAMA BIN LADEN | 
USAMA BIN LADEN | USAMA BIN LADIN | ABU ABDALLAH BIN 
LADEN | SHAYKH ABDULLA | SHEIK USAMA | ABU ABDALLAH | 
SHEIK ABDALLAH | USAMA MUHAMMED AWAD BIN LADEN 
Ag00275 WADIH EL HAGE 
ABD AL SABBUR | ABDALLAH LUBNANI | ABDUS SABBUR | ABU 
ABDULLAH AL LUBNANI | ABU ABDULLAH LUBNANI | NORMAN | 
TANZANITE | THE MANAGER | WA'DA NORMAN | WADIA | WADI 
EL-HAGE | ABU ABDULLAH | WADIH EL-HAGE 
Ag00279 
JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-
FADL 
ABU BAKR SUDANI | JAMAL AL-FADL | ABU BAKR AL SUDANI | 
ABU KASTANI | ABU KAZAM | JAMAL AL FADHL 
Ag00280 MUSTAFA SHALABI   
Ag00281 ABU SHALEED AL-FALASTINI   
Ag00282 ABU NOFAL AL SAUDI   
Ag00283 ISSAWI ABU HASSAN   
Ag00284 ABU FEDA EL MASRY   
Ag00285 ABU JAFFAR   
Ag00286 SALEM EL MASRY SALEM AL MASRY | SALEM EL AL MASRY 
Ag00287 HAYDAR DOSARI   
Ag00288 ABU KHEIR EL MASRY   
Ag00289 ABU AYOUB AL IRAQI AYOUB AL IRAQI 
Ag00290 YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYUB)   
Ag00291 ABU FARAJ AL YEMENI ABU FARAJ 
Ag00293 
DOCTOR ABDEL MUNIM AL 
KHABIR 
DR. ABDEL KHABIR 
Ag00294 ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE 
MADANI AL TAYYIB | ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE MADANI AL 
TAYYAB | ABU FADHL MAKKEE | ABU FAHDL AL MAKKEE | ABUD 
FADHL AL MAKKEE | MEDANI 
Ag00295 SHEIKH SAYYID EL MASRY SHEIKH SAYYID | SAYYID EL MASRY 
Ag00296 QARICEPT AL JIZAERI   
Ag00297 SAIF AL LIBY   
Ag00298 ABU BURHAN AL IRAQI ABU BURHAN 
Ag00299 HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS 
SHEIK HASSAN | SHEIKH HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS ALI | SHAYKH 
HASSAN DAHIR AWES | HASSAN DAHIR AWEIS 
Ag00300 ABU HAFS AL MANSOURI   
Ag00301 ABU KHALEED AL MADANI   
Ag00302 ABU HAMMAM AL SAUDI   
Ag00303 ABU QUTADA 
ABU QATADA | OMAR MAHMOUD MOHAMMED OTHMAN | ABU 
QATADA AL-FILISTINI | ABU UMR TAKFIRI | ABU ISMAIL | ABU 
OMAR ABU UMAR | AL-SAMMAN UTHMAN | ABU UMAR UMAR | 
UMAR UTHMAN | OMAR MAHMOUD UTHMAN | OMAH ABU OMAR 
| ABU QOTADAH | UTHMAN OMAR MAHMOUD 
Ag00304 SA'ID YUSIF ALI ABU AZIZAH 
SAID YOUSSEF ALI ABU AZIZA | SA'ID YUSIF ALI ABU AZIZAT | 
SA'ID YUSIF ABU AZIZ | SA'UD ABU AZIZ | ABU THERAB | ABU 
THURAB | ABU TURAB | ABDUL HAMID | ABD AL-HAMID | ABDEL 
HAMEED | ABUDULA MEED  
Ag00305 ABU YASSER AL JAZAIRI ABU YASSER AL SIRIR 
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Ag00306 ABU ABD AL SABBUR   
Ag00307 ABU UBAIDAH AL IRAQI   
Ag00308 ABU FADL AL IRAQI   
Ag00309 ALI HAROUN ABU HASSAN AL SUDANI 
Ag00310 ABDEL MAHMABABO   
Ag00311 
OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL 
BASHIR 
OMAR AL-BASHIR 
Ag00312 DR. SHARIF AL DIN ALI MUKHTAR SHARIF AL DIN ALI MUKHTAR | SHARIF AL DEEN 
Ag00313 MOHAMED BAYAZID ABU RIDA AL SURI | ABU RIDA | ABU RIDA SURI 
Ag00314 ABU HASSAN EL MASRY   
Ag00315 DR. MUBARAK AL DOORI 
MUBARAK AL DURI | MUBARAK ABDUL-RAZAK | DR. MOUBARAK 
ALI AL DURI 
Ag00316 AL QUBASHI THE SUDANI AL QUBASHI AL SUDANI 
Ag00317 SADEEK   
Ag00318 FARJAHM   
Ag00319 IBN AL TAMIYEH IBN TAYMIYYA, TAQI AL-DIN | IBN TAYMIYYA 
Ag00320 ABU TALHA AL SUDANI 
ABU TALHA THE SUDANI | TALHA AL SUDANI | ABU TALHA AL-
SUDANI | TARIQ ABDULLAH | ABDULHAMAN  
Ag00321 ABU MOHAMED AL YEMENI   
Ag00322 MOHAMED AL NALFI MOHAMED A NALFI | MOHAMMED SUDA AL NALFI 
Ag00323 
AHMED ABDEL RAHMAN 
HAMADABI 
  
Ag00324 SHEIKH NOMANI   
Ag00325 ABU JAFFER EL MASRY   
Ag00326 ABDUL BASET HAMZA 
MUQADEM ABDUL BASET HAMZA | MUQADEM ABDUL BASIT 
HAMZA 
Ag00327 AMIN ABDEL MAROUF AL AMIN ABDEL MAROUF 
Ag00328 ABU TALAL EL MASRY   
Ag00329 ABU YASSER EL MASRY   
Ag00330 ABU JAFFAR AL LIBY   
Ag00332 HAMZALLAH AL LIBY HAMAS AL LIBY | HAMZALLA AL LIBY | HAMZA AL LIBY 
Ag00333 ABU ABDEL QADER AL LIBY   
Ag00334 MUTWAKAL   
Ag00335 SAIF ISLAMI JANNUBI   
Ag00336 ABU KHALIL AL MADANI   
Ag00337 ABU HABIB AL TUNISI   
Ag00338 ABU MAHDI AL SAUDI   
Ag00339 ABU KHADIJA AL IRAQI   
Ag00340 USAMA AZMARAI 
AL ASSAD | AZMARAI | THE LION | USAMA AZAMUARI | OSAMA 
AZMARAI 
Ag00341 ABU DIJANA AL YEMENI 
ABDALLAH A YEMENI | ABU ABDULLAH AL YEMENI | ABU 
DIJANA | ABU DIJANA ABDALLAH AL YEMENI 
Ag00342 DR. ABDALLAH IZZELDINE IZZILDINE 
Ag00343 ABDALLAH AZZAM 
ABDULLAH AZZAM | ABDULLAH YUSUF AZZAM | ABDALA 
AZZAM 
Ag00344 ABDEL RAHMAN SOMALI   
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Ag00345 ABDOUH AL MUKHLAFI   
Ag00346 ABU AHMED EL MASRY ABU UBAIDAH | ABU UBAIDAH, THE ANIMAL DOCTOR 
Ag00347 ABU AKRAM URDANI ABU AKRAM | ABU AHRAM AL URDANI 
Ag00348 ABU ALI SUDANI ABU ALI AL SUDANI 
Ag00349 ABU HABIB AL PAKISTANI   
Ag00350 ABU KHABUIB AL SUDANI   
Ag00351 SHEIK BAILALA   
Ag00352 ABU MOHAMED AL SURI   
Ag00353 ABU MUSAB AL SUDANI   
Ag00354 ABU MUSAB AL SAUDI   
Ag00355 MUSTAFA SETMARIAM NASAR 
ABU MUSAB | MUSTAFA SETMARIAM ASNAN | MUSTAFA 
SETMARIAM | MUSTAPHA SETMARIAN NASAR | MUSTAFA 
SETMARIAN NASAR | ABU MUSAB AL SURI | MOHAMED 
SETMARIAN NASAR 
Ag00356 ABU MUSAB REUTER   
Ag00357 ABU NEAM   
Ag00358 ABU QUAIDBA EL MASRY   
Ag00359 AFAD MAKKEE   
Ag00360 AHMED ALI LOOTAH   
Ag00361 APRIL BRIGHTSKY RAY MRS. WADIH EL HAGE | UM ABDULLAH 
Ag00362 DR. ABDULLAH MOHAMED YUSEF ABDULLAH MOHAMED YUSEF 
Ag00363 IBN AL MUBARAK AL SHARQAWI IBN MUBARAK 
Ag00364 IHSAN EL MADANI   
Ag00365 KHALID ALI WALEED   
Ag00366 KHALIFA AL MUSCAT OMANI KHALIFA AL OMANI 
Ag00367 MOHAMED AL KHEIR   
Ag00368 MOHAMED JARA AL NABI   
Ag00369 MOHAMED SHABANA MOHAMMED SHABANA 
Ag00370 MOTASSEM SADEEK ABU SASHL   
Ag00371 
MRS. JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED 
AL-FADAL (SUDANESE WIFE) 
  
Ag00372 DR. MOTRIF AL SADEEK   
Ag00373 OMAR AL MAKKEE   
Ag00374 SAID BIN LADEN   
Ag00375 SHEIK ARAFA   
Ag00376 SAAD AL SHARIF 
ABU MOHAMED EL MASRY | ABU MOHAMED EL MASRY SAAD AL 
SHARIF | ABU MOHAMED SAID SHARIF | ABU SAAD AL SHARIF 
ABU MOHAMED SAUDI | SAAD SHARIF | SAYYID SHAIKH AL-
SHARIF 
Ag00377 ABU ISHEM MADANI   
Ag00378 
AZERI (JAMAL AL-FADL'S 
BROTHER) 
  
Ag00379 ESSAM AL RIDI ABU TAREQ | ABU TARAK EL MASRY 
Ag00380 ABU JAFFER   
Ag00381 ABU AL DARDAA   
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Ag00382 ASHIF MOHAMED JUMA ASHIF JUMA | POPU | POPO 
Ag00383 FATIMA JUMA   
Ag00384 MOHAMED ASHRIF JUMA   
Ag00385 SETUNA JUMA   
Ag00386 TAHERA JUMA   
Ag00387 SHAMINA JUMA   
Ag00388 MANIRA JUMA   
Ag00389 SIKANDER JUMA ASHIF HUSSEIN MOHAMMED JUMA | ASHFAK HUSSEIN 
Ag00390 2ND BORN OF ESSAM AL RIDI   
Ag00391 KHALID SIDO   
Ag00392 
ABU MUSABAL SURRE OMAR 
ABDEL HAKEEM 
  
Ag00393 ABU UBADDA   
Ag00394 AZMARAI ALSUI   
Ag00395 
DAUGHTER OF ESSAM AL RIDI 
(1ST BORN) 
  
Ag00396 LOAY   
Ag00397 MOATAZ AL HALLAK   
Ag00398 MOHAMMED KARAMA MOHAMED KARAMA SALIM 
Ag00399 MOHAMMED NAJIBULLAH   
Ag00400 MRS. ESSAM AL RIDI   
Ag00401 SHEIK ABDUL RASOOL SAYYAF ABDUL RASUL SAYYAF 
Ag00402 JOHN RAY   
Ag00403 ABU JANDAL   
Ag00404 ABU MALIK   
Ag00405 AHMED SKEIK   
Ag00406 RASHAD KHALIFA   
Ag00407 MOHAMMED KASSEM   
Ag00408 ABDEL MEJID   
Ag00409 ADAM MOHAMED NOOR   
Ag00410 ABU AMJED   
Ag00411 
IBRAHIM (BROTHER OF JAMAL AL-
FADL) 
  
Ag00412 ABOUHALIMA ABOUOHALIMA 
Ag00413 ABU FARAJIMNI   
Ag00414 ABU IBRAHIM AL IRAQI   
Ag00415 ABU IBRAHIM IRATI   
Ag00416 ABU ISRA AL IRAQI   
Ag00417 ABU MAT EGYPTIAN   
Ag00418 ABU TAMIM LIBY   
Ag00419 ASADALLAH AL SINDI   
Ag00420 BASHEER   
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Ag00421 BUSHRA YASIN   
Ag00422 DITAR ABU MAHIS   
Ag00423 DR. OMAR ABDEL MAROUF   
Ag00424 FADL AL SHAHIDEEN   
Ag00425 
FAISAL (COUSIN OF JAMAL AL-
FADL) 
  
Ag00426 IBN SALAM   
Ag00427 
MOQADEM SALAH ABDEL AL 
MOBRUK 
  
Ag00428 MOTASEM AL SAUDI   
Ag00429 MUBARAK EL DOORY   
Ag00430 SADEEK ALI MOHAMED   
Ag00431 SAFAR AL HAWALI SHEIKH SAFAR ABDEL ALHAWARI | SHEIK SAFAR AL HAWALI 
Ag00432 SALMAN AL AUDA SHEIK SALMAN AL AWDAH 
Ag00434 SHEIKH FAZHIL UR RAHMAN   
Ag00435 USAMA LUBNANI   
Ag00436 
YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYOUB 
AL IRAQI) 
  
Ag00437 ZINDANI   
Ag00438 L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU 
ABU ZAID MAGHREBI | ABU TALAL | YOUSEF MZUNKO | YOUSEF 
THE WHITE 
Ag00439 ANSWAR SHABAN ANWAR SHABAN | AMUR SHABAN 
Ag00440 ABU ISALM MASRY 
ISLAM | ABU ISALM MASRY THE OLDER | ABU ISLAM AL KHABIR | 
SAIF AL ISLAM | SAIF AL ISLAM EL MASRY 
Ag00441 ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER ABU EL MUHAJER | ABU RACHMAN ABU HAJER 
Ag00442 SHEIK ALATI   
Ag00443 MRS. SALEH   
Ag00444 FARAJ ABU EL MASRY   
Ag00446 ABU SURIR   
Ag00447 MUNTASSER AL JAZIRI   
Ag00448 MRS. L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU   
Ag00449 ALI MOHAMED 
BAKHBOLA | BILI BILI | HAYDARA | ABU MOHAMED AL AMRIKI | 
ABU MOHAMED THE AMERICAN | ALI MOHAMMED | ALI 
MUHAMMAD | ABU MOHAMED AL-AMRIKI | ABU OMAR | ABU 
OSAMA | AHMAD BAHA ADAM | ALI ABDELSAOUD MUSTAFA | ALI 
TAYMOUR | ALI ABDELSAOUD MUSTAFA MOHAMED | ALI 
ABUALACOUD MOHAMED | ALI NASSER | BAKHBOULA | JEFF | 
OMAR | TAYMOUR | ABU MOHAMMED AMRIKI 
Ag00451 ABU MADYAN EL MASRY   
Ag00452 ABU RIFA AL LIBY   
Ag00453 ABU AL ALKALI   
Ag00454 SALEM AL-IRAQI SALEM THE IRAQI 
Ag00455 SULIMAN (SON OF NAWAWI)   
Ag00456 ABU KHALID AL NUBI 
ABU KHALEENUBI | MUSTAFA | ABU JIHAD AL NUBI | ABU 
KHALID EL MASRY | ABU KHALID ANUBI | ABU JIHAD 
Ag00457 
MRS. ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI 
(EGYPTIAN WIFE) 
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Ag00458 ABU SAID AL MASRY ABU SAID MASRY 
Ag00459 ABU MOHAMMED MAHEJAN   
Ag00460 MRS. ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER   
Ag00461 SAFIR ALADA   
Ag00462 MRS. ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE   
Ag00463 ABU KHEIR AL YEMENI ABU AL KHERYEMENI 
Ag00464 ABU AMMAR AL SURI   
Ag00465 SAAD   
Ag00466 MOHAMMED KARAMA TAWFIQ 
Ag00467 ABU DERDAA   
Ag00468 DR. MONTESSUR   
Ag00469 
FIRST BORN OF L'HOUSSAINE 
KHERCHTOU 
  
Ag00470 SHEIK JIHAD EL MASRY POSSIBLY THE SAME AS ABU KHALID AL NUBI? 
Ag00471 ABU SALAAMA   
Ag00472 ABDOUH ABDALLAH AL YEMENI POSSIBLY THE SAME AS ABU DIJANA AL YEMENI? 
Ag00473 ABU BADEN EL MASRY   
Ag00474 ABU MUATH   
Ag00475 ABU DAUD   
Ag00476 MAK DAUD   
Ag00477 ABU ISMAL   
Ag00478 ABU SARA   
Ag00479 ABDEL KADIM   
Ag00480 AHMED HASSAN (I) AHMAD HASSAN 
Ag00481 AHMED HASSAN (II)   
Ag00482 ABU JAMAL AMRIK ABU JAMAL 
Ag00483 AHMED TIK   
Ag00484 ABU HARAD EL MASRY   
Ag00485 KIBARUA MJITTA KIBARUA MIKIIR MJITTA 
Ag00486 ABU UBAIDAH (OF SADEEK CAMP)   
Ag00487 ABU THOMAMA   
Ag00488 MOHAMED SAHAL   
Ag00489 ALI MANI   
Ag00490 MEENA   
Ag00491 OMAR (ODEH'S BROTHER-IN-LAW)   
Ag00492 SKEIK SAFA   
Ag00493 ABDUL RACHMAN AL HOWARI   
Ag00494 ABU SAYYID AL KIRDI   
Ag00495 BILAL (COUSIN OF JIHAD ALI)   
Ag00496 ABDUL JAFAR   
Ag00497 AHMED AL HAZZA   
551 
 
ID No. PRIMARY NAME KNOWN ALIASES 
Ag00498 FATHER OF OWHALI   
Ag00499 
MOHAMED BIN AWADH BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00500 OMAR BIN AWADH BIN LADEN   
Ag00501 
ABDULLAH BIN AWDAH BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00502 
1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN 
ABOUD BIN LADEN 
  
Ag00503 
1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN 
ABOUD BIN LADEN 
  
Ag00504 
3RD DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN 
ABOUD BIN LADEN 
  
Ag00505 AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN   
Ag00506 
DAUGHTER OF AL-MADUDI 
FAMILY 
  
Ag00507 
ABDULAZIZ BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00508 
ABDULLAH BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00509 
AETEDAL BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00510 
AHMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00511 ALI BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00512 AYSHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00513 BAKR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00514 EMAN BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00515 
FATIMA BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00516 
FOWZIYAH BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00517 
GHALIB BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00518 
HAIDER BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00519 
HASSAN BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00520 HUDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00521 
IBRAHIM BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00522 ILHAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00523 ISSA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00524 
KHALED BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00525 
KHALIL BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00526 
MAHROUS BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00527 
MALAK BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00528 
MARIAM BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00529 
MOHAMMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00530 MUNA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00531 
MUNEERA BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
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Ag00532 
NAJIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00533 NOUR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00534 OMAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00535 
RAEDAH BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00536 RAJA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00537 RANDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00538 
RUQQUEIYA BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00539 SAAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00540 SAHAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00541 SALEH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00542 
SALEHA BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00543 SALEM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00544 SALMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00545 
SAMIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00546 
SANA'A BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00547 SEEMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00548 
SHAFIQ BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00549 
SHEIKHA BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00550 
SU'ADD BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00551 TAREQ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00552 
TAYYEBA BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00553 
THABIT BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00554 WAFA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00555 
YAHYA BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00556 YASIR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN   
Ag00557 
YESLAM BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00558 
ZEENAT BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00559 
ZUBAIDA BIN MOHAMED BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag00560 UM AYSHA   
Ag00561 
FATIMAH AHMED MOHSEN 
BAHARETH 
  
Ag00562 ALIA AL-GHANEM   
Ag00563 UM ABDULAZIZ   
Ag00564 UM ALI   
Ag00565 UM YESLAM   
Ag00566 SAID SALEM OMAR   
Ag00567 TAMARRA RATEMO   
Ag00568 MOHAMED ZAIDI   
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Ag00569 JULIUS KISINGO CEM   
Ag00570 ABDULWAHDI AHMED SALUM   
Ag00571 USAMA BIN HUSSEIN   
Ag00572 ANNIS BIN HUSSEIN   
Ag00573 MOHAMED K. MOHAMED   
Ag00574 FATIMA FADHIL   
Ag00575 ANIS FADHIL   
Ag00576 USA FADHIL   
Ag00577 ABDALLAH HAMISI SHLLM   
Ag00578 ABDUL HALLEK   
Ag00579 ABU AHMED AL HARBI   
Ag00580 ABU MARWAN   
Ag00581 ABU RAFA   
Ag00582 ADELKA   
Ag00583 ALI (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)   
Ag00584 
BAHARI (FRIEND OF KK 
MOHAMED) 
  
Ag00585 FATUMA MOHAMED   
Ag00586 HADYEA RUBEYA   
Ag00587 HAJI JUMA   
Ag00588 
HASAN (FRIEND OF KK 
MOHAMED) 
  
Ag00589 
ISMAEL (FRIEND OF KK 
MOHAMED) 
  
Ag00590 KALAL   
Ag00591 KASSUM JUMA   
Ag00592 MARIUM   
Ag00593 MASSELIM MASSELIM   
Ag00594 MOHAMED MUSLIM SALUM   
Ag00595 MR. CHAUDRY M.M. CHAUDHRI 
Ag00596 
MRS. FAZUL ABDULLAH 
MOHAMMED 
  
Ag00597 MUMIN IBRAHIM   
Ag00598 NASSOR MOHAMED   
Ag00599 RAHMA AHMED KHAMIS   
Ag00600 RASHID SALEH HAMED   
Ag00601 RAYA JUMA   
Ag00602 RUBAYA MOHAMED   
Ag00603 SALIM CHICHI SALIM CHICHIR 
Ag00604 SALMA MOHAMMED   
Ag00605 SALUM MUSLIM   
Ag00606 
SULIMAN (FRIEND OF KK 
MOHAMED) 
  
Ag00607 TARIQ HAMDI   
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Ag00608 ZIYAD KHALEEL   
Ag00609 ZUHURU MOHAMED ZUHURA MOHAMED 
Ag00610 IHAB MOHAMED ALI 
NAWAWI | IHAB ALI | ABU AL TAYAR | YOSEF KENANA | ABU 
SULIMAN | JOSEPH KENANA | ABU JAFFAR AL TAYAR | ABU 
SULEIMAN 
Ag00611 KHALID ABDUL RACHMAN   
Ag00612 JALAL FOUD   
Ag00613 ELEMIGY ABDELDAIM   
Ag00614 
MOHAMED ALI MURAWEH SAL 
ODEH 
  
Ag00615 DENAL CASMIRI   
Ag00616 DR. JOSEPH MISOI   
Ag00617 DR. EL SAYED TILIB DR. SAID TALEB 
Ag00618 SAMIR RAHMAN MOHAMED   
Ag00619 ABU AL MUTAZ   
Ag00620 SHEIK ISHAQ SHEIK GABO 
Ag00621 
EZALADEN ABDEL RAHMAN 
MOHAMED 
  
Ag00622 SHEIK SULEIMAN SILL   
Ag00623 DAVID MATWAH   
Ag00624 ALI OMAR MOHAMED ALI GAB 
Ag00625 ABDULLAH EL ZUBEIDY   
Ag00626 ADAN A. HASSAN   
Ag00627 SIMON (WADIH EL HAGE'S FRIEND)   
Ag00628 AHMAD YOUNES AHMED YOUNAS 
Ag00629 MARION BROWN   
Ag00630 YUMICO ABUEILEN   
Ag00631 BADR ABUEILEN   
Ag00632 NASSER ABUEILEN   
Ag00633 KHALID ABUEILEN   
Ag00634 SUMA ABUEILEN   
Ag00635 ATEF ABUEILEN   
Ag00636 SULIMAN ALI   
Ag00637 KHAMIS MOHAMED KHALFAN   
Ag00638 RUBEYA KHAMIS MOHAMED   
Ag00639 OMAR NASSOR SALIM   
Ag00640 SULEIMAN ABDALLAH   
Ag00641 MSELLEM SHINEY MSELLEM   
Ag00642 MUSALAM   
Ag00643 
MRS. JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED 
AL-FADAL (AMERICAN WIFE) 
  
Ag00644 JAMAL ZOUGAM ANGEL OF DEATH 
Ag00645 SALAHEDDINE BENYAICH 
ABU MUHGEN | ABU MUGHEN | SALAHEDINE BENYAICH | 
SALAHEDDIN BENYAICH 
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Ag00646 ABDELAZIZ BENYAICH ABDELAZIZ BENLAICH 
Ag00647 MOHAMMED AL-GERBOUZI 
MOHAMMED AL-GARBUZI | MOHAMMED GARBOUZE | 
MOHAMMED EL GUERBOUZI | MUHAMMAD AL-GERBOUZI 
Ag00648 ABU DAHDAH IMAD EDDIN BARAKAT YARKAS | BARAKAT YARKAS 
Ag00649 ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI 
KHALAILAH | AHMED FADEE II AL-KHALAYLAH | AHMAD FADIL 
NAZZALI ABU AL-MU'TAZ 
Ag00650 MOHAMMED FIZAZI 
MOHAMMED FAZAZI | MOHAMMED EL FAZAZI | MOHAMED AL-
FAZAZI | ABOU MARIAM 
Ag00651 ABDULAK AL MAGREBI   
Ag00652 MOHAMED CHAOUI MOHAMMAD SHAWI 
Ag00653 SAID CHEDADI   
Ag00654 ALI AMROUS   
Ag00655 
SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID 
FAKHET 
EL TUNECINO | SERHAN BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET | SERHANE 
ABDELMAJID FAKHET 
Ag00656 AMER AZIZI OTHMAN AL ANDULUSI | AMER EL AZIZI | AMERI AZIZI 
Ag00657 
MONEIR MAHMOUD ALY EL-
MESSERY 
  
Ag00658 JAMAL AHMIDAN EL CHINO | MOWGLI | YOUSSEF BEN SALAH 
Ag00659 MOHAMMED ATTA 
MOHAMED ATTA | MOHAMED EL-AMIR | MUHAMMAD ATTA | 
MEHAN ATTA | MOHAMMAD EL AMIR | MOHAMED EL SAYED | 
MOHAMED ELSAYED | MUHAMMAD MUHAMMAD AL AMIR 
AWAG AL SAYYID ATTA | MUHAMMAD MUHAMMAD AL-AMIR 
AWAD AL SAYAD 
Ag00660 TARIQ IBN ZIYAD   
Ag00661 MOHAMED BEKKALI MOHAMED BAKKALI | MOHAMMED BEKKALI | BEKKS 
Ag00662 VINAY KOHLY   
Ag00663 SUREH KOMAR SURECH KUMAR | SURESH KUMAR 
Ag00664 FAISAL ALLUCH FAISAL ULLAC | FAISAL ALLOUCH 
Ag00665 KHALID OULAD KHALID OULAD AKCHA | KHALED OULAD AKCHA 
Ag00666 NAIMA OULAD NAIMA OULAD AKCHA 
Ag00667 BASEL GHAYOUN BASET GHAYOUN | BASEL GHALYOUN | BASET OHAYOUN 
Ag00668 HAMID AHMIDAN   
Ag00669 ABD AL-HADI AL-IRAQI 
NASHWAN ABD AL RAZZAQ ABD AL BAQI | NASHWAN AL RAMER 
ABDULRAZZAQ 
Ag00670 FOUAD EL MORABIT ANGHAR 
FOUAD EL MORABIT AMGHAR | FOUAD ALMORABIT | FOUAD EL 
MORABIT | AUGHAR FOUAD EL MORABIT | FOUD EL MORABIT 
ANGHAR 
Ag00671 MUHANNAD ALMALLAH DABAS 
ALMALLAH DABAS MUHAMMAD | MOHANNAD ALMALLAH 
DABAS | MOUHANNAD ALMALLAH DABAS | ALMALLAH DABAS 
MOUHAMMAD | MUHAMMAD ALMALLAH DABAS 
Ag00672 SAID BERRAJ   
Ag00673 MOHAMMED OULAD AKCHA MOHAMED OULAD AKCHA 
Ag00674 RACHID OULAD AKCHA   
Ag00675 ABDENNABI KOUNJAA ABDALLAH | EL BARBAS 
Ag00676 
JOSE EMILIO SUAREZ 
TRASHORRAS 
SUAREZ TRASHORRAS 
Ag00677 RAFA ZOUHIER RAFA ZUHER | RAFA ZOHUIER | EL BUGA | WHEELS 
Ag00678 OTMAN EL GNAOUT OTHMAN EL GNAOUI | OTMAN EL-GNAOUI 
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Ag00679 ABDELILAH EL FADUAL EL AKIL 
ABDELILAH EL FADWAL EL AKIL | ABDELILAH EL FADUAL EL 
ALIL | ABDELILAH EL-FADOAUL EL-AKIL 
Ag00680 RACHID AGLIF EL CONEJO | THE RABBIT 
Ag00681 YOUSSEF BELHADJ 
THE AFGHAN | ABU DUHAN AL-AFGHANI | ABU DUJAN AL-
AFGHANI | YUSSUF BELHADJ 
Ag00682 ABDELMAJID BOUCHAR THE ZEBRA | EL GAMO | THE DEER 
Ag00683 HASSAN EL HASKI ABU HAMZA | HASSAN AL HASKI 
Ag00684 RABEI OSMAN SAYED AHMED 
MOHAMED THE EGYPTIAN | RABEI OSMAN EL-SAYED AHMED | 
RABEI OUSMANE SAYED AHMED | MUHAMMAD THE EGYPTIAN | 
RABEI OSMAN 
Ag00685 MOHAMED LARBI BEN SELLAM   
Ag00686 BRAHIM MOUSSATEN IBRAHIM MOUSSATEN 
Ag00687 MOHAMED MOUSSATEN   
Ag00688 RAMZI BINALSHIBH 
RAMZI BIN AL SHIBH | RAMZI MOHAMED ABDULLAH 
BINALSHEIDAH | RAMZI MOHAMMED ABDULLAH BINALSHIBH | 
RAMZI MOHAMMED ABDELLAH OMAR | RAMZI OMAR | RAMZI 
BIN AL-SHIBH | RAMZI MOHAMED ABDULLAH BINALSHIBH 
Ag00689 MOHAMMED AL HADI CHEDADI MOHAMED CHEDADI | MOHAMED EL HADI CHEDADI 
Ag00690 ABDERRAHIM ZBAKH ABDERRAHIM ZBAKN | THE CHEMIST | CHEMICAL ALI 
Ag00691 FARID OULD ALI FARID OULAD 
Ag00692 MALAK ANDALUSI   
Ag00693 AICHA ACHAB AICHA ZOUGAM 
Ag00694 ALI ZOUGAM   
Ag00696 ZAKI BEKKALI   
Ag00697 MOHAMMED BEKKALI, SR.   
Ag00698 CHARAFA BEKKALI   
Ag00699 ABDEL HALIM   
Ag00700 ABDULATIF MERROUN ABDELLATIF MERROUN 
Ag00701 JAMAL BENYAICH   
Ag00702 ALICE BENYAICH   
Ag00703 DAVID COURTAILLER   
Ag00704 JEROME COURTAILLER JERMOE COURTELLIER | SELKMAN 
Ag00705 ABDELKRIM MEJJATI   
Ag00706 BEN SALAWI   
Ag00707 ABDELOUAHID BERRAK ABDELWAHID BERRAK | ABDELWAHID BERRAK 
Ag00708 ANTONIO TORO CASTRO   
Ag00709 WALID ALTARAKI   
Ag00710 MOHAMAD BADR DDIN AKKAD 
MOHAMAD BADR DDIN AL-AKKAD | MOHAMAD BADR EDDIN 
AKKAD 
Ag00711 ZINEB (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S SISTER)   
Ag00712 
SAMIRA (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S 
SISTER) 
  
Ag00713 ABDELILAH EL-FUAD FADUAL AQILI | ABDELILAH EL FOUAD | ABDELILAH EL FUAD 
Ag00714 RACHID ADLI   
Ag00715 
MRS. SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID 
FAKHET 
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Ag00716 MUSTAFA MAYMOUNI MOUSTAFA MAYMOUNI 
Ag00717 ABDILAH FIZAZI ABDILAH EL FAZAZI 
Ag00718 ABDELHALIM FIZAZI ABDELHALIM EL FAZAZI 
Ag00719 ASSIYA FIZAZI ASSIYA EL FAZAZI 
Ag00720 EL GITANILLO LITTLE GYPSY | GABRIEL M | GABRIEL M.V. 
Ag00721 ALLEKEMA LAMARI ALLEKAMA LAMARI 
Ag00722 CARMEN MARIA TORO CASTRO   
Ag00723 MOHAMED BELHADJ ABU DUJAN AL-AFGHANI? 
Ag00724 MOHAMED AFALAH MOHAMED ALFALAH 
Ag00725 OUHNANE DAOUD DAOUD OUHNANE | DAOUD OUHMANE 
Ag00726 ADRI RIFAAT ANOUAR ASRI RIFAT ANOUAR 
Ag00727 ABDELATIF MOURAFIK MALEK THE ANDALUSIAN | MALEK THE NORTH AFRICAN 
Ag00728 DRISS CHEBLI   
Ag00729 MOHAMED BELFATMI   
Ag00730 NOUREDINE NFIA ABU MOUAD 
Ag00731 KHALID MAJATI   
Ag00732 AZIZA AL-GERBOUZI   
Ag00733 SAID BAHAJI   
Ag00734 TAYSSIR ALLUNI TAYSIR ALONY | TAYSSIR ALOUNI | ABU MUSAB 
Ag00735 FARID HILALI SHAKUR | SHUKRI 
Ag00736 
MUHAMED GALEB KALAJE 
ZOUAYDI 
ABU TALHA | MUHAMMED GALEB KALAJE ZOUAYDI | MOHAMED 
GHALEB KALAJE ZOUAYDI | ABU THALA | MUHAMMAD GALEB 
KALAJE ZOUAYDI | ABU TALJHA | ABOU TALHA 
Ag00737 BASSAM DALATI SATUT 
BASSAN DALATI SATUT | ABU ABDO | BASSAM DALATI | BASSAN 
DALATI SATUT 
Ag00738 ABU ABDUL RAHMAN EL CALVO | THE BALD ONE 
Ag00739 ABU ZUBAYDAH 
ZAIN AL-ABIDEEN MUHAMAD ASAN | ABU ZUBAIDAH | ZAIN AL-
ABIDIN MUHAMMAD HUSAIN | ABU ZUBAIDA | ZEINULABIDEEN 
MUHAMMED HUSEIN ABU ZUBEIDAH | ABD AL-HADI AL-WAHAB | 
ZAYN AL-ABIDIN MUHAMMAD HUSAYN | ZAYN AL-ABIDIN 
MUHAMMAD HUSSEIN | TARIQ | ABU ZUBEIDA | MOHAMMED ABU 
ZUBAYDAH | ABOU ZOUBEIDA 
Ag00740 MOHAMED BAHAIAH ABU KHALED 
Ag00741 MOHAMMED HAYDAR ZAMMAR MOHAMMED HAIDAR ZAMMAR | MOHAMED HEIDAR ZAMMAR 
Ag00742 MAMOUN DARKAZANLI   
Ag00743 LUIS JOSE GALAN GONZALEZ YUSUF GALAN | LUIS JOSE GALAN | JOSE GALAN GONZALEZ 
Ag00744 JASEM MAHBOULE ABU MOHAMAD | JASEM MABHOULE | ABU MOHAMED 
Ag00745 OSAMA DARRA ABU THABET | ABU BASHIR | OUSAMA DARRA 
Ag00746 MOHAMED NEEDL ACAID NIDAL 
Ag00747 
AHMAD RAGHAD MARDINI 
DAKICHL 
ABU AMER 
Ag00748 MOHAMED ARABI SHEHIMI MUHAMMAD ARABI SHEHIMI 
Ag00749 MOHAMED ZAHER ASADE ZAHER 
Ag00750 
ANWAR ADNAN MOHAMED 
SALAH 
CHEIJ SALH | SHEIK SALAH | ABU SALEH | ANWAR ADNAN 
AHMAD SALAH | ANWAR ADNAN MOHAMED SALEH 
558 
 
ID No. PRIMARY NAME KNOWN ALIASES 
Ag00751 MOHAMED BOUALEM KHOUNI 
ABDALLAH | MOHAMED BOUALEM KHNOUNI | MOHAMMED 
KHOUNI BOUALEM | MOHAMED BOUALEM KHNOUNI | MOHAMED 
BOUALEM KHOUNI | MOHAMED KHOUNI BOUALEM 
Ag00752 MOHAMED BENSAKHRIA MOHAMMED BENSAKHRIA 
Ag00753 
GHASOUB AL-ABRASH AL-
GHALYOUN 
ABU MUSAB | GHASOUB AL-ABRASH GALYOUN | GHUSUP 
Ag00754 AHMED BRAHIM   
Ag00755 NABIL NANAKLI KOSAIBATI NABIL NANAKLI 
Ag00756 SHEIK MOHAMMED OMRAN ABU AL-SHAYKH (POSSIBLE) 
Ag00757 BILAL KHAZAL BELAL KHAZAL | BILAL KHAZAAL | ABU AL SHAYKH 
Ag00758 MOHAMED KHAIR AL-SAQQ 
ABU AL DARDA | MUHAMMAD KHAIR AL-SAQQ | ABU ALARDA | 
MOHAMED KHAIR AL SAGD | MOHAMED KHAIR AL SAGD 
Ag00759 ABDALRAHMAN ALARNAOT ABDALRAHMAN ALARNAOT ABU-ALJER | ABU OBEID 
Ag00760 PARLINDUNGAN SIREGAR 
PARLIN | SALEH SIREGAR | SALEH PARLINDUNGAN SIREGAR | 
PARLIN SIREGAR | PARLIN SIREGAR 
Ag00761 NAJIB CHAIB MOHAMED NAJIB | SHAYKH NAJIB | MOHAMED NAJIB CHAIB 
Ag00762 ABU ABDULRAHMAN FRANK BESSON DELILE 
Ag00763 SID AHMED BOUDJELLA SIDLI 
Ag00764 MOURAD KADDAR HAMID CHATAR | MOURAD KADDER 
Ag00765 MARIA LUISA MARTIN   
Ag00766 ABU RACHED   
Ag00767 SAID MANSOUR   
Ag00768 ABU SUUD   
Ag00769 
ZEIN AL-ABIDINE MOHAMED 
HASSAN 
SHEIKH SALAH 
Ag00770 ABDULLA KHAYATA KATAN 
ABDULLA KHAYATA KATTAN | ABU IBRAHIM | KHAYATA 
KATTAN 
Ag00771 AHMED KOSHAGI KELANI   
Ag00772 ABU WALID   
Ag00773 ABU AL HARETH   
Ag00774 DJAMEL BEGHAL DJAMEL BEGAL | JAMAL BEGHAL 
Ag00775 ABDELGHANI MZOUDI   
Ag00776 
ROBERT RICHARD ANTOINE-
PIERRE 
ABOU ABDERRAHMANE | LHAJ | PIERRE ROBERT 
Ag00777 MUHSEN KHAYBER ABDUL RAHIM | ABDUL-MAJID AL-LIBI 
Ag00778 ABDENNABID CHEDADI   
Ag00779 RAHMA AHMIDAN   
Ag00780 MUSTAFA AHMIDAN   
Ag00781 JABER AHMIDAN   
Ag00782 YUSSEF AHMIDAN   
Ag00783 HICHAM AHMIDAN   
Ag00784 MOHAMED BOUHARRAT   
Ag00785 SAED EL HARRAK   
Ag00786 NASREDDINE BOUSBAA   
Ag00787 EMILIO LLANO ALVAREZ   
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Ag00788 IVAN GRANADOS PENA   
Ag00789 JAVIER GONZALEZ PENA THE DYNAMITE | JAVIER GONZALEZ DIAZ 
Ag00790 ANTONIO IVAN REIS PALACIO   
Ag00791 SERGIO ALVAREZ SANCHEZ   
Ag00792 RAUL GONZALEZ PELEAZ RAUL GONZALES PELAEZ 
Ag00793 GHAZI BIDEL   
Ag00794 YAHIA RAGHEH YAHIA PAYUMI 
Ag00795 MOUTAZ ALMALLAH MOUTAZ ALMALLAH DABAS 
Ag00796 PILAR M.V.   
Ag00797 MIGUEL ANGEL M.V.   
Ag00798 SOUFIANE RAIFAK   
Ag00799 LOFTI SBAI   
Ag00800 MOHAMMAD AFZAAL   
Ag00801 SHAHZAD ALI GUJAR SHAZAD ALI GUTJAR 
Ag00802 RACHID MOHAMED KADDUR   
Ag00803 RACHID BENDOUDA RACHID EL GORDO 
Ag00804 JAOUAD EL BOUZROUTI   
Ag00805 MIMOUN BELHADJ   
Ag00806 RUBEN IGLESIAS   
Ag00807 OMAR NAKHCHA   
Ag00808 ABDELILAH HRIZ   
Ag00809 MOHAMED EL-IDRISSI MOHAMED EL IDRISSI 
Ag00810 SAMIR TAHTAH   
Ag00811 SAFIA BELHADJ   
Ag00812 ALLAL MOUSSATEN   
Ag00813 AHMED RESSAM REDA 
Ag00814 OMAR DEGHAYES   
Ag00815 GONZALO LOPEZ GONZALEZ   
Ag00816 MAHMOUD SLIMANE AOUN GABY EID SEMAAN 
Ag00817 MOHAMMED LAMARI   
Ag00818 TELDJA LAMARI   
Ag00819 ZACARIYA ESSABAR ZAKARYA ESSABAR | ZAKARIYA ESSABAR 
Ag00820 HASAM ALHUSEIN   
Ag00821 WAHID KOSHAGI KELANI   
Ag00822 SADIK MERIZAK   
Ag00823 
PRINCE MOHAMMED AL-FAISAL 
AL-SAUD 
  
Ag00824 
PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL AL-
SAUD 
  
Ag00825 SAMER DABBAS   
Ag00826 REDA SEYAM   
Ag00827 SALEH ABDULAZIZ AL-FAHHAD   
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Ag00828 ABDULRAHMAN AL-FAHHAD   
Ag00829 ATMANE RESALI ATMANE RESALL 
Ag00830 HABIBA MOHAMED   
Ag00831 CARMEN FERNANDEZ   
Ag00832 ASMA ZAFRA   
Ag00833 NAJAT FADAL   
Ag00834 MARIAM GARCIA   
Ag00835 MOHAMED BELAZIZ MOHAMMED BELAZZIZ 
Ag00836 YASIN SEDDIKI   
Ag00837 HAKIM ZERZOUR   
Ag00838 MAJID SAHOUANE 
ABDERRAHMAN | ABDELMAJID | MADJID SAHOUANE | MAJAD 
SAHOUANE 
Ag00839 ABDERRAMAN KHOUNI   
Ag00840 HOCINE KHOUNI   
Ag00841 MOHAMMED ACHRAF 
MOHAMED ACHRAF | KAMEL SAADI | ABDERRAHMAN TAHIRI | 
MUHAMMAD AL-ASHRAF | ABDERRAHMANE TAHIRI 
Ag00842 REDA CHERIF   
Ag00843 DJAMEL SEDDIKI DJAMEL SEDDIQI | DJAMEL SEDIKI 
Ag00844 NIZAR TRABELSI NIZAR TRABLISI | NIZAR BEN ABDELAZIZ TRABELSI 
Ag00845 ESSID SAMI BEN KHEMAIS SABER | ISEED SAMI BIN-KAMAI 
Ag00846 MOHAMED BOUKIRI   
Ag00847 ABDELKADER TCHAREK   
Ag00848 NABIL SAYADI ABU ZEINAB 
Ag00849 HAZAR AL-DABBAS   
Ag00850 PIRJO BRAHIM   
Ag00851 NORA BRAHIM   
Ag00852 ABU KHALEB   
Ag00853 MAHER KHAZAL   
Ag00854 KAMAL HADID CHAAR ABU NOUR 
Ag00855 SYLVIE BEGHAL   
Ag00856 BAGHDAD MEZIANE   
Ag00857 BRAHIM BENMERZOUGA   
Ag00858 KAMEL DAOUDI   
Ag00859 AZZEDIN JOURNAZI   
Ag00860 MUSTAPHA ABUSHIMA   
Ag00861 WEDAD AHMED   
Ag00862 ABDULLAH BANDASSER 
ABDELHAQ BENTASSIR | MOUL SEBBAT | ABDELHAK | 
ABDELLAHK BENTASSIR | MOUL SEBAT 
Ag00864 SAYER BEDER SAYER BEDER MEJADER | EL SAYED BEDER MEGAHED 
Ag00865 NOUREDINE YENADI NOUREDINE DJENADI 
Ag00866 ABDELKADER AMARA   
Ag00867 MOHAMMAD CHOUDRY ASLAM   
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Ag00868 MOHAMMAD NAEEM NOOR KHAN 
ABU TALHA | NAEEM NOOR KHAN | MOHAMMED NAEEM NOOR 
KHAN 
Ag00869 AMJAD FAROOQI AMJAD HUSSAIN FAROOQI 
Ag00870 ADNAN ASLAM   
Ag00871 ABDELAZIZ HOUARI MELLAS   
Ag00872 MOSTAFA AZTOUT   
Ag00873 BELGACEM BELLIL BELLIL BELGACEM 
Ag00874 NASSREDDINE BEN LAIDNE AMRI NASREDDINE BEN LAID AMRI 
Ag00875 DJILALI BOUSSIRI   
Ag00876 ABDELAZIZ EL MERABIT   
Ag00877 ABDELKRIM LEBCHINA   
Ag00878 HAMMAD LAHSINI   
Ag00879 TAHA SEGHROUCHNI   
Ag00880 ZOHAIR KHADIRI ZOHAIB KHADIRI 
Ag00881 OTMAN EL MOUIB   
Ag00882 KAMAL AHBAR   
Ag00883 TAREK HAMED HAMU   
Ag00884 ZOHRA ZEWAWI   
Ag00885 TAHER DEGHAYES   
Ag00886 AMANI DEGHAYES   
Ag00887 MOHAMMED BOUYERI MOHAMMED B. 
Ag00888 SAMIR AZZOUZ   
Ag00889 ABDELADIM AKOUDAD   
Ag00890 MOHAMMED SALAMEH 
MOHAMED AMINE SALAMEH | MOHAMED SALAMEH | 
MOHAMMED A. SALAMEH 
Ag00891 AMINE MEZBAR 
ADEL TOBBICHI | J.P.D. STRAEBLER | MATHIEU MILJADI 
PRAJASEMITA 
Ag00892 SAMIR KISHK KISHK SAMIR 
Ag00893 ABU DOHA 
THE DOCTOR | AMAR MAKHLULIF | RACHID KEFFLOUS | HAYDAR 
ABU DOHA | DR HAIDER | DIDIER AJUELOS 
Ag00894 LASED BEN HENI AL AS'AD BEN HENI 
Ag00895 MOKHTAR BOUCHOUCHA 
AL-MOKHTAR BEN MOHAMED BEN AL-MOKHTAR BOUCHOUCHA 
| MOKHTAR BUSHUSHA 
Ag00896 TAREK CHARAABI 
TAREK BEN AL-BECHIR BEN AMARA AL-CHARAABI | TAREK 
SHARAAB 
Ag00897 
MOHAMMED BEN BELGACEM 
AOUADI 
MOHAMED BEN BELKACEM AOUADI | BELGACEM MOHAMED 
BEN AOUADI | MOHAMED BELKALEM 
Ag00898 ABDELKADIR ES-SAYED 
ABDELKADIR ES SAYED | MAHMOUD ES-SAYED ABDELKADER | 
ABU SALEH | ABDELKADER MAHMOUD ES SAYED 
Ag00899 SALIM BOUKHARI   
Ag00900 LAMINE MARONI KARUNI | LAMINE KARUNI 
Ag00901 AEUROBI BEANDALI   
Ag00902 SAMAIR KARIMOU   
Ag00903 FOUHAD SABOUR   
Ag00904 TAREK MAAROUFI TAREK BEN HABIB BEN AL-TOUMI MAAROUFI 
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Ag00905 ESSOUSSI LAAROUSSI   
Ag00906 
EMAD ABDELWAHID AHMED 
ALWAN 
ABU MOHAMED | ABU MOHAMMED EL-YEMENI | IMAD 
ABDELWAHID AHMED ALWAN 
Ag00907 AMMARI SAIFI 
ABDERREZAK AL-PARA | ALBADA | ABOU HAIDARA | EL-OURASSI 
| ABDERREZAK | EL PARA | ABDEREZAK ZAIMECHE | 
ABDERREZAK ZAIMECHE | ABDERREZAK LE PARA | ABDUL 
RASAK AMMANE ABU HAIDRA | ABDALARAK | AMARI SAIFI | 
SAIFI AMMARI 
Ag00908 RIADH JELASSI 
JELASSI RIADH | RIADH BEN BELKASSEM BEN MOHAMED 
JELASSI 
Ag00909 ABU IMAD   
Ag00910 YASSINE CHEKKOURI   
Ag00911 NABIL BENATTIA NABIL BEN ATTIA | NABIL BEN MOHAMED BEN ALI ATTIA 
Ag00912 ABDEL HALIM HAFED REMADNA ABDELHALIM HAFED REMADNA | ABDELHALIM REMADNA 
Ag00913 MEHDI KHAMMOUN 
MEHDI KAMMOUN | MEHDI BEN MOHAMED BEN MOHAMED 
KAMMOUN 
Ag00914 ADEL BEN SOLTANE ADEL BEN AL-AZHAR BEN YOUSSEF BEN SOLTANE 
Ag00915 LAZHAR BEN MOHAMMED TLILI AL-AZHAR BEN AMMAR BEN ABADALLAH TLILI 
Ag00916 MANSOUR THAER   
Ag00917 HABIB WADDANI   
Ag00918 MOHAMMED YEHIA KAAKI   
Ag00919 SALEH JAMAL   
Ag00920 FARID BELARIBI   
Ag00921 JOHAN BONTE JOHANN BONTE 
Ag00922 RACHID BENMESSAHEL   
Ag00923 ABDELKRIF LEFKIR ABDELKRIM LEFKIR 
Ag00924 RACHID JALIL ABOU ANAS | ABU ANAS 
Ag00925 YASSINE LAHNECH ABOU IBRAHIM | ABU IBRAHIM 
Ag00926 MOHAMED EL OMARI 
ABOU ZOUHEIR | ABOU ZOUBEIR | ABU ZUBIR | MOHAMMED EL 
OMARI | MOHAMMED EL ARBAOUI 
Ag00927 ABU MUSA AL-HINDI 
ISSA AL-HINDI | BILAL | ABU EISA AL-HINDI | DHIREN BAROT | 
ISSA AL-BRITANI | ISSA THE INDIAN | ISSA AL-BRITANI | ISSA THE 
BRITON | ISSA AL BRITANI 
Ag00928 AHMED OMAR SAEED SHEIKH 
AHMED OMAR SHEIKH | SHEIKH OMAR | MOHAMMAD BASHIR | 
OMAR SHEIKH 
Ag00929 ABU FARAJ AL-LIBBI 
ABU FARAJ AL-LIBI | ABU FARAJ FARJ AL LIBI | ABU FARAJ FARJ | 
DR TAUFEEQ 
Ag00930 QARI SAIFULLAH AKHTAR   
Ag00931 BABAR AHMAD   
Ag00932 
MOHAMMED MASOOD AZHAR 
ALVI 
MAULANA MASOOD AZHAR | MASUD AZHAR | MASOOD AZHAR | 
WALI ADAM ISAH | WALI ADAM ESAH 
Ag00933 FAZLUR REHMAN-KHALIL 
FAZLUR REHMAN KHALIL | MAULANA FAZLUR REHMAN KHALIL 
| SHEIKH FAZLUR REHMAN KHALIL | MAULANA FAZLUL 
RAHMAN KHALIL 
Ag00934 HAFIZ SAEED 
HAFIZ MUHAMMAD SAEED | HAFIZ MOHAMMAD SAYEED 
SAYEED 
Ag00935 HAMEEDULLAH NIAZI HAMEEDULLAH KHAN NIAZI 
Ag00936 ADIL IMRAN 
Ag00937 KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED KSM | ABDUL MAJID | MUKHTAR 
Ag00938 MOHAMMED SOHAIL   
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Ag00939 HASHIM QADEER MOHAMMAD HASHIM QADEER | ARIF 
Ag00940 MOHAMED MRABET FAHSI   
Ag00941 MOUNIR MRABET FAHSI   
Ag00942 MOHAMED SAID HSSISNI   
Ag00943 HASSAN MOURDOUDE   
Ag00944 MUSTAFA FAWZI AIT OUDRISS   
Ag00945 MUSTAPHA ES SATTY   
Ag00946 ABDELHAK BOUDINA   
Ag00947 MHAMED HADDAD   
Ag00948 DRISS HADDAD   
Ag00949 HASSAN HADDAD   
Ag00950 MOHAMED HADDAD   
Ag00951 MAHAMAD TIAZOUNIE   
Ag00952 ABDENBI LEBCHINA   
Ag00953 MAHAMAD SULEYMAN   
Ag00954 SAMIR SULEYMAN   
Ag00955 MUSTAPHA MOHAMED RIZK   
Ag00956 MOHAMED KAFARNA   
Ag00957 OMAR SALWA   
Ag00958 ZIANI MAHDI   
Ag00959 MOURAD YALA ABU ANAS | MOURAT YALA 
Ag00960 REDOUAN AL-ISSAR ABU KHALED 
Ag00961 ISMAIL AKHNIKH ISMAEL A. | ISMAIL A. 
Ag00962 JASON WALTERS JASON W. 
Ag00963 MARAD J.   
Ag00964 NADIR ADARRAF   
Ag00965 LABIDINE AOURGHE ZINE LABIDINE AOURGHE 
Ag00966 MOHAMED BOUGHABA MOHAMED FAHMI BOUGHABE 
Ag00967 MOHAMED EL BOUSKLAOUI   
Ag00968 YOUSEF ETTOUMI   
Ag00969 ZAKARIA TAYBI   
Ag00970 AHMED HAMDI   
Ag00971 RASHID BOUSSANA RACHID BOUSANA 
Ag00972 MOHAMED EL MORABIT MUHAMMAD AL-MORABIT 
Ag00973 NOUREDINE EL FAHTNI 
NOUREDINE EL-FAHTNI | NOURIDDIN EL-FATMI | NOURIDDIN EL 
FATMI | FOUAD 
Ag00974 JERMAINE WALTERS   
Ag00975 EL-SAYYID NOSAIR EL SAYYID NOSAIR | EL SAYYID A. NOSAIR | SAYYID NOSAIR 
Ag00976 NIDAL AYYAD 
NIDAL A. AYYAD | WIDAL AYYAD | NIDALY AYYAD | WIDAL 
AYYAD 
Ag00977 MAHMOUD ABOUHALIMA MAHMUD ABOUHALIMA 
Ag00978 IBRAHIM ELGABROWNY IBRAHIM EL-GABROWNY 
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Ag00979 AHMAD AJAJ MOHAMMAD AHMAD AJAJ | KHURRAM KHAN 
Ag00980 RAMZI YOUSEF 
RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF | ABDUL BASIT BALOCHI | MAHMOUD 
KAREEM | ABDUL BASIT | AZAN MUHAMMAD | KHURRAM KHAN | 
RASHED | KAMAL IBRAHAM | NAJI HADDAD | AMALDO FORLANI | 
ADAM ALI QASAM | DR PAUL VIJAY | DR ADEL SABAH | 
MUHAMMED ALI BALOCH 
Ag00981 ABDUL MURAD 
ABDUL HAKIM MURAD | ABDUL HAKIM ALI HASHIM MURAD | 
ABDULHAKIM MURAD | ALI MURAD 
Ag00982 BILAL ALKAISI   
Ag00983 ABDELGHANI RABIA MOHAMMED BERKOUS 
Ag00984 FAIZA BENNOUNA   
Ag00985 ABDELLAH BOUABDELLAH   
Ag00986 MOKHTAR HAOUARI MOKHTAR HAOURI 
Ag00987 RABAH KADRE KADRE | TOUFIK | RABAH KADRI 
Ag00988 KAMEL BOURGASS   
Ag00989 NABIL SAHRAWI 
ABU IBRAHIM MUSTAFA | NABIL SAHRAOUI | MUSTAPHA ABOU 
IBRAHIM 
Ag00990 SAAJID BADAT SAJID BADAT 
Ag00991 BURAWI EL WAHIR   
Ag00992 ABDESSATTAR DAHMAN DAHMANE ABD AL-SATTAR | KARIM TOUZANI 
Ag00993 ADEL TEBOURSKI   
Ag00994 MOHAMED ZITLI 
MOHAMED SLITI | MOHAMMED AMOR SLITI | AMOR BEN 
MOHAMED SLITI 
Ag00995 AHMED ELLATTAH   
Ag00996 MOKHTAR BELMOKHTAR 
KHALED ABOU EL ABBAS | EL AOUAR | THE ONE-EYED | 
MUKHTAR BILMUKHTAR | BELAOUVER | MARLBORO 
GODFATHER | KHALED ABOU ABBAS | LAOUAR ONE-EYED MAN | 
ABOU EL-ABBES KHALED BELMOKHTAR 
Ag00997 EL-ZAHRANI KHALID SAEED AHMAD AL ZAHRANI (?) 
Ag00998 ABOU CHIHAB   
Ag00999 MOHAMED DJABER   
Ag01000 YASSER SAYYAF ABOU YASSER SAYYAF | KETOUF MOULOUD 
Ag01001 IBRAHIM GHUREIKA IBRAHIM ABI ISAAC 
Ag01002 HASSAN HATTAB ABOU HAMZA 
Ag01003 NUREDDIN GHUREIKA   
Ag01004 BILAL (GSPC)   
Ag01006 ASSEM AL-TIBSI   
Ag01007 YEHIA (GSPC)   
Ag01008 AL-BASHIR AL-GHARBI   
Ag01009 ABU DAJANA (GSPC) ABOU DAJANA 
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Ag01010 ABDELMALIK DAROUKEDEL 
ABOU MOUSAAB ABDELOUADOUD | ABDELMALEK DROUKDEL | 
ABDELMAKEK DROUKDEL | ABOU MOSSAAB ABDELWADOUD | 
ABDELMALEK DROUKDAL | ABDELMALEK DROUKADAL | 
ABDELMALEK DARDAKIL | ABDELMALEK DROKDAL | 
ABDELMALEK DOURKDAL | ABDELMALEK DROUGDEL | 
ABDELMALEK DROUKBEL | ABDELMALEK DERDOUKAL | ABDEL 
MALEK DEROUDEL | ABDEL MALEK DROUKDEL | ABDELMALIK 
DROUKDAL | `ABD AL-MALIK DRUKDAL | `ABD AL-MALIK 
DURIKDAL | `ABD-AL-MALIK DROKDAL | ABD-AL-MALIK 
DRIDQAL | ABDELOUADOUR DROUKDEL | ABU-MUS'AB ABD-AL-
WADUD | ABDELMALEK DROUKDEL | ABOU MOSSAAB 
ABDELOUADOUD | ABU MUSAB ABDELOUDOUD | ABU MUSSAAB 
ABDELOUADODUD | ABU MUS'AB ABDELOUADOUD | ABU 
MOSSAB ABDELOUADOUD 
Ag01011 EL CHERIF GOUSMI   
Ag01012 ABDELAZIZ ABBI 
OUKACHA EL PARA | OKACHA EL-PARA | ABI ABDELAZIZ | A. 
ABDELAZIZ 
Ag01013 REDOUAN CHEKKOURI   
Ag01014 YOUNES CHEKKOURI   
Ag01015 ABDEL HAMID SHAARI   
Ag01016 OMAR SHAABANI ABU JAFFA | ABOU JAFFA | ABU JAFAR AL-JAZIRI 
Ag01017 SAID ATMANI KARIM SAID ATMANI 
Ag01018 
ABDULSALAM ALI ALI 
ABDULRAHMAN 
  
Ag01019 MEVLUET TAR   
Ag01020 RAMEZ SULTAN MOHAMED RAMEZ SULTAN 
Ag01021 OTHMAN KAAKI   
Ag01022 MOHAMMED OMAR JAMAL OMAR JAMAL 
Ag01023 AHMED JAMAL   
Ag01024 HAITHAM MULHEM   
Ag01025 MICHAEL KANAAN   
Ag01026 WASIM EL-ASAAD   
Ag01027 RABEEH MAWAS   
Ag01028 SHEIK ABDUL ZOUD 
SHEIKH ABDUL SALAM ZOUD | SHEIKH ABDUS SALAAM 
MOHAMMED ZOUD 
Ag01029 WILLIE BRIGITTE SALA HUDIN | WILLIE VIRGILLE BRIGITTE | WILLY BRIGITTE 
Ag01030 MAMDOUH HABIB AHMAD HABIB 
Ag01031 FAHEEM KHALID LODHI ABU HAMZA | ABU HAMZA (LET) | ROGER | SAM PRAVEEN 
Ag01032 IZHAR UL-HAQUE   
Ag01033 NABIL BOUNOUR   
Ag01034 AZNIRI FILALI   
Ag01035 AHMED ZEBBAR   
Ag01036 YUSSEF FIKRI YOUSSEF FIKRI | SHEIKH AL-AFGHAN 
Ag01037 HASSAN TAOUSI HASSAN TAOUSSI | HASSAN TAWSSI 
Ag01038 MILOUDI ZAKARIA   
Ag01039 ABDELKRIM CHADLI   
Ag01040 OMAR HADDOUCHI   
Ag01041 ABDUL AZIZ JALIL   
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Ag01042 OMAR ABDUR REHMAN   
Ag01043 MOHAMMED ZIA UL HAQ ZIA UL HAQ 
Ag01044 NADEEM TARMOHAMED   
Ag01045 MOHAMMED NAVEED BHATTI   
Ag01046 QUAISIR SHAFFI QAISAR SHAFFI | QUAISAR SHAFFI 
Ag01047 JUNADE FEROZE   
Ag01048 ATTA-UR RAHMAN IBRAHIM | ATAUR REHMAN 
Ag01049 SHAHZAD BAJWA SHAHZAD AHMED BAJWA 
Ag01050 MASRAB AROCHI   
Ag01051 EDA KHAN EDIA KHAN 
Ag01052 FEROZ IBRAHIM   
Ag01053 ZUBAIR ISMAIL   
Ag01054 SALMAN SAQUIB   
Ag01055 FAHD NASIM FAHAD NASEEM 
Ag01056 SHEIKH ADIL   
Ag01057 MOHAMMAD ASLAM   
Ag01058 SADIA OMAR SHEIKH   
Ag01059 AHMED SAEED SHEIKH   
Ag01060 IMTIAZ SIDDIQE IMTIAZ SIDDIQUI 
Ag01061 AFTAB ANSARI FARHAN MALIK 
Ag01062 MAZHARUL ISLAM MOHAMMAD OMAR CHOTO | DHOBI 
Ag01063 FAZAL KARIM   
Ag01064 ATTAUR REHMAN NAEEM BOKHARI | NAEEM BUKHARI 
Ag01065 LIAQUAT HUSSEIN   
Ag01066 MAULANA TAHIR ASHRAFI   
Ag01067 KHALID KHAWAJA   
Ag01068 ZAHEERUL ISLAM ABBASI   
Ag01069 WAQAR HUSSAIN KHAN   
Ag01070 AHMED ABDULLAH MANI   
Ag01071 RAMAY S ZAMZAM RAMA ZAMZAM 
Ag01072 IMAN HASAN YAMAR   
Ag01073 OMAR FAROUK UMAR FAROUK 
Ag01074 MAZEN MOKHTAR   
Ag01075 SHAMIL BASAYEV   
Ag01076 SYED R. MASWOOD   
Ag01077 YASER AL JHANI   
Ag01078 HASSAN ABUJIHAAD PAUL R. HALL 
Ag01079 DERRICK SHAREEF TALIB ABU SALAM IBN SHAREEF 
Ag01080 PIR SAIFULLAH KHALID MAULANA PIR SAIFULLAH KHALID | SAIFULLAH KHALID 
Ag01081 MUFTI RASHEED AHMAD MAULANA MUFTI RASHEED AHMAD 
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Ag01082 MUFTI NIZAMUDDIN SHAMZAI MAULANA MUFTI NIZAMUDDIN SHAMZAI 
Ag01083 SHER ALI SHAH MAULANA SHER ALI SHAH 
Ag01084 ABDUR RAZZAK FAROOQI MAULANA ABDUR RAZZAK FAROOQI 
Ag01085 AZIZUR REHMAN MAULANA AZIZUR REHMAN | SHEIKH AZIZUR REHMAN 
Ag01086 DIN MOHAMMAD MAULANA DIN MOHAMMAD 
Ag01087 MOHAMMAD NASRULLAH MAULANA MOHAMMAD NASRULLAH 
Ag01088 ASADULLAH FAROOQ MAULANA ASADULLAH FAROOQ 
Ag01089 MANSOOR AHMAD MAULANA MANSOOR AHMAD 
Ag01090 GHAZI BABA 
SHAHBAZ KHAN | VICTORIOUS ONE | ABU JIHADI | SHANAWAZ 
KHAN 
Ag01091 MUHAMMAD AFZAL MOHAMMAD AFZAL 
Ag01092 TABASSUM AFZAL   
Ag01093 MOHAMMAD NAEEM   
Ag01094 SAEEDUR REHMAN   
Ag01095 MUHAMMAD SOHAIL   
Ag01096 MOHAMMAD AJMAL AMIR KASAB 
AJMAL AMIR KAMAL | AZAM AMIR QASAB | MOHAMMAD AJMAL 
AMIR QASAB | AJMAL AMIR KASAB | AJMAL KASAB | AJMAL 
QASAB 
Ag01097 ABDUL WAHID KASHMIRI MAULANA ABDUL WAHID KASHMIRI 
Ag01098 
ABDULLAH (FROM ANANTNAG-
ISLAMABAD) 
  
Ag01099 HAJI MOHAMMAD AZAM   
Ag01100 MUZAMMIL BUTT YOUSAF | YUSUF MUZAMMIL 
Ag01101 MOHAMMAD UMAIR MOHAMMED UMER MADANI 
Ag01102 FAISAL DAR   
Ag01103 
CHOUDHRY ABDULLAH KHALID 
CHOHAN 
  
Ag01104 RAFIQ AKHTAR   
Ag01105 AFTAB HUSSAIN   
Ag01106 CHOUDHRY YOUSAF   
Ag01107 MOHAMMAD SHRIF BALGHARI   
Ag01108 RAJA MOHAMMAD IRSHAD   
Ag01109 MASOOD LONE   
Ag01110 MEMOONA SAEED   
Ag01111 YAHYA MUJAHID MUHAMMAD YAHYA MUJAHID 
Ag01112 KHALID BASHIR   
Ag01113 HAFIZ ABDUR REHMAN MAKKI   
Ag01114 HAJI MOHAMMAD ASHRAF   
Ag01115 ABU AHMED AL HASHIM   
Ag01116 MOHAMMAD SARWAR   
Ag01117 ABU USAMA   
Ag01118 BASHIR ALI WANI   
Ag01119 SYED MOHAMMED ALI   
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Ag01120 MOHAMMAD AKRAM NIAZI   
Ag01121 ZIA IKRAM NIAZI   
Ag01122 RIZWAN NIAZI   
Ag01123 HAMAD NIAZI   
Ag01124 SULEMAN SAQIB   
Ag01125 MOHAMED ANOUAR ZAOUDI   
Ag01126 ISSA BEN OTHMAN   
Ag01127 KHADIJA PODD VIRGINIA FAHSI 
Ag01128 ABDOL GHAFFAR HASHEMI   
Ag01129 NAOUFEL ABDELADIM AKOUAD | NAOUFEL AKOUDAD 
Ag01130 ABDELKRIM BENSMAIL ABDELKRIM BENESMAIL | ABDELKRIM BESMAIL 
Ag01131 MOHAMED AMINE AKLI MOHAMMED AMINE AKLI 
Ag01132 BACHIR BELHAKEM BACHIR BELHAKEN 
Ag01133 MAJID MCHMACHA MAGID MCHMACHA 
Ag01134 EDDEBDOUBI TAOUFIK   
Ag01135 MOUAD DOUAS   
Ag01136 MUSTAFA FARJANI   
Ag01137 BAANOU ABDULLAH   
Ag01138 SAID AFIF   
Ag01139 MOKHATAR SIAH   
Ag01140 DJAMEL MERABET   
Ag01141 KAMARA BIRAHIMA DIADIE   
Ag01142 BALDOMERO LARA SANCHEZ   
Ag01143 SMAIL LATRECH   
Ag01144 AHMED MOHAMED AHMED   
Ag01145 ALI OMAR JELLOUL 
Ag01146 MEDHI MEHDI 
Ag01147 MASLOHI ALI HASSAN L. | MOHAMMED 
Ag01148 AMROUCH EL H.   
Ag01149 RACHID BELKACEM ABU FADEL 
Ag01150 BISLAN I.   
Ag01151 INGRID WALTERS   
Ag01152 CARL WALTERS   
Ag01153 MALIKA CHABI   
Ag01154 MOHAMMAD EL SHERSHABY   
Ag01155 SOUMAYA SAHLA   
Ag01156 ADNAN KONSTANTINE   
Ag01157 SIDDIG IBRAHIM SIDDIG ALI SIDDIG SIDDIG-ALI | SIDDIG ALI 
Ag01158 CLEMENT RODNEY HAMPTON-EL 
DR. RASHID | CLEMENT HAMPTON-EL | ABDUL RASHID 
ABDULLAH | RASHEED 
Ag01159 ABDO MOHAMMED HAGGAG   
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Ag01160 AMIR ABDELGANI   
Ag01161 FARES KHALLAFALLA FARES KHALAFALLAH | FARES KHALAFALLA 
Ag01162 TARIG ELHASSAN TARIG EL-HASSAN 
Ag01163 FADIL ABDELGANI FADIL ABDELGHANI 
Ag01164 MOHAMMED SALEH MOHAMMED SALAH 
Ag01165 VICTOR ALVAREZ MOHAMMED THE SPANISH 
Ag01166 
MATARAWY MOHAMMED SAID 
SALEH 
WAHID | WAHID SALEH 
Ag01167 EARL GANT ABDUL RASHID | ABDUL JALIL 
Ag01168 MARIANNE ABOUHALIMA   
Ag01169 MOHAMED ABOUHALIMA MOHAMED ABOUHAHIMA | MOHAMMED ABOUHALIMA 
Ag01170 ABDEL-RAHMAN JOSEPH AYYAD   
Ag01171 RESIQ AYYAD   
Ag01172 ABDUL AYYAD   
Ag01173 ABDO YASSIN   
Ag01174 IBRAHIM AHMAD SULEIMAN   
Ag01175 EYAD MAHMOUD ISMOIL IYAD MAHMOUD ISMAIL NAJEM 
Ag01176 MOHAMMAD ABUKHDEIR   
Ag01177 OMAR OBAID   
Ag01178 EDWIN ANGELES   
Ag01179 MUSTAFA AHMAD AL-HAWSAWI 
MUSTAFA AHMAD ADIN AL-HUSAWI | HASIM ABD-AL RAHMAN | 
ZAHIR | AYYUB | MUHAMMAD ADNAN 
Ag01180 MOHAMAD JAMAL KHALIFA 
MOHAMMAD JAMAL KHALIFA | JAMAL MOHAMMED KHALIFA | 
ABU BARAA 
Ag01181 ALICE YABO JAMEELAH 
Ag01182 NORALYN ZARAGOSA   
Ag01183 ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN 
ABDUL RAHMAN SAID YASIN | ABOUD YASIN | ABDUL RAHMAN S. 
TAHA | ABDUL RAHMAN S. TAHER 
Ag01184 WALI KHAN WALI KHAN AMIN SHAH | USAMA ASMURAI 
Ag01185 ISTIAQUE PARKER   
Ag01186 FAZEL OMAR   
Ag01187 ADEL ATTAYYAB ADEL AT-TAYYEB 
Ag01188 BAHAUDDIN   
Ag01189 IBRAHIM RASUL   
Ag01190 FAZLULLAH HAMIDI   
Ag01191 SALEEM ABDEL RAHIM   
Ag01192 TARIQ RANA   
Ag01193 ABDUL SHAKUR ADBUL SHAKOOR | ABDUL SHAKOOR 
Ag01194 MAHAUD AFFIF ABDEJALIL   
Ag01195 NEDAL SALEH ODEH ABU TURAB 
Ag01196 MOHAMMAD JUBRAN ABU RASHID 
Ag01197 AHMAD JUBRAN ABU DAUD 
Ag01198 WALID ISMOIL   
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Ag01199 MUHAMMAD ABDUL KARIM   
Ag01200 
MOHAMMAD SABRI SELAMAH 
ABUSWEIRAH 
  
Ag01201 AHAMAD ABD BIN MASRIE   
Ag01202 HASSAN AL DDEN HASAN ALI   
Ag01203 HADI YOUSEF ALGHOUL HEDI YOUSEF ALGHOUL 
Ag01204 HASSAN AL-HIND   
Ag01205 FUAD JARDAN   
Ag01206 KHALID HASSAN   
Ag01207 FHAD AOUD   
Ag01208 AHMAD ABED MASRIE   
Ag01209 MUSTAFA FARAH   
Ag01210 KHALIL HUSSEIN   
Ag01211 HAMBALI 
RIDUAN ISAMUDDIN | RIDUAN BIN ISOMUDDIN | NURJAMAN 
RIDUAN BIN ISAMUDDIN | AZMAN | NURJAMAN RIDUAN 
ISAMUDDIN 
Ag01212 FATHUR ROMAN AL-GHOZI 
MIKE THE BOMBMAKER | MIKE | ALIH RANDY | FATHURROHMAN 
AL GHOZI 
Ag01213 FAIZ BIN ABU BAKAR BAFANA FAIZ BAFANA | FAIZ BIN ABUBAKAR BAFANA 
Ag01214 MUKHLIS YUNOS 
MUKLIS YUNOS | SAIFULLA YUNOS | SAIFFULAH YUNOS | MOKLIS 
| HADJI ONOS | SAIFULLA MOKLIS YUNOS | SAIFULLAH MUKHLIS 
YUNOS 
Ag01215 AHMED SATTAR AHMED ABDEL SATTAR 
Ag01216 ABUBKR ALY   
Ag01217 SAAID IBRAHIM SAAD IBRAHIM 
Ag01218 RACHID AHMED ZOUAOUI   
Ag01219 ABDEL MESKINI ABDEL GHANI MESKINI | ABDELGHANI MESKINI 
Ag01220 SAMIR AIT MOHAMED   
Ag01221 ABDELMADJID DAHOUMANE ABDELMAJID ROUGI | LE ROUQUIN 
Ag01222 MUSTAFA LABSI   
Ag01223 FATEH KAMEL   
Ag01224 MOHAMMED SUMIR   
Ag01225 HASAN ZUMERI   
Ag01226 RABAH CHEHAJ-BIAS   
Ag01227 KARIM KADOURI   
Ag01228 SLIMANE KHALFAOUI   
Ag01229 MIROUANE BEN AHMED   
Ag01230 AHMED BELHOUD   
Ag01231 MOHAMED MERBAH   
Ag01232 ABDELLAH ABDELHAFID   
Ag01233 MOURAD IDIR ABES   
Ag01234 GHALEM BELHADJ   
Ag01235 KARIM BENAMGHAR   
Ag01236 SALAH MOULLEF   
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Ag01237 HAKIM ZIEM   
Ag01238 SOFIANE LAHAMAR HASSIM ZIEM   
Ag01239 DAVID AISSA KHALEF DAVID KHALEF 
Ag01240 MOULOUD SIHALI OMAR NAITATMANE | RIBERRO 
Ag01241 ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA 
Ag01242 MOHAMMED MEGUERBA   
Ag01243 MOHAMMAD SIDIQUE KHAN IBRAHIM | MOHAMMED SADIQUE KHAN 
Ag01244 SHEHZAD TANWEER KHAKHA 
Ag01245 JERMAINE LINDSAY GERMAINE LINDSAY | LINDSEY GERMAINE | JAMAL 
Ag01246 VALERIE TRAVERSO   
Ag01247 NAGAT CHAFFE   
Ag01248 OMAR DJEDID   
Ag01249 OMAR NAITATMANE   
Ag01250 SIDALI FEDDAG   
Ag01251 MUSTAPHA TALEB   
Ag01252 MUHAMMAD AL-TAYYIB   
Ag01253 SHAYKH ABD-AL-SAMAD AHMAD MUFTI ABD-AL-SAMAD 
Ag01254 RICHARD REID 
RICHARD C. REID | RICHARD COLVIN REID | ABDUL-RAHEEM | 
ABU IBRAHIM ABDUL RAHEEM 
Ag01255 NOUREDDINNE MOULEFF   
Ag01256 MOHAMMED BADAT   
Ag01257 ZUBEDA BADAT   
Ag01258 MALIKA EL AROUD   
Ag01259 YOUCEF AOUNI YOUSSEF EL-AOUNI 
Ag01260 YASSER AL-SIRI   
Ag01261 ABDERAHMANE AMEROUD   
Ag01262 MEHREZ AZOUZ   
Ag01264 KHELLAF HAMAM   
Ag01265 IBRAHIM KEITA   
Ag01267 ABDELKRIM EL HADOUTI   
Ag01268 ABID HAMMADOU 
ABDELHAMID ABOU ZEID | ABIB HAMMADOU | ABDELHAMID 
ABU ZEID 
Ag01269 SALIM EL-AFGHANI SALIM THE AFGHAN 
Ag01270 SIDI OULD SIDNA   
Ag01271 MOHAMED OULD CHABARNOU   
Ag01272 MAAROUF OULD HAIBA   
Ag01273 ABD-LEKHDIME   
Ag01274 ABDEL AZIZ   
Ag01275 KHATAB MOURAD ABDELBER ABOU OMAR 
Ag01276 ABDELHAMID SADAOUI ABDELHAMID SAADAOUI | ABOU YAHIA 
Ag01277 MOHAMED BELMOKHTAR   
Ag01278 ABOU ISHAK IBRAHIM   
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Ag01279 ASSEM ABOU SAID   
Ag01280 ABOU DOUJANA (GSPC)   
Ag01281 ABDELHAKIM (GSPC)   
Ag01282 BACHIR ABOU AL BARRA   
Ag01283 ABOU MOHAMED AL JINKI   
Ag01284 ALI DIX SID ALI RACHID | ALI DIS | ALI ABU DAHDAH 
Ag01285 HAROUN EL ACHAACHI NOUR MOHAMED 
Ag01286 ABOU-OUSSAMA ABOU OUSSAMA ELMERDASSI | ZAOUIDI BELKACEM 
Ag01287 YAHIA ABOU AMAR   
Ag01288 ABOU DEHDEH   
Ag01289 ABDEL ZAID ESSOUFFI   
Ag01290 HAMID ZAID ESSOUFFI HAMID ESSOUFI 
Ag01291 EL-HADJ   
Ag01292 AHMED ABOU AL-BARAA AHMED ZARABIB 
Ag01293 ADEL MECHAT   
Ag01294 OMAR SAITI   
Ag01295 KARIM BOUTRI   
Ag01296 IYAD AG GHALI   
Ag01297 BABA ULD SHEIKH   
Ag01298 MOHAMED RACHED   
Ag01299 ANTAR ZOUABRI   
Ag01300 ABOU KHALED   
Ag01301 ABDELMADJID DICHOU ABOU MASAB | ABOU MOUSSAAB 
Ag01302 AHMED CHABI   
Ag01303 MUSTAPHA EL YAZID   
Ag01304 SAADAOUI LYES HOUDAIFA 
Ag01305 ABOU HAYFEM   
Ag01306 NOREDINE SKODARLI   
Ag01307 S.H.   
Ag01308 M.G.   
Ag01309 C.W.   
Ag01310 R.R.C.   
Ag01311 Y.A.   
Ag01312 ATIYAH ABD AL-RAHMAN   
Ag01313 ANOUR MAJRAR   
Ag01314 LASSAD SASSI   
Ag01315 MUHAMMAD BENHEDI MSAHEL   
Ag01316 SAMI SAYOUD   
Ag01317 ABDELLATIF ZEHRAOUI   
Ag01319 ARMAN AHMED AL-HISSINI   
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Ag01320 HASSAN MUSTAFA OSAMA NASR ABU OMAR 
Ag01321 MOHAMED GAME   
Ag01322 IGNAOUA HABIB   
Ag01323 ABU HAFS THE MAURITANIAN 
MAHFOUZ OULD AL-WALID | KHALID AL-SHANQITI | ABU HAFS 
MAURICNI 
Ag01324 LUCIA GARAFALO   
Ag01325 ABDEL HAKIM TIZEGHA   
Ag01326 BOUABIDE CHAMCHI   
Ag01327 YAMIN RACHEK   
Ag01328 BRAHIM MAHDI   
Ag01330 IHAB DAFEH   
Ag01331 KHALED OMAR MINAWI   
Ag01332 ABDULLAH AL-MUTHADI   
Ag01333 ABDUL RAKIB HASAN   
Ag01334 ALI JAMAL   
Ag01335 MELANIE BROWN KHADIJA 
Ag01336 ABU SALAH   
Ag01337 SAMIR   
Ag01338 MAMADOU NDAW   
Ag01339 MUSTAFA CHEIKHO   
Ag01340 
MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH HASAN 
ABU-AL-KHAYR 
ABDALLAH AL-HALABI | 'ABDALLAH AL-HALABI AL-MADANI | 
ABDALLAH AL-MAKKI | ABDALLAH EL HALABI | ABDULLAH AL-
HALABI | ABU 'ABDALLAH AL-HALABI | ABU ABDALLAH AL-
MADANI | MOHAMMED ABDULLAH HASSAN ABUL-KHAIR | 
MUHAMMAD BIN- 'ABDULLAH BIN-HAMD ABU-AL-KHAYR | 
MUHANNAD AL-JADDAWI         
Ag01341 VICTORIA BRIGITTE   
Ag01342 CHRISTIAN BRIGITTE   
Ag01344 MAHA HABIB   
Ag01345 
MUHAMMAD ARIF BIN 
NAHARUDIN 
ARIF NAHARUDIN 
Ag01346 SAJID (LET)   
Ag01347 STEVEN CAI   
Ag01348 INAM UL-HAQUE   
Ag01349 IKRAM UL-HAQUE   
Ag01350 MOHAMED DAMIR MOHAMED DMIR 
Ag01351 AHMED AL-RAFIKI   
Ag01352 ABDELMALEK BOUZGARENE ABDELMALEK BOUZGARNE 
Ag01353 YOUSSEF ADAD   
Ag01354 ABDELAZIZ FIKRI   
Ag01355 MOHAMED BENHAMOU   
Ag01356 ISAM ZAMZANI   
Ag01357 ADIL ACHIR   
Ag01358 MOHAMMED HAMOUMI   
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Ag01359 MOHAMMED MABROUK   
Ag01360 BENDAOUD DMIR   
Ag01361 BRAHIM HAMDI   
Ag01362 HICHAM DARBANI   
Ag01363 SALAHEDDINE DEBICHE   
Ag01364 MOHAMED JERMOUNI   
Ag01365 MOURAD LAMNAOUAR   
Ag01366 SALEH ZARLI   
Ag01367 ABDERRAZAK FAOUZI   
Ag01368 KAMAL HANOUICHI   
Ag01369 BOUCHAIB GUERMACH   
Ag01370 LAKBIR KOUTOUBI   
Ag01371 BOUCHAIB MGHADER   
Ag01372 OMAR MAAROUF   
Ag01373 LAARBI DAQIQ   
Ag01374 ABDERRAHMAN MAJDOUBI   
Ag01375 RACHID AMRINE   
Ag01376 MILOUD MANDOUR   
Ag01377 MUSTAPHA LAKRIMI   
Ag01378 HOUSSEIN BERGHACHI   
Ag01379 YAZID AJREF   
Ag01380 MOURAD SAROUF   
Ag01381 MOHAMED JOK   
Ag01382 YOUSEF JALIL   
Ag01384 ABDELRAZAQ RTIWI   
Ag01385 ABDELKADER EL ARBAOUI   
Ag01386 AMNA EL ARBAOUI   
Ag01387 MUSTAFA EL ARBAOUI   
Ag01388 OMAR ALTIMIMI   
Ag01389 YOUNIS TSOULI IRAHABI7 
Ag01390 WASEEM MUGHAL   
Ag01391 TARIQ AL-DAOUR   
Ag01392 MOHAMMED FEROZE   
Ag01394 HAROON ASWAT HAROON RASHID ASWAT 
Ag01395 FARIS AL-ZAHRANI   
Ag01396 YAQOOB SAEED   
Ag01397 UZAIR AHMED   
Ag01398 SHOAIB SIDDIQUI   
Ag01399 DANISH INAM   
Ag01400 NAJEEBULLAH   
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Ag01401 KHURRAM SAIFULLAH   
Ag01402 SHAHZAD MUKHTAR   
Ag01403 AKMAL WAHEED   
Ag01404 ARSHAD WAHEED   
Ag01405 RAO KHLAID   
Ag01406 MOHAMMAD SHOAIB   
Ag01407 ADNAN SHAH   
Ag01408 ABDUL WAHEED   
Ag01409 JEHAN ARA   
Ag01410 ABDUL HASAB   
Ag01411 GUL HASAN ALI HAIDER 
Ag01412 HASAMUL SANI   
Ag01413 TAHIR YULDASH QARI TAHIR JAN | YULDASHEV TOHIR 
Ag01414 ABDULLAH AL-HAJ   
Ag01415 DAWAR KHAN   
Ag01416 RIAZ BASRA   
Ag01417 USAMA KHALID   
Ag01418 KHALID FAROUK   
Ag01419 SUBIRA FAROUK   
Ag01420 AMAL KHALIFA   
Ag01421 ABDUL BASIT   
Ag01422 SHARIF MUHAMMAD   
Ag01423 ABU OMAR AS-SEYF   
Ag01424 MAGOMED YEVLOYEV MAGAS | ALI TAZIYEV | MAGOMED KHASHIYEV 
Ag01425 ELINA ERSENOYEVA   
Ag01426 MARIE SCHULTZ   
Ag01427 ISHAQ RIND   
Ag01428 ZAKIUR REHMAN LAKHVI 
ABU WAHEED IRSHAD AHMAD | ZAKI-UR-REHMAN | ZAKIR UR-
REHMAN | ZAKI- UR- REHMAN | CHACHU | UNCLE 
Ag01429 HAFIZ AZIZUR REHMAN   
Ag01430 ABU ABDUR RAHMAN SAREEHI   
Ag01431 ABU ANAS   
Ag01432 MOHAMMAD QASIM   
Ag01433 ABDUL QADEER KHAMOSH   
Ag01434 HAFIZ TAHIR MAHMOOD ASHRAFI   
Ag01435 
ARSHAD MOHAMMED HANIF 
ANSARI 
  
Ag01436 SYED MOHAMMED HANIF RAHIM   
Ag01437 FAMIDA RAHIM   
Ag01438 FARHEEN RAHIM   
Ag01439 NASIR MEHMOOD AHWAN   
Ag01440 MOHAMMED (JEM)   
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Ag01441 HAMZA (JEM)   
Ag01442 HAIDER (JEM)   
Ag01443 RANA (JEM)   
Ag01444 RAJA (JEM)   
Ag01445 AR GEELANI   
Ag01446 SHAUKAT HUSSAIN GURU SHAUKAT HUSSAIN 
Ag01447 AFSANA NAVJOT SANDHU | AFSAN GURU 
Ag01448 SUBHASH MALHOTRA   
Ag01449 VIRENDRA PAL   
Ag01450 TARIQ AHMED TARIQ (JEM) 
Ag01451 SAIFUL ISLAM   
Ag01452 ABU KASHA   
Ag01453 ABU ZAID   
Ag01454 ABDUL REHMAN DEDAR   
Ag01455 KHURSHID AHMED PARREY   
Ag01456 SEHRAI BABA   
Ag01457 GHALIB AFZAL   
Ag01458 YAHYA   
Ag01459 ISMAIL KHAN ABU ISMAIL 
Ag01460 FAHEEM ANSARI FAHIM ANSARI | FAHIM ARSHAD MOHAMMAD YUSUF ANSARI 
Ag01461 SABAUDDIN SHAIKH 
SABAUDDIN AHMED | SABAUDDIN AHMAD | SABAUDDIN AHMED 
SHABBIR AHMED SHAIKH 
Ag01462 HAMMAD AMIN SADIQ   
Ag01463 DAVID HEADLEY DAVID COLEMAN HEADLEY | DAOOD GILANI 
Ag01464 ABU AL QAMA MAZHAR IQBAL | UMAR 
Ag01465 ZARAR SHAH ZARRAR SHAH | ABDUL WAJID | RANA MUZMAL | YOUSAF 
Ag01466 SHAHID JAMIL RIAZ SHAH JAMIL RIAZ 
Ag01467 JAMIL AHMED   
Ag01468 MUHAMMED YOUNAS ANJAM YOUNAS ANJUM 
Ag01469 SAMIR ALI   
Ag01471 ILLYAS KASHMIRI MOHAMMAD ILYAS KASHMIRI 
Ag01472 ATEEQ CHAUHAN   
Ag01473 SHAMSHAD AHMAD SALFI   
Ag01474 ABDULLAH MUNTAZIR   
Ag01475 ZAFFAR IQBAL   
Ag01476 TALHA SAEED   
Ag01477 
FAWAD (COUSIN OF SULEMAN 
SAQIB) 
  
Ag01478 ADIL SHEIKH   
Ag01479 SOUBHI KINIC SOUBI KUNI 
Ag01480 
NAUREDDINE SALIN 
ABDOUMALOU 
NOURREDINE SALIM 
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Ag01481 MOHAMED HAMID   
Ag01482 ABDELLAH HAWARI   
Ag01483 RACHID MOHAMED MOHAMED   
Ag01484 MOHAMED LEUSSADI   
Ag01485 SADE ASDE   
Ag01486 SALAH GHOULAM   
Ag01487 HADJ BOURGIBA   
Ag01488 ALI IBRAHIM   
Ag01489 MOHAMMED ADJIMI   
Ag01490 FARID GHRIEB   
Ag01491 MEHREZ BEN MAHDOUD   
Ag01492 DIBALI ABDELLAH ADDILA MIMON 
Ag01493 AFIF MEJRI   
Ag01494 YACINE AHMED NACER   
Ag01495 ALI EL HEIT   
Ag01496 RABAH BOURAS   
Ag01497 LAMINE AHMED NACER   
Ag01498 FARID AIDER   
Ag01499 
ANTONIO (SPANISH ARMS 
TRAFFICKER) 
  
Ag01500 EMAD SALEM   
Ag01501 ASHRAF MOHAMMED   
Ag01502 AHMED YOUSIF MOHAMED AHMED YOUSEF 
Ag01503 SIRAJ EL'DIN YOUSIF SIRAJ EL-DIN 
Ag01504 SHEIK MUBARAK SHAH JILANI SHEIK MUBARAK ALI GILANI | SHEIK MUBARIK ALI SHAH GILANI 
Ag01505 JAMES WILLIAMS   
Ag01506 STEPHEN PASTER   
Ag01507 WARITH DEEN UMAR   
Ag01508 JOSE PADILLA 
IBRAHIM | ABU ABDULLAH THE PUERTO RICAN | ABU ABDULLAH 
AL MUJAHIR 
Ag01509 JOHN WALKER LINDH ABDUL HAMID | SULAYMAN FARIS | SULEYMAN AL-LINDH 
Ag01511 LT. GEN. JAVED NASIR   
Ag01512 
YAHYA ABU UBAIDAH 
MUHAMMAD 
KARL DEXTER TAYLOR 
Ag01513 ELSIE HAMPTON-EL   
Ag01514 LEON HOLLAND ABDUL MALIK SHABAZZ 
Ag01515 LAMONT HOLDER MASSOUD SHAHEED 
Ag01516 ABD AL-AZIZ UDA   
Ag01517 KHIDR ALI   
Ag01518 GLENN NEVILLE FORD   
Ag01519 CABA JOSE HARRIS   
Ag01520 ROBERT JUNIOR WESLEY   
Ag01521 TYRONE JUNIOR COLE   
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Ag01522 MUSTAFA ABDU RASHID   
Ag01523 TRACI ELAINE UPSHUR   
Ag01524 VINCENTE PIERRE   
Ag01525 ABDUL JABBAR   
Ag01526 ABDUS-SALAAM   
Ag01527 KAREN ANN MILLS SWEENEY   
Ag01528 LINDA LEE SANCHEZ   
Ag01529 YOUSEF AYYAD   
Ag01530 EVONNE GRAVES   
Ag01531 HASAB ELRASOUL BABEKIR   
Ag01532 OSMAN EL-SHEIKH   
Ag01533 SAEED AKMAN SAID AHMED 
Ag01534 ADEL ANNON   
Ag01535 EDITH GESMUNDO   
Ag01536 JOVENAL BRUNO JUVENAL BRUNO 
Ag01537 
ABURAJAK ABUBAKAR 
JANJALANI 
ABUBAKAR JANJALANI | ABDURAJAK ABUBAKAR JANJALANI 
Ag01538 KHADAFI MONTANO JANJALANI KHADAFI JANJALANI | ABU MUKTAR 
Ag01540 ISAM MOHAMMED ABDUL HADI   
Ag01541 MOHAMMED ISMAEL DEIB   
Ag01542 NABIL NASSER AL-RIYAMI   
Ag01543 WAIL RACHEL AL-KAATIB   
Ag01544 
ASERAF ABDUL ALZOURI 
RAHMAN 
  
Ag01545 ENAAM M. ARNAOUT ABU MAHMOUD | ABDEL SAMIA 
Ag01546 
SHEIK ADIL ABDUL GALIL 
BATARGY 
  
Ag01547 ABUBAKAR SHARIFADA   
Ag01548 ZAKARIA M. SHIKH   
Ag01549 NORALWIZAH LEE NORALWIZAH LEE ABDULLAH | NORALIZA ABDULLAH 
Ag01550 OMAR AL-FARUQ 
MAHMUD ADMAD ASSAGAF | OMAR AL-FAROUQ | UMAR FARUQ | 
MOHAMMED ASSEGAF 
Ag01551 GOLIYAH ASSAGAF   
Ag01552 HANUN ASSAGAF   
Ag01553 MIRA AGUSTINA   
Ag01554 MAHMOUD AFIF ABDELJALIL   
Ag01555 KHALID AL-MIDHAR 
KHALID ALMIHDHAR | SANNAN AL-MAKKI | KHALID BIN 
MUHAMMAD | 'ADDALLAH AL-MIHDHAR | KHALID MOHAMMAD 
AL-SAQAF 
Ag01556 NAWAF AL-HAZMI NAWAF ALHAZMI | NAWAF AL HAZMI | NAWAF M.S. AL HAZMI 
Ag01557 ABED SHEIKH MOHAMMED   
Ag01558 ZAHED SHEIKH MOHAMMED ZAHID SHEIKH MOHAMMED 
Ag01559 AREF SHEIKH MOHAMMED   
Ag01560 
ABDULLAH BIN KHALID AL-
THANI 
SHEIKH ABDALLAH BIN KHALID BIN HAMAD AL THANI 
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Ag01561 AHMAD AL-HAMWI ABU OMAR 
Ag01562 YAZID SUFAAT   
Ag01563 MUHAMMAD IQBAL 
ABU JIBRAIL | ABU JIBRIL | FIKIRUDDIN MUQTI | MOHAMED IBAL 
BIN ABDURRAHMAN | MOHAMMAD IQBAL ABDUL RAHMAN | 
MOHAMAD IQBAL ABDURRAHMAN 
Ag01564 CHOMEL SUFAAT   
Ag01565 MUHAMMAD SOBRI   
Ag01566 ABU BAKAR BASHIR ABU BAKAR BAASYIR | ABU BAKAR BA‘ASYIR | ABDUS SOMAD 
Ag01567 SHAHRIL HAT   
Ag01568 MADAM FATIMAH ZAHARA    
Ag01569 ISMAEL LUMINGKIT ALI   
Ag01570 ABDULRAHMAN ESPINA   
Ag01571 ISMAEL NACAN   
Ag01572 ABDUL MANNAN MUKSAN   
Ag01573 ALEEM SHUAIB ABIDIN   
Ag01574 MOHAMED MANSOUR JABARA 
MOHAMAD MANSOUR JABARAH | MOHAMMED MANSOUR 
JABARAH | SAMMY | ABU HAFS AL KUWAITI 
Ag01576 ALI IMRON   
Ag01577 WAN MIN WAN MAT   
Ag01578 AMROZI AMROZI NURHASYIM | AMROZI BIN NURHASYIM | M ROZI | ROZI 
Ag01579 MUHAMMAD ZAKARIA   
Ag01580 ALI AL-AZIA ALI 
AMMAR AL-BALUCHI | AMIR BALUCHI | ALI ABD AL-AZIZ ALI | ALI 
ABDUL AZIZ ALI | ISAM MANSUR 
Ag01581 KANKAN ABDUL QADIR KAN KAN 
Ag01582 MARIYANI   
Ag01583 ZUBAIR MOHAMAD   
Ag01584 AZAHARI HUSIN DR. AZAHARI BIN HUSIN | ADAM 
Ag01585 SALMAH ABDULLAH   
Ag01586 ABDUL SAID   
Ag01587 ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI 
ZACARIOUS MOUSSAOUI | ZACHARIAS MOUSSAOUI | ABU 
KHALED AL SAHRAWI | SHAQUIL 
Ag01588 RUSMAN GUNAWAN GUN GUN RUSMAN GUNAWAN | ABDUL HADI 
Ag01589 HAMBALI'S CAMBODIAN WIFE   
Ag01590 ARIFIN BIN ALI   
Ag01591 HOQUE SINDIK   
Ag01592 MOHAMMED NAZIR BIN LEP  LI-LI | LILLIE | BASHIR BIN LEP | BASHIR BIN LAP 
Ag01593 ABID KHAR   
Ag01594 BASHIR MEHMOOD   
Ag01595 SHAYKH MOHAMED MOKHTAR   
Ag01596 SAPAE-ING BASOR   
Ag01597 ESAM MOHAMID KHIRD ALI   
Ag01598 ABDUL AZI HAJI CHIMING ABDUL AZIZ HAJICHEMING 
Ag01599 MUHAMMAD YALALUDIN   
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MADING 
Ag01600 SMAN ISMAEL   
Ag01601 IBRAHIM (JI IN CAMBODIA)   
Ag01602 ROUSHA YASSER   
Ag01603 KHORIYAHAN   
Ag01604 AZZAM (JI)   
Ag01605 TAUFIQ RIFQI TAUFIK REFKE | TAUFIK RIFKI 
Ag01606 ABDUL GHONI 
UMAR WAYAN | UMAR BESAR | HASYIM ABDUL GHANI | UMAR | 
WAYAN 
Ag01607 IQBAL UZZAMAN IQBAL UZZAMAN  
Ag01608 DELIAR NOER    
Ag01609 AL GABRE MAHMUD   
Ag01610 ABDUL JABAR SOLEH 
Ag01611 OMAR OPIK LASAL   
Ag01613 AGUNG BIYADI   
Ag01617 JA'FAR BIN MISTOOKI JAFAR BIN MISTUKI | JA'AFAR BIN MISTOOKI | JA'AFAR | SAAD 
Ag01618 HASHIM BIN ABAS HASIM BIN ABBAS | HASHIM | HASYIM BIN ABBAS 
Ag01619 IMAM SAMUDRA 
ABDUL AZIZ | ABDURRAHMAN | FATIH | FAT | KUDAMA | ABU 
UMAR | HERI | FAIZ YUNSHAR | HENDRI 
Ag01620 YASSIN SYWAL 
YASSIN SYAWAL | SALIM YASIN | ABDUL HADI YASIN ABU SETA | 
MAHMUD MAHMUD MUBAROK | MUHAMMAD SYAWAL | LAODE 
IDA | ABU MUAMAR | MAHMUD | MOCHTAR YASIN MAHMUD | 
MUHAMAD MUBAROK 
Ag01621 JULKIPLI SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN JULKIPLI SALIM | KIPLI SALI | SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN JULKIPLI 
Ag01622 SOLAMAIN ESMAEL   
Ag01623 ARIS MUNANDAR   
Ag01624 AGUS DWIKARNA AGUS DWI KARNA 
Ag01625 HUSSAIN RAMOS COSAIN RAMOS | ABU ALI | CUSAIN RAMOS 
Ag01626 ANTONIO REYES TONY OF TANKE 
Ag01627 ABDULLAH SUNGKAR ABDUL HALIM 
Ag01631 ZAINURI AL-GHOZI   
Ag01632 ALI GHUFRON 
MUCHLAS | GUFRON | ALI GUFRON | MUKHLAS | HUDA BIN ABDUL 
HAQ 
Ag01633 MOHAMBEDOU OULD SLAHI MOHAMEDOU OULD SLAHI | ABU MUSAB 
Ag01634 MR. MAURITANIA   
Ag01635 KHALIL DEEK   
Ag01636 MOURAD IKHLEF   
Ag01637 MUHAMMAD AHMED AL-AHDAL   
Ag01638 AHMED MUHAMMAD AMIN   
Ag01639 GHULAM MUSTAFA RAMA   
Ag01640 IMAM KAMEL DIN   
Ag01641 NICOLAS BELLONI   
Ag01642 MOHAMED YACINE AKNOUCHE   
Ag01643 JAMES UJAAMA EARNEST JAMES UJAAMA 
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Ag01644 YASIN HASSAN OMAR YASSIN OMAR | YASSIN HASSAN OMAR 
Ag01645 ATILLA AHMET ABU ABDULLAH 
Ag01646 MOHAMMED ANSWAR   
Ag01647 BASHIR AHMED   
Ag01648 HASIB HUSSAIN HASIB MIR HUSSAIN 
Ag01649 HASINA KHAN   
Ag01650 MAGDY EL-NASHAR MAGDY MAHMOUD MUSTAFA EL-NASHAR 
Ag01651 MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN   
Ag01652 MANZIA HUSSAIN   
Ag01653 IMRAN HUSSAIN   
Ag01654 MOHAMMED JUNAID BABAR   
Ag01655 OMAR KHYAM OMAR KHYAM 
Ag01656 ANTHONY GARCIA RAHMAN ADAM 
Ag01657 WAHEED MAHMOOD   
Ag01658 JAWAD AKBAR   
Ag01659 SALAHUDDIN AMIN   
Ag01660 SHUJAH MAHMOOD   
Ag01661 NABEEL HUSSAIN   
Ag01662 ZEESHAN SIDDIQI   
Ag01663 OSAMA NAZIR USAMA BIN WAHEED 
Ag01664 HUSSEIN OSMAN   
Ag01665 MOHAMMAD MOMIN KHAWAJA   
Ag01666 SHERAFIYAH SAMANTHA 
Ag01667 ALI AYED AL-SHAMRANI   
Ag01668 ABU ZUBAIR AL-HAILI 
ZUBAYR AL-HA'ILI | THE BEAR | ZOUHAIR HILAL MOHAMED 
TABITI 
Ag01669 
KHALID BIN ODEH BIN 
MOHAMMED AL-HARBI 
ABU SULAIMAN AL-MAKKI | ABU SUALAIMAN AL-MAKKI | ABI 
SULAIMAN AL-MAKKI | ABU SULEIMAN AL-MAKKI | KHALED 
AWDEH AL-HARBI 
Ag01670 FAHD AL-QUSO 
ABU HATHAYFAH AL-ADANI | FAHD AL-QASAA | ABU HAZIFA | 
FAHD MOHAMMED AHMED AL-QUSO | ABU HUTHAIFAH AL-
YEMENI | ABU AL-BARA' | FAHD MOHAMMED AHMED AL-AWLAQI 
| HUTHAIFAH AL-YEMENI | ABU HUTHAIFAH AL-ABU AL-BARA'  
Ag01672 SAYYID QUTUB SAYID QUTB 
Ag01673 AHMED AL ANI   
Ag01674 ABDELBAKI   
Ag01675 ABDELKADER HAKIMI   
Ag01676 
ABDERREHMANE AMLKI 
ZAKERAHMAN 
  
Ag01677 ABDUL FATAH ZAMMAR   
Ag01678 ABDUL HADI AL-IRAQI   
Ag01679 ABU ANZAR   
Ag01680 ABU MOHAMMED AL MAQDARI   
Ag01681 ABU TALAL AL-QASIMY TALAAT FOUAD QASSEM | EBRAHIM JACOB EZAT 
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Ag01682 AHMAD EL-ITTAH   
Ag01683 AHMED ELOMAR   
Ag01684 AICHA ARBAWI   
Ag01685 AMIR LAARAJ   
Ag01686 ASIF REZA KHAN ASIF RAZA KHAN 
Ag01687 AWATES MASWOOD   
Ag01688 AZAM CHEEMA   
Ag01689 CAROL SANTIAGO   
Ag01690 CHEJ SALAH ANWAR ADNAN MOHAMED SALEK 
Ag01691 DEDI SETIONO EDDY | EDDY SETIONO | ABBAS | UTHMAN 
Ag01692 FARIDA PATEL   
Ag01693 FEIZ MOHAMED SHEIK FEIZ 
Ag01694 GEMMA CRUZ-ARANETA   
Ag01696 GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR 
GULUBBUDIN HEKMATIAR | GULUBBUDIN HEKMATYAR | 
GULBUDIN HEKMETYAR | GOLBODDIN HIKMETYAR | GULBUDDIN 
KHEKMATIYAR 
Ag01698 
HAFIZ MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH 
BAHAWALPURI 
  
Ag01699 HAMZAR HAZIZ   
Ag01700 HASAN AL-TURABI   
Ag01701 HASSAN OULAD AKCHA   
Ag01702 JACK ROCHE PAUL GEORGE HOLLAND 
Ag01703 JAFFAR UMAR THALIB   
Ag01704 ABDELKARIM MEJJATI 
ABDEL KARIM AL-MEJATI | KARIM AL-MAJATI | ABDELKRIM 
MEJATI 
Ag01705 MAHMOUD JAMAL   
Ag01706 MAULVI SALEEMULLAH KHAN   
Ag01707 MOHAMED KHAMIS MOHAMED   
Ag01709 MOHAMMAD SALEEM   
Ag01710 MOHAMMED ABDULLAH   
Ag01711 MOSSAAB KHATIR   
Ag01712 MUFTI MOHAMMED JAMIL   
Ag01713 MULLAH KREKAR FATEH NAJMEDDIN FARAJ 
Ag01714 MULLAH OMAR 
MULLAH MOHAMMAD OMAR | AMIRUL MOMINEEN | 
COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL | MOLA OMAR 
Ag01715 
MUSTAFA (SUSPECT IN 
CASABLANCA BOMBINGS) 
  
Ag01716 NASIR ABBAS MOH. NASIR BIN ABBAS 
Ag01717 NAZIR AHMED TAUNSVI   
Ag01718 NORA YABO   
Ag01719 OMAR KHAN SHARIF   
Ag01720 OUSSAMA KASSIR ABU ABDULLAH | ABU KHADIJA 
Ag01721 RACHID AHMIDAN   
Ag01722 REGINA KREIS   
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Ag01723 ROBERT PIERRE   
Ag01724 TAHIR PERVAIZ   
Ag01725 YAHIA DJOUADI ABOU AMMAR YAHIA DJOUADI ABOU AMMAR 
Ag01727 ABDERRAHMANE AMEUROUD   
Ag01728 ABDUL HAQQ BAKER   
Ag01729 
ABDUL RAHMAN ABU ABDUL 
NASSER AL-AASSEMI 
  
Ag01730 ARIF TAJIK   
Ag01731 ASIM UZMANI   
Ag01732 AZAM TARIQ   
Ag01733 DJAMAL ZITOUNI   
Ag01734 EDWARD FILTON   
Ag01735 GHIAS HUSSEIN   
Ag01736 HAFIZ DUR MOHAMMED   
Ag01737 IBRAHIM ABU UTHMAN   
Ag01738 IFTIKAR ALI   
Ag01739 ISMAIL MULLA   
Ag01740 MARWAN AL-SHEHHI 
MARWAN AL SHEHHI | MARWAN YUSIF MUHAMMAD RASHID AL-
SHEHI | MARWAN YUSIF MUHAMMAD RASHID LAKRAB AL-
SHIHHI | ABU ABDULLAH 
Ag01741 MAULANA YOUSUF BINNORI   
Ag01742 MOHAMMAD AMJID KHAN   
Ag01743 MOHAMMAD UZAIR   
Ag01744 MYSTERY PAKISTANI   
Ag01745 QARI AHMAD   
Ag01746 QARI GHULAM MURTAZA   
Ag01747 RACHID RAMDA   
Ag01749 SHEIKH MOHAMMED ADEEL   
Ag01750 SUHIR A. AHMAD   
Ag01751 ZAFAR IQBAL   
Ag01752 SHAKER AL-ABSSI   
Ag01753 CHERIE MARIA STULTZ   
Ag01754 JOSHUA PADILLA   
Ag01755 MUHAMMED JAVED   
Ag01756 SHAMIA'A   
Ag01757 HUSSEIN PADILLA   
Ag01758 HASSAN PADILLA   
Ag01759 MRS. ABDULATIF MERROUN   
Ag01760 ABDUL AZIZ AL OMARI ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI 
Ag01761 SATAM AL SUQAMI   
Ag01762 WALI AL SHEHRI WAIL M. ALSHEHRI 
Ag01763 WALEED AL SHEHRI WALEED M. ALSHEHRI 
584 
 
ID No. PRIMARY NAME KNOWN ALIASES 
Ag01764 FAYEZ BENIHAMMAD 
FAYEZ AHMAD | FAYEZ RASHID AHMED | BANIHAMMAD FAYEZ | 
RASID AHMED HASSEN ALQADI | ABU DHABI BANIHAMMAD | 
AHMED FAYEZ | FAEZ AHMED | BANIHAMMAD FAYEZ ABU DHABI 
BANIHAMMAD 
Ag01765 MOHAND AL SHEHRI 
MOHAMMED ALSHEHHI | MOHAMD ALSHEHRI | MOHALD 
ALSHEHRI 
Ag01766 AHMED AL GHAMDI AHMED SALAH ALGHAMDI 
Ag01767 HAMZA AL GHAMDI HAMZA AL-GHAMDI | HAMZA GHAMDI | HAMZAH ALGHAMDI 
Ag01768 MAJED MOQED MAJED M.GH MOQED | MAJED MASHAAN MOQED 
Ag01769 HANI HANJOUR HANI SALEH HANJOUR | HANI SALEH | HANI SALEH H. HANJOUR 
Ag01770 SALEM AL HAZMI   
Ag01771 SAEED AL GHAMDI 
ABDUL RAHMAN SAED ALGHAMDI | ALI S ALGHAMDI | AL- 
GAMDI | SAAD M.S. AL GHAMDI | SADDA AL GHAMDI | SAHEED 
AL-GHAMDI | SEED AL GHAMDI 
Ag01772 AHMED ABDULLAH ALNAMI 
AHMED AL NAMI | AHMED ALNAMI | ALI AHMED ALNAMI | 
AHMED A. AL-NAMI | AHMED AL- NAWI | AHMED AL NAZMI 
Ag01773 AHMAD AL HAZNAWI AHMED IBRAHIM A. AL HAZNAWI | AHMED ALHAZNAWI 
Ag01774 ZIAD JARRAH 
ZAID JARRAHI | ZAID SAMR JARRAH | ZIAD S. JARRAH | ZIAD 
JARRAH JARRAT | ZIAD SAMIR JARRAHI 
Ag01775 KHALED MOHAMMED AL-ALI   
Ag01776 
MOHAMMED BIN USAMA BIN 
LADEN 
  
Ag01777 SAAD BIN USAMA BIN LADEN 
SAAD BIN LADEN | SA'AD BIN LADEN | SAD BIN LADEN | SA'AD 
MUHAMMAD AWAD ABUD MUHAMMAD AWAD | MUHAMMAD 
'AWAD ADBUD SA'AD MUHAMMAD BAABOOD ABDUL RAHMAN 
AL-KAHTANE BIN MUHAMMAD AWAD ABBUD 
Ag01778 HAMZA BIN USAMA BIN LADEN   
Ag01780 OMAR AL-KHATAB   
Ag01781 ALI MAHMUD   
Ag01782 ABOUD ROGO ABOUD ROGO MOHAMMED 
Ag01783 MOHAMED KUBWA KUBWA MOHAMMED 
Ag01784 KARIM (MOMBASA ATTACKS)   
Ag01785 SAID SAGGAR AHMED   
Ag01786 AMINA MOHAMMED KUBWA               
Ag01787 ADNAN G. EL SHUKRIJUMAH 
ADNAN SHUKRIJUMAH | ADNAN EL SHUKRIJUMAH | HAMAD | 
ADNAN G. EL SHUKRI JUMAH | ABU ARIF | JA'FAR AL-TAYAR | 
JAFFAR AL-TAYYAR | JAFAR TAYAR | JAAFAR AL-TAYYAR | ABU 
JAFFAR AL TAYAR         
Ag01788 ADERRAUF JDEY 
ABDERRAOUF JDEY | AL RAUF BIN AL HABIB BIN YOUSEF AL-
JIDDI | FAROUQ AL-TUNISI  
Ag01789 AMER EL-MAATI               
Ag01790 ADAM GADAHN ADAM PERLMAN | AZZAM AL-AMRIKI             
Ag01791 SALEH ALI SALEH NABHAN SWALEH NABHAN  
Ag01792 
HALIMA BADROUDINE FAZUL 
HUSSEINE               
Ag01793 HASHI HUSSEIN FARAH               
Ag01794 UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALAB               
Ag01795 OMAR AWADH OMAR ABU SAHAL  
Ag01796 HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE               
Ag01797 ISSA OSMAN ISSA ISA USMAN ISA | ABDULLAH BUR | ABDULLAH ATTO | ABDALA 
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SUDANI | AFADEY  
Ag01798 FUMO MOHAMED FUMO               
Ag01799 SALIM SAMIR BA'AMER               
Ag01800 AHMED HAJJI               
Ag01801 
DABBAS BIN MOHAMMED AL-
DABBASY 
              
Ag01802 MOHAMMED ALI SALEH NABHAN               
Ag01803 NASSEM               
Ag01804 MUNIRA               
Ag01805 ALI SAGGAR               
Ag01806 HANIYA               
Ag01807 OMAR SAID OMAR AHMED ALI MOHAMED  
Ag01809 
SULEIMAN ABDALLA SALIM 
HEMED 
ISSA | SULEIMAN AHMED SALIM HEMED | ISSA TANZANIA  
Ag01810 SALMIN MOHAMMED KHAMIS   
Ag01811 FAISAL ALI NASSOR FAIZAL ALI NASSOR  
Ag01812 OMAR FAROOQ               
Ag01813 MOHAMMED ILLYAS QARI JAMIL | QARI ILYAS | M ILYAS  
Ag01814 ANNELIESE BAHAJI               
Ag01815 NESE KUL               
Ag01816 MOUNIR EL-MOTASSADEQ MOUNIR EL MOTASSADEQ  
Ag01817 HAMZA RABIA HAMZA RABI'A  
Ag01818 KUBWA MOHAMMED               
Ag01819 SWALHA KUBWA               
Ag01820 AAFIA SIDDIQUI               
Ag01821 CHARLES TAYLOR               
Ag01822 AISHA NABHAN               
Ag01823 
SHEIKH MUKHTAR ABDIRAHMAN 
ABU-ZUBEYR               
Ag01824 OMAR HAMMAMI OMAR SHAFIK HAMMAMI | ABU MANSOUR AL-AMRIKI | FAROUK  
Ag01825 AL-AMIN KIMATHI KIMATHI  
Ag01826 BILAL EL BERJAWI HALWAY CARPET | OMAR YUSUF | BILAL BERJAWI  
Ag01827 OMAR BADRUDIN               
Ag01828 WALLA ELDIN ABDEL RAHMAN               
Ag01829 SAKRIH MOHAMMED               
Ag01830 HASSAN AGADE               
Ag01831 FARIDAH HAMUBU               
Ag01832 FATUMA SAIDI ABUDULLAR               
Ag01833 EDRISA ISSA LUYIMA               
Ag01834 EDRISA NSUBUGA               
Ag01835 HARUNA HASSAN LUYIMA               
Ag01836 MOHAMOOD MUGISHA               
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Ag01837 HAMID MOHAMED SULEIMAN               
Ag01838 YAHYA SULEIMAN MBUTHIA               
Ag01839 HABIB SULEIMAN NJOROGE               
Ag01840 HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE               
Ag01841 HASSAN FROM SOMALIA               
Ag01842 KASULE               
Ag01843 IDRIS MAGONDU               
Ag01844 MUSTAFA ABU AL YAZID 
MUSTAFA ABUL-YAZID | MUSTAFA ABU AL-YAZEED | MUSTAFA 
ABU AL-YAZID | SHEIKH SAID | SHEIKH SA'ID AL-MASRI | 
MUSTAPHA AHMED MOHAMED OSMAN ABU EL YAZEED           
Ag01845 INTIKHAB AHMED ABBASI               
Ag01846 MOHAMMAD KABIR ABBOTABAD               
Ag01847 ABID KHAN               
Ag01848 ZAFARALI               
Ag01849 QAMAR ZAMAN               
Ag01850 MOHAMMAD ISHAQUE               
Ag01852 SHAMSUL HAQ SHAMASUL HAQ | MOHAMMAD RIZWAN | M RIZWAN  
Ag01853 
ABU GHARIB AL-MAKKI KAMAL 
SALIM ATTIYA AL-FUDLI AL-
HADHLI 
              
Ag01854 RAO SHAUKAT RAO SHAKIR ALI  
Ag01855 MURSALEEN               
Ag01856 FAHAD MUNIR MITHOO  
Ag01860 MUHAMMAD ASIF ALI               
Ag01861 ABDUL REHMAN (HUJI)               
Ag01862 MUREED AHMAD               
Ag01863 DR. USMAN/AQEEL DR. USMAN | AQEEL             
Ag01864 ATTAULLAH KHAN               
Ag01865 FAISAL AHMED KHAN   
Ag01866 DR ABDUL RAZZAQ               
Ag01867 ZEESHAN JALIL KHIZAR  
Ag01868 MOHAMMAD SARFARAZ MOHAMMAD KHAN | M SARFRAZ             
Ag01869 MOHAMMAD NAEEM SHAKIR ZUBAIR | M NAEEM SHAKIR             
Ag01870 MOHAMMAD NADEEM BABU SALAHUDDIN | M NADEEM             
Ag01871 MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI               
Ag01872 ISMAT SIDDIQUI               
Ag01873 FOWZIA SIDDIQUI               
Ag01874 MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUI               
Ag01875 SUHEIL LAHER               
Ag01876 MOHAMAD AKRA               
Ag01877 MOHAMMAD AMJAD KHAN               
Ag01878 AHMED KHAN               
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Ag01879 MIRIAM KHAN               
Ag01880 SULIEMAN KHAN               
Ag01881 MAJID KHAN               
Ag01882 UZAIR PARACHA               
Ag01883 ALI SHINAWY               
Ag01884 HAMDI MOUSSA               
Ag01885 MOHAMMAD SAAD               
Ag01886 WALID BIN ATTASH 
TAWFIQ ATTASH | KHALLAD | TAFIQ MUHAMMED SALEH BIN 
ROSHAYD BIN ATTASH | SILVER | KHALID BIN ATTASH  
Ag01887 GOULED HASSAN DOURAD               
Ag01888 
MUSA ALI SAID AL SAID AL 
UMARI               
Ag01889 
ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMAD 
AL NUR               
Ag01890 NAJIBULLAH ZAZI               
Ag01891 ZURAH ADBU AHMED               
Ag01892 MAHMOUD TALEB               
Ag01893 IYMAN FARIS MOHAMMED RAUF | IYAM FARRIS             
Ag01894 ABDUL RAOUF HAWAS               
Ag01896 QAMAR MOHAMMAD AYUB               
Ag01897 YUSUF POLAT               
Ag01898 LOUAI SAKKA               
Ag01988 HABIB AKTAS               
Ag01989 BAKI YIGIT               
Ag01990 GURCAN BAC               
Ag01991 FEVZI YITIZ               
Ag01992 ADNAN ERSOZ               
Ag01993 MESUT CABUK               
Ag01994 GOKHAN ELALTUNTAS               
Ag01995 FERIDUN UGURLU               
Ag01996 ILYAS KUNCAK               
Ag01997 HARUN ILHAN               
Ag01998 IBRAHIM KUS               
Ag01999 AZAD EKINCI               
Ag02000 SEYIT ERTUL               
Ag02001 HAMED OBYSI               
Ag02002 SERVET YITIZ               
Ag02003 IMAD MUGHNIYEH MUGHANIYAH  
Ag02004 
JAMAL AHMED MOHA MED ALI 
AL-BADAWI 
ABU ABED MOHAMED AL-BADAWI | GAMAL AHMED BADAWI | 
ABU ABDERRAHMAN | JAMEL AHMED MOHAMMED ALI AL-
BADAWI | JAMAL MUHSIN AL-TALI | ABU ABDUL RAHMAN AL-
BADAWI | ABU ABDUL RAHMAN AL-ADANI | JAMAL MOHAMMAD 
AHMAD          
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Ag02005 
ABDUL RAHIM MOHAMMED 
HUSSEIN ABDA AL-NASHERI 
MOHAMMED OMAR HARAZI | ABU BILAL AL-MAKI | MULLAH 
BILAL | NASHERI | ABDA HUSSEIN MOHAMMED | BILAL | ABD AL-
RAHIM HUSSEIN MUHAMMAD ABDU | KHALID AL-SAFANI | 
MUHAMMED OMAR AL-HARAZI  
Ag02006 IBRAHIM AL-THAWAR NIBRASS  
Ag02007 HASSAN AWADH AL-KHAMRI HASAN AL-TA-EFI | HASAN             
Ag02008 MOHD FARIK BIN AMIN ZUBAIR | ZAID             
Ag02009 SULIEMAN ABU GHAITH 
SULAYMAN BU GHAYTH | SULAIMAN JASSEM SULAIMAN ALI 
ABO GHAITH             
Ag02010 MUHAMMAD AL-QAHTANI 
ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-JANUBI | MUHAMMAD MANI' AHMAD 
SHA'LAN AL-QAHTANI             
Ag02011 SAIFULLAH PARACHA               
Ag02012 IBN AL-KHATTAB OMAR IBN AL KHATTAB | HABIB ABDEL RAHMAN KHATAB             
Ag02013 HASSAN ATTASH               
Ag02014 MUHAMMAD ATTASH               
Ag02015 
ALI ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-FAQASI 
AL-GHAMDI 
ALI ABD AL RAHMAN AL FAQASI AL GHAMDI | ABU BAKR AL-
AZDI             
Ag02016 TURKI NASSER AL-DANDANI               
Ag02017 
KHALED MOHAMMAD BIN 
MUSLIM AL-ARAWI AL-JUHANI 
              
Ag02018 
MOHAMMED OTHMAN 
ABDULLAH AL-WALIDI AL-
SHEHRI 
              
Ag02019 
HANI SAEED AHMAD AL ABDUL-
KARIM AL-GHAMDI 
SAEED ABDULLAH SAEED AL GHAMDI (?)  
Ag02020 
JUBRAN ALI AHMAD HAKAMI 
KHABRANI               
Ag02021 
KHALED BIN IBRAHIM MAHMOUD 
BAGHDADI 
              
Ag02022 
MEHMAS BIN MOHAMMED 
MEHMAS AL-HAWASHLEH AL-
DOSARI 
              
Ag02023 
MOHAMMED BIN SHADHAF ALI 
AL-MAHZOUM AL-SHEHRI               
Ag02024 
HAZEM MOHAMMED SAEED 
KASHMIRI               
Ag02025 
MAJED ABDULLAH SA'AD BIN 
OKAIL               
Ag02026 
BANDAR BIN ABDUL-RAHMAN 
MENAWER AL-RAHIMI AL-
MUTAIRI 
              
Ag02027 
ABDUL-KARIM MOHAMMED 
JUBRAN YAZJI               
Ag02028 
ABDULLAH FARRES BIN JUFAIN 
AL-RAHIMI AL-MUTAIRI 
              
Ag02030 AMMAR AL-WAELI               
Ag02031 QASIM MOHAMED (AIAI)               
Ag02032 MOHAMED AL KAHTANI MOHAMED MANI AHMAD AL KAHTANI  
Ag02033 YOUNIS KHALIS               
Ag02034 AHMED SHAH MASSOUD 
AHMED SHAH MASSOD | AHMED SHAH MASOUD | AHMED SHAH 
MASOOD  
Ag02035 ABU BARA AL YEMENI               
Ag02036 SALAH AL DIN               
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Ag02037 AYSEL SENGUEN               
Ag02038 KHALID AL-MASRI               
Ag02040 KHADR ABU HOSHAR KHADAR ABU HOSHAR  
Ag02041 RAED HIJAZI 
ABU AHMED THE MORTARMAN | ABU AHMED THE AMERICAN | 
RI‘AD (RAED) MUHAMMAD HASAN MUHAMMAD HIJAZI  
Ag02042 MOHAMAD KAMAL ELZAHABI               
Ag02043 SAAD HIJAZI               
Ag02044 HUSSEIN TURI               
Ag02045 OSAMA SUMAR               
Ag02046 MOHAMMED HIJAZI               
Ag02047 MOHDAR ABDULLAH               
Ag02048 KHALLAM (CALIFORNIA)               
Ag02049 FAHAD AL THUMAIRY               
Ag02050 OMAR AL BAYOUMI               
Ag02051 OSAMA AWADALLAH               
Ag02052 OMAR BAKARBASHAT               
Ag02053 ANWAR AULAQI               
Ag02054 YAZEED AL SALMI               
Ag02055 EYAD AL RABABAH               
Ag02056 SULAYMAN AL ALWAN               
Ag02057 MUSHABIB AL HAMLAN               
Ag02058 SAUD AL RASHID               
Ag02059 ZUHAIR AL THUBAITI               
Ag02060 QUTAYBAH AL NAJDI               
Ag02061 SAEED AL BALUCHI               
Ag02062 ABU TURAB AL JORDANI ABU TURAB AL-URDANI  
Ag02063 
ABD AL RAHIM GHULUM 
RABBANI 
ABU RAHMAH  
Ag02064 ABDULLAH SINDHI               
Ag02065 AWS AL MADANI               
Ag02066 ABDEL KARIM AL NASSER ABDELKARIM HUSSEIN MOHAMED AL-NASSER  
Ag02067 AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL ABU OMRAN | AHMAD IBRAHIM AL-MUGHASSIL             
Ag02068 ALI AL-HOURI ALI SAED BIN ALI EL-HOURI | ALI SAED BIN ALI EL-HOORIE             
Ag02069 HANI AL-SAYEGH               
Ag02070 IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB IBRAHIM SALIH MOHAMMED AL-YACOUB  
Ag02071 MUSTAFA AL-QASSAB               
Ag02072 SA‘ED AL-BAHAR               
Ag02073 ABDALLAH AL-JARASH               
Ag02074 HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS               
Ag02075 ALI AL-MARHOUN               
Ag02076 SALEH RAMADAN               
Ag02077 MUSTAFA MU‘ALEM               
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Ag02078 AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI               
Ag02079 FADEL AL-ALAWE               
Ag02080 JOHN DOE (HIZBALLAH)               
Ag02081 ADEL RAFEEA               
Ag02082 IBRAHIM MAIDIN HAJI IBRAHIM BIN HAJI MAIDIN | ABU HALIL             
Ag02083 OTHMAN MOHAMED OTHMAN BIN MOHAMED  
Ag02084 MAS SELAMAT BIN KASTARI   
Ag02085 KHALIM JAFFAR MOHAMED KHALIM BIN JAFFAR | KHALIM BIN JAFFAR             
Ag02086 AB WAHAB BIN AHMAD               
Ag02087 SYED IBRAHIM               
Ag02088 
MOHAMMAD ASLAM BIN YAR ALI 
KHAN 
ASLAM  
Ag02089 FATHI ABU BAKAR BAFANA FATHI  
Ag02090 ADNAN BIN MUSA ADNAN  
Ag02091 
MOHAMED NAZIR MOHMMED 
UTHMAN 
NAZIR  
Ag02092 SABAH               
Ag02093 ANDREW GERARD ALI RIDHAA BIN ABDULLAH  
Ag02094 HALIM BIN HUSSAIN HALIM | HALIM BIN HUSSEIN             
Ag02095 TENGKU ISMUHADI               
Ag02096 DIDIN ROSMAN IQBAL (JI-BANDUNG)  
Ag02097 TAUFIK ABDUL HALIM DANI  
Ag02098 ABDULLAH ANSHORI ABU FAITH | ABU FATIH | IBNU THOYIB  
Ag02099 IRFAN AWWAS SURYAHARDY               
Ag02100 MURSALIN DAHLAN               
Ag02101 FUAD AMSYARI               
Ag02102 ENJANG BASTAMAN JABIR | UJANG | SYAHID JABIR  
Ag02103 ZULKIFLI MARZUKI ZULKEPLI MARZUKI | AWANG IBRAHIM             
Ag02104 DAUD BEUREUEH               
Ag02105 HASAN DI TIRO               
Ag02106 ABU HASBI GEUDONG               
Ag02107 CHADIJAH GEUDONG               
Ag02108 MUCHTAR GEUDONG               
Ag02109 FAUZI GEUDONG FAUZI HASBI  
Ag02110 SYAFRIE SJAMSUDDIN               
Ag02111 ABU HURAERAH ABU HURAIRAH  
Ag02112 AKIM HAKIMUDDIN ASEP | SUHEB | AKIM (JI-BANDUNG) | AKIM AKIMUDDIN            
Ag02113 HENDROPRIYONO               
Ag02114 LIGADINSYAH LINGGA              
Ag02115 FADLI AKIM              
Ag02116 EDI SUGIARTO               
Ag02117 POLEM HERIANTO | ISWANDI             
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Ag02118 RAMLI               
Ag02119 BASUKI IQBAL BIN NGATMO              
Ag02120 MOHAMMED FAWAZI               
Ag02121 SYAHRIR               
Ag02122 UMAR (JI-BANDUNG)               
Ag02123 HAJI ACENG SUHERI HAJI ACENG  
Ag02124 AGUS KURNIAWAN               
Ag02125 RONY MILYAR               
Ag02126 WAWAN               
Ag02127 DEDI MULYADI               
Ag02128 HOLIS UDIN  
Ag02129 YOYO               
Ag02130 RAJA HUSAIN TEUKU IDRIS | IDRIS | IDRIS ACHENESE  
Ag02131 ABDUL AZIZ KAHAR MUZAKKAR KAHAR MUZAKKAR | QAHHAR MUDZAKKAR             
Ag02132 HARIS FADILLAH ABU DZAR  
Ag02133 KYAI SALEH AS‘AD               
Ag02134 ABDUL RAUF SAM BIN JAHRUDDIN | RAUF | SAM FROM PORIS  
Ag02135 YUDI/ANDRI ANDRI | OCTAVIA | ANDRI OCTAVIA | ANDRI OKTAVIA            
Ag02136 AGUS HIDAYAT ANDI HIDAYAT | AGUS AMIN | ANDI | AMIN            
Ag02138 IQBAL (BALI BOMBER) ARMASAN | LACONG | ARNASAN  
Ag02139 APRIANTO ENDANG  
Ag02140 PUJATA               
Ag02141 IKHWAN FAUZI               
Ag02142 FATURRAHMAN               
Ag02143 ZULKIFLI BIN ABDUL HIR 
ZULKIFLI BIN ABDUL | ZULKIFLI BIN HIR | MARWAN | MUSA | 
ZULKIFLI ABDHIR | HULAGU | HOLAGU | LAGU | KULON | MUSA 
ABDUL | MUSA ABDUL HIR | ABDUL HIR BIN ZULKIFLI | ABDULHIR 
BIN HIR | BIN ABDUL HIR ZULKIFLI | ZULKIFLI HUD | COMMANDER 
MAROHOMALLEGEDLY | ZULKIFLI ABDUL HIR  
Ag02144 ZULKARNAEN ARIS SUMARSONO | PAK DAUD             
Ag02145 THORIQUDIN ABU RUSDAN | HAMZAH             
Ag02146 MUSTOPA PRANATA YUHDA | MUSTOFA | NASRUDDIN  
Ag02147 MUSTAQIM QOMARUDDIN BIN ZAIMUN | ABU YUSUF             
Ag02148 MUSTAFA MASHUR               
Ag02149 
MUHAMMAD SAUWKI AL-
ISTAMBULI               
Ag02150 AJENGAN MASDUKI               
Ag02151 SALAHUDIN SOLAHUDIN  
Ag02152 HABIB               
Ag02153 ACHMAD ROIHAN SAAD  
Ag02154 MOHAMMED FAIQ HAFIDZ               
Ag02155 MOHAMED QITAL               
Ag02156 AHMAD SAJULI UYONG  
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Ag02157 SYUNON               
Ag02158 MUCHLIANSYAH SOLIHIN  
Ag02159 ASEP DANU               
Ag02160 FIRDAUS AHMAD AZZAM | NYONG ALI             
Ag02161 ZUHRONI NUIM  
Ag02162 FARIHIN AHMAD FARIHIN  
Ag02163 ARKAM/ARQOM HARIS | AZMI             
Ag02165 UTOMO PAMUNGKAS MUBAROK | MUBARROK             
Ag02166 DULMATIN DUL MATIN | JOKO PITONO | YAHYA IBRAHIM | TGK. HAMZAH            
Ag02167 USAID ZAINAL ARIFIN | SUWARSO | SAKLO             
Ag02168 MUCHTAR DAENG ABU URWAH | ILYAS             
Ag02169 KAHAR MUSTAFA               
Ag02170 SYARIFUDDIN ABU JAMIAH  
Ag02171 BASYIR ABU MUKHLISUN  
Ag02172 MOH. JAUHARI BIN ABDULLAH               
Ag02173 DADANG SURATMAN ABU YUSUF | DADAN             
Ag02175 SUHEIMI               
Ag02176 JAMSARI               
Ag02177 ABDUL RAZAK FAROUK  
Ag02178 MUHAMMAD TAUFIQURRAHMAN AKRAM | SAMSUDIN | SHAMSUDDIN | SYAMSUDIN            
Ag02179 ABAS BIN LATIF ABBAS (FATHER OF HASHIM)  
Ag02180 SARJIYO SAWWAD | SAWAD | SARDJIYO | SARJIO            
Ag02181 MUHAJIR IDRIS  
Ag02182 ACHMAD DAHLAN               
Ag02183 MUCHLIANSYAH               
Ag02184 HAJI MOH. FALEH OF KUDUS               
Ag02185 HAJI DANU MUH               
Ag02186 ABDUL ROCHIM               
Ag02187 JAMALUDDIN               
Ag02188 ZAINI ZAKARIA ZAINI  
Ag02189 ZAMZURI               
Ag02190 HENRY BIN MANSOUR AMRAN | ANDI | AMRAN BIN MANSOOR | AMRAN MANSOR            
Ag02191 FATURAHMAN DAEMUGADING FATUL MUIN  
Ag02192 ZAITUN RASMIN               
Ag02193 AGUNG HAMID               
Ag02194 HISBULLAH RASYID HIZBULLAH RASHID  
Ag02195 ANTHON               
Ag02196 ILHAM RIYADI               
Ag02197 MANSUR               
Ag02199 DAHLAN ASEP JAJA  
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Ag02200 ASHAR DAENG SALAM               
Ag02201 SALAMAT HAYSIM SALAMAT HASHIM  
Ag02202 SARDJONO GABRIEL               
Ag02203 SYAIFUL GABRIEL               
Ag02204 MACHMUDI HARIONO YUSUF  
Ag02205 FAHIM               
Ag02206 SURYADI MAS‘UD               
Ag02207 HASTA               
Ag02208 IMAM HANAFI               
Ag02209 SOLAHUDIN AL-AYUBI               
Ag02210 USTADZ YUNUS YUNUS  
Ag02211 USTADZ AZHARI DIPOKUSUMO               
Ag02212 FARIDA BIN ABBAS               
Ag02213 WAHYUDIN               
Ag02214 FERIAL MUCHLIS ABDUL HALIM FERRY | FERIAL MUCHLIS             
Ag02215 ISNAIRIN BINTI ABDUL ROSYID               
Ag02216 ASADULLAH YAHYA | AHMAD RIYADI             
Ag02217 YOYOK DANU  
Ag02218 ZULFIKAR               
Ag02219 ABDULLAH (DI)               
Ag02220 EDY RIANTO AMIR  
Ag02221 NAIMAN               
Ag02222 EDY TAUFIK               
Ag02223 SUHENDI               
Ag02224 ROJAK               
Ag02225 MUSTAQIM (AMIN)               
Ag02226 MATORI ABDUL JALIL               
Ag02227 ZULKIFAR PIKAR  
Ag02228 TAJUL ARIFIN   
Ag02229 NOORDIN MOHD TOP 
NOOR DIN MOHAMED TOP | NOORDIN MUH TOP | NOORDIN MAT 
TOP | NOORDIN DIN MOCH TOP            
Ag02230 KANG JAJA AQDAM  
Ag02231 NURUDIN ZAID BUTONG  
Ag02232 IWAN/ROIS ROIS | IWAN DHARMAWAN | IWAN DARMAWAN  
Ag02233 MIA IBRAHIM               
Ag02234 USTADZ HERI HAFIDZIN HERI HAFIDIN | HAFIDIN             
Ag02235 ASEP/DARWIN               
Ag02236 DIDIN RAIDIN               
Ag02237 SARKONI               
Ag02238 HARIS (FATHER OF UYOK)               
Ag02239 HENRI GOLUN AGUN FROM SUKABUMI | HERI GOLUNG             
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Ag02240 APUY EPUL  
Ag02241 UYOK               
Ag02242 FATHURROBI/HARUN               
Ag02243 OMAN ROCHMAN AMAN ABDURRAHMAN | USTAD AMAN             
Ag02244 HASAN (JI)               
Ag02245 GEMPUR BUDI ANGKORO JABIR | GEMPUR             
Ag02246 CHANDRA               
Ag02247 MOHAMED IKHWAN ISMAIL (JI)  
Ag02248 SURAMTO 
DENI | MUHAMMAD FAIZ | MOH. FAIZ | DENY SURAMTO | UST ZIAD 
| TORIQ FROM SOLO           
Ag02249 IRUN HIDAYAT IRUN  
Ag02251 MOHAMED RAIS               
Ag02252 TONI TOGAR INDRAWARMAN | INDRA WARMAN             
Ag02253 RIAU               
Ag02254 MASRIZAL BIN ALI UMAR TOHIR | MAS'UD             
Ag02255 SARDONA SILIWANGI               
Ag02256 MOHAMED IHSAN 
JHONI HENDRAW | GEMBROT | IDRIS | JHONI HENDRAWAN | JONI 
HENDRAWAN  
Ag02257 ASMAR LATIN SANI               
Ag02258 ABU DUJANA YUSRON MAHMUDI | AINUL BAHRI             
Ag02259 QOTADAH BASYIR  
Ag02260 SEF/FAHIM               
Ag02261 SON HADI               
Ag02262 KHUMAIDI               
Ag02263 HENRI SIGU SAMBOJA ILYASA | HERI SIGU SAMBOJA | AL-ANSHORI  
Ag02264 ACHMAD HASAN               
Ag02265 ADUNG SUNARTO BIN KARTODIHARJO  
Ag02266 SYAIFUDDIN UMAR ABU FIDA  
Ag02267 BAGUS BUDI PRANOTO URWAH | URWA             
Ag02268 LUFTI HAIDAROH UBEID NGRUKI | UBEID | LUTFI HUDAEROH | UBAID            
Ag02269 HERI/UMAR               
Ag02270 MUNFIATUN               
Ag02271 SAPTONO               
Ag02272 WIWIT               
Ag02273 AWAL PURNOMO               
Ag02274 AGUS AHMAD               
Ag02275 ROSIHIN NOOR               
Ag02276 IWAN SAJAI               
Ag02277 LIS               
Ag02278 ENGKOS KOSASIH PAK KAMAL  
Ag02279 BAHARUDIN SOLEH ABDUL HADI  
Ag02280 DIDI/RIJUL               
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Ag02281 KOMARUDIN FURJAM  
Ag02282 HERNIANTO RONI  
Ag02283 MAKAFRI               
Ag02284 MOH NAJIB               
Ag02285 HERLAMBANG               
Ag02286 SAIFUL               
Ag02287 WIBOWO               
Ag02288 MUSAFAK               
Ag02289 ABDULLAH SUNATA               
Ag02290 ABDUL MALIK               
Ag02291 ACENG KURINA               
Ag02292 ALI ZEIN               
Ag02293 ABDUL ROHIM ABDUL RAHIM | ABDUL RAHIM BA‘ASYIR             
Ag02294 PURNAMA PURTA USMAN | TIKUS | MOUSE  
Ag02295 ENCENG KURINA ARHAM | ARNOLD             
Ag02296 HARI KUNCORO BAHAR  
Ag02297 UMAR PATEK OMAR PATEK  
Ag02298 HILMAN               
Ag02299 UMAR (WAIMURAT CAMP)               
Ag02300 ALI (WAIMURAT CAMP)               
Ag02301 SALMAN               
Ag02302 MOHAMED SAIFUDDIN               
Ag02303 DANI CHANDRA               
Ag02304 IQBAL HUSEINI REZA  
Ag02305 IMAM BUKHORI               
Ag02306 JOKO HARUN               
Ag02307 SALIK FIRDAUS               
Ag02309 ABDUL AZIZ (PEKALONGAN)               
Ag02310 MISRO               
Ag02311 SUBUR SUGIARTO               
Ag02312 ANIF SOLCHANUDIN               
Ag02313 AIP HIDAYAT               
Ag02315 JUNAEDI               
Ag02316 MAKMURI               
Ag02317 EKO HADI PRASETYO               
Ag02318 PURYANTO               
Ag02319 FIRMANSYAH               
Ag02320 HAMZA BAYA               
Ag02321 MUJAROT               
Ag02322 SIROJUL               
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Ag02323 IMAN SUSANTO               
Ag02324 MASYKUR ABDUL KADIR MASYKUR  
Ag02325 SUKASTOPO               
Ag02326 SOFYAN               
Ag02327 ILHAM               
Ag02328 BAHARUDIN LATIF BARIDIN  
Ag02329 SAIFUDDIN ZUHRI 
SYAIFUDDIN ZUHRI | SABIT | SUGENG | SAEFUDDIN ZUHRI | ABU 
LUBABA  
Ag02330 ARINA RAHMAH ARINA  
Ag02332 ANI SUGANDI ANIS SUGANDI  
Ag02333 ABDUR ROHIM BIN THOYIB ABU HUSNA  
Ag02334 ZARKASIH NUAIM | MBAH             
Ag02335 ALI MASYHUDI   
Ag02336 
MOHAMED HASSAN BIN 
SAYNUDIN 
FAJAR TASLIM  
Ag02337 TAUFIK AHMAD ABU ARINAH  
Ag02338 SAYUTI               
Ag02339 ABDURRAHMAN TAIB               
Ag02340 SUKARSO ABDILLAH               
Ag02341 HELMI HANAFI               
Ag02342 YUDO HASTOYO YUDO  
Ag02343 AGUSTIWARMAN               
Ag02344 HERI PURWANTO               
Ag02345 SUGIARTO               
Ag02346 WAHYUDI               
Ag02347 SULTHON QOLBI ASADOLLAH | ARSYAD | USTAD ABUM  
Ag02348 YOSI               
Ag02349 OLOAN MARTUA HARAHAP               
Ag02350 TIMOTIUS               
Ag02351 IWAN               
Ag02352 KI AGUS MUHAMMAD TONI               
Ag02353 IBROHIM               
Ag02354 AMIR IBRAHIM AMIR ABDILLAH  
Ag02355 AIR SETYAWAN AHER | AHER SETYAWAN | AHER SETIAWAN | AIR SETIAWAN            
Ag02356 EKO JOKO SARJONO EKO PEYANG | EKO JOKO SANTOSO             
Ag02357 DANI DWI PERTAMA               
Ag02358 NANA IKHWAN MAULANA               
Ag02359 SYAIFUDIN JAELANI               
Ag02360 MUJAHRI               
Ag02361 IWAN HERDIANSYAH               
Ag02362 ALI MUHAMMAD               
Ag02363 MOHAMAD SJAHRIR MOHAMED SYAHRIR | AING             
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Ag02364 MISTAM HUSAMUDIN AJI | ARIO SUDARSO             
Ag02365 MOHAMAD JIBRIL               
Ag02366 UMAR BURHANUDDIN               
Ag02367 RINA               
Ag02368 PARMIN               
Ag02369 AHMAD JAELANI               
Ag02370 SUCIHANI               
Ag02371 ERY               
Ag02372 AHMAD ISROFIL               
Ag02373 ABU MUHAMMAD AL-MAQDISI               
Ag02374 NIKO/JUNDI RIDWAN  
Ag02375 HASAN NOOR HASAN NUR | BLACKBERRY             
Ag02376 SIBGHO/MUS'AB               
Ag02377 ISMET KAKIKI               
Ag02378 KAMALUDIN BIN KHASAN   
Ag02379 GEMA AWAL RAMADHAN AHMAD | ABU HEIDIR             
Ag02380 HALAWI MAKMUN               
Ag02381 YUDI ZULFAHRI BAROK  
Ag02382 MOH. SOFYAN TSAURI SOFYAN  
Ag02383 ABU NUR               
Ag02384 TGK. AHMAD ANDRE  
Ag02385 ALI ARAFAH               
Ag02386 
TGK. MUSLIM 
ATTAHIRI 
              
Ag02387 MUCHTAR IBRAHIM               
Ag02388 TAUFIK MARZUKI ABU SAYYAF | TAUFIK | ALEX  
Ag02389 AZWANI/ABU MATANG ABU MUS'AB  
Ag02390 AZWAR/ABU RECONG               
Ag02391 MUNIR/ABU RIMBA ABU UTEN  
Ag02392 MUHSIN/IMAM MUDA ABU IPON | ACONK             
Ag02393 MUHIBUDDIN               
Ag02394 MUKHLIS (SOFYAN'S TRAINEE)               
Ag02395 MUHAMMAD TOAT               
Ag02396 AHMAD SAYID MAULANA   
Ag02397 JOKO SULISTYO ZAINUDIN  
Ag02398 AULIA SYAHIDAH               
Ag02399 MASYKUR RAHMAT               
Ag02400 BAYU SENO RAKHMAT | TONO             
Ag02401 
PANDU WICAKSONO 
WIDYANPUTRO 
PANDU  
Ag02402 YUSUF ARIFIN               
Ag02403 ALI FROM ACEH               
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Ag02404 USMAN/GITO               
Ag02405 ENAL TA'O               
Ag02406 ILYAS (GAM)               
Ag02407 RASYID RIDHO ABDUL ROSYID  
Ag02408 AFIF ABDUL MAJID               
Ag02409 MUSTAQIM MUZAYYIN               
Ag02410 HARIS AMIR FALAH               
Ag02411 HARIYADI USMAN               
Ag02412 SYARIF USMAN               
Ag02413 SUMARNO               
Ag02414 MOHAMED AMIN MUSA               
Ag02415 SILVESTER TENDEAN               
Ag02416 YAHYA GOBA               
Ag02417 SAHIM ALWAN               
Ag02418 SHAFAL MOSED               
Ag02419 YASEIN TAHER               
Ag02420 FAYSAL GALAB               
Ag02421 JABER ELBANEH   
Ag02422 MUKTAR AL-BAKRI               
Ag02423 MOHAMMED ALBANNA               
Ag02424 KAMAL DERWISH               
Ag02425 ABU ALI AL-HARITHI ALI QAED SUNIAN AL-HARITHI  
Ag02426 MOHAMED HAMDI AL-AHDAL 
ABU ISSAM AL-MAKI | MOHAMMAD HAMDI MOHAMMAD SADIQ 
AL-AHDAL             
Ag02427 
BANDAR BIN ABDURRAHMAN AL-
GHAMDI               
Ag02428 AHMED BILAL               
Ag02429 MUHAMMAD BILAL               
Ag02430 PATRICE LUMUMBA FORD               
Ag02431 JEFFREY BATTLE AHMAD ALI | ―ABU ISA             
Ag02432 HABIS AL SAOUB HABIS ABULLAH AL SAOUB  
Ag02433 KHALED ALI STEITIYE               
Ag02434 MAHER HAWASH MIKE HAWASH  
Ag02435 OCTOBER LEWIS               
Ag02436 JUMA AL-DOSARI JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF AL-DOSARI  
Ag02437 BINYAM AHMED MUHAMMAD               
Ag02438 ADHAM AMIN HASSOUN ABU SAYYAF              
Ag02439 MOHAMED HESHAM YOUSSEF ABU TURAB              
Ag02440 KIFAH WAEL JAYYOUSI ABU MOHAMED              
Ag02441 KASSEM DAHER ABU ZURR | MAHMOUD             
Ag02443 ALI AL-TIMMI ALI TIMIMI  
Ag02444 MASOUD KHAN MASOUD AHMAD KHAN  
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Ag02445 RANDALL ROYER RANDALL TODD ROYER | ISMAIL ROYER             
Ag02446 YONG KWON YONG KI KWON  
Ag02447 MUHAMMAD AATIQUE MUHAMMED AATIQUE  
Ag02448 KHWAJA HASAN               
Ag02449 DONALD SURRATT DONALD T. SURRAT  
Ag02450 HAMMAD ABDUR-RAHEEM               
Ag02451 CALIPH ABDUR-RAHEEM CALIPH BASHA | CALIPH BASHA ABDUR-RAHEEM             
Ag02452 SEIFULLAH CHAPMAN               
Ag02453 NURADIN M. ABDI               
Ag02454 JAMES ELSHAFAY                
Ag02455 SHAHWAR MARTIN SIRAJ SHAHAWAR MATIN SIRAJ  
Ag02456 YASSIN MUHIDDIN AREF               
Ag02457 
MOHAMMED MOSHARREF 
HOSSAIN               
Ag02458 KEVIN JAMES 
SHAKYH SHAHAAB MURSHID | ABDUL-WAHID ASH-SHEENA | AS-
SUDAANI | ASH-SHAFI'E | ASH SHAYK SUDANI | SHABAB MURSHID 
ABDUL-WAHID SUDANI | SHIBAB JAMES | ABDUL WAHID | 
SHABAB MURSHID | SHABAB JAMES         
Ag02459 LEVAR WASHINGTON 
ABDUR REHMAN | NUMAIR | SHABAB NUMIR ABD RAHMAN | 
NUMAIR ABD RAHMAN ASH-SHEENA | EMIR  
Ag02460 GREGORY PATTERSON BILAL  
Ag02461 HAMMAD SAMANA               
Ag02462 MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS               
Ag02463 SHANNEN ROSSMILLER               
Ag02464 SYED HARIS AHMED TURAB | THANDYMAZAQ             
Ag02465 EHSANUL ISLAM SADEQUEE SHIFA | ABOO KHUBAYB ALMUWAHHID AND KHUBZ             
Ag02466 FAHIM AHMAD               
Ag02467 AZDI ORNANI               
Ag02468 AABID HUSSEIN KHAN               
Ag02469 ZUBAIR AHMED               
Ag02470 MIRSAD BEKTASEVIC               
Ag02471 NARSEAL BATISTE BROTHER NAZ | PRINCE MANNA             
Ag02472 PATRICK ABRAHAM BROTHER PAT  
Ag02473 STANLEY GRANT PHANOR BROTHER SUNNI  
Ag02474 NAUDIMAR HERRERA BROTHER NAUDY  
Ag02475 BURSON AUGUSTIN BROTHER B  
Ag02476 ROTHSCHILD AUGUSTINE BROTHER ROT  
Ag02477 LYGLENSON LEMORIN BROTHER LEVI | BROTHER LEVI-EL             
Ag02478 ASSAD SARWAR ASSAD ALI SARWAR  
Ag02479 ABDULLA AHMED ALI 
AHMED ALI KHAN | ABDULA AHMED ALI | AHMED ABDULLAH ALI 
| ABDULLAH ALI AHMED KHAN            
Ag02480 TANVIR HUSSAIN               
Ag02481 ARAFAT KHAN ARAFAT WAHEED KHAN | WAHEED ARAFAT KHAN             
Ag02482 IBRAHIM SAVANT OLIVER  
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Ag02483 WAHEED ZAMAN               
Ag02484 UMAR ISLAM BRIAN YOUNG  
Ag02485 DONALD STEWART-WHYTE               
Ag02486 MOHAMMED GULZAR ALTAF RAVAT  
Ag02487 MUKTAR SAID IBRAHIM MUKTAR IBRAHIM | IBRAHIM MUKTAR SAID             
Ag02488 RASHID RAUF 
IBRAHIM | NOTE: RASHID RAUF AND MAITUR REHMAN ARE NOT 
THE SAME PERSON, DESPITE EARLY REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY            
Ag02489 RAMZI MOHAMED               
Ag02490 ADEL YAHYA               
Ag02491 MANFO ASIEDU SUMAILA ABUBAKARI  
Ag02492 ABDUL SHERIF               
Ag02493 SIRAJ ALI SIRAJ YASSIN ABDULLAH ALI  
Ag02494 MUHEDIN ALI               
Ag02495 YESHIEMBERT GIRMA YESHI  
Ag02496 WAHBI MOHAMMED               
Ag02497 ISMIL ABDURAHMAN               
Ag02498 ABDULLAH EL-FAISAL 
TREVOR WILLIAM FOREST | SHEIKH FAISAL | SHEIK FAISAL | 
IMAM AL-JAMAIKEE | ABDALLAH AL FAISAL  
Ag02499 ESAYAS GIRMA               
Ag02500 MULUMEBET GIRMA               
Ag02501 MOHAMED KABASHI               
Ag02502 ABDUL MUHAMMAD CARLOS BLEDSOE | ABDULHAKIM MUHAMMAD             
Ag02503 ADIS MEDUNJANIN MUHAMMAD  
Ag02504 ZAREIN AHMEDZAY OMAR  
Ag02505 ALI SALEH KAHLAH AL-MARRI ABDUL-RAHMAN AL-QATARI  
Ag02506 JEHAD SERWAN MOSTAFA               
Ag02507 AMINA FARAH ALI               
Ag02508 HAWO MOHAMED HASSAN               
Ag02509 MOHAMUD ABDI YUSUF 
SHEIKH HASSAN | HASSAN DHUNKAAL | MOHAMOUD YUSUF 
DHUNKAAL            
Ag02510 DUANE MOHAMED DIRIYE 
DUWANE MAXAMED DIRIIYE | DUANE DIRIE | DUANE MOHAMED 
DIRIYE  
Ag02511 ABDI MAHDI HUSSEIN ABDI HUSSEIN | KHALIIF             
Ag02512 SHEIKH SAAID               
Ag02513 ABID NASSER               
Ag02514 TARIQ UR REHMAN               
Ag02515 SALEH AL-SOMALI 
ABDUL HAFIDH | ABDUL HAFEEZ | NOTE: FNU LNU IS AN 
ACRONYM: FIRST NAME UNKNOWN, LAST NAME UNKNOWN  
Ag02517 ADEN HASHI AYROW ADEN HASHI AYRO | ADEN HASHI 'AYRO             
Ag02518 MOHAMED IBRAHIM AHMED TALHA  
Ag02519 MOHAMAD SHNEWER               
Ag02520 DRITAN DUKA DISTAN DUKA | ANTHONY DUKA | TONY DUKA  
Ag02521 ELJVIR DUKA ELVIS DUKA | SULAYMAN             
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Ag02522 SHAIN DUKA               
Ag02523 SERDAR TATAR               
Ag02524 AGRON ABDULLAHU               
Ag02525 ZENAB ARMANDPISHEH               
Ag02526 OMAR BAKRI MOHAMMED               
Ag02527 ABU MUNTHIR               
Ag02528 ZABI UL-TAIFI               
Ag02529 RUSSELL DEFREITAS MOHAMMED  
Ag02530 KAREEM IBRAHIM AMIR KAREEM | WINSTON KINGSTON             
Ag02531 ABDUL KADIR AUBREY MICHAEL SEAFORTH  
Ag02532 ABDEL NUR COMPTON EVERSLEY  
Ag02533 ABU BAKR (JAM)               
Ag02534 
SHEIK MOHAMED ABDIRAHMAN 
KARIYE               
Ag02535 IBRAHIM AL-HAMDI (LET)               
Ag02536 MICHAEL C. FINTON TALIB ISLAM  
Ag02537 HOSAM MAHER HUSEIN SMADI               
Ag02538 BRYANT NEAL VINAS IBRAHIM | BASHIR AL-AMERIKI | BEN YAMEEN AL-KANADEE  
Ag02539 RAJA LAHRASIB KHAN               
Ag02540 KHALID ALI-M ALDAWSARI                
Ag02541 SYED HASHMI FAHAD  
Ag02542 HAMID HAYAT               
Ag02543 UMER HAYAT               
Ag02544 KHALID OUAZZANI               
Ag02545 AHMED OMAR ABU ALI               
Ag02546 FAROOQUE AHMED               
Ag02547 CHRISTOPHER PAUL 
ABDUL | ABDUL MALEK | ABDUL MALIK | ABDUL MELIK | 
ABDULMALED | ABDEL MALEK | ABDUL MALEK KENYATTA | 
PAUL KENYATTA LAWS | PAUL LAWS  
Ag02548 KHALIFA LNU               
Ag02549 RAHMAT ABDUL HIR 
RAHMAT ABDHIR | SEAN KASEM | SEAN KALIMIN | ROY KALIMIN | 
SALAM A. JABAR  
Ag02550 MINAH BINTI AOGIS ABD AZIZ MAK  
Ag02551 ABDUL BASIT USMAN 
ABDULBASIT USMAN | USMAN | AHMAD AKMAD BATABOL 
USMAN | BASIT USMAN | ABDULBASIT  
Ag02552 
MOHAMMED ABDULLAH 
WARSAME 
ABU MARYAM  
Ag02553 AHMED FARAZ KHAN               
Ag02554 FATUMA               
Ag02555 MUKHTAR ROOBOW ALI 
ABU MANSUR | MUKHTAR ROBOW | MUKHTAR ALI RUBU | 
MUKHTAR ABDULLAHI ALI | MUJAHID MUKHTAR ROBOW ALI | 
SHAYKH MUKHTAR ROBO ALI | ABU MANSUR | ABU MANSOUR          
Ag02556 HARUNI BAMUSA HARUN BAMUSA | SAID             
Ag02557 HASSAN SAID OMAR               
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Ag02558 MOHAMED MWAKUZA KUZA ABDULMALIK | MOHAMED MWAKUUUZA KUZA             
Ag02559 HALIMA               
Ag02560 SAUDA               
Ag02561 SAMIR SAID SLAIM BA'AMIR SAMIR SALIM  
Ag02562 MOHAMED ALI 'ISSE YUSUF MOHAMED ABDI 'ISSE YUSUF  
Ag02563 IBRAHIM "AL-AFGHANI"               
Ag02564 JAAMA ALI ISMA'IL KUTIYE  
Ag02565 DA'UD SALA IIDLE               
Ag02566 FARHAN ABDULLE MOHAMED               
Ag02567 HALIMA ABDI ISSA YUSUF               
Ag02568 YAYAN               
Ag02569 ABDUL RASYID               
Ag02570 CHANDRA NASRULLAH               
Ag02571 NIK ADLI BIN NIK AZIS               
Ag02572 TAMZIL LINRUNG               
Ag02573 ABU FATAH               
Ag02574 SALIMULLAH               
Ag02575 TASRIFAH KHUSUSIATI               
Ag02576 FURQON               
Ag02577 MAHMUD (JI - BATAM)               
Ag02578 TARMIZI               
Ag02579 MUKTIB               
Ag02580 SUKRI               
Ag02581 NASRI               
Ag02582 ALI FAUZI M FAUZI  
Ag02583 YASIR               
Ag02584 IFANA               
Ag02585 UMAR KECIL               
Ag02586 MURTAJAB               
Ag02587 HALIMAH               
Ag02588 HJ AFIAH               
Ag02589 HM KOZIN               
Ag02590 JARAF SHODIQ               
Ag02591 AMIN JABIR               
Ag02592 TAFISR               
Ag02593 TASRIFAH               
Ag02594 SUMIAH               
Ag02595 NAIMAH               
Ag02596 H NUR HASYIM               
Ag02597 HJ TARIYEM               
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Ag02598 SITI ROHMA               
Ag02599 JULIA MAHENDRA               
Ag02600 ASTUTI               
Ag02601 KHOIRIANA KHUSUSIATI               
Ag02602 HAULA BINTI AMROZI               
Ag02603 BILAL/SAEED               
Ag02604 AITEZAZ SHAH               
Ag02605 SHER ZEHMAN               
Ag02606 HUSNAIN GUL               
Ag02607 MOHAMAD RAFAQAT RAFAQAT  
Ag02608 RASHEED AHMED               
Ag02609 NASRULLAH ABDULLAH               
Ag02610 BAITULLAH MEHSUD EMIR SAHIB  
Ag02611 MAULVI SAHIB               
Ag02612 BRIGADIER EJZA SHAH               
Ag02613 NAZIR (MUMBAI ATTACK) ABU UMER  
Ag02614 SHOAIB (MUMBAI ATTACK) ABU SOHEB | ABU SAHEB             
Ag02616 JAVED (MUMBAI ATTACKS) ABU ALI  
Ag02617 IMRAN BABAR ABU AAKASHA | BABAR IMRAN | ABU AKASHA  
Ag02618 
MAHMOUD MOHAMMED 
BAHAZIQ 
ABU ABD AL-AZIZ | ABU ABD AL-'AZIZ | BAHAZIQ MAHMOUD | 
SHAYK SAHIB | MAHMOUD MOHAMMAD AHMED BAHAZIQ  
Ag02620 HAFIZ ARSHAD ABU ABDAR REHMAN | HAFU ARSHAD | HAYAJI  
Ag02621 ABDEL REHMAN CHHOTA ABU ABDAR REHMAN | ABDUR REHMAN | SAKIB  
Ag02622 FAHAD ULLAH FAHADULLA  
Ag02623 NASER (MUMBAI ATTACKS) ABU UMAR  
Ag02626 ABU MUFTI SAEED               
Ag02627 ABU ABDURREHMAN               
Ag02628 ABU MAAVIA               
Ag02629 ABU ANIS (LET)               
Ag02630 ABU BASHIR (LET)               
Ag02631 ABU HANJLA PATHAN               
Ag02632 ABU SARIA               
Ag02633 ABU SAIF-UR-REHMAN               
Ag02634 ABU IMRAN               
Ag02635 HAKIM SAHEB               
Ag02636 KAAHFA ABU KAFA | ABU KAHFA             
Ag02637 SHAHID GHAFOOR               
Ag02638 TAHAWWUR HUSSAIN RANA               
Ag02639 ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED PASHA | MAJOR | ABDUR RAHMAN  
Ag02640 MAJOR HAROON ASIQ               
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Ag02641 ABU YAHYA AL-LIBI 
HASAN QAIID | YUNIS AL-SAHRAWI | MUHAMMAD HASAN AL-LIBI 
| HASAN QAYID            
Ag02642 BURHANUDDIN RABBANI               
Ag02653 AL-HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM AL-HAJ MURAD | KAGI | KAGI MURAD  
Ag02654 BENJIE MIDTIMBANG               
Ag02655 JOHN MACK               
Ag02656 ABDULLAH MACAAPAR               
Ag02657 ALIM ABDULAZIZ MIMBANTAS ABU WIDAD  
Ag02658 GHAZALI JAFAAR               
Ag02659 SHEIKH OMAR PASIGAN               
Ag02660 SAMIR HASHIM               
Ag02661 SOLAMAIN PANGALIAN 
ALEEM SULAIMAN PANGALIAN | SULAIMAN PANGALIAN | 
COMMANDER PANGALIAN  
Ag02662 OKASHA               
Ag02663 NASRULLAH (JI)               
Ag02664 ILYAS/HANIF               
Ag02665 SAID (JI)               
Ag02666 ANWAR (JI)               
Ag02667 ABDURROHMAN               
Ag02668 MUSTHOFA               
Ag02669 MUADZ               
Ag02670 HAZAH               
Ag02671 IBU SIRIN               
Ag02672 ZUBEIR               
Ag02673 ABU FARHAN               
Ag02674 ZAID               
Ag02675 HUDAIFAH               
Ag02676 MACAANGCOS MIMBANTAS               
Ag02677 AMIR PAUTE               
Ag02678 ZAINAL PAX               
Ag02679 SALMAN MORO               
Ag02680 USTADZ SAID               
Ag02681 OSAMA ARA               
Ag02682 MOHAMMAD GUINDOLONGAN               
Ag02683 JULKIPLI 
ZOL | JOL | ZULKIFLI | GUL KIPLI | JUL | GEOL | JABBAR | BADRUDIN 
| BRO  
Ag02684 HAMDAN HAMJA | HAMZAH             
Ag02685 NOOR MOHAMMAD UMUG 
MUHAMMAD NOOR UMOG | USTADZ MUHAMMAD NOOR UMOG | 
ABU MUSLIM ALGHAZIE  
Ag02686 HAJI AKHMAD               
Ag02687 SULAIMAN               
Ag02688 HADJI ABDUL SASAMU               
Ag02689 USTADZ BAEM SAMUYA               
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Ag02690 NASRUDDIN SULYANG               
Ag02691 ESMAEL AKMAD               
Ag02692 TOHAMI BAGUNDANG               
Ag02693 ESMAEL MAMALANGKAS               
Ag02694 IDAR               
Ag02695 JIMMY BALULAO               
Ag02696 GUINDATU MAMINTAL DULANG               
Ag02697 NASRUDDIN IBRAHIM               
Ag02698 DONGDONG PIDTUKASAN               
Ag02699 REX MOHIR               
Ag02700 MORI ALI USMAN               
Ag02701 TONG ABBAS               
Ag02702 BILAL ABDULLAH               
Ag02703 SHEIKH AMAD AL-KUBAISI               
Ag02704 SABEEL AHMED               
Ag02705 KAFEEL AHMED               
Ag02706 MOHAMMED HANEEF   
Ag02707 MOHAMMED ASHA               
Ag02708 ADAM KHATIB OSMAN ADAM KHATIB  
Ag02709 COSSAR ALI               
Ag02800 MEHRAN HUSSAIN               
Ag02801 MOHAMMED AL GHABRA               
Ag02802 SADIQ SHEIKH MOHAMMED SADIQ ISRAR SHEIKH  
Ag02804 AMIR RAZA AMIR RAZA KHAN | AMIR REZA KHAN             
Ag02805 ABU RASHID               
Ag02806 AFZAL USMANI AFZAL MUTALIB USMANI  
Ag02807 ARIF SHEIKH MOHAMMED ARIF SHEIKH  
Ag02808 MOHAMMED ZAKIR SHEIKH MOHAMMED ZAKIR SHEIKH  
Ag02809 MOHAMMED ANSAR SHEIKH SHEIKH MOHAMMED ANSAR  
Ag02811 ROSHAN KHAN               
Ag02812 AMEER RAZAQ               
Ag02813 ASIF RAZAQ               
Ag02814 ATIF AMEEN ATIQ | MOHAMMAD ATIF AMEEN             
Ag02815 RIYAZ BHATKAL RIYAZ SHABANDARI | DILAWAR IQBAL | SHARUKH KHAN  
Ag02816 ABDUS SUBHAN QURESHI TAUQEER | ALTAF SUBHAN QURESHI             
Ag02817 FAISAL SHAIKH FAISAL SHEIKH | ABU AAMEEN | SAMEER  
Ag02818 MAULANA ABDUL HALIM               
Ag02819 SAMEER SADIQ               
Ag02820 MUFTI ABU BASHAR               
Ag02821 MOHAMMED SAIF MOHAMMAD SAIF  
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Ag02822 MOHAMMED ZEESHAN               
Ag02823 SAQIB NISAR SAQIB NISSAR  
Ag02824 MOHAMMED SHAKEEL MOHAMMAD SHAKEEL  
Ag02825 ZIA-UR-REHMAN               
Ag02826 MUJAHID SALIM               
Ag02827 RASOOL KHAN               
Ag02828 MAULANA NASEERUDIN NASIR               
Ag02829 ANAS AL KANDARI               
Ag02830 ABDUL RAHMAN JABARAH ABDUL-RAHMAN MANSOUR JABARAH              
Ag02831 AHMED SAHAGI               
Ag02832 ANWAR AL-AWLAKI 
ANWAR AL-AULAQI | IMAM ANWAR | SHEIKH ANWAR | ANWAR 
NASSER ABDULLA AL-AULAQI            
Ag02833 NASSER AL-AULAQI               
Ag02835 AHMED MUHAMMED DHAKANE 
ABDI GALL | DHAKHANE ABDIFATAH MOHAMED | WILLIAMS 
MARK | MARK WILLIAMS | AHMAN MOHAMMED DHAKHANE | TSA 
WANE DHAKHANE | ABDIGAL | ALI WARSAME | AWIL JAMA | 
ABDIFATAH MOHAMED         
Ag02836 ADANI LNU               
Ag02837 MOHAMMED EREG IDRIS  
Ag02838 ABDRIZAK LNU AL QAEDA  
Ag02839 HASSAN YARE               
Ag02840 ABDELLAH BENYAICH ABDULLAH BENYAICH | ABDALLAH BENLAICH             
Ag02841 AQEEL ABDUL-AZIZ AI'AQEEL AQUEEL AL-AQUEEL  
Ag02842 SALEH ABDULLAH KAMEL               
Ag02843 OMAR ABDULLAH KAMEL               
Ag02844 ADEL ABDUL JALIL BATTERJEE 
SHEIK ADIL ABDUL GALIL BATARGY | ADEL ABDUL JALIL 
IBRAHIM BATTERJEE             
Ag02845 SULAIMAN ABDULAZIZ AL-RAJHI               
Ag02846 SALEH ABDULAZAIA AL-RAJHI               
Ag02847 KHALID BIN MAHFOUZ               
Ag02848 KALEDA BIN MAHFOUZ               
Ag02849 YOUSSEF NADA               
Ag02850 ALI GHALIB HIMMAT               
Ag02851 YOUSSEF AL-QARDAWI               
Ag02852 ABDEL FATTAH ABU GHADDA               
Ag02853 AHMED HUBER ALBERT FRIEDRICH ARMAND HUBER  
Ag02854 AHMED NASREDDIN               
Ag02855 SOLIMAN AL-BUTHE 
SOLIMAN HAMD AL-BUTHE | SULIMAN HAMD SULEIMAN AL-
BUTHE             
Ag02856 PIROUZ SEDAGHATY PETE SEDA | PEROUZ SEDA GHATY | ABU YUNUS  
Ag02857 MARAT AVLARIGOV               
Ag02858 CHAMSOUDIN AVLARIGOV               
Ag02859 MUNIB ZAHARIGAC               
Ag02860 HAROUN ABED               
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Ag02861 MUBARAK HAMED               
Ag02862 AHMED MUSTAFA               
Ag02863 KHALID AL-SUDANEE               
Ag02864 MARK DELI SILJANDER               
Ag02865 ABDEL AZIM EL-SIDDIG               
Ag02866 RABIH HADDAD               
Ag02867 KHALED SMAILI               
Ag02868 USAMA HAMDAN               
Ag02869 HAYTHAM MAGHAWRI               
Ag02870 MOHAMMED EL-MEZAIN               
Ag02871 MOHAMMED IBRAHIM SULAIMAN               
Ag02872 
JAFFAR AHMAD ABDULLAH 
MAKKI 
              
Ag02873 
ABDUL AZIZ ABBAKAR 
MUHAMAD               
Ag02874 
KHALID AHMAD JUMAH AL-
SUDANI 
              
Ag02875 IBRAHIM BUISIR               
Ag02876 AHMED SANTOS HILARION SANTOS | HILARION DEL ROSARIO SANTOS  
Ag02877 
ABU HAMZA ABU HAMID AL-
LUZONI 
              
Ag02878 HANNAH SANTOS               
Ag02879 NURUMIJA AMDAL               
Ag02880 MURSIDI BALAO               
Ag02881 ISMAEL IDIRIS               
Ag02882 MALIK MIMUDDIN               
Ag02883 ANNE ANOVER               
Ag02884 BODOT ABDULLAH               
Ag02885 RUBEN OMAR LAVILLA 
RUBEN PESTANO LAVILLA, JR. | OMAR LAVILLA | REUBEN 
LAVILLA | AHMAD OMAR SHARIEF | SHAYKH OMAR LOBILLA | 
OMAR LABELLA | REYMUND LAVILLA | MILE D. LAVILLA | MIKE 
DE LAVILLA | ABDULLAH MUDDARIS | RAMO LAVILLA  
Ag02886 REDENDO CAIN DELLOSA 
REDENDO DELLOSA Y CAIN | REDENDO CAIN JABIL DELLOSA | 
HAKID AKMAL | HABIL AKMAD DELLOSA | HABIL AHMAD 
DELLOSA | REENDO CAIN DELLOS | AHMAD DELLOSA | ABU 
LLONGGO | ABU ILONGGO | ABU MUADZ | BRANDON BERUSA | 
ARNULFO ALVARADO        
Ag02887 YUSUF LEDESMA               
Ag02889 JAINAL ANTEL SALI, JR. 
JAMAL SALI | ABU SULAYMAN | ABU SOLAIMAN | ABU 
SOLAYMAN | APONG SOLAIMAN | APUNG | THE ENGINEER   
Ag02890 MOHAMMAD BARRIENTOS               
Ag02891 ANGELO RAMIREZ TRINIDAD 
ANGELO TRINIDAD Y RAMIREZ | KHALIL TRINIDAD | KHULIL 
TRINIDAD | ABU KHALIL TRINIDAD | CALIB TRINIDAD | KALIB 
TRINIDAD | ADRIAN TOMAS   
Ag02892 PIO ABOGNE DE VERA 
PIO DE VERA Y ABOGNE | PIO ABOGUE DE VERA | PIO ABAGNE DE 
VERA | LEO M. OBOGNE | ISMAEL DE VERA | ISMAIL DE VERA | 
ESMAEL DE VERA | MANEX | TITO ART  
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Ag02893 
FELICIANO SEMBORIO DELOS 
REYES, JR. 
FELICIANO DE LOS REYES | FELECIANO SEMBORIO DELOS REYES | 
FELECIANO DELOS REYES Y SEMBERIO | FELICIANO ABUBAKAR 
DE LOS REYES | USTADZ ABUBAKAR DELOS REYES | ABUBAKAR 
REYES | USTADZ ABUBAKAR ABDILLAH | ABUBAKAR ABDILLAH | 
ABDUL ABDILLAH | JORGE CASTRO         
Ag02894 RICARDO PEREZ AYERAS 
RICARDO ABDULKARIM AYERAS | RICARDO ABDULKAREEM 
AYERAS | RICKY AYERAS | ABDUL KAREEM AYERAS | ABDUL 
KAREM AYERAS | ABDUL KARIM AYERAS | ABDUL KARIM AYERS 
| KHALIL AYERAS | ISAAC JAY GALANG PEREZ | JAY PEREZ | 
ABDUL MUJIB  
Ag02895 DINNO AMOR ROSALEJOS PAREJA 
DINO AMOR ROSALEJOS-PAREJA | DINNO ROSALEJOS PAREJA | 
KHALIL PAREJA | KAHLIL PAREJA | KHALIL PAREJA AMINAH | 
JOHNNY PAREJA           
Ag02896 ISNILON HAPILON 
ISNILON TOTONI HAPILON | HAPILUN, ISNILON | HAPILUN, 
ISNILUN | SALAHUDIN | ABU MUSAB | TUAN ISNILON | ESNILON 
HAPILON | THE DEPUTY          
Ag02897 RADULAN SAHIRON 
SAHIRON, RADULLAN | SAHIRUN, RADULAN | SAJIRUN, RADULAN 
| COMMANDER PUTOL | RADULAN SAJIRON  
Ag02898 CHHOTA SAJID SAJID | MOHAMMAD SAJID             
Ag02899 RIYAZ ISMAIL SHAHBANDRI               
Ag02900 DR SHAHNAWAZ               
Ag02901 ASADULLAH AKHTAR ASADULLAH KHAN  
Ag02902 RAHIL SHEIKH RAHIL ABDUL SHEIKH | RAHIL ATAUR-REHMAN SHEIKH             
Ag02903 AHAD SABET               
Ag02904 FARUQ AL-TUNISI ABU FARUQ AL-TUNISI  
Ag02905 FAISAL SHAHZAD               
Ag02906 HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD ZULFIQAR  
Ag02907 
HUMAM KHALIL ABU MULAL AL-
BALAWI 
ABU DUJANAH AL KHURASANI  
Ag02908 ABDELRAZZAK               
Ag02909 MOSOUD ELBARA               
Ag02910 ASIF CHUTO               
Ag02911 MUFTI OBAID               
Ag02912 MUHAMMAD ALI MEMON               
Ag02913 ARIFA               
Ag02914 HABIBA               
Ag02915 JUMA NAMANGANI JUMABAY KHOJIYEV  
Ag02916 SHERALY AKBOTOEV               
Ag02917 ABDUL QAHAR               
Ag02918 HUSSAIN (IMU)               
Ag02919 MOHAMMED KHALID               
Ag02920 ABDUL AZIZ AL-GHAMDI ABU WALID  
Ag02921 NURPASHI KULAYEV               
Ag02922 IZNAUR KODZOYEV               
Ag02923 MAGOMED AUSHEV               
Ag02924 VLADIMIR KHODOV               
Ag02925 KHANPASHI KULAYEV               
Ag02926 ARSEN MERZHOYEV               
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Ag02927 MAIRBEK SHAIBEKKHANOV               
Ag02928 ABU UMAR (LET)               
Ag02929 ABU QASIM               
Ag02930 SHAFAQAT IQBAL MIR               
Ag02931 SHABBIR AHMED               
Ag02932 DAWOOD IBRAHIM 
DAWOOD EBRAHIM | SHEIKH DAWOOD HASSAN | DAWOOD 
IBRAHIM KASKAR | ABDUL HAMID ABDUL AZIZ | ANIS IBRAHIM | 
AZIZ DILIP | DAUD HASAN SHAIKH IBRAHIM KASKAR | DAUD 
IBRAHIM MEMON | DAUD IBRAHIM MEMON KASKAR | 
DAUDHASAN SHAIKH IBRAHIM KASKAR | DAWOOD HASAN 
IBRAHIM KASKAR | DAWOOD HASSAN | DAWOOD HASSAN 
SHEIKH | DAWOOD IBRAHIM MEMON | DAWOOD SABRI | DOWOOD 
HASSAN SHAIKH IBRAHIM | HIZRAT | IBRAHIM SHAIKH MOHD 
ANIS | KASKAR DAWOOD HASAN | SHAIKH DAUD HASAN | SHAIKH 
ISMAIL ABDUL | SHAIKH MOHD ISMAIL ABDUL REHMAN | SHEIKH 
DAWOOD HASSAN | SHEIKH IBRAHIM  
Ag02933 ABDUL KARIM TUNDA TUNDA  
Ag02934 SAJID MIR SAJID MAJID  
Ag02935 COLONEL R SADATULLAH               
Ag02936 MAJOR GENERAL SAHAB               
Ag02937 MOHD ALTAF               
Ag02938 MOHD ABDU MATIN ABDUL BASIT               
Ag02939 
SHEIKH MOHD MUZZAMIL JAMIL 
AHMED               
Ag02940 
ZAHIR AHMED BASHIR AHMED 
SHAIKH               
Ag02941 
SAYED KHWAJA YUNUS KHWAJA 
AYUB   
Ag02942 IRFAN REHMAN KHAN               
Ag02943 MOHAMED HAMID (ENGLAND)               
Ag02944 KIBLEY DA COSTA               
Ag02945 MUHAMMAD AL-FIGARI               
Ag02946 KADAR AHMED               
Ag02947 MOUSSA BROWN               
Ag02948 SALOUM JOH               
Ag02949 SALEH AL QUUWAYE               
Ag02950 ZAID AL AMER               
Ag02951 EMAD ELMUBARAK Y ALI               
Ag02952 HASH MI               
Ag02953 MOHAMMAD ANEES               
Ag02954 ABDUL KAREEM JASSIM BIDAWI               
Ag02955 HALEEM JASSIM BIDAWI               
Ag02956 JAMAAL JALOUD Y HATO               
Ag02957 IBRAHIM ABID               
Ag02958 NAJIM NASSER Y TAHER               
Ag02959 COMMANDER ROBOT GALIB ANDANG  
Ag02960 HECTOR JANJALANI ABU ESCOBAR  
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Ag02961 JULISAM HARUM               
Ag02962 ABDUL MARAYIN               
Ag02963 ABDULHAKIM EDRIS 
ABDULMUKIM EDRIS | MUKIM EDRIS | HAMIL HAMJA AJILUL | 
ALEX | RYAN  
Ag02964 USTAJ AHMAN HALIFA               
Ag02965 HUSIN SAMIL               
Ag02966 FAWAZ ZI AJJUR AJOOR  
Ag02967 ALBADER PARAD               
Ag02969 JUL AKRAM HADJAIL               
Ag02970 ARULA ABUBAKAR               
Ag02971 MUJIB SUSUKAN MUNJIB SUSUKAN  
Ag02972 BROTHER OF MUJIB SUSUKAN               
Ag02973 LAKANDULA               
Ag02974 BEN ISMI MARSAN  
Ag02975 LANDASAN UMAR               
Ag02976 ITING AGA               
Ag02977 HASHIM               
Ag02978 USTADZ UMBRA JUMDAIL USTADZ | DOCTOR ABU PULA | DR. ABU  
Ag02979 MUHAMMAD AMIN AJIJON               
Ag02980 COMMANDER GLOBAL 
NADZMIE SAABDULLAH | NADZMIE SAABDULLA | ABDULAN 
MADJI  
Ag02981 ALTON LADJAALAM AL  
Ag02982 KEFFREY JINNUI               
Ag02983 AJID HALIK               
Ag02984 HAMDA SAMAC               
Ag02985 COMMANDER KOSOVO ALHAMZER LIMBONG  
Ag02986 HAFTI DAIS KA LANDO  
Ag02987 SALIP ABDULLAH MASDAL COMMANDER SUKARNO HABIB HASHIM  
Ag02988 MADHATTA HAIPE COMMANDER HAIPE  
Ag02989 JATIB USMAN COMMANDER MILIKAN  
Ag02990 PULAH ALIH               
Ag02991 FAIZAL MUTIA               
Ag02992 ALDREN AMIL               
Ag02993 USTADZ SALIM TADO               
Ag02994 PULA                
Ag02995 NUR HASSAN JAMIRI               
Ag02996 REYNALDO APILADO               
Ag02997 HTIMIL HARON               
Ag02998 ALLAN SABUDIN               
Ag02999 MUAMAR ASTALI               
Ag03000 ADONG SALAHUDDIN               
Ag03001 JEROME MUSTAKIM BERANG  
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Ag03002 BURRONG RASUL BARRO ABU MOHAMMAD  
Ag03003 MUJIBAR ALIH AMON BONGBONG | KHATAB | PAPPONG | APPONG            
Ag03004 BASARUN AROK BASARUN AHADUK  
Ag03005 JUMADAIL ARAD               
Ag03006 KARIM JULDANI               
Ag03007 ALBASHIR ADJILI               
Ag03008 ROWENA AKSAN               
Ag03009 NURSIMA ANNUDDEN               
Ag03010 RABIA ASIRI               
Ag03011 MARWINA SALASAIN               
Ag03012 MADRIMAR               
Ag03013 MIDSFAR AKSAN               
Ag03014 ALVIN BAGADI               
Ag03015 ALHASBY MISAYA               
Ag03016 MUBIN SAKANDAL ABDURAJAK  
Ag03017 TING JUMDAEL               
Ag03018 MAGDAR JUMDAEL               
Ag03019 ARMINDA JUMDAEL               
Ag03020 DARUL               
Ag03021 SALLAM               
Ag03022 JULMILLUN               
Ag03023 SADDAM PARAD               
Ag03024 MUNIR ARBISON               
Ag03025 COCOY TULAWIE               
Ag03026 MOAMIL ASKALI               
Ag03027 JULHAN ALIHUDDIN               
Ag03028 SULAIMAN MUIN               
Ag03029 HADJI NAHRIM AKMAD               
Ag03030 YASIR IGASAN ABU ALIH  
Ag03031 MARCIAL JABAROT               
Ag03032 NADZMIR AMIRUL ABU KUDAMA  
Ag03033 JAITUN TIMUAL               
Ag03034 COMMANDER KIRRIH               
Ag03035 TETENG MANDANGAN               
Ag03036 JANATIN MADJAKIN JING AMILUL | ASALUL MADJAKAN             
Ag03037 NURHASSAN JAMIRI               
Ag03038 COMMANDER TOTO SANTAWAR               
Ag03039 HAJAL               
Ag03040 COMMANDER JAVIER               
Ag03041 HAMSIRAJI MARUSI SALI JOSE RAMIREZ | TIBERKIS             
612 
 
ID No. PRIMARY NAME KNOWN ALIASES 
Ag03042 ALDAM TILAO ABU SABAYA | ABU CATADA | ABU AHMAD SALAYUDDIN  
Ag03043 SHAMSUL BAHARI               
Ag03044 AHMAD HASAN AGUNG SUNTORO  
Ag03045 IWAN MUTHO               
Ag03046 MOHAMMAD CHOLILY YAHYA ANTONY  
Ag03047 DWI WIDYARTO               
Ag03048 ALIAS OSMAN               
Ag03049 ANSORI               
Ag03050 ACHMAD BASIR               
Ag03051 BUDI DARMAWAN ARMAN | AGUS PURYANTO             
Ag03052 TEDI SURYA TEDDY | RENO | TEDI  
Ag03053 AHMED MAAZ               
Ag03054 MUHAMMAD RAZI               
Ag03055 AMIN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)               
Ag03056 AKHWAN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)               
Ag03057 FIRDOUS (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)               
Ag03058 MOHAMMAD SYAIFUDIN SAIFUDDIN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)  
Ag03059 ILHAM SOFYANDI ELHAM (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)  
Ag03060 FURQON ABDULLAH FURQAN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)  
Ag03061 DAOUD (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)               
Ag03062 ANWAR (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)               
Ag03063 
MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN 
MOHAMED YUNOS 
              
Ag03064 ACHMAD KANDAI               
Ag03065 NATSIR/RISTAN               
Ag03066 DATUK RAJO AMEH               
Ag03067 BASIT USMAN               
Ag03068 GUIDAY MUNTASIR               
Ag03069 RICO ABURVA               
Ag03070 IMAM LAMAI               
Ag03071 ABDUL SAKIM SALI COMMANDER KIDLAT  
Ag03072 AL POZE               
Ag03073 JOLING               
Ag03074 ELMER AMBRAN ELMER ENURAN  
Ag03075 USTADZ USMAN COLANO               
Ag03076 JAYBE OFRASIO               
Ag03077 ROHMAT               
Ag03078 ALI AL-KHUDAIR               
Ag03079 AHMAD AL-KHALIDI               
Ag03080 NASSER AL-FAHD               
Ag03081 KAHLED JEHANI               
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Ag03082 ZUBAYR AL-RIMI SULTAN JUBRAN SULTAN AL-QAHTANI  
Ag03083 YOSIF SALIH FAHD ALA'YEERI               
Ag03084 
ABDULLAH BIN IBRAHIM BIN 
ABDULLAH ALSHABRAMI               
Ag03085 YUSUF ABDULLAH               
Ag03086 HILAL JABER EL ASSIR               
Ag03087 AHMED ELMOULLA BILLAL               
Ag03089 JAMILUDDIN NASIR               
Ag03090 SADAQAT KHAN MOHAMMAD SADIQ | SADAKAT             
Ag03091 REHAN ALAM               
Ag03092 MUSHARRAT HUSSAIN SYED MOSSARAF HOSSAIN | BOBBY             
Ag03093 HUSRAT ALAM               
Ag03094 SHAKIB AKHTAR               
Ag03095 ADIL HASSAN               
Ag03096 MOHAMMED SABIR MD SABIR  
Ag03097 RAJENDRA VRAJLAL ANADKAT               
Ag03098 SHEIKH OBAIDULLAH               
Ag03099 IDRIS MOHAMMAD ZAHID               
Ag03100 ABDUL KAREEM MOOSA               
Ag03101 NOOR ABU ILAHI               
Ag03102 WALID JINNAH               
Ag03103 MAHFOOZ ALAM               
Ag03104 DAWOOD ALI AHMED ABU ANAS  
Ag03105 EZAZ AHMED DEEPAK  
Ag03106 JAMIR SHAYKH JAMEER  
Ag03107 SOHAIL SHAYKH SOHAIL SHEIKH  
Ag03108 TANVIR ANSARI               
Ag03109 ABED AWAD               
Ag03110 FIROZ LATIF GHASWALA ABDULLAH | FIROZE GHASWALLA             
Ag03111 MOHAMMED IQBAL (LET) ABU HAMZA  
Ag03112 MOHAMMED ALI CHHIPA UBEDULLAH | MOHAMMED CHIPPA | MOHAMMED ALI  
Ag03113 ASIF ABDUL KHAN JUNAID | ASIF KHAN BASHIR KHAN             
Ag03114 NOMAN SHEIKH               
Ag03115 ABU HURERA               
Ag03116 RIZWAN DAWRE RIZWAN AHMED DAVRE  
Ag03117 MUZAMMIL SHAIKH               
Ag03118 EHTESHAM SIDDIQUI               
Ag03119 FAIYAZ KAGZI               
Ag03120 MOHAMMED NAVED               
Ag03121 KAMALUDDIN ANSARI KAMAL ANSARI  
Ag03122 ABU UMAID ABU OSAMA | ABU SALEM             
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Ag03123 SALIM (LET)               
Ag03124 MANISHA CHAVAN               
Ag03125 ZAMEER SHEIKH               
Ag03126 MIRZA HIMAYAT INAYAT BAIG               
Ag03127 
LAL BABA MOHAMMED HUSSAIN 
FAREED 
BILAL  
Ag03128 
MOHAMMAD AHMED ZARAR 
SIDDIBAPPA 
YASIN BHATKAL | AHMED SIDDIBAPPA             
Ag03129 MOHSIN CHAUDHARY               
Ag03130 IKRAM IKRAMULLAH  
Ag03131 ABOUSFIAN ABDELRAZIK   
Ag03132 AHMED ABDI AW-MOHAMED 
AHMED ABDI AW MOHAMMED | MUKTAR ABDULRAHIM 
ABUZUBAIR | SHAYKH MUKHTAR | ABU ZUBEYR | GODANI | 
GODANE           
Ag03133 AHMAD ROFIQ RIDHO               
Ag03134 JOKO TRI PRIYANTO               
Ag03135 MUSTAGHFIRIN               
Ag03136 SOLAHUDDIN               
Ag03137 FADLI SADAMA   
Ag03138 AYMAN AL-BALAWI               
Ag03139 MARUTO               
Ag03140 SUSILO               
Ag03141 PUTRI MUNAROH               
Ag03142 HAWIN MURTADLO               
Ag03143 MOHAMMED AZAM GHAURI               
Ag03144 ABU ABDALLAH AL-SHAMI   
Ag03145 ABU NASIR AL-QAHTANI NAYIF BIN-MUHAMMAD AL-QAHTANI  
Ag03146 MUHAMMAD AHMAD   
Ag03147 ABDALLAH AL-SADIQ ABD-AL-HAKIM BELHAJ  
Ag03148 KHALID AL-SHARIF ABU-HAZIM  
Ag03149 ABU-AL-MUNDHIR SAMI AL-SA'DI | ABU-AL-MUNDHIR AL-SA'IDI             
Ag03150 SHAYKH MIFTAH AL-DUWWADI ABD-AL-GHAFFAR  
Ag03151 ABD-AL-WAHAB QAYID IDRIS               
Ag03152 MUSTAFA QANFID ABU-AL-ZUBAYR  
Ag03153 IBN AL-SHAYKH AL-LIBI ALI MUHAMMAD 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ AL-FAKHRI  
Ag03154 ABU LAITH AL-LIBI   
Ag03155 UMBRA KATO COMMANDER AMERIL UMBRA KATO  
Ag03156 SALIP ALOY ALSREE               
Ag03157 LATIP JAMAT               
Ag03158 NASSER MACABATO               
Ag03159 IMAM ABUBAKAR               
Ag03160 WANING ABDUSALAM               
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Ag03161 SAIDAMEN ALICK               
Ag03162 ADZMIE               
Ag03163 ABUNAWAS               
Ag03164 ABDULRAHMAN MACAPAAR COMMANDER BRAVO  
Ag03165 PLATON BLAH SAMSUDIN DEMAALO | COMMANDER PLATON BLAH             
Ag03166 KULE MAMAGONG USTADZ KULE  
Ag03167 DAUD SARIP               
Ag03168 BIZNAR SALAHUDDIN               
Ag03169 ATTI LINTUNGAN USTADZ ATTI  
Ag03170 ZAHIDE ABDUL ZABIRI ABDUL | BEDZ             
Ag03171 USMAN AL MAJAD               
Ag03172 KASANADEL PIGKAWALAN               
Ag03173 USI AMPATUAN               
Ag03174 NAYANG TIMAN               
Ag03175 DATUKALAN MONTOK SAMAD               
Ag03176 TUMALAO BUTUAN               
Ag03177 MANAMPAN               
Ag03178 TOLNI SALIK               
Ag03179 KUMANDER NASER               
Ag03180 BAY               
Ag03181 AKA KEDIE               
Ag03182 WAHAB UPAO               
Ag03183 MOHAMAD BAEHAQI LATIF | SALMAN | TATOH  
Ag03184 ASNAN SAWAJAAN               
Ag03185 ABRAHAM IBNO               
Ag03186 ANSAR YUSOP               
Ag03187 ABRAL ABDUSALAM               
Ag03188 GUINGONA SAMAL               
Ag03189 SMAWTIN BASILAN               
Ag03190 EDGAR MALAYDAN               
Ag03191 ARIF QADIR               
Ag03192 SHADAAB               
Ag03193 SHEHZAAD               
Ag03194 SALMAN AHMED CHHOTU | SALMAN             
Ag03195 ARIZ KHAN               
Ag03196 MOHAMMAD KHAN               
Ag03197 HAMID SHEIKH               
Ag03198 SHAHRUKH               
Ag03199 ABDUL SATTAR JAINUDDIN  
Ag03200 QAYAMUDDIN KAPADIA               
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Ag03201 IQBAL BHATKAL               
Ag03202 SALEH MUHAMMAD AL-AOOFI               
Ag03203 ABDULAZIZ AL-MOQRIN               
Ag03204 OMAR AHMED ABDULLAH ALI               
Ag03205 MIKAEL DAVUD               
Ag03206 DAVID JAKOBSEN               
Ag03207 
SHAWAN SADEK SAEED BUJAK 
BUJAK               
Ag03208 AHMAD/ISMAIL               
Ag03209 ABI PAMANAY               
Ag03210 ABDULRAHMAN SAMUEL               
Ag03211 JOHER IBRAHIM               
Ag03212 MUJAHID IBRAHIM               
Ag03213 ABU TAHER               
Ag03214 ALSHEED ALLING ALBANI               
Ag03215 ABDUL BAKI               
Ag03216 BARAHAMA SALI               
Ag03271 SHEIK MIYAR HAMZA               
Ag03272 FARDOSA ABDULLAHI               
Ag03273 ASGHAR MUKADAM               
Ag03274 SHAHNAWAZ QURESHI               
Ag03275 SHOAIB GHANSAR               
Ag03276 ABDUL GANI TURK               
Ag03277 YAKUB MEMON YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON  
Ag03278 ESSA MEMON               
Ag03279 YUSUF MEMON               
Ag03280 RUBINA MEMON               
Ag03281 IBRAHIM (TIGER) MEMON ABDUL RAZZAK MEMON | TIGER MEMON             
Ag03282 IMTIAZ GHAVTE               
Ag03283 NASIM BARMARE               
Ag03284 FAROOQ PAWLE               
Ag03285 BASHIR KHAIRULLA               
Ag03286 ZAKIR HUSSAIN SHAIKH               
Ag03287 FEROZ MALLIK               
Ag03288 ABDUL AKHTAR KHAN               
Ag03289 DAWOOD MOHAMMAD PHANSE               
Ag03290 ANIS IBRAHIM ANEES IBRAHIM  
Ag03291 NAIBUDDIN               
Ag03292 MOHAMMED SHARIF               
Ag03293 AYUB MEMON               
Ag03294 ANEES MEMON               
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Ag03295 TANVIR SHEIKH               
Ag03296 SANJAY KUMAR               
Ag03297 ABDUL JAVED               
Ag03298 ABU SALEM               
Ag03299 IQBAL SHEIKH KASKAR               
Ag03300 EZAZ PATHAN               
Ag03301 ATUL KANITAL SHAH               
Ag03302 ASHOK BHANSALI               
Ag03303 AFTAB BATKI               
Ag03304 ABU JINDAL               
Ag03305 AHMED SIDDIQUI AHMED SIDIQI  
Ag03306 SHAHAB DASHTI               
Ag03307 RAMI MAKANESI               
Ag03308 NAAMEN MEZICHE               
Ag03309 GAFUR JUMDAIL               
Ag03310 NAIZ KHAN               
Ag03311 ABU MUHAMMAD HAMZA               
Ag03312 SALEM SAAD BIN SUWEID               
Ag03313 YASIR FRIEHAT               
Ag03314 MUHAMMAD DEMES               
Ag03315 MUHAMMAD AMIN               
Ag03316 ALI KHALED AL-JABOURI               
Ag03317 
MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-
SAMARAI 
              
Ag03318 UMAR BAZIYANI               
Ag03319 
MAHMOOD ABDEL AZIZ AL-
HARAMI AL-JANABI               
Ag03320 FADHIL AL-KURDI ABU UBAYDA  
Ag03321 MARWAN HADID AL-SURI ABU MARWAN (IRAQ INSURGENCY) | ABU MARWAN             
Ag03322 
SAMI MUHAMMAD ALI SAID AL-
JAAF 
OMAR AL-KURDI  
Ag03323 
HASAM HAMAD ABDULLAH 
MUHSIN AL-DULAIMI               
Ag03324 HASSAN IBRAHIM               
Ag03325 ABU TALHA (IRAQ INSURGENCY)               
Ag03326 SABHAN AHMAD RAMADAN AGHA ABU SAAD  
Ag03327 AZMI AL-JAYOUSI               
Ag03328 MOHAMMED SHARKAWA               
Ag03329 
KHAMIS FARHAN KHALAF ABD 
AL-FAHDAWI               
Ag03330 ABU AZZAM               
Ag03331 BILAL MAHMUD AWAD SHEBAH ABU UBAYDAH  
Ag03332 ABU SUFIAN               
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Ag03333 SERGEI MALYSCHEW               
Ag03334 MUHAMMAD G               
Ag03335 MUHAMMAD WASFI               
Ag03336 ABU MOHAMMED AL-MAQDISI               
Ag03337 HUTHAIFA AZZAM   
Ag03338 SHEIK HARITH AL-DARI               
Ag03339 
ABDULLAH RASHID AL-
BAGHDADI               
Ag03340 ABU ABDUL-RAHMAN AL-IRAQI               
Ag03341 ABU HAMZA AL-MUHAJER               
Ag03342 NASIR AL-WAHAYSHI 
NASIR AL-WUHAYSHI | NASIR AL-WAHISHI | ABU BASIR | ABU 
BASIR AL-YAMANI (OR YEMENI) | NASIR ‗ABD-AL-KARIM 
‗ABDULLAH AL-WAHISHI  
Ag03343 QASSEM AL-REMI 
QASIM AL-RAYMI | ABU HURAYRAH AL-SANA'ANI | QASSIM AL-
RAIMI | QASIM YAHYA MAHDI AL-RIMI            
Ag03344 SAID AL-SHEHRI 
SAID ALI AL-SHIHRI | ABU SUFYAN AL-AZDI AL-SHAHRI | SAEED 
AL-SHIHRI  
Ag03345 NASIR AL-BAHRI   
Ag03346 MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-SIHLI               
Ag03347 ABDELRAHMAN AL-SIHLI               
Ag03348 ABDULLAH AL-SIHLI               
Ag03349 MUHAMMAD HAMID HUSSEIN               
Ag03350 ALI HUSSEIN ALI AL-SHAMARI               
Ag03351 
RAWAD JASSEM MOHAMMED 
ABED               
Ag03352 SAFAA MOHAMMED ALI               
Ag03353 
SAJIDA MUBARAK ATROUS AL-
RISHAWI 
              
Ag03354 MUBARAK ATROUS AL-RISHAWI               
Ag03355 NIDAL HASAN NIDAL MALIK HASAN  
Ag03356 AYED AL-SHABWANI               
Ag03358 SALEH AL-TEYS               
Ag03359 IBRAHIM HASSAN AL-ASIRI IBRAHIM HASSAN TALI AL-ASIRI  
Ag03360 ABDULLAH AL-ASIRI               
Ag03361 JABIR AL-FAYFI ABU JAAFAR AL-ANSARI  
Ag03362 MIDHAT MURSI AL-SAYID UMAR 
SHEIKH ABU KHABAB AL-MASRI | MEDHAT MURSI AL-SAYED | 
ABU KHABAB | MADDAT MURSI AL-SAYYID UMAR            
Ag03363 
ABU MOHAMMED IBRAHIM BIN 
ABI AL-FARAJ AL-MASRI 
ABU MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM BIN ABI AL FARAJ AL MASRI  
Ag03364 ABD AL-WAHAB AL-MASRI ABDUL WAHHAB AL MASRI  
Ag03365 ABU ISLAM AL-MASRI ABU ISLAM AL-MASRI  
Ag03366 KHALID HABIB               
Ag03367 MAHMOUD MAHDI ZEIDAN               
Ag03368 TAYIP RAUF               
Ag03369 MATIUR REHMAN               
Ag03370 MAROOF RAUF               
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Ag03371 TAHIR MASOOD               
Ag03372 KUSHMIR NESIRWAN               
Ag03373 ABDUL RAHIM AYUB ABDULRAHIM AYUB  
Ag03374 ABDUL RAHMAN AYUB ABDULRAHMAN AYUB  
Ag03375 RABIYAH HUTCHINSON ROBYN MARY HUTCHINSON  
Ag03376 MUSTAFA HAMID 
ABU AL WALID AL-MASRI | MUSTAFA MUHAMMAD `ATIYA 
HAMID | MUSTAFA ATIYA | ABU WALID AL-MISRI | ABU AL-WALID 
AL-MASRI | ABU AL-WALID | HASHIM AL-MAKKI   
Ag03377 AFIFA ROCHE               
Ag03378 JOHN MUSA               
Ag03379 AZMAN HASHIM               
Ag03380 JACK THOMAS JIHAD JACK | JOSEPH TERRENCE THOMAS             
Ag03381 MARYATI IDRIS               
Ag03382 AISYAH BARAJA               
Ag03383 ZULFAH BASHIR               
Ag03384 MOHAMMED AYUB   
Ag03385 ABDULLAH AYUB   
Ag03386 
MUHAMMAD RAB'A AL-SA YID 
AL-BAHTIYTI 
MUHAMMAD MAHMUD RABI' AL-ZAYD AL-BAHTITI | 
MUHAMMAD MAHMUD AL-BAHTITI | MUHAMMAD RABI' AL-SA'ID 
AL-HATITI | MUHAMMAD RABI' AL-BAHTITI | ABU DUJANA AL-
MASRI  
Ag03387 ALI SALEH HUSAIN 
ABU DAHHAK | 'ALI SALIH HUSAYN AL-DHAHAK AL-TABUKI | ALI 
SALEH HUSAIN AL-TABUKI 'ALI SALIH HUSAYN 'ULA'LAH 'ALI 
SALIH HUSAYN | ALA'LAH DHAHHAK AL-TABUKI | ABU DHAHAK 
AL-YEMENI   
Ag03388 AHMED KHADR 
AHMED SAID KHADR | AHMAD SAEED KHADR | AHMED SAID 
KHEDR | AHMED SAID AL KADER | ABDUL REHMAN KHADR AL-
KANADI | SHAIKH SAID ABDUL REHMAN | AL-KANADI | ABU ABD 
AL-RAHMAN          
Ag03389 KHALID ABDULLAH               
Ag03390 OMAR KHADR               
Ag03391 ABDUL RAHMAN KHADR               
Ag03392 RAHMAH CHIEKHO               
Ag03393 KHALED CHIEKHO               
Ag03394 MAREK SAMULSKI               
Ag03395 
YOUNIS MOHAMMED IBRAHIM 
AL-HAYARI               
Ag03396 SAUD AL-OTAIBI SA'UD AL-UTAYBI  
Ag03397 OMAR BALADJAM               
Ag03398 MOHAMED ALI ELOMAR               
Ag03399 MIRSAD MULAHALILOVIC               
Ag03400 KHALED SHARROUF               
Ag03401 MAZEN TOUMA               
Ag03402 MOUSTAFA CHEIKHO ABU ASAD  
Ag03403 ABDUL RAKIB HASAN               
Ag03404 ABDUL NACER BENBRIKA ABU BAKR  
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Ag03405 AHMED MEHRI ABDULLAH MEHRI  
Ag03406 EZZIT RAAD               
Ag03407 AIMEN JOUD               
Ag03408 FADAL SAYADI               
Ag03409 AMER JADDARA               
Ag03410 AHMED RAAD               
Ag03411 SHANT KENT               
Ag03412 HANY TAHA               
Ag03413 MUSTAFA AYUB               
Ag03414 AMINAH AYUB               
Ag03415 UMNYA AL ZAWAHIRI               
Ag03416 HEBA AL ZAWAHIRI               
Ag03417 MOHAMMED AL ZAWAHIRI MUHAMMAD AL-ZAWAHIRI  
Ag03418 HUSSEIN AL ZAWAHIRI               
Ag03419 KAMAL HABIB               
Ag03420 AZZA NOWAIR               
Ag03421 ISAM AL-QAMARI               
Ag03422 KHALED ISLAMBOULI MOHAMMED AHMED SHAWKI AL ISLAMBOLLY  
Ag03423 SAYYID IMAM 
DR SAYYID IMAM AL-SHARIF | SAYYID IMAM AL-SHARIF | ABD-
AL-QADIR ABD-AL-AZIZ | DR. FADL | DR. FADHL EL MASRY | DR. 
FADHL | SAYYED IMAM SHERIF | DOCTOR FADHL          
Ag03424 FATIMA AL ZAWAHIRI               
Ag03425 NABILA AL ZAWAHIRI               
Ag03426 KHADIGA AL ZAWAHIRI               
Ag03427 UMAYMA AL ZAWAHIRI               
Ag03428 
MOHAMMED BIN AYMAN AL 
ZAWAHIRI               
Ag03429 AISHA AL ZAWAHIRI               
Ag03430 ISMAIL NASSIR               
Ag03431 AHMAD SALAMA MABRUK 
NAJIB | ABU FARAJ AL MASRI | ABU-A -FARAJ AL-ASRI | NASR 
FAHMI NASR | MUHAMMAD SALAH | ABU-IBRAHIM | MURJAN 
MUSTAFA SALIM AL-JAWHARI | 'ISA | SAMI | MAHMUD | IBRAHIM 
AL-AYDARUSI | NASR FAHMI NASR HASSANNEIN        
Ag03432 MAHMUD HISHAM AL-HENNAWI   
Ag03433 AHMAD IBRAHIM AL-NAGAR AHMAD AL-NAJJAR | AHMAD RAJAB FAWDAH             
Ag03434 AHMED ISMAIL               
Ag03435 SARWAT SHEHATA               
Ag03436 ADEL ABDEL QODDUS               
Ag03437 HASSAN ZEMIRI   
Ag03438 ABDEL-GHANI ALI JAWHAR               
Ag03439 TAREK MERHI               
Ag03440 OSAMA AL-SHEHABI               
Ag03441 
MOHAMMED SHAWKI 
ISLAMBOULI               
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ID No. PRIMARY NAME KNOWN ALIASES 
Ag03442 ADNAN AL-SAYEGH               
Ag03443 
OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL-
GHAMDI               
Ag03444 
FAHD SALEH SULAIMAN AL-
JATILI 
              
Ag03445 MOHAMMAD AL-DUKHI               
Ag03446 WAEL ABU JABER               
Ag03447 RACHMAT PUJIPRABOWO BEJO  
Ag03448 USMAN BIN SEF PAHIM  
Ag03449 SABTURANI ROSLAN | ANWAR             
Ag03450 KARIM KHADR               
Ag03451 ABU OBAIDAH AL-MASRI ABU UBAIDA AL-MASRI  
Ag03452 MULLAH ABDUL RAHIM               
Ag03453 FAQIR MOHAMMAD COMMANDER FAQIR  
Ag03454 
ABDUR REHMAN (KARWAN-E-
NIAMATULLAH) 
              
Ag03455 NIAMATULLAH               
Ag03456 MAULVI OMAR               
Ag03457 FATEH MOHAMMAD               
Ag03458 RAFIUDDIN               
Ag03459 ANWAR (TTP)               
Ag03460 QARI ZIAUR REHMAN               
Ag03461 WALI UR REHMAN               
Ag03462 NEK MOHAMMED               
Ag03463 QARI HUSSEIN QARI HUSSAIN | QARI HUSSAIN MEHSUD | USTAD-E-FIDAYEEN  
Ag03464 AAZAM TARIQ               
Ag03465 REHMATULLAH               
Ag03466 ABDULLAH MEHSUD   
Ag03467 SHAKIR ULLAH SHAKIR               
Ag03468 SHARQAWI ABDU ALI AL-HAJJ RIYADH THE FACILITATOR  
Ag03469 
MOHAMMAD OMAR ABDEL-
RAHMAN 
ASADULLAH | LION OF GOD             
Ag03470 AHMAD ABDEL-RAHMAN SEIF ALLAH | GOD'S SWORD             
Ag03471 ASSAD ABDEL RAHMAN ASSAD ULLAH  
Ag03472 ABD AL AZIZ AL-JAMAL ABU-KHALID | ABU KHALID  
Ag03473 
IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD SALIH AL-
BANNA 
              
Ag03474 ABD-AL-MUN'IM AL-BADAWI 
ABU-AYYUB AL-MISRI | SHARIF HAZZA | ABU-AYYUB AL-MASRI | 
SHAYKH ABU HAMZA AL-MUHAJIR | SHEIKH ABU HAMZA AL-
MUHAJER | ABDEL MONEIM EZZEDDINE ALI AL-BADAWI           
Ag03475 MAHMUD AL-DIB               
Ag03476 KHALID BAKIR               
Ag03477 IBRAHIM KARIM               
Ag03478 HASAN ABADI               
Ag03479 KHALIL NUR-AL-DIN               
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Ag03480 YUSUF MUHAMMADAYN               
Ag03481 CHIEFTAIN DARDIRI               
Ag03482 MUHAMMAD UMAYR AL-AWLAQI               
Ag03483 ABDULLAH HAMAS AL FILISTINI               
Ag03484 ABU SULAYMAN JAZAIRI               
Ag03485 ZAIN UL ABU QASIM QASIM HAMZA  
Ag03486 ABDULLAH AZZAM AL SAUDI               
Ag03487 ABU ZUBAIR AL MASRI               
Ag03488 ABDUR REHMAN WAZIR               
Ag03489 ZANJIR WAZIR               
Ag03490 ABDUL SALAM               
Ag03491 ABU WAFA AL SAUDI               
Ag03492 ABDUL KHALIQ HAQQANI               
Ag03493 ABU HARIS ABU HARIS ABDUL HAKIM | ABU HARRIS             
Ag03494 ABU HAMZA HAMZA ARABI  
Ag03495 ABU JIHAD AL MASRI MOHAMMAD HASAN KHALIL AL-HAKIM  
Ag03499 ABDUL RAUF NASSIB   
Ag03500 MUHAMMAD SHARAF               
Ag03501 MUS'AB SHARAF               
Ag03502 QAED SALEM SUNIAN AL-HARTHI ABU ALI  
Ag03503 
MUNIR AHMED ABDULLAH AL-
SAUDA               
Ag03504 SALEH HUSSEIN ALI AL-ZONO               
Ag03505 AOUSSAN AHMED AL-TIRIHI               
Ag03506 ADEL NASSER AL-SAUDA               
Ag03507 KAMAL DARWISH               
Ag03508 MUHAMMAD SHOAIB               
Ag03509 MEHMOOH KHALIB               
Ag03510 IMRAN CHEEMA               
Ag03511 MAHROOF MIRZA MAROOF AHMED MIRZA  
Ag03512 AQEELUR REHMAN ABBASSI               
Ag03513 MUHAMMAD TARIQ               
Ag03514 QADEER MALIK MALIK QADEER  
Ag03515 ABDUL HAFEZ AHMED               
Ag03516 MUHAMMAD AYUB ELAHI MOHAMMAD AYUD ELAHI BIBI  
Ag03517 ROSHAN JAMAL KHAN               
Ag03518 NAZIMUDDIN ZALALOV 
YAHYO | NAZIMUMDDIN ZALALOVE | NAZIMUDDIN | NAJMIDDIN 
KAMOLITDINOVIC JALOLOV | NAJMIDDIN KAMOLITDINOVICH 
JALOLOV | NAZHMIDDIN ZHALALOV | NAJMIDDIN JALALOV | 
NAJMIDDIN JALOLOV | NAZHMIDDIN ZHALOLOV | NAZHMUDDIN 
KAMOLDINOVICH ZHALOLOV | ABU YAHYA MUHAMMAD FATIH | 
ABDURAKHMON | YAKH'YO | NAJMIDDIN KAMILIDINOVICH 
ZHANOV       
Ag03519 ABU AHMED AL-KUWAITI SHEIKH ABU AHMED | IBRAHIM SAEED AHMED             
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Ag03520 HASSAN GHUL               
Ag03521 MUHAMMAD ALI QASIM ABU SOHAIB AL MAKKI  
Ag03522 JALALUDDIN HAQQANI 
HAQANI JALLALOUDDINE | JALALUDDIN HAQANI | 
JALLALOUDDIN HAQQANI | JALLALOUDDINE HAQANI             
Ag03523 MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM               
Ag03524 MUHAMMAD HAQQANI               
Ag03525 QARI ZAFAR               
Ag03526 MUHAMMAD BEG               
Ag03527 MULLAH ABDULLAH               
Ag03528 SIRAJUDDIN HAQQANI 
SIRAJ HAQQANI | SERAJUDDIN HAQANI | SIRAJ HAQANI | SARAJ 
HAQANI | KHALIFA  
Ag03530 SALAHUDDIN               
Ag03531 FAROUQ               
Ag03532 NASIRUDDIN HAQQANI 
NASEER HAQQANI | DR. NASEER HAQQANI | NASSIR HAQQANI 
NASHIR HAQQANI | NASERUDDIN | DR. ALIM GHAIR            
Ag03533 KHALIL AL-RAHMAN HAQQANI 
KHALIL UR RAHMAN HAQQANI | KHALEEL HAQQANI | KHALIL 
AHMAD HAQQANI | KHALIL AHMED HAQQANI            
Ag03534 SAID JAN 'ABD AL-SALAM 
SA‘ID JAN 'ABD-AL-SALAM | QAZI 'ABDALLAH | QAZI ABDULLAH | 
IBRAHIM WALID | DILAWAR KHAN ZAIN KHAN | QASI SA'ID JAN | 
SAID JHAN | FARHAN KHAN | AZIZ CAIRO | NANGIALI         
Ag03535 HOMAYOUN HUMAYUN  
Ag03536 BADRUDDIN HAQQANI               
Ag03537 ABDULLAH FARHAD               
Ag03538 DARIM SEDGAI               
Ag03539 COL. IMAM SULTAN AMIR TARAR  
Ag03540 ABU TAYEB               
Ag03541 MR. C               
Ag03542 HASSAN ALMREI 
HASSAN AHMED AL MEREI | HASSAN AL MREI | HASSAN ALMERI | 
HASSAN EL MREI | HASSAN ALMRIE | HASSAN EL MERIEI           
Ag03543 NABIL ALMARABH               
Ag03544 AHMED AL KAYSEE               
Ag03545 MAHMOUD JABALLAH 
NAWWAF HAIZAN | ABU AHMED | ABU ABDEL-RAHMAN | BILAL | 
BELLAL | MOHAMED EL SAID GABALLAH SAID | MAHMOUD SAID | 
ABU ABDEL RAHMAN EL ASMAR AND SAMEER GAMAL | ALI 
GAMAL  
Ag03546 THIRWAT SHEHATA 
KHALID YASEEN MOHAMMED MAHMOUD | MUHAMMAD ALI | 
THARWAT SALAH SHAHATA | MOHAMMED ALI | THIRWAT 
SHEHATA | THIRWAT SALAH SHIHATA | THIRWAT SALAH 
SHAHATTA | SHEHATA | THRAWAT SALAH SHEHATA ABD ALLAH | 
THARWAT SALAH SHIHATA         
Ag03547 MOHAMAD ZEKI MAHJOUB 
MAHGOUB | MAHMOUB | MOHAMMED HASAN | MAHMOUD 
SHAKER | ABU IBRAHIM | MOHAMMA SHAKR | MOHAMED 
MAHMOUD MAHGOUB | MOHAMED ZAKI MOHAMED MAHGOUB | 
MUHAMMAD ZAKI MUHAMMAD MAHJUB | MOHAMMED MAGOUB         
Ag03548 
ESSAM MOHAMED HAFEZ 
MARZOUK 
ISSAM MOHAMED HAFEZ MARZOUK | MARZUQ | ISSAM MARBUK | 
AMR HAMED | ADNAN | ABU THIR | ESSAM MARZOUK   
Ag03549 HANI YUSEF AL SEBAI 
HANI YUSEF AL SAYYID AL SEBAI | ABU KARIM | HANI AL-
SAYYID AL-SEBAI  
Ag03550 IBRAHIM ALLAM 
IBRAHIM ISMAEL ALLAM | AALAM | ABED AL-RAHMAN | ABDEL 
HAMAED            
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Ag03551 ABU YASSER IZZAT | EZZAT ABU YASSER | BARAKAT FAHIM ALI MOHAMED  
Ag03552 MUSTAFA MOHAMED KRER ABU FADL | ABU AL FADL | ABU DUNYA | ABU DUNIA | ABU JASEM  
Ag03553 HASSAN FARHAT ABDUL JABER | ABU KHALID | HASSAN FARAHAT             
Ag03554 MOHAMED HARKAT 
MOHAMMED M. MOHAMMED S. AL QAHTANI | ABU MUSLIM | ABU 
MUSLIMA | MOHAMMAD ADNANI | MOHAMMED HARKAT  
Ag03555 PACHA WAZIR HADJE WAZIR  
Ag03556 
ABU MESSAB AL 
SHEHRE               
Ag03557 KAMEL AGIZA 
ABDEL HAMID | ABD-AL-HAMID | ABDEL HAMEED | AHMED 
HUSSEIN MOUSTAFA KAMEL AGIZA | AHAMAD HUSAYN | 
UJAYZAK | KAMAL UJAYZAH | AHMED HUSSEIN MUSTAFA 
KAMEL EGAIZAH | AHMAD HUSAYN KAMIL AGIZA  
Ag03558 IHAB SAQR               
Ag03559 
SAEED RASOUL 
SOBRAHATOLLAH MUHAMMAD               
Ag03560 MASOUD RASOUL               
Ag03561 AL-MUGHIRA AL GAZA'IRI AL-MUGHIRA AL-GHAZIRI  
Ag03562 GHARIB               
Ag03563 SHAHWALI               
Ag03564 DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV               
Ag03565 GHAIRAT BAHEER               
Ag03566 AMANULLAH               
Ag03567 NOOR MOHAMMED               
Ag03568 MUSTAFA HAMZA ABU HAZEM | MOSTAPHA HAMZA | IBRAHIM  
Ag03569 METHAT AHMED ABDELRAHMAN               
Ag03570 MOHSIN GHALAIN MOHSSIN GHAILAN  
Ag03571 MOHAMMED KAMEL MOSTAFA MUSTAPHA HAMZA | MOHAMMED MUSTAFA KAMEL             
Ag03572 ABU HASSAN               
Ag03573 AHMED ABDEL SATTAR               
Ag03574 SHEIK SALAH HASHIM               
Ag03575 SOFID HASSAN ADDULKANI AZIK FAISAL | SAFWAT HASSAN ABDEL-GHANI             
Ag03576 
AL-ARAB TSADIK HASSIN 
MOHAMMED 
AL-ARABI SADIQ MOHAMMED  
Ag03577 
ABDULKERIM ALNAZI 
ABDLURAZI 
              
Ag03578 
SHERIF ABDEL-RAHMAN TEWFIK 
EL-MADANI               
Ag03579 HUSSEIN AHMED SHAHAF ALI SIRAJ MOHAMMED | HUSSEIN AHMED SHAHIT | SIRRAJ  
Ag03580 EZET YASSIN               
Ag03581 HAMZA MUSTAFA KAMEL               
Ag03582 MOHAMED CHIADMI               
Ag03583 ABDUL CHIADMI               
Ag03584 KHALID JEBARI               
Ag03585 MALIK NASSAR HARHRA   
Ag03586 SHAHID BUTT   
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Ag03587 SARMAD AHMED   
Ag03588 GHULAM HUSSEIN   
Ag03589 SHAZ NABI   
Ag03590 AYAD HUSSEIN   
Ag03591 YASSER MOSTAFA KAMEL               
Ag03592 MUAMIN ALI               
Ag03593 KARIM ABDULLAH               
Ag03594 MAJAD MAHMOUD               
Ag03595 SULEIMAN FLAIFIL               
Ag03596 MUHAMMAD FLAIFIL               
Ag03597 MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH RIBA'A               
Ag03598 MUHAMMAD GAYEZ SABAH MOHAMMED JAEZ  
Ag03599 NASSER KHAMIS AL-MALLAHI               
Ag03600 KHALED MUSSAED               
Ag03601 YOUNIS ELIAN ABU JARIR               
Ag03602 
OSAMA ABDEL-GHANI AL-
NAKHLAWI 
OSAMA ABDELGHANI AL-NIKHLAWI   
Ag03603 IYAD AL-FALESTINI               
Ag03604 SALEM SHANOUB               
Ag03605 MOHAMMED ABDALLAH ELIAN               
Ag03606 HASSAN AL-ARAYSHI               
Ag03607 TALEB MURTADA               
Ag03608 ARAFAT OUDA ALI               
Ag03609 AHMED MOHAMMED AL-KOREIMI               
Ag03610 MOHAMMED ABDELAZIZ NAFEI               
Ag03611 ATALLAH AL-KORM               
Ag03612 YUSRI MOHAREB                
Ag03613 AYMAN MOHAREB               
Ag03614 TAMER NUSSEIRAT               
Ag03615 
HASSAN RAFAAT AHMED 
BASHANDI               
Ag03616 MOHAMED SOBHI ALI JIDAN               
Ag03617 GAMAL SOBHI ALI JIDAN               
Ag03618 AKRAM MOHAMMED FAWZI               
Ag03619 TAREK AHMED AL-SAYED               
Ag03620 REDA SAYED AHMED               
Ag03621 ASHRAF SAIED YOUSSEF               
Ag03622 EHAB YOUSRI YASSIN               
Ag03623 GAMAL AHMED ABDEL AAL               
Ag03624 ASHRAF SAEED YOUSSEF               
Ag03625 NEGAT YASSIN               
Ag03626 IMAN IBRAHIM KHAMIS               
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Ag03627 MOHAMMED YOUSRI YASSIN               
Ag03628 SABER FARHAT ABU EL-ELA   
Ag03629 MAHMOUD ABI EL-ELA               
Ag03630 MOHAMED SALEM ABDEL-NABI               
Ag03631 ISMAIL ABDALLAH               
Ag03632 HAFEZ ABDEL HAKIM               
Ag03633 TAHA YEHIA SAYYED TAHA YAHYA HUSAYN SAYYID HUSAYN | ABU KHALID             
Ag03634 GURUKANTH DESAI               
Ag03635 OMAR SHARIF LATIF               
Ag03636 ABDUL MALIK MIAH               
Ag03637 
MOHAMMED MOKSUDUR 
RAHMAN CHOWDHURY 
              
Ag03638 
SHAH MOHAMMED LUTFAR 
RAHMAN               
Ag03639 NAZAM HUSSAIN               
Ag03640 USMAN KHAN               
Ag03641 MOHIBUR RAHMAN               
Ag03642 
ABUL BOSHER MOHAMMED 
SHAHJAHAN               
Ag03643 
TAIMOUR ABDULWAHAB AL-
ABDALY 
              
Ag03644 EZEDDEN AL KHALEDI               
Ag03645 ABU OMAR AL-BAGHDADI               
Ag03646 MONA AL-ABDALY               
Ag03647 
MUHARIB ABDUL LATIF AL-
JUBOURI 
              
Ag03648 ABU NIZAR               
Ag03649 HASNA ALI YEHYE HUSSAIN               
Ag03650 WATHI AL-JASSEM               
Ag03651 ABRAR SAEED AHMED               
Ag03652 ABU UNAYS AL SAUDI   
Ag03653 
MOHAMED ELLIAS S/O MOHAMED 
KHAN 
ELLIAS  
Ag03654 CHRISTIAN GANCZARSKI               
Ag03655 WALID NOUAR               
Ag03656 NIZAR NOUAR               
Ag03657 BELGACEM NOUAR               
Ag03658 ASIF MOHAMMED HANIF               
Ag03659 FRITZ MARTIN GELOWICZ               
Ag03660 KARIM MEHDI               
Ag03661 TOLGA D.               
Ag03662 DANIEL MARTIN SCHNEIDER               
Ag03663 ADEM YILMAZ               
Ag03664 ATTILA SELEK               
Ag03665 BILAL BIN MARWAN MULLAH BILAL  
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Ag03666 SALIM AHMED HAMDAN SALIM AHMAD SALIM HAMDAN  
Ag03667 YOUSUF AL-SHAHRI YOUSEF MOHAMMED AL-SHIHRI  
Ag03668 RAYED ABDULLAHI AL-HARBI               
Ag03669 YOUNIS AL-MAURITANI 
ABD AL-RAHMAN OULD MUHAMMAD AL-HUSAYN OULD 
MUHAMMAD SALIM  
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APPENDIX C: MODELED MEMBERSHIP OVER TIME 
 
 
A Note on Interpretation: The difficulty of displaying more than two decades worth of membership data in a readable format 
required some accommodations, including the use of diminutive font and abbreviations.  The letter ―x‖ indicates that, for a given year, 
an individual did not appear in the data used to model membership.  The number ―0‖ indicates that, for a given year, an individual did 
appear in that data, but the modeling process failed to locate them in a named organization.  The majority of the abbreviations used to 
represent organizations are both intuitive and widely used; however, as a handful are non-standard, readers are encouraged to review 
the list below, which includes all abbreviations used to reference organizations, prior to viewing the table containing information on 
agents‘ modeled membership.  Finally, because of the blurry lines that exist between insurgency and terror, this appendix also includes 
information on a handful of organizations that were beyond the scope of this inquiry‘s effort to model Sunni Islamist-motivated terror 
groups.  Data on unmodeled organizations was taken at face value from the original data, and parentheses are used to clearly 
distinguish these unmodeled characterizations from the characterizations derived from the formal membership model.  For example, 
whenever the raw data explicitly referenced someone as a member of the Taliban—an unmodeled organization—they appear in the 
table below as ―(Tal).‖ 
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Table 10.2 List of Organizational Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
Organization Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Organization Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Organization Name 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Abu Sayyaf Group ASG Gujarat Revenge group GRG Laskar Jihad LJ 
Afghan Taliban (Tal) HAMAS (HAM) Laskhar-e-Taiba/Indian Mujahideen LeT 
al-Fuqra Fuqra Haqqani Network HN Martyrs for Morocco MfM 
al-Qaida AQ Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami HUJI Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) Hezb e Islami Gulubbudin (HIG) Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group/ Salafia Jihadia GICM 
al-Qaida in the Arabic Peninsula AQAP Hizballah (Hizb) Pakistani Taliban TTP 
al-Shabaab Shbb Hofstad Group Hof Palembang Group Plbg 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Islamic Group IG Rajah Solaiman Movement RSM 
Asif Raza Commando Force ARCF Jaish-e-Mohammed JeM Rawalpindi-9 Raw-9 
Bayaat al-Imam BaI Jamaat al Muslimeen JAM 
Riyadus-Salakhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion 
of Chechen Martyrs 
RSBM 
D-Company D-Com Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh JIS 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat/Al-Qaida in the 
Islamic Maghreb 
AQIM 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad EIJ Jemaah Islamiyah JI Saudi Hizballah  SdHzb 
Fatah al-Islam FaI Jundallah Jund Sea of David SoD 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Lashkar-e-Jahangvi (LeJ) Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad TQJ 
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Table 10.3 Modeled Membership Over Time 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
00
01
 
FAZUL 
ABDULLAH 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x AQ AQ AQ 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ AQ x x AQ AQ AQ x x 0 0 0 0 0 
A
g0
00
05
 
ADEL ABDEL 
BARY 
x x x x x x x x EIJ EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
06
 
ABDULLAH 
AHMED 
ABDULLAH 
x x x 0 x AQ AQ x EIJ x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
09
 
ABU UBAIDAH 
AL BANSHIRI 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ AQ AQ AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
13
 
AHMED 
KHALFAN 
GHAILANI 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x AQ x 0 AQ AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
14
 
AHMED 
MOHAMED 
HAMED ALI 
x x x EIJ EIJ AQ AQ 0 x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
15
 
RIFA'I AHMAD 
TAHA MUSA 
x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
16
 
HAMDEN 
KHALIF 
ALLAH AWAD 
x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
19
 
ZAKARIA x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
23
 
ANAS AL LIBY x x x x EIJ AQ AQ 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
24
 OTHMAN 
AHMED 
OTHMAN AL 
OMAIRAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
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 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
00
25
 
IBRAHIM 
MOHAMMED 
KHALIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
00
26
 
MUHSIN AL-
FADHLI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
27
 
MUHAMMAD 
AL-HAMATI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
28
 
ABD AL-AZIZ 
AL-MASRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
30
 
AYMAN AL 
ZAWAHIRI 
x AQ AQ x AQ AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 AQ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ AQ AQ AQ 
AQ; 
LeT 
x AQ x x 
A
g0
00
31
 
JIHAD 
MOHAMMED 
ABDOU ALI 
x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
32
 
NUR AL-DIN 
AL-DIBISKI 
x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
33
 ABD ALLAH 
MOHAMED 
RAGAB 
ABDEL 
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
34
 `ALI 
SULAYMAN 
MAS'UD `ABD 
AL-SAYYID 
0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
48
 
CO-
CONSPIRATOR 
2 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
49
 
CO-
CONSPIRATOR 
5 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
50
 
CO-
CONSPIRATOR 
1 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
00
51
 
CO-
CONSPIRATOR 
3 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
52
 
CO-
CONSPIRATOR 
4 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
53
 
CO-
CONSPIRATOR 
6 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
90
 
SADDIQ AL 
MAHDI 
x 0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
00
91
 FAHID 
MOHAMMED 
ALLY 
MSALAM 
x x x x x x 0 0 x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
0 x 
A
g0
01
21
 
MOHAMED 
BELKALEM 
x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 0 x x 0 0 0 x 0 x x 
A
g0
01
22
 
SUHAYL 
FATILLOEVIC
H BURANOV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
01
24
 
IBRAHIM 
DAOUD ABU 
ABDULLA 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
01
25
 
IBRAHIM 
EIDAROUS 
x x x x x x x x EIJ EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
01
65
 
KHALFAN 
KHAMIS 
MOHAMED 
x x 0 0 x x 0 0 0 AQ AQ 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
01
66
 
KHALID AL 
FAWWAZ 
x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ AQ AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
01
81
 
MAMDOUH 
MAHMUD 
SALIM 
x AQ AQ AQ AQ AQ 0 x x AQ 0 x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
01
99
 MOHAMED 
RASHED 
DAOUD AL-
'OWHALI 
x x 0 0 x x x x x 
AQ; 
(Tal) 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
633 
 
ID
 N
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19
88
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19
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19
95
 
19
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19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
02
00
 
MOHAMED 
SADEEK ODEH 
0 x 0 EIJ EIJ AQ AQ x 0 AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
08
 
ABU HAFS AL 
MASRY 
x AQ 0 AQ AQ AQ AQ 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
09
 MUHSIN 
MUSA 
MATWALLI 
ATWAH 
x x x x EIJ AQ x x x x AQ 0 AQ x x x x 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
02
10
 
MUSTAFA 
MOHAMED 
FADHIL 
x x x x EIJ AQ 0 0 EIJ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
44
 
SAIF AL ADEL x x x AQ EIJ AQ x x EIJ 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ AQ AQ x AQ x x x x x x 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
02
53
 
SHEIK OMAR 
ABDEL 
RAHMAN 
AQ IG IG IG IG IG IG IG EIJ AQ x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
54
 
SHEIKH 
AHMED SALIM 
SWEDAN 
x x x x x AQ AQ 0 x AQ AQ x x AQ AQ x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
0 x 
A
g0
02
72
 
USAMA BIN 
LADEN 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ AQ 
AQ; 
IG; 
(MI
LF) 
AQ AQ AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ; 
(Tal) 
AQ; 
EIJ; 
(Tal) 
AQ; 
EIJ; 
JI; 
(Tal) 
AQ; 
AQI
M; 
JI; 
(Tal) 
AQ; 
JI; 
(Tal) 
AQ; 
JI; 
(Tal) 
AQ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
AQ; 
LeT 
AQ; 
FaI 
AQ AQ AQ 
A
g0
02
75
 
WADIH EL 
HAGE 
EIJ 0 AQ 
AQ; 
IG 
AQ AQ AQ 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
79
 JAMAL 
AHMED 
MOHAMED 
AL-FADL 
EIJ 
AQ; 
IG 
AQ AQ AQ AQ AQ EIJ 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
80
 
MUSTAFA 
SHALABI 
EIJ x IG IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
81
 
ABU SHALEED 
AL-FALASTINI 
EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
634 
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20
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20
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20
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20
07
 
20
08
 
20
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20
10
 
A
g0
02
82
 
ABU NOFAL 
AL SAUDI 
x AQ x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
83
 
ISSAWI ABU 
HASSAN 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
84
 
ABU FEDA EL 
MASRY 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
85
 
ABU JAFFAR x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
86
 
SALEM EL 
MASRY 
x AQ x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
87
 
HAYDAR 
DOSARI 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
88
 
ABU KHEIR EL 
MASRY 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
89
 
ABU AYOUB 
AL IRAQI 
EIJ AQ AQ x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
90
 
YASIN 
(BROTHER OF 
ABU AYUB) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
91
 
ABU FARAJ AL 
YEMENI 
x AQ x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
93
 DOCTOR 
ABDEL 
MUNIM AL 
KHABIR 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
94
 
ABU FADHL 
AL MAKKEE 
x AQ AQ AQ AQ AQ AQ 0 x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
95
 
SHEIKH 
SAYYID EL 
MASRY 
x AQ x AQ AQ AQ x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
02
 
20
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20
04
 
20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
02
96
 
QARICEPT AL 
JIZAERI 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
97
 
SAIF AL LIBY x AQ x x EIJ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
98
 
ABU BURHAN 
AL IRAQI 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
02
99
 
HASSAN 
DAHIR AWEYS 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x Shbb x x 
A
g0
03
00
 
ABU HAFS AL 
MANSOURI 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
01
 
ABU 
KHALEED AL 
MADANI 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
02
 
ABU 
HAMMAM AL 
SAUDI 
x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
03
 
ABU QUTADA x AQ 0 0 x 0 x 0 x 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x x 0 x x 
A
g0
03
04
 
SA'ID YUSIF 
ALI ABU 
AZIZAH 
x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
05
 
ABU YASSER 
AL JAZAIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
06
 
ABU ABD AL 
SABBUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
07
 
ABU UBAIDAH 
AL IRAQI 
x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
08
 
ABU FADL AL 
IRAQI 
x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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A
g0
03
09
 
ALI HAROUN x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
10
 
ABDEL 
MAHMABABO 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
11
 OMAR 
HASSAN 
AHMAD AL 
BASHIR 
x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
12
 
DR. SHARIF AL 
DIN ALI 
MUKHTAR 
x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
13
 
MOHAMED 
BAYAZID 
x x AQ AQ AQ AQ 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
14
 
ABU HASSAN 
EL MASRY 
x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
15
 
DR. MUBARAK 
AL DOORI 
x x x AQ x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
16
 
AL QUBASHI 
THE SUDANI 
x x x AQ x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
17
 
SADEEK x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
18
 
FARJAHM x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
19
 
IBN AL 
TAMIYEH 
x AQ x x x AQ x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
20
 
ABU TALHA 
AL SUDANI 
x x x AQ AQ AQ 0 x x x AQ x x 0 AQ AQ 0 x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
03
21
 
ABU 
MOHAMED AL 
YEMENI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
03
 
20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
03
22
 
MOHAMED AL 
NALFI 
x x x x x AQ 0 EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
23
 AHMED 
ABDEL 
RAHMAN 
HAMADABI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
24
 
SHEIKH 
NOMANI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
25
 
ABU JAFFER 
EL MASRY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
26
 
ABDUL BASET 
HAMZA 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
03
27
 
AMIN ABDEL 
MAROUF 
x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
28
 
ABU TALAL 
EL MASRY 
x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
29
 
ABU YASSER 
EL MASRY 
x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
30
 
ABU JAFFAR 
AL LIBY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
32
 
HAMZALLAH 
AL LIBY 
x x x AQ x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
33
 
ABU ABDEL 
QADER AL 
LIBY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
34
 
MUTWAKAL x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
35
 
SAIF ISLAMI 
JANNUBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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00
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01
 
20
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20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
03
36
 
ABU KHALIL 
AL MADANI 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
37
 
ABU HABIB AL 
TUNISI 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
38
 
ABU MAHDI 
AL SAUDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
39
 
ABU KHADIJA 
AL IRAQI 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
40
 
USAMA 
AZMARAI 
x AQ AQ x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
41
 
ABU DIJANA 
AL YEMENI 
x x x x AQ AQ 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
42
 
DR. 
ABDALLAH 
IZZELDINE 
x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
43
 
ABDALLAH 
AZZAM 
AQ AQ x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
03
44
 
ABDEL 
RAHMAN 
SOMALI 
x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
45
 
ABDOUH AL 
MUKHLAFI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
46
 
ABU AHMED 
EL MASRY 
x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
EIJ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
47
 
ABU AKRAM 
URDANI 
x x x x x AQ x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
48
 
ABU ALI 
SUDANI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
639 
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NAME 
19
88
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19
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19
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19
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19
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98
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
03
49
 
ABU HABIB AL 
PAKISTANI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
50
 
ABU KHABUIB 
AL SUDANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
51
 
SHEIK 
BAILALA 
x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
52
 
ABU 
MOHAMED AL 
SURI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
53
 
ABU MUSAB 
AL SUDANI 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
54
 
ABU MUSAB 
AL SAUDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
55
 
MUSTAFA 
SETMARIAM 
NASAR 
x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x 0 x x AQ 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
03
56
 
ABU MUSAB 
REUTER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
57
 
ABU NEAM x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
58
 
ABU QUAIDBA 
EL MASRY 
x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
59
 
AFAD 
MAKKEE 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
60
 
AHMED ALI 
LOOTAH 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
61
 
APRIL 
BRIGHTSKY 
RAY 
x x x x AQ x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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NAME 
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96
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
03
62
 DR. 
ABDULLAH 
MOHAMED 
YUSEF 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
63
 
IBN AL 
MUBARAK AL 
SHARQAWI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
64
 
IHSAN EL 
MADANI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
65
 
KHALID ALI 
WALEED 
x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
66
 
KHALIFA AL 
MUSCAT 
OMANI 
x AQ x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
67
 
MOHAMED AL 
KHEIR 
x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
68
 
MOHAMED 
JARA AL NABI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
69
 
MOHAMED 
SHABANA 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
70
 
MOTASSEM 
SADEEK ABU 
SASHL 
x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
71
 MRS. JAMAL 
AL-FADAL 
(SUDANESE 
WIFE) 
x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
72
 
DR. MOTRIF 
AL SADEEK 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
73
 
OMAR AL 
MAKKEE 
x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
74
 
SAID BIN 
LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
03
75
 
SHEIK ARAFA x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
76
 
SAAD AL 
SHARIF 
x AQ x x AQ AQ 0 x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
77
 
ABU ISHEM 
MADANI 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
78
 
AZERI (JAMAL 
AL-FADL'S 
BROTHER) 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
79
 
ESSAM AL 
RIDI 
x x x x 0 AQ AQ x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
80
 
ABU JAFFER x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
81
 
ABU AL 
DARDAA 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
82
 
ASHIF 
MOHAMED 
JUMA 
x x x x x AQ x x EIJ x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
83
 
FATIMA JUMA x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
84
 
MOHAMED 
ASHRIF JUMA 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
85
 
SETUNA JUMA x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
86
 
TAHERA JUMA x x x x x AQ x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
87
 
SHAMINA 
JUMA 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
642 
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o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
03
88
 
MANIRA JUMA x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
89
 
SIKANDER 
JUMA 
x x x x x AQ x x EIJ x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
90
 
2ND BORN OF 
ESSAM AL 
RIDI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
91
 
KHALID SIDO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
92
 ABU 
MUSABAL 
SURRE OMAR 
ABDEL 
HAKEEM 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
93
 
ABU UBADDA x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
94
 
AZMARAI 
ALSUI 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
95
 DAUGHTER OF 
ESSAM AL 
RIDI (1ST 
BORN) 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
96
 
LOAY x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
97
 
MOATAZ AL 
HALLAK 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
98
 
MOHAMMED 
KARAMA 
x x x x x AQ x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
03
99
 
MOHAMMED 
NAJIBULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
643 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
04
00
 
MRS. ESSAM 
AL RIDI 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
01
 
SHEIK ABDUL 
RASOOL 
SAYYAF 
AQ 0 0 EIJ IG x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
02
 
JOHN RAY x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
03
 
ABU JANDAL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
04
 
ABU MALIK x 0 x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
05
 
AHMED SKEIK x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
06
 
RASHAD 
KHALIFA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
07
 
MOHAMMED 
KASSEM 
x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
08
 
ABDEL MEJID x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
09
 
ADAM 
MOHAMED 
NOOR 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
10
 
ABU AMJED x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
11
 IBRAHIM 
(BROTHER OF 
JAMAL AL-
FADL) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
12
 
ABOUHALIMA EIJ 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
644 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
04
13
 
ABU 
FARAJIMNI 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
14
 
ABU IBRAHIM 
AL IRAQI 
x AQ x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
15
 
ABU IBRAHIM 
IRATI 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
16
 
ABU ISRA AL 
IRAQI 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
17
 
ABU MAT 
EGYPTIAN 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
18
 
ABU TAMIM 
LIBY 
x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
19
 
ASADALLAH 
AL SINDI 
x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
20
 
BASHEER x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
21
 
BUSHRA 
YASIN 
x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
22
 
DITAR ABU 
MAHIS 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
23
 
DR. OMAR 
ABDEL 
MAROUF 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
24
 
FADL AL 
SHAHIDEEN 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
25
 FAISAL 
(COUSIN OF 
JAMAL AL-
FADL) 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
645 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
04
26
 
IBN SALAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
27
 
MOQADEM 
SALAH ABDEL 
AL MOBRUK 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
28
 
MOTASEM AL 
SAUDI 
x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
29
 
MUBARAK EL 
DOORY 
x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
30
 
SADEEK ALI 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
31
 
SAFAR AL 
HAWALI 
x x x 0 x AQ x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
32
 
SALMAN AL 
AUDA 
x x x x x AQ x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
34
 
SHEIKH 
FAZHIL UR 
RAHMAN 
x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
35
 
USAMA 
LUBNANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
36
 YASIN 
(BROTHER OF 
ABU AYOUB 
AL IRAQI) 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
37
 
ZINDANI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
38
 
L'HOUSSAINE 
KHERCHTOU 
x 0 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
EIJ AQ AQ 0 EIJ AQ AQ x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
39
 
ANSWAR 
SHABAN 
x x 0 x x IG x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
646 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
04
40
 
ABU ISALM 
MASRY 
x 0 x AQ x AQ x x EIJ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
41
 
ABU 
RACHMAN AL 
MUHAJER 
x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
42
 
SHEIK ALATI x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
43
 
MRS. SALEH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
44
 
FARAJ ABU EL 
MASRY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
46
 
ABU SURIR x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
47
 
MUNTASSER 
AL JAZIRI 
x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
48
 
MRS. 
L'HOUSSAINE 
KHERCHTOU 
x x x x EIJ AQ x x x x AQ x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
49
 
ALI 
MOHAMED 
x IG x AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 AQ x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
51
 
ABU MADYAN 
EL MASRY 
x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
52
 
ABU RIFA AL 
LIBY 
x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
53
 
ABU AL 
ALKALI 
x x x x EIJ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
54
 
SALEM AL-
IRAQI 
x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
647 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
04
55
 
SULIMAN 
(SON OF 
NAWAWI) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
56
 
ABU KHALID 
AL NUBI 
x x x x x AQ AQ 0 x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
57
 MRS. ABU 
UBAIDAH AL 
BANSHIRI 
(EGYPTIAN 
WIFE) 
x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
58
 
ABU SAID AL 
MASRY 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
59
 
ABU 
MOHAMMED 
MAHEJAN 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
60
 
MRS. ABU 
RACHMAN AL 
MUHAJER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
61
 
SAFIR ALADA x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
62
 
MRS. ABU 
FADHL AL 
MAKKEE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
63
 
ABU KHEIR AL 
YEMENI 
x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
64
 
ABU AMMAR 
AL SURI 
x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
65
 
SAAD x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
66
 
MOHAMMED 
KARAMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
648 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
04
67
 
ABU DERDAA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
68
 
DR. 
MONTESSUR 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
69
 FIRST BORN 
OF 
L'HOUSSAINE 
KHERCHTOU 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
70
 
SHEIK JIHAD 
EL MASRY 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
71
 
ABU 
SALAAMA 
x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
72
 
ABDOUH 
ABDALLAH 
AL YEMENI 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
73
 
ABU BADEN 
EL MASRY 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
74
 
ABU MUATH x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
75
 
ABU DAUD x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
76
 
MAK DAUD x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
77
 
ABU ISMAL x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
78
 
ABU SARA x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
79
 
ABDEL KADIM x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
649 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
04
80
 
AHMED 
HASSAN (I) 
x x x x x x x 0 EIJ EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
81
 
AHMED 
HASSAN (II) 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
82
 
ABU JAMAL 
AMRIK 
x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
83
 
AHMED TIK x x x x EIJ x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
84
 
ABU HARAD 
EL MASRY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
85
 
KIBARUA 
MJITTA 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
86
 
ABU UBAIDAH 
(OF SADEEK 
CAMP) 
x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
87
 
ABU 
THOMAMA 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
88
 
MOHAMED 
SAHAL 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
89
 
ALI MANI x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
90
 
MEENA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
91
 OMAR 
(ODEH'S 
BROTHER-IN-
LAW) 
x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
92
 
SKEIK SAFA x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
650 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
04
93
 
ABDUL 
RACHMAN AL 
HOWARI 
x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
94
 
ABU SAYYID 
AL KIRDI 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
95
 
BILAL 
(COUSIN OF 
JIHAD ALI) 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
96
 
ABDUL JAFAR x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
97
 
AHMED AL 
HAZZA 
x x x x x x x x x (Tal) AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
98
 
FATHER OF 
OWHALI 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
04
99
 
MOHAMED 
BIN AWADH 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
00
 
OMAR BIN 
AWADH BIN 
LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
01
 
ABDULLAH 
BIN AWDAH 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
02
 1ST 
DAUGHTER OF 
AWDAH BIN 
ABOUD BIN 
LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
03
 1ST 
DAUGHTER OF 
AWDAH BIN 
ABOUD BIN 
LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
04
 3RD 
DAUGHTER OF 
AWDAH BIN 
ABOUD BIN 
LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
651 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
05
05
 
AWDAH BIN 
ABOUD BIN 
LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
06
 
DAUGHTER OF 
AL-MADUDI 
FAMILY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
07
 ABDULAZIZ 
BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
08
 ABDULLAH 
BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
09
 
AETEDAL BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
10
 
AHMAD BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
11
 
ALI BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
12
 
AYSHA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
13
 
BAKR BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
14
 
EMAN BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
15
 
FATIMA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
16
 FOWZIYAH 
BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
17
 
GHALIB BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
652 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
05
18
 
HAIDER BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
19
 
HASSAN BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
20
 
HUDA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
21
 
IBRAHIM BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
22
 
ILHAM BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
23
 
ISSA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
24
 
KHALED BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
25
 
KHALIL BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
26
 
MAHROUS BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
27
 
MALAK BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
28
 
MARIAM BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
29
 MOHAMMAD 
BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
30
 
MUNA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
05
31
 
MUNEERA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
32
 
NAJIAH BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
33
 
NOUR BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
34
 
OMAR BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
35
 
RAEDAH BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
36
 
RAJA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
37
 
RANDA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
38
 RUQQUEIYA 
BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
39
 
SAAD BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
40
 
SAHAR BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
41
 
SALEH BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
42
 
SALEHA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
43
 
SALEM BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
05
44
 
SALMA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
45
 
SAMIAH BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
46
 
SANA'A BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
47
 
SEEMA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
48
 
SHAFIQ BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
49
 
SHEIKHA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
50
 
SU'ADD BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
51
 
TAREQ BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
52
 
TAYYEBA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
53
 
THABIT BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
54
 
WAFA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
55
 
YAHYA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
56
 
YASIR BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
05
57
 
YESLAM BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
58
 
ZEENAT BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
59
 
ZUBAIDA BIN 
MOHAMED 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
60
 
UM AYSHA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
61
 FATIMAH 
AHMED 
MOHSEN 
BAHARETH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
62
 
ALIA AL-
GHANEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
63
 
UM 
ABDULAZIZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
64
 
UM ALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
65
 
UM YESLAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
66
 
SAID SALEM 
OMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
67
 
TAMARRA 
RATEMO 
x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
68
 
MOHAMED 
ZAIDI 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
69
 
JULIUS 
KISINGO CEM 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
05
70
 
ABDULWAHDI 
AHMED 
SALUM 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
05
71
 
USAMA BIN 
HUSSEIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
72
 
ANNIS BIN 
HUSSEIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
73
 
MOHAMED K. 
MOHAMED 
x x x 0 x x x x x EIJ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
74
 
FATIMA 
FADHIL 
x x x x x x 0 x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
75
 
ANIS FADHIL x x x x x x 0 x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
76
 
USA FADHIL x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
77
 
ABDALLAH 
HAMISI 
SHLLM 
x x x 0 x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
78
 
ABDUL 
HALLEK 
x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
79
 
ABU AHMED 
AL HARBI 
x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
80
 
ABU MARWAN x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
81
 
ABU RAFA x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
82
 
ADELKA x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
05
83
 
ALI (FRIEND 
OF KK 
MOHAMED) 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
84
 BAHARI 
(FRIEND OF 
KK 
MOHAMED) 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
85
 
FATUMA 
MOHAMED 
x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
86
 
HADYEA 
RUBEYA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
87
 
HAJI JUMA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
88
 HASAN 
(FRIEND OF 
KK 
MOHAMED) 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
89
 ISMAEL 
(FRIEND OF 
KK 
MOHAMED) 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
90
 
KALAL x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
91
 
KASSUM 
JUMA 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
92
 
MARIUM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
93
 
MASSELIM 
MASSELIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
94
 
MOHAMED 
MUSLIM 
SALUM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
95
 
MR. CHAUDRY x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
05
96
 
MRS. FAZUL 
ABDULLAH 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
97
 
MUMIN 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
98
 
NASSOR 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
05
99
 
RAHMA 
AHMED 
KHAMIS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
00
 
RASHID 
SALEH 
HAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
01
 
RAYA JUMA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
02
 
RUBAYA 
MOHAMED 
x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
03
 
SALIM CHICHI x x x x x x x x EIJ x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
04
 
SALMA 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
05
 
SALUM 
MUSLIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
06
 SULIMAN 
(FRIEND OF 
KK 
MOHAMED) 
x x x x x x 0 0 x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
07
 
TARIQ HAMDI x x x x x x x x 0 x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
08
 
ZIYAD 
KHALEEL 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
06
09
 
ZUHURU 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
10
 
IHAB 
MOHAMED 
ALI 
x x x EIJ AQ AQ 0 x 0 AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
11
 
KHALID 
ABDUL 
RACHMAN 
x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
12
 
JALAL FOUD x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
13
 
ELEMIGY 
ABDELDAIM 
x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
14
 MOHAMED 
ALI 
MURAWEH 
SAL ODEH 
0 x 0 x 0 0 x x EIJ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
15
 
DENAL 
CASMIRI 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
16
 
DR. JOSEPH 
MISOI 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
17
 
DR. EL SAYED 
TILIB 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
18
 
SAMIR 
RAHMAN 
MOHAMED 
x x x x 0 x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
19
 
ABU AL 
MUTAZ 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
20
 
SHEIK ISHAQ x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
21
 EZALADEN 
ABDEL 
RAHMAN 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
660 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
06
22
 
SHEIK 
SULEIMAN 
SILL 
0 x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
23
 
DAVID 
MATWAH 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
24
 
ALI OMAR 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
25
 
ABDULLAH EL 
ZUBEIDY 
x x 0 x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
26
 
ADAN A. 
HASSAN 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
27
 SIMON 
(WADIH EL 
HAGE'S 
FRIEND) 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
28
 
AHMAD 
YOUNES 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
29
 
MARION 
BROWN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
30
 
YUMICO 
ABUEILEN 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
31
 
BADR 
ABUEILEN 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
32
 
NASSER 
ABUEILEN 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
33
 
KHALID 
ABUEILEN 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
34
 
SUMA 
ABUEILEN 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
06
35
 
ATEF 
ABUEILEN 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
36
 
SULIMAN ALI x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
37
 
KHAMIS 
MOHAMED 
KHALFAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
38
 
RUBEYA 
KHAMIS 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
39
 
OMAR 
NASSOR 
SALIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
40
 
SULEIMAN 
ABDALLAH 
x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
41
 
MSELLEM 
SHINEY 
MSELLEM 
x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
42
 
MUSALAM x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
43
 MRS. JAMAL 
AL-FADAL 
(AMERICAN 
WIFE) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
44
 
JAMAL 
ZOUGAM 
x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x 0 0 x 
GIC
M 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
45
 
SALAHEDDINE 
BENYAICH 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x JI 0 x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
46
 
ABDELAZIZ 
BENYAICH 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 0 x 0 0 
GIC
M 
x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
06
47
 
MOHAMMED 
AL-GERBOUZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x 
GIC
M 
0 0 x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
06
48
 
ABU DAHDAH x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AQ 0 
GIC
M 
x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
06
49
 
ABU MUSAB 
AL-ZARQAWI 
0 x x x x BaI BaI BaI x x 0 JI 0 AQ 0 AQ 
AQ; 
(AQ
I) 
(AQ
I) 
AQ; 
(AQ
I) 
x 0 x x 
A
g0
06
50
 
MOHAMMED 
FIZAZI 
x x x 0 x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
51
 
ABDULAK AL 
MAGREBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
52
 
MOHAMED 
CHAOUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
53
 
SAID 
CHEDADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
54
 
ALI AMROUS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
55
 
SARHANE BEN 
ABDELMAJID 
FAKHET 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 0 0 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
56
 
AMER AZIZI x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 AQ 0 0 AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
57
 MONEIR 
MAHMOUD 
ALY EL-
MESSERY 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
58
 
JAMAL 
AHMIDAN 
x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
59
 
MOHAMMED 
ATTA 
x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 AQ AQ 
AQ; 
LeT 
0 x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
06
60
 
TARIQ IBN 
ZIYAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
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19
88
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
06
61
 
MOHAMED 
BEKKALI 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
62
 
VINAY KOHLY x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
63
 
SUREH 
KOMAR 
x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
64
 
FAISAL 
ALLUCH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
65
 
KHALID 
OULAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
66
 
NAIMA 
OULAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
67
 
BASEL 
GHAYOUN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
68
 
HAMID 
AHMIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
69
 
ABD AL-HADI 
AL-IRAQI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
06
70
 
FOUAD EL 
MORABIT 
ANGHAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
71
 
MUHANNAD 
ALMALLAH 
DABAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 
Mf
M 
0 x x x x x 
A
g0
06
72
 
SAID BERRAJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
73
 
MOHAMMED 
OULAD 
AKCHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
06
74
 
RACHID 
OULAD 
AKCHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
75
 
ABDENNABI 
KOUNJAA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
76
 
JOSE EMILIO 
SUAREZ 
TRASHORRAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
77
 
RAFA 
ZOUHIER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
78
 
OTMAN EL 
GNAOUT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
79
 
ABDELILAH 
EL FADUAL EL 
AKIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
80
 
RACHID AGLIF x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
81
 
YOUSSEF 
BELHADJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
0 x x x x x 
A
g0
06
82
 
ABDELMAJID 
BOUCHAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
0 x x x x x 
A
g0
06
83
 
HASSAN EL 
HASKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
84
 
RABEI OSMAN 
SAYED 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 
AQ; 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
85
 
MOHAMED 
LARBI BEN 
SELLAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
0 x x x x x 
A
g0
06
86
 
BRAHIM 
MOUSSATEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
0 x 0 x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
06
87
 
MOHAMED 
MOUSSATEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
0 x x x x x 
A
g0
06
88
 
RAMZI 
BINALSHIBH 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AQ AQ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
89
 
MOHAMMED 
AL HADI 
CHEDADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
90
 
ABDERRAHIM 
ZBAKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
91
 
FARID OULD 
ALI 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
92
 
MALAK 
ANDALUSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
93
 
AICHA ACHAB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
94
 
ALI ZOUGAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
96
 
ZAKI BEKKALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
97
 
MOHAMMED 
BEKKALI, SR. 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
98
 
CHARAFA 
BEKKALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
06
99
 
ABDEL HALIM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
00
 
ABDULATIF 
MERROUN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
07
01
 
JAMAL 
BENYAICH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
02
 
ALICE 
BENYAICH 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
03
 
DAVID 
COURTAILLER 
x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
04
 
JEROME 
COURTAILLER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 AQ x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
05
 
ABDELKRIM 
MEJJATI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
06
 
BEN SALAWI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
07
 
ABDELOUAHI
D BERRAK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
08
 
ANTONIO 
TORO CASTRO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
09
 
WALID 
ALTARAKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
10
 
MOHAMAD 
BADR DDIN 
AKKAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
11
 
ZINEB (JAMAL 
ZOUGAM'S 
SISTER) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
12
 SAMIRA 
(JAMAL 
ZOUGAM'S 
SISTER) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
13
 
ABDELILAH 
EL-FUAD 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
667 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
07
14
 
RACHID ADLI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
15
 MRS. 
SARHANE BEN 
ABDELMAJID 
FAKHET 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
16
 
MUSTAFA 
MAYMOUNI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
17
 
ABDILAH 
FIZAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
18
 
ABDELHALIM 
FIZAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
19
 
ASSIYA FIZAZI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
20
 
EL GITANILLO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
21
 
ALLEKEMA 
LAMARI 
x x x x x x x x x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x 0 x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
22
 
CARMEN 
MARIA TORO 
CASTRO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
23
 
MOHAMED 
BELHADJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
24
 
MOHAMED 
AFALAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
0 x x x x x 
A
g0
07
25
 
OUHNANE 
DAOUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
26
 
ADRI RIFAAT 
ANOUAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
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19
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99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
07
27
 
ABDELATIF 
MOURAFIK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
28
 
DRISS CHEBLI x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x 
GIC
M 
x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
07
29
 
MOHAMED 
BELFATMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
30
 
NOUREDINE 
NFIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
31
 
KHALID 
MAJATI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
07
32
 
AZIZA AL-
GERBOUZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
33
 
SAID BAHAJI x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
34
 
TAYSSIR 
ALLUNI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
35
 
FARID HILALI x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 0 x x 0 x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
07
36
 MUHAMED 
GALEB 
KALAJE 
ZOUAYDI 
x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 AQ 0 x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
07
37
 
BASSAM 
DALATI 
SATUT 
x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 0 0 x x 0 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
07
38
 
ABU ABDUL 
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
39
 
ABU 
ZUBAYDAH 
x x x x 0 0 0 AQ AQ 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
07
40
 
MOHAMED 
BAHAIAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
41
 
MOHAMMED 
HAYDAR 
ZAMMAR 
x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
42
 
MAMOUN 
DARKAZANLI 
x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 AQ 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
07
43
 
LUIS JOSE 
GALAN 
GONZALEZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
44
 
JASEM 
MAHBOULE 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
45
 
OSAMA 
DARRA 
x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
46
 
MOHAMED 
NEEDL ACAID 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
47
 AHMAD 
RAGHAD 
MARDINI 
DAKICHL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
48
 
MOHAMED 
ARABI 
SHEHIMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
49
 
MOHAMED 
ZAHER ASADE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
50
 ANWAR 
ADNAN 
MOHAMED 
SALAH 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
51
 
MOHAMED 
BOUALEM 
KHOUNI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
52
 
MOHAMED 
BENSAKHRIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
07
53
 
GHASOUB AL-
ABRASH AL-
GHALYOUN 
x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
54
 
AHMED 
BRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
55
 
NABIL 
NANAKLI 
KOSAIBATI 
x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
56
 
SHEIK 
MOHAMMED 
OMRAN 
AQ x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 AQ x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
57
 
BILAL 
KHAZAL 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
58
 
MOHAMED 
KHAIR AL-
SAQQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
59
 
ABDALRAHM
AN 
ALARNAOT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
60
 
PARLINDUNG
AN SIREGAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
61
 
NAJIB CHAIB 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
62
 
ABU 
ABDULRAHM
AN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
63
 
SID AHMED 
BOUDJELLA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
07
64
 
MOURAD 
KADDAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
65
 
MARIA LUISA 
MARTIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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NAME 
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
07
66
 
ABU RACHED x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
67
 
SAID 
MANSOUR 
x x x x x x x x x 
(GI
A) 
0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
68
 
ABU SUUD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
69
 ZEIN AL-
ABIDINE 
MOHAMED 
HASSAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
70
 
ABDULLA 
KHAYATA 
KATAN 
x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
71
 
AHMED 
KOSHAGI 
KELANI 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
72
 
ABU WALID x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
73
 
ABU AL 
HARETH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
74
 
DJAMEL 
BEGHAL 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
75
 
ABDELGHANI 
MZOUDI 
x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
76
 ROBERT 
RICHARD 
ANTOINE-
PIERRE 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
77
 
MUHSEN 
KHAYBER 
x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
07
78
 
ABDENNABID 
CHEDADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
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NAME 
19
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19
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19
92
 
19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
07
79
 
RAHMA 
AHMIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
80
 
MUSTAFA 
AHMIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
81
 
JABER 
AHMIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
82
 
YUSSEF 
AHMIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
83
 
HICHAM 
AHMIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
84
 
MOHAMED 
BOUHARRAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
85
 
SAED EL 
HARRAK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
86
 
NASREDDINE 
BOUSBAA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
07
87
 
EMILIO 
LLANO 
ALVAREZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
88
 
IVAN 
GRANADOS 
PENA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
89
 
JAVIER 
GONZALEZ 
PENA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
90
 
ANTONIO 
IVAN REIS 
PALACIO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
91
 
SERGIO 
ALVAREZ 
SANCHEZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
07
92
 
RAUL 
GONZALEZ 
PELEAZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
93
 
GHAZI BIDEL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
94
 
YAHIA 
RAGHEH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
95
 
MOUTAZ 
ALMALLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
07
96
 
PILAR M.V. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
97
 
MIGUEL 
ANGEL M.V. 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
07
98
 
SOUFIANE 
RAIFAK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
07
99
 
LOFTI SBAI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
00
 
MOHAMMAD 
AFZAAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
01
 
SHAHZAD ALI 
GUJAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
02
 
RACHID 
MOHAMED 
KADDUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
08
03
 
RACHID 
BENDOUDA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
08
04
 
JAOUAD EL 
BOUZROUTI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
08
05
 
MIMOUN 
BELHADJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
08
06
 
RUBEN 
IGLESIAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
07
 
OMAR 
NAKHCHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
08
08
 
ABDELILAH 
HRIZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
08
09
 
MOHAMED 
EL-IDRISSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
08
10
 
SAMIR 
TAHTAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
0 x 0 x x x 
A
g0
08
11
 
SAFIA 
BELHADJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
08
12
 
ALLAL 
MOUSSATEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
08
13
 
AHMED 
RESSAM 
x x x x x x IG x x x 0 
(GI
A) 
0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
14
 
OMAR 
DEGHAYES 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
15
 
GONZALO 
LOPEZ 
GONZALEZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
16
 
MAHMOUD 
SLIMANE 
AOUN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
17
 
MOHAMMED 
LAMARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
08
18
 
TELDJA 
LAMARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
19
 
ZACARIYA 
ESSABAR 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
20
 
HASAM 
ALHUSEIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
21
 
WAHID 
KOSHAGI 
KELANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
22
 
SADIK 
MERIZAK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
08
23
 PRINCE 
MOHAMMED 
AL-FAISAL 
AL-SAUD 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
24
 
PRINCE TURKI 
AL-FAISAL 
AL-SAUD 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
25
 
SAMER 
DABBAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
08
26
 
REDA SEYAM 0 x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x JI JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
27
 
SALEH 
ABDULAZIZ 
AL-FAHHAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
28
 
ABDULRAHM
AN AL-
FAHHAD 
x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
29
 
ATMANE 
RESALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
30
 
HABIBA 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
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NAME 
19
88
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89
 
19
90
 
19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
08
31
 
CARMEN 
FERNANDEZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
32
 
ASMA ZAFRA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
33
 
NAJAT FADAL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
34
 
MARIAM 
GARCIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
35
 
MOHAMED 
BELAZIZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
36
 
YASIN 
SEDDIKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
37
 
HAKIM 
ZERZOUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
38
 
MAJID 
SAHOUANE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
39
 
ABDERRAMA
N KHOUNI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
40
 
HOCINE 
KHOUNI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
41
 
MOHAMMED 
ACHRAF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
42
 
REDA CHERIF x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
43
 
DJAMEL 
SEDDIKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
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90
 
19
91
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92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
08
44
 
NIZAR 
TRABELSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ AQ 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
45
 
ESSID SAMI 
BEN KHEMAIS 
x x x x x x x x AQ x 0 x 0 AQ 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
46
 
MOHAMED 
BOUKIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
Mf
M 
x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
08
47
 
ABDELKADER 
TCHAREK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
48
 
NABIL 
SAYADI 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x AQ x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
49
 
HAZAR AL-
DABBAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
50
 
PIRJO BRAHIM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
51
 
NORA 
BRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
52
 
ABU KHALEB x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
53
 
MAHER 
KHAZAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
54
 
KAMAL 
HADID CHAAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
55
 
SYLVIE 
BEGHAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
56
 
BAGHDAD 
MEZIANE 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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19
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19
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98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
08
57
 
BRAHIM 
BENMERZOUG
A 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
58
 
KAMEL 
DAOUDI 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
59
 
AZZEDIN 
JOURNAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
60
 
MUSTAPHA 
ABUSHIMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
61
 
WEDAD 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
62
 
ABDULLAH 
BANDASSER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
64
 
SAYER BEDER x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
08
65
 
NOUREDINE 
YENADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
08
66
 
ABDELKADER 
AMARA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
08
67
 
MOHAMMAD 
CHOUDRY 
ASLAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
68
 
MOHAMMAD 
NAEEM NOOR 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x AQ x AQ x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
08
69
 
AMJAD 
FAROOQI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(LeJ
) 
AQ AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
70
 
ADNAN 
ASLAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
08
71
 
ABDELAZIZ 
HOUARI 
MELLAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
08
72
 
MOSTAFA 
AZTOUT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
08
73
 
BELGACEM 
BELLIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
74
 
NASSREDDINE 
BEN LAIDNE 
AMRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
08
75
 
DJILALI 
BOUSSIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
08
76
 
ABDELAZIZ 
EL MERABIT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
77
 
ABDELKRIM 
LEBCHINA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
08
78
 
HAMMAD 
LAHSINI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
79
 
TAHA 
SEGHROUCHN
I 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
08
80
 
ZOHAIR 
KHADIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
08
81
 
OTMAN EL 
MOUIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
82
 
KAMAL 
AHBAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
08
83
 
TAREK 
HAMED HAMU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
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90
 
19
91
 
19
92
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93
 
19
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19
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19
96
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19
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
08
84
 
ZOHRA 
ZEWAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
85
 
TAHER 
DEGHAYES 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
86
 
AMANI 
DEGHAYES 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
87
 
MOHAMMED 
BOUYERI 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x Hof Hof 
JI; 
Hof 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
88
 
SAMIR 
AZZOUZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M; 
Hof 
Hof 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
08
89
 
ABDELADIM 
AKOUDAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
90
 
MOHAMMED 
SALAMEH 
0 IG IG IG IG IG x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
91
 
AMINE 
MEZBAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
92
 
SAMIR KISHK x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
93
 
ABU DOHA x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
94
 
LASED BEN 
HENI 
x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
95
 
MOKHTAR 
BOUCHOUCHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
96
 
TAREK 
CHARAABI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
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90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
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19
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19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
08
97
 MOHAMMED 
BEN 
BELGACEM 
AOUADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
98
 
ABDELKADIR 
ES-SAYED 
x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
08
99
 
SALIM 
BOUKHARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
00
 
LAMINE 
MARONI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
01
 
AEUROBI 
BEANDALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
02
 
SAMAIR 
KARIMOU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
03
 
FOUHAD 
SABOUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
04
 
TAREK 
MAAROUFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
05
 
ESSOUSSI 
LAAROUSSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
06
 EMAD 
ABDELWAHID 
AHMED 
ALWAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
07
 
AMMARI SAIFI x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
09
08
 
RIADH 
JELASSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
09
 
ABU IMAD x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x 
682 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
09
10
 
YASSINE 
CHEKKOURI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
11
 
NABIL 
BENATTIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
12
 
ABDEL HALIM 
HAFED 
REMADNA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
13
 
MEHDI 
KHAMMOUN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
14
 
ADEL BEN 
SOLTANE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
15
 
LAZHAR BEN 
MOHAMMED 
TLILI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
16
 
MANSOUR 
THAER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
17
 
HABIB 
WADDANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
18
 
MOHAMMED 
YEHIA KAAKI 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
19
 
SALEH JAMAL x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
20
 
FARID 
BELARIBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
21
 
JOHAN BONTE x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
22
 
RACHID 
BENMESSAHE
L 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
09
23
 
ABDELKRIF 
LEFKIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
24
 
RACHID JALIL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
09
25
 
YASSINE 
LAHNECH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
26
 
MOHAMED EL 
OMARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
27
 
ABU MUSA 
AL-HINDI 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 JI 0 AQ x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
28
 
AHMED OMAR 
SAEED 
SHEIKH 
x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 0 0 
AQ; 
LeT 
AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
29
 
ABU FARAJ 
AL-LIBBI 
x x x x 0 x 0 AQ AQ 0 0 JI AQ x 0 
AQ; 
(HI
G); 
(Tal) 
AQ AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
09
30
 
QARI 
SAIFULLAH 
AKHTAR 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
x x 
A
g0
09
31
 
BABAR 
AHMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x (Tal) x x (Tal) 0 x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
32
 
MOHAMMED 
MASOOD 
AZHAR ALVI 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x 0 0 x x x x TTP x x x 
A
g0
09
33
 
FAZLUR 
REHMAN-
KHALIL 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
34
 
HAFIZ SAEED x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT LeT 0 LeT x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
09
35
 
HAMEEDULLA
H NIAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
684 
 
ID
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
92
 
19
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19
94
 
19
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19
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19
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19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
09
36
 
ADIL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
37
 
KHALID 
SHAIKH 
MOHAMMED 
AQ 0 0 EIJ IG IG AQ 0 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
38
 
MOHAMMED 
SOHAIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
39
 
HASHIM 
QADEER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
40
 
MOHAMED 
MRABET 
FAHSI 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x 0 0 x x 0 0 
A
g0
09
41
 
MOUNIR 
MRABET 
FAHSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
42
 
MOHAMED 
SAID HSSISNI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
43
 
HASSAN 
MOURDOUDE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
44
 
MUSTAFA 
FAWZI AIT 
OUDRISS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
45
 
MUSTAPHA ES 
SATTY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
46
 
ABDELHAK 
BOUDINA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
47
 
MHAMED 
HADDAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
48
 
DRISS 
HADDAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 
685 
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19
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
09
49
 
HASSAN 
HADDAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
50
 
MOHAMED 
HADDAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
51
 
MAHAMAD 
TIAZOUNIE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
52
 
ABDENBI 
LEBCHINA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
53
 
MAHAMAD 
SULEYMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
54
 
SAMIR 
SULEYMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
55
 
MUSTAPHA 
MOHAMED 
RIZK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
56
 
MOHAMED 
KAFARNA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
57
 
OMAR SALWA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
58
 
ZIANI MAHDI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
59
 
MOURAD 
YALA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
60
 
REDOUAN AL-
ISSAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Hof Hof Hof 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
61
 
ISMAIL 
AKHNIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 Hof x x x x x x 
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ID
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19
88
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19
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20
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
09
62
 
JASON 
WALTERS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x Hof x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
63
 
MARAD J. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
64
 
NADIR 
ADARRAF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
65
 
LABIDINE 
AOURGHE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
66
 
MOHAMED 
BOUGHABA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
67
 
MOHAMED EL 
BOUSKLAOUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
68
 
YOUSEF 
ETTOUMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
69
 
ZAKARIA 
TAYBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
70
 
AHMED 
HAMDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
71
 
RASHID 
BOUSSANA 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
72
 
MOHAMED EL 
MORABIT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
73
 
NOUREDINE 
EL FAHTNI 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x Hof Hof Hof 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
09
74
 
JERMAINE 
WALTERS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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19
88
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
09
75
 
EL-SAYYID 
NOSAIR 
0 IG IG IG 0 IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
76
 
NIDAL AYYAD x IG x IG 0 IG x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
77
 
MAHMOUD 
ABOUHALIMA 
0 IG IG 
AQ; 
IG 
x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
78
 
IBRAHIM 
ELGABROWN
Y 
x x x 
AQ; 
IG 
0 IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
79
 
AHMAD AJAJ x x x x IG IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
80
 
RAMZI 
YOUSEF 
x 
AQ; 
IG 
0 0 
ASG
; IG 
IG AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
81
 
ABDUL 
MURAD 
x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
82
 
BILAL 
ALKAISI 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
83
 
ABDELGHANI 
RABIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
84
 
FAIZA 
BENNOUNA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
85
 
ABDELLAH 
BOUABDELLA
H 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
86
 
MOKHTAR 
HAOUARI 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
(GI
A) 
0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
87
 
RABAH 
KADRE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x 
688 
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
09
88
 
KAMEL 
BOURGASS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQ; 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
89
 
NABIL 
SAHRAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
AQ; 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
90
 
SAAJID 
BADAT 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 JI 0 AQ x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
91
 
BURAWI EL 
WAHIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
92
 
ABDESSATTA
R DAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
93
 
ADEL 
TEBOURSKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
09
94
 
MOHAMED 
ZITLI 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
95
 
AHMED 
ELLATTAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
96
 
MOKHTAR 
BELMOKHTAR 
x x x EIJ 0 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x 0 x x 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
A
g0
09
97
 
EL-ZAHRANI x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
98
 
ABOU CHIHAB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
09
99
 
MOHAMED 
DJABER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
00
 
YASSER 
SAYYAF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
689 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
10
01
 
IBRAHIM 
GHUREIKA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
10
02
 
HASSAN 
HATTAB 
x x x x x 0 x x x x 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
x 
AQI
M 
0 x 0 x 0 AQ x x 
A
g0
10
03
 
NUREDDIN 
GHUREIKA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
04
 
BILAL (GSPC) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
06
 
ASSEM AL-
TIBSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
10
07
 
YEHIA (GSPC) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
10
08
 
AL-BASHIR 
AL-GHARBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
10
09
 
ABU DAJANA 
(GSPC) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
10
10
 
ABDELMALIK 
DAROUKEDEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
AQI
M 
x x 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
x x 
A
g0
10
11
 
EL CHERIF 
GOUSMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
12
 
ABDELAZIZ 
ABBI 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
13
 
REDOUAN 
CHEKKOURI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
14
 
YOUNES 
CHEKKOURI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
15
 
ABDEL HAMID 
SHAARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
690 
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
10
16
 
OMAR 
SHAABANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
17
 
SAID ATMANI x x x x x x IG 0 0 0 0 
(GI
A) 
0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
18
 ABDULSALAM 
ALI ALI 
ABDULRAHM
AN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
19
 
MEVLUET TAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
20
 
RAMEZ 
SULTAN 
0 x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
21
 
OTHMAN 
KAAKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
22
 
MOHAMMED 
OMAR JAMAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
10
23
 
AHMED 
JAMAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
10
24
 
HAITHAM 
MULHEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
25
 
MICHAEL 
KANAAN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
26
 
WASIM EL-
ASAAD 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
27
 
RABEEH 
MAWAS 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
28
 
SHEIK ABDUL 
ZOUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x 
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19
88
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90
 
19
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19
92
 
19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
10
29
 
WILLIE 
BRIGITTE 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x (Tal) 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
30
 
MAMDOUH 
HABIB 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
10
31
 
FAHEEM 
KHALID 
LODHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x 0 0 x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
10
32
 
IZHAR UL-
HAQUE 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 0 x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
33
 
NABIL 
BOUNOUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
34
 
AZNIRI FILALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
35
 
AHMED 
ZEBBAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
36
 
YUSSEF FIKRI x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
GIC
M 
x x 0 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
37
 
HASSAN 
TAOUSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
38
 
MILOUDI 
ZAKARIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
39
 
ABDELKRIM 
CHADLI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
40
 
OMAR 
HADDOUCHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
41
 
ABDUL AZIZ 
JALIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
692 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
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89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
10
42
 
OMAR ABDUR 
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
43
 
MOHAMMED 
ZIA UL HAQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
44
 
NADEEM 
TARMOHAME
D 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
45
 
MOHAMMED 
NAVEED 
BHATTI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
46
 
QUAISIR 
SHAFFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
47
 
JUNADE 
FEROZE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
48
 
ATTA-UR 
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund 
AQ; 
Jund 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
49
 
SHAHZAD 
BAJWA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund 
AQ; 
Jund 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
50
 
MASRAB 
AROCHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
51
 
EDA KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
52
 
FEROZ 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
53
 
ZUBAIR 
ISMAIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
54
 
SALMAN 
SAQUIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
693 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
10
55
 
FAHD NASIM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
56
 
SHEIKH ADIL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
57
 
MOHAMMAD 
ASLAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
58
 
SADIA OMAR 
SHEIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
59
 
AHMED 
SAEED 
SHEIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
60
 
IMTIAZ 
SIDDIQE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
61
 
AFTAB 
ANSARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 LeT 
ARC
F 
x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
10
62
 
MAZHARUL 
ISLAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(LeJ
) 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
63
 
FAZAL KARIM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(LeJ
) 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
64
 
ATTAUR 
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(LeJ
) 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
65
 
LIAQUAT 
HUSSEIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x 
A
g0
10
66
 
MAULANA 
TAHIR 
ASHRAFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
FaI 
0 x x 
A
g0
10
67
 
KHALID 
KHAWAJA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x 0 
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ID
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19
88
 
19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
95
 
19
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19
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19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
10
68
 
ZAHEERUL 
ISLAM ABBASI 
x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
69
 
WAQAR 
HUSSAIN 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 
A
g0
10
70
 
AHMED 
ABDULLAH 
MANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 
A
g0
10
71
 
RAMAY S 
ZAMZAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 
A
g0
10
72
 
IMAN HASAN 
YAMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 
A
g0
10
73
 
OMAR 
FAROUK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 
A
g0
10
74
 
MAZEN 
MOKHTAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
75
 
SHAMIL 
BASAYEV 
x x x 0 x x 0 0 0 0 0 
RSB
M 
x 
RSB
M 
RSB
M 
x 
RSB
M 
RSB
M 
0 x x x x 
A
g0
10
76
 
SYED R. 
MASWOOD 
x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
77
 
YASER AL 
JHANI 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
78
 
HASSAN 
ABUJIHAAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
10
79
 
DERRICK 
SHAREEF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
10
80
 
PIR 
SAIFULLAH 
KHALID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
10
81
 
MUFTI 
RASHEED 
AHMAD 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
82
 
MUFTI 
NIZAMUDDIN 
SHAMZAI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x 0 0 0 x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
83
 
SHER ALI 
SHAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
10
84
 
ABDUR 
RAZZAK 
FAROOQI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
85
 
AZIZUR 
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
86
 
DIN 
MOHAMMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
87
 
MOHAMMAD 
NASRULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
88
 
ASADULLAH 
FAROOQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
10
89
 
MANSOOR 
AHMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
90
 
GHAZI BABA x 0 x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
91
 
MUHAMMAD 
AFZAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
92
 
TABASSUM 
AFZAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
93
 
MOHAMMAD 
NAEEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
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19
90
 
19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
10
94
 
SAEEDUR 
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
95
 
MUHAMMAD 
SOHAIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (Tal) x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
96
 
MOHAMMAD 
AJMAL AMIR 
KASAB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
10
97
 
ABDUL 
WAHID 
KASHMIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
98
 ABDULLAH 
(FROM 
ANANTNAG-
ISLAMABAD) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
10
99
 
HAJI 
MOHAMMAD 
AZAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
00
 
MUZAMMIL 
BUTT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
11
01
 
MOHAMMAD 
UMAIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
02
 
FAISAL DAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
03
 CHOUDHRY 
ABDULLAH 
KHALID 
CHOHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
04
 
RAFIQ 
AKHTAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
05
 
AFTAB 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
06
 
CHOUDHRY 
YOUSAF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
07
 
MOHAMMAD 
SHRIF 
BALGHARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
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19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
11
08
 
RAJA 
MOHAMMAD 
IRSHAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
09
 
MASOOD 
LONE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
10
 
MEMOONA 
SAEED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
11
 
YAHYA 
MUJAHID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
12
 
KHALID 
BASHIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
11
13
 
HAFIZ ABDUR 
REHMAN 
MAKKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
11
14
 
HAJI 
MOHAMMAD 
ASHRAF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
11
15
 
ABU AHMED 
AL HASHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
11
16
 
MOHAMMAD 
SARWAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
11
17
 
ABU USAMA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
18
 
BASHIR ALI 
WANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
19
 
SYED 
MOHAMMED 
ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
20
 
MOHAMMAD 
AKRAM NIAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
21
 
ZIA IKRAM 
NIAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
11
22
 
RIZWAN NIAZI x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
23
 
HAMAD NIAZI x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
24
 
SULEMAN 
SAQIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
25
 
MOHAMED 
ANOUAR 
ZAOUDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
11
26
 
ISSA BEN 
OTHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
11
27
 
KHADIJA 
PODD 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
28
 
ABDOL 
GHAFFAR 
HASHEMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
29
 
NAOUFEL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M; 
Hof 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
30
 
ABDELKRIM 
BENSMAIL 
x x x x x x x x x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
31
 
MOHAMED 
AMINE AKLI 
x x x x x x x x x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
32
 
BACHIR 
BELHAKEM 
x x x x x x x x x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
33
 
MAJID 
MCHMACHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
34
 
EDDEBDOUBI 
TAOUFIK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
35
 
MOUAD 
DOUAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
11
36
 
MUSTAFA 
FARJANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
37
 
BAANOU 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
38
 
SAID AFIF x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
39
 
MOKHATAR 
SIAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
40
 
DJAMEL 
MERABET 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
41
 
KAMARA 
BIRAHIMA 
DIADIE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
42
 
BALDOMERO 
LARA 
SANCHEZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
43
 
SMAIL 
LATRECH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
44
 
AHMED 
MOHAMED 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
45
 
ALI OMAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
46
 
MEDHI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
47
 
MASLOHI ALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
48
 
AMROUCH EL 
H. 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
49
 
RACHID 
BELKACEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Hof x x 0 0 x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
11
50
 
BISLAN I. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
11
51
 
INGRID 
WALTERS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
52
 
CARL 
WALTERS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
53
 
MALIKA 
CHABI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
54
 
MOHAMMAD 
EL 
SHERSHABY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Hof x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
55
 
SOUMAYA 
SAHLA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
11
56
 
ADNAN 
KONSTANTINE 
x x x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
57
 
SIDDIG 
IBRAHIM 
SIDDIG ALI 
x x x IG IG IG x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
58
 
CLEMENT 
RODNEY 
HAMPTON-EL 
x IG IG IG IG IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
59
 
ABDO 
MOHAMMED 
HAGGAG 
x x x x IG IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
60
 
AMIR 
ABDELGANI 
x x x x IG IG x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
61
 
FARES 
KHALLAFALL
A 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
62
 
TARIG 
ELHASSAN 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
63
 
FADIL 
ABDELGANI 
x x x x IG IG x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
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19
90
 
19
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19
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19
93
 
19
94
 
19
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19
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19
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19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
11
64
 
MOHAMMED 
SALEH 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
65
 
VICTOR 
ALVAREZ 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
66
 
MATARAWY 
MOHAMMED 
SAID SALEH 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
67
 
EARL GANT x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
68
 
MARIANNE 
ABOUHALIMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
69
 
MOHAMED 
ABOUHALIMA 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
70
 ABDEL-
RAHMAN 
JOSEPH 
AYYAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
71
 
RESIQ AYYAD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
72
 
ABDUL 
AYYAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
73
 
ABDO YASSIN x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
74
 
IBRAHIM 
AHMAD 
SULEIMAN 
x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
75
 
EYAD 
MAHMOUD 
ISMOIL 
x 0 x 0 IG IG x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
76
 
MOHAMMAD 
ABUKHDEIR 
x x x x IG 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
77
 
OMAR OBAID x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
11
78
 
EDWIN 
ANGELES 
x x x 0 x 0 x 0 x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
79
 
MUSTAFA 
AHMAD AL-
HAWSAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
80
 
MOHAMAD 
JAMAL 
KHALIFA 
AQ 0 0 0 0 0 0 IG 0 x 0 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
81
 
ALICE YABO x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
82
 
NORALYN 
ZARAGOSA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
83
 
ABDUL 
RAHMAN 
YASIN 
x x x x 0 IG 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
84
 
WALI KHAN x AQ x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
85
 
ISTIAQUE 
PARKER 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
86
 
FAZEL OMAR x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
87
 
ADEL 
ATTAYYAB 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
88
 
BAHAUDDIN x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
89
 
IBRAHIM 
RASUL 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
90
 
FAZLULLAH 
HAMIDI 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
91
 
SALEEM 
ABDEL RAHIM 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
11
92
 
TARIQ RANA x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
93
 
ABDUL 
SHAKUR 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
94
 
MAHAUD 
AFFIF 
ABDEJALIL 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
95
 
NEDAL SALEH 
ODEH 
x x x x x 0 x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
96
 
MOHAMMAD 
JUBRAN 
x x x x x 0 x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
97
 
AHMAD 
JUBRAN 
x x x x x 0 x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
98
 
WALID ISMOIL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
11
99
 
MUHAMMAD 
ABDUL KARIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
00
 MOHAMMAD 
SABRI 
SELAMAH 
ABUSWEIRAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
01
 
AHAMAD ABD 
BIN MASRIE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
02
 
HASSAN AL 
DDEN HASAN 
ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
03
 
HADI YOUSEF 
ALGHOUL 
x x x x x x x IG x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
04
 
HASSAN AL-
HIND 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
05
 
FUAD JARDAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
12
06
 
KHALID 
HASSAN 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
07
 
FHAD AOUD x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
08
 
AHMAD ABED 
MASRIE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
09
 
MUSTAFA 
FARAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
10
 
KHALIL 
HUSSEIN 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
11
 
HAMBALI AQ 
AQ; 
IG 
0 EIJ 0 x x 0 
AQ; 
JI 
JI 
AQ; 
EIJ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
ASG
; JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
12
 
FATHUR 
ROMAN AL-
GHOZI 
0 0 0 EIJ x 0 0 JI JI 0 0 x 
ASG
; JI; 
(MI
LF) 
JI JI 0 x TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
12
13
 
FAIZ BIN ABU 
BAKAR 
BAFANA 
x 0 x EIJ 0 0 x JI x 0 0 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
ASG
; JI 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
14
 
MUKHLIS 
YUNOS 
x 
(MI
LF) 
x 
(MI
LF) 
(MI
LF) 
(MI
LF) 
(MI
LF) 
(MI
LF) 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
(MI
LF) 
(MI
LF) 
(MI
LF) 
ASG
; JI 
x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
15
 
AHMED 
SATTAR 
x x x IG x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
16
 
ABUBKR ALY x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
17
 
SAAID 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
18
 
RACHID 
AHMED 
ZOUAOUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
12
19
 
ABDEL 
MESKINI 
x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
20
 
SAMIR AIT 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
21
 
ABDELMADJI
D 
DAHOUMANE 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
22
 
MUSTAFA 
LABSI 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
23
 
FATEH KAMEL x x x x x x IG x 0 x 0 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
12
24
 
MOHAMMED 
SUMIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
25
 
HASAN 
ZUMERI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
26
 
RABAH 
CHEHAJ-BIAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
27
 
KARIM 
KADOURI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
28
 
SLIMANE 
KHALFAOUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
29
 
MIROUANE 
BEN AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
30
 
AHMED 
BELHOUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
31
 
MOHAMED 
MERBAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
12
32
 
ABDELLAH 
ABDELHAFID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
33
 
MOURAD IDIR 
ABES 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
34
 
GHALEM 
BELHADJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
35
 
KARIM 
BENAMGHAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
36
 
SALAH 
MOULLEF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
37
 
HAKIM ZIEM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
38
 
SOFIANE 
LAHAMAR 
HASSIM ZIEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
39
 
DAVID AISSA 
KHALEF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
40
 
MOULOUD 
SIHALI 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
41
 
ABU HAMZA 
AL-MASRI 
x x x x x 0 x x x 0 0 0 (Tal) 
AQI
M; 
(Tal) 
AQI
M 
0 0 AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
12
42
 
MOHAMMED 
MEGUERBA 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
AQ; 
AQI
M 
AQI
M; 
(Tal) 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
43
 
MOHAMMAD 
SIDIQUE 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 AQ AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
12
44
 
SHEHZAD 
TANWEER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x AQ AQ AQ x x x x 
707 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
12
45
 
JERMAINE 
LINDSAY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x AQ AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
12
46
 
VALERIE 
TRAVERSO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
47
 
NAGAT 
CHAFFE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
48
 
OMAR DJEDID x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
49
 
OMAR 
NAITATMANE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
50
 
SIDALI 
FEDDAG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
51
 
MUSTAPHA 
TALEB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
52
 
MUHAMMAD 
AL-TAYYIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
53
 
SHAYKH ABD-
AL-SAMAD 
AHMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
54
 
RICHARD 
REID 
x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x AQ x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
55
 
NOUREDDINN
E MOULEFF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
56
 
MOHAMMED 
BADAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
57
 
ZUBEDA 
BADAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
12
58
 
MALIKA EL 
AROUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
12
59
 
YOUCEF 
AOUNI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
60
 
YASSER AL-
SIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
61
 
ABDERAHMA
NE AMEROUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
62
 
MEHREZ 
AZOUZ 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
64
 
KHELLAF 
HAMAM 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
65
 
IBRAHIM 
KEITA 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
67
 
ABDELKRIM 
EL HADOUTI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
68
 
ABID 
HAMMADOU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
A
g0
12
69
 
SALIM EL-
AFGHANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
70
 
SIDI OULD 
SIDNA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x 
A
g0
12
71
 
MOHAMED 
OULD 
CHABARNOU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x 
A
g0
12
72
 
MAAROUF 
OULD HAIBA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x 
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00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
12
73
 
ABD-
LEKHDIME 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
12
74
 
ABDEL AZIZ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
12
75
 
KHATAB 
MOURAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
76
 
ABDELHAMID 
SADAOUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x 
A
g0
12
77
 
MOHAMED 
BELMOKHTAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
78
 
ABOU ISHAK 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
12
79
 
ASSEM ABOU 
SAID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
12
80
 
ABOU 
DOUJANA 
(GSPC) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
12
81
 
ABDELHAKIM 
(GSPC) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
12
82
 
BACHIR ABOU 
AL BARRA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
12
83
 
ABOU 
MOHAMED AL 
JINKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
12
84
 
ALI DIX x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x 
A
g0
12
85
 
HAROUN EL 
ACHAACHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
12
86
 
ABOU-
OUSSAMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
AQI
M; 
(GI
A) 
x x 
A
g0
12
87
 
YAHIA ABOU 
AMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x 
A
g0
12
88
 
ABOU 
DEHDEH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x 
A
g0
12
89
 
ABDEL ZAID 
ESSOUFFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x 
A
g0
12
90
 
HAMID ZAID 
ESSOUFFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x 
A
g0
12
91
 
EL-HADJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x 
A
g0
12
92
 
AHMED ABOU 
AL-BARAA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
12
93
 
ADEL 
MECHAT 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
94
 
OMAR SAITI x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
95
 
KARIM 
BOUTRI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
96
 
IYAD AG 
GHALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
97
 
BABA ULD 
SHEIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
12
98
 
MOHAMED 
RACHED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
12
99
 
ANTAR 
ZOUABRI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
00
 
ABOU 
KHALED 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
01
 
ABDELMADJI
D DICHOU 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
02
 
AHMED CHABI x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
03
 
MUSTAPHA EL 
YAZID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
04
 
SAADAOUI 
LYES 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
05
 
ABOU 
HAYFEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
06
 
NOREDINE 
SKODARLI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
07
 
S.H. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
08
 
M.G. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
09
 
C.W. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
10
 
R.R.C. x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
11
 
Y.A. x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
13
12
 
ATIYAH ABD 
AL-RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
13
 
ANOUR 
MAJRAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
13
14
 
LASSAD SASSI x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
13
15
 
MUHAMMAD 
BENHEDI 
MSAHEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
13
16
 
SAMI SAYOUD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
13
17
 
ABDELLATIF 
ZEHRAOUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
13
19
 
ARMAN 
AHMED AL-
HISSINI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
13
20
 
HASSAN 
MUSTAFA 
OSAMA NASR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
21
 
MOHAMED 
GAME 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
13
22
 
IGNAOUA 
HABIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
13
23
 ABU HAFS 
THE 
MAURITANIA
N 
x 
AQ; 
IG 
x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
13
24
 
LUCIA 
GARAFALO 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
25
 
ABDEL HAKIM 
TIZEGHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
26
 
BOUABIDE 
CHAMCHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
13
27
 
YAMIN 
RACHEK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
28
 
BRAHIM 
MAHDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
30
 
IHAB DAFEH x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
31
 
KHALED 
OMAR 
MINAWI 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
32
 
ABDULLAH 
AL-MUTHADI 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
33
 
ABDUL RAKIB 
HASAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
13
34
 
ALI JAMAL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
35
 
MELANIE 
BROWN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
36
 
ABU SALAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
37
 
SAMIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
38
 
MAMADOU 
NDAW 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
39
 
MUSTAFA 
CHEIKHO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
40
 MUHAMMAD 
ABDALLAH 
HASAN ABU-
AL-KHAYR 
x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
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01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
13
41
 
VICTORIA 
BRIGITTE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
42
 
CHRISTIAN 
BRIGITTE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
44
 
MAHA HABIB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
45
 
MUHAMMAD 
ARIF BIN 
NAHARUDIN 
x x x x x x x JI JI 0 JI 0 0 LeT x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
46
 
SAJID (LET) x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
47
 
STEVEN CAI x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
48
 
INAM UL-
HAQUE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
49
 
IKRAM UL-
HAQUE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
50
 
MOHAMED 
DAMIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x 0 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
51
 
AHMED AL-
RAFIKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
52
 
ABDELMALEK 
BOUZGARENE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
53
 
YOUSSEF 
ADAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
54
 
ABDELAZIZ 
FIKRI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
13
55
 
MOHAMED 
BENHAMOU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
56
 
ISAM 
ZAMZANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
57
 
ADIL ACHIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
58
 
MOHAMMED 
HAMOUMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
59
 
MOHAMMED 
MABROUK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
60
 
BENDAOUD 
DMIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
61
 
BRAHIM 
HAMDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
62
 
HICHAM 
DARBANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
63
 
SALAHEDDINE 
DEBICHE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
64
 
MOHAMED 
JERMOUNI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
65
 
MOURAD 
LAMNAOUAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
66
 
SALEH ZARLI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
67
 
ABDERRAZAK 
FAOUZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
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20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
13
68
 
KAMAL 
HANOUICHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
69
 
BOUCHAIB 
GUERMACH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
70
 
LAKBIR 
KOUTOUBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
71
 
BOUCHAIB 
MGHADER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
72
 
OMAR 
MAAROUF 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
73
 
LAARBI 
DAQIQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
74
 
ABDERRAHM
AN MAJDOUBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
75
 
RACHID 
AMRINE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
76
 
MILOUD 
MANDOUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
77
 
MUSTAPHA 
LAKRIMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
78
 
HOUSSEIN 
BERGHACHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
79
 
YAZID AJREF x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
80
 
MOURAD 
SAROUF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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A
g0
13
81
 
MOHAMED 
JOK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
82
 
YOUSEF JALIL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
84
 
ABDELRAZAQ 
RTIWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
85
 
ABDELKADER 
EL ARBAOUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
86
 
AMNA EL 
ARBAOUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
87
 
MUSTAFA EL 
ARBAOUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
88
 
OMAR 
ALTIMIMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
13
89
 
YOUNIS 
TSOULI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
13
90
 
WASEEM 
MUGHAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
13
91
 
TARIQ AL-
DAOUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
13
92
 
MOHAMMED 
FEROZE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
94
 
HAROON 
ASWAT 
x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x 0 x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
13
95
 
FARIS AL-
ZAHRANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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A
g0
13
96
 
YAQOOB 
SAEED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
97
 
UZAIR AHMED x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
98
 
SHOAIB 
SIDDIQUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
13
99
 
DANISH INAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
00
 
NAJEEBULLA
H 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
01
 
KHURRAM 
SAIFULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
02
 
SHAHZAD 
MUKHTAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
03
 
AKMAL 
WAHEED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
04
 
ARSHAD 
WAHEED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
14
05
 
RAO KHLAID x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
06
 
MOHAMMAD 
SHOAIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
07
 
ADNAN SHAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
08
 
ABDUL 
WAHEED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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A
g0
14
09
 
JEHAN ARA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
10
 
ABDUL 
HASAB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
11
 
GUL HASAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(LeJ
) 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
12
 
HASAMUL 
SANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
13
 
TAHIR 
YULDASH 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
14
 
ABDULLAH 
AL-HAJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
15
 
DAWAR KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
16
 
RIAZ BASRA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
17
 
USAMA 
KHALID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
18
 
KHALID 
FAROUK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
14
19
 
SUBIRA 
FAROUK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
20
 
AMAL 
KHALIFA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
21
 
ABDUL BASIT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
22
 
SHARIF 
MUHAMMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
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20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
14
23
 
ABU OMAR 
AS-SEYF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
0 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
24
 
MAGOMED 
YEVLOYEV 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
RSB
M 
x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
25
 
ELINA 
ERSENOYEVA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x 
A
g0
14
26
 
MARIE 
SCHULTZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
27
 
ISHAQ RIND x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
28
 
ZAKIUR 
REHMAN 
LAKHVI 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x LeT AQ x LeT x LeT x x 
A
g0
14
29
 
HAFIZ AZIZUR 
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
30
 
ABU ABDUR 
RAHMAN 
SAREEHI 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
31
 
ABU ANAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
32
 
MOHAMMAD 
QASIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
14
33
 
ABDUL 
QADEER 
KHAMOSH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
14
34
 
HAFIZ TAHIR 
MAHMOOD 
ASHRAFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
14
35
 
ARSHAD 
MOHAMMED 
HANIF ANSARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GR
G 
x x x x x x x 
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03
 
20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
14
36
 
SYED 
MOHAMMED 
HANIF RAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GR
G 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
37
 
FAMIDA 
RAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GR
G 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
38
 
FARHEEN 
RAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GR
G 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
39
 
NASIR 
MEHMOOD 
AHWAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
40
 
MOHAMMED 
(JEM) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
41
 
HAMZA (JEM) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
42
 
HAIDER (JEM) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
43
 
RANA (JEM) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
44
 
RAJA (JEM) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
45
 
AR GEELANI x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
46
 
SHAUKAT 
HUSSAIN 
GURU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
47
 
AFSANA x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
48
 
SUBHASH 
MALHOTRA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
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20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
14
49
 
VIRENDRA 
PAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
50
 
TARIQ AHMED x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
51
 
SAIFUL ISLAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
52
 
ABU KASHA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
53
 
ABU ZAID x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
54
 
ABDUL 
REHMAN 
DEDAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
55
 
KHURSHID 
AHMED 
PARREY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
56
 
SEHRAI BABA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
57
 
GHALIB 
AFZAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
58
 
YAHYA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
14
59
 
ISMAIL KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
14
60
 
FAHEEM 
ANSARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
14
61
 
SABAUDDIN 
SHAIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
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20
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20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
14
62
 
HAMMAD 
AMIN SADIQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x 
A
g0
14
63
 
DAVID 
HEADLEY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x 0 0 
AQ; 
LeT 
AQ x 
A
g0
14
64
 
ABU AL QAMA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x 0 LeT 0 0 
A
g0
14
65
 
ZARAR SHAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x 
A
g0
14
66
 
SHAHID JAMIL 
RIAZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x 
A
g0
14
67
 
JAMIL AHMED x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x 
A
g0
14
68
 
MUHAMMED 
YOUNAS 
ANJAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x 
A
g0
14
69
 
SAMIR ALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
14
71
 
ILLYAS 
KASHMIRI 
x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
AQ 
AQ; 
TTP 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
14
72
 
ATEEQ 
CHAUHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
14
73
 
SHAMSHAD 
AHMAD SALFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
14
74
 
ABDULLAH 
MUNTAZIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
14
75
 
ZAFFAR 
IQBAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
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19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
14
76
 
TALHA SAEED x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
77
 FAWAD 
(COUSIN OF 
SULEMAN 
SAQIB) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
78
 
ADIL SHEIKH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
79
 
SOUBHI KINIC x x x x x x x x x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
80
 NAUREDDINE 
SALIN 
ABDOUMALO
U 
x x x x x x x x x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
81
 
MOHAMED 
HAMID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
82
 
ABDELLAH 
HAWARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
83
 
RACHID 
MOHAMED 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
84
 
MOHAMED 
LEUSSADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
85
 
SADE ASDE x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
86
 
SALAH 
GHOULAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
87
 
HADJ 
BOURGIBA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
88
 
ALI IBRAHIM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
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19
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19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
14
89
 
MOHAMMED 
ADJIMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
90
 
FARID GHRIEB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
91
 
MEHREZ BEN 
MAHDOUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
92
 
DIBALI 
ABDELLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
14
93
 
AFIF MEJRI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
14
94
 
YACINE 
AHMED 
NACER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
14
95
 
ALI EL HEIT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
14
96
 
RABAH 
BOURAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
14
97
 
LAMINE 
AHMED 
NACER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
14
98
 
FARID AIDER x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
14
99
 ANTONIO 
(SPANISH 
ARMS 
TRAFFICKER) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
00
 
EMAD SALEM x x x IG 0 IG x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
01
 
ASHRAF 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
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94
 
19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
15
02
 
AHMED 
YOUSIF 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
03
 
SIRAJ EL'DIN 
YOUSIF 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
04
 
SHEIK 
MUBARAK 
SHAH JILANI 
x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
05
 
JAMES 
WILLIAMS 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
06
 
STEPHEN 
PASTER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
07
 
WARITH DEEN 
UMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
08
 
JOSE PADILLA x x 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 EIJ 0 0 AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
09
 
JOHN 
WALKER 
LINDH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(Tal) 
x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
15
11
 
LT. GEN. 
JAVED NASIR 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
12
 
YAHYA ABU 
UBAIDAH 
MUHAMMAD 
x x x x x IG x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
13
 
ELSIE 
HAMPTON-EL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
14
 
LEON 
HOLLAND 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
15
 
LAMONT 
HOLDER 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
16
 
ABD AL-AZIZ 
UDA 
x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
15
17
 
KHIDR ALI x x x 
Fuqr
a 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
18
 
GLENN 
NEVILLE 
FORD 
x x x 
Fuqr
a 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
19
 
CABA JOSE 
HARRIS 
x x x 
Fuqr
a 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
20
 
ROBERT 
JUNIOR 
WESLEY 
x x x 
Fuqr
a 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
21
 
TYRONE 
JUNIOR COLE 
x x x 
Fuqr
a 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
22
 
MUSTAFA 
ABDU RASHID 
x x x 
Fuqr
a 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
23
 
TRACI ELAINE 
UPSHUR 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
24
 
VINCENTE 
PIERRE 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
25
 
ABDUL 
JABBAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
26
 
ABDUS-
SALAAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
27
 
KAREN ANN 
MILLS 
SWEENEY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
28
 
LINDA LEE 
SANCHEZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
29
 
YOUSEF 
AYYAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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NAME 
19
88
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
15
30
 
EVONNE 
GRAVES 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
31
 
HASAB 
ELRASOUL 
BABEKIR 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
32
 
OSMAN EL-
SHEIKH 
x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
33
 
SAEED 
AKMAN 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
34
 
ADEL ANNON x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
35
 
EDITH 
GESMUNDO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
36
 
JOVENAL 
BRUNO 
x x x x x x ASG ASG x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
37
 
ABURAJAK 
ABUBAKAR 
JANJALANI 
AQ 0 0 ASG 
ASG
; IG 
ASG ASG ASG ASG ASG ASG x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
38
 
KHADAFI 
MONTANO 
JANJALANI 
x x x x x x x ASG x x ASG ASG ASG ASG ASG x ASG 
AS
G 
ASG
; JI 
x x x x 
A
g0
15
40
 
ISAM 
MOHAMMED 
ABDUL HADI 
x x x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
41
 
MOHAMMED 
ISMAEL DEIB 
x x x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
42
 
NABIL 
NASSER AL-
RIYAMI 
x x x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
43
 
WAIL RACHEL 
AL-KAATIB 
x x x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
729 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
15
44
 ASERAF 
ABDUL 
ALZOURI 
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
45
 
ENAAM M. 
ARNAOUT 
x 
AQ; 
IG; 
(HIG
) 
x x AQ x x x x 0 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
46
 
SHEIK ADIL 
ABDUL GALIL 
BATARGY 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
47
 
ABUBAKAR 
SHARIFADA 
x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
48
 
ZAKARIA M. 
SHIKH 
x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
49
 
NORALWIZAH 
LEE 
x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
50
 
OMAR AL-
FARUQ 
AQ x x x 0 0 0 
AQ; 
(MI
LF) 
x 0 0 0 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
JI x x 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
15
51
 
GOLIYAH 
ASSAGAF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
52
 
HANUN 
ASSAGAF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
53
 
MIRA 
AGUSTINA 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
54
 
MAHMOUD 
AFIF 
ABDELJALIL 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
55
 
KHALID AL-
MIDHAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
56
 
NAWAF AL-
HAZMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
15
57
 
ABED SHEIKH 
MOHAMMED 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
58
 
ZAHED 
SHEIKH 
MOHAMMED 
0 0 x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
59
 
AREF SHEIKH 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
60
 
ABDULLAH 
BIN KHALID 
AL-THANI 
x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
61
 
AHMAD AL-
HAMWI 
x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
62
 
YAZID 
SUFAAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
63
 
MUHAMMAD 
IQBAL 
0 0 x x x x x x x JI x JI x 0 0 x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
64
 
CHOMEL 
SUFAAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
65
 
MUHAMMAD 
SOBRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
66
 
ABU BAKAR 
BASHIR 
AQ 0 0 EIJ 0 JI JI JI JI JI 
AQ; 
EIJ; 
JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x 0 JI JI 0 0 
A
g0
15
67
 
SHAHRIL HAT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
68
 
MADAM 
FATIMAH 
ZAHARA  
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
69
 
ISMAEL 
LUMINGKIT 
ALI 
x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
15
70
 
ABDULRAHM
AN ESPINA 
x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
71
 
ISMAEL 
NACAN 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
72
 
ABDUL 
MANNAN 
MUKSAN 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
73
 
ALEEM 
SHUAIB 
ABIDIN 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
74
 
MOHAMED 
MANSOUR 
JABARA 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
AQ; 
JI; 
(Tal) 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
76
 
ALI IMRON x 0 0 EIJ x JI x x x x 0 0 
AQ; 
ASG
; JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
77
 
WAN MIN 
WAN MAT 
x x x x x JI x 0 JI 0 x x 0 x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
15
78
 
AMROZI x 0 x x 0 x JI JI JI JI JI 0 
AQ; 
ASG
; JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
15
79
 
MUHAMMAD 
ZAKARIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
80
 
ALI AL-AZIA 
ALI 
x x x x x x 0 x x 0 0 x AQ AQ AQ 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
81
 
KANKAN 
ABDUL QADIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
82
 
MARIYANI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
83
 
ZUBAIR 
MOHAMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
732 
 
ID
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o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
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93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
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98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
15
84
 
AZAHARI 
HUSIN 
x x x x x x x 0 x 0 JI JI 
AQ; 
JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
JI JI TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
15
85
 
SALMAH 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
86
 
ABDUL SAID x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
87
 
ZACARIAS 
MOUSSAOUI 
x x x x x x x AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x 0 x 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
88
 
RUSMAN 
GUNAWAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 JI AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
89
 
HAMBALI'S 
CAMBODIAN 
WIFE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
90
 
ARIFIN BIN 
ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
91
 
HOQUE 
SINDIK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
92
 
MOHAMMED 
NAZIR BIN LEP  
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x AQ x 
AQ; 
JI 
JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
93
 
ABID KHAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
94
 
BASHIR 
MEHMOOD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
95
 
SHAYKH 
MOHAMED 
MOKHTAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
96
 
SAPAE-ING 
BASOR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
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19
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19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
15
97
 
ESAM 
MOHAMID 
KHIRD ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
98
 
ABDUL AZI 
HAJI CHIMING 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
15
99
 
MUHAMMAD 
YALALUDIN 
MADING 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
00
 
SMAN ISMAEL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
01
 
IBRAHIM (JI IN 
CAMBODIA) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
02
 
ROUSHA 
YASSER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
03
 
KHORIYAHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
04
 
AZZAM (JI) x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
05
 
TAUFIQ RIFQI x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
06
 
ABDUL GHONI x 0 x EIJ 0 0 x x x x 0 0 x JI 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
07
 
IQBAL 
UZZAMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
08
 
DELIAR NOER  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
09
 
AL GABRE 
MAHMUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
16
10
 
ABDUL JABAR x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
AQ; 
ASG
; JI 
x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
11
 
OMAR OPIK 
LASAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
13
 
AGUNG 
BIYADI 
x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
17
 
JA'FAR BIN 
MISTOOKI 
x x x EIJ x x x JI JI JI JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
18
 
HASHIM BIN 
ABAS 
x x x EIJ x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
19
 
IMAM 
SAMUDRA 
0 x 0 EIJ x x x JI JI JI JI 0 
AQ; 
JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
16
20
 
YASSIN 
SYWAL 
AQ 0 0 EIJ 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
21
 
JULKIPLI 
SALIM Y 
SALAMUDDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
22
 
SOLAMAIN 
ESMAEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
23
 
ARIS 
MUNANDAR 
x 0 x EIJ 0 0 x x x x x 0 0 JI x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
24
 
AGUS 
DWIKARNA 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x LJ JI 0 JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
25
 
HUSSAIN 
RAMOS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
26
 
ANTONIO 
REYES 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ASG
; JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
27
 
ABDULLAH 
SUNGKAR 
AQ x x EIJ 0 JI JI JI JI JI 
AQ; 
EIJ; 
JI 
JI x x x x x x x x x x x 
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01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
16
31
 
ZAINURI AL-
GHOZI 
x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
32
 
ALI GHUFRON 0 0 x 0 0 JI JI JI JI JI JI 0 
AQ; 
JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x TQJ AQ x 0 x x 
A
g0
16
33
 
MOHAMBEDO
U OULD SLAHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
34
 
MR. 
MAURITANIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
35
 
KHALIL DEEK x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
36
 
MOURAD 
IKHLEF 
x x x x x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
37
 
MUHAMMAD 
AHMED AL-
AHDAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
38
 
AHMED 
MUHAMMAD 
AMIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
39
 
GHULAM 
MUSTAFA 
RAMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
40
 
IMAM KAMEL 
DIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
41
 
NICOLAS 
BELLONI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
42
 
MOHAMED 
YACINE 
AKNOUCHE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
43
 
JAMES 
UJAAMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
16
44
 
YASIN 
HASSAN 
OMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
16
45
 
ATILLA 
AHMET 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
16
46
 
MOHAMMED 
ANSWAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
16
47
 
BASHIR 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
48
 
HASIB 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
16
49
 
HASINA KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
50
 
MAGDY EL-
NASHAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
16
51
 
MOHAMMAD 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
52
 
MANZIA 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
53
 
IMRAN 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
16
54
 
MOHAMMED 
JUNAID 
BABAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
AQ AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
55
 
OMAR KHYAM x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 
AQI
M; 
(Tal) 
AQI
M 
0 AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
56
 
ANTHONY 
GARCIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 AQ x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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A
g0
16
57
 
WAHEED 
MAHMOOD 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 
AQI
M 
AQI
M 
0 AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
58
 
JAWAD 
AKBAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
59
 
SALAHUDDIN 
AMIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x 0 AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
60
 
SHUJAH 
MAHMOOD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
61
 
NABEEL 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
62
 
ZEESHAN 
SIDDIQI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
63
 
OSAMA NAZIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
A
g0
16
64
 
HUSSEIN 
OSMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
16
65
 
MOHAMMAD 
MOMIN 
KHAWAJA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
66
 
SHERAFIYAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
67
 
ALI AYED AL-
SHAMRANI 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
68
 
ABU ZUBAIR 
AL-HAILI 
x x x x x x x AQ x x 0 x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
69
 KHALID BIN 
ODEH BIN 
MOHAMMED 
AL-HARBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 0 x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
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A
g0
16
70
 
FAHD AL-
QUSO 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x 0 x 
AQ
AP 
x x 
AQ
AP 
x 
A
g0
16
72
 
SAYYID 
QUTUB 
EIJ AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
16
73
 
AHMED AL 
ANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
74
 
ABDELBAKI x x x x x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
75
 
ABDELKADER 
HAKIMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
76
 ABDERREHMA
NE AMLKI 
ZAKERAHMA
N 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
77
 
ABDUL FATAH 
ZAMMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
78
 
ABDUL HADI 
AL-IRAQI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
16
79
 
ABU ANZAR x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
80
 
ABU 
MOHAMMED 
AL MAQDARI 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
81
 
ABU TALAL 
AL-QASIMY 
x x x x x AQ x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
82
 
AHMAD EL-
ITTAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
83
 
AHMED 
ELOMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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A
g0
16
84
 
AICHA 
ARBAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
85
 
AMIR LAARAJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
16
86
 
ASIF REZA 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
87
 
AWATES 
MASWOOD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
88
 
AZAM 
CHEEMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 0 AQ LeT LeT x LeT x x 
A
g0
16
89
 
CAROL 
SANTIAGO 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
90
 
CHEJ SALAH x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
91
 
DEDI SETIONO 0 0 x x x x x x x x x LJ 
AQ; 
ASG
; JI 
JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
92
 
FARIDA 
PATEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
93
 
FEIZ 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
94
 
GEMMA 
CRUZ-
ARANETA 
x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
16
96
 
GULBUDDIN 
HEKMATYAR 
0 
AQ; 
(HIG
) 
IG; 
(HI
G) 
x 
(HIG
) 
x 
(HI
G) 
(HI
G) 
(HI
G) 
x x x x x 
AQ; 
(HI
G) 
AQ; 
(HI
G); 
(Tal) 
0 x x x 
HN; 
(HI
G) 
x x 
A
g0
16
98
 HAFIZ 
MOHAMMAD 
ABDULLAH 
BAHAWALPUR
I 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
740 
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20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
16
99
 
HAMZAR 
HAZIZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
00
 
HASAN AL-
TURABI 
x AQ x AQ x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
01
 
HASSAN 
OULAD 
AKCHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mf
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
02
 
JACK ROCHE x x x x x x 0 0 x JI JI 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x 0 x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
17
03
 
JAFFAR UMAR 
THALIB 
x x x x x x x JI JI JI JI x 0 x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
04
 
ABDELKARIM 
MEJJATI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
GIC
M 
x x x x 
GIC
M 
Mf
M 
AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
17
05
 
MAHMOUD 
JAMAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
06
 
MAULVI 
SALEEMULLA
H KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
07
 
MOHAMED 
KHAMIS 
MOHAMED 
x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
09
 
MOHAMMAD 
SALEEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
17
10
 
MOHAMMED 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
11
 
MOSSAAB 
KHATIR 
x x x x 
(GIA
) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
12
 
MUFTI 
MOHAMMED 
JAMIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
741 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
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20
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20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
17
13
 
MULLAH 
KREKAR 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
14
 
MULLAH 
OMAR 
x IG IG 0 0 0 x x x 
AQ; 
(Tal) 
(Tal) 0 0 0 0 AQ x x x x AQ x x 
A
g0
17
15
 MUSTAFA 
(SUSPECT IN 
CASABLANCA 
BOMBINGS) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
16
 
NASIR ABBAS 0 0 x x x x JI 0 JI x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
17
 
NAZIR AHMED 
TAUNSVI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
18
 
NORA YABO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
19
 
OMAR KHAN 
SHARIF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
20
 
OUSSAMA 
KASSIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
17
21
 
RACHID 
AHMIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
22
 
REGINA KREIS 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
23
 
ROBERT 
PIERRE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
24
 
TAHIR 
PERVAIZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
25
 
YAHIA 
DJOUADI 
ABOU AMMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
x 
A
g0
17
27
 
ABDERRAHM
ANE 
AMEUROUD 
x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
03
 
20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
17
28
 
ABDUL HAQQ 
BAKER 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
29
 ABDUL 
RAHMAN ABU 
ABDUL 
NASSER AL-
AASSEMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
17
30
 
ARIF TAJIK x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
31
 
ASIM UZMANI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
32
 
AZAM TARIQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
33
 
DJAMAL 
ZITOUNI 
x x x x x x 0 x 
(GI
A) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
34
 
EDWARD 
FILTON 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
35
 
GHIAS 
HUSSEIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
36
 
HAFIZ DUR 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
37
 
IBRAHIM ABU 
UTHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
17
38
 
IFTIKAR ALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
17
39
 
ISMAIL 
MULLA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
40
 
MARWAN AL-
SHEHHI 
x x x x x x x x x 0 0 AQ AQ AQ x x x 0 x x x x x 
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20
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20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
17
41
 
MAULANA 
YOUSUF 
BINNORI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
42
 
MOHAMMAD 
AMJID KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
17
43
 
MOHAMMAD 
UZAIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Jund x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
44
 
MYSTERY 
PAKISTANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
17
45
 
QARI AHMAD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
46
 
QARI 
GHULAM 
MURTAZA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
47
 
RACHID 
RAMDA 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
49
 
SHEIKH 
MOHAMMED 
ADEEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
50
 
SUHIR A. 
AHMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
51
 
ZAFAR IQBAL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
17
52
 
SHAKER AL-
ABSSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x 
AQ; 
FaI 
x x x 
A
g0
17
53
 
CHERIE 
MARIA 
STULTZ 
x x x x 0 0 x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
54
 
JOSHUA 
PADILLA 
x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
744 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
17
55
 
MUHAMMED 
JAVED 
x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
56
 
SHAMIA'A x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
57
 
HUSSEIN 
PADILLA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
58
 
HASSAN 
PADILLA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
59
 
MRS. 
ABDULATIF 
MERROUN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
60
 
ABDUL AZIZ 
AL OMARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
61
 
SATAM AL 
SUQAMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
62
 
WALI AL 
SHEHRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
63
 
WALEED AL 
SHEHRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
64
 
FAYEZ 
BENIHAMMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
65
 
MOHAND AL 
SHEHRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
66
 
AHMED AL 
GHAMDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
67
 
HAMZA AL 
GHAMDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
745 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
17
68
 
MAJED 
MOQED 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
69
 
HANI 
HANJOUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
70
 
SALEM AL 
HAZMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
71
 
SAEED AL 
GHAMDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
72
 
AHMED 
ABDULLAH 
ALNAMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
73
 
AHMAD AL 
HAZNAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
74
 
ZIAD JARRAH x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
75
 
KHALED 
MOHAMMED 
AL-ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
76
 
MOHAMMED 
BIN USAMA 
BIN LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
77
 
SAAD BIN 
USAMA BIN 
LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
17
78
 
HAMZA BIN 
USAMA BIN 
LADEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
80
 
OMAR AL-
KHATAB 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
81
 
ALI MAHMUD x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
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00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
17
82
 
ABOUD ROGO x x x x x x 0 x x AQ x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
83
 
MOHAMED 
KUBWA 
x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x AQ 0 x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
17
84
 
KARIM 
(MOMBASA 
ATTACKS) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
85
 
SAID SAGGAR 
AHMED 
x x x x x x 0 x x x AQ x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
17
86
 
AMINA 
MOHAMMED 
KUBWA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
87
 
ADNAN G. EL 
SHUKRIJUMA
H 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x AQ x 0 0 x x x AQ x 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
17
88
 
ADERRAUF 
JDEY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
89
 
AMER EL-
MAATI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
90
 
ADAM 
GADAHN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x AQ x 
AQ; 
LeT 
x x x 0 
A
g0
17
91
 
SALEH ALI 
SALEH 
NABHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 AQ AQ x x 0 x x 0 x 
A
g0
17
92
 HALIMA 
BADROUDINE 
FAZUL 
HUSSEINE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
17
93
 
HASHI 
HUSSEIN 
FARAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
17
94
 UMAR 
FAROUK 
ABDULMUTAL
AB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x 
AQ
AP 
x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
17
95
 
OMAR 
AWADH 
OMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
17
96
 
HUSSEIN 
HASSAN 
AGADE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
17
97
 
ISSA OSMAN 
ISSA 
x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 0 0 0 AQ AQ x x x 
Shb
b 
x x 0 
A
g0
17
98
 
FUMO 
MOHAMED 
FUMO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
17
99
 
SALIM SAMIR 
BA'AMER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
00
 
AHMED HAJJI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
01
 
DABBAS BIN 
MOHAMMED 
AL-DABBASY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
02
 
MOHAMMED 
ALI SALEH 
NABHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
03
 
NASSEM x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
04
 
MUNIRA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
05
 
ALI SAGGAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
06
 
HANIYA x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
07
 
OMAR SAID 
OMAR 
x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 0 0 AQ AQ x 0 x x x x x 
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00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
18
09
 
SULEIMAN 
ABDALLA 
SALIM HEMED 
x x x x x x x x 0 x AQ 0 0 0 AQ AQ x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
18
10
 
SALMIN 
MOHAMMED 
KHAMIS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x 0 x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
11
 
FAISAL ALI 
NASSOR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
12
 
OMAR 
FAROOQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
x x 
A
g0
18
13
 
MOHAMMED 
ILLYAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
A
g0
18
14
 
ANNELIESE 
BAHAJI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
15
 
NESE KUL x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
16
 
MOUNIR EL-
MOTASSADEQ 
x x x x x x x AQ 0 x 0 AQ 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
17
 
HAMZA RABIA x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 AQ AQ 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
18
18
 
KUBWA 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
18
19
 
SWALHA 
KUBWA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
20
 
AAFIA 
SIDDIQUI 
x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x AQ x x 0 AQ x x x x 0 x 0 
A
g0
18
21
 
CHARLES 
TAYLOR 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
22
 
AISHA 
NABHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
18
23
 SHEIKH 
MUKHTAR 
ABDIRAHMAN 
ABU-ZUBEYR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
24
 
OMAR 
HAMMAMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
18
25
 
AL-AMIN 
KIMATHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
26
 
BILAL EL 
BERJAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
27
 
OMAR 
BADRUDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
28
 
WALLA ELDIN 
ABDEL 
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
29
 
SAKRIH 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
30
 
HASSAN 
AGADE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
31
 
FARIDAH 
HAMUBU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
32
 
FATUMA 
SAIDI 
ABUDULLAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
33
 
EDRISA ISSA 
LUYIMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
34
 
EDRISA 
NSUBUGA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
35
 
HARUNA 
HASSAN 
LUYIMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
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20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
18
36
 
MOHAMOOD 
MUGISHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
37
 
HAMID 
MOHAMED 
SULEIMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
38
 
YAHYA 
SULEIMAN 
MBUTHIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
39
 
HABIB 
SULEIMAN 
NJOROGE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
40
 
HUSSEIN 
HASSAN 
AGADE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 
A
g0
18
41
 
HASSAN 
FROM 
SOMALIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
42
 
KASULE x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
43
 
IDRIS 
MAGONDU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
18
44
 
MUSTAFA 
ABU AL YAZID 
x x x AQ x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x TTP 
AQ; 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
AQ 0 
A
g0
18
45
 
INTIKHAB 
AHMED 
ABBASI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
18
46
 
MOHAMMAD 
KABIR 
ABBOTABAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
18
47
 
ABID KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
18
48
 
ZAFARALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
18
49
 
QAMAR 
ZAMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
18
50
 
MOHAMMAD 
ISHAQUE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
18
52
 
SHAMSUL 
HAQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
A
g0
18
53
 ABU GHARIB 
AL-MAKKI 
K.S.A. AL-
FUDLI AL-
HADHLI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
x x 
A
g0
18
54
 
RAO 
SHAUKAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
x x 
A
g0
18
55
 
MURSALEEN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9; 
(LeJ
) 
x x 
A
g0
18
56
 
FAHAD MUNIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9; 
(LeJ
) 
x x 
A
g0
18
60
 
MUHAMMAD 
ASIF ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
61
 
ABDUL 
REHMAN 
(HUJI) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
62
 
MUREED 
AHMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
63
 
DR. 
USMAN/AQEE
L 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9; 
(LeJ
) 
0 x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
18
64
 
ATTAULLAH 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP 0 0 x 
A
g0
18
65
 
FAISAL 
AHMED KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
A
g0
18
66
 
DR ABDUL 
RAZZAQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
A
g0
18
67
 
ZEESHAN 
JALIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
A
g0
18
68
 
MOHAMMAD 
SARFARAZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
A
g0
18
69
 
MOHAMMAD 
NAEEM 
SHAKIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
A
g0
18
70
 
MOHAMMAD 
NADEEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
Raw
-9 
A
g0
18
71
 
MOHAMMED 
SIDDIQUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
72
 
ISMAT 
SIDDIQUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
73
 
FOWZIA 
SIDDIQUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
74
 
MUHAMMAD 
SIDDIQUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
75
 
SUHEIL 
LAHER 
x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
76
 
MOHAMAD 
AKRA 
x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
18
77
 
MOHAMMAD 
AMJAD KHAN 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
78
 
AHMED KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
18
79
 
MIRIAM KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
80
 
SULIEMAN 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
81
 
MAJID KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
82
 
UZAIR 
PARACHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
83
 
ALI SHINAWY x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
84
 
HAMDI 
MOUSSA 
x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
85
 
MOHAMMAD 
SAAD 
x x x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
86
 
WALID BIN 
ATTASH 
x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
87
 
GOULED 
HASSAN 
DOURAD 
x x x 0 x 0 x x AQ x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
88
 
MUSA ALI 
SAID AL SAID 
AL UMARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
89
 ANWAR 
HAMDAN 
MUHAMMAD 
AL NUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
754 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
18
90
 
NAJIBULLAH 
ZAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x AQ AQ x 
A
g0
18
91
 
ZURAH ADBU 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
92
 
MAHMOUD 
TALEB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
AQ; 
FaI 
x x x 
A
g0
18
93
 
IYMAN FARIS x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
94
 
ABDUL 
RAOUF 
HAWAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
96
 
QAMAR 
MOHAMMAD 
AYUB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
97
 
YUSUF POLAT x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
18
98
 
LOUAI SAKKA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
88
 
HABIB AKTAS x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
AQ x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
89
 
BAKI YIGIT x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
90
 
GURCAN BAC x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
91
 
FEVZI YITIZ x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
92
 
ADNAN ERSOZ x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ 0 x x x x x x x 
755 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
19
93
 
MESUT 
CABUK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
94
 
GOKHAN 
ELALTUNTAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
95
 
FERIDUN 
UGURLU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
96
 
ILYAS 
KUNCAK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
97
 
HARUN ILHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
98
 
IBRAHIM KUS x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
19
99
 
AZAD EKINCI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
00
 
SEYIT ERTUL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
01
 
HAMED OBYSI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
02
 
SERVET YITIZ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
03
 
IMAD 
MUGHNIYEH 
x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(Hiz
b) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
20
04
 JAMAL 
AHMED MOHA 
MED ALI AL-
BADAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x 0 x 
AQ
AP 
0 
AQ; 
AQ
AP 
x x 
A
g0
20
05
 ABDUL RAHIM 
MO. HUSSEIN 
ABDA AL-
NASHERI 
x x x x IG x AQ AQ AQ x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
756 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
20
06
 
IBRAHIM AL-
THAWAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
07
 
HASSAN 
AWADH AL-
KHAMRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
08
 
MOHD FARIK 
BIN AMIN 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x AQ 
AQ; 
JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
09
 
SULIEMAN 
ABU GHAITH 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
10
 
MUHAMMAD 
AL-QAHTANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
11
 
SAIFULLAH 
PARACHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
12
 
IBN AL-
KHATTAB 
x 
AQ; 
IG 
IG 0 0 x x 0 0 0 x 
RSB
M 
RSB
M 
RSB
M 
0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
13
 
HASSAN 
ATTASH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
14
 
MUHAMMAD 
ATTASH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
15
 ALI ABD AL-
RAHMAN AL-
FAQASI AL-
GHAMDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
16
 
TURKI 
NASSER AL-
DANDANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
17
 KHALED MO. 
BIN MUSLIM 
AL-ARAWI AL-
JUHANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
18
 MO. OTHMAN 
ABDULLAH 
AL-WALIDI 
AL-SHEHRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
757 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
20
19
 HANI SAEED 
AHMAD AL 
ABDUL-
KARIM AL-
GHAMDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
20
 JUBRAN ALI 
AHMAD 
HAKAMI 
KHABRANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
21
 KHALED BIN 
IBRAHIM 
MAHMOUD 
BAGHDADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
22
 MEHMAS MO. 
MEHMAS AL-
HAWASHLEH 
AL-DOSARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
23
 MO. BIN 
SHADHAF ALI 
AL-MAHZOUM 
AL-SHEHRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
24
 HAZEM 
MOHAMMED 
SAEED 
KASHMIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
25
 MAJED 
ABDULLAH 
SA'AD BIN 
OKAIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
26
 BANDAR BIN 
ABDUL-
RAHMAN M.R. 
AL-MUTAIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
27
 ABDUL-
KARIM 
MOHAMMED 
JUBRAN YAZJI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
28
 ABDULLAH 
FARRES BIN 
J.R. AL-
MUTAIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
30
 
AMMAR AL-
WAELI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
x 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
20
31
 
QASIM 
MOHAMED 
(AIAI) 
x x x x x 0 x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
758 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
20
32
 
MOHAMED AL 
KAHTANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
33
 
YOUNIS 
KHALIS 
x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
34
 
AHMED SHAH 
MASSOUD 
x x x x 0 x x x AQ x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
35
 
ABU BARA AL 
YEMENI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
36
 
SALAH AL DIN x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
37
 
AYSEL 
SENGUEN 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
38
 
KHALID AL-
MASRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
40
 
KHADR ABU 
HOSHAR 
x x x x x x x x AQ 0 0 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
41
 
RAED HIJAZI x x 0 x x x x x AQ 0 0 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
42
 
MOHAMAD 
KAMAL 
ELZAHABI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
43
 
SAAD HIJAZI x x x x x x x x AQ x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
44
 
HUSSEIN TURI x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
45
 
OSAMA 
SUMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
759 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
20
46
 
MOHAMMED 
HIJAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
47
 
MOHDAR 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
48
 
KHALLAM 
(CALIFORNIA) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
49
 
FAHAD AL 
THUMAIRY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
50
 
OMAR AL 
BAYOUMI 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
51
 
OSAMA 
AWADALLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
52
 
OMAR 
BAKARBASHA
T 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
53
 
ANWAR 
AULAQI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
54
 
YAZEED AL 
SALMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
55
 
EYAD AL 
RABABAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
56
 
SULAYMAN 
AL ALWAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
57
 
MUSHABIB AL 
HAMLAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
58
 
SAUD AL 
RASHID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
760 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
20
59
 
ZUHAIR AL 
THUBAITI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
60
 
QUTAYBAH 
AL NAJDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
61
 
SAEED AL 
BALUCHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
62
 
ABU TURAB 
AL JORDANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
63
 ABD AL 
RAHIM 
GHULUM 
RABBANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
64
 
ABDULLAH 
SINDHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
65
 
AWS AL 
MADANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
66
 
ABDEL KARIM 
AL NASSER 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
67
 
AHMED AL-
MUGHASSIL 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
68
 
ALI AL-HOURI 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
69
 
HANI AL-
SAYEGH 
SdH
zb 
x 
SdH
zb 
x x 
SdH
zb 
x x 
SdH
zb 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
70
 
IBRAHIM AL-
YACOUB 
SdH
zb; 
(Hiz
b) 
SdH
zb; 
(Hiz
b) 
x 
SdH
zb; 
(Hiz
b) 
x 
SdH
zb; 
(Hiz
b) 
x x 
SdH
zb; 
(Hiz
b) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
71
 
MUSTAFA AL-
QASSAB 
SdH
zb 
x x x 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
x 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
761 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
20
72
 
SA‘ED AL-
BAHAR 
x 
SdH
zb; 
(Hiz
b) 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
73
 
ABDALLAH 
AL-JARASH 
SdH
zb 
x x x x 
SdH
zb 
x x 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
74
 
HUSSEIN AL-
MUGHIS 
x x 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
x x x 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
75
 
ALI AL-
MARHOUN 
x x x 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
76
 
SALEH 
RAMADAN 
x x x x 
SdH
zb 
x 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
77
 
MUSTAFA 
MU‘ALEM 
x x x x 
SdH
zb 
x 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
78
 
AYATOLLAH 
KHOMEINI 
x 0 x x 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
79
 
FADEL AL-
ALAWE 
x x x x 
SdH
zb 
x x 
SdH
zb 
SdH
zb 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
80
 
JOHN DOE 
(HIZBALLAH) 
x x x x x x x x 
SdH
zb; 
(Hiz
b) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
81
 
ADEL RAFEEA x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
82
 
IBRAHIM 
MAIDIN 
0 0 x x x 0 x x x x x JI JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
83
 
OTHMAN 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
84
 
MAS 
SELAMAT BIN 
KASTARI 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
0 0 JI 0 x x x x 0 0 x 
762 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
20
85
 
KHALIM 
JAFFAR 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
AQ; 
JI 
x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
86
 
AB WAHAB 
BIN AHMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
87
 
SYED 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
88
 MOHAMMAD 
ASLAM BIN 
YAR ALI 
KHAN 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
89
 
FATHI ABU 
BAKAR 
BAFANA 
x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
90
 
ADNAN BIN 
MUSA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
91
 MOHAMED 
NAZIR 
MOHMMED 
UTHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
92
 
SABAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
93
 
ANDREW 
GERARD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
94
 
HALIM BIN 
HUSSAIN 
x x x EIJ 0 0 x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
95
 
TENGKU 
ISMUHADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
96
 
DIDIN 
ROSMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
97
 
TAUFIK 
ABDUL HALIM 
x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
763 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
20
98
 
ABDULLAH 
ANSHORI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
20
99
 
IRFAN 
AWWAS 
SURYAHARDY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
00
 
MURSALIN 
DAHLAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
01
 
FUAD 
AMSYARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
02
 
ENJANG 
BASTAMAN 
0 0 0 EIJ 0 x x AQ x x 0 x 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
03
 
ZULKIFLI 
MARZUKI 
x x x x x x x x x JI JI x 
AQ; 
JI 
JI JI x x x x 0 x 0 x 
A
g0
21
04
 
DAUD 
BEUREUEH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
05
 
HASAN DI 
TIRO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
06
 
ABU HASBI 
GEUDONG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
07
 
CHADIJAH 
GEUDONG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
08
 
MUCHTAR 
GEUDONG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
09
 
FAUZI 
GEUDONG 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
10
 
SYAFRIE 
SJAMSUDDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
21
11
 
ABU 
HURAERAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
12
 
AKIM 
HAKIMUDDIN 
x 0 0 EIJ x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
13
 
HENDROPRIY
ONO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
14
 
LIGADINSYAH x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(GA
M) 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
15
 
FADLI x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(GA
M) 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
16
 
EDI SUGIARTO x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(GA
M) 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
17
 
POLEM 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
18
 
RAMLI x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
19
 
BASUKI x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
20
 
MOHAMMED 
FAWAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
21
 
SYAHRIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
22
 
UMAR (JI-
BANDUNG) 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
23
 
HAJI ACENG 
SUHERI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
24
 
AGUS 
KURNIAWAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x x 
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NAME 
19
88
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19
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19
93
 
19
94
 
19
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19
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19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
21
25
 
RONY MILYAR x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
26
 
WAWAN x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
27
 
DEDI 
MULYADI 
x 0 0 EIJ 0 x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
28
 
HOLIS x 0 0 EIJ 0 x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
29
 
YOYO x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
30
 
RAJA HUSAIN x x x x x x x x x x x x JI JI 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
31
 
ABDUL AZIZ 
KAHAR 
MUZAKKAR 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
32
 
HARIS 
FADILLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x LJ 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
33
 
KYAI SALEH 
AS‘AD 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
34
 
ABDUL RAUF x x x x 0 0 0 JI 0 0 x x x JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
35
 
YUDI/ANDRI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JI x x x x JI JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
36
 
AGUS 
HIDAYAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
38
 
IQBAL (BALI 
BOMBER) 
0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x JI JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
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19
88
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90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
21
39
 
APRIANTO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
40
 
PUJATA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
41
 
IKHWAN 
FAUZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
42
 
FATURRAHMA
N 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
43
 
ZULKIFLI BIN 
ABDUL HIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x JI x 0 x x 0 0 x ASG x 
A
g0
21
44
 
ZULKARNAEN 0 0 x x 0 0 JI 0 JI x 0 0 JI JI 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
45
 
THORIQUDIN 0 x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 0 x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
46
 
MUSTOPA 0 x x x x x JI x x 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
47
 
MUSTAQIM 0 x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x JI x x x x JI x 0 0 
A
g0
21
48
 
MUSTAFA 
MASHUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
49
 
MUHAMMAD 
SAUWKI AL-
ISTAMBULI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
50
 
AJENGAN 
MASDUKI 
AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
51
 
SALAHUDIN x x x x x 0 0 x JI x x x 
ASG
; JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
21
52
 
HABIB x x x x x 0 0 x JI x x x 
ASG
; JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
53
 
ACHMAD 
ROIHAN 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
54
 
MOHAMMED 
FAIQ HAFIDZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
55
 
MOHAMED 
QITAL 
0 x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
56
 
AHMAD 
SAJULI 
0 x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
57
 
SYUNON 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
58
 
MUCHLIANSY
AH 
0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
59
 
ASEP DANU 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
60
 
FIRDAUS 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
61
 
ZUHRONI 0 0 x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
62
 
FARIHIN 
AHMAD 
0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x JI JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
63
 
ARKAM/ARQO
M 
0 0 x x x JI x x x 0 x x JI JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
65
 
UTOMO 
PAMUNGKAS 
x 0 0 EIJ x x JI 0 x 0 0 0 
AQ; 
ASG
; JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
10
 
A
g0
21
66
 
DULMATIN x 0 0 EIJ 0 x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
ASG
; JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
(MI
LF) 
x 
AS
G 
x 
AS
G; 
JI 
JI ASG 0 
A
g0
21
67
 
USAID x 0 0 EIJ x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
68
 
MUCHTAR 
DAENG 
x 0 0 EIJ x x x x x x x LJ x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
69
 
KAHAR 
MUSTAFA 
x 0 0 EIJ x x x x x 0 x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
70
 
SYARIFUDDIN x 0 0 EIJ x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
71
 
BASYIR x 0 0 EIJ x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
72
 
MOH. 
JAUHARI BIN 
ABDULLAH 
x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
73
 
DADANG 
SURATMAN 
x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x 
ASG
; JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
75
 
SUHEIMI x x x EIJ 0 0 x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
76
 
JAMSARI x x x EIJ 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
77
 
ABDUL 
RAZAK 
x x x EIJ 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
78
 
MUHAMMAD 
TAUFIQURRA
HMAN 
x x x EIJ 0 0 0 x x x x 0 
AQ; 
JI 
x x 0 JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
79
 
ABAS BIN 
LATIF 
x x x EIJ 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
03
 
20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
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20
09
 
20
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A
g0
21
80
 
SARJIYO x x x EIJ 0 0 x AQ JI 0 0 x 
AQ; 
ASG
; JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
81
 
MUHAJIR x x x EIJ 0 0 x x x 0 x x 
AQ; 
JI 
JI JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
82
 
ACHMAD 
DAHLAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
83
 
MUCHLIANSY
AH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
84
 
HAJI MOH. 
FALEH OF 
KUDUS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
85
 
HAJI DANU 
MUH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
86
 
ABDUL 
ROCHIM 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
87
 
JAMALUDDIN x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
88
 
ZAINI 
ZAKARIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
89
 
ZAMZURI x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
90
 
HENRY BIN 
MANSOUR 
x x x x x x x x JI x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
91
 
FATURAHMAN 
DAEMUGADIN
G 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
92
 
ZAITUN 
RASMIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
21
93
 
AGUNG 
HAMID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
94
 
HISBULLAH 
RASYID 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
95
 
ANTHON x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
96
 
ILHAM RIYADI x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
97
 
MANSUR x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
21
99
 
DAHLAN x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 0 x x JI 0 JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
00
 
ASHAR 
DAENG 
SALAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
01
 
SALAMAT 
HAYSIM 
x x x x x 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x 
ASG
; JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
02
 
SARDJONO 
GABRIEL 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
03
 
SYAIFUL 
GABRIEL 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
04
 
MACHMUDI 
HARIONO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
05
 
FAHIM x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
06
 
SURYADI 
MAS‘UD 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x LJ 0 JI JI x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
22
07
 
HASTA x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
08
 
IMAM HANAFI x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
09
 
SOLAHUDIN 
AL-AYUBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
10
 
USTADZ 
YUNUS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
11
 
USTADZ 
AZHARI 
DIPOKUSUMO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
12
 
FARIDA BIN 
ABBAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
13
 
WAHYUDIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
22
14
 
FERIAL 
MUCHLIS 
ABDUL HALIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
15
 
ISNAIRIN 
BINTI ABDUL 
ROSYID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
16
 
ASADULLAH x x 0 x x x x x x 0 0 LJ 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
17
 
YOYOK x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
18
 
ZULFIKAR x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
19
 
ABDULLAH 
(DI) 
x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
22
20
 
EDY RIANTO x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
21
 
NAIMAN x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
22
 
EDY TAUFIK x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
23
 
SUHENDI x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
24
 
ROJAK x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
25
 
MUSTAQIM 
(AMIN) 
x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
26
 
MATORI 
ABDUL JALIL 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
27
 
ZULKIFAR x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
28
 
TAJUL ARIFIN x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
29
 
NOORDIN 
MOHD TOP 
x x x x x x x JI JI 0 JI 0 0 JI JI JI JI TQJ AQ 
TQJ
; 
Plbg 
JI TQJ x 
A
g0
22
30
 
KANG JAJA x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 JI 0 0 x JI x x x JI x 0 
A
g0
22
31
 
NURUDIN x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
32
 
IWAN/ROIS x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x JI x x x JI x x 
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
22
33
 
MIA IBRAHIM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
34
 
USTADZ HERI 
HAFIDZIN 
0 x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
35
 
ASEP/DARWIN x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 JI x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
36
 
DIDIN RAIDIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
37
 
SARKONI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
38
 
HARIS 
(FATHER OF 
UYOK) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
39
 
HENRI GOLUN x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
40
 
APUY x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
41
 
UYOK x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
42
 
FATHURROBI/
HARUN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
43
 
OMAN 
ROCHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 
A
g0
22
44
 
HASAN (JI) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
45
 
GEMPUR BUDI 
ANGKORO 
x x x x x 0 0 JI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JI TQJ 0 x x x x 
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01
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20
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20
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20
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20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
22
46
 
CHANDRA x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JI JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
47
 
MOHAMED 
IKHWAN 
x x x 0 0 JI JI JI JI 0 JI x x x 0 JI JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
48
 
SURAMTO x x x x 0 0 0 JI 0 0 x x 0 0 0 0 JI x x JI x x 0 
A
g0
22
49
 
IRUN 
HIDAYAT 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
51
 
MOHAMED 
RAIS 
x x x 0 0 0 0 JI JI 0 JI 0 x JI 0 JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
52
 
TONI TOGAR 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x JI JI x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
22
53
 
RIAU x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
54
 
MASRIZAL 
BIN ALI UMAR 
x x 0 0 0 0 0 x x x JI 0 0 x 0 JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
55
 
SARDONA 
SILIWANGI 
x x x x x 0 0 JI 0 0 x x 0 0 0 JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
56
 
MOHAMED 
IHSAN 
x 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x 0 x 
AQ; 
JI 
JI 
AQ; 
JI 
JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
57
 
ASMAR LATIN 
SANI 
x x x 0 0 0 0 JI x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
58
 
ABU DUJANA AQ x IG 0 x x x x x x x x x x x JI JI x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
22
59
 
QOTADAH x x x x x x JI 0 JI 0 0 x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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A
g0
22
60
 
SEF/FAHIM x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 JI JI 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
22
61
 
SON HADI 0 0 0 0 x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JI JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
62
 
KHUMAIDI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
63
 
HENRI SIGU 
SAMBOJA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
64
 
ACHMAD 
HASAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI JI TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
22
65
 
ADUNG x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
66
 
SYAIFUDDIN 
UMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
67
 
BAGUS BUDI 
PRANOTO 
x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0 JI 0 0 
TQJ
; 
Plbg 
JI TQJ x 
A
g0
22
68
 
LUFTI 
HAIDAROH 
x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 JI JI x 0 JI JI 0 0 
A
g0
22
69
 
HERI/UMAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
22
70
 
MUNFIATUN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
71
 
SAPTONO x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
72
 
WIWIT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
22
73
 
AWAL 
PURNOMO 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
74
 
AGUS AHMAD x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
75
 
ROSIHIN 
NOOR 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
76
 
IWAN SAJAI x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
77
 
LIS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
78
 
ENGKOS 
KOSASIH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
79
 
BAHARUDIN 
SOLEH 
x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 0 JI TQJ 0 x x x x 
A
g0
22
80
 
DIDI/RIJUL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
81
 
KOMARUDIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
82
 
HERNIANTO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
83
 
MAKAFRI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
84
 
MOH NAJIB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
85
 
HERLAMBANG x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
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A
g0
22
86
 
SAIFUL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
87
 
WIBOWO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
88
 
MUSAFAK x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
89
 
ABDULLAH 
SUNATA 
x x x x x x x x x x x LJ JI JI JI 0 JI 0 x 0 x 0 0 
A
g0
22
90
 
ABDUL MALIK x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
91
 
ACENG 
KURINA 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
92
 
ALI ZEIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
93
 
ABDUL ROHIM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
22
94
 
PURNAMA 
PURTA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x 0 JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
22
95
 
ENCENG 
KURINA 
x x x x x x x x x x x LJ x x x 0 JI 0 x x 0 0 0 
A
g0
22
96
 
HARI 
KUNCORO 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x 
(MI
LF) 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x 0 
A
g0
22
97
 
UMAR PATEK x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x 
AS
G 
x JI x ASG x 
A
g0
22
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HILMAN x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
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A
g0
22
99
 
UMAR 
(WAIMURAT 
CAMP) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
00
 
ALI 
(WAIMURAT 
CAMP) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
01
 
SALMAN x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
02
 
MOHAMED 
SAIFUDDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
03
 
DANI 
CHANDRA 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
04
 
IQBAL 
HUSEINI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
05
 
IMAM 
BUKHORI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
06
 
JOKO HARUN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
23
07
 
SALIK 
FIRDAUS 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
23
09
 
ABDUL AZIZ 
(PEKALONGA
N) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
23
10
 
MISRO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
23
11
 
SUBUR 
SUGIARTO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
23
12
 
ANIF 
SOLCHANUDI
N 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
779 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
23
13
 
AIP HIDAYAT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
23
15
 
JUNAEDI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
16
 
MAKMURI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
17
 
EKO HADI 
PRASETYO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
18
 
PURYANTO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
19
 
FIRMANSYAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
20
 
HAMZA BAYA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
21
 
MUJAROT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
22
 
SIROJUL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
23
 
IMAN 
SUSANTO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
24
 
MASYKUR 
ABDUL KADIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
25
 
SUKASTOPO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
26
 
SOFYAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
10
 
A
g0
23
27
 
ILHAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
28
 
BAHARUDIN 
LATIF 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
29
 
SAIFUDDIN 
ZUHRI 
0 0 x EIJ x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x Plbg x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
30
 
ARINA 
RAHMAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 0 x 
A
g0
23
32
 
ANI SUGANDI 0 0 0 EIJ 0 x x x 0 0 0 0 x x x x x 0 Plbg x x x x 
A
g0
23
33
 
ABDUR 
ROHIM BIN 
THOYIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
23
34
 
ZARKASIH 0 0 0 EIJ 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
23
35
 
ALI 
MASYHUDI 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0 x Plbg Plbg 0 x x 
A
g0
23
36
 
MOHAMED 
HASSAN BIN 
SAYNUDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 JI 0 0 x Plbg Plbg 0 x x 
A
g0
23
37
 
TAUFIK 
AHMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
23
38
 
SAYUTI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
39
 
ABDURRAHM
AN TAIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 Plbg Plbg 0 x x 
A
g0
23
40
 
SUKARSO 
ABDILLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 Plbg x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
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20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
23
41
 
HELMI 
HANAFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
23
42
 
YUDO 
HASTOYO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
23
43
 
AGUSTIWARM
AN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 Plbg Plbg 0 x x 
A
g0
23
44
 
HERI 
PURWANTO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 Plbg Plbg 0 x x 
A
g0
23
45
 
SUGIARTO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 Plbg Plbg 0 x x 
A
g0
23
46
 
WAHYUDI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 Plbg Plbg 0 x x 
A
g0
23
47
 
SULTHON 
QOLBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x LJ JI JI JI 0 0 0 Plbg Plbg x x x 
A
g0
23
48
 
YOSI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Plbg x x x x 
A
g0
23
49
 
OLOAN 
MARTUA 
HARAHAP 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Plbg x x x x 
A
g0
23
50
 
TIMOTIUS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Plbg x x x x 
A
g0
23
51
 
IWAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Plbg x x x x 
A
g0
23
52
 
KI AGUS 
MUHAMMAD 
TONI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Plbg Plbg 0 x x 
A
g0
23
53
 
IBROHIM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x TQJ x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
23
54
 
AMIR 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
55
 
AIR 
SETYAWAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
56
 
EKO JOKO 
SARJONO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
57
 
DANI DWI 
PERTAMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
58
 
NANA 
IKHWAN 
MAULANA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
59
 
SYAIFUDIN 
JAELANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
60
 
MUJAHRI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
61
 
IWAN 
HERDIANSYA
H 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
62
 
ALI 
MUHAMMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
63
 
MOHAMAD 
SJAHRIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
64
 
MISTAM 
HUSAMUDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Plbg x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
65
 
MOHAMAD 
JIBRIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
23
66
 
UMAR 
BURHANUDDI
N 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 JI x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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A
g0
23
67
 
RINA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x 
A
g0
23
68
 
PARMIN x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0 x JI x x JI x x 
A
g0
23
69
 
AHMAD 
JAELANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
70
 
SUCIHANI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
71
 
ERY x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
72
 
AHMAD 
ISROFIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
73
 
ABU 
MUHAMMAD 
AL-MAQDISI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
23
74
 
NIKO/JUNDI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x JI x x 0 
A
g0
23
75
 
HASAN NOOR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x 0 
A
g0
23
76
 
SIBGHO/MUS'A
B 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x 
A
g0
23
77
 
ISMET KAKIKI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 
A
g0
23
78
 
KAMALUDIN 
BIN KHASAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 JI JI x x 
A
g0
23
79
 
GEMA AWAL 
RAMADHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
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20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
23
80
 
HALAWI 
MAKMUN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
23
81
 
YUDI 
ZULFAHRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI JI 0 0 
A
g0
23
82
 
MOH. SOFYAN 
TSAURI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 JI JI 0 0 
A
g0
23
83
 
ABU NUR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
84
 
TGK. AHMAD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
23
85
 
ALI ARAFAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
86
 
TGK. MUSLIM 
ATTAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 
A
g0
23
87
 
MUCHTAR 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 
A
g0
23
88
 
TAUFIK 
MARZUKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
23
89
 
AZWANI/ABU 
MATANG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
23
90
 
AZWAR/ABU 
RECONG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
23
91
 
MUNIR/ABU 
RIMBA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
23
92
 
MUHSIN/IMAM 
MUDA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
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01
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
23
93
 
MUHIBUDDIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
23
94
 
MUKHLIS 
(SOFYAN'S 
TRAINEE) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
23
95
 
MUHAMMAD 
TOAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
23
96
 
AHMAD 
SAYID 
MAULANA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 0 x 
A
g0
23
97
 
JOKO 
SULISTYO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x 0 0 
A
g0
23
98
 
AULIA 
SYAHIDAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
23
99
 
MASYKUR 
RAHMAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
24
00
 
BAYU SENO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
24
01
 PANDU 
WICAKSONO 
WIDYANPUTR
O 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
24
02
 
YUSUF ARIFIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
24
03
 
ALI FROM 
ACEH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
24
04
 
USMAN/GITO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
24
05
 
ENAL TA'O x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x 0 x x JI 0 0 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
24
06
 
ILYAS (GAM) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
07
 
RASYID 
RIDHO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
08
 
AFIF ABDUL 
MAJID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
24
09
 
MUSTAQIM 
MUZAYYIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
24
10
 
HARIS AMIR 
FALAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 
A
g0
24
11
 
HARIYADI 
USMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 
A
g0
24
12
 
SYARIF 
USMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 
A
g0
24
13
 
SUMARNO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
14
 
MOHAMED 
AMIN MUSA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
15
 
SILVESTER 
TENDEAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
16
 
YAHYA GOBA x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
17
 
SAHIM 
ALWAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
18
 
SHAFAL 
MOSED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
24
19
 
YASEIN 
TAHER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
20
 
FAYSAL 
GALAB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
21
 
JABER 
ELBANEH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x 0 x 
AQ
AP 
x x x 0 
A
g0
24
22
 
MUKTAR AL-
BAKRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
23
 
MOHAMMED 
ALBANNA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
24
 
KAMAL 
DERWISH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
25
 
ABU ALI AL-
HARITHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
26
 
MOHAMED 
HAMDI AL-
AHDAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 0 x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
24
27
 BANDAR BIN 
ABDURRAHM
AN AL-
GHAMDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
28
 
AHMED BILAL x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
29
 
MUHAMMAD 
BILAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
30
 
PATRICE 
LUMUMBA 
FORD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
31
 
JEFFREY 
BATTLE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
788 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
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20
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20
06
 
20
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20
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20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
24
32
 
HABIS AL 
SAOUB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
33
 
KHALED ALI 
STEITIYE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
34
 
MAHER 
HAWASH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
35
 
OCTOBER 
LEWIS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
36
 
JUMA AL-
DOSARI 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
37
 
BINYAM 
AHMED 
MUHAMMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(Tal) 
0 x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
38
 
ADHAM AMIN 
HASSOUN 
x x x x x x 0 0 EIJ EIJ 0 
RSB
M 
RSB
M 
AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
39
 
MOHAMED 
HESHAM 
YOUSSEF 
x x x x x x x x 0 EIJ 0 0 AQ x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
40
 
KIFAH WAEL 
JAYYOUSI 
x x x x x 0 0 0 0 x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
41
 
KASSEM 
DAHER 
x x x x x x x 0 EIJ EIJ 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
43
 
ALI AL-TIMMI x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 LeT x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
44
 
MASOUD 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
45
 
RANDALL 
ROYER 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 0 LeT x 0 x x x x x x x 
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01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
24
46
 
YONG KWON x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 LeT x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
47
 
MUHAMMAD 
AATIQUE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
48
 
KHWAJA 
HASAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
49
 
DONALD 
SURRATT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
50
 
HAMMAD 
ABDUR-
RAHEEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 LeT 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
51
 
CALIPH 
ABDUR-
RAHEEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 LeT x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
52
 
SEIFULLAH 
CHAPMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 LeT 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
53
 
NURADIN M. 
ABDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
54
 
JAMES 
ELSHAFAY  
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
55
 
SHAHWAR 
MARTIN SIRAJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
56
 
YASSIN 
MUHIDDIN 
AREF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
57
 
MOHAMMED 
MOSHARREF 
HOSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
24
58
 
KEVIN JAMES x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JIS JIS x x x x x 
790 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
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20
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20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
24
59
 
LEVAR 
WASHINGTON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JIS JIS x x x x x 
A
g0
24
60
 
GREGORY 
PATTERSON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JIS JIS 0 x x x x 
A
g0
24
61
 
HAMMAD 
SAMANA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JIS JIS 0 x x x x 
A
g0
24
62
 
MICHAEL 
CURTIS 
REYNOLDS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
24
63
 
SHANNEN 
ROSSMILLER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
64
 
SYED HARIS 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
24
65
 
EHSANUL 
ISLAM 
SADEQUEE 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 0 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
24
66
 
FAHIM 
AHMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
67
 
AZDI ORNANI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
68
 
AABID 
HUSSEIN 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
24
69
 
ZUBAIR 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
70
 
MIRSAD 
BEKTASEVIC 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
71
 
NARSEAL 
BATISTE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x SoD SoD x x x x 
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01
 
20
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20
03
 
20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
24
72
 
PATRICK 
ABRAHAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x SoD SoD x x x x 
A
g0
24
73
 
STANLEY 
GRANT 
PHANOR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x SoD SoD x x x x 
A
g0
24
74
 
NAUDIMAR 
HERRERA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x SoD SoD x x x x 
A
g0
24
75
 
BURSON 
AUGUSTIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x SoD SoD x x x x 
A
g0
24
76
 
ROTHSCHILD 
AUGUSTINE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x SoD SoD x x x x 
A
g0
24
77
 
LYGLENSON 
LEMORIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x SoD SoD x x x x 
A
g0
24
78
 
ASSAD 
SARWAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
24
79
 
ABDULLA 
AHMED ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x AQ x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
24
80
 
TANVIR 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
24
81
 
ARAFAT 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
24
82
 
IBRAHIM 
SAVANT 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
24
83
 
WAHEED 
ZAMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
24
84
 
UMAR ISLAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x 
792 
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20
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20
04
 
20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
24
85
 
DONALD 
STEWART-
WHYTE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
24
86
 
MOHAMMED 
GULZAR 
x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x AQ x 0 x x 
A
g0
24
87
 
MUKTAR SAID 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x AQ x x AQ AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
24
88
 
RASHID RAUF x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x AQ 0 AQ x x 
A
g0
24
89
 
RAMZI 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
24
90
 
ADEL YAHYA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
91
 
MANFO 
ASIEDU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
24
92
 
ABDUL 
SHERIF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
93
 
SIRAJ ALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
94
 
MUHEDIN ALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
24
95
 
YESHIEMBERT 
GIRMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
96
 
WAHBI 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
97
 
ISMIL 
ABDURAHMA
N 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
24
98
 
ABDULLAH 
EL-FAISAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
AQI
M 
0 x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
24
99
 
ESAYAS 
GIRMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
25
00
 
MULUMEBET 
GIRMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
25
01
 
MOHAMED 
KABASHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
25
02
 
ABDUL 
MUHAMMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x 
A
g0
25
03
 
ADIS 
MEDUNJANIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x AQ 0 0 
A
g0
25
04
 
ZAREIN 
AHMEDZAY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 0 
A
g0
25
05
 
ALI SALEH 
KAHLAH AL-
MARRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
06
 
JEHAD 
SERWAN 
MOSTAFA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
07
 
AMINA FARAH 
ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
25
08
 
HAWO 
MOHAMED 
HASSAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
25
09
 
MOHAMUD 
ABDI YUSUF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 
A
g0
25
10
 
DUANE 
MOHAMED 
DIRIYE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
25
11
 
ABDI MAHDI 
HUSSEIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 
A
g0
25
12
 
SHEIKH SAAID x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
25
13
 
ABID NASSER x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x 
A
g0
25
14
 
TARIQ UR 
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
25
15
 
SALEH AL-
SOMALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x 
A
g0
25
17
 
ADEN HASHI 
AYROW 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 0 0 AQ 
Shb
b 
Shbb x x 
A
g0
25
18
 
MOHAMED 
IBRAHIM 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
25
19
 
MOHAMAD 
SHNEWER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
25
20
 
DRITAN DUKA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
25
21
 
ELJVIR DUKA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
25
22
 
SHAIN DUKA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
25
23
 
SERDAR 
TATAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
25
24
 
AGRON 
ABDULLAHU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
25
25
 
ZENAB 
ARMANDPISH
EH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
26
 
OMAR BAKRI 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
27
 
ABU MUNTHIR x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
28
 
ZABI UL-TAIFI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
25
29
 
RUSSELL 
DEFREITAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JAM 
JA
M 
x x x 
A
g0
25
30
 
KAREEM 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JA
M 
x x x 
A
g0
25
31
 
ABDUL KADIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JA
M 
x x x 
A
g0
25
32
 
ABDEL NUR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JA
M 
x x x 
A
g0
25
33
 
ABU BAKR 
(JAM) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JA
M 
x x x 
A
g0
25
34
 SHEIK 
MOHAMED 
ABDIRAHMAN 
KARIYE 
x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
35
 
IBRAHIM AL-
HAMDI (LET) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 LeT x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
36
 
MICHAEL C. 
FINTON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x 
A
g0
25
37
 HOSAM 
MAHER 
HUSEIN 
SMADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
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00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
25
38
 
BRYANT NEAL 
VINAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQ; 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
x x 
A
g0
25
39
 
RAJA 
LAHRASIB 
KHAN 
x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
AQ AQ 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
25
40
 
KHALID ALI-M 
ALDAWSARI  
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
41
 
SYED HASHMI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
25
42
 
HAMID 
HAYAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
25
43
 
UMER HAYAT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
25
44
 
KHALID 
OUAZZANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
25
45
 
AHMED OMAR 
ABU ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
46
 
FAROOQUE 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
25
47
 
CHRISTOPHER 
PAUL 
x x 0 EIJ 0 x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
25
48
 
KHALIFA LNU x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
49
 
RAHMAT 
ABDUL HIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
25
50
 
MINAH BINTI 
AOGIS ABD 
AZIZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
25
51
 
ABDUL BASIT 
USMAN 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x 
ASG
; JI 
x 
AQ; 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x JI x x x 
AS
G 
A
g0
25
52
 
MOHAMMED 
ABDULLAH 
WARSAME 
x x x x x x x x x x x x (Tal) x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
53
 
AHMED 
FARAZ KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
25
54
 
FATUMA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
55
 
MUKHTAR 
ROOBOW ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 
Shb
b 
x x x 
A
g0
25
56
 
HARUNI 
BAMUSA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
57
 
HASSAN SAID 
OMAR 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
58
 
MOHAMED 
MWAKUZA 
KUZA 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 AQ AQ x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
25
59
 
HALIMA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
60
 
SAUDA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
61
 
SAMIR SAID 
SLAIM 
BA'AMIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
62
 
MOHAMED 
ALI 'ISSE 
YUSUF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x 
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20
00
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01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
25
63
 
IBRAHIM "AL-
AFGHANI" 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
64
 
JAAMA ALI 
ISMA'IL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
65
 
DA'UD SALA 
IIDLE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
66
 
FARHAN 
ABDULLE 
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
67
 
HALIMA ABDI 
ISSA YUSUF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
68
 
YAYAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
25
69
 
ABDUL 
RASYID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
70
 
CHANDRA 
NASRULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
71
 
NIK ADLI BIN 
NIK AZIS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
72
 
TAMZIL 
LINRUNG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
73
 
ABU FATAH x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
74
 
SALIMULLAH x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
75
 
TASRIFAH 
KHUSUSIATI 
x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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01
 
20
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20
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20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
25
76
 
FURQON x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
77
 
MAHMUD (JI - 
BATAM) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
78
 
TARMIZI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
79
 
MUKTIB x x x x x x x x x x 0 x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
80
 
SUKRI x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
81
 
NASRI x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
82
 
ALI FAUZI x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
83
 
YASIR x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
ASG
; JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
84
 
IFANA x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
85
 
UMAR KECIL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
86
 
MURTAJAB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
87
 
HALIMAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
88
 
HJ AFIAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
08
 
20
09
 
20
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A
g0
25
89
 
HM KOZIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
90
 
JARAF 
SHODIQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
91
 
AMIN JABIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
92
 
TAFISR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
93
 
TASRIFAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
94
 
SUMIAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
95
 
NAIMAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
96
 
H NUR 
HASYIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
97
 
HJ TARIYEM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
98
 
SITI ROHMA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
25
99
 
JULIA 
MAHENDRA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
00
 
ASTUTI x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
01
 
KHOIRIANA 
KHUSUSIATI 
x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
26
02
 
HAULA BINTI 
AMROZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
03
 
BILAL/SAEED x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP x x x 
A
g0
26
04
 
AITEZAZ 
SHAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP 0 x x 
A
g0
26
05
 
SHER 
ZEHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP x x x 
A
g0
26
06
 
HUSNAIN GUL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP 0 x x 
A
g0
26
07
 
MOHAMAD 
RAFAQAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP 0 x x 
A
g0
26
08
 
RASHEED 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP x x x 
A
g0
26
09
 
NASRULLAH 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP x x x 
A
g0
26
10
 
BAITULLAH 
MEHSUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 TTP 
AQ; 
TTP 
TTP x 
A
g0
26
11
 
MAULVI 
SAHIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
12
 
BRIGADIER 
EJZA SHAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
13
 
NAZIR 
(MUMBAI 
ATTACK) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
14
 
SHOAIB 
(MUMBAI 
ATTACK) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
802 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
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20
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20
04
 
20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
26
16
 
JAVED 
(MUMBAI 
ATTACKS) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
17
 
IMRAN BABAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
18
 
MAHMOUD 
MOHAMMED 
BAHAZIQ 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
20
 
HAFIZ 
ARSHAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
21
 
ABDEL 
REHMAN 
CHHOTA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
22
 
FAHAD 
ULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
23
 
NASER 
(MUMBAI 
ATTACKS) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
26
 
ABU MUFTI 
SAEED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
27
 
ABU 
ABDURREHM
AN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
28
 
ABU MAAVIA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
29
 
ABU ANIS 
(LET) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
30
 
ABU BASHIR 
(LET) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
31
 
ABU HANJLA 
PATHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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A
g0
26
32
 
ABU SARIA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
33
 
ABU SAIF-UR-
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
34
 
ABU IMRAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
35
 
HAKIM SAHEB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
36
 
KAAHFA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
37
 
SHAHID 
GHAFOOR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
26
38
 
TAHAWWUR 
HUSSAIN 
RANA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 LeT AQ x 
A
g0
26
39
 
ABDUR 
REHMAN 
HASHIM SYED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
LeT 
AQ x 
A
g0
26
40
 
MAJOR 
HAROON ASIQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 
A
g0
26
41
 
ABU YAHYA 
AL-LIBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x TTP AQ 0 0 
A
g0
26
42
 
BURHANUDDI
N RABBANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
53
 
AL-HAJ 
MURAD 
EBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG 
(MI
LF) 
x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x 
A
g0
26
54
 
BENJIE 
MIDTIMBANG 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
804 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
26
55
 
JOHN MACK x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
56
 
ABDULLAH 
MACAAPAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
57
 
ALIM 
ABDULAZIZ 
MIMBANTAS 
x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
58
 
GHAZALI 
JAFAAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
26
59
 
SHEIKH OMAR 
PASIGAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
60
 
SAMIR 
HASHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
61
 
SOLAMAIN 
PANGALIAN 
x x x 0 0 0 0 0 JI 0 0 0 
ASG
; JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x 
A
g0
26
62
 
OKASHA x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
63
 
NASRULLAH 
(JI) 
x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
64
 
ILYAS/HANIF x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
65
 
SAID (JI) x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
66
 
ANWAR (JI) x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
67
 
ABDURROHM
AN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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03
 
20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
26
68
 
MUSTHOFA x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
69
 
MUADZ x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
70
 
HAZAH x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
71
 
IBU SIRIN x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
72
 
ZUBEIR x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
73
 
ABU FARHAN x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
74
 
ZAID x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
75
 
HUDAIFAH x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
76
 
MACAANGCO
S MIMBANTAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
77
 
AMIR PAUTE x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
78
 
ZAINAL PAX x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
79
 
SALMAN 
MORO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
80
 
USTADZ SAID x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
26
81
 
OSAMA ARA x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
82
 
MOHAMMAD 
GUINDOLONG
AN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ASG
; JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
83
 
JULKIPLI x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
84
 
HAMDAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
85
 
NOOR 
MOHAMMAD 
UMUG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
86
 
HAJI AKHMAD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
87
 
SULAIMAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
88
 
HADJI ABDUL 
SASAMU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
89
 
USTADZ 
BAEM 
SAMUYA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
90
 
NASRUDDIN 
SULYANG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
91
 
ESMAEL 
AKMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
92
 
TOHAMI 
BAGUNDANG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
93
 
ESMAEL 
MAMALANGK
AS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
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00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
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20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
26
94
 
IDAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
95
 
JIMMY 
BALULAO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
96
 
GUINDATU 
MAMINTAL 
DULANG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
97
 
NASRUDDIN 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
98
 
DONGDONG 
PIDTUKASAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
26
99
 
REX MOHIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
27
00
 
MORI ALI 
USMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
27
01
 
TONG ABBAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
27
02
 
BILAL 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
27
03
 
SHEIKH AMAD 
AL-KUBAISI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
27
04
 
SABEEL 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
27
05
 
KAFEEL 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
A
g0
27
06
 
MOHAMMED 
HANEEF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
27
07
 
MOHAMMED 
ASHA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
27
08
 
ADAM 
KHATIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
27
09
 
COSSAR ALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
00
 
MEHRAN 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
28
01
 
MOHAMMED 
AL GHABRA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
28
02
 
SADIQ SHEIKH x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x LeT x LeT x LeT LeT LeT LeT x x 
A
g0
28
04
 
AMIR RAZA x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x LeT LeT x x x 
A
g0
28
05
 
ABU RASHID x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
28
06
 
AFZAL 
USMANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT LeT LeT LeT x x 
A
g0
28
07
 
ARIF SHEIKH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT LeT LeT LeT x x 
A
g0
28
08
 
MOHAMMED 
ZAKIR SHEIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT LeT LeT LeT x x 
A
g0
28
09
 
MOHAMMED 
ANSAR 
SHEIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT LeT LeT LeT x x 
A
g0
28
11
 
ROSHAN 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT LeT LeT LeT x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
28
12
 
AMEER 
RAZAQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT LeT LeT LeT x x 
A
g0
28
13
 
ASIF RAZAQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
28
14
 
ATIF AMEEN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x LeT LeT LeT LeT x x 
A
g0
28
15
 
RIYAZ 
BHATKAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT LeT LeT LeT x 0 
A
g0
28
16
 
ABDUS 
SUBHAN 
QURESHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x LeT x x x LeT LeT x x x x 
A
g0
28
17
 
FAISAL 
SHAIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 0 AQ LeT LeT x x x x 
A
g0
28
18
 
MAULANA 
ABDUL HALIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HUJ
I 
HUJ
I 
x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
28
19
 
SAMEER 
SADIQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
28
20
 
MUFTI ABU 
BASHAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
28
21
 
MOHAMMED 
SAIF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x 
A
g0
28
22
 
MOHAMMED 
ZEESHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x 
A
g0
28
23
 
SAQIB NISAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
28
24
 
MOHAMMED 
SHAKEEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
28
25
 
ZIA-UR-
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
28
26
 
MUJAHID 
SALIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
27
 
RASOOL 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
28
 
MAULANA 
NASEERUDIN 
NASIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
29
 
ANAS AL 
KANDARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
30
 
ABDUL 
RAHMAN 
JABARAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
31
 
AHMED 
SAHAGI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
32
 
ANWAR AL-
AWLAKI 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x AQ 0 x x 0 LeT 0 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
28
33
 
NASSER AL-
AULAQI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
35
 
AHMED 
MUHAMMED 
DHAKANE 
x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x 0 0 x x 
A
g0
28
36
 
ADANI LNU x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
28
37
 
MOHAMMED 
EREG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
28
38
 
ABDRIZAK 
LNU 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
28
39
 
HASSAN YARE x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
28
40
 
ABDELLAH 
BENYAICH 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
41
 
AQEEL 
ABDUL-AZIZ 
AI'AQEEL 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
42
 
SALEH 
ABDULLAH 
KAMEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
43
 
OMAR 
ABDULLAH 
KAMEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
44
 
ADEL ABDUL 
JALIL 
BATTERJEE 
x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
45
 
SULAIMAN 
ABDULAZIZ 
AL-RAJHI 
x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
46
 
SALEH 
ABDULAZAIA 
AL-RAJHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
47
 
KHALID BIN 
MAHFOUZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
48
 
KALEDA BIN 
MAHFOUZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
49
 
YOUSSEF 
NADA 
0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
50
 
ALI GHALIB 
HIMMAT 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
51
 
YOUSSEF AL-
QARDAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
28
52
 
ABDEL 
FATTAH ABU 
GHADDA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
53
 
AHMED 
HUBER 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
54
 
AHMED 
NASREDDIN 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
55
 
SOLIMAN AL-
BUTHE 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
56
 
PIROUZ 
SEDAGHATY 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
57
 
MARAT 
AVLARIGOV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
58
 
CHAMSOUDIN 
AVLARIGOV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
59
 
MUNIB 
ZAHARIGAC 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
60
 
HAROUN 
ABED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
61
 
MUBARAK 
HAMED 
x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 
A
g0
28
62
 
AHMED 
MUSTAFA 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
63
 
KHALID AL-
SUDANEE 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
64
 
MARK DELI 
SILJANDER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
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NAME 
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98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
28
65
 
ABDEL AZIM 
EL-SIDDIG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
66
 
RABIH 
HADDAD 
x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AQ 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
67
 
KHALED 
SMAILI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
68
 
USAMA 
HAMDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(HA
M) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
69
 
HAYTHAM 
MAGHAWRI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
(HA
M) 
(HA
M) 
(HA
M) 
x x 
(HA
M) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
70
 
MOHAMMED 
EL-MEZAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x 
(HA
M) 
(HA
M) 
(HA
M) 
x 0 
(HA
M) 
x x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
71
 
MOHAMMED 
IBRAHIM 
SULAIMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
72
 JAFFAR 
AHMAD 
ABDULLAH 
MAKKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
73
 
ABDUL AZIZ 
ABBAKAR 
MUHAMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
74
 KHALID 
AHMAD 
JUMAH AL-
SUDANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
75
 
IBRAHIM 
BUISIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
76
 
AHMED 
SANTOS 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 
RS
M 
ASG ASG 
RS
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
77
 
ABU HAMZA 
ABU HAMID 
AL-LUZONI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
814 
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
28
78
 
HANNAH 
SANTOS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
79
 
NURUMIJA 
AMDAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
80
 
MURSIDI 
BALAO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
81
 
ISMAEL IDIRIS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
82
 
MALIK 
MIMUDDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
83
 
ANNE 
ANOVER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
84
 
BODOT 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
85
 
RUBEN OMAR 
LAVILLA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x ASG x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
28
86
 
REDENDO 
CAIN 
DELLOSA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG ASG x ASG x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
87
 
YUSUF 
LEDESMA 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 
RS
M 
ASG ASG 
RS
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
89
 
JAINAL ANTEL 
SALI, JR. 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG ASG 0 
AS
G 
0 
AS
G; 
JI 
x x x 
A
g0
28
90
 
MOHAMMAD 
BARRIENTOS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
28
91
 
ANGELO 
RAMIREZ 
TRINIDAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x 
AS
G 
x x x x x 
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20
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01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
28
92
 
PIO ABOGNE 
DE VERA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
AS
G 
x x x x x 
A
g0
28
93
 FELICIANO 
SEMBORIO 
DELOS REYES, 
JR. 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
28
94
 
RICARDO 
PEREZ 
AYERAS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AS
G 
x 0 x x x 
A
g0
28
95
 
DINNO AMOR 
ROSALEJOS 
PAREJA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
RS
M 
0 x x x x 
A
g0
28
96
 
ISNILON 
HAPILON 
x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG ASG ASG ASG ASG x 
AS
G 
x x x x x 
A
g0
28
97
 
RADULAN 
SAHIRON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x ASG x 0 x x x ASG ASG 
AS
G 
A
g0
28
98
 
CHHOTA 
SAJID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x LeT x x 
A
g0
28
99
 
RIYAZ ISMAIL 
SHAHBANDRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
00
 
DR 
SHAHNAWAZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x LeT x 0 
A
g0
29
01
 
ASADULLAH 
AKHTAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
29
02
 
RAHIL SHEIKH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x LeT LeT x 0 x x 
A
g0
29
03
 
AHAD SABET x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
04
 
FARUQ AL-
TUNISI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x 
816 
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NAME 
19
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19
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20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
29
05
 
FAISAL 
SHAHZAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x AQ TTP 
A
g0
29
06
 
HAKIMULLAH 
MEHSUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 TTP TTP TTP 
A
g0
29
07
 HUMAM 
KHALIL ABU 
MULAL AL-
BALAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x 
A
g0
29
08
 
ABDELRAZZA
K 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
09
 
MOSOUD 
ELBARA 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQI
M 
0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
10
 
ASIF CHUTO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
11
 
MUFTI OBAID x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
12
 
MUHAMMAD 
ALI MEMON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
13
 
ARIFA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
29
14
 
HABIBA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
29
15
 
JUMA 
NAMANGANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x (Tal) x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
16
 
SHERALY 
AKBOTOEV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
17
 
ABDUL 
QAHAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
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19
88
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
29
18
 
HUSSAIN 
(IMU) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
19
 
MOHAMMED 
KHALID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
20
 
ABDUL AZIZ 
AL-GHAMDI 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
21
 
NURPASHI 
KULAYEV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
22
 
IZNAUR 
KODZOYEV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
23
 
MAGOMED 
AUSHEV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
24
 
VLADIMIR 
KHODOV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
25
 
KHANPASHI 
KULAYEV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
26
 
ARSEN 
MERZHOYEV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
27
 
MAIRBEK 
SHAIBEKKHA
NOV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
RSB
M 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
28
 
ABU UMAR 
(LET) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
29
29
 
ABU QASIM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
29
30
 
SHAFAQAT 
IQBAL MIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
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20
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20
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20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
29
31
 
SHABBIR 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
29
32
 
DAWOOD 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x 0 x 0 0 x 0 x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
29
33
 
ABDUL KARIM 
TUNDA 
x x x x x 0 x x x 0 0 x x x x x AQ x 0 x x 0 0 
A
g0
29
34
 
SAJID MIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
29
35
 
COLONEL R 
SADATULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
29
36
 
MAJOR 
GENERAL 
SAHAB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
29
37
 
MOHD ALTAF x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
38
 
MOHD ABDU 
MATIN ABDUL 
BASIT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
39
 
SHEIKH MOHD 
MUZZAMIL 
JAMIL AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
40
 ZAHIR AHMED 
BASHIR 
AHMED 
SHAIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
41
 SAYED 
KHWAJA 
YUNUS 
KHWAJA 
AYUB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
42
 
IRFAN 
REHMAN 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
29
43
 
MOHAMED 
HAMID 
(ENGLAND) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
29
44
 
KIBLEY DA 
COSTA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
29
45
 
MUHAMMAD 
AL-FIGARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
29
46
 
KADAR 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
29
47
 
MOUSSA 
BROWN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
29
48
 
SALOUM JOH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
29
49
 
SALEH AL 
QUUWAYE 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
50
 
ZAID AL 
AMER 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
51
 
EMAD 
ELMUBARAK 
Y ALI 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
52
 
HASH MI x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
53
 
MOHAMMAD 
ANEES 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
54
 ABDUL 
KAREEM 
JASSIM 
BIDAWI 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
55
 
HALEEM 
JASSIM 
BIDAWI 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
29
56
 
JAMAAL 
JALOUD Y 
HATO 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
57
 
IBRAHIM ABID x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
58
 
NAJIM 
NASSER Y 
TAHER 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
59
 
COMMANDER 
ROBOT 
x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x ASG x 0 0 x 
AS
G 
x x x x x 
A
g0
29
60
 
HECTOR 
JANJALANI 
x x x x x x x ASG x x x x 
ASG
; JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
61
 
JULISAM 
HARUM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
62
 
ABDUL 
MARAYIN 
x x x ASG 
ASG
; IG 
ASG ASG ASG ASG ASG ASG x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
63
 
ABDULHAKIM 
EDRIS 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
64
 
USTAJ AHMAN 
HALIFA 
x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
65
 
HUSIN SAMIL x x x x x x x x x x ASG x ASG x ASG ASG x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
66
 
FAWAZ ZI 
AJJUR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
29
67
 
ALBADER 
PARAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AS
G; 
JI 
ASG
; JI 
ASG 
AS
G 
A
g0
29
69
 
JUL AKRAM 
HADJAIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
29
70
 
ARULA 
ABUBAKAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
71
 
MUJIB 
SUSUKAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
72
 
BROTHER OF 
MUJIB 
SUSUKAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
73
 
LAKANDULA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
74
 
BEN ISMI x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
75
 
LANDASAN 
UMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
76
 
ITING AGA x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
77
 
HASHIM x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
78
 
USTADZ 
UMBRA 
JUMDAIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x 
AS
G; 
JI 
ASG
; JI 
ASG 
AS
G 
A
g0
29
79
 
MUHAMMAD 
AMIN AJIJON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
80
 
COMMANDER 
GLOBAL 
x x x x x x x ASG x x x x ASG ASG x x x 
AS
G 
x x x x x 
A
g0
29
81
 
ALTON 
LADJAALAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
29
82
 
KEFFREY 
JINNUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
29
83
 
AJID HALIK x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
84
 
HAMDA 
SAMAC 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
85
 
COMMANDER 
KOSOVO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x ASG 
AS
G 
x x x x x 
A
g0
29
86
 
HAFTI DAIS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AS
G 
x x x x x 
A
g0
29
87
 
SALIP 
ABDULLAH 
MASDAL 
x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG ASG ASG 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
88
 
MADHATTA 
HAIPE 
x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
29
89
 
JATIB USMAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
29
90
 
PULAH ALIH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
29
91
 
FAIZAL 
MUTIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
29
92
 
ALDREN AMIL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
29
93
 
USTADZ 
SALIM TADO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
94
 
PULA  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
29
95
 
NUR HASSAN 
JAMIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
29
96
 
REYNALDO 
APILADO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
29
97
 
HTIMIL 
HARON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
29
98
 
ALLAN 
SABUDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
29
99
 
MUAMAR 
ASTALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
30
00
 
ADONG 
SALAHUDDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
30
01
 
JEROME 
MUSTAKIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
30
02
 
BURRONG 
RASUL BARRO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
30
03
 
MUJIBAR ALIH 
AMON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG 0 0 0 x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
30
04
 
BASARUN 
AROK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG 
AS
G 
A
g0
30
05
 
JUMADAIL 
ARAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
30
06
 
KARIM 
JULDANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
07
 
ALBASHIR 
ADJILI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
08
 
ROWENA 
AKSAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
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02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
30
09
 
NURSIMA 
ANNUDDEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
10
 
RABIA ASIRI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
11
 
MARWINA 
SALASAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
12
 
MADRIMAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
13
 
MIDSFAR 
AKSAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
14
 
ALVIN 
BAGADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
15
 
ALHASBY 
MISAYA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
16
 
MUBIN 
SAKANDAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
17
 
TING 
JUMDAEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
18
 
MAGDAR 
JUMDAEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
19
 
ARMINDA 
JUMDAEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
20
 
DARUL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
21
 
SALLAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
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03
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20
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20
07
 
20
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20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
30
22
 
JULMILLUN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
23
 
SADDAM 
PARAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
24
 
MUNIR 
ARBISON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
25
 
COCOY 
TULAWIE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
26
 
MOAMIL 
ASKALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
27
 
JULHAN 
ALIHUDDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
28
 
SULAIMAN 
MUIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
29
 
HADJI 
NAHRIM 
AKMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
30
 
YASIR IGASAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x 
A
g0
30
31
 
MARCIAL 
JABAROT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x 
A
g0
30
32
 
NADZMIR 
AMIRUL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x 
A
g0
30
33
 
JAITUN 
TIMUAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
30
34
 
COMMANDER 
KIRRIH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
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01
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20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
30
35
 
TETENG 
MANDANGAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
30
36
 
JANATIN 
MADJAKIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ASG
; JI 
AS
G 
x x x 
A
g0
30
37
 
NURHASSAN 
JAMIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AS
G 
x x x 
A
g0
30
38
 
COMMANDER 
TOTO 
SANTAWAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
39
 
HAJAL x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
40
 
COMMANDER 
JAVIER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
41
 
HAMSIRAJI 
MARUSI SALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
42
 
ALDAM TILAO x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
43
 
SHAMSUL 
BAHARI 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
44
 
AHMAD 
HASAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
45
 
IWAN MUTHO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
46
 
MOHAMMAD 
CHOLILY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
30
47
 
DWI 
WIDYARTO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
30
48
 
ALIAS OSMAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
49
 
ANSORI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
50
 
ACHMAD 
BASIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
30
51
 
BUDI 
DARMAWAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
30
52
 
TEDI SURYA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
30
53
 
AHMED MAAZ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
54
 
MUHAMMAD 
RAZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
55
 
AMIN (JAMIA 
ABI BAKAR) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
56
 
AKHWAN 
(JAMIA ABI 
BAKAR) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
57
 
FIRDOUS 
(JAMIA ABI 
BAKAR) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
58
 
MOHAMMAD 
SYAIFUDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
59
 
ILHAM 
SOFYANDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
60
 
FURQON 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
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19
88
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20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
30
61
 
DAOUD 
(JAMIA ABI 
BAKAR) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
62
 
ANWAR 
(JAMIA ABI 
BAKAR) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
63
 MUHAMMAD 
AMIN BIN 
MOHAMED 
YUNOS 
x x x x x JI JI JI JI 0 JI JI AQ AQ x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
64
 
ACHMAD 
KANDAI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
65
 
NATSIR/RISTA
N 
AQ x x x x x x JI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
66
 
DATUK RAJO 
AMEH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
67
 
BASIT USMAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
68
 
GUIDAY 
MUNTASIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
69
 
RICO ABURVA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
70
 
IMAM LAMAI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
71
 
ABDUL SAKIM 
SALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
72
 
AL POZE x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
73
 
JOLING x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
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20
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20
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20
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A
g0
30
74
 
ELMER 
AMBRAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
75
 
USTADZ 
USMAN 
COLANO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
76
 
JAYBE 
OFRASIO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
77
 
ROHMAT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
30
78
 
ALI AL-
KHUDAIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
79
 
AHMAD AL-
KHALIDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
80
 
NASSER AL-
FAHD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
81
 
KAHLED 
JEHANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
82
 
ZUBAYR AL-
RIMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
83
 
YOSIF SALIH 
FAHD 
ALA'YEERI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
84
 
ABDULLAH 
BIN IBRAHIM 
ALSHABRAMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
85
 
YUSUF 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
30
86
 
HILAL JABER 
EL ASSIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
830 
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
30
87
 
AHMED 
ELMOULLA 
BILLAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
89
 
JAMILUDDIN 
NASIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 
ARC
F 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
90
 
SADAQAT 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 
ARC
F 
x x x LeT x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
91
 
REHAN ALAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ARC
F 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
92
 
MUSHARRAT 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ARC
F 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
93
 
HUSRAT 
ALAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ARC
F 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
94
 
SHAKIB 
AKHTAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ARC
F 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
95
 
ADIL HASSAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ARC
F 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
96
 
MOHAMMED 
SABIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
ARC
F 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
97
 
RAJENDRA 
VRAJLAL 
ANADKAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
30
98
 
SHEIKH 
OBAIDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
30
99
 
IDRIS 
MOHAMMAD 
ZAHID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ARC
F 
x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
00
 
ABDUL 
KAREEM 
MOOSA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
31
01
 
NOOR ABU 
ILAHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
02
 
WALID 
JINNAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
03
 
MAHFOOZ 
ALAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
04
 
DAWOOD ALI 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
05
 
EZAZ AHMED x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
06
 
JAMIR 
SHAYKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ LeT LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
07
 
SOHAIL 
SHAYKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x LeT LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
08
 
TANVIR 
ANSARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ LeT LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
09
 
ABED AWAD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x FaI x x 
A
g0
31
10
 
FIROZ LATIF 
GHASWALA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x x x x 
A
g0
31
11
 
MOHAMMED 
IQBAL (LET) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
31
12
 
MOHAMMED 
ALI CHHIPA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x x x x 
A
g0
31
13
 
ASIF ABDUL 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
14
 
NOMAN 
SHEIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
832 
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20
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20
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20
04
 
20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
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20
09
 
20
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A
g0
31
15
 
ABU HURERA x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
31
16
 
RIZWAN 
DAWRE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
17
 
MUZAMMIL 
SHAIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
18
 
EHTESHAM 
SIDDIQUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
19
 
FAIYAZ KAGZI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x x x 0 
A
g0
31
20
 
MOHAMMED 
NAVED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
21
 
KAMALUDDIN 
ANSARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
22
 
ABU UMAID x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
23
 
SALIM (LET) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x x 
A
g0
31
24
 
MANISHA 
CHAVAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
25
 
ZAMEER 
SHEIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
26
 
MIRZA 
HIMAYAT 
INAYAT BAIG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 
A
g0
31
27
 LAL BABA 
MOHAMMED 
HUSSAIN 
FAREED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
833 
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94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
31
28
 MOHAMMAD 
AHMED 
ZARAR 
SIDDIBAPPA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
29
 
MOHSIN 
CHAUDHARY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
30
 
IKRAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP x x x 
A
g0
31
31
 
ABOUSFIAN 
ABDELRAZIK 
x x x x x x x AQ x x 0 0 x x x 0 0 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
31
32
 
AHMED ABDI 
AW-
MOHAMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
31
33
 
AHMAD ROFIQ 
RIDHO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
TQJ x x x x x 
A
g0
31
34
 
JOKO TRI 
PRIYANTO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
31
35
 
MUSTAGHFIRI
N 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
31
36
 
SOLAHUDDIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
31
37
 
FADLI 
SADAMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x JI x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
38
 
AYMAN AL-
BALAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
39
 
MARUTO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
31
40
 
SUSILO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
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19
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20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
31
41
 
PUTRI 
MUNAROH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TQJ x 
A
g0
31
42
 
HAWIN 
MURTADLO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
31
43
 
MOHAMMED 
AZAM 
GHAURI 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
44
 
ABU 
ABDALLAH 
AL-SHAMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x 
A
g0
31
45
 
ABU NASIR 
AL-QAHTANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
31
46
 
MUHAMMAD 
AHMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
31
47
 
ABDALLAH 
AL-SADIQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
31
48
 
KHALID AL-
SHARIF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
31
49
 
ABU-AL-
MUNDHIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
50
 
SHAYKH 
MIFTAH AL-
DUWWADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
51
 
ABD-AL-
WAHAB 
QAYID IDRIS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
52
 
MUSTAFA 
QANFID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
31
53
 
IBN AL-
SHAYKH AL-
LIBI 
AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
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20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
31
54
 
ABU LAITH 
AL-LIBI 
x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 AQ x x 
A
g0
31
55
 
UMBRA KATO x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
0 0 
A
g0
31
56
 
SALIP ALOY 
ALSREE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
31
57
 
LATIP JAMAT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
31
58
 
NASSER 
MACABATO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
31
59
 
IMAM 
ABUBAKAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
31
60
 
WANING 
ABDUSALAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 
A
g0
31
61
 
SAIDAMEN 
ALICK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
31
62
 
ADZMIE x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
63
 
ABUNAWAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
64
 
ABDULRAHM
AN 
MACAPAAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
0 x 
A
g0
31
65
 
PLATON BLAH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x JI x x x x 
A
g0
31
66
 
KULE 
MAMAGONG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x 
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19
99
 
20
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
31
67
 
DAUD SARIP x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x 
A
g0
31
68
 
BIZNAR 
SALAHUDDIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x 
A
g0
31
69
 
ATTI 
LINTUNGAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x 
A
g0
31
70
 
ZAHIDE 
ABDUL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x 
A
g0
31
71
 
USMAN AL 
MAJAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
JI; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x 
A
g0
31
72
 
KASANADEL 
PIGKAWALAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x 
A
g0
31
73
 
USI 
AMPATUAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x 
A
g0
31
74
 
NAYANG 
TIMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x 
A
g0
31
75
 
DATUKALAN 
MONTOK 
SAMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x 
A
g0
31
76
 
TUMALAO 
BUTUAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x 
A
g0
31
77
 
MANAMPAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(MI
LF) 
x x 
A
g0
31
78
 
TOLNI SALIK x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
31
79
 
KUMANDER 
NASER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
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 N
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NAME 
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20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
31
80
 
BAY x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
31
81
 
AKA KEDIE x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
31
82
 
WAHAB UPAO x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
31
83
 
MOHAMAD 
BAEHAQI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x JI x 0 x x 
A
g0
31
84
 
ASNAN 
SAWAJAAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
31
85
 
ABRAHAM 
IBNO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
86
 
ANSAR YUSOP x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
87
 
ABRAL 
ABDUSALAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
88
 
GUINGONA 
SAMAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
31
89
 
SMAWTIN 
BASILAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x 
A
g0
31
90
 
EDGAR 
MALAYDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
31
91
 
ARIF QADIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
31
92
 
SHADAAB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
838 
 
ID
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o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
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19
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19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
31
93
 
SHEHZAAD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
31
94
 
SALMAN 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT LeT x 0 
A
g0
31
95
 
ARIZ KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
31
96
 
MOHAMMAD 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
31
97
 
HAMID 
SHEIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
31
98
 
SHAHRUKH x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
31
99
 
ABDUL 
SATTAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT 0 x 
A
g0
32
00
 
QAYAMUDDIN 
KAPADIA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x 
A
g0
32
01
 
IQBAL 
BHATKAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
32
02
 
SALEH 
MUHAMMAD 
AL-AOOFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x AQ 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
32
03
 
ABDULAZIZ 
AL-MOQRIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
04
 
OMAR AHMED 
ABDULLAH 
ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
32
05
 
MIKAEL 
DAVUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 0 
839 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
88
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19
91
 
19
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19
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19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
32
06
 
DAVID 
JAKOBSEN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
32
07
 
SHAWAN 
SADEK SAEED 
BUJAK BUJAK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
32
08
 
AHMAD/ISMAI
L 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
32
09
 
ABI PAMANAY x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
10
 
ABDULRAHM
AN SAMUEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AS
G 
A
g0
32
11
 
JOHER 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AS
G 
A
g0
32
12
 
MUJAHID 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AS
G 
A
g0
32
13
 
ABU TAHER x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
32
14
 
ALSHEED 
ALLING 
ALBANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
ASG
; JI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
15
 
ABDUL BAKI x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
16
 
BARAHAMA 
SALI 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
71
 
SHEIK MIYAR 
HAMZA 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
72
 
FARDOSA 
ABDULLAHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
840 
 
ID
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19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
32
73
 
ASGHAR 
MUKADAM 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
74
 
SHAHNAWAZ 
QURESHI 
x x x x EIJ 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
75
 
SHOAIB 
GHANSAR 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
76
 
ABDUL GANI 
TURK 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
77
 
YAKUB 
MEMON 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
78
 
ESSA MEMON x x x x x 
D-
Com 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
79
 
YUSUF 
MEMON 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
80
 
RUBINA 
MEMON 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
81
 
IBRAHIM 
(TIGER) 
MEMON 
x x x x 
D-
Com 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x 
A
g0
32
82
 
IMTIAZ 
GHAVTE 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
83
 
NASIM 
BARMARE 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
84
 
FAROOQ 
PAWLE 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
85
 
BASHIR 
KHAIRULLA 
x x x x 
D-
Com 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
841 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
88
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
32
86
 
ZAKIR 
HUSSAIN 
SHAIKH 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
87
 
FEROZ 
MALLIK 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
88
 
ABDUL 
AKHTAR 
KHAN 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
89
 
DAWOOD 
MOHAMMAD 
PHANSE 
x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
90
 
ANIS IBRAHIM x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
91
 
NAIBUDDIN x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
92
 
MOHAMMED 
SHARIF 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
93
 
AYUB MEMON x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x 
A
g0
32
94
 
ANEES 
MEMON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x 
A
g0
32
95
 
TANVIR 
SHEIKH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
96
 
SANJAY 
KUMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
97
 
ABDUL JAVED x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
32
98
 
ABU SALEM x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
842 
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NAME 
19
88
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89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
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19
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19
94
 
19
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19
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19
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19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
32
99
 
IQBAL SHEIKH 
KASKAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
00
 
EZAZ PATHAN x x x x x 
D-
Com 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
01
 
ATUL 
KANITAL 
SHAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
02
 
ASHOK 
BHANSALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
03
 
AFTAB BATKI x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
04
 
ABU JINDAL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
33
05
 
AHMED 
SIDDIQUI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
33
06
 
SHAHAB 
DASHTI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
33
07
 
RAMI 
MAKANESI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
33
08
 
NAAMEN 
MEZICHE 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 
AQ; 
HUJ
I 
A
g0
33
09
 
GAFUR 
JUMDAIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ASG ASG 0 
A
g0
33
10
 
NAIZ KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
33
11
 
ABU 
MUHAMMAD 
HAMZA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
843 
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NAME 
19
88
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
33
12
 
SALEM SAAD 
BIN SUWEID 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
13
 
YASIR 
FRIEHAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
14
 
MUHAMMAD 
DEMES 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
15
 
MUHAMMAD 
AMIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
16
 
ALI KHALED 
AL-JABOURI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
17
 
MUHAMMAD 
HASSAN AL-
SAMARAI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
18
 
UMAR 
BAZIYANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
19
 MAHMOOD 
ABDEL AZIZ 
AL-HARAMI 
AL-JANABI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
20
 
FADHIL AL-
KURDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(AQ
I) 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
21
 
MARWAN 
HADID AL-
SURI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
33
22
 SAMI 
MUHAMMAD 
ALI SAID AL-
JAAF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
23
 HASAM 
HAMAD 
ABDULLAH 
MUHSIN AL-
DULAIMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(AQ
I) 
x x x x x 
A
g0
33
24
 
HASSAN 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(AQ
I) 
x x x x x x 
844 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
33
25
 
ABU TALHA 
(IRAQ 
INSURGENCY) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(AQ
I) 
x x x x x 
A
g0
33
26
 
SABHAN 
AHMAD 
RAMADAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(AQ
I) 
x x x x x 
A
g0
33
27
 
AZMI AL-
JAYOUSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
28
 
MOHAMMED 
SHARKAWA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(AQ
I) 
x x x x x 
A
g0
33
29
 KHAMIS 
FARHAN 
KHALAF ABD 
AL-FAHDAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(AQ
I) 
x x x x x 
A
g0
33
30
 
ABU AZZAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(AQ
I) 
x x 
A
g0
33
31
 BILAL 
MAHMUD 
AWAD 
SHEBAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(AQ
I) 
x x x x x 
A
g0
33
32
 
ABU SUFIAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
33
 
SERGEI 
MALYSCHEW 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
34
 
MUHAMMAD 
G 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
35
 
MUHAMMAD 
WASFI 
x IG x x x BaI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
36
 
ABU 
MOHAMMED 
AL-MAQDISI 
x x x x x BaI BaI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
37
 
HUTHAIFA 
AZZAM 
x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
845 
 
ID
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NAME 
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98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
33
38
 
SHEIK HARITH 
AL-DARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
39
 
ABDULLAH 
RASHID AL-
BAGHDADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
40
 
ABU ABDUL-
RAHMAN AL-
IRAQI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(AQ
I) 
x x x x 
A
g0
33
41
 
ABU HAMZA 
AL-MUHAJER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
42
 
NASIR AL-
WAHAYSHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
AQ; 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
33
43
 
QASSEM AL-
REMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
x 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
33
44
 
SAID AL-
SHEHRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
AQ; 
AQ
AP 
0 x 
A
g0
33
45
 
NASIR AL-
BAHRI 
x x x x x x x x x AQ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
AQ AQ x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
46
 
MUHAMMAD 
HASSAN AL-
SIHLI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
47
 
ABDELRAHMA
N AL-SIHLI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
48
 
ABDULLAH 
AL-SIHLI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
49
 
MUHAMMAD 
HAMID 
HUSSEIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
50
 
ALI HUSSEIN 
ALI AL-
SHAMARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
846 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
88
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
33
51
 RAWAD 
JASSEM 
MOHAMMED 
ABED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
52
 
SAFAA 
MOHAMMED 
ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
53
 SAJIDA 
MUBARAK 
ATROUS AL-
RISHAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
54
 
MUBARAK 
ATROUS AL-
RISHAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
55
 
NIDAL HASAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
x 
A
g0
33
56
 
AYED AL-
SHABWANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
33
58
 
SALEH AL-
TEYS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
33
59
 
IBRAHIM 
HASSAN AL-
ASIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
x x 
AQ
AP 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
33
60
 
ABDULLAH 
AL-ASIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
x x 
AQ
AP 
x 
A
g0
33
61
 
JABIR AL-
FAYFI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 0 x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
33
62
 
MIDHAT 
MURSI AL-
SAYID UMAR 
x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x AQ x x 
A
g0
33
63
 ABU MO. 
IBRAHIM BIN 
ABI AL-FARAJ 
AL-MASRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 
A
g0
33
64
 
ABD AL-
WAHAB AL-
MASRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 
847 
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NAME 
19
88
 
19
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90
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92
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93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
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19
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19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
33
65
 
ABU ISLAM 
AL-MASRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 
A
g0
33
66
 
KHALID 
HABIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x AQ x x 
HUJ
I; 
Raw
-9 
x x 
A
g0
33
67
 
MAHMOUD 
MAHDI 
ZEIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
33
68
 
TAYIP RAUF x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
33
69
 
MATIUR 
REHMAN 
x x x 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x 0 AQ AQ AQ 
AQ; 
(LeJ
) 
x x x x 
A
g0
33
70
 
MAROOF 
RAUF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x 
A
g0
33
71
 
TAHIR 
MASOOD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
72
 
KUSHMIR 
NESIRWAN 
x x x x x x x JI x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
73
 
ABDUL RAHIM 
AYUB 
x x x x x 0 x 0 0 0 0 x JI 0 0 x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
33
74
 
ABDUL 
RAHMAN 
AYUB 
x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
75
 
RABIYAH 
HUTCHINSON 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x 0 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
76
 
MUSTAFA 
HAMID 
x x x x x x x AQ x x 
AQ; 
EIJ; 
(Tal) 
x AQ 
AQ; 
(Tal) 
x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
77
 
AFIFA ROCHE x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
848 
 
ID
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19
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19
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19
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
33
78
 
JOHN MUSA x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
79
 
AZMAN 
HASHIM 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x JI 0 x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
80
 
JACK THOMAS x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 AQ AQ 0 x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
33
81
 
MARYATI 
IDRIS 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
82
 
AISYAH 
BARAJA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
83
 
ZULFAH 
BASHIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
84
 
MOHAMMED 
AYUB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
33
85
 
ABDULLAH 
AYUB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
33
86
 MUHAMMAD 
RAB'A AL-SA 
YID AL-
BAHTIYTI 
x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x AQ x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
87
 
ALI SALEH 
HUSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
88
 
AHMED 
KHADR 
AQ IG IG 0 0 0 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
89
 
KHALID 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
90
 
OMAR KHADR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
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20
01
 
20
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
33
91
 
ABDUL 
RAHMAN 
KHADR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
92
 
RAHMAH 
CHIEKHO 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
33
93
 
KHALED 
CHIEKHO 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
94
 
MAREK 
SAMULSKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
33
95
 YOUNIS 
MOHAMMED 
IBRAHIM AL-
HAYARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
33
96
 
SAUD AL-
OTAIBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
33
97
 
OMAR 
BALADJAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
98
 
MOHAMED 
ALI ELOMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
33
99
 
MIRSAD 
MULAHALILO
VIC 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
00
 
KHALED 
SHARROUF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
01
 
MAZEN 
TOUMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
02
 
MOUSTAFA 
CHEIKHO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x LeT x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
03
 
ABDUL RAKIB 
HASAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
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19
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
34
04
 
ABDUL 
NACER 
BENBRIKA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
05
 
AHMED 
MEHRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
06
 
EZZIT RAAD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
07
 
AIMEN JOUD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
08
 
FADAL 
SAYADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
09
 
AMER 
JADDARA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
10
 
AHMED RAAD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
11
 
SHANT KENT x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
12
 
HANY TAHA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
34
13
 
MUSTAFA 
AYUB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
14
 
AMINAH 
AYUB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
15
 
UMNYA AL 
ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
16
 
HEBA AL 
ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
851 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
34
17
 
MOHAMMED 
AL ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
18
 
HUSSEIN AL 
ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
19
 
KAMAL HABIB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
20
 
AZZA NOWAIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
21
 
ISAM AL-
QAMARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
22
 
KHALED 
ISLAMBOULI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
23
 
SAYYID IMAM EIJ AQ x x 0 x x x x x x x x AQ x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
24
 
FATIMA AL 
ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
25
 
NABILA AL 
ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
26
 
KHADIGA AL 
ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
27
 
UMAYMA AL 
ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
28
 
MOHAMMED 
BIN AYMAN 
AL ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
29
 
AISHA AL 
ZAWAHIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
852 
 
ID
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
34
30
 
ISMAIL 
NASSIR 
x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
31
 
AHMAD 
SALAMA 
MABRUK 
x x x x x x x x EIJ EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
32
 
MAHMUD 
HISHAM AL-
HENNAWI 
x x x x x x x x EIJ EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
33
 
AHMAD 
IBRAHIM AL-
NAGAR 
x x x x x EIJ EIJ x EIJ x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
34
 
AHMED 
ISMAIL 
x x x x x EIJ x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
35
 
SARWAT 
SHEHATA 
x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
36
 
ADEL ABDEL 
QODDUS 
x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
37
 
HASSAN 
ZEMIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x AQ x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
34
38
 
ABDEL-GHANI 
ALI JAWHAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x FaI x x 
A
g0
34
39
 
TAREK MERHI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x FaI x x 
A
g0
34
40
 
OSAMA AL-
SHEHABI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x FaI x x 
A
g0
34
41
 
MOHAMMED 
SHAWKI 
ISLAMBOULI 
0 x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
42
 
ADNAN AL-
SAYEGH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
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00
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20
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20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
34
43
 OTHMAN 
AHMED 
OTHMAN AL-
GHAMDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 
A
g0
34
44
 
FAHD SALEH 
SULAIMAN 
AL-JATILI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
34
45
 
MOHAMMAD 
AL-DUKHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x FaI x x 
A
g0
34
46
 
WAEL ABU 
JABER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x FaI x x 
A
g0
34
47
 
RACHMAT 
PUJIPRABOWO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
48
 
USMAN BIN 
SEF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
49
 
SABTURANI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
50
 
KARIM 
KHADR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
51
 
ABU OBAIDAH 
AL-MASRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x AQ x 0 x x 
A
g0
34
52
 
MULLAH 
ABDUL RAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
34
53
 
FAQIR 
MOHAMMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x AQ TTP 
AQ; 
TTP 
TTP 0 
A
g0
34
54
 ABDUR 
REHMAN 
(KARWAN-E-
NIAMATULLA
H) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
854 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
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19
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19
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
34
55
 
NIAMATULLA
H 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
34
56
 
MAULVI 
OMAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
TTP x 
A
g0
34
57
 
FATEH 
MOHAMMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
0 0 
A
g0
34
58
 
RAFIUDDIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
34
59
 
ANWAR (TTP) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
34
60
 
QARI ZIAUR 
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
34
61
 
WALI UR 
REHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP x 
A
g0
34
62
 
NEK 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x x x x (Tal) (Tal) (Tal) 
AQ; 
(Tal) 
x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
63
 
QARI HUSSEIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x TTP TTP 
A
g0
34
64
 
AAZAM TARIQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP x 
A
g0
34
65
 
REHMATULLA
H 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x TTP 0 
A
g0
34
66
 
ABDULLAH 
MEHSUD 
x x x x x x x x (Tal) x x x x AQ x AQ 0 x x 0 x x x 
A
g0
34
67
 
SHAKIR 
ULLAH 
SHAKIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
34
68
 
SHARQAWI 
ABDU ALI AL-
HAJJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
69
 
MOHAMMAD 
OMAR ABDEL-
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
70
 
AHMAD 
ABDEL-
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
71
 
ASSAD ABDEL 
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
72
 
ABD AL AZIZ 
AL-JAMAL 
EIJ x x x x x EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
73
 IBRAHIM 
MUHAMMAD 
SALIH AL-
BANNA 
x x x x x EIJ EIJ x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
JI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A
g0
34
74
 
ABD-AL-
MUN'IM AL-
BADAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
JI 0 x x x x x 
AQ; 
(AQ
I) 
x 
AQ; 
(AQ
I) 
x 
TTP
; 
(AQ
I) 
A
g0
34
75
 
MAHMUD AL-
DIB 
x x x x x EIJ EIJ 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
76
 
KHALID 
BAKIR 
x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
77
 
IBRAHIM 
KARIM 
x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
78
 
HASAN ABADI x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
79
 
KHALIL NUR-
AL-DIN 
x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
34
80
 
YUSUF 
MUHAMMADA
YN 
x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
856 
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NAME 
19
88
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91
 
19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
34
81
 
CHIEFTAIN 
DARDIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
JI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A
g0
34
82
 
MUHAMMAD 
UMAYR AL-
AWLAQI 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
34
83
 
ABDULLAH 
HAMAS AL 
FILISTINI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
34
84
 
ABU 
SULAYMAN 
JAZAIRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
34
85
 
ZAIN UL ABU 
QASIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
A
g0
34
86
 
ABDULLAH 
AZZAM AL 
SAUDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(Tal) 
x x 
A
g0
34
87
 
ABU ZUBAIR 
AL MASRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x 
A
g0
34
88
 
ABDUR 
REHMAN 
WAZIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 AQ x x AQ x x 
(HI
G) 
x x 
A
g0
34
89
 
ZANJIR WAZIR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HN; 
(HI
G) 
x x 
A
g0
34
90
 
ABDUL 
SALAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(HI
G) 
x x 
A
g0
34
91
 
ABU WAFA AL 
SAUDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x 
A
g0
34
92
 
ABDUL 
KHALIQ 
HAQQANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x 0 x x 
A
g0
34
93
 
ABU HARIS x IG x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x HN x HN x x 
857 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
88
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
34
94
 
ABU HAMZA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
A
g0
34
95
 
ABU JIHAD AL 
MASRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x 0 x x 
A
g0
34
99
 
ABDUL RAUF 
NASSIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x 0 x 
AQ
AP 
x x x x 
A
g0
35
00
 
MUHAMMAD 
SHARAF 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
01
 
MUS'AB 
SHARAF 
x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
02
 
QAED SALEM 
SUNIAN AL-
HARTHI 
x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x AQ x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
03
 MUNIR 
AHMED 
ABDULLAH 
AL-SAUDA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
04
 
SALEH 
HUSSEIN ALI 
AL-ZONO 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
05
 
AOUSSAN 
AHMED AL-
TIRIHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
06
 
ADEL NASSER 
AL-SAUDA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
07
 
KAMAL 
DARWISH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
08
 
MUHAMMAD 
SHOAIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
35
09
 
MEHMOOH 
KHALIB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
858 
 
ID
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NAME 
19
88
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89
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19
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19
92
 
19
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19
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19
96
 
19
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19
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19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
35
10
 
IMRAN 
CHEEMA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
35
11
 
MAHROOF 
MIRZA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
35
12
 
AQEELUR 
REHMAN 
ABBASSI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
35
13
 
MUHAMMAD 
TARIQ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
35
14
 
QADEER 
MALIK 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
35
15
 
ABDUL HAFEZ 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
35
16
 
MUHAMMAD 
AYUB ELAHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
35
17
 
ROSHAN 
JAMAL KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x x 
A
g0
35
18
 
NAZIMUDDIN 
ZALALOV 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 0 x 
AQ; 
TTP 
x 
A
g0
35
19
 
ABU AHMED 
AL-KUWAITI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x AQ AQ x x x x AQ 
A
g0
35
20
 
HASSAN GHUL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
21
 
MUHAMMAD 
ALI QASIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
22
 
JALALUDDIN 
HAQQANI 
x 
IG; 
(HIG
) 
x x 0 x x x x (Tal) x x x 
AQ; 
(Tal) 
x x 0 x x x HN x x 
859 
 
ID
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99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
35
23
 
MOHAMMAD 
IBRAHIM 
x x x x x x x x x (Tal) x x x 
AQ; 
(Tal) 
0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
24
 
MUHAMMAD 
HAQQANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HN; 
(Tal
) 
A
g0
35
25
 
QARI ZAFAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x TTP 
A
g0
35
26
 
MUHAMMAD 
BEG 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
A
g0
35
27
 
MULLAH 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
A
g0
35
28
 
SIRAJUDDIN 
HAQQANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN HN HN HN HN x 
A
g0
35
30
 
SALAHUDDIN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
A
g0
35
31
 
FAROUQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
A
g0
35
32
 
NASIRUDDIN 
HAQQANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN HN HN HN HN HN 
A
g0
35
33
 
KHALIL AL-
RAHMAN 
HAQQANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HN; 
(Tal) 
x 
A
g0
35
34
 
SAID JAN 'ABD 
AL-SALAM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
35
 
HOMAYOUN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
A
g0
35
36
 
BADRUDDIN 
HAQQANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
860 
 
ID
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20
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20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
35
37
 
ABDULLAH 
FARHAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
A
g0
35
38
 
DARIM 
SEDGAI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x HN x x 
A
g0
35
39
 
COL. IMAM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
40
 
ABU TAYEB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HN; 
(Tal) 
x x 
A
g0
35
41
 
MR. C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
HN; 
(Tal) 
x x 
A
g0
35
42
 
HASSAN 
ALMREI 
x x 0 x x x 0 0 x x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
43
 
NABIL 
ALMARABH 
x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
44
 
AHMED AL 
KAYSEE 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
45
 
MAHMOUD 
JABALLAH 
x x x x x x x x EIJ EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
46
 
THIRWAT 
SHEHATA 
x x x x x x AQ AQ EIJ EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x AQ x x x x x 
A
g0
35
47
 
MOHAMAD 
ZEKI 
MAHJOUB 
x x x AQ AQ AQ AQ x EIJ EIJ 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
48
 ESSAM 
MOHAMED 
HAFEZ 
MARZOUK 
x x x x EIJ x x x EIJ EIJ 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
49
 
HANI YUSEF 
AL SEBAI 
x x x x x x x x EIJ EIJ x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
861 
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19
88
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19
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20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
35
50
 
IBRAHIM 
ALLAM 
x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
51
 
ABU YASSER x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
52
 
MUSTAFA 
MOHAMED 
KRER 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
53
 
HASSAN 
FARHAT 
x x x x x x x x EIJ 0 x x 0 x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
54
 
MOHAMED 
HARKAT 
x x 0 x 0 0 x AQ 0 
(GI
A) 
x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
55
 
PACHA WAZIR x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
56
 
ABU MESSAB 
AL 
SHEHRE 
x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
57
 
KAMEL AGIZA x x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
58
 
IHAB SAQR x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
59
 SAEED 
RASOUL 
SOBRAHATOL
LAH 
MUHAMMAD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
60
 
MASOUD 
RASOUL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
61
 
AL-MUGHIRA 
AL GAZA'IRI 
x x x x 0 0 0 
AQ; 
(MI
LF) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
862 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
35
62
 
GHARIB x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
63
 
SHAHWALI x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
64
 
DZHOKHAR 
DUDAYEV 
x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
65
 
GHAIRAT 
BAHEER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
66
 
AMANULLAH x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
67
 
NOOR 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x x 
(HI
G) 
(Tal) x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
68
 
MUSTAFA 
HAMZA 
x x x x x x x EIJ 0 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x 0 0 x x x 0 x 
AQ; 
LeT 
x x x x 
A
g0
35
69
 METHAT 
AHMED 
ABDELRAHMA
N 
x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
EIJ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
70
 
MOHSIN 
GHALAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
35
71
 
MOHAMMED 
KAMEL 
MOSTAFA 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
35
72
 
ABU HASSAN x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
73
 
AHMED 
ABDEL 
SATTAR 
x x IG x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
74
 
SHEIK SALAH 
HASHIM 
x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x 
863 
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20
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20
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20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
35
75
 SOFID 
HASSAN 
ADDULKANI 
AZIK 
x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
76
 AL-ARAB 
TSADIK 
HASSIN 
MOHAMMED 
x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
77
 
ABDULKERIM 
ALNAZI 
ABDLURAZI 
x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
78
 SHERIF 
ABDEL-
RAHMAN 
TEWFIK EL-
MADANI 
x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
79
 
HUSSEIN 
AHMED 
SHAHAF ALI 
x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
80
 
EZET YASSIN x x x x x x x EIJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
81
 
HAMZA 
MUSTAFA 
KAMEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
35
82
 
MOHAMED 
CHIADMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
83
 
ABDUL 
CHIADMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
84
 
KHALID 
JEBARI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
85
 
MALIK 
NASSAR 
HARHRA 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
86
 
SHAHID BUTT x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
864 
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NAME 
19
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
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20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
35
87
 
SARMAD 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
88
 
GHULAM 
HUSSEIN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
89
 
SHAZ NABI x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
90
 
AYAD 
HUSSEIN 
x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
91
 
YASSER 
MOSTAFA 
KAMEL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
35
92
 
MUAMIN ALI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
35
93
 
KARIM 
ABDULLAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
35
94
 
MAJAD 
MAHMOUD 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
35
95
 
SULEIMAN 
FLAIFIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
96
 
MUHAMMAD 
FLAIFIL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
35
97
 
MUHAMMAD 
ABDALLAH 
RIBA'A 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
35
98
 
MUHAMMAD 
GAYEZ SABAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 x x x x 
A
g0
35
99
 
NASSER 
KHAMIS AL-
MALLAHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x 
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20
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20
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20
03
 
20
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20
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20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
36
00
 
KHALED 
MUSSAED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
01
 
YOUNIS ELIAN 
ABU JARIR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
02
 OSAMA 
ABDEL-GHANI 
AL-
NAKHLAWI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
03
 
IYAD AL-
FALESTINI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
04
 
SALEM 
SHANOUB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
05
 
MOHAMMED 
ABDALLAH 
ELIAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
36
06
 
HASSAN AL-
ARAYSHI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
07
 
TALEB 
MURTADA 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
08
 
ARAFAT 
OUDA ALI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
36
09
 
AHMED 
MOHAMMED 
AL-KOREIMI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
36
10
 
MOHAMMED 
ABDELAZIZ 
NAFEI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
36
11
 
ATALLAH AL-
KORM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
36
12
 
YUSRI 
MOHAREB  
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x 
866 
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20
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20
03
 
20
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20
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20
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20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
36
13
 
AYMAN 
MOHAREB 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
36
14
 
TAMER 
NUSSEIRAT 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x 
A
g0
36
15
 HASSAN 
RAFAAT 
AHMED 
BASHANDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
16
 
MOHAMED 
SOBHI ALI 
JIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
17
 
GAMAL SOBHI 
ALI JIDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
18
 
AKRAM 
MOHAMMED 
FAWZI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
19
 
TAREK 
AHMED AL-
SAYED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
20
 
REDA SAYED 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
21
 
ASHRAF 
SAIED 
YOUSSEF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
22
 
EHAB YOUSRI 
YASSIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
23
 
GAMAL 
AHMED 
ABDEL AAL 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
24
 
ASHRAF 
SAEED 
YOUSSEF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
25
 
NEGAT 
YASSIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
867 
 
ID
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98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
36
26
 
IMAN 
IBRAHIM 
KHAMIS 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
27
 
MOHAMMED 
YOUSRI 
YASSIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x 
A
g0
36
28
 
SABER 
FARHAT ABU 
EL-ELA 
x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
29
 
MAHMOUD 
ABI EL-ELA 
x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
30
 
MOHAMED 
SALEM 
ABDEL-NABI 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
31
 
ISMAIL 
ABDALLAH 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
32
 
HAFEZ ABDEL 
HAKIM 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
33
 
TAHA YEHIA 
SAYYED 
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
34
 
GURUKANTH 
DESAI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
36
35
 
OMAR SHARIF 
LATIF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
36
36
 
ABDUL MALIK 
MIAH 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
36
37
 MOHAMMED 
MOKSUDUR 
RAHMAN 
CHOWDHURY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
36
38
 SHAH 
MOHAMMED 
LUTFAR 
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
868 
 
ID
 N
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NAME 
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88
 
19
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19
93
 
19
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19
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19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
36
39
 
NAZAM 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
36
40
 
USMAN KHAN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
36
41
 
MOHIBUR 
RAHMAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
36
42
 
ABUL BOSHER 
MOHAMMED 
SHAHJAHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ
AP 
A
g0
36
43
 
TAIMOUR 
ABDULWAHA
B AL-ABDALY 
x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 0 x x 0 TTP 
A
g0
36
44
 
EZEDDEN AL 
KHALEDI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 TTP 
A
g0
36
45
 
ABU OMAR 
AL-BAGHDADI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(AQ
I) 
AQ x TTP 
A
g0
36
46
 
MONA AL-
ABDALY 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
47
 
MUHARIB 
ABDUL LATIF 
AL-JUBOURI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(AQ
I) 
(AQ
I) 
x x x 
A
g0
36
48
 
ABU NIZAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
(AQ
I) 
x x 
A
g0
36
49
 
HASNA ALI 
YEHYE 
HUSSAIN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
36
50
 
WATHI AL-
JASSEM 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 
A
g0
36
51
 
ABRAR SAEED 
AHMED 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
36
52
 
ABU UNAYS 
AL SAUDI 
x x AQ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
53
 MOHAMED 
ELLIAS S/O 
MOHAMED 
KHAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
AQ; 
JI 
x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
54
 
CHRISTIAN 
GANCZARSKI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
55
 
WALID 
NOUAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
56
 
NIZAR NOUAR x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
57
 
BELGACEM 
NOUAR 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
58
 
ASIF 
MOHAMMED 
HANIF 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
59
 
FRITZ MARTIN 
GELOWICZ 
x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AQ 0 x x x 
A
g0
36
60
 
KARIM MEHDI x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
61
 
TOLGA D. x x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 x x x 
A
g0
36
62
 
DANIEL 
MARTIN 
SCHNEIDER 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x 
A
g0
36
63
 
ADEM 
YILMAZ 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ 0 x x x 
A
g0
36
64
 
ATTILA SELEK x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x x x 
870 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
NAME 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
A
g0
36
65
 
BILAL BIN 
MARWAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ AQ x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
66
 
SALIM AHMED 
HAMDAN 
x x x x x x x x x x x x AQ AQ x x x x x x x x x 
A
g0
36
67
 
YOUSUF AL-
SHAHRI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 0 
A
g0
36
68
 
RAYED 
ABDULLAHI 
AL-HARBI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
A
g0
36
69
 
YOUNIS AL-
MAURITANI 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 0 x 
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APPENDIX D: AGENT ATTRIBUTES  
 
 
Note on Interpretation: All dates listed in this appendix are in yyyymmdd format.  Because of the ambiguity inherent to the subject 
matter, these dates should be interpreted as approximate.  Often times, dates of birth are listed only to the year, e.g. 1977.  In such 
instances, the date was set to the midpoint of the calendar year; thus, 1977 becomes 19770702.  Similarly, when the data listed dates 
only to the month, e.g. November 1977, attribute values were set to the midpoint of the month, e.g. 19771115.  As with the alias list, 
space precludes a full recounting of the thousands of sources used to compile the attributes listed in the table below, but as the 
information was obtained through deductive observation of the sources listed in Appendix H, which lists the interactions associated 
with each individual in the data, a reasonable approximation of the sourcing underlying the attribute data can be derived from that 
appendix. 
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Table 10.4 Agent Attributes 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
00
01
 
FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED Male 19720825 19740225 
Moroni, 
Comoros 
Islands 
0 Comoros Kenya (False) West Africa 
A
g0
00
05
 
ADEL ABDEL BARY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
06
 
ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH Male 19630702 0 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
09
 
ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI Male 19500501 0 
Cairo, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt Netherlands North Africa 
A
g0
00
13
 
AHMED KHALFAN GHAILANI Male 19740314 0 
Zanzibar, 
Tanzania 
0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
00
14
 
AHMED MOHAMED HAMED ALI Male 19650702 19700801 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
873 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
00
15
 
RIFA'I AHMAD TAHA MUSA Male 19540624 19740413 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
16
 
HAMDEN KHALIF ALLAH AWAD Male 19700813 19740414 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
19
 
ZAKARIA Male 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
23
 
ANAS AL LIBY Male 19640330 0 
Tripoli, 
Libya 
0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
24
 
OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL OMAIRAH Male 19680702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
00
25
 
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED KHALIL Male 19760702 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
00
26
 
MUHSIN AL-FADHLI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
874 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
00
27
 
MUHAMMAD AL-HAMATI Male 19810424 0 0 0 Kuwait 0 Middle East 
A
g0
00
28
 
ABD AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI Male 19660418 0 
Bani 
Suwayf, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
30
 
AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI Male 19510619 0 Giza, Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
31
 
JIHAD MOHAMMED ABDOU ALI Male 19740319 0 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
00
32
 
NUR AL-DIN AL-DIBISKI Male 19630702 0 
Tripoli, 
Libya 
0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
33
 
ABD ALLAH MOHAMED RAGAB ABDEL 
RAHMAN 
Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
00
34
 
`ALI SULAYMAN MAS'UD `ABD AL-SAYYID Male 19690702 0 
Tripoli, 
Libya 
0 Libya 0 North Africa 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
00
48
 
CO-CONSPIRATOR 2 Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
00
49
 
CO-CONSPIRATOR 5 Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
00
50
 
CO-CONSPIRATOR 1 Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
00
51
 
CO-CONSPIRATOR 3 Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
00
52
 
CO-CONSPIRATOR 4 Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
00
53
 
CO-CONSPIRATOR 6 Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
00
90
 
SADDIQ AL MAHDI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
876 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
00
91
 
FAHID MOHAMMED ALLY MSALAM Male 19760219 0 
Mombasa, 
Kenya 
0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
01
21
 
MOHAMED BELKALEM Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
01
22
 
SUHAYL FATILLOEVICH BURANOV Male 19831011 0 
Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan 
0 Uzbekistan 0 Central Asia 
A
g0
01
24
 
IBRAHIM DAOUD ABU ABDULLA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
01
25
 
IBRAHIM EIDAROUS Male 19570702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
01
65
 
KHALFAN KHAMIS MOHAMED Male 19730725 0 
Kidimini, 
Zanzibar, 
Tanzania 
0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
01
66
 
KHALID AL FAWWAZ Male 19620825 19620824 Kuwait 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
877 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
01
81
 
MAMDOUH MAHMUD SALIM Male 19580702 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
01
99
 
MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL-'OWHALI Male 19770118 19770702 
Liverpool, 
England 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
02
00
 
MOHAMED SADEEK ODEH Male 19650702 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
02
08
 
ABU HAFS AL MASRY Male 19510702 
19560702; 
19440702 
Alexandria, 
Egypt 
Menoufy
a, Egypt 
Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
09
 
MUHSIN MUSA MATWALLI ATWAH Male 19640619 0 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
10
 
MUSTAFA MOHAMED FADHIL Male 19760623 0 
Cairo, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
44
 
SAIF AL ADEL Male 19630702 0 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
878 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
02
53
 
SHEIK OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN Male 19380702 0 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
54
 
SHEIKH AHMED SALIM SWEDAN Male 19690409 19600409 
Mombasa, 
Kenya 
0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
02
72
 
USAMA BIN LADEN Male 19570630 19580702 
Jeddah, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Yemen 
Saudi Arabia 
(Revoked April 
1994) 
0 Middle East 
A
g0
02
75
 
WADIH EL HAGE Male 19600725 0 
Sidon, 
Lebanon 
0 
USA (Granted 
in 1989) 
0 North America 
A
g0
02
79
 
JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADL Male 19630702 0 
Ruffa City, 
Sudan 
0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
80
 
MUSTAFA SHALABI Male 19520702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
81
 
ABU SHALEED AL-FALASTINI Male 0 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
879 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
02
82
 
ABU NOFAL AL SAUDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
02
83
 
ISSAWI ABU HASSAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
02
84
 
ABU FEDA EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
85
 
ABU JAFFAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
02
86
 
SALEM EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
87
 
HAYDAR DOSARI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
02
88
 
ABU KHEIR EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
880 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
02
89
 
ABU AYOUB AL IRAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
02
90
 
YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYUB) Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
02
91
 
ABU FARAJ AL YEMENI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
02
93
 
DOCTOR ABDEL MUNIM AL KHABIR Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
94
 
ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE Male 0 0 
Mecca, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
02
95
 
SHEIKH SAYYID EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
96
 
QARICEPT AL JIZAERI Male 0 0 0 0 Nigeria 0 West Africa 
881 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
02
97
 
SAIF AL LIBY Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
02
98
 
ABU BURHAN AL IRAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
02
99
 
HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS Male 19350702 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
00
 
ABU HAFS AL MANSOURI Male 0 0 
Mansour, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
01
 
ABU KHALEED AL MADANI Male 0 0 
Madina, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
02
 
ABU HAMMAM AL SAUDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
03
 
ABU QUTADA Male 16901230 19601213 
Bethlehem, 
West Bank 
0 Palestine Jordan Middle East 
882 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
04
 
SA'ID YUSIF ALI ABU AZIZAH Male 19580702 0 
Tripoli, 
Libya 
0 Libya Saudi Arabia North Africa 
A
g0
03
05
 
ABU YASSER AL JAZAIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Nigeria 0 West Africa 
A
g0
03
06
 
ABU ABD AL SABBUR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
07
 
ABU UBAIDAH AL IRAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
08
 
ABU FADL AL IRAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
09
 
ALI HAROUN Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
10
 
ABDEL MAHMABABO Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
883 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
11
 
OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
12
 
DR. SHARIF AL DIN ALI MUKHTAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
13
 
MOHAMED BAYAZID Male 0 0 0 0 Syria USA Middle East 
A
g0
03
14
 
ABU HASSAN EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
15
 
DR. MUBARAK AL DOORI Male 0 0 Iraq 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
03
16
 
AL QUBASHI THE SUDANI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
17
 
SADEEK Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
884 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
18
 
FARJAHM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
19
 
IBN AL TAMIYEH Male 12630702 0 
Harran, 
Syria 
0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
20
 
ABU TALHA AL SUDANI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
21
 
ABU MOHAMED AL YEMENI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
22
 
MOHAMED AL NALFI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
23
 
AHMED ABDEL RAHMAN HAMADABI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
24
 
SHEIKH NOMANI Male 0 0 0 0 Iran 0 Middle East 
885 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
25
 
ABU JAFFER EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
26
 
ABDUL BASET HAMZA Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
27
 
AMIN ABDEL MAROUF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
28
 
ABU TALAL EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
29
 
ABU YASSER EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
30
 
ABU JAFFAR AL LIBY Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
32
 
HAMZALLAH AL LIBY Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
886 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
33
 
ABU ABDEL QADER AL LIBY Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
34
 
MUTWAKAL Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
35
 
SAIF ISLAMI JANNUBI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
36
 
ABU KHALIL AL MADANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
37
 
ABU HABIB AL TUNISI Male 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
38
 
ABU MAHDI AL SAUDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
39
 
ABU KHADIJA AL IRAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Israel Germany Middle East 
887 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
40
 
USAMA AZMARAI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
41
 
ABU DIJANA AL YEMENI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
42
 
DR. ABDALLAH IZZELDINE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
43
 
ABDALLAH AZZAM Male 19410702 0 
Jenin, 
Palestine 
0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
44
 
ABDEL RAHMAN SOMALI Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
45
 
ABDOUH AL MUKHLAFI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
46
 
ABU AHMED EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
888 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
47
 
ABU AKRAM URDANI Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
48
 
ABU ALI SUDANI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
49
 
ABU HABIB AL PAKISTANI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
03
50
 
ABU KHABUIB AL SUDANI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
51
 
SHEIK BAILALA Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
52
 
ABU MOHAMED AL SURI Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
53
 
ABU MUSAB AL SUDANI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
889 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
54
 
ABU MUSAB AL SAUDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
55
 
MUSTAFA SETMARIAM NASAR Male 19580702 0 Syria 0 Syria Spain Middle East 
A
g0
03
56
 
ABU MUSAB REUTER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
57
 
ABU NEAM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
58
 
ABU QUAIDBA EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
59
 
AFAD MAKKEE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
60
 
AHMED ALI LOOTAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
890 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
61
 
APRIL BRIGHTSKY RAY Female 0 0 0 0 USA  0 North America 
A
g0
03
62
 
DR. ABDULLAH MOHAMED YUSEF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
63
 
IBN AL MUBARAK AL SHARQAWI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
64
 
IHSAN EL MADANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
65
 
KHALID ALI WALEED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
66
 
KHALIFA AL MUSCAT OMANI Male 0 0 
Muscat, 
Oman 
0 Oman 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
67
 
MOHAMED AL KHEIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
891 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
68
 
MOHAMED JARA AL NABI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
69
 
MOHAMED SHABANA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
70
 
MOTASSEM SADEEK ABU SASHL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
71
 
MRS. JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADAL 
(SUDANESE WIFE) 
Female 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
72
 
DR. MOTRIF AL SADEEK Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
73
 
OMAR AL MAKKEE Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
74
 
SAID BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
892 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
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A
g0
03
75
 
SHEIK ARAFA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
76
 
SAAD AL SHARIF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
77
 
ABU ISHEM MADANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
78
 
AZERI (JAMAL AL-FADL'S BROTHER) Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
03
79
 
ESSAM AL RIDI Male 19580702 0 
Cairo, 
Egypt 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
03
80
 
ABU JAFFER Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
81
 
ABU AL DARDAA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
893 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
82
 
ASHIF MOHAMED JUMA Male 19650422 0 
Maswa 
City, 
Tanzania 
0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
83
 
FATIMA JUMA Female 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
84
 
MOHAMED ASHRIF JUMA Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
85
 
SETUNA JUMA Female 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
86
 
TAHERA JUMA Female 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
87
 
SHAMINA JUMA Female 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
88
 
MANIRA JUMA Female 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
894 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
03
89
 
SIKANDER JUMA Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
90
 
2ND BORN OF ESSAM AL RIDI Unknown 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
03
91
 
KHALID SIDO Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
03
92
 
ABU MUSABAL SURRE OMAR ABDEL 
HAKEEM 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
93
 
ABU UBADDA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
94
 
AZMARAI ALSUI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
95
 
DAUGHTER OF ESSAM AL RIDI (1ST BORN) Female 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
895 
 
ID
 N
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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A
g0
03
96
 
LOAY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
97
 
MOATAZ AL HALLAK Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
03
98
 
MOHAMMED KARAMA Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
03
99
 
MOHAMMED NAJIBULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
04
00
 
MRS. ESSAM AL RIDI Female 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
04
01
 
SHEIK ABDUL RASOOL SAYYAF Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
04
02
 
JOHN RAY Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
896 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
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A
g0
04
03
 
ABU JANDAL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
04
 
ABU MALIK Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
04
05
 
AHMED SKEIK Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
06
 
RASHAD KHALIFA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
07
 
MOHAMMED KASSEM Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
08
 
ABDEL MEJID Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
09
 
ADAM MOHAMED NOOR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
897 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
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Nationality 
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A
g0
04
10
 
ABU AMJED Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
11
 
IBRAHIM (BROTHER OF JAMAL AL-FADL) Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
12
 
ABOUHALIMA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
13
 
ABU FARAJIMNI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
14
 
ABU IBRAHIM AL IRAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
15
 
ABU IBRAHIM IRATI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
16
 
ABU ISRA AL IRAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
898 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
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A
g0
04
17
 
ABU MAT EGYPTIAN Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
18
 
ABU TAMIM LIBY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
19
 
ASADALLAH AL SINDI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
04
20
 
BASHEER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
21
 
BUSHRA YASIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
22
 
DITAR ABU MAHIS Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
23
 
DR. OMAR ABDEL MAROUF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
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ID
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Nationality 
Region  
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A
g0
04
24
 
FADL AL SHAHIDEEN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
25
 
FAISAL (COUSIN OF JAMAL AL-FADL) Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
26
 
IBN SALAM Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
27
 
MOQADEM SALAH ABDEL AL MOBRUK Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
28
 
MOTASEM AL SAUDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
29
 
MUBARAK EL DOORY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
30
 
SADEEK ALI MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
900 
 
ID
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Nationality) 
A
g0
04
31
 
SAFAR AL HAWALI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
32
 
SALMAN AL AUDA Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
34
 
SHEIKH FAZHIL UR RAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
04
35
 
USAMA LUBNANI Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
36
 
YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYOUB AL IRAQI) Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
37
 
ZINDANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
38
 
L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU Male 19640515 0 Morocco 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
901 
 
ID
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A
g0
04
39
 
ANSWAR SHABAN Male 0 0 Egypt 0 Egpyt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
40
 
ABU ISALM MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
41
 
ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
42
 
SHEIK ALATI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
43
 
MRS. SALEH Female 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
44
 
FARAJ ABU EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
46
 
ABU SURIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
902 
 
ID
 N
o.
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A
g0
04
47
 
MUNTASSER AL JAZIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Nigeria 0 West Africa 
A
g0
04
48
 
MRS. L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU Female 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
49
 
ALI MOHAMED Male 19520702 0 
Kafr El 
Sheikh, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt USA North Africa 
A
g0
04
51
 
ABU MADYAN EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
52
 
ABU RIFA AL LIBY Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
53
 
ABU AL ALKALI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
54
 
SALEM AL-IRAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
903 
 
ID
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A
g0
04
55
 
SULIMAN (SON OF NAWAWI) Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
56
 
ABU KHALID AL NUBI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
57
 
MRS. ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI 
(EGYPTIAN WIFE) 
Female 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
58
 
ABU SAID AL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
59
 
ABU MOHAMMED MAHEJAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
60
 
MRS. ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER Female 0 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
61
 
SAFIR ALADA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
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ID
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A
g0
04
62
 
MRS. ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
63
 
ABU KHEIR AL YEMENI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
64
 
ABU AMMAR AL SURI Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
65
 
SAAD Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
66
 
MOHAMMED KARAMA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
67
 
ABU DERDAA Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
68
 
DR. MONTESSUR Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
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ID
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A
g0
04
69
 
FIRST BORN OF L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU Unknown 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
70
 
SHEIK JIHAD EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
71
 
ABU SALAAMA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
72
 
ABDOUH ABDALLAH AL YEMENI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
73
 
ABU BADEN EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
74
 
ABU MUATH Male 0 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
75
 
ABU DAUD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
906 
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A
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04
76
 
MAK DAUD Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
77
 
ABU ISMAL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
78
 
ABU SARA Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
79
 
ABDEL KADIM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
80
 
AHMED HASSAN (I) Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
81
 
AHMED HASSAN (II) Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
82
 
ABU JAMAL AMRIK Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
907 
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A
g0
04
83
 
AHMED TIK Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
84
 
ABU HARAD EL MASRY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
04
85
 
KIBARUA MJITTA Male 19570702 0 Kenya 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
04
86
 
ABU UBAIDAH (OF SADEEK CAMP) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
87
 
ABU THOMAMA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
88
 
MOHAMED SAHAL Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
04
89
 
ALI MANI Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
908 
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A
g0
04
90
 
MEENA Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
91
 
OMAR (ODEH'S BROTHER-IN-LAW) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
92
 
SKEIK SAFA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
93
 
ABDUL RACHMAN AL HOWARI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
94
 
ABU SAYYID AL KIRDI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
04
95
 
BILAL (COUSIN OF JIHAD ALI) Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
96
 
ABDUL JAFAR Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
909 
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A
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04
97
 
AHMED AL HAZZA Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
98
 
FATHER OF OWHALI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
04
99
 
MOHAMED BIN AWADH BIN LADEN Male 19080702 0 
Doan, 
Yemen 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
00
 
OMAR BIN AWADH BIN LADEN Male 0 0 
Doan, 
Yemen 
0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
01
 
ABDULLAH BIN AWDAH BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
02
 
1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN 
LADEN 
Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
03
 
1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN 
LADEN 
Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
910 
 
ID
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A
g0
05
04
 
3RD DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN 
LADEN 
Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
05
 
AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN Male 18750702 0 
Rakiyah, 
Yemen 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
06
 
DAUGHTER OF AL-MADUDI FAMILY Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
07
 
ABDULAZIZ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 19540702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
08
 
ABDULLAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
09
 
AETEDAL BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
10
 
AHMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
911 
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A
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05
11
 
ALI BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
12
 
AYSHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 19430702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
13
 
BAKR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 19470702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
14
 
EMAN BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
15
 
FATIMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
16
 
FOWZIYAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
17
 
GHALIB BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
912 
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A
g0
05
18
 
HAIDER BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
19
 
HASSAN BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
20
 
HUDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
21
 
IBRAHIM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
22
 
ILHAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
23
 
ISSA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
24
 
KHALED BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
913 
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A
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05
25
 
KHALIL BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
26
 
MAHROUS BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
27
 
MALAK BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
28
 
MARIAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
29
 
MOHAMMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
30
 
MUNA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
31
 
MUNEERA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
914 
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A
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05
32
 
NAJIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Unknown 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
33
 
NOUR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
34
 
OMAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
35
 
RAEDAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Unknown 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
36
 
RAJA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
37
 
RANDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
38
 
RUQQUEIYA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
915 
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A
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05
39
 
SAAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
40
 
SAHAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
41
 
SALEH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
42
 
SALEHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
43
 
SALEM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 19440702 19450702 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
44
 
SALMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
45
 
SAMIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
916 
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A
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05
46
 
SANA'A BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Unknown 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
47
 
SEEMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
48
 
SHAFIQ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
49
 
SHEIKHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
50
 
SU'ADD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Unknown 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
51
 
TAREQ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
52
 
TAYYEBA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Unknown 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
917 
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53
 
THABIT BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
54
 
WAFA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Unknown 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
55
 
YAHYA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
56
 
YASIR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
57
 
YESLAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Male 19501019 0 
Mecca, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
58
 
ZEENAT BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
59
 
ZUBAIDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
918 
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A
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05
60
 
UM AYSHA Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
61
 
FATIMAH AHMED MOHSEN BAHARETH Female 19240702 0 
Mecca, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabi 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
62
 
ALIA AL-GHANEM Female 19420702 0 
Latakia, 
Syria 
0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
63
 
UM ABDULAZIZ Female 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
05
64
 
UM ALI Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
65
 
UM YESLAM Female 0 0 0 0 Iran 0 Middle East 
A
g0
05
66
 
SAID SALEM OMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
919 
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A
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05
67
 
TAMARRA RATEMO Female 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
68
 
MOHAMED ZAIDI Male 0 0 
Dar es 
Salaam, 
Tanzania 
0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
69
 
JULIUS KISINGO CEM Male 0 0 
Dar es 
Salaam, 
Tanzania 
0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
70
 
ABDULWAHDI AHMED SALUM Male 0 0 
Pemba, 
Tanzania 
0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
71
 
USAMA BIN HUSSEIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
72
 
ANNIS BIN HUSSEIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
73
 
MOHAMED K. MOHAMED Male 0 0 Tanzania 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
920 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
05
74
 
FATIMA FADHIL Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
75
 
ANIS FADHIL Male 19940702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
76
 
USA FADHIL Female 19970702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
77
 
ABDALLAH HAMISI SHLLM Male 0 0 
Olay, 
Tanzania 
0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
78
 
ABDUL HALLEK Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
05
79
 
ABU AHMED AL HARBI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
80
 
ABU MARWAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
921 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
05
81
 
ABU RAFA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
82
 
ADELKA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
83
 
ALI (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED) Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
84
 
BAHARI (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED) Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
85
 
FATUMA MOHAMED Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
86
 
HADYEA RUBEYA Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
87
 
HAJI JUMA Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
922 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
05
88
 
HASAN (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED) Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
89
 
ISMAEL (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED) Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
90
 
KALAL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
91
 
KASSUM JUMA Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
05
92
 
MARIUM Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
93
 
MASSELIM MASSELIM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
94
 
MOHAMED MUSLIM SALUM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
923 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
05
95
 
MR. CHAUDRY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
96
 
MRS. FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
97
 
MUMIN IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
98
 
NASSOR MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
05
99
 
RAHMA AHMED KHAMIS Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
00
 
RASHID SALEH HAMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
01
 
RAYA JUMA Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
924 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
02
 
RUBAYA MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
03
 
SALIM CHICHI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
04
 
SALMA MOHAMMED Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
05
 
SALUM MUSLIM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
06
 
SULIMAN (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED) Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
06
07
 
TARIQ HAMDI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
08
 
ZIYAD KHALEEL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
925 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
09
 
ZUHURU MOHAMED Female 19770702 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
06
10
 
IHAB MOHAMED ALI Male 19690702 19700702 0 0 Egypt USA North Africa 
A
g0
06
11
 
KHALID ABDUL RACHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
12
 
JALAL FOUD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
13
 
ELEMIGY ABDELDAIM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
14
 
MOHAMED ALI MURAWEH SAL ODEH Male 19390209 0 Haifa, Israel 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
06
15
 
DENAL CASMIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
926 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
16
 
DR. JOSEPH MISOI Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
06
17
 
DR. EL SAYED TILIB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
18
 
SAMIR RAHMAN MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
19
 
ABU AL MUTAZ Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
06
20
 
SHEIK ISHAQ Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
21
 
EZALADEN ABDEL RAHMAN MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
22
 
SHEIK SULEIMAN SILL Male 19290702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
927 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
23
 
DAVID MATWAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
24
 
ALI OMAR MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
25
 
ABDULLAH EL ZUBEIDY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
26
 
ADAN A. HASSAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
27
 
SIMON (WADIH EL HAGE'S FRIEND) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
28
 
AHMAD YOUNES Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
29
 
MARION BROWN Female 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
928 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
30
 
YUMICO ABUEILEN Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
31
 
BADR ABUEILEN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
32
 
NASSER ABUEILEN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
33
 
KHALID ABUEILEN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
34
 
SUMA ABUEILEN Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
35
 
ATEF ABUEILEN Male 0 0 0 0 Qatar 0 Middle East 
A
g0
06
36
 
SULIMAN ALI Male 19960310 0 
Nairobi, 
Kenya 
0 USA 0 North America 
929 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
37
 
KHAMIS MOHAMED KHALFAN Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
06
38
 
RUBEYA KHAMIS MOHAMED Male 19720702 0 
Zanzibar, 
Tanzania 
0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
06
39
 
OMAR NASSOR SALIM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
40
 
SULEIMAN ABDALLAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
41
 
MSELLEM SHINEY MSELLEM Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
06
42
 
MUSALAM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
43
 
MRS. JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADAL 
(AMERICAN WIFE) 
Female 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
930 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
44
 
JAMAL ZOUGAM Male 19731005 19740702 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
45
 
SALAHEDDINE BENYAICH Male 0 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
46
 
ABDELAZIZ BENYAICH Male 19660702 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco France North Africa 
A
g0
06
47
 
MOHAMMED AL-GERBOUZI Male 19600702 0 
Larache, 
Morocco 
0 Britain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
06
48
 
ABU DAHDAH Male 19630702 0 
Aleppo, 
Syria 
0 Spain Syria West Europe 
A
g0
06
49
 
ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI Male 19661020 0 
Zarqa, 
Jordan 
0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
06
50
 
MOHAMMED FIZAZI Male 19470702 19480702 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
931 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
51
 
ABDULAK AL MAGREBI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
52
 
MOHAMED CHAOUI Male 19690702 19700702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
53
 
SAID CHEDADI Male 0 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
54
 
ALI AMROUS Male 19750702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
55
 
SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET Male 19690702 19680702 
Tunis, 
Tunisia 
0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
56
 
AMER AZIZI Male 19680702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
57
 
MONEIR MAHMOUD ALY EL-MESSERY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
932 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
58
 
JAMAL AHMIDAN Male 19710702 0 
Tetouan, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
59
 
MOHAMMED ATTA Male 19680901 0 
Kafr el-
Sheikh, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
60
 
TARIQ IBN ZIYAD Male 06890702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
06
61
 
MOHAMED BEKKALI Male 19730702 19720702 
Tetuan, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
62
 
VINAY KOHLY Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
06
63
 
SUREH KOMAR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
06
64
 
FAISAL ALLUCH Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
933 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
65
 
KHALID OULAD Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
66
 
NAIMA OULAD Female 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
67
 
BASEL GHAYOUN Male 19800225 0 Syria 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
06
68
 
HAMID AHMIDAN Male 19771120 19780702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
69
 
ABD AL-HADI AL-IRAQI Male 19610702 0 Mosul, Iraq 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
06
70
 
FOUAD EL MORABIT ANGHAR Male 19730903 19750702 
Nador, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
71
 
MUHANNAD ALMALLAH DABAS Male 19640225 19640702 Syria 0 Syria Spain Middle East 
934 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
72
 
SAID BERRAJ Male 19730702 19750702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
73
 
MOHAMMED OULAD AKCHA Male 19760702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
74
 
RACHID OULAD AKCHA Male 19710702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
75
 
ABDENNABI KOUNJAA Male 19760702 0 
Tetouan, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
76
 
JOSE EMILIO SUAREZ TRASHORRAS Male 19761210 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
06
77
 
RAFA ZOUHIER Male 19790615 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
78
 
OTMAN EL GNAOUT Male 19750425 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
935 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
79
 
ABDELILAH EL FADUAL EL AKIL Male 19691026 19690702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
80
 
RACHID AGLIF Male 19791119 19800702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
81
 
YOUSSEF BELHADJ Male 19760527 19770702 
Touzine, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
82
 
ABDELMAJID BOUCHAR Male 19830109 19830702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
83
 
HASSAN EL HASKI Male 19630805 19630702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
84
 
RABEI OSMAN SAYED AHMED Male 19710722 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
85
 
MOHAMED LARBI BEN SELLAM Male 19770610 19770702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
936 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
86
 
BRAHIM MOUSSATEN Male 19831112 19840702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
87
 
MOHAMED MOUSSATEN Male 19840925 19850702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
88
 
RAMZI BINALSHIBH Male 19720501 19730816 
Ghayl 
Bawazir, 
Yemen 
Khartou
m, Sudan 
Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
06
89
 
MOHAMMED AL HADI CHEDADI Male 19660702 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
90
 
ABDERRAHIM ZBAKH Male 19720702 
19710702; 
19810702 
Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
91
 
FARID OULD ALI Male 19700702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
92
 
MALAK ANDALUSI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
937 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
06
93
 
AICHA ACHAB Female 19520702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
94
 
ALI ZOUGAM Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
96
 
ZAKI BEKKALI Male 19660702 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
97
 
MOHAMMED BEKKALI, SR. Male 19470702 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
98
 
CHARAFA BEKKALI Female 0 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
06
99
 
ABDEL HALIM Male 0 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
00
 
ABDULATIF MERROUN Male 19620702 0 Morocco 0 UK Morocco West Europe 
938 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
01
 
JAMAL BENYAICH Male 0 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
02
 
ALICE BENYAICH Female 0 0 0 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
03
 
DAVID COURTAILLER Male 19760702 0 
ST.-
PIERRE-
EN-
FAUCIGN
Y, France  
0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
04
 
JEROME COURTAILLER Male 19750702 0 
ST.-
PIERRE-
EN-
FAUCIGN
Y, France  
0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
05
 
ABDELKRIM MEJJATI Male 19680702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
06
 
BEN SALAWI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
07
 
ABDELOUAHID BERRAK Male 19710702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
939 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
08
 
ANTONIO TORO CASTRO Male 19770613 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
09
 
WALID ALTARAKI Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
10
 
MOHAMAD BADR DDIN AKKAD Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
11
 
ZINEB (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S SISTER) Female 19770702 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
12
 
SAMIRA (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S SISTER) Female 19790702 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
13
 
ABDELILAH EL-FUAD Male 19760702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
14
 
RACHID ADLI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
940 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
15
 
MRS. SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET Female 19870702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
16
 
MUSTAFA MAYMOUNI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
17
 
ABDILAH FIZAZI Male 19780702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
18
 
ABDELHALIM FIZAZI Male 19740702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
19
 
ASSIYA FIZAZI Female 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
20
 
EL GITANILLO Male 19900702 19870702 
Aviles, 
Spain 
0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
21
 
ALLEKEMA LAMARI Male 19650702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
941 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
22
 
CARMEN MARIA TORO CASTRO Female 19810817 19810702 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
23
 
MOHAMED BELHADJ Male 19800702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
24
 
MOHAMED AFALAH Male 19760702 19770702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
25
 
OUHNANE DAOUD Male 19700702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
26
 
ADRI RIFAAT ANOUAR Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
27
 
ABDELATIF MOURAFIK Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
28
 
DRISS CHEBLI Male 19720702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
942 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
29
 
MOHAMED BELFATMI Male 19760702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
30
 
NOUREDINE NFIA Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
31
 
KHALID MAJATI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
32
 
AZIZA AL-GERBOUZI Female 19610702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
33
 
SAID BAHAJI Male 19750715 19750702 
Haselunne, 
Lower 
Saxony, 
Germany 
0 Germany Morocco West Europe 
A
g0
07
34
 
TAYSSIR ALLUNI Male 19470702 19550702 Syria 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
35
 
FARID HILALI Male 19690702 19670702 Morocco 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
943 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
36
 
MUHAMED GALEB KALAJE ZOUAYDI Male 19610702 0 
Aleppo, 
Syria 
0 Spain Syria West Europe 
A
g0
07
37
 
BASSAM DALATI SATUT Male 19600702 0 
Aleppo, 
Syria 
0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
38
 
ABU ABDUL RAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
39
 
ABU ZUBAYDAH Male 19710312 0 
Riyadh, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
40
 
MOHAMED BAHAIAH Male 19630406 0 
Aleppo, 
Syria 
0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
41
 
MOHAMMED HAYDAR ZAMMAR Male 19610702 0 
Aleppo, 
Syria 
0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
42
 
MAMOUN DARKAZANLI Male 19580804 0 
Aleppo, 
Syria 
0 Germany 0 West Europe 
944 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
43
 
LUIS JOSE GALAN GONZALEZ Male 19640702 0 
Madrid, 
Spain 
0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
44
 
JASEM MAHBOULE Male 0 0 Syria 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
45
 
OSAMA DARRA Male 0 0 Syria 0 Syria Algerian Middle East 
A
g0
07
46
 
MOHAMED NEEDL ACAID Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
47
 
AHMAD RAGHAD MARDINI DAKICHL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
48
 
MOHAMED ARABI SHEHIMI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
49
 
MOHAMED ZAHER ASADE Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
945 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
50
 
ANWAR ADNAN MOHAMED SALAH Male 0 0 Palestine 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
51
 
MOHAMED BOUALEM KHOUNI Male 19690702 0 
Kabyle, 
Algeria 
0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
52
 
MOHAMED BENSAKHRIA Male 19670702 19680702 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
53
 
GHASOUB AL-ABRASH AL-GHALYOUN Male 19660702 0 Syria 0 Spain Syria West Europe 
A
g0
07
54
 
AHMED BRAHIM Male 19450702 0 Algeria 0 Spain Algeria West Europe 
A
g0
07
55
 
NABIL NANAKLI KOSAIBATI Male 0 0 Syria 0 Spain Syria West Europe 
A
g0
07
56
 
SHEIK MOHAMMED OMRAN Male 0 0 Jordan 0 Australia 0 Australia 
946 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
57
 
BILAL KHAZAL Male 19700702 0 Lebanon 0 Australia Lebanon Australia 
A
g0
07
58
 
MOHAMED KHAIR AL-SAQQ Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
59
 
ABDALRAHMAN ALARNAOT Male 0 0 Syria 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
60
 
PARLINDUNGAN SIREGAR Male 19570425 19670425 Indonesia 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
07
61
 
NAJIB CHAIB MOHAMED Male 19670702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
62
 
ABU ABDULRAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
63
 
SID AHMED BOUDJELLA Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
947 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
64
 
MOURAD KADDAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
65
 
MARIA LUISA MARTIN Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
66
 
ABU RACHED Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
07
67
 
SAID MANSOUR Male 0 0 0 0 Denmark Morocco West Europe 
A
g0
07
68
 
ABU SUUD Male 0 0 0 0 Denmark 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
69
 
ZEIN AL-ABIDINE MOHAMED HASSAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
70
 
ABDULLA KHAYATA KATAN Male 19760702 0 Syria 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
948 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
71
 
AHMED KOSHAGI KELANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
72
 
ABU WALID Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
73
 
ABU AL HARETH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
07
74
 
DJAMEL BEGHAL Male 19650702 0 Algeria 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
75
 
ABDELGHANI MZOUDI Male 19730702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
76
 
ROBERT RICHARD ANTOINE-PIERRE Male 19720702 0 France 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
77
 
MUHSEN KHAYBER Male 19700702 0 
Larache, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
949 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
78
 
ABDENNABID CHEDADI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
79
 
RAHMA AHMIDAN Female 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
80
 
MUSTAFA AHMIDAN Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
81
 
JABER AHMIDAN Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
82
 
YUSSEF AHMIDAN Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
83
 
HICHAM AHMIDAN Male 19800702 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
84
 
MOHAMED BOUHARRAT Male 19790511 19800702 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
950 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
85
 
SAED EL HARRAK Male 19730410 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
86
 
NASREDDINE BOUSBAA Male 19610519 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
87
 
EMILIO LLANO ALVAREZ Male 19601215 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
88
 
IVAN GRANADOS PENA Male 19820823 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
89
 
JAVIER GONZALEZ PENA Male 19520914 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
90
 
ANTONIO IVAN REIS PALACIO Male 19820823 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
91
 
SERGIO ALVAREZ SANCHEZ Male 19810509 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
951 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
92
 
RAUL GONZALEZ PELEAZ Male 19760801 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
93
 
GHAZI BIDEL Male 19770702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
94
 
YAHIA RAGHEH Male 19830702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
07
95
 
MOUTAZ ALMALLAH Male 19660702 0 
Damascus, 
Syria 
0 Britain Spain West Europe 
A
g0
07
96
 
PILAR M.V. Female 0 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
97
 
MIGUEL ANGEL M.V. Male 0 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
07
98
 
SOUFIANE RAIFAK Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
952 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
07
99
 
LOFTI SBAI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
00
 
MOHAMMAD AFZAAL Male 19650702 0 Pakistan 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
08
01
 
SHAHZAD ALI GUJAR Male 19710702 0 Pakistan 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
08
02
 
RACHID MOHAMED KADDUR Male 19700702 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
03
 
RACHID BENDOUDA Male 19720702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
04
 
JAOUAD EL BOUZROUTI Male 19840702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
05
 
MIMOUN BELHADJ Male 19850702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
953 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
06
 
RUBEN IGLESIAS Male 0 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
07
 
OMAR NAKHCHA Male 19830702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
08
 
ABDELILAH HRIZ Male 19780702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
09
 
MOHAMED EL-IDRISSI Male 19770702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
10
 
SAMIR TAHTAH Male 19770702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
11
 
SAFIA BELHADJ Female 19630702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
12
 
ALLAL MOUSSATEN Male 19620702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
954 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
13
 
AHMED RESSAM Male 19670509 0 Algeria 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
14
 
OMAR DEGHAYES Male 19700702 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
15
 
GONZALO LOPEZ GONZALEZ Male 19760702 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
16
 
MAHMOUD SLIMANE AOUN Male 19600702 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
08
17
 
MOHAMMED LAMARI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
18
 
TELDJA LAMARI Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
19
 
ZACARIYA ESSABAR Male 19770413 19770403 
Essaouria, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
955 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
20
 
HASAM ALHUSEIN Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
08
21
 
WAHID KOSHAGI KELANI Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
08
22
 
SADIK MERIZAK Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
23
 
PRINCE MOHAMMED AL-FAISAL AL-SAUD Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabi 0 Middle East 
A
g0
08
24
 
PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL AL-SAUD Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabi 0 Middle East 
A
g0
08
25
 
SAMER DABBAS Male 19770702 0 
Aleppo, 
Syria 
0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
08
26
 
REDA SEYAM Male 19600702 0 Egypt 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
956 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
27
 
SALEH ABDULAZIZ AL-FAHHAD Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabi 0 Middle East 
A
g0
08
28
 
ABDULRAHMAN AL-FAHHAD Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabi 0 Middle East 
A
g0
08
29
 
ATMANE RESALI Male 19710702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
30
 
HABIBA MOHAMED Female 0 0 
Cueta, 
Spain 
0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
31
 
CARMEN FERNANDEZ Female 0 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
32
 
ASMA ZAFRA Female 0 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
33
 
NAJAT FADAL Female 19740702 0 
Cueta, 
Spain 
0 Spain 0 West Europe 
957 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
34
 
MARIAM GARCIA Female 19670702 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
35
 
MOHAMED BELAZIZ Male 19750702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
36
 
YASIN SEDDIKI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
37
 
HAKIM ZERZOUR Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
38
 
MAJID SAHOUANE Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
39
 
ABDERRAMAN KHOUNI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
40
 
HOCINE KHOUNI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
958 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
41
 
MOHAMMED ACHRAF Male 19750702 19730702 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
42
 
REDA CHERIF Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
43
 
DJAMEL SEDDIKI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
44
 
NIZAR TRABELSI Male 19660702 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
45
 
ESSID SAMI BEN KHEMAIS Male 19680702 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
46
 
MOHAMED BOUKIRI Male 19740702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
47
 
ABDELKADER TCHAREK Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
959 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
48
 
NABIL SAYADI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
49
 
HAZAR AL-DABBAS Female 19660702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
50
 
PIRJO BRAHIM Female 0 0 Finland 0 Finland 0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
51
 
NORA BRAHIM Female 19880702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
52
 
ABU KHALEB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
53
 
MAHER KHAZAL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
54
 
KAMAL HADID CHAAR Male 19600702 0 
Aleppo, 
Syria 
0 Spain 0 West Europe 
960 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
55
 
SYLVIE BEGHAL Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
56
 
BAGHDAD MEZIANE Male 19650702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
57
 
BRAHIM BENMERZOUGA Male 19720702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
58
 
KAMEL DAOUDI Male 19740702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
59
 
AZZEDIN JOURNAZI Male 0 0 Libya 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
60
 
MUSTAPHA ABUSHIMA Male 19670702 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
61
 
WEDAD AHMED Female 19600702 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
961 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
62
 
ABDULLAH BANDASSER Male 0 0 
Fez, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
64
 
SAYER BEDER Male 19480702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
65
 
NOUREDINE YENADI Male 19650702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
66
 
ABDELKADER AMARA Male 19680702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
67
 
MOHAMMAD CHOUDRY ASLAM Male 19600702 0 Pakistan 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
08
68
 
MOHAMMAD NAEEM NOOR KHAN Male 19790702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
08
69
 
AMJAD FAROOQI Male 19720702 0 
Toba Tek 
Singh 
district, 
Punjab 
Province, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
962 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
70
 
ADNAN ASLAM Male 19800702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
71
 
ABDELAZIZ HOUARI MELLAS Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
72
 
MOSTAFA AZTOUT Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
73
 
BELGACEM BELLIL Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
74
 
NASSREDDINE BEN LAIDNE AMRI Male 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
75
 
DJILALI BOUSSIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
76
 
ABDELAZIZ EL MERABIT Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
963 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
77
 
ABDELKRIM LEBCHINA Male 19750702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
78
 
HAMMAD LAHSINI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
79
 
TAHA SEGHROUCHNI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
80
 
ZOHAIR KHADIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
81
 
OTMAN EL MOUIB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
82
 
KAMAL AHBAR Male 19780702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
83
 
TAREK HAMED HAMU Male 19790702 0 
Cueta, 
Spain 
0 Spain 0 West Europe 
964 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
84
 
ZOHRA ZEWAWI Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
85
 
TAHER DEGHAYES Male 19670702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
86
 
AMANI DEGHAYES Female 19750702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
08
87
 
MOHAMMED BOUYERI Male 19780702 0 Amsterdam 0 Netherlands Morocco West Europe 
A
g0
08
88
 
SAMIR AZZOUZ Male 19860702 0 0 0 Netherlands 0 West Europe 
A
g0
08
89
 
ABDELADIM AKOUDAD Male 19680702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
90
 
MOHAMMED SALAMEH Male 19670702 19680702 Palestine 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
965 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
91
 
AMINE MEZBAR Male 19680702 0 
Constantine
, Algeria 
0 Canada Algeria North America 
A
g0
08
92
 
SAMIR KISHK Male 19550514 0 
Gharbia, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
93
 
ABU DOHA Male 19650702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
94
 
LASED BEN HENI Male 19690205 0 
Tripoli, 
Libya 
0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
95
 
MOKHTAR BOUCHOUCHA Male 19691013 0 Tunisia 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
96
 
TAREK CHARAABI Male 19700331 0 Tunisia 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
97
 
MOHAMMED BEN BELGACEM AOUADI Male 19741211 0 Tunisia 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
966 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
08
98
 
ABDELKADIR ES-SAYED Male 19620702 19610702 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
08
99
 
SALIM BOUKHARI Male 19720702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
00
 
LAMINE MARONI Male 19710702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
01
 
AEUROBI BEANDALI Male 19790702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
02
 
SAMAIR KARIMOU Male 19690702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
03
 
FOUHAD SABOUR Male 19670702 0 0 0 Algeria France North Africa 
A
g0
09
04
 
TAREK MAAROUFI Male 19651123 19620702 
Ghardimao
u, Tunisia 
Ghar el-
dimaa, 
Tunisia 
Belgium Tunisia West Europe 
967 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
09
05
 
ESSOUSSI LAAROUSSI Male 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
06
 
EMAD ABDELWAHID AHMED ALWAN Male 19650702 0 Yemen 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
09
07
 
AMMARI SAIFI Male 19680101 0 
Kef Rih, 
Algeria 
0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
08
 
RIADH JELASSI Male 19701215 0 
Al-
Mohamedia
, Tunisia 
0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
09
 
ABU IMAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
10
 
YASSINE CHEKKOURI Male 19661006 19670702 
Safi, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
11
 
NABIL BENATTIA Male 19660511 19670702 
Tunis, 
Tunisia 
0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
968 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
09
12
 
ABDEL HALIM HAFED REMADNA Male 19660402 19670702 
Bistra, 
Algeria 
0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
13
 
MEHDI KHAMMOUN Male 19680403 0 
Tunis, 
Tunisia 
0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
14
 
ADEL BEN SOLTANE Male 19700714 0 
Tunis, 
Tunisia 
0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
15
 
LAZHAR BEN MOHAMMED TLILI Male 19690326 0 
Tunis, 
Tunisia 
0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
16
 
MANSOUR THAER Male 19740321 19760702 
Baghdad, 
Iraq 
0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
09
17
 
HABIB WADDANI Male 19700610 0 
Tunis, 
Tunisia 
0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
18
 
MOHAMMED YEHIA KAAKI Male 19770702 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
969 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
09
19
 
SALEH JAMAL Male 19750702 19750702 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
09
20
 
FARID BELARIBI Male 19660702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
21
 
JOHAN BONTE Male 19820702 0 0 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
09
22
 
RACHID BENMESSAHEL Male 19710702 0 0 0 France Algeria West Europe 
A
g0
09
23
 
ABDELKRIF LEFKIR Male 19710702 0 0 0 France Algeria West Europe 
A
g0
09
24
 
RACHID JALIL Male 19750702 0 
Carriere 
Thomas, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
25
 
YASSINE LAHNECH Male 19810702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
970 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
09
26
 
MOHAMED EL OMARI Male 19790702 19810517 
Carriere 
Thomas, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
27
 
ABU MUSA AL-HINDI Male 19720702 0 India 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
09
28
 
AHMED OMAR SAEED SHEIKH Male 19730702 0 
London, 
England 
0 
United 
Kingdom 
Pakistan West Europe 
A
g0
09
29
 
ABU FARAJ AL-LIBBI Male 19650702 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
30
 
QARI SAIFULLAH AKHTAR Male 0 0 
Chishtian, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
09
31
 
BABAR AHMAD Male 19740702 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
09
32
 
MOHAMMED MASOOD AZHAR ALVI Male 19680710 19680610 
Bahawalpur
, Punjab 
Province, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
971 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
09
33
 
FAZLUR REHMAN-KHALIL Male 0 0 
Dera Ismail 
Khan, 
North West 
Frontier 
Province, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
09
34
 
HAFIZ SAEED Male 19500702 0 
Punjab, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
09
35
 
HAMEEDULLAH NIAZI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
09
36
 
ADIL Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
09
37
 
KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED Male 19650314 19650401 
Badawiya 
neighborho
od, 
Fahaheel, 
Kuwait 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
09
38
 
MOHAMMED SOHAIL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
39
 
HASHIM QADEER Male 19700702 0 
Ahmed Pur 
Sharqia, 
Punjab 
Province, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
972 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
09
40
 
MOHAMED MRABET FAHSI Male 19680702 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
09
41
 
MOUNIR MRABET FAHSI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
42
 
MOHAMED SAID HSSISNI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
43
 
HASSAN MOURDOUDE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
44
 
MUSTAFA FAWZI AIT OUDRISS Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
45
 
MUSTAPHA ES SATTY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
46
 
ABDELHAK BOUDINA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
973 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
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A
g0
09
47
 
MHAMED HADDAD Male 19640702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
48
 
DRISS HADDAD Male 19790702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
49
 
HASSAN HADDAD Male 19770702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
50
 
MOHAMED HADDAD Male 19750702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
51
 
MAHAMAD TIAZOUNIE Male 19720702 0 Rome, Italy 0 Italy Syria West Europe 
A
g0
09
52
 
ABDENBI LEBCHINA Male 19700702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
53
 
MAHAMAD SULEYMAN Male 19590702 0 Jeser, Syria 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
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ID
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
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Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
09
54
 
SAMIR SULEYMAN Male 19740702 0 Jeser, Syria 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
09
55
 
MUSTAPHA MOHAMED RIZK Male 19750702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
56
 
MOHAMED KAFARNA Male 19750702 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
09
57
 
OMAR SALWA Male 19760702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
58
 
ZIANI MAHDI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
59
 
MOURAD YALA Male 19600702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
60
 
REDOUAN AL-ISSAR Male 19610702 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
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ID
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Alt. 
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Nationality 
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A
g0
09
61
 
ISMAIL AKHNIKH Male 19820702 19830702 
Amsterdam, 
Netherlands 
0 Netherlands 0 West Europe 
A
g0
09
62
 
JASON WALTERS Male 19850702 19860702 0 0 USA Netherlands North America 
A
g0
09
63
 
MARAD J. Male 19830702 0 
Chechnya, 
Russia 
0 Russia 0 East Europe 
A
g0
09
64
 
NADIR ADARRAF Male 19820702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
65
 
LABIDINE AOURGHE Male 19780702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
66
 
MOHAMED BOUGHABA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
67
 
MOHAMED EL BOUSKLAOUI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
976 
 
ID
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A
g0
09
68
 
YOUSEF ETTOUMI Male 19780702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
69
 
ZAKARIA TAYBI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
70
 
AHMED HAMDI Male 19790702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
71
 
RASHID BOUSSANA Male 19780702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
72
 
MOHAMED EL MORABIT Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
73
 
NOUREDINE EL FAHTNI Male 19830702 0 Morocco 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
74
 
JERMAINE WALTERS Male 19870702 0 0 0 USA Netherlands North America 
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ID
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
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A
g0
09
75
 
EL-SAYYID NOSAIR Male 19560702 0 
Sinai 
Peninsula, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 
USA (from 
1989) 
North Africa 
A
g0
09
76
 
NIDAL AYYAD Male 19680702 0 Kuwait 0 
United States 
(as of 1991) 
0 North America 
A
g0
09
77
 
MAHMOUD ABOUHALIMA Male 19600702 0 Egypt 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
09
78
 
IBRAHIM ELGABROWNY Male 19510702 0 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
79
 
AHMAD AJAJ Male 19660702 0 Jerusalem 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
09
80
 
RAMZI YOUSEF Male 19680427 19690702 Kuwait 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
81
 
ABDUL MURAD Male 19680702 0 Kuwait 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
978 
 
ID
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Alt. 
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A
g0
09
82
 
BILAL ALKAISI Male 19660702 0 Jordan 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
09
83
 
ABDELGHANI RABIA Male 19750702 19720702 0 0 Algeria France North Africa 
A
g0
09
84
 
FAIZA BENNOUNA Female 19810702 0 Netherlands 0 Netherlands 0 West Europe 
A
g0
09
85
 
ABDELLAH BOUABDELLAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
09
86
 
MOKHTAR HAOUARI Male 19690702 0 Algeria 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
09
87
 
RABAH KADRE Male 19670702 0 0 0 Algeria France North Africa 
A
g0
09
88
 
KAMEL BOURGASS Male 19740702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
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ID
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A
g0
09
89
 
NABIL SAHRAWI Male 19640702 0 
Constantine
, Algeria 
0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
90
 
SAAJID BADAT Male 19800702 0 
Gloucester, 
England 
0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
09
91
 
BURAWI EL WAHIR Male 19720702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
92
 
ABDESSATTAR DAHMAN Male 19620702 0 Tunisia 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
93
 
ADEL TEBOURSKI Male 19630702 19640702 Algeria Tunisia France Tunisia West Europe 
A
g0
09
94
 
MOHAMED ZITLI Male 19600702 0 Algeria 0 Belgium Algeria West Europe 
A
g0
09
95
 
AHMED ELLATTAH Male 19670702 0 Morocco 0 Belgium Morocco West Europe 
980 
 
ID
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A
g0
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96
 
MOKHTAR BELMOKHTAR Male 19720601 0 
Ghradieh, 
Algeria 
Ghardaia, 
Algeria 
Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
09
97
 
EL-ZAHRANI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabi 0 Middle East 
A
g0
09
98
 
ABOU CHIHAB Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabi 0 Middle East 
A
g0
09
99
 
MOHAMED DJABER Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabi 0 Middle East 
A
g0
10
00
 
YASSER SAYYAF Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
01
 
IBRAHIM GHUREIKA Male 0 0 
Ghradieh, 
Algeria 
0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
02
 
HASSAN HATTAB Male 19670702 0 
Beni 
Mourad, 
Algeria 
Rouiba, 
Algeria 
Algeria 0 North Africa 
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A
g0
10
03
 
NUREDDIN GHUREIKA Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
04
 
BILAL (GSPC) Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
06
 
ASSEM AL-TIBSI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
07
 
YEHIA (GSPC) Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
08
 
AL-BASHIR AL-GHARBI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
09
 
ABU DAJANA (GSPC) Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
10
 
ABDELMALIK DAROUKEDEL Male 19700420 0 
Meftah, 
Algeria 
Khemis 
El 
Khechna, 
Algeria 
Algeria 0 North Africa 
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(Derived from 
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A
g0
10
11
 
EL CHERIF GOUSMI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
12
 
ABDELAZIZ ABBI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
13
 
REDOUAN CHEKKOURI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
14
 
YOUNES CHEKKOURI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
15
 
ABDEL HAMID SHAARI Male 0 0 Libya 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
10
16
 
OMAR SHAABANI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
17
 
SAID ATMANI Male 19670702 0 Morocco 0 Morocco Bosnia North Africa 
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A
g0
10
18
 
ABDULSALAM ALI ALI ABDULRAHMAN Male 19600702 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
10
19
 
MEVLUET TAR Male 19790702 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
10
20
 
RAMEZ SULTAN Male 19610702 0 0 0 Australia Lebanon Australia 
A
g0
10
21
 
OTHMAN KAAKI Male 19790702 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
10
22
 
MOHAMMED OMAR JAMAL Male 19840702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
10
23
 
AHMED JAMAL Male 19820702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
10
24
 
HAITHAM MULHEM Male 0 0 Lebanon 0 Australia 0 Australia 
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Citizenship/ 
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A
g0
10
25
 
MICHAEL KANAAN Male 19750702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
10
26
 
WASIM EL-ASAAD Male 19770702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
10
27
 
RABEEH MAWAS Male 19770702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
10
28
 
SHEIK ABDUL ZOUD Male 0 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
10
29
 
WILLIE BRIGITTE Male 19680702 19690702 Guadaloupe 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
10
30
 
MAMDOUH HABIB Male 19560702 0 Egypt 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
10
31
 
FAHEEM KHALID LODHI Male 19700702 0 Pakistan 0 
Australia (as of 
2000) 
0 Australia 
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A
g0
10
32
 
IZHAR UL-HAQUE Male 19830702 0 Pakistan 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
10
33
 
NABIL BOUNOUR Male 19710702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
34
 
AZNIRI FILALI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
35
 
AHMED ZEBBAR Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
36
 
YUSSEF FIKRI Male 19780702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
37
 
HASSAN TAOUSI Male 19790702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
38
 
MILOUDI ZAKARIA Male 19680702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
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A
g0
10
39
 
ABDELKRIM CHADLI Male 19600702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
40
 
OMAR HADDOUCHI Male 19610702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
10
41
 
ABDUL AZIZ JALIL Male 19730702 0 0 0 Britain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
10
42
 
OMAR ABDUR REHMAN Male 19840702 0 0 0 Britain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
10
43
 
MOHAMMED ZIA UL HAQ Male 19790702 0 0 0 Britain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
10
44
 
NADEEM TARMOHAMED Male 19780702 0 0 0 Britain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
10
45
 
MOHAMMED NAVEED BHATTI Male 19800702 0 0 0 Britain 0 West Europe 
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ID
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Nationality 
Region  
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A
g0
10
46
 
QUAISIR SHAFFI Male 19790702 0 0 0 Britain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
10
47
 
JUNADE FEROZE Male 19760702 0 
Blackburn, 
England 
0 Britain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
10
48
 
ATTA-UR RAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
49
 
SHAHZAD BAJWA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
50
 
MASRAB AROCHI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
10
51
 
EDA KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
52
 
FEROZ IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 South Africa 0 South Africa 
988 
 
ID
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A
g0
10
53
 
ZUBAIR ISMAIL Male 0 0 0 0 South Africa 0 South Africa 
A
g0
10
54
 
SALMAN SAQUIB Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
55
 
FAHD NASIM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
56
 
SHEIKH ADIL Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
57
 
MOHAMMAD ASLAM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
58
 
SADIA OMAR SHEIKH Female 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
59
 
AHMED SAEED SHEIKH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
989 
 
ID
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A
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10
60
 
IMTIAZ SIDDIQE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
10
61
 
AFTAB ANSARI Male 19650702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
62
 
MAZHARUL ISLAM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
63
 
FAZAL KARIM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
64
 
ATTAUR REHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
65
 
LIAQUAT HUSSEIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
10
66
 
MAULANA TAHIR ASHRAFI Male 19730702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
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A
g0
10
67
 
KHALID KHAWAJA Male 19520702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
68
 
ZAHEERUL ISLAM ABBASI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
69
 
WAQAR HUSSAIN KHAN Male 19880702 0 0 0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
10
70
 
AHMED ABDULLAH MANI Male 19900702 0 
Virginia, 
USA 
0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
10
71
 
RAMAY S ZAMZAM Male 19880702 0 Egypt 0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
10
72
 
IMAN HASAN YAMAR Male 19930702 0 0 0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
10
73
 
OMAR FAROUK Male 19860702 0 0 0 United States 0 North America 
991 
 
ID
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A
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10
74
 
MAZEN MOKHTAR Male 19680702 0 0 0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
10
75
 
SHAMIL BASAYEV Male 19650702 0 
Vedeno, 
Chechnya 
0 Chechnya 0 East Europe 
A
g0
10
76
 
SYED R. MASWOOD Male 19630702 0 Bangladesh 0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
10
77
 
YASER AL JHANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
10
78
 
HASSAN ABUJIHAAD Male 19760702 0 California 0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
10
79
 
DERRICK SHAREEF Male 19840702 0 
Rockford, 
IL 
0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
10
80
 
PIR SAIFULLAH KHALID Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
992 
 
ID
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A
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10
81
 
MUFTI RASHEED AHMAD Male 19310702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
82
 
MUFTI NIZAMUDDIN SHAMZAI Male 19290702 19340702 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
83
 
SHER ALI SHAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
84
 
ABDUR RAZZAK FAROOQI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
85
 
AZIZUR REHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
86
 
DIN MOHAMMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
87
 
MOHAMMAD NASRULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
993 
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Nationality) 
A
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10
88
 
ASADULLAH FAROOQ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
89
 
MANSOOR AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
90
 
GHAZI BABA Male 19610702 0 
Bahawalpur
, Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
91
 
MUHAMMAD AFZAL Male 0 0 Kashmir 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
92
 
TABASSUM AFZAL Female 19710702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
93
 
MOHAMMAD NAEEM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
94
 
SAEEDUR REHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
994 
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A
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95
 
MUHAMMAD SOHAIL Male 19870702 0 
Swat, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
96
 
MOHAMMAD AJMAL AMIR KASAB Male 19870913 0 
Fardikot 
District, 
Punjab 
Province, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
97
 
ABDUL WAHID KASHMIRI Male 19460702 0 
Kolti 
District, 
Kashmir, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
98
 
ABDULLAH (FROM ANANTNAG-ISLAMABAD) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
10
99
 
HAJI MOHAMMAD AZAM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
00
 
MUZAMMIL BUTT Male 0 0 
Gujranwala, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
01
 
MOHAMMAD UMAIR Male 0 0 
Madhubani, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
995 
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Nationality) 
A
g0
11
02
 
FAISAL DAR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
03
 
CHOUDHRY ABDULLAH KHALID CHOHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
04
 
RAFIQ AKHTAR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
05
 
AFTAB HUSSAIN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
06
 
CHOUDHRY YOUSAF Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
07
 
MOHAMMAD SHRIF BALGHARI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
08
 
RAJA MOHAMMAD IRSHAD Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
996 
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Alt. 
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A
g0
11
09
 
MASOOD LONE Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
10
 
MEMOONA SAEED Female 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
11
 
YAHYA MUJAHID Male 19610702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
12
 
KHALID BASHIR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
13
 
HAFIZ ABDUR REHMAN MAKKI Male 19480702 0 
Bahawalpur
, Punjab 
province, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
14
 
HAJI MOHAMMAD ASHRAF Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
15
 
ABU AHMED AL HASHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
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A
g0
11
16
 
MOHAMMAD SARWAR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
17
 
ABU USAMA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
18
 
BASHIR ALI WANI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
19
 
SYED MOHAMMED ALI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
20
 
MOHAMMAD AKRAM NIAZI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
21
 
ZIA IKRAM NIAZI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
22
 
RIZWAN NIAZI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
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A
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11
23
 
HAMAD NIAZI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
24
 
SULEMAN SAQIB Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
25
 
MOHAMED ANOUAR ZAOUDI Male 19770702 0 
Tangier, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
26
 
ISSA BEN OTHMAN Male 19770702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
27
 
KHADIJA PODD Female 19670702 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
11
28
 
ABDOL GHAFFAR HASHEMI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco Netherlands North Africa 
A
g0
11
29
 
NAOUFEL Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
999 
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A
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11
30
 
ABDELKRIM BENSMAIL Male 19630702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
31
 
MOHAMED AMINE AKLI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
32
 
BACHIR BELHAKEM Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
33
 
MAJID MCHMACHA Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
34
 
EDDEBDOUBI TAOUFIK Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
35
 
MOUAD DOUAS Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
36
 
MUSTAFA FARJANI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
1000 
 
ID
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A
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11
37
 
BAANOU ABDULLAH Male 19850702 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
11
38
 
SAID AFIF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
39
 
MOKHATAR SIAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
40
 
DJAMEL MERABET Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
41
 
KAMARA BIRAHIMA DIADIE Male 0 0 0 0 Mauritania 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
42
 
BALDOMERO LARA SANCHEZ Male 0 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
11
43
 
SMAIL LATRECH Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1001 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
11
44
 
AHMED MOHAMED AHMED Male 0 0 
Cueta, 
Spain 
0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
11
45
 
ALI OMAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
46
 
MEDHI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
47
 
MASLOHI ALI Male 19570701 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
48
 
AMROUCH EL H. Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
49
 
RACHID BELKACEM Male 19730702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
50
 
BISLAN I. Male 19800702 0 Chechnya 0 Russia 0 East Europe 
1002 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
11
51
 
INGRID WALTERS Female 0 0 0 0 Netherlands 0 West Europe 
A
g0
11
52
 
CARL WALTERS Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
11
53
 
MALIKA CHABI Female 19880702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
54
 
MOHAMMAD EL SHERSHABY Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
55
 
SOUMAYA SAHLA Female 19830702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
56
 
ADNAN KONSTANTINE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
57
 
SIDDIG IBRAHIM SIDDIG ALI Male 19620702 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
1003 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
11
58
 
CLEMENT RODNEY HAMPTON-EL Male 19380702 0 
United 
States 
0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
11
59
 
ABDO MOHAMMED HAGGAG Male 19690702 0 
Cairo, 
Egypt 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
11
60
 
AMIR ABDELGANI Male 19600702 19610702 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
61
 
FARES KHALLAFALLA Male 19620702 19630702 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
62
 
TARIG ELHASSAN Male 19550702 19560702 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
63
 
FADIL ABDELGANI Male 19630702 19630702 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
64
 
MOHAMMED SALEH Male 19560702 19570702 0 0 Jordan United States Middle East 
1004 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
11
65
 
VICTOR ALVAREZ Male 19660702 19670702 Puerto Rico 0 United States 0 North America 
A
g0
11
66
 
MATARAWY MOHAMMED SAID SALEH Male 19570702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
67
 
EARL GANT Male 19660702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
11
68
 
MARIANNE ABOUHALIMA Female 19640702 0 Germany 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
69
 
MOHAMED ABOUHALIMA Male 19640702 0 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
70
 
ABDEL-RAHMAN JOSEPH AYYAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
71
 
RESIQ AYYAD Male 19760702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1005 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
11
72
 
ABDUL AYYAD Male 19790702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
73
 
ABDO YASSIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
74
 
IBRAHIM AHMAD SULEIMAN Male 19640702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
75
 
EYAD MAHMOUD ISMOIL Male 19710702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
76
 
MOHAMMAD ABUKHDEIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
77
 
OMAR OBAID Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
78
 
EDWIN ANGELES Male 19670702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1006 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
11
79
 
MUSTAFA AHMAD AL-HAWSAWI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
11
80
 
MOHAMAD JAMAL KHALIFA Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
11
81
 
ALICE YABO Female 0 0 
Mindanao, 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
11
82
 
NORALYN ZARAGOSA Female 0 0 
Bulacan, 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
11
83
 
ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN Male 19600410 0 
Bloomingto
n, Indiana 
0 United States Iraq North America 
A
g0
11
84
 
WALI KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
85
 
ISTIAQUE PARKER Male 0 0 0 0 South Africa 0 South Africa 
1007 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
11
86
 
FAZEL OMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
87
 
ADEL ATTAYYAB Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
88
 
BAHAUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
11
89
 
IBRAHIM RASUL Male 0 0 0 0 Iran 0 Middle East 
A
g0
11
90
 
FAZLULLAH HAMIDI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
91
 
SALEEM ABDEL RAHIM Male 0 0 Syria 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
92
 
TARIQ RANA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1008 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
11
93
 
ABDUL SHAKUR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
11
94
 
MAHAUD AFFIF ABDEJALIL Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
11
95
 
NEDAL SALEH ODEH Male 0 0 0 0 Kuwait 0 Middle East 
A
g0
11
96
 
MOHAMMAD JUBRAN Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan Palestine Middle East 
A
g0
11
97
 
AHMAD JUBRAN Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan Palestine Middle East 
A
g0
11
98
 
WALID ISMOIL Male 19680702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
11
99
 
MUHAMMAD ABDUL KARIM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1009 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
00
 
MOHAMMAD SABRI SELAMAH ABUSWEIRAH Male 19660702 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
12
01
 
AHAMAD ABD BIN MASRIE Male 19700702 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
12
02
 
HASSAN AL DDEN HASAN ALI Male 19660702 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
12
03
 
HADI YOUSEF ALGHOUL Male 19670702 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
12
04
 
HASSAN AL-HIND Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
05
 
FUAD JARDAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
06
 
KHALID HASSAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1010 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
07
 
FHAD AOUD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
08
 
AHMAD ABED MASRIE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
09
 
MUSTAFA FARAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
10
 
KHALIL HUSSEIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
11
 
HAMBALI Male 19640404 19660702 
Sukamanah, 
West Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
12
12
 
FATHUR ROMAN AL-GHOZI Male 19710702 0 
Maduin, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
12
13
 
FAIZ BIN ABU BAKAR BAFANA Male 19620101 19630702 Singapore 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
1011 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
14
 
MUKHLIS YUNOS Male 19660707 0 
LANAO 
DEL SUR, 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
12
15
 
AHMED SATTAR Male 19600702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
16
 
ABUBKR ALY Male 0 0 Sudan 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
17
 
SAAID IBRAHIM Male 19790702 0 Ethiopia Eritrea Netherlands 0 West Europe 
A
g0
12
18
 
RACHID AHMED ZOUAOUI Male 19680702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
19
 
ABDEL MESKINI Male 19680702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
20
 
SAMIR AIT MOHAMED Male 19690702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1012 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
21
 
ABDELMADJID DAHOUMANE Male 19670702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
22
 
MUSTAFA LABSI Male 19700702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
23
 
FATEH KAMEL Male 19600702 0 0 0 Algeria Canada North Africa 
A
g0
12
24
 
MOHAMMED SUMIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
25
 
HASAN ZUMERI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
26
 
RABAH CHEHAJ-BIAS Male 19810702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
27
 
KARIM KADOURI Male 19690702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1013 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
28
 
SLIMANE KHALFAOUI Male 19750702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
29
 
MIROUANE BEN AHMED Male 19730702 0 0 0 France Algeria West Europe 
A
g0
12
30
 
AHMED BELHOUD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
31
 
MOHAMED MERBAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
32
 
ABDELLAH ABDELHAFID Male 19690702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
33
 
MOURAD IDIR ABES Male 19750702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
34
 
GHALEM BELHADJ Male 19660702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1014 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
35
 
KARIM BENAMGHAR Male 19710702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
36
 
SALAH MOULLEF Male 19700702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
37
 
HAKIM ZIEM Male 19710702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
38
 
SOFIANE LAHAMAR HASSIM ZIEM Male 19730702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
39
 
DAVID AISSA KHALEF Male 19730702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
40
 
MOULOUD SIHALI Male 19770702 19760702 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
41
 
ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI Male 19590702 0 Egypt 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
1015 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
42
 
MOHAMMED MEGUERBA Male 19740702 0 
Belcourt, 
Algeria 
0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
43
 
MOHAMMAD SIDIQUE KHAN Male 19741020 0 
Leeds, 
England 
0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
12
44
 
SHEHZAD TANWEER Male 19821215 0 
Leeds, 
England 
0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
12
45
 
JERMAINE LINDSAY Male 19850923 0 Jamacia 0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
12
46
 
VALERIE TRAVERSO Female 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
12
47
 
NAGAT CHAFFE Female 19400702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
48
 
OMAR DJEDID Male 19740702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1016 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
49
 
OMAR NAITATMANE Male 0 0 0 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
12
50
 
SIDALI FEDDAG Male 19850702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
51
 
MUSTAPHA TALEB Male 19700702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
52
 
MUHAMMAD AL-TAYYIB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
53
 
SHAYKH ABD-AL-SAMAD AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
54
 
RICHARD REID Male 19730702 0 London 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
12
55
 
NOUREDDINNE MOULEFF Male 19670702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1017 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
56
 
MOHAMMED BADAT Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
57
 
ZUBEDA BADAT Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
58
 
MALIKA EL AROUD Female 19600702 0 
Tanger, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
59
 
YOUCEF AOUNI Male 19740702 0 Morocco 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
12
60
 
YASSER AL-SIRI Male 19630702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
61
 
ABDERAHMANE AMEROUD Male 19780702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
62
 
MEHREZ AZOUZ Male 19670702 0 0 0 Algeria France North Africa 
1018 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
64
 
KHELLAF HAMAM Male 19680702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
65
 
IBRAHIM KEITA Male 19670702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
67
 
ABDELKRIM EL HADOUTI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
68
 
ABID HAMMADOU Male 19460702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
69
 
SALIM EL-AFGHANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
70
 
SIDI OULD SIDNA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
71
 
MOHAMED OULD CHABARNOU Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1019 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
72
 
MAAROUF OULD HAIBA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
73
 
ABD-LEKHDIME Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
74
 
ABDEL AZIZ Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
12
75
 
KHATAB MOURAD Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
76
 
ABDELHAMID SADAOUI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
77
 
MOHAMED BELMOKHTAR Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
78
 
ABOU ISHAK IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1020 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
79
 
ASSEM ABOU SAID Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
80
 
ABOU DOUJANA (GSPC) Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
81
 
ABDELHAKIM (GSPC) Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
82
 
BACHIR ABOU AL BARRA Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
83
 
ABOU MOHAMED AL JINKI Male 0 0 0 0 Mauritania 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
84
 
ALI DIX Male 19730702 0 
Lakhdaria, 
Algeria 
0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
85
 
HAROUN EL ACHAACHI Male 19730702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1021 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
86
 
ABOU-OUSSAMA Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
87
 
YAHIA ABOU AMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
88
 
ABOU DEHDEH Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
89
 
ABDEL ZAID ESSOUFFI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
90
 
HAMID ZAID ESSOUFFI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
91
 
EL-HADJ Male 0 0 0 0 Nigeria 0 West Africa 
A
g0
12
92
 
AHMED ABOU AL-BARAA Male 19630702 0 
Budadu, 
Algeria 
0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1022 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
12
93
 
ADEL MECHAT Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
94
 
OMAR SAITI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
95
 
KARIM BOUTRI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
96
 
IYAD AG GHALI Male 19680702 0 0 0 Mali 0 West Africa 
A
g0
12
97
 
BABA ULD SHEIKH Male 0 0 0 0 Mali 0 West Africa 
A
g0
12
98
 
MOHAMED RACHED Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
12
99
 
ANTAR ZOUABRI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1023 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
00
 
ABOU KHALED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
01
 
ABDELMADJID DICHOU Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
02
 
AHMED CHABI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
03
 
MUSTAPHA EL YAZID Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
04
 
SAADAOUI LYES Male 19710702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
05
 
ABOU HAYFEM Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
06
 
NOREDINE SKODARLI Male 0 0 
Kadara, 
Algeria 
0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1024 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
07
 
S.H. Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
08
 
M.G. Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
09
 
C.W. Female 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
10
 
R.R.C. Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
11
 
Y.A. Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
12
 
ATIYAH ABD AL-RAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
13
 
ANOUR MAJRAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1025 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
14
 
LASSAD SASSI Male 19710702 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
15
 
MUHAMMAD BENHEDI MSAHEL Male 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
16
 
SAMI SAYOUD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
17
 
ABDELLATIF ZEHRAOUI Male 19780702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
19
 
ARMAN AHMED AL-HISSINI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
20
 
HASSAN MUSTAFA OSAMA NASR Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
21
 
MOHAMED GAME Male 19740702 0 Libya 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
1026 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
22
 
IGNAOUA HABIB Male 19610702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
23
 
ABU HAFS THE MAURITANIAN Male 19750702 0 0 0 Mauritania 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
24
 
LUCIA GARAFALO Female 19640702 0 0 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
13
25
 
ABDEL HAKIM TIZEGHA Male 19710702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
26
 
BOUABIDE CHAMCHI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
27
 
YAMIN RACHEK Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
28
 
BRAHIM MAHDI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1027 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
30
 
IHAB DAFEH Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
13
31
 
KHALED OMAR MINAWI Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
13
32
 
ABDULLAH AL-MUTHADI Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
13
33
 
ABDUL RAKIB HASAN Male 19690702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
13
34
 
ALI JAMAL Male 0 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
13
35
 
MELANIE BROWN Female 19770524 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
13
36
 
ABU SALAH Male 0 0 
Chechnya, 
Russia 
0 Russia 0 East Europe 
1028 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
37
 
SAMIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
38
 
MAMADOU NDAW Male 0 0 0 0 Senegal 0 West Africa 
A
g0
13
39
 
MUSTAFA CHEIKHO Male 19770702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
13
40
 
MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH HASAN ABU-AL-
KHAYR 
Male 19750619 19750618 
Al-Madinah 
al-
Munawwar
ah. Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
13
41
 
VICTORIA BRIGITTE Female 0 0 0 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
13
42
 
CHRISTIAN BRIGITTE Male 0 0 0 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
13
44
 
MAHA HABIB Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1029 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
45
 
MUHAMMAD ARIF BIN NAHARUDIN Male 19830702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
13
46
 
SAJID (LET) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
47
 
STEVEN CAI Male 0 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
13
48
 
INAM UL-HAQUE Male 0 0 Pakistan 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
13
49
 
IKRAM UL-HAQUE Male 19760702 0 Pakistan 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
13
50
 
MOHAMED DAMIR Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
51
 
AHMED AL-RAFIKI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1030 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
52
 
ABDELMALEK BOUZGARENE Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
53
 
YOUSSEF ADAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
54
 
ABDELAZIZ FIKRI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
55
 
MOHAMED BENHAMOU Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
56
 
ISAM ZAMZANI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
57
 
ADIL ACHIR Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
58
 
MOHAMMED HAMOUMI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
1031 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
59
 
MOHAMMED MABROUK Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
60
 
BENDAOUD DMIR Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
61
 
BRAHIM HAMDI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
62
 
HICHAM DARBANI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
63
 
SALAHEDDINE DEBICHE Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
64
 
MOHAMED JERMOUNI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
65
 
MOURAD LAMNAOUAR Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
1032 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
66
 
SALEH ZARLI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
67
 
ABDERRAZAK FAOUZI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
68
 
KAMAL HANOUICHI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
69
 
BOUCHAIB GUERMACH Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
70
 
LAKBIR KOUTOUBI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
71
 
BOUCHAIB MGHADER Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
72
 
OMAR MAAROUF Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
1033 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
73
 
LAARBI DAQIQ Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
74
 
ABDERRAHMAN MAJDOUBI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
75
 
RACHID AMRINE Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
76
 
MILOUD MANDOUR Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
77
 
MUSTAPHA LAKRIMI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
78
 
HOUSSEIN BERGHACHI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
79
 
YAZID AJREF Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
1034 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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Nationality 
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Nationality) 
A
g0
13
80
 
MOURAD SAROUF Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
81
 
MOHAMED JOK Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
82
 
YOUSEF JALIL Male 19820702 0 
Carriere 
Thomas, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
84
 
ABDELRAZAQ RTIWI Male 0 0 
Carriere 
Thomas, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
85
 
ABDELKADER EL ARBAOUI Male 0 0 
Carriere 
Thomas, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
86
 
AMNA EL ARBAOUI Female 0 0 
Carriere 
Thomas, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
13
87
 
MUSTAFA EL ARBAOUI Male 19840702 0 
Carriere 
Thomas, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
1035 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
88
 
OMAR ALTIMIMI Male 19700702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
89
 
YOUNIS TSOULI Male 19840702 0 0 0 Morocco UK North Africa 
A
g0
13
90
 
WASEEM MUGHAL Male 19830702 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
13
91
 
TARIQ AL-DAOUR Male 19860702 0 0 0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0 Middle East 
A
g0
13
92
 
MOHAMMED FEROZE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
13
94
 
HAROON ASWAT Male 19740702 0 
Dewsbury, 
England 
0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 West Europe 
A
g0
13
95
 
FARIS AL-ZAHRANI Male 19770702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1036 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
13
96
 
YAQOOB SAEED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
13
97
 
UZAIR AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
13
98
 
SHOAIB SIDDIQUI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
13
99
 
DANISH INAM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
00
 
NAJEEBULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
01
 
KHURRAM SAIFULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
02
 
SHAHZAD MUKHTAR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1037 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
14
03
 
AKMAL WAHEED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
04
 
ARSHAD WAHEED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
05
 
RAO KHLAID Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
06
 
MOHAMMAD SHOAIB Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
07
 
ADNAN SHAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
08
 
ABDUL WAHEED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
09
 
JEHAN ARA Female 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1038 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
14
10
 
ABDUL HASAB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
11
 
GUL HASAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
12
 
HASAMUL SANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
13
 
TAHIR YULDASH Male 0 0 
Namangan, 
Uzbekistan 
0 Uzbekistan 0 Central Asia 
A
g0
14
14
 
ABDULLAH AL-HAJ Male 0 0 
Zarqa, 
Jordan 
0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
14
15
 
DAWAR KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
16
 
RIAZ BASRA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1039 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
14
17
 
USAMA KHALID Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
18
 
KHALID FAROUK Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
19
 
SUBIRA FAROUK Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
20
 
AMAL KHALIFA Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
21
 
ABDUL BASIT Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
22
 
SHARIF MUHAMMAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
23
 
ABU OMAR AS-SEYF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1040 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
14
24
 
MAGOMED YEVLOYEV Male 19770702 0 
Ingushetia, 
Russia 
0 Chechnya Russia East Europe 
A
g0
14
25
 
ELINA ERSENOYEVA Female 0 0 0 0 Russia 0 East Europe 
A
g0
14
26
 
MARIE SCHULTZ Female 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
14
27
 
ISHAQ RIND Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
28
 
ZAKIUR REHMAN LAKHVI Male 19601230 0 
Okara 
District, 
Punjab 
Province 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
29
 
HAFIZ AZIZUR REHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
30
 
ABU ABDUR RAHMAN SAREEHI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1041 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
14
31
 
ABU ANAS Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
32
 
MOHAMMAD QASIM Male 19870702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
33
 
ABDUL QADEER KHAMOSH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
34
 
HAFIZ TAHIR MAHMOOD ASHRAFI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
35
 
ARSHAD MOHAMMED HANIF ANSARI Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
36
 
SYED MOHAMMED HANIF RAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
37
 
FAMIDA RAHIM Female 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1042 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
14
38
 
FARHEEN RAHIM Female 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
39
 
NASIR MEHMOOD AHWAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
40
 
MOHAMMED (JEM) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
41
 
HAMZA (JEM) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
42
 
HAIDER (JEM) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
43
 
RANA (JEM) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
44
 
RAJA (JEM) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1043 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
14
45
 
AR GEELANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
46
 
SHAUKAT HUSSAIN GURU Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
47
 
AFSANA Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
48
 
SUBHASH MALHOTRA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
49
 
VIRENDRA PAL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
50
 
TARIQ AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
51
 
SAIFUL ISLAM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1044 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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A
g0
14
52
 
ABU KASHA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
53
 
ABU ZAID Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
54
 
ABDUL REHMAN DEDAR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
55
 
KHURSHID AHMED PARREY Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
56
 
SEHRAI BABA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
57
 
GHALIB AFZAL Male 19990702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
58
 
YAHYA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1045 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
14
59
 
ISMAIL KHAN Male 19830702 0 
Dera Ismail 
Khan, 
NWFP, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
60
 
FAHEEM ANSARI Male 19740702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
61
 
SABAUDDIN SHAIKH Male 19850702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
62
 
HAMMAD AMIN SADIQ Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
63
 
DAVID HEADLEY Male 19600702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
14
64
 
ABU AL QAMA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
65
 
ZARAR SHAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1046 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
14
66
 
SHAHID JAMIL RIAZ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
67
 
JAMIL AHMED Male 0 0 
Battgram, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
68
 
MUHAMMED YOUNAS ANJAM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
69
 
SAMIR ALI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
71
 
ILLYAS KASHMIRI Male 19640210 0 
Bimbur, 
Kashmir, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
72
 
ATEEQ CHAUHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
73
 
SHAMSHAD AHMAD SALFI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1047 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
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A
g0
14
74
 
ABDULLAH MUNTAZIR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
75
 
ZAFFAR IQBAL Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
76
 
TALHA SAEED Male 19770702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
77
 
FAWAD (COUSIN OF SULEMAN SAQIB) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
78
 
ADIL SHEIKH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
14
79
 
SOUBHI KINIC Male 0 0 0 0 Algerian 0 North Africa 
A
g0
14
80
 
NAUREDDINE SALIN ABDOUMALOU Male 0 0 0 0 Algerian 0 North Africa 
1048 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
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(Derived from 
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A
g0
14
81
 
MOHAMED HAMID Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
82
 
ABDELLAH HAWARI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
83
 
RACHID MOHAMED MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
84
 
MOHAMED LEUSSADI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
85
 
SADE ASDE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
86
 
SALAH GHOULAM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
87
 
HADJ BOURGIBA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1049 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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A
g0
14
88
 
ALI IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
89
 
MOHAMMED ADJIMI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
90
 
FARID GHRIEB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
91
 
MEHREZ BEN MAHDOUD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
92
 
DIBALI ABDELLAH Male 19850702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
14
93
 
AFIF MEJRI Male 19630702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
94
 
YACINE AHMED NACER Male 19710702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1050 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
14
95
 
ALI EL HEIT Male 19700702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
96
 
RABAH BOURAS Male 19620702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
97
 
LAMINE AHMED NACER Male 19710702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
98
 
FARID AIDER Male 19650702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
14
99
 
ANTONIO (SPANISH ARMS TRAFFICKER) Male 0 0 0 0 Spain 0 West Europe 
A
g0
15
00
 
EMAD SALEM Male 19500702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
15
01
 
ASHRAF MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1051 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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Nationality 
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(Derived from 
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A
g0
15
02
 
AHMED YOUSIF MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
15
03
 
SIRAJ EL'DIN YOUSIF Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
15
04
 
SHEIK MUBARAK SHAH JILANI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
15
05
 
JAMES WILLIAMS Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
06
 
STEPHEN PASTER Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
07
 
WARITH DEEN UMAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
08
 
JOSE PADILLA Male 19710702 0 
Brooklyn, 
NY 
0 USA 0 North America 
1052 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
09
 
JOHN WALKER LINDH Male 19810702 0 
Silver 
Spring, MD 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
11
 
LT. GEN. JAVED NASIR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
15
12
 
YAHYA ABU UBAIDAH MUHAMMAD Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
13
 
ELSIE HAMPTON-EL Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
14
 
LEON HOLLAND Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
15
 
LAMONT HOLDER Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
16
 
ABD AL-AZIZ UDA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1053 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
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A
g0
15
17
 
KHIDR ALI Male 19650702 0 0 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
15
18
 
GLENN NEVILLE FORD Male 19520702 0 0 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
15
19
 
CABA JOSE HARRIS Male 19550702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
20
 
ROBERT JUNIOR WESLEY Male 19430702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
21
 
TYRONE JUNIOR COLE Male 19590702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
22
 
MUSTAFA ABDU RASHID Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
23
 
TRACI ELAINE UPSHUR Female 19650702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
1054 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
24
 
VINCENTE PIERRE Male 19580702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
25
 
ABDUL JABBAR Male 19760702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
26
 
ABDUS-SALAAM Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
27
 
KAREN ANN MILLS SWEENEY Female 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
28
 
LINDA LEE SANCHEZ Female 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
15
29
 
YOUSEF AYYAD Male 19730702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
30
 
EVONNE GRAVES Female 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
1055 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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A
g0
15
31
 
HASAB ELRASOUL BABEKIR Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
15
32
 
OSMAN EL-SHEIKH Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
15
33
 
SAEED AKMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
34
 
ADEL ANNON Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq Pakistan Middle East 
A
g0
15
35
 
EDITH GESMUNDO Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
36
 
JOVENAL BRUNO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
37
 
ABURAJAK ABUBAKAR JANJALANI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1056 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
38
 
KHADAFI MONTANO JANJALANI Male 19750702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
40
 
ISAM MOHAMMED ABDUL HADI Male 19660702 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
41
 
MOHAMMED ISMAEL DEIB Male 19720702 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
42
 
NABIL NASSER AL-RIYAMI Male 19750702 0 0 0 Oman 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
43
 
WAIL RACHEL AL-KAATIB Male 19740702 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
44
 
ASERAF ABDUL ALZOURI RAHMAN Male 19670702 0 0 0 UAE 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
45
 
ENAAM M. ARNAOUT Male 19630702 0 Syria 0 USA 0 North America 
1057 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
15
46
 
SHEIK ADIL ABDUL GALIL BATARGY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
47
 
ABUBAKAR SHARIFADA Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
48
 
ZAKARIA M. SHIKH Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
49
 
NORALWIZAH LEE Female 19700702 0 
Sabah, 
Malaysia 
0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
50
 
OMAR AL-FARUQ Male 19710524 0 Kuwait 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
51
 
GOLIYAH ASSAGAF Male 20000702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
52
 
HANUN ASSAGAF Male 20010702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1058 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
53
 
MIRA AGUSTINA Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
54
 
MAHMOUD AFIF ABDELJALIL Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
55
 
KHALID AL-MIDHAR Male 19750516 0 
Mecca, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
56
 
NAWAF AL-HAZMI Male 19760809 
19760808; 
19760909 
Mecca, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
57
 
ABED SHEIKH MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
15
58
 
ZAHED SHEIKH MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
15
59
 
AREF SHEIKH MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1059 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
60
 
ABDULLAH BIN KHALID AL-THANI Male 0 0 0 0 Qatar 0 Middle East 
A
g0
15
61
 
AHMAD AL-HAMWI Male 0 0 Syria 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
62
 
YAZID SUFAAT Male 19650702 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
63
 
MUHAMMAD IQBAL Male 19570817 0 
Tirpas-
Selong 
village, East 
Lombok, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
64
 
CHOMEL SUFAAT Female 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
65
 
MUHAMMAD SOBRI Male 19570702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
66
 
ABU BAKAR BASHIR Male 19380702 0 
Jombang, 
East Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1060 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
67
 
SHAHRIL HAT Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
68
 
MADAM FATIMAH ZAHARA  Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
69
 
ISMAEL LUMINGKIT ALI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
70
 
ABDULRAHMAN ESPINA Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
71
 
ISMAEL NACAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
72
 
ABDUL MANNAN MUKSAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
73
 
ALEEM SHUAIB ABIDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1061 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
74
 
MOHAMED MANSOUR JABARA Male 0 0 Kuwait 0 Canada Kuwait North America 
A
g0
15
76
 
ALI IMRON Male 19670702 0 
Lamongan, 
East Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
77
 
WAN MIN WAN MAT Male 19600923 0 Malaysia 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
78
 
AMROZI Male 19620705 0 
Lamongan, 
East Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
79
 
MUHAMMAD ZAKARIA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
15
80
 
ALI AL-AZIA ALI Male 19770702 0 Baluchistan 0 Pakistan Kuwait South Asia 
A
g0
15
81
 
KANKAN ABDUL QADIR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1062 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
82
 
MARIYANI Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
83
 
ZUBAIR MOHAMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
84
 
AZAHARI HUSIN Male 19570702 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
85
 
SALMAH ABDULLAH Female 19630702 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
86
 
ABDUL SAID Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
87
 
ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI Male 19680530 0 France 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
15
88
 
RUSMAN GUNAWAN Male 19760702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1063 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
89
 
HAMBALI'S CAMBODIAN WIFE Female 0 0 0 0 Cambodia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
90
 
ARIFIN BIN ALI Male 0 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
91
 
HOQUE SINDIK Male 19650702 0 0 0 Bangladesh 0 South Asia 
A
g0
15
92
 
MOHAMMED NAZIR BIN LEP  Male 0 0 Malaysia 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
93
 
ABID KHAR Male 19800702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
15
94
 
BASHIR MEHMOOD Male 19800702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
15
95
 
SHAYKH MOHAMED MOKHTAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1064 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
15
96
 
SAPAE-ING BASOR Male 0 0 0 0 Cambodia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
97
 
ESAM MOHAMID KHIRD ALI Male 19640702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
15
98
 
ABDUL AZI HAJI CHIMING Male 19690702 0 0 0 Thailand 0 East Asia 
A
g0
15
99
 
MUHAMMAD YALALUDIN MADING Male 19630702 0 0 0 Thailand 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
00
 
SMAN ISMAEL Male 0 0 0 0 Cambodia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
01
 
IBRAHIM (JI IN CAMBODIA) Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
02
 
ROUSHA YASSER Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
1065 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
16
03
 
KHORIYAHAN Female 0 0 
Maduin, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
04
 
AZZAM (JI) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
05
 
TAUFIQ RIFQI Male 19740702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
06
 
ABDUL GHONI Male 19690702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
07
 
IQBAL UZZAMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
08
 
DELIAR NOER  Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
09
 
AL GABRE MAHMUD Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
1066 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
16
10
 
ABDUL JABAR Male 19700702 0 
Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
11
 
OMAR OPIK LASAL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
13
 
AGUNG BIYADI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
17
 
JA'FAR BIN MISTOOKI Male 19600702 19620702 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
18
 
HASHIM BIN ABAS Male 19610702 19620702 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
19
 
IMAM SAMUDRA Male 19700114 19700115 
Tasikmalay
a, West 
Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
20
 
YASSIN SYWAL Male 19720702 0 
Makassar, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1067 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
16
21
 
JULKIPLI SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN Male 19670620 0 
TULAY, 
JOLO 
SULU, 
Philippines 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
22
 
SOLAMAIN ESMAEL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
23
 
ARIS MUNANDAR Male 19660702 0 
Sambi, 
Boyolani, 
Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
24
 
AGUS DWIKARNA Male 19640811 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
25
 
HUSSAIN RAMOS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
26
 
ANTONIO REYES Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
27
 
ABDULLAH SUNGKAR Male 19370702 0 
Makassar, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1068 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
16
31
 
ZAINURI AL-GHOZI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
32
 
ALI GHUFRON Male 19600202 19650702 
Lamongan, 
East Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
33
 
MOHAMBEDOU OULD SLAHI Male 0 0 0 0 Mauritania 0 North Africa 
A
g0
16
34
 
MR. MAURITANIA Male 0 0 0 0 Mauritania 0 North Africa 
A
g0
16
35
 
KHALIL DEEK Male 0 0 Jordan 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
16
36
 
MOURAD IKHLEF Male 19680702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
16
37
 
MUHAMMAD AHMED AL-AHDAL Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
1069 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
16
38
 
AHMED MUHAMMAD AMIN Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
16
39
 
GHULAM MUSTAFA RAMA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
16
40
 
IMAM KAMEL DIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
41
 
NICOLAS BELLONI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
42
 
MOHAMED YACINE AKNOUCHE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
43
 
JAMES UJAAMA Male 19660702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
44
 
YASIN HASSAN OMAR Male 19810702 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
1070 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
16
45
 
ATILLA AHMET Male 19640702 0 0 0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
16
46
 
MOHAMMED ANSWAR Male 19860702 0 0 0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
16
47
 
BASHIR AHMED Male 19400702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
48
 
HASIB HUSSAIN Male 19860916 0 
Leeds, 
England 
0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
16
49
 
HASINA KHAN Female 19770702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
50
 
MAGDY EL-NASHAR Male 19720702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
16
51
 
MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1071 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
16
52
 
MANZIA HUSSAIN Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
53
 
IMRAN HUSSAIN Female 19800702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
54
 
MOHAMMED JUNAID BABAR Male 19760702 0 
Lahore, 
Pakistan 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
16
55
 
OMAR KHYAM Male 19820702 0 
Crawley, 
West 
Sussex, 
England 
0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
16
56
 
ANTHONY GARCIA Male 19830702 0 Algeria 0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
16
57
 
WAHEED MAHMOOD Male 19720702 0 
Crawley, 
West 
Sussex, 
England 
0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
16
58
 
JAWAD AKBAR Male 19840702 0 
Crawley, 
West 
Sussex, 
England 
0 England 0 West Europe 
1072 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
16
59
 
SALAHUDDIN AMIN Male 19750702 0 
London, 
England 
0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
16
60
 
SHUJAH MAHMOOD Male 19870702 0 
Crawley, 
West 
Sussex, 
England 
0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
16
61
 
NABEEL HUSSAIN Male 19850702 0 
Horley, 
Surrey, 
England 
0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
16
62
 
ZEESHAN SIDDIQI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
63
 
OSAMA NAZIR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
16
64
 
HUSSEIN OSMAN Male 19800702 0 0 0 Ethiopia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
16
65
 
MOHAMMAD MOMIN KHAWAJA Male 19790702 0 0 0 Canada 0 North America 
1073 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Citizenship/ 
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A
g0
16
66
 
SHERAFIYAH Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
67
 
ALI AYED AL-SHAMRANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
68
 
ABU ZUBAIR AL-HAILI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
16
69
 
KHALID BIN ODEH BIN MOHAMMED AL-
HARBI 
Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
16
70
 
FAHD AL-QUSO Male 19741112 0 Yemen 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
16
72
 
SAYYID QUTUB Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
16
73
 
AHMED AL ANI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
1074 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Region  
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A
g0
16
74
 
ABDELBAKI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
16
75
 
ABDELKADER HAKIMI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
76
 
ABDERREHMANE AMLKI ZAKERAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
77
 
ABDUL FATAH ZAMMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
16
78
 
ABDUL HADI AL-IRAQI Male 19600702 0 
Kurdistan, 
Iraq 
0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
16
79
 
ABU ANZAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
80
 
ABU MOHAMMED AL MAQDARI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1075 
 
ID
 N
o.
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A
g0
16
81
 
ABU TALAL AL-QASIMY Male 19570702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
16
82
 
AHMAD EL-ITTAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
83
 
AHMED ELOMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
16
84
 
AICHA ARBAWI Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
85
 
AMIR LAARAJ Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
86
 
ASIF REZA KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
16
87
 
AWATES MASWOOD Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1076 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
16
88
 
AZAM CHEEMA Male 19530702 0 
Faisalabad, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
16
89
 
CAROL SANTIAGO Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
90
 
CHEJ SALAH Male 19580702 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
16
91
 
DEDI SETIONO Male 0 0 
Bogor, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
16
92
 
FARIDA PATEL Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
93
 
FEIZ MOHAMED Male 19700702 0 
Sydney, 
Australia 
0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
16
94
 
GEMMA CRUZ-ARANETA Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1077 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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Nationality 
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Nationality) 
A
g0
16
96
 
GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR Male 19490801 0 
Kunduz 
Provice, 
Afghanistan 
0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
16
98
 
HAFIZ MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH 
BAHAWALPURI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
16
99
 
HAMZAR HAZIZ Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
17
00
 
HASAN AL-TURABI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
17
01
 
HASSAN OULAD AKCHA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
02
 
JACK ROCHE Male 19530702 0 Britain 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
17
03
 
JAFFAR UMAR THALIB Male 19620702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1078 
 
ID
 N
o.
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(Derived from 
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A
g0
17
04
 
ABDELKARIM MEJJATI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
17
05
 
MAHMOUD JAMAL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
06
 
MAULVI SALEEMULLAH KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
07
 
MOHAMED KHAMIS MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 Tanzania 0 East Africa 
A
g0
17
09
 
MOHAMMAD SALEEM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
17
10
 
MOHAMMED ABDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
11
 
MOSSAAB KHATIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1079 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Alt. 
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A
g0
17
12
 
MUFTI MOHAMMED JAMIL Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
17
13
 
MULLAH KREKAR Male 19570702 0 0 0 Iraq Norway Middle East 
A
g0
17
14
 
MULLAH OMAR Male 19590702 0 
Singesar, 
Afgahnistan 
0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
17
15
 
MUSTAFA (SUSPECT IN CASABLANCA 
BOMBINGS) 
Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
17
16
 
NASIR ABBAS Male 19700702 0 Singapore 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
17
17
 
NAZIR AHMED TAUNSVI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
18
 
NORA YABO Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1080 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
17
19
 
OMAR KHAN SHARIF Male 0 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
17
20
 
OUSSAMA KASSIR Male 0 0 0 0 Sweden 0 West Europe 
A
g0
17
21
 
RACHID AHMIDAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
22
 
REGINA KREIS Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
23
 
ROBERT PIERRE Male 0 0 0 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
17
24
 
TAHIR PERVAIZ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
17
25
 
YAHIA DJOUADI ABOU AMMAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1081 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
17
27
 
ABDERRAHMANE AMEUROUD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
28
 
ABDUL HAQQ BAKER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
29
 
ABDUL RAHMAN ABU ABDUL NASSER AL-
AASSEMI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
30
 
ARIF TAJIK Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
31
 
ASIM UZMANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
32
 
AZAM TARIQ Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
33
 
DJAMAL ZITOUNI Male 19660702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1082 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
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Nationality) 
A
g0
17
34
 
EDWARD FILTON Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
35
 
GHIAS HUSSEIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
36
 
HAFIZ DUR MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
37
 
IBRAHIM ABU UTHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
38
 
IFTIKAR ALI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
17
39
 
ISMAIL MULLA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
40
 
MARWAN AL-SHEHHI Male 19780509 0 
Ras al 
Khaimah, 
UAE 
0 UAE 0 Middle East 
1083 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
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A
g0
17
41
 
MAULANA YOUSUF BINNORI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
42
 
MOHAMMAD AMJID KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
43
 
MOHAMMAD UZAIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
44
 
MYSTERY PAKISTANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
45
 
QARI AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
46
 
QARI GHULAM MURTAZA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
47
 
RACHID RAMDA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1084 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Citizenship/ 
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A
g0
17
49
 
SHEIKH MOHAMMED ADEEL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
50
 
SUHIR A. AHMAD Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
51
 
ZAFAR IQBAL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
52
 
SHAKER AL-ABSSI Male 19550702 0 
Jericho, 
West Bank, 
Palestine 
0 Palestine Lebanon Middle East 
A
g0
17
53
 
CHERIE MARIA STULTZ Female 19680702 0 Jamacia 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
17
54
 
JOSHUA PADILLA Male 19900702 0 USA 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
17
55
 
MUHAMMED JAVED Male 0 0 Pakistan 0 USA 0 North America 
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A
g0
17
56
 
SHAMIA'A Female 19800702 0 Egypt 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
17
57
 
HUSSEIN PADILLA Male 20000702 0 
Cairo, 
Egypt 
0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
58
 
HASSAN PADILLA Male 20020702 0 
Tanta, 
Egypt 
0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
59
 
MRS. ABDULATIF MERROUN Female 0 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
17
60
 
ABDUL AZIZ AL OMARI Male 19721224 19790528 
Asir 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
61
 
SATAM AL SUQAMI Male 19760628 0 
Riyadh, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
62
 
WALI AL SHEHRI Male 19680901 0 
Asir 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
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ID
 N
o.
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A
g0
17
63
 
WALEED AL SHEHRI Male 19740913 
19760101; 
19760303; 
19770708; 
19781220; 
19790511; 
19791105 
Asir 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
64
 
FAYEZ BENIHAMMAD Male 19770319 0 
Khorfakkan
, UAE 
0 UAE 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
65
 
MOHAND AL SHEHRI Male 19790507 0 
Asir 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
66
 
AHMED AL GHAMDI Male 0 0 
al Bahah 
region, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
67
 
HAMZA AL GHAMDI Male 19801118 0 
Ajandam, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
68
 
MAJED MOQED Male 19770618 0 
Annakhil, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
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ID
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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Nationality 
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A
g0
17
69
 
HANI HANJOUR Male 19720830 0 
Ta'if, Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
70
 
SALEM AL HAZMI Male 19810202 0 
Mecca, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
71
 
SAEED AL GHAMDI Male 19791121 0 
al Bahah 
region, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
72
 
AHMED ABDULLAH ALNAMI Male 19771207 0 
Jeddah, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
73
 
AHMAD AL HAZNAWI Male 19801011 0 
al Bahah 
region, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
74
 
ZIAD JARRAH Male 19750511 0 
Mazarra, 
Lebanon 
0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
75
 
KHALED MOHAMMED AL-ALI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
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A
g0
17
76
 
MOHAMMED BIN USAMA BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
77
 
SAAD BIN USAMA BIN LADEN Male 19820702 19810702 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
17
78
 
HAMZA BIN USAMA BIN LADEN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
80
 
OMAR AL-KHATAB Male 0 0 0 0 Chechnya 0 East Europe 
A
g0
17
81
 
ALI MAHMUD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
82
 
ABOUD ROGO Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
17
83
 
MOHAMED KUBWA Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
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A
g0
17
84
 
KARIM (MOMBASA ATTACKS) Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
17
85
 
SAID SAGGAR AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
17
86
 
AMINA MOHAMMED KUBWA Female 19890702 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
17
87
 
ADNAN G. EL SHUKRIJUMAH Male 19750804 0 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Guyana Saudi Arabia 
South 
America/Carribb
ean 
A
g0
17
88
 
ADERRAUF JDEY Male 19760702 0 Tunisia 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
17
89
 
AMER EL-MAATI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
90
 
ADAM GADAHN Male 19780901 0 
Riverside 
County, CA 
0 USA 0 North America 
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ID
 N
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Nationality 
Region  
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A
g0
17
91
 
SALEH ALI SALEH NABHAN Male 19810702 19790702 
Mombasa, 
Kenya 
0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
17
92
 
HALIMA BADROUDINE FAZUL HUSSEINE Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
93
 
HASHI HUSSEIN FARAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
94
 
UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALAB Male 19870702 0 0 0 Nigeria 0 West Africa 
A
g0
17
95
 
OMAR AWADH OMAR Male 19730702 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
17
96
 
HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
17
97
 
ISSA OSMAN ISSA Male 19730702 0 
Malindi, 
Kenya 
0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
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A
g0
17
98
 
FUMO MOHAMED FUMO Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
17
99
 
SALIM SAMIR BA'AMER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
00
 
AHMED HAJJI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
18
01
 
DABBAS BIN MOHAMMED AL-DABBASY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
02
 
MOHAMMED ALI SALEH NABHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
03
 
NASSEM Female 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
04
 
MUNIRA Female 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
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A
g0
18
05
 
ALI SAGGAR Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
06
 
HANIYA Female 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
07
 
OMAR SAID OMAR Male 19710702 0 
Mombasa, 
Kenya 
0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
09
 
SULEIMAN ABDALLA SALIM HEMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
10
 
SALMIN MOHAMMED KHAMIS Female 19760702 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
11
 
FAISAL ALI NASSOR Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
12
 
OMAR FAROOQ Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
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A
g0
18
13
 
MOHAMMED ILLYAS Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
14
 
ANNELIESE BAHAJI Female 0 0 0 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
18
15
 
NESE KUL Female 0 0 0 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
18
16
 
MOUNIR EL-MOTASSADEQ Male 19750702 0 
Marrakesh, 
Morocco 
0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
18
17
 
HAMZA RABIA Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
18
18
 
KUBWA MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
19
 
SWALHA KUBWA Female 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
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A
g0
18
20
 
AAFIA SIDDIQUI Female 19720702 0 
Karachi, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
21
 
CHARLES TAYLOR Male 0 0 0 0 Liberia 0 West Africa 
A
g0
18
22
 
AISHA NABHAN Female 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
23
 
SHEIKH MUKHTAR ABDIRAHMAN ABU-
ZUBEYR 
Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
24
 
OMAR HAMMAMI Male 19840702 0 
Alabama, 
USA 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
18
25
 
AL-AMIN KIMATHI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
26
 
BILAL EL BERJAWI Male 19840928 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
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A
g0
18
27
 
OMAR BADRUDIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
28
 
WALLA ELDIN ABDEL RAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
29
 
SAKRIH MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
30
 
HASSAN AGADE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
31
 
FARIDAH HAMUBU Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
32
 
FATUMA SAIDI ABUDULLAR Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
33
 
EDRISA ISSA LUYIMA Male 19770702 0 0 0 Uganda 0 East Africa 
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Nationality 
Region  
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A
g0
18
34
 
EDRISA NSUBUGA Male 19800702 0 0 0 Uganda 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
35
 
HARUNA HASSAN LUYIMA Male 19830702 0 0 0 Uganda 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
36
 
MOHAMOOD MUGISHA Male 0 0 0 0 Uganda 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
37
 
HAMID MOHAMED SULEIMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
38
 
YAHYA SULEIMAN MBUTHIA Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
39
 
HABIB SULEIMAN NJOROGE Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
40
 
HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
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A
g0
18
41
 
HASSAN FROM SOMALIA Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
42
 
KASULE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
43
 
IDRIS MAGONDU Male 0 0 0 0 Uganda 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
44
 
MUSTAFA ABU AL YAZID Male 19560702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
18
45
 
INTIKHAB AHMED ABBASI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
46
 
MOHAMMAD KABIR ABBOTABAD Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
47
 
ABID KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
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A
g0
18
48
 
ZAFARALI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
49
 
QAMAR ZAMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
50
 
MOHAMMAD ISHAQUE Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
52
 
SHAMSUL HAQ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
53
 
ABU GHARIB AL-MAKKI KAMAL SALIM 
ATTIYA AL-FUDLI AL-HADHLI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
54
 
RAO SHAUKAT Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
55
 
MURSALEEN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1099 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
18
56
 
FAHAD MUNIR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
60
 
MUHAMMAD ASIF ALI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
61
 
ABDUL REHMAN (HUJI) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
62
 
MUREED AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
63
 
DR. USMAN/AQEEL Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
64
 
ATTAULLAH KHAN Male 19850702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
65
 
FAISAL AHMED KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1100 
 
ID
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o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
18
66
 
DR ABDUL RAZZAQ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
67
 
ZEESHAN JALIL Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
68
 
MOHAMMAD SARFARAZ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
69
 
MOHAMMAD NAEEM SHAKIR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
70
 
MOHAMMAD NADEEM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
71
 
MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
72
 
ISMAT SIDDIQUI Female 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1101 
 
ID
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o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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A
g0
18
73
 
FOWZIA SIDDIQUI Female 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
74
 
MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
75
 
SUHEIL LAHER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
76
 
MOHAMAD AKRA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
77
 
MOHAMMAD AMJAD KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
78
 
AHMED KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
79
 
MIRIAM KHAN Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1102 
 
ID
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A
g0
18
80
 
SULIEMAN KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
81
 
MAJID KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
82
 
UZAIR PARACHA Male 19800702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
83
 
ALI SHINAWY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
84
 
HAMDI MOUSSA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
85
 
MOHAMMAD SAAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
86
 
WALID BIN ATTASH Male 19790702 0 Yemen 0 Yemen Saudi Arabia Middle East 
1103 
 
ID
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o.
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A
g0
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87
 
GOULED HASSAN DOURAD Male 19740702 0 
Mogadishu, 
Somalia 
0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
18
88
 
MUSA ALI SAID AL SAID AL UMARI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
89
 
ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMAD AL NUR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
90
 
NAJIBULLAH ZAZI Male 19850702 0 
Paktia, 
Afghanistan 
0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
91
 
ZURAH ADBU AHMED Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
18
92
 
MAHMOUD TALEB Male 0 0 Gaza 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
18
93
 
IYMAN FARIS Male 19690604 0 Kashmir 0 USA 0 North America 
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ID
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A
g0
18
94
 
ABDUL RAOUF HAWAS Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
18
96
 
QAMAR MOHAMMAD AYUB Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
18
97
 
YUSUF POLAT Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
18
98
 
LOUAI SAKKA Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
88
 
HABIB AKTAS Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
89
 
BAKI YIGIT Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
90
 
GURCAN BAC Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
1105 
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Nationality) 
A
g0
19
91
 
FEVZI YITIZ Male 0 0 
Van, 
Turkey 
0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
92
 
ADNAN ERSOZ Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
93
 
MESUT CABUK Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
94
 
GOKHAN ELALTUNTAS Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
95
 
FERIDUN UGURLU Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
96
 
ILYAS KUNCAK Male 19560702 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
97
 
HARUN ILHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
1106 
 
ID
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Nationality) 
A
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19
98
 
IBRAHIM KUS Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
19
99
 
AZAD EKINCI Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
00
 
SEYIT ERTUL Male 0 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
01
 
HAMED OBYSI Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
02
 
SERVET YITIZ Male 0 0 
Van, 
Turkey 
0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
03
 
IMAD MUGHNIYEH Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
04
 
JAMAL AHMED MOHA MED ALI AL-BADAWI Male 19600722 19601023 
Al-
Shargian, 
Makiris, 
Yemen 
0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
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ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Region  
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A
g0
20
05
 
ABDUL RAHIM MOHAMMED HUSSEIN ABDA 
AL-NASHERI 
Male 19650105 0 
Mecca, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
06
 
IBRAHIM AL-THAWAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
07
 
HASSAN AWADH AL-KHAMRI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
08
 
MOHD FARIK BIN AMIN Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
09
 
SULIEMAN ABU GHAITH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
10
 
MUHAMMAD AL-QAHTANI Male 19790702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
11
 
SAIFULLAH PARACHA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
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ID
 N
o.
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A
g0
20
12
 
IBN AL-KHATTAB Male 19700702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia Jordan Middle East 
A
g0
20
13
 
HASSAN ATTASH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
14
 
MUHAMMAD ATTASH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
15
 
ALI ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-FAQASI AL-
GHAMDI 
Male 19730702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
16
 
TURKI NASSER AL-DANDANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
17
 
KHALED MOHAMMAD BIN MUSLIM AL-
ARAWI AL-JUHANI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
18
 
MOHAMMED OTHMAN ABDULLAH AL-
WALIDI AL-SHEHRI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
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ID
 N
o.
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A
g0
20
19
 
HANI SAEED AHMAD AL ABDUL-KARIM AL-
GHAMDI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
20
 
JUBRAN ALI AHMAD HAKAMI KHABRANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
21
 
KHALED BIN IBRAHIM MAHMOUD 
BAGHDADI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
22
 
MEHMAS BIN MOHAMMED MEHMAS AL-
HAWASHLEH AL-DOSARI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
23
 
MOHAMMED BIN SHADHAF ALI AL-
MAHZOUM AL-SHEHRI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
24
 
HAZEM MOHAMMED SAEED KASHMIRI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
25
 
MAJED ABDULLAH SA'AD BIN OKAIL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1110 
 
ID
 N
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A
g0
20
26
 
BANDAR BIN ABDUL-RAHMAN MENAWER 
AL-RAHIMI AL-MUTAIRI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
27
 
ABDUL-KARIM MOHAMMED JUBRAN YAZJI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
28
 
ABDULLAH FARRES BIN JUFAIN AL-RAHIMI 
AL-MUTAIRI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
30
 
AMMAR AL-WAELI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
31
 
QASIM MOHAMED (AIAI) Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
20
32
 
MOHAMED AL KAHTANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
33
 
YOUNIS KHALIS Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
1111 
 
ID
 N
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A
g0
20
34
 
AHMED SHAH MASSOUD Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
20
35
 
ABU BARA AL YEMENI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
36
 
SALAH AL DIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
37
 
AYSEL SENGUEN Female 0 0 0 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
20
38
 
KHALID AL-MASRI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt? 0 North Africa 
A
g0
20
40
 
KHADR ABU HOSHAR Male 19650702 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
41
 
RAED HIJAZI Male 19700702 0 California 0 USA 0 North America 
1112 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
20
42
 
MOHAMAD KAMAL ELZAHABI Male 19630702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
43
 
SAAD HIJAZI Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
20
44
 
HUSSEIN TURI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
20
45
 
OSAMA SUMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
46
 
MOHAMMED HIJAZI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
47
 
MOHDAR ABDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
48
 
KHALLAM (CALIFORNIA) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1113 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
20
49
 
FAHAD AL THUMAIRY Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
50
 
OMAR AL BAYOUMI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
51
 
OSAMA AWADALLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
52
 
OMAR BAKARBASHAT Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
53
 
ANWAR AULAQI Male 0 0 
New 
Mexico, 
USA 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
20
54
 
YAZEED AL SALMI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
55
 
EYAD AL RABABAH Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
1114 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
20
56
 
SULAYMAN AL ALWAN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
57
 
MUSHABIB AL HAMLAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
58
 
SAUD AL RASHID Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
59
 
ZUHAIR AL THUBAITI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
60
 
QUTAYBAH AL NAJDI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
61
 
SAEED AL BALUCHI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
62
 
ABU TURAB AL JORDANI Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
1115 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
20
63
 
ABD AL RAHIM GHULUM RABBANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
64
 
ABDULLAH SINDHI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
20
65
 
AWS AL MADANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
66
 
ABDEL KARIM AL NASSER Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
67
 
AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL Male 19670627 0 
Qatif 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
68
 
ALI AL-HOURI Male 19650710 0 
El 
Dibabiya, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
69
 
HANI AL-SAYEGH Male 19700702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1116 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
20
70
 
IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB Male 19661016 0 
Tarut, Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
71
 
MUSTAFA AL-QASSAB Male 0 0 
Qatif 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
72
 
SA‘ED AL-BAHAR Male 0 0 
Qatif 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
73
 
ABDALLAH AL-JARASH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
74
 
HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS Male 0 0 
Qatif 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
75
 
ALI AL-MARHOUN Male 0 0 
Qatif 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
76
 
SALEH RAMADAN Male 0 0 
Qatif 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1117 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
20
77
 
MUSTAFA MU‘ALEM Male 0 0 
Qatif 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
78
 
AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI Male 19000517 19020924 
Khomein, 
Iran 
0 Iran 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
79
 
FADEL AL-ALAWE Male 0 0 
Qatif 
Province, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
80
 
JOHN DOE (HIZBALLAH) Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
20
81
 
ADEL RAFEEA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
82
 
IBRAHIM MAIDIN Male 19510702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
83
 
OTHMAN MOHAMED Male 19600702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
1118 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
20
84
 
MAS SELAMAT BIN KASTARI Male 19610702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
85
 
KHALIM JAFFAR Male 19710702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
86
 
AB WAHAB BIN AHMAD Male 19610702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
87
 
SYED IBRAHIM Male 19730702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
88
 
MOHAMMAD ASLAM BIN YAR ALI KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
89
 
FATHI ABU BAKAR BAFANA Male 19660702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
90
 
ADNAN BIN MUSA Male 19660702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
1119 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
20
91
 
MOHAMED NAZIR MOHMMED UTHMAN Male 19750702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
92
 
SABAH Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
93
 
ANDREW GERARD Male 16980702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
94
 
HALIM BIN HUSSAIN Male 19610702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
95
 
TENGKU ISMUHADI Male 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
96
 
DIDIN ROSMAN Male 19580702 0 
Pesar 
Ucing, 
Garut, West 
Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
20
97
 
TAUFIK ABDUL HALIM Male 19760702 0 
Muar Johor, 
Malaysia 
0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
1120 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
20
98
 
ABDULLAH ANSHORI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
20
99
 
IRFAN AWWAS SURYAHARDY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
00
 
MURSALIN DAHLAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
01
 
FUAD AMSYARI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
02
 
ENJANG BASTAMAN Male 19620702 0 
Banjarsari, 
Ciamis, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
03
 
ZULKIFLI MARZUKI Male 19680702 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
04
 
DAUD BEUREUEH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1121 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
05
 
HASAN DI TIRO Male 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
06
 
ABU HASBI GEUDONG Male 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
07
 
CHADIJAH GEUDONG Female 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
08
 
MUCHTAR GEUDONG Male 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
09
 
FAUZI GEUDONG Male 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
10
 
SYAFRIE SJAMSUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
11
 
ABU HURAERAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1122 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
12
 
AKIM HAKIMUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
13
 
HENDROPRIYONO Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
14
 
LIGADINSYAH Male 19620702 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
15
 
FADLI Male 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
16
 
EDI SUGIARTO Male 19550822 0 
Medan, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
17
 
POLEM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
18
 
RAMLI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1123 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
19
 
BASUKI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
20
 
MOHAMMED FAWAZI Male 0 0 
Lombok, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
21
 
SYAHRIR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
22
 
UMAR (JI-BANDUNG) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
23
 
HAJI ACENG SUHERI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
24
 
AGUS KURNIAWAN Male 19780809 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
25
 
RONY MILYAR Male 19790702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1124 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
26
 
WAWAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
27
 
DEDI MULYADI Male 19690702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
28
 
HOLIS Male 0 0 
Taskimalay
a, Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
29
 
YOYO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
30
 
RAJA HUSAIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
31
 
ABDUL AZIZ KAHAR MUZAKKAR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
32
 
HARIS FADILLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1125 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
33
 
KYAI SALEH AS‘AD Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
34
 
ABDUL RAUF Male 19810702 0 
Cipodoh, 
Tangerang, 
West Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
35
 
YUDI/ANDRI Male 19800702 0 
Sukamanah, 
Malimping, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
36
 
AGUS HIDAYAT Male 0 0 
Sukamanah, 
Malimping, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
38
 
IQBAL (BALI BOMBER) Male 19800702 0 
Sukamanah, 
Malimping, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
39
 
APRIANTO Male 0 0 
Kasemen, 
Serang, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
40
 
PUJATA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1126 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
41
 
IKHWAN FAUZI Male 0 0 
Kasemen, 
Serang, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
42
 
FATURRAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
43
 
ZULKIFLI BIN ABDUL HIR Male 19660105 0 
Muar, 
Johor, 
Malaysia 
0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
44
 
ZULKARNAEN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
45
 
THORIQUDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
46
 
MUSTOPA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
47
 
MUSTAQIM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1127 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
48
 
MUSTAFA MASHUR Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
21
49
 
MUHAMMAD SAUWKI AL-ISTAMBULI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
21
50
 
AJENGAN MASDUKI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
51
 
SALAHUDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
52
 
HABIB Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
53
 
ACHMAD ROIHAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
54
 
MOHAMMED FAIQ HAFIDZ Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1128 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
55
 
MOHAMED QITAL Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
56
 
AHMAD SAJULI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
57
 
SYUNON Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
58
 
MUCHLIANSYAH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
59
 
ASEP DANU Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
60
 
FIRDAUS Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
61
 
ZUHRONI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1129 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
62
 
FARIHIN AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
63
 
ARKAM/ARQOM Male 19600702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
65
 
UTOMO PAMUNGKAS Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
66
 
DULMATIN Male 19700606 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
67
 
USAID Male 0 0 
Karanganya
r, Solo, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
68
 
MUCHTAR DAENG Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
69
 
KAHAR MUSTAFA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1130 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
21
70
 
SYARIFUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
71
 
BASYIR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
72
 
MOH. JAUHARI BIN ABDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
73
 
DADANG SURATMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
75
 
SUHEIMI Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
76
 
JAMSARI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
77
 
ABDUL RAZAK Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1131 
 
ID
 N
o.
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A
g0
21
78
 
MUHAMMAD TAUFIQURRAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
79
 
ABAS BIN LATIF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
80
 
SARJIYO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
81
 
MUHAJIR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
82
 
ACHMAD DAHLAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
83
 
MUCHLIANSYAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
84
 
HAJI MOH. FALEH OF KUDUS Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1132 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
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Nationality) 
A
g0
21
85
 
HAJI DANU MUH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
86
 
ABDUL ROCHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
87
 
JAMALUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
88
 
ZAINI ZAKARIA Male 19680702 0 
Kelantan, 
Malaysia 
0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
89
 
ZAMZURI Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
90
 
HENRY BIN MANSOUR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
21
91
 
FATURAHMAN DAEMUGADING Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1133 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
21
92
 
ZAITUN RASMIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
93
 
AGUNG HAMID Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
94
 
HISBULLAH RASYID Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
95
 
ANTHON Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
96
 
ILHAM RIYADI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
97
 
MANSUR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
21
99
 
DAHLAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1134 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
22
00
 
ASHAR DAENG SALAM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
01
 
SALAMAT HAYSIM Male 19420702 0 
Cotabato 
Region, 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
02
 
SARDJONO GABRIEL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
03
 
SYAIFUL GABRIEL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
04
 
MACHMUDI HARIONO Male 19760702 0 
Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
05
 
FAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
06
 
SURYADI MAS‘UD Male 19720702 0 
Makassar, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1135 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
22
07
 
HASTA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
08
 
IMAM HANAFI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
09
 
SOLAHUDIN AL-AYUBI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
10
 
USTADZ YUNUS Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
11
 
USTADZ AZHARI DIPOKUSUMO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
12
 
FARIDA BIN ABBAS Female 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
13
 
WAHYUDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1136 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
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A
g0
22
14
 
FERIAL MUCHLIS ABDUL HALIM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
15
 
ISNAIRIN BINTI ABDUL ROSYID Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
16
 
ASADULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
17
 
YOYOK Male 0 0 
Ring 
Condet, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
18
 
ZULFIKAR Male 0 0 
Tanjung 
Priok, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
19
 
ABDULLAH (DI) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
20
 
EDY RIANTO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1137 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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A
g0
22
21
 
NAIMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
22
 
EDY TAUFIK Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
23
 
SUHENDI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
24
 
ROJAK Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
25
 
MUSTAQIM (AMIN) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
26
 
MATORI ABDUL JALIL Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
27
 
ZULKIFAR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1138 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
22
28
 
TAJUL ARIFIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
29
 
NOORDIN MOHD TOP Male 19680811 0 
Johor, 
Malaysia 
0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
30
 
KANG JAJA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
31
 
NURUDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
32
 
IWAN/ROIS Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
33
 
MIA IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
34
 
USTADZ HERI HAFIDZIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1139 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
22
35
 
ASEP/DARWIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
36
 
DIDIN RAIDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
37
 
SARKONI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
38
 
HARIS (FATHER OF UYOK) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
39
 
HENRI GOLUN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
40
 
APUY Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
41
 
UYOK Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1140 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
22
42
 
FATHURROBI/HARUN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
43
 
OMAN ROCHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
44
 
HASAN (JI) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
45
 
GEMPUR BUDI ANGKORO Male 19790702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
46
 
CHANDRA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
47
 
MOHAMED IKHWAN Male 19810702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
48
 
SURAMTO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1141 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
22
49
 
IRUN HIDAYAT Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
51
 
MOHAMED RAIS Male 19750702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
52
 
TONI TOGAR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
53
 
RIAU Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
54
 
MASRIZAL BIN ALI UMAR Male 19740702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
55
 
SARDONA SILIWANGI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
56
 
MOHAMED IHSAN Male 19680702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1142 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
22
57
 
ASMAR LATIN SANI Male 19750702 0 
West 
Sumatra, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
58
 
ABU DUJANA Male 19700702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
59
 
QOTADAH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
60
 
SEF/FAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
61
 
SON HADI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
62
 
KHUMAIDI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
63
 
HENRI SIGU SAMBOJA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1143 
 
ID
 N
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
22
64
 
ACHMAD HASAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
65
 
ADUNG Male 19590702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
66
 
SYAIFUDDIN UMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
67
 
BAGUS BUDI PRANOTO Male 19781102 0 
Kudus, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
68
 
LUFTI HAIDAROH Male 19790702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
69
 
HERI/UMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
70
 
MUNFIATUN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1144 
 
ID
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Alt. 
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A
g0
22
71
 
SAPTONO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
72
 
WIWIT Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
73
 
AWAL PURNOMO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
74
 
AGUS AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
75
 
ROSIHIN NOOR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
76
 
IWAN SAJAI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
77
 
LIS Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1145 
 
ID
 N
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Alt. 
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A
g0
22
78
 
ENGKOS KOSASIH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
79
 
BAHARUDIN SOLEH Male 19820702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
80
 
DIDI/RIJUL Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
81
 
KOMARUDIN Male 19730702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
82
 
HERNIANTO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
83
 
MAKAFRI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
84
 
MOH NAJIB Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1146 
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 N
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Alt. 
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A
g0
22
85
 
HERLAMBANG Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
86
 
SAIFUL Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
87
 
WIBOWO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
88
 
MUSAFAK Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
89
 
ABDULLAH SUNATA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
90
 
ABDUL MALIK Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
91
 
ACENG KURINA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1147 
 
ID
 N
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Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
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A
g0
22
92
 
ALI ZEIN Male 19750702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
93
 
ABDUL ROHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
94
 
PURNAMA PURTA Male 19810702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
95
 
ENCENG KURINA Male 19720702 0 
Bandung, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
96
 
HARI KUNCORO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
97
 
UMAR PATEK Male 19710702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
22
98
 
HILMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1148 
 
ID
 N
o.
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A
g0
22
99
 
UMAR (WAIMURAT CAMP) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
00
 
ALI (WAIMURAT CAMP) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
01
 
SALMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
02
 
MOHAMED SAIFUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
03
 
DANI CHANDRA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
04
 
IQBAL HUSEINI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
05
 
IMAM BUKHORI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1149 
 
ID
 N
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Alt. 
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A
g0
23
06
 
JOKO HARUN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
07
 
SALIK FIRDAUS Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
09
 
ABDUL AZIZ (PEKALONGAN) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
10
 
MISRO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
11
 
SUBUR SUGIARTO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
12
 
ANIF SOLCHANUDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
13
 
AIP HIDAYAT Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1150 
 
ID
 N
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Nationality) 
A
g0
23
15
 
JUNAEDI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
16
 
MAKMURI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
17
 
EKO HADI PRASETYO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
18
 
PURYANTO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
19
 
FIRMANSYAH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
20
 
HAMZA BAYA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
21
 
MUJAROT Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1151 
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A
g0
23
22
 
SIROJUL Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
23
 
IMAN SUSANTO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
24
 
MASYKUR ABDUL KADIR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
25
 
SUKASTOPO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
26
 
SOFYAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
27
 
ILHAM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
28
 
BAHARUDIN LATIF Male 19510702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1152 
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A
g0
23
29
 
SAIFUDDIN ZUHRI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
30
 
ARINA RAHMAH Female 19850702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
32
 
ANI SUGANDI Male 19660702 0 
South 
Sumatra, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
33
 
ABDUR ROHIM BIN THOYIB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
23
34
 
ZARKASIH Male 19620702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
35
 
ALI MASYHUDI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
36
 
MOHAMED HASSAN BIN SAYNUDIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1153 
 
ID
 N
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A
g0
23
37
 
TAUFIK AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
23
38
 
SAYUTI Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
39
 
ABDURRAHMAN TAIB Male 19700702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
40
 
SUKARSO ABDILLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
41
 
HELMI HANAFI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
42
 
YUDO HASTOYO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
43
 
AGUSTIWARMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1154 
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A
g0
23
44
 
HERI PURWANTO Male 19820702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
45
 
SUGIARTO Male 19850702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
46
 
WAHYUDI Male 19730702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
47
 
SULTHON QOLBI Male 0 0 
Madura, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
48
 
YOSI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
49
 
OLOAN MARTUA HARAHAP Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
50
 
TIMOTIUS Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1155 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
23
51
 
IWAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
52
 
KI AGUS MUHAMMAD TONI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
53
 
IBROHIM Male 19720702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
54
 
AMIR IBRAHIM Male 19760702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
55
 
AIR SETYAWAN Male 19810702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
56
 
EKO JOKO SARJONO Male 19820702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
57
 
DANI DWI PERTAMA Male 19910702 0 
Bogor, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1156 
 
ID
 N
o.
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A
g0
23
58
 
NANA IKHWAN MAULANA Male 19810702 0 
Pandeglang, 
Banten, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
59
 
SYAIFUDIN JAELANI Male 19770702 0 
Kuningan, 
Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
60
 
MUJAHRI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
61
 
IWAN HERDIANSYAH Male 19820702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
62
 
ALI MUHAMMAD Male 19580702 0 
Riyadh, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Saudi Arabai 0 Middle East 
A
g0
23
63
 
MOHAMAD SJAHRIR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
64
 
MISTAM HUSAMUDIN Male 0 0 
Purbalingga
, Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1157 
 
ID
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o.
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A
g0
23
65
 
MOHAMAD JIBRIL Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
66
 
UMAR BURHANUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
67
 
RINA Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
68
 
PARMIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
69
 
AHMAD JAELANI Male 0 0 
Kuningan, 
Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
70
 
SUCIHANI Female 0 0 
Kuningan, 
Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
71
 
ERY Female 0 0 
Kuningan, 
Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1158 
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A
g0
23
72
 
AHMAD ISROFIL Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
73
 
ABU MUHAMMAD AL-MAQDISI Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
23
74
 
NIKO/JUNDI Male 0 0 
Cibubur, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
75
 
HASAN NOOR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
76
 
SIBGHO/MUS'AB Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
77
 
ISMET KAKIKI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
78
 
KAMALUDIN BIN KHASAN Male 19810702 0 
Majalengka, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1159 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Alt. 
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A
g0
23
79
 
GEMA AWAL RAMADHAN Male 0 0 
Medan, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
80
 
HALAWI MAKMUN Male 0 0 
Bogor, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
81
 
YUDI ZULFAHRI Male 19830702 0 
Keutapang, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
82
 
MOH. SOFYAN TSAURI Male 0 0 
Cirebon, 
Java, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
83
 
ABU NUR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
84
 
TGK. AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
85
 
ALI ARAFAH Male 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
1160 
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 N
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
23
86
 
TGK. MUSLIM 
ATTAHIRI 
Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
87
 
MUCHTAR IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
88
 
TAUFIK MARZUKI Male 0 0 
Pidie, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
89
 
AZWANI/ABU MATANG Male 0 0 
Bireun, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
90
 
AZWAR/ABU RECONG Male 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
91
 
MUNIR/ABU RIMBA Male 19850702 0 
Aceh Besar, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
92
 
MUHSIN/IMAM MUDA Male 0 0 
Pidie, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1161 
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A
g0
23
93
 
MUHIBUDDIN Male 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
94
 
MUKHLIS (SOFYAN'S TRAINEE) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
95
 
MUHAMMAD TOAT Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
96
 
AHMAD SAYID MAULANA Male 19740702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
97
 
JOKO SULISTYO Male 0 0 
Boyolali, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
98
 
AULIA SYAHIDAH Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
23
99
 
MASYKUR RAHMAT Male 19890702 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1162 
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A
g0
24
00
 
BAYU SENO Male 0 0 
Solo, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
01
 
PANDU WICAKSONO WIDYANPUTRO Male 0 0 
Solo, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
02
 
YUSUF ARIFIN Male 0 0 
Lampung, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
03
 
ALI FROM ACEH Male 0 0 
Aceh, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
04
 
USMAN/GITO Male 0 0 
Lampung, 
Indonesia 
0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
05
 
ENAL TA'O Male 19720702 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
06
 
ILYAS (GAM) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1163 
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
07
 
RASYID RIDHO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
08
 
AFIF ABDUL MAJID Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
09
 
MUSTAQIM MUZAYYIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
10
 
HARIS AMIR FALAH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
11
 
HARIYADI USMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
12
 
SYARIF USMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
13
 
SUMARNO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1164 
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A
g0
24
14
 
MOHAMED AMIN MUSA Male 19740702 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
24
15
 
SILVESTER TENDEAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
16
 
YAHYA GOBA Male 19770130 0 USA 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
17
 
SAHIM ALWAN Male 19721209 0 USA 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
18
 
SHAFAL MOSED Male 19780611 0 USA 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
19
 
YASEIN TAHER Male 19771209 0 USA 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
20
 
FAYSAL GALAB Male 19760326 0 USA 0 USA 0 North America 
1165 
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A
g0
24
21
 
JABER ELBANEH Male 19670702 0 Yemen 0 Yemen USA Middle East 
A
g0
24
22
 
MUKTAR AL-BAKRI Male 19800420 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
23
 
MOHAMMED ALBANNA Male 19510702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
24
 
KAMAL DERWISH Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
25
 
ABU ALI AL-HARITHI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
24
26
 
MOHAMED HAMDI AL-AHDAL Male 19710702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabai 0 Middle East 
A
g0
24
27
 
BANDAR BIN ABDURRAHMAN AL-GHAMDI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1166 
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A
g0
24
28
 
AHMED BILAL Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
29
 
MUHAMMAD BILAL Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
30
 
PATRICE LUMUMBA FORD Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
31
 
JEFFREY BATTLE Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
32
 
HABIS AL SAOUB Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
24
33
 
KHALED ALI STEITIYE Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
34
 
MAHER HAWASH Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
1167 
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A
g0
24
35
 
OCTOBER LEWIS Female 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
36
 
JUMA AL-DOSARI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
24
37
 
BINYAM AHMED MUHAMMAD Male 19790702 0 0 0 Ethiopia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
24
38
 
ADHAM AMIN HASSOUN Male 19620702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
39
 
MOHAMED HESHAM YOUSSEF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
40
 
KIFAH WAEL JAYYOUSI Male 19620702 0 Jordan 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
41
 
KASSEM DAHER Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
1168 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
43
 
ALI AL-TIMMI Male 19640702 0 
Washington
, D.C.-
metro area 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
44
 
MASOUD KHAN Male 19720702 0 Pakistan 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
45
 
RANDALL ROYER Male 19730702 0 
St. Louis, 
MO 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
46
 
YONG KWON Male 19760702 0 
South 
Korea 
0 USA South Korea North America 
A
g0
24
47
 
MUHAMMAD AATIQUE Male 19730702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
48
 
KHWAJA HASAN Male 19760702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
49
 
DONALD SURRATT Male 19730702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
1169 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
50
 
HAMMAD ABDUR-RAHEEM Male 19690702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
51
 
CALIPH ABDUR-RAHEEM Male 19750702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
52
 
SEIFULLAH CHAPMAN Male 0 0 California 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
53
 
NURADIN M. ABDI Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
24
54
 
JAMES ELSHAFAY  Male 19850702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
55
 
SHAHWAR MARTIN SIRAJ Male 19820702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
24
56
 
YASSIN MUHIDDIN AREF Male 19700702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1170 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
57
 
MOHAMMED MOSHARREF HOSSAIN Male 19550702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
58
 
KEVIN JAMES Male 19760702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
59
 
LEVAR WASHINGTON Male 19800702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
60
 
GREGORY PATTERSON Male 19840702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
61
 
HAMMAD SAMANA Male 19840702 0 0 0 Pakistan USA South Asia 
A
g0
24
62
 
MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS Male 19580702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
63
 
SHANNEN ROSSMILLER Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1171 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
64
 
SYED HARIS AHMED Male 19840702 0 Pakistan 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
65
 
EHSANUL ISLAM SADEQUEE Male 19860702 0 
Virginia, 
USA 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
66
 
FAHIM AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
67
 
AZDI ORNANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
68
 
AABID HUSSEIN KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
69
 
ZUBAIR AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
70
 
MIRSAD BEKTASEVIC Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1172 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
71
 
NARSEAL BATISTE Male 19740702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
72
 
PATRICK ABRAHAM Male 19790702 0 0 0 Haiti 0 
South 
America/Carribb
ean 
A
g0
24
73
 
STANLEY GRANT PHANOR Male 19750702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
74
 
NAUDIMAR HERRERA Male 19840702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
75
 
BURSON AUGUSTIN Male 19850702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
76
 
ROTHSCHILD AUGUSTINE Male 19840702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
24
77
 
LYGLENSON LEMORIN Male 19750702 0 0 0 Haiti 0 
South 
America/Carribb
ean 
1173 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
78
 
ASSAD SARWAR Male 19800524 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
79
 
ABDULLA AHMED ALI Male 19801010 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
80
 
TANVIR HUSSAIN Male 19810221 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
81
 
ARAFAT KHAN Male 19810518 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
82
 
IBRAHIM SAVANT Male 19801219 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
83
 
WAHEED ZAMAN Male 19840527 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
84
 
UMAR ISLAM Male 19780423 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
1174 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
85
 
DONALD STEWART-WHYTE Male 19870702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
86
 
MOHAMMED GULZAR Male 19820702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
24
87
 
MUKTAR SAID IBRAHIM Male 19780702 0 Eritrea 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
88
 
RASHID RAUF Male 19810702 19770702 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
89
 
RAMZI MOHAMED Male 19820702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
90
 
ADEL YAHYA Male 19820702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
91
 
MANFO ASIEDU Male 19730702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
1175 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
92
 
ABDUL SHERIF Male 19770702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
93
 
SIRAJ ALI Male 19750702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
94
 
MUHEDIN ALI Male 19780702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
95
 
YESHIEMBERT GIRMA Female 19760702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
96
 
WAHBI MOHAMMED Male 19830702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
97
 
ISMIL ABDURAHMAN Male 19820702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
24
98
 
ABDULLAH EL-FAISAL Male 19640702 0 Jamacia 0 Jamacia 0 
South 
America/Carribb
ean 
1176 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
24
99
 
ESAYAS GIRMA Male 19850702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
25
00
 
MULUMEBET GIRMA Female 19840702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
25
01
 
MOHAMED KABASHI Male 19820702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
25
02
 
ABDUL MUHAMMAD Male 19850709 0 
Memphis, 
TN 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
03
 
ADIS MEDUNJANIN Male 19850702 0 Bosnia 0 Bosnia 0 East Europe 
A
g0
25
04
 
ZAREIN AHMEDZAY Male 19860702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
05
 
ALI SALEH KAHLAH AL-MARRI Male 19660702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia Qatar Middle East 
1177 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
06
 
JEHAD SERWAN MOSTAFA Male 19880702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
07
 
AMINA FARAH ALI Male 19770702 0 Somalia 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
08
 
HAWO MOHAMED HASSAN Male 19470702 0 Somalia 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
09
 
MOHAMUD ABDI YUSUF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
10
 
DUANE MOHAMED DIRIYE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
11
 
ABDI MAHDI HUSSEIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
12
 
SHEIKH SAAID Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
1178 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
13
 
ABID NASSER Male 19860702 0 
Peshawar, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
25
14
 
TARIQ UR REHMAN Male 19720702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
25
15
 
SALEH AL-SOMALI Male 19690702 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
17
 
ADEN HASHI AYROW Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
18
 
MOHAMED IBRAHIM AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 Eritrea 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
19
 
MOHAMAD SHNEWER Male 19850702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
20
 
DRITAN DUKA Male 19780702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
1179 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
21
 
ELJVIR DUKA Male 19830702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
22
 
SHAIN DUKA Male 19810702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
23
 
SERDAR TATAR Male 19830702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
24
 
AGRON ABDULLAHU Male 19820702 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
25
 
ZENAB ARMANDPISHEH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
26
 
OMAR BAKRI MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
27
 
ABU MUNTHIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1180 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
28
 
ZABI UL-TAIFI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
29
 
RUSSELL DEFREITAS Male 19440702 0 Guyana 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
30
 
KAREEM IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Guyana Trinidad 
South 
America/Carribb
ean 
A
g0
25
31
 
ABDUL KADIR Male 19520702 0 0 0 Trinidad 0 
South 
America/Carribb
ean 
A
g0
25
32
 
ABDEL NUR Male 19500702 0 0 0 Guyana 0 
South 
America/Carribb
ean 
A
g0
25
33
 
ABU BAKR (JAM) Male 0 0 0 0 Trinidad 0 
South 
America/Carribb
ean 
A
g0
25
34
 
SHEIK MOHAMED ABDIRAHMAN KARIYE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1181 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
35
 
IBRAHIM AL-HAMDI (LET) Male 19780702 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
25
36
 
MICHAEL C. FINTON Male 19800702 0 Decatur, IL 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
37
 
HOSAM MAHER HUSEIN SMADI Male 19900605 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
25
38
 
BRYANT NEAL VINAS Male 19830702 0 
Long 
Island, NY 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
39
 
RAJA LAHRASIB KHAN Male 19540702 0 Pakistan 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
40
 
KHALID ALI-M ALDAWSARI  Male 19900424 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
25
41
 
SYED HASHMI Male 19800702 0 Pakistan 0 USA 0 North America 
1182 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
42
 
HAMID HAYAT Male 19830702 0 Pakistan 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
43
 
UMER HAYAT Male 19580702 0 Pakistan 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
44
 
KHALID OUAZZANI Male 19771217 0 Morocco 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
45
 
AHMED OMAR ABU ALI Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
46
 
FAROOQUE AHMED Male 19760702 0 Pakistan 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
47
 
CHRISTOPHER PAUL Male 19640702 0 
Columbus, 
Ohio 
0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
48
 
KHALIFA LNU Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1183 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
49
 
RAHMAT ABDUL HIR Male 19640702 0 Malaysia 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
25
50
 
MINAH BINTI AOGIS ABD AZIZ Female 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
51
 
ABDUL BASIT USMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
52
 
MOHAMMED ABDULLAH WARSAME Male 19730812 0 
Mogadishu, 
Somalia 
0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
25
53
 
AHMED FARAZ KHAN Male 19840702 0 
Bannu, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
25
54
 
FATUMA Female 19850702 0 
Lamu, 
Kenya 
0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
55
 
MUKHTAR ROOBOW ALI Male 19691010 0 
Xudur, 
Somalia 
0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
1184 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
56
 
HARUNI BAMUSA Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
57
 
HASSAN SAID OMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Kenya 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
58
 
MOHAMED MWAKUZA KUZA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
59
 
HALIMA Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
60
 
SAUDA Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
61
 
SAMIR SAID SLAIM BA'AMIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
62
 
MOHAMED ALI 'ISSE YUSUF Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
1185 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
63
 
IBRAHIM "AL-AFGHANI" Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
64
 
JAAMA ALI ISMA'IL Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
65
 
DA'UD SALA IIDLE Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
66
 
FARHAN ABDULLE MOHAMED Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
67
 
HALIMA ABDI ISSA YUSUF Female 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
25
68
 
YAYAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
69
 
ABDUL RASYID Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1186 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
70
 
CHANDRA NASRULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
71
 
NIK ADLI BIN NIK AZIS Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
72
 
TAMZIL LINRUNG Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
73
 
ABU FATAH Male 0 0 0 0 Thailand 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
74
 
SALIMULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Burma 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
75
 
TASRIFAH KHUSUSIATI Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
76
 
FURQON Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1187 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
77
 
MAHMUD (JI - BATAM) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
78
 
TARMIZI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
79
 
MUKTIB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
80
 
SUKRI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
81
 
NASRI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
82
 
ALI FAUZI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
83
 
YASIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1188 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Alt. 
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A
g0
25
84
 
IFANA Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
85
 
UMAR KECIL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
86
 
MURTAJAB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
25
87
 
HALIMAH Unknown 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
88
 
HJ AFIAH Unknown 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
89
 
HM KOZIN Unknown 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
90
 
JARAF SHODIQ Unknown 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1189 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
91
 
AMIN JABIR Unknown 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
92
 
TAFISR Unknown 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
93
 
TASRIFAH Unknown 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
94
 
SUMIAH Unknown 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
95
 
NAIMAH Unknown 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
96
 
H NUR HASYIM Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
97
 
HJ TARIYEM Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1190 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
25
98
 
SITI ROHMA Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
25
99
 
JULIA MAHENDRA Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
00
 
ASTUTI Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
01
 
KHOIRIANA KHUSUSIATI Female 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
02
 
HAULA BINTI AMROZI Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
03
 
BILAL/SAEED Male 19920702 0 
South 
Waziristan, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
04
 
AITEZAZ SHAH Male 19930702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1191 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
05
 
SHER ZEHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
06
 
HUSNAIN GUL Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
07
 
MOHAMAD RAFAQAT Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
08
 
RASHEED AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
09
 
NASRULLAH ABDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
10
 
BAITULLAH MEHSUD Male 19740702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
11
 
MAULVI SAHIB Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1192 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
12
 
BRIGADIER EJZA SHAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
13
 
NAZIR (MUMBAI ATTACK) Male 19800702 0 
Faisalabad, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
14
 
SHOAIB (MUMBAI ATTACK) Male 19870702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
16
 
JAVED (MUMBAI ATTACKS) Male 19860702 0 
Okara, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
17
 
IMRAN BABAR Male 19830702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
18
 
MAHMOUD MOHAMMED BAHAZIQ Male 19430817 0 
Hyderabad, 
India 
0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
26
20
 
HAFIZ ARSHAD Male 19850702 0 
Multan, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1193 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
21
 
ABDEL REHMAN CHHOTA Male 19870702 0 
Chhota, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
22
 
FAHAD ULLAH Male 19850702 0 
Okara, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
23
 
NASER (MUMBAI ATTACKS) Male 19850702 0 
Faisalabad, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
26
 
ABU MUFTI SAEED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
27
 
ABU ABDURREHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
28
 
ABU MAAVIA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
29
 
ABU ANIS (LET) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1194 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
30
 
ABU BASHIR (LET) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
31
 
ABU HANJLA PATHAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
32
 
ABU SARIA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
33
 
ABU SAIF-UR-REHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
34
 
ABU IMRAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
35
 
HAKIM SAHEB Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
36
 
KAAHFA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1195 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
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A
g0
26
37
 
SHAHID GHAFOOR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
38
 
TAHAWWUR HUSSAIN RANA Male 19610702 0 Pakistan 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
26
39
 
ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
26
40
 
MAJOR HAROON ASIQ Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
41
 
ABU YAHYA AL-LIBI Male 0 0 0 0 Libia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
26
42
 
BURHANUDDIN RABBANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
53
 
AL-HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM Male 19490702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1196 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
54
 
BENJIE MIDTIMBANG Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
55
 
JOHN MACK Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
56
 
ABDULLAH MACAAPAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
57
 
ALIM ABDULAZIZ MIMBANTAS Male 19460702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
58
 
GHAZALI JAFAAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
59
 
SHEIKH OMAR PASIGAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
60
 
SAMIR HASHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1197 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
61
 
SOLAMAIN PANGALIAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
62
 
OKASHA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
63
 
NASRULLAH (JI) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
64
 
ILYAS/HANIF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
65
 
SAID (JI) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
66
 
ANWAR (JI) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
67
 
ABDURROHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1198 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
68
 
MUSTHOFA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
69
 
MUADZ Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
70
 
HAZAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
71
 
IBU SIRIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
72
 
ZUBEIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
73
 
ABU FARHAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
74
 
ZAID Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1199 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
75
 
HUDAIFAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
26
76
 
MACAANGCOS MIMBANTAS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
77
 
AMIR PAUTE Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
78
 
ZAINAL PAX Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
79
 
SALMAN MORO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
80
 
USTADZ SAID Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
81
 
OSAMA ARA Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1200 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
82
 
MOHAMMAD GUINDOLONGAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
83
 
JULKIPLI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
84
 
HAMDAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
85
 
NOOR MOHAMMAD UMUG Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
86
 
HAJI AKHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
87
 
SULAIMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
88
 
HADJI ABDUL SASAMU Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1201 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
89
 
USTADZ BAEM SAMUYA Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
90
 
NASRUDDIN SULYANG Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
91
 
ESMAEL AKMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
92
 
TOHAMI BAGUNDANG Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
93
 
ESMAEL MAMALANGKAS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
94
 
IDAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
95
 
JIMMY BALULAO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1202 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
26
96
 
GUINDATU MAMINTAL DULANG Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
97
 
NASRUDDIN IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
98
 
DONGDONG PIDTUKASAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
26
99
 
REX MOHIR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
27
00
 
MORI ALI USMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
27
01
 
TONG ABBAS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
27
02
 
BILAL ABDULLAH Male 19800702 0 Britain 0 Iraq Britain Middle East 
1203 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
27
03
 
SHEIKH AMAD AL-KUBAISI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
27
04
 
SABEEL AHMED Male 19810702 0 
Bangalore, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
27
05
 
KAFEEL AHMED Male 19800702 0 
Bangalore, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
27
06
 
MOHAMMED HANEEF Male 19800702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
27
07
 
MOHAMMED ASHA Male 19810702 0 0 0 Palestine Jordan Middle East 
A
g0
27
08
 
ADAM KHATIB Male 19870702 0 0 0 UK 
Richard Ford, 
"Converts and 
a young 
mother among 
accused," The 
Australian 
(Australia), 
August 23, 
2006. 
West Europe 
1204 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
27
09
 
COSSAR ALI Female 19830702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
28
00
 
MEHRAN HUSSAIN Male 0 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
28
01
 
MOHAMMED AL GHABRA Male 19800601 0 
Damascus, 
Syria 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
28
02
 
SADIQ SHEIKH Male 19760702 19780702 
Azamgarh 
district, 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
04
 
AMIR RAZA Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
05
 
ABU RASHID Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
06
 
AFZAL USMANI Male 19760702 0 
Azamgarh 
district, 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
1205 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
07
 
ARIF SHEIKH Male 19770702 0 
Azamgarh 
district, 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
08
 
MOHAMMED ZAKIR SHEIKH Male 19800702 0 
Azamgarh 
district, 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
09
 
MOHAMMED ANSAR SHEIKH Male 19770702 0 
Azamgarh 
district, 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
11
 
ROSHAN KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
12
 
AMEER RAZAQ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
13
 
ASIF RAZAQ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
14
 
ATIF AMEEN Male 19840702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1206 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
15
 
RIYAZ BHATKAL Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
16
 
ABDUS SUBHAN QURESHI Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
17
 
FAISAL SHAIKH Male 19740702 0 
Malegaon, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
18
 
MAULANA ABDUL HALIM Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
19
 
SAMEER SADIQ Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
20
 
MUFTI ABU BASHAR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
21
 
MOHAMMED SAIF Male 19860702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1207 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
22
 
MOHAMMED ZEESHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
23
 
SAQIB NISAR Male 19850702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
24
 
MOHAMMED SHAKEEL Male 19840702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
25
 
ZIA-UR-REHMAN Male 19860702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
26
 
MUJAHID SALIM Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
27
 
RASOOL KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
28
 
MAULANA NASEERUDIN NASIR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1208 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
29
 
ANAS AL KANDARI Male 0 0 0 0 Kuwait 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
30
 
ABDUL RAHMAN JABARAH Male 19800702 0 0 0 Kuwait Canada Middle East 
A
g0
28
31
 
AHMED SAHAGI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
32
 
ANWAR AL-AWLAKI Male 19720702 0 
New 
Mexico, 
USA 
0 USA Yemen North America 
A
g0
28
33
 
NASSER AL-AULAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
35
 
AHMED MUHAMMED DHAKANE Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
28
36
 
ADANI LNU Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
1209 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
37
 
MOHAMMED EREG Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
28
38
 
ABDRIZAK LNU Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
28
39
 
HASSAN YARE Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
28
40
 
ABDELLAH BENYAICH Male 0 0 Tangiers 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
28
41
 
AQEEL ABDUL-AZIZ AI'AQEEL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
42
 
SALEH ABDULLAH KAMEL Male 19410702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
43
 
OMAR ABDULLAH KAMEL Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1210 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
44
 
ADEL ABDUL JALIL BATTERJEE Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
45
 
SULAIMAN ABDULAZIZ AL-RAJHI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
46
 
SALEH ABDULAZAIA AL-RAJHI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
47
 
KHALID BIN MAHFOUZ Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
48
 
KALEDA BIN MAHFOUZ Female 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
49
 
YOUSSEF NADA Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
28
50
 
ALI GHALIB HIMMAT Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
1211 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
51
 
YOUSSEF AL-QARDAWI Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
52
 
ABDEL FATTAH ABU GHADDA Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
53
 
AHMED HUBER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
54
 
AHMED NASREDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
55
 
SOLIMAN AL-BUTHE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
56
 
PIROUZ SEDAGHATY Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
28
57
 
MARAT AVLARIGOV Male 0 0 0 0 Georgian 0 Central Asia 
1212 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
58
 
CHAMSOUDIN AVLARIGOV Male 0 0 0 0 Georgian 0 Central Asia 
A
g0
28
59
 
MUNIB ZAHARIGAC Male 0 0 0 0 Bosnia 0 East Europe 
A
g0
28
60
 
HAROUN ABED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
28
61
 
MUBARAK HAMED Male 0 0 Sudan 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
28
62
 
AHMED MUSTAFA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
63
 
KHALID AL-SUDANEE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
64
 
MARK DELI SILJANDER Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
1213 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
65
 
ABDEL AZIM EL-SIDDIG Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
28
66
 
RABIH HADDAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
67
 
KHALED SMAILI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
68
 
USAMA HAMDAN Male 19650702 0 
Gaza, 
Palestine 
0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
28
69
 
HAYTHAM MAGHAWRI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
70
 
MOHAMMED EL-MEZAIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
71
 
MOHAMMED IBRAHIM SULAIMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1214 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
72
 
JAFFAR AHMAD ABDULLAH MAKKI Male 19560702 0 Sudan 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
28
73
 
ABDUL AZIZ ABBAKAR MUHAMAD Male 19610702 0 Sudan 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
28
74
 
KHALID AHMAD JUMAH AL-SUDANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
28
75
 
IBRAHIM BUISIR Male 19620702 0 Libya 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
28
76
 
AHMED SANTOS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
77
 
ABU HAMZA ABU HAMID AL-LUZONI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
78
 
HANNAH SANTOS Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1215 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
79
 
NURUMIJA AMDAL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
80
 
MURSIDI BALAO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
81
 
ISMAEL IDIRIS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
82
 
MALIK MIMUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
83
 
ANNE ANOVER Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
84
 
BODOT ABDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1216 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
85
 
RUBEN OMAR LAVILLA Male 19721004 0 
Sitio Banga 
Maiti, 
Barangay 
Tranghawa
n, 
Lambunao, 
Iloilo 
Province, 
the 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
86
 
REDENDO CAIN DELLOSA Male 19720515 0 
Manila, 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
87
 
YUSUF LEDESMA Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
89
 
JAINAL ANTEL SALI, JR. Male 19650601 0 
Barangay 
Lanote, 
Bliss, 
Isabele, 
Basilan, the 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
90
 
MOHAMMAD BARRIENTOS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
91
 
ANGELO RAMIREZ TRINIDAD Male 19780320 0 
Gattaran, 
Cagayan 
Province, 
the 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1217 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
92
 
PIO ABOGNE DE VERA Male 19691219 0 
Bagac, 
Bagamanok
, 
Catanduane
s Province, 
the 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
93
 
FELICIANO SEMBORIO DELOS REYES, JR. Male 19631104 0 
Arco, 
Lamitan, 
Basilan 
Province, 
the 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
94
 
RICARDO PEREZ AYERAS Male 19730915 0 
Manila, 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
95
 
DINNO AMOR ROSALEJOS PAREJA Male 19810719 0 
Cebu City, 
Cebu 
Province, 
the 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
96
 
ISNILON HAPILON Male 19660318 19670310 
Bulanza, 
Lantawan, 
Basilan, the 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
97
 
RADULAN SAHIRON Male 19550702 0 
Kaunayan, 
Patikul, 
Jolo Island, 
the 
Philippines 
0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
28
98
 
CHHOTA SAJID Male 19890702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1218 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
28
99
 
RIYAZ ISMAIL SHAHBANDRI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
29
00
 
DR SHAHNAWAZ Male 0 0 
Azamgarh 
district, 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
01
 
ASADULLAH AKHTAR Male 0 0 
Azamgarh 
district, 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
02
 
RAHIL SHEIKH Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
03
 
AHAD SABET Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
29
04
 
FARUQ AL-TUNISI Male 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
29
05
 
FAISAL SHAHZAD Male 19800702 0 Pakistan 0 USA 0 North America 
1219 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
06
 
HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD Male 19790702 19810702 
Jandola, 
South 
Waziristan, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
07
 
HUMAM KHALIL ABU MULAL AL-BALAWI Male 19770702 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
29
08
 
ABDELRAZZAK Male 19700702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
29
09
 
MOSOUD ELBARA Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
29
10
 
ASIF CHUTO Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
11
 
MUFTI OBAID Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
12
 
MUHAMMAD ALI MEMON Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1220 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
13
 
ARIFA Female 19870702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
14
 
HABIBA Female 19850702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
15
 
JUMA NAMANGANI Male 19690702 0 
Namangan, 
Uzbekistan 
0 Uzbekistan 0 Central Asia 
A
g0
29
16
 
SHERALY AKBOTOEV Male 0 0 0 0 Uzbekistan 0 Central Asia 
A
g0
29
17
 
ABDUL QAHAR Male 19780702 0 0 0 Uzbekistan 0 Central Asia 
A
g0
29
18
 
HUSSAIN (IMU) Male 19900702 0 0 0 Tajikistan 0 Central Asia 
A
g0
29
19
 
MOHAMMED KHALID Male 19880702 0 0 0 Tajikistan 0 Central Asia 
1221 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
20
 
ABDUL AZIZ AL-GHAMDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
29
21
 
NURPASHI KULAYEV Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
29
22
 
IZNAUR KODZOYEV Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
29
23
 
MAGOMED AUSHEV Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
29
24
 
VLADIMIR KHODOV Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
29
25
 
KHANPASHI KULAYEV Male 0 0 
Engenoi, 
Nozhai-
Yurt district 
of 
Chechnya 
0 Chechnya 0 East Europe 
A
g0
29
26
 
ARSEN MERZHOYEV Male 0 0 
Engenoi, 
Nozhai-
Yurt district 
of 
Chechnya 
0 Chechnya 0 East Europe 
1222 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
27
 
MAIRBEK SHAIBEKKHANOV Male 0 0 
Engenoi, 
Nozhai-
Yurt district 
of 
Chechnya 
0 Chechnya 0 East Europe 
A
g0
29
28
 
ABU UMAR (LET) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
29
 
ABU QASIM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
30
 
SHAFAQAT IQBAL MIR Male 0 0 
Doda, 
Kashmir 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
31
 
SHABBIR AHMED Male 0 0 
Doda, 
Kashmir 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
32
 
DAWOOD IBRAHIM Male 19551226 0 
RATNAGI
RI, India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
33
 
ABDUL KARIM TUNDA Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1223 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
34
 
SAJID MIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
29
35
 
COLONEL R SADATULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
36
 
MAJOR GENERAL SAHAB Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
37
 
MOHD ALTAF Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
38
 
MOHD ABDU MATIN ABDUL BASIT Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
39
 
SHEIKH MOHD MUZZAMIL JAMIL AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
40
 
ZAHIR AHMED BASHIR AHMED SHAIKH Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1224 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
41
 
SAYED KHWAJA YUNUS KHWAJA AYUB Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
42
 
IRFAN REHMAN KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
43
 
MOHAMED HAMID (ENGLAND) Male 19580702 0 0 0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
29
44
 
KIBLEY DA COSTA Male 19830702 0 0 0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
29
45
 
MUHAMMAD AL-FIGARI Male 19640702 0 0 0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
29
46
 
KADAR AHMED Male 19870702 0 0 0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
29
47
 
MOUSSA BROWN Male 19660702 0 0 0 England 0 West Europe 
1225 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
48
 
SALOUM JOH Male 19850702 0 0 0 England 0 West Europe 
A
g0
29
49
 
SALEH AL QUUWAYE Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
29
50
 
ZAID AL AMER Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
29
51
 
EMAD ELMUBARAK Y ALI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
29
52
 
HASH MI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
29
53
 
MOHAMMAD ANEES Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
29
54
 
ABDUL KAREEM JASSIM BIDAWI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
1226 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
55
 
HALEEM JASSIM BIDAWI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
29
56
 
JAMAAL JALOUD Y HATO Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
29
57
 
IBRAHIM ABID Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
29
58
 
NAJIM NASSER Y TAHER Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
29
59
 
COMMANDER ROBOT Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
60
 
HECTOR JANJALANI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
61
 
JULISAM HARUM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1227 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
62
 
ABDUL MARAYIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
63
 
ABDULHAKIM EDRIS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
64
 
USTAJ AHMAN HALIFA Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
65
 
HUSIN SAMIL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
66
 
FAWAZ ZI AJJUR Male 19660702 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
29
67
 
ALBADER PARAD Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
69
 
JUL AKRAM HADJAIL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1228 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
70
 
ARULA ABUBAKAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
71
 
MUJIB SUSUKAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
72
 
BROTHER OF MUJIB SUSUKAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
73
 
LAKANDULA Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
74
 
BEN ISMI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
75
 
LANDASAN UMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
76
 
ITING AGA Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1229 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
77
 
HASHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
78
 
USTADZ UMBRA JUMDAIL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
79
 
MUHAMMAD AMIN AJIJON Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
80
 
COMMANDER GLOBAL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
81
 
ALTON LADJAALAM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
82
 
KEFFREY JINNUI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
83
 
AJID HALIK Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1230 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
84
 
HAMDA SAMAC Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
85
 
COMMANDER KOSOVO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
86
 
HAFTI DAIS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
87
 
SALIP ABDULLAH MASDAL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
88
 
MADHATTA HAIPE Male 19620702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
89
 
JATIB USMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
90
 
PULAH ALIH Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1231 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
91
 
FAIZAL MUTIA Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
92
 
ALDREN AMIL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
93
 
USTADZ SALIM TADO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
94
 
PULA  Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
95
 
NUR HASSAN JAMIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
96
 
REYNALDO APILADO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
97
 
HTIMIL HARON Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1232 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
29
98
 
ALLAN SABUDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
29
99
 
MUAMAR ASTALI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
00
 
ADONG SALAHUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
01
 
JEROME MUSTAKIM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
02
 
BURRONG RASUL BARRO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
03
 
MUJIBAR ALIH AMON Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
04
 
BASARUN AROK Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1233 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
05
 
JUMADAIL ARAD Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
06
 
KARIM JULDANI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
07
 
ALBASHIR ADJILI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
08
 
ROWENA AKSAN Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
09
 
NURSIMA ANNUDDEN Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
10
 
RABIA ASIRI Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
11
 
MARWINA SALASAIN Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1234 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
12
 
MADRIMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
13
 
MIDSFAR AKSAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
14
 
ALVIN BAGADI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
15
 
ALHASBY MISAYA Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
16
 
MUBIN SAKANDAL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
17
 
TING JUMDAEL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
18
 
MAGDAR JUMDAEL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1235 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
19
 
ARMINDA JUMDAEL Female 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
20
 
DARUL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
21
 
SALLAM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
22
 
JULMILLUN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
23
 
SADDAM PARAD Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
24
 
MUNIR ARBISON Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
25
 
COCOY TULAWIE Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1236 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
26
 
MOAMIL ASKALI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
27
 
JULHAN ALIHUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
28
 
SULAIMAN MUIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
29
 
HADJI NAHRIM AKMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
30
 
YASIR IGASAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
31
 
MARCIAL JABAROT Male 19780702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
32
 
NADZMIR AMIRUL Male 19900702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1237 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
33
 
JAITUN TIMUAL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
34
 
COMMANDER KIRRIH Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
35
 
TETENG MANDANGAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
36
 
JANATIN MADJAKIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
37
 
NURHASSAN JAMIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
38
 
COMMANDER TOTO SANTAWAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
39
 
HAJAL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1238 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
40
 
COMMANDER JAVIER Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
41
 
HAMSIRAJI MARUSI SALI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
42
 
ALDAM TILAO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
43
 
SHAMSUL BAHARI Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
44
 
AHMAD HASAN Male 19710702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
45
 
IWAN MUTHO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
46
 
MOHAMMAD CHOLILY Male 19770702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1239 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
47
 
DWI WIDYARTO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
48
 
ALIAS OSMAN Male 19660702 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
49
 
ANSORI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
30
50
 
ACHMAD BASIR Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
51
 
BUDI DARMAWAN Male 19810702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
52
 
TEDI SURYA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
30
53
 
AHMED MAAZ Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
1240 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
54
 
MUHAMMAD RAZI Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
55
 
AMIN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR) Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
56
 
AKHWAN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR) Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
57
 
FIRDOUS (JAMIA ABI BAKAR) Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
58
 
MOHAMMAD SYAIFUDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
59
 
ILHAM SOFYANDI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
60
 
FURQON ABDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1241 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
61
 
DAOUD (JAMIA ABI BAKAR) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
62
 
ANWAR (JAMIA ABI BAKAR) Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
63
 
MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN MOHAMED YUNOS Male 19820702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
64
 
ACHMAD KANDAI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
65
 
NATSIR/RISTAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
66
 
DATUK RAJO AMEH Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
67
 
BASIT USMAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1242 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
68
 
GUIDAY MUNTASIR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
69
 
RICO ABURVA Male 19750702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
70
 
IMAM LAMAI Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
71
 
ABDUL SAKIM SALI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
72
 
AL POZE Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
73
 
JOLING Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
74
 
ELMER AMBRAN Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1243 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
75
 
USTADZ USMAN COLANO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
76
 
JAYBE OFRASIO Male 19730702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
77
 
ROHMAT Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
30
78
 
ALI AL-KHUDAIR Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
30
79
 
AHMAD AL-KHALIDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
30
80
 
NASSER AL-FAHD Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
30
81
 
KAHLED JEHANI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1244 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
82
 
ZUBAYR AL-RIMI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
30
83
 
YOSIF SALIH FAHD ALA'YEERI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
30
84
 
ABDULLAH BIN IBRAHIM BIN ABDULLAH 
ALSHABRAMI 
Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
30
85
 
YUSUF ABDULLAH Male 19770702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
30
86
 
HILAL JABER EL ASSIR Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
30
87
 
AHMED ELMOULLA BILLAL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
30
89
 
JAMILUDDIN NASIR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1245 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
90
 
SADAQAT KHAN Male 0 0 
Azamgarh, 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
30
91
 
REHAN ALAM Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
30
92
 
MUSHARRAT HUSSAIN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
30
93
 
HUSRAT ALAM Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
30
94
 
SHAKIB AKHTAR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
30
95
 
ADIL HASSAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
30
96
 
MOHAMMED SABIR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1246 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
30
97
 
RAJENDRA VRAJLAL ANADKAT Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
30
98
 
SHEIKH OBAIDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
30
99
 
IDRIS MOHAMMAD ZAHID Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
00
 
ABDUL KAREEM MOOSA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
01
 
NOOR ABU ILAHI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
02
 
WALID JINNAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
03
 
MAHFOOZ ALAM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1247 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
04
 
DAWOOD ALI AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
05
 
EZAZ AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
06
 
JAMIR SHAYKH Male 0 0 
Mumbai, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
07
 
SOHAIL SHAYKH Male 19700702 0 Pune, India 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
08
 
TANVIR ANSARI Male 19750702 0 
Mumbai, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
09
 
ABED AWAD Male 0 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
31
10
 
FIROZ LATIF GHASWALA Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1248 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
11
 
MOHAMMED IQBAL (LET) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
12
 
MOHAMMED ALI CHHIPA Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
13
 
ASIF ABDUL KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
14
 
NOMAN SHEIKH Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
15
 
ABU HURERA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
16
 
RIZWAN DAWRE Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
17
 
MUZAMMIL SHAIKH Male 19830702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1249 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
18
 
EHTESHAM SIDDIQUI Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
19
 
FAIYAZ KAGZI Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
20
 
MOHAMMED NAVED Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
21
 
KAMALUDDIN ANSARI Male 19740702 0 Bihar, India 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
22
 
ABU UMAID Male 0 0 
Faisalabad, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
23
 
SALIM (LET) Male 0 0 
Lahore, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
24
 
MANISHA CHAVAN Female 19810702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1250 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
25
 
ZAMEER SHEIKH Male 19750702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
26
 
MIRZA HIMAYAT INAYAT BAIG Male 19810702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
27
 
LAL BABA MOHAMMED HUSSAIN FAREED Male 19830702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
28
 
MOHAMMAD AHMED ZARAR SIDDIBAPPA Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
29
 
MOHSIN CHAUDHARY Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
30
 
IKRAM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
31
 
ABOUSFIAN ABDELRAZIK Male 19620101 0 Sudan 0 Canada 0 North America 
1251 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
32
 
AHMED ABDI AW-MOHAMED Male 19770710 0 
Hargeysa, 
Somalia 
0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
31
33
 
AHMAD ROFIQ RIDHO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesian 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
34
 
JOKO TRI PRIYANTO Male 19720702 0 0 0 Indonesian 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
35
 
MUSTAGHFIRIN Male 19820702 0 0 0 Indonesian 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
36
 
SOLAHUDDIN Male 19760702 0 0 0 Indonesian 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
37
 
FADLI SADAMA Male 19830702 0 0 0 Indonesian 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
38
 
AYMAN AL-BALAWI Male 19730702 0 0 0 Palestine Jordan Middle East 
1252 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
39
 
MARUTO Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
40
 
SUSILO Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
41
 
PUTRI MUNAROH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
42
 
HAWIN MURTADLO Male 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
43
 
MOHAMMED AZAM GHAURI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
44
 
ABU ABDALLAH AL-SHAMI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
45
 
ABU NASIR AL-QAHTANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1253 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
46
 
MUHAMMAD AHMAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
31
47
 
ABDALLAH AL-SADIQ Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
31
48
 
KHALID AL-SHARIF Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
31
49
 
ABU-AL-MUNDHIR Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
31
50
 
SHAYKH MIFTAH AL-DUWWADI Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
31
51
 
ABD-AL-WAHAB QAYID IDRIS Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
31
52
 
MUSTAFA QANFID Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
1254 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
53
 
IBN AL-SHAYKH AL-LIBI Male 0 0 Libya 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
31
54
 
ABU LAITH AL-LIBI Male 19670702 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
31
55
 
UMBRA KATO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
56
 
SALIP ALOY ALSREE Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
57
 
LATIP JAMAT Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
58
 
NASSER MACABATO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
59
 
IMAM ABUBAKAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1255 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
60
 
WANING ABDUSALAM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
61
 
SAIDAMEN ALICK Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
62
 
ADZMIE Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
63
 
ABUNAWAS Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
64
 
ABDULRAHMAN MACAPAAR Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
65
 
PLATON BLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
66
 
KULE MAMAGONG Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1256 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
67
 
DAUD SARIP Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
68
 
BIZNAR SALAHUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
69
 
ATTI LINTUNGAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
70
 
ZAHIDE ABDUL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
71
 
USMAN AL MAJAD Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
72
 
KASANADEL PIGKAWALAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
73
 
USI AMPATUAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1257 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
74
 
NAYANG TIMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
75
 
DATUKALAN MONTOK SAMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
76
 
TUMALAO BUTUAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
77
 
MANAMPAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
78
 
TOLNI SALIK Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
79
 
KUMANDER NASER Male 19730702 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
80
 
BAY Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1258 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
81
 
AKA KEDIE Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
82
 
WAHAB UPAO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
83
 
MOHAMAD BAEHAQI Male 19820702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
84
 
ASNAN SAWAJAAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
85
 
ABRAHAM IBNO Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
86
 
ANSAR YUSOP Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
87
 
ABRAL ABDUSALAM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1259 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
88
 
GUINGONA SAMAL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
89
 
SMAWTIN BASILAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
90
 
EDGAR MALAYDAN Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
31
91
 
ARIF QADIR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
92
 
SHADAAB Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
93
 
SHEHZAAD Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
94
 
SALMAN AHMED Male 19890702 0 
Sanjarpur, 
India 
0 India 0 South Asia 
1260 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
31
95
 
ARIZ KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
96
 
MOHAMMAD KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
97
 
HAMID SHEIKH Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
98
 
SHAHRUKH Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
31
99
 
ABDUL SATTAR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
00
 
QAYAMUDDIN KAPADIA Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
01
 
IQBAL BHATKAL Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1261 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
32
02
 
SALEH MUHAMMAD AL-AOOFI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
32
03
 
ABDULAZIZ AL-MOQRIN Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
32
04
 
OMAR AHMED ABDULLAH ALI Male 19700702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
32
05
 
MIKAEL DAVUD Male 19710702 0 China 0 Norway China West Europe 
A
g0
32
06
 
DAVID JAKOBSEN Male 19790702 0 0 0 Uzbekistan 0 Central Asia 
A
g0
32
07
 
SHAWAN SADEK SAEED BUJAK BUJAK Male 19730702 0 
Kurdistan, 
Iraq 
0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
32
08
 
AHMAD/ISMAIL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1262 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
32
09
 
ABI PAMANAY Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
32
10
 
ABDULRAHMAN SAMUEL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
32
11
 
JOHER IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
32
12
 
MUJAHID IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
32
13
 
ABU TAHER Male 19640702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
14
 
ALSHEED ALLING ALBANI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
32
15
 
ABDUL BAKI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
1263 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
32
16
 
BARAHAMA SALI Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
32
71
 
SHEIK MIYAR HAMZA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
72
 
FARDOSA ABDULLAHI Female 19880702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
32
73
 
ASGHAR MUKADAM Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
74
 
SHAHNAWAZ QURESHI Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
75
 
SHOAIB GHANSAR Male 19690702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
76
 
ABDUL GANI TURK Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1264 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
32
77
 
YAKUB MEMON Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
78
 
ESSA MEMON Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
79
 
YUSUF MEMON Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
80
 
RUBINA MEMON Female 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
81
 
IBRAHIM (TIGER) MEMON Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
82
 
IMTIAZ GHAVTE Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
83
 
NASIM BARMARE Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1265 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
32
84
 
FAROOQ PAWLE Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
85
 
BASHIR KHAIRULLA Male 19660702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
86
 
ZAKIR HUSSAIN SHAIKH Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
87
 
FEROZ MALLIK Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
88
 
ABDUL AKHTAR KHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
89
 
DAWOOD MOHAMMAD PHANSE Male 19240702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
90
 
ANIS IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1266 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
32
91
 
NAIBUDDIN Male 19740702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
92
 
MOHAMMED SHARIF Male 19720702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
93
 
AYUB MEMON Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
94
 
ANEES MEMON Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
95
 
TANVIR SHEIKH Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
96
 
SANJAY KUMAR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
97
 
ABDUL JAVED Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
1267 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
32
98
 
ABU SALEM Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
32
99
 
IQBAL SHEIKH KASKAR Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
33
00
 
EZAZ PATHAN Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
33
01
 
ATUL KANITAL SHAH Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
33
02
 
ASHOK BHANSALI Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
33
03
 
AFTAB BATKI Male 0 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
33
04
 
ABU JINDAL Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1268 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
05
 
AHMED SIDDIQUI Male 0 0 0 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
33
06
 
SHAHAB DASHTI Male 0 0 0 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
33
07
 
RAMI MAKANESI Male 0 0 0 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
33
08
 
NAAMEN MEZICHE Male 0 0 0 0 France 0 West Europe 
A
g0
33
09
 
GAFUR JUMDAIL Male 0 0 0 0 Philippines 0 East Asia 
A
g0
33
10
 
NAIZ KHAN Male 19830702 0 Afghanistan 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
33
11
 
ABU MUHAMMAD HAMZA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1269 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
12
 
SALEM SAAD BIN SUWEID Male 19630702 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
33
13
 
YASIR FRIEHAT Male 19750702 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
14
 
MUHAMMAD DEMES Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
15
 
MUHAMMAD AMIN Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
16
 
ALI KHALED AL-JABOURI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
17
 
MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-SAMARAI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
18
 
UMAR BAZIYANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1270 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
19
 
MAHMOOD ABDEL AZIZ AL-HARAMI AL-
JANABI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
20
 
FADHIL AL-KURDI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
21
 
MARWAN HADID AL-SURI Male 19680702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
22
 
SAMI MUHAMMAD ALI SAID AL-JAAF Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
23
 
HASAM HAMAD ABDULLAH MUHSIN AL-
DULAIMI 
Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
24
 
HASSAN IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
25
 
ABU TALHA (IRAQ INSURGENCY) Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1271 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
26
 
SABHAN AHMAD RAMADAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
27
 
AZMI AL-JAYOUSI Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
28
 
MOHAMMED SHARKAWA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
29
 
KHAMIS FARHAN KHALAF ABD AL-FAHDAWI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
30
 
ABU AZZAM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
31
 
BILAL MAHMUD AWAD SHEBAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
32
 
ABU SUFIAN Male 19800702 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
1272 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
33
 
SERGEI MALYSCHEW Male 0 0 0 0 Belarous 0 East Europe 
A
g0
33
34
 
MUHAMMAD G Male 19690702 0 0 0 Ghana 0 West Africa 
A
g0
33
35
 
MUHAMMAD WASFI Male 19630702 0 
West Bank, 
Palestine 
0 Jordan Palestine Middle East 
A
g0
33
36
 
ABU MOHAMMED AL-MAQDISI Male 0 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
37
 
HUTHAIFA AZZAM Male 19710702 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
38
 
SHEIK HARITH AL-DARI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
39
 
ABDULLAH RASHID AL-BAGHDADI Male 0 0 
Baghdad, 
Iraq 
0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
1273 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
40
 
ABU ABDUL-RAHMAN AL-IRAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
41
 
ABU HAMZA AL-MUHAJER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
42
 
NASIR AL-WAHAYSHI Male 19780702 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
43
 
QASSEM AL-REMI Male 19770702 0 
Raima, 
Yemen 
0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
44
 
SAID AL-SHEHRI Male 19750702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
45
 
NASIR AL-BAHRI Male 19730702 0 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
46
 
MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-SIHLI Male 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
1274 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
47
 
ABDELRAHMAN AL-SIHLI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
48
 
ABDULLAH AL-SIHLI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
49
 
MUHAMMAD HAMID HUSSEIN Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
50
 
ALI HUSSEIN ALI AL-SHAMARI Male 0 0 
Anbar 
Province, 
Iraq 
0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
51
 
RAWAD JASSEM MOHAMMED ABED Male 19820702 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
52
 
SAFAA MOHAMMED ALI Male 19820702 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
53
 
SAJIDA MUBARAK ATROUS AL-RISHAWI Female 19700702 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
1275 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
54
 
MUBARAK ATROUS AL-RISHAWI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
55
 
NIDAL HASAN Male 0 0 0 0 USA 0 North America 
A
g0
33
56
 
AYED AL-SHABWANI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
58
 
SALEH AL-TEYS Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
59
 
IBRAHIM HASSAN AL-ASIRI Male 19820702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
60
 
ABDULLAH AL-ASIRI Male 19860702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
61
 
JABIR AL-FAYFI Male 19750702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1276 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
62
 
MIDHAT MURSI AL-SAYID UMAR Male 19530415 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
33
63
 
ABU MOHAMMED IBRAHIM BIN ABI AL-
FARAJ AL-MASRI 
Male 19530702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
33
64
 
ABD AL-WAHAB AL-MASRI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
33
65
 
ABU ISLAM AL-MASRI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
33
66
 
KHALID HABIB Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
33
67
 
MAHMOUD MAHDI ZEIDAN Male 19750702 0 0 0 Jordan 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
68
 
TAYIP RAUF Male 19840702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
1277 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
69
 
MATIUR REHMAN Male 19770702 0 
Had 
Rajgan, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
33
70
 
MAROOF RAUF Male 19870702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
33
71
 
TAHIR MASOOD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
72
 
KUSHMIR NESIRWAN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
73
 
ABDUL RAHIM AYUB Male 19630702 19640702 0 0 Indonesia Australia East Asia 
A
g0
33
74
 
ABDUL RAHMAN AYUB Male 19630702 19640702 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
33
75
 
RABIYAH HUTCHINSON Female 19530702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
1278 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
76
 
MUSTAFA HAMID Male 19450315 0 
Alexandria, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
33
77
 
AFIFA ROCHE Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
33
78
 
JOHN MUSA Male 0 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
33
79
 
AZMAN HASHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
33
80
 
JACK THOMAS Male 19740702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
33
81
 
MARYATI IDRIS Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
33
82
 
AISYAH BARAJA Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
1279 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
83
 
ZULFAH BASHIR Female 0 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
33
84
 
MOHAMMED AYUB Male 19870702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
33
85
 
ABDULLAH AYUB Male 19850702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
33
86
 
MUHAMMAD RAB'A AL-SA YID AL-BAHTIYTI Male 19710702 0 
  
 
Al-
Sharqiyyah, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
33
87
 
ALI SALEH HUSAIN Male 19700702 0 
al-
Hudaydah, 
Yemen 
0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
33
88
 
AHMED KHADR Male 19480301 0 Egypt 0 Egypt Canada North Africa 
A
g0
33
89
 
KHALID ABDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
1280 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
90
 
OMAR KHADR Male 19860919 0 
Toronto, 
Canada 
0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
33
91
 
ABDUL RAHMAN KHADR Male 19830702 0 0 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
33
92
 
RAHMAH CHIEKHO Female 19820702 0 
Sydney, 
Australia 
0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
33
93
 
KHALED CHIEKHO Male 19730702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
94
 
MAREK SAMULSKI Male 0 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
33
95
 
YOUNIS MOHAMMED IBRAHIM AL-HAYARI Male 0 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
33
96
 
SAUD AL-OTAIBI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1281 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
33
97
 
OMAR BALADJAM Male 19770702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
33
98
 
MOHAMED ALI ELOMAR Male 19650702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
33
99
 
MIRSAD MULAHALILOVIC Male 19760702 0 Bosnia 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
34
00
 
KHALED SHARROUF Male 19810702 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
34
01
 
MAZEN TOUMA Male 19800702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
02
 
MOUSTAFA CHEIKHO Male 19770702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
03
 
ABDUL RAKIB HASAN Male 19690702 0 Bangladesh 0 0 0 Unknown 
1282 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
04
 
ABDUL NACER BENBRIKA Male 19600702 0 Algeria 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
05
 
AHMED MEHRI Male 19850702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
06
 
EZZIT RAAD Male 19820702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
07
 
AIMEN JOUD Male 19840702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
08
 
FADAL SAYADI Male 19800702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
09
 
AMER JADDARA Male 19790702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
10
 
AHMED RAAD Male 19830702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
1283 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
11
 
SHANT KENT Male 19770702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
12
 
HANY TAHA Male 19740702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
13
 
MUSTAFA AYUB Male 19900702 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
14
 
AMINAH AYUB Female 0 0 0 0 Australia 0 Australia 
A
g0
34
15
 
UMNYA AL ZAWAHIRI Male 19510619 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
16
 
HEBA AL ZAWAHIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
17
 
MOHAMMED AL ZAWAHIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
1284 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
18
 
HUSSEIN AL ZAWAHIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
19
 
KAMAL HABIB Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
20
 
AZZA NOWAIR Female 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
21
 
ISAM AL-QAMARI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
22
 
KHALED ISLAMBOULI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
23
 
SAYYID IMAM Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
24
 
FATIMA AL ZAWAHIRI Female 19810702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
1285 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
25
 
NABILA AL ZAWAHIRI Female 19860702 0 
Peshawar, 
Pakistan 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
26
 
KHADIGA AL ZAWAHIRI Female 19870702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
27
 
UMAYMA AL ZAWAHIRI Female 19850702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
28
 
MOHAMMED BIN AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI Male 19880702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
29
 
AISHA AL ZAWAHIRI Female 19970702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
30
 
ISMAIL NASSIR Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
31
 
AHMAD SALAMA MABRUK Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
1286 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
32
 
MAHMUD HISHAM AL-HENNAWI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
33
 
AHMAD IBRAHIM AL-NAGAR Male 0 0 
Nahya 
Village, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
34
 
AHMED ISMAIL Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
35
 
SARWAT SHEHATA Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
36
 
ADEL ABDEL QODDUS Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
37
 
HASSAN ZEMIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
34
38
 
ABDEL-GHANI ALI JAWHAR Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
1287 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
39
 
TAREK MERHI Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
40
 
OSAMA AL-SHEHABI Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
41
 
MOHAMMED SHAWKI ISLAMBOULI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
42
 
ADNAN AL-SAYEGH Male 19820702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
43
 
OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL-GHAMDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
44
 
FAHD SALEH SULAIMAN AL-JATILI Male 19830702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
45
 
MOHAMMAD AL-DUKHI Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
1288 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
46
 
WAEL ABU JABER Male 0 0 0 0 Lebanon 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
47
 
RACHMAT PUJIPRABOWO Male 19750702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
34
48
 
USMAN BIN SEF Male 19650702 0 0 0 Indonesia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
34
49
 
SABTURANI Male 19630702 0 0 0 Malaysia 0 East Asia 
A
g0
34
50
 
KARIM KHADR Male 19880702 0 0 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
34
51
 
ABU OBAIDAH AL-MASRI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
52
 
MULLAH ABDUL RAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
1289 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
53
 
FAQIR MOHAMMAD Male 19700702 0 
Chopatra, 
Pakistan 
0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
54
 
ABDUR REHMAN (KARWAN-E-
NIAMATULLAH) 
Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
55
 
NIAMATULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
56
 
MAULVI OMAR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
57
 
FATEH MOHAMMAD Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
58
 
RAFIUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
59
 
ANWAR (TTP) Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1290 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
60
 
QARI ZIAUR REHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
61
 
WALI UR REHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
62
 
NEK MOHAMMED Male 19770702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
63
 
QARI HUSSEIN Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
64
 
AAZAM TARIQ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
65
 
REHMATULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
66
 
ABDULLAH MEHSUD Male 19750702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1291 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
67
 
SHAKIR ULLAH SHAKIR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
68
 
SHARQAWI ABDU ALI AL-HAJJ Male 19740702 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
69
 
MOHAMMAD OMAR ABDEL-RAHMAN Male 19730702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
70
 
AHMAD ABDEL-RAHMAN Male 19640702 19730702 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
71
 
ASSAD ABDEL RAHMAN Male 19720702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
72
 
ABD AL AZIZ AL-JAMAL Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
34
73
 
IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD SALIH AL-BANNA Male 19560702 0 
Shibin al-
Kawm, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
1292 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
74
 
ABD-AL-MUN'IM AL-BADAWI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
75
 
MAHMUD AL-DIB Male 0 0 
Kirdasah, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
76
 
KHALID BAKIR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
34
77
 
IBRAHIM KARIM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
34
78
 
HASAN ABADI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
34
79
 
KHALIL NUR-AL-DIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
34
80
 
YUSUF MUHAMMADAYN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1293 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
81
 
CHIEFTAIN DARDIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
82
 
MUHAMMAD UMAYR AL-AWLAQI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
83
 
ABDULLAH HAMAS AL FILISTINI Male 0 0 0 0 Palestine 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
84
 
ABU SULAYMAN JAZAIRI Male 0 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
85
 
ZAIN UL ABU QASIM Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
86
 
ABDULLAH AZZAM AL SAUDI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
34
87
 
ABU ZUBAIR AL MASRI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1294 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
88
 
ABDUR REHMAN WAZIR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
89
 
ZANJIR WAZIR Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
90
 
ABDUL SALAM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
91
 
ABU WAFA AL SAUDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
34
92
 
ABDUL KHALIQ HAQQANI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
34
93
 
ABU HARIS Male 0 0 0 0 Jordan Palestine Middle East 
A
g0
34
94
 
ABU HAMZA Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
1295 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
34
95
 
ABU JIHAD AL MASRI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
34
99
 
ABDUL RAUF NASSIB Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
00
 
MUHAMMAD SHARAF Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
01
 
MUS'AB SHARAF Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
02
 
QAED SALEM SUNIAN AL-HARTHI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
03
 
MUNIR AHMED ABDULLAH AL-SAUDA Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
04
 
SALEH HUSSEIN ALI AL-ZONO Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
1296 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
05
 
AOUSSAN AHMED AL-TIRIHI Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
06
 
ADEL NASSER AL-SAUDA Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
07
 
KAMAL DARWISH Male 0 0 0 0 USA Yemen North America 
A
g0
35
08
 
MUHAMMAD SHOAIB Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
09
 
MEHMOOH KHALIB Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
10
 
IMRAN CHEEMA Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
11
 
MAHROOF MIRZA Male 19700702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
1297 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
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Nationality) 
A
g0
35
12
 
AQEELUR REHMAN ABBASSI Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
13
 
MUHAMMAD TARIQ Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
14
 
QADEER MALIK Male 19760702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
15
 
ABDUL HAFEZ AHMED Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
16
 
MUHAMMAD AYUB ELAHI Male 19450702 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
17
 
ROSHAN JAMAL KHAN Male 19590702 0 0 0 India 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
18
 
NAZIMUDDIN ZALALOV Male 19720401 0 
Andijan 
region, 
Uzbekistan 
0 Uzbekistan 0 Central Asia 
1298 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
19
 
ABU AHMED AL-KUWAITI Male 0 0 Kuwait 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
20
 
HASSAN GHUL Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
21
 
MUHAMMAD ALI QASIM Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
22
 
JALALUDDIN HAQQANI Male 19430702 19420702 
Khost, 
Afghanistan 
0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
23
 
MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
24
 
MUHAMMAD HAQQANI Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
25
 
QARI ZAFAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1299 
 
ID
 N
o.
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Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
26
 
MUHAMMAD BEG Male 0 0 0 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
27
 
MULLAH ABDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
28
 
SIRAJUDDIN HAQQANI Male 19770702 19780702 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
30
 
SALAHUDDIN Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
31
 
FAROUQ Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
32
 
NASIRUDDIN HAQQANI Male 19720702 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
33
 
KHALIL AL-RAHMAN HAQQANI Male 19660101 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
1300 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
34
 
SAID JAN 'ABD AL-SALAM Male 19810205 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
35
 
HOMAYOUN Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
36
 
BADRUDDIN HAQQANI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
37
 
ABDULLAH FARHAD Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
38
 
DARIM SEDGAI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
39
 
COL. IMAM Male 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
40
 
ABU TAYEB Male 0 0 0 0 Afganistan 0 South Asia 
1301 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
41
 
MR. C Male 0 0 0 0 Afganistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
42
 
HASSAN ALMREI Male 19740702 0 Syria 0 Syria 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
43
 
NABIL ALMARABH Male 19670702 0 0 0 Kuwait Syria Middle East 
A
g0
35
44
 
AHMED AL KAYSEE Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
45
 
MAHMOUD JABALLAH Male 19620702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
46
 
THIRWAT SHEHATA Male 19600629 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
47
 
MOHAMAD ZEKI MAHJOUB Male 19600702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
1302 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
48
 
ESSAM MOHAMED HAFEZ MARZOUK Male 19680702 0 0 0 Canada Egypt North America 
A
g0
35
49
 
HANI YUSEF AL SEBAI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
50
 
IBRAHIM ALLAM Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
51
 
ABU YASSER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
52
 
MUSTAFA MOHAMED KRER Male 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
53
 
HASSAN FARHAT Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
54
 
MOHAMED HARKAT Male 19680702 0 0 0 Algeria 0 North Africa 
1303 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
55
 
PACHA WAZIR Male 0 0 0 0 UAE 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
56
 
ABU MESSAB ALSHEHRE Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
57
 
KAMEL AGIZA Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
58
 
IHAB SAQR Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
59
 
SAEED RASOUL SOBRAHATOLLAH 
MUHAMMAD 
Male 19740702 0 0 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
35
60
 
MASOUD RASOUL Male 0 0 0 0 Canada 0 North America 
A
g0
35
61
 
AL-MUGHIRA AL GAZA'IRI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
1304 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
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Nationality) 
A
g0
35
62
 
GHARIB Male 0 0 0 0 Somalia 0 East Africa 
A
g0
35
63
 
SHAHWALI Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
64
 
DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV Male 0 0 0 0 Chechnya 0 East Europe 
A
g0
35
65
 
GHAIRAT BAHEER Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
66
 
AMANULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Afghanistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
35
67
 
NOOR MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
35
68
 
MUSTAFA HAMZA Male 19570702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
1305 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
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Nationality) 
A
g0
35
69
 
METHAT AHMED ABDELRAHMAN Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
70
 
MOHSIN GHALAIN Male 19810702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
71
 
MOHAMMED KAMEL MOSTAFA Male 19820702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
72
 
ABU HASSAN Male 0 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
35
73
 
AHMED ABDEL SATTAR Male 19590702 0 Egypt 0 USA Egypt North America 
A
g0
35
74
 
SHEIK SALAH HASHIM Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
75
 
SOFID HASSAN ADDULKANI AZIK Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
1306 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
76
 
AL-ARAB TSADIK HASSIN MOHAMMED Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
77
 
ABDULKERIM ALNAZI ABDLURAZI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
78
 
SHERIF ABDEL-RAHMAN TEWFIK EL-
MADANI 
Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
79
 
HUSSEIN AHMED SHAHAF ALI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
80
 
EZET YASSIN Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
81
 
HAMZA MUSTAFA KAMEL Male 19870702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
82
 
MOHAMED CHIADMI Male 0 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
1307 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
83
 
ABDUL CHIADMI Male 0 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
84
 
KHALID JEBARI Male 0 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
85
 
MALIK NASSAR HARHRA Male 0 0 
Birmingha
m, England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
86
 
SHAHID BUTT Male 19660702 0 
Birmingha
m, England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
87
 
SARMAD AHMED Male 19780702 0 
Birmingha
m, England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
88
 
GHULAM HUSSEIN Male 19750702 0 
Luton, 
England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
89
 
SHAZ NABI Male 19800702 0 
Birmingha
m, England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
1308 
 
ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
90
 
AYAD HUSSEIN Male 19760702 0 
Birmingha
m, England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
91
 
YASSER MOSTAFA KAMEL Male 19910702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
35
92
 
MUAMIN ALI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
93
 
KARIM ABDULLAH Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
94
 
MAJAD MAHMOUD Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
95
 
SULEIMAN FLAIFIL Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
96
 
MUHAMMAD FLAIFIL Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
35
97
 
MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH RIBA'A Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
98
 
MUHAMMAD GAYEZ SABAH Male 0 0 
Arish, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
35
99
 
NASSER KHAMIS AL-MALLAHI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
00
 
KHALED MUSSAED Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
01
 
YOUNIS ELIAN ABU JARIR Male 0 0 
Arish, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
02
 
OSAMA ABDEL-GHANI AL-NAKHLAWI Male 19830702 0 
Arish, 
Egypt 
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
03
 
IYAD AL-FALESTINI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
04
 
SALEM SHANOUB Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
05
 
MOHAMMED ABDALLAH ELIAN Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
06
 
HASSAN AL-ARAYSHI Male 1980702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
07
 
TALEB MURTADA Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
08
 
ARAFAT OUDA ALI Male 19780702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
09
 
AHMED MOHAMMED AL-KOREIMI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
10
 
MOHAMMED ABDELAZIZ NAFEI Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
11
 
ATALLAH AL-KORM Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
12
 
YUSRI MOHAREB  Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
13
 
AYMAN MOHAREB Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
14
 
TAMER NUSSEIRAT Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
15
 
HASSAN RAFAAT AHMED BASHANDI Male 19870702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
16
 
MOHAMED SOBHI ALI JIDAN Male 19810702 0 
Qalioubia 
Province, 
Egypt  
0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
17
 
GAMAL SOBHI ALI JIDAN Male 19780702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
18
 
AKRAM MOHAMMED FAWZI Male 19700702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
19
 
TAREK AHMED AL-SAYED Male 19710702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
20
 
REDA SAYED AHMED Male 19860702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
21
 
ASHRAF SAIED YOUSSEF Male 19780702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
22
 
EHAB YOUSRI YASSIN Male 19810702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
23
 
GAMAL AHMED ABDEL AAL Male 19700702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
24
 
ASHRAF SAEED YOUSSEF Male 19780702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
25
 
NEGAT YASSIN Female 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
26
 
IMAN IBRAHIM KHAMIS Female 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
27
 
MOHAMMED YOUSRI YASSIN Male 19880702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
28
 
SABER FARHAT ABU EL-ELA Male 19650702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
29
 
MAHMOUD ABI EL-ELA Male 0 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
30
 
MOHAMED SALEM ABDEL-NABI Male 19690702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
31
 
ISMAIL ABDALLAH Male 19670702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
32
 
HAFEZ ABDEL HAKIM Male 19640702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
33
 
TAHA YEHIA SAYYED Male 19710702 0 0 0 Egypt 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
34
 
GURUKANTH DESAI Male 19820702 0 
Cardiff, 
Wales 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
35
 
OMAR SHARIF LATIF Male 19840702 0 
Cardiff, 
Wales 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
36
 
ABDUL MALIK MIAH Male 19860702 0 
Cardiff, 
Wales 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
37
 
MOHAMMED MOKSUDUR RAHMAN 
CHOWDHURY 
Male 19900702 0 
London, 
England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
38
 
SHAH MOHAMMED LUTFAR RAHMAN Male 19820702 0 
London, 
England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
39
 
NAZAM HUSSAIN Male 19850702 0 
Stoke, 
England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
40
 
USMAN KHAN Male 19910702 0 
Stoke, 
England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
41
 
MOHIBUR RAHMAN Male 19840702 0 
Stoke, 
England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
42
 
ABUL BOSHER MOHAMMED SHAHJAHAN Male 19840702 0 
Stoke, 
England 
0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
43
 
TAIMOUR ABDULWAHAB AL-ABDALY Male 19820702 0 
Baghdad, 
Iraq 
0 Sweden 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
44
 
EZEDDEN AL KHALEDI Male 19810702 0 0 0 Kuwait 0 Middle East 
A
g0
36
45
 
ABU OMAR AL-BAGHDADI Male 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
46
 
MONA AL-ABDALY Female 0 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
47
 
MUHARIB ABDUL LATIF AL-JUBOURI Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
36
48
 
ABU NIZAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
36
49
 
HASNA ALI YEHYE HUSSAIN Female 19690702 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
A
g0
36
50
 
WATHI AL-JASSEM Female 19610702 0 0 0 Iraq 0 Middle East 
A
g0
36
51
 
ABRAR SAEED AHMED Male 0 0 Kuwait 0 Pakistan 0 South Asia 
A
g0
36
52
 
ABU UNAYS AL SAUDI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
53
 
MOHAMED ELLIAS S/O MOHAMED KHAN Male 19730702 0 0 0 Singapore 0 East Asia 
A
g0
36
54
 
CHRISTIAN GANCZARSKI Male 19650702 0 Poland 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
55
 
WALID NOUAR Male 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
56
 
NIZAR NOUAR Male 19780702 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
57
 
BELGACEM NOUAR Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown 
A
g0
36
58
 
ASIF MOHAMMED HANIF Male 19820702 0 0 0 UK 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
59
 
FRITZ MARTIN GELOWICZ Male 19790901 0 
Munich, 
Germany 
0 Germany 0 West Europe 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
60
 
KARIM MEHDI Male 19690702 0 0 0 Morocco 0 North Africa 
A
g0
36
61
 
TOLGA D. Male 0 0 0 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
62
 
DANIEL MARTIN SCHNEIDER Male 19850702 0 0 0 Germany 0 West Europe 
A
g0
36
63
 
ADEM YILMAZ Male 19780702 0 Turkey 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
36
64
 
ATTILA SELEK Male 19860702 0 0 0 Turkey 0 Middle East 
A
g0
36
65
 
BILAL BIN MARWAN Male 19470702 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
36
66
 
SALIM AHMED HAMDAN Male 19700702 0 0 0 Yemen 0 Middle East 
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ID
 N
o.
 
PRIMARY NAME Gender DOB Alt. DOB POB Alt. POB 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Alt. 
Citizenship/ 
Nationality 
Region  
(Derived from 
Nationality) 
A
g0
36
67
 
YOUSUF AL-SHAHRI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
36
68
 
RAYED ABDULLAHI AL-HARBI Male 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 Middle East 
A
g0
36
69
 
YOUNIS AL-MAURITANI Male 0 0 Mauritania 0 0 0 North Africa 
1320 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E: EVENT ATTRIBUTES 
 
 
Note on Interpretation: With the exception of the variables listing the date of events, the number of victims killed in completed 
attacks, the number of individuals injured in completed attacks, and the number of functional interactions recorded for each event, the 
attributes listed in this appendix are all coded as binary dummy variables.  Per standard coding practice, values of ―1‖ indicate the 
presence of a condition, and values of ―0‖ indicate the absence of a condition.  Attribute titles are self-explanatory, and thematically 
related variables have been grouped and color coded.  Events are ordered by date of occurrence.  As with the agent attributes, space 
considerations preclude a full recounting of the thousands of sources used to derive this information; however, a reasonable 
approximation of the sourcing underlying the attribute data on events can be derived from Appendix H. 
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Table 10.5 Event Attributes 
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Traini
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Iran 
X
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
44
1 Traini
ng in 
Leba
non 
X
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
45
4 Traini
ng in 
Philip
pines 
X
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
48
2 
Failur
e to 
Join 
Talib
an or 
AQ 
X
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
52
5 Traini
ng in 
Saudi 
Arabi
a 
X
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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8 Traini
ng in 
Mala
ysia 
X
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
65
2 
Traini
ng in 
New 
South 
Wale
s 
X
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
74
3 Traini
ng in 
Yeme
n 
X
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
84
7 Traini
ng in 
Palest
ine 
X
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
45
2 
1998 
- ???? 
Confl
ict in 
Sula
wesi 
X
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
 
E
vt
01
47
3 Israel
/Pales
tine 
Confl
ict 
X
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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3 Trave
l to 
Bangl
adesh 
X
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
51
9 Trave
l to 
Mace
donia 
X
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
06
8 
Arres
t |  |  X
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
62
0 Traini
ng in 
Suda
n 
X
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
74
5 Lived 
in 
Britai
n 
#N
/A
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
75
3 Lived 
in 
Lond
on 
#N
/A
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Lived 
in 
San 
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Neigh
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od of 
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d 
#N
/A
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
83
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Move 
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Spain #
N
/A
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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vt
00
83
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Move 
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Spain #
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83
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Move 
to 
Spain #
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/A
 
E
vt
00
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Bomb
ing of 
Hind
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Temp
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(Date 
Unkn
own) 
#N
/A
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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4 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
U.S. 
Emba
ssy in 
Jakart
a 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
35
2 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
U.S. 
Nucle
ar 
Plants 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
35
4 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Kissi
nger-
owne
d Oil 
Comp
any 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
46
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Smug
gling/
Hidin
g of 
Bali 
Bomb
ers 
20
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
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4 
2006-
2007 
Attac
ks on 
Int'l 
Peace
keepe
rs in 
Soma
lia 
20
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
00
81
5 Move 
to 
Kuwa
it 19
62
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
67
6 
Death 
| 
Egypt 
| 
1966
0829 
19
66
08
29
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
39
3 
Arriv
es in 
Lond
on | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
1974 
19
74
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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1 
1975 
Faile
d 
Insurr
ection 
Again
st 
Afgh
an-
Com
munis
t 
Gov't 
19
75
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
83
7 
Move 
back 
to US 19
78
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
67
6 
Arres
t | 
Indon
esia | 
1978
1119 
19
78
11
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
37
5 
Arriv
al in 
U.K. | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
7/197
9 
19
79
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
88
5 
Death 
| 
Keny
a | 
1980
0702 
19
80
07
02
 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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5 Immi
grates 
to 
U.S. 19
80
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
05
1 
1979-
1989 
Sovie
t-
Afgh
an 
War 
19
80
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86
 
E
vt
00
00
3 
1981 
Fatwa 
on 
Sadat 
Assas
sinati
on 
19
81
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
38
8 
Arriv
al in 
US | 
New 
Jerse
y | 
1981 
19
81
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
61
2 
Arres
t | 
Egypt 
| 
1981
0702 
19
81
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
05
5 Retur
n to 
Kuwa
it 19
81
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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1981 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Anwa
r 
Sadat 
19
81
10
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
92
1 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Indon
esia | 
1982
0702 
19
82
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
07
0 
Retur
n to 
US as 
Flight 
Instru
ctor 
19
82
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
37
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Arriv
al in 
U.S. | 
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klyn, 
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07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
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E
vt
00
39
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Arriv
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1983 
19
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07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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1 Immi
grate 
to 
Spain 19
83
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
82
5 Move 
to 
Pakist
an 19
83
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
42
4 
1983 
Attac
k on 
Rajne
esh-
owne
d 
Hotel 
19
83
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
88
6 
1983 
Murd
er of 
Detro
it 
Imam 
19
83
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
61
3 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Egypt 
| 
1984
0702 
19
84
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
1331 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
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47
4 
1984 
Bomb
ing of 
Hare 
Krish
na 
Temp
les 
(Phill
y) 
19
84
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
47
5 
1984 
Bomb
ing of 
Hare 
Krish
na 
Temp
les 
(Den
ver) 
19
84
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
54
9 1984 
Custo
dy 
Kidna
pping 
19
84
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
06
6 
1984 
Bomb
ings 
in 
Prote
st of 
Suhar
to 
Regi
me 
19
84
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
36
7 
Arriv
al in 
Mala
ysia | 
Johor
, 
Mala
ysia | 
1985 
19
85
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
36
8 
Arriv
al in 
Mala
ysia | 
Johor
, 
Mala
ysia | 
1985 
19
85
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
37
8 
Arriv
al in 
U.S. | 
New 
Jerse
y | 
1985 
19
85
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
39
2 
Arriv
ed in 
Spain 
| 
Spain 
| 1985 
19
85
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
36
6 
Arriv
al in 
Mala
ysia | 
Mala
ysia | 
1985 
19
85
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
38
9 
Arriv
ed in 
Afgh
anista
n | 
Afgh
anista
n | 
1985 
19
85
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
25
0 
Arres
t 
(Juve
nile 
Deten
tion) | 
Chica
go, IL 
| 
1985
0702 
19
85
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
38
7 
Arriv
al in 
US | 
NYC 
| 
9/198
5 
19
85
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
76
6 1985 
Hajj 
Pilgri
mage 19
85
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
38
2 
Arriv
al in 
U.S. | 
Broo
klyn, 
NY | 
1986 
19
86
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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E
vt
02
54
8 
Deten
tion 
for 
Sexua
l 
Assau
lt | 
Jorda
n | 
1986
0702? 
19
86
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
84
3 Move
d to 
Broo
klyn 19
86
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
84
8 Move
d to 
Britai
n 19
86
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
45
3 Bayat 
to 
Sung
kar 19
86
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
73
4 
Left 
NC 
19
86
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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ra
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E
vt
00
35
7 
Arriv
al in 
Austr
alia | 
Sydn
ey, 
Austr
alia | 
1987 
19
87
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
74
4 Lived 
in 
Britai
n 19
87
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
77
4 
Death 
| 
Texas 
| 
1988
0529 
19
88
05
29
 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
35
6 
Arriv
al in 
Austr
alia | 
Austr
alia | 
1988 
19
88
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
37
7 
Arriv
al in 
U.S. | 
Jerse
y 
City, 
NJ | 
1988 
19
88
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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ra
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E
vt
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61
9 1988 
Exile 
to 
Mala
ysia 
19
88
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
78
3 
1988 
State
ments 
Again
st 
Sadda
m 
Husse
in 
19
88
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
54
9 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion 
for 
Sexua
l 
Assau
lt | 
Jorda
n | 
1988
0702? 
19
88
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
92
7 
1988 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Gorb
achev 
19
88
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
97
1 
1988 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Hind
u 
Temp
les of 
Boro
bodur 
19
88
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
75
6 Lived 
in 
Philip
pines 19
88
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
71
9 Leave
s 
Afgh
anista
n 
19
89
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
77
5 
Death 
| 
Jalala
bad, 
Afgh
anista
n | 
1989
0215 
19
89
02
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
77
6 Death 
| Iran 
| 
1989
0603 
19
89
06
03
 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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nt
er
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E
vt
00
60
0 
Depo
sed--
Natio
nal 
Islam
ic 
Front 
Assu
mes 
Powe
r 
19
89
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
30
0 
1989 
Weap
ons 
Traini
ng in 
Long 
Island 
19
89
07
01
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
38
3 
Arriv
al in 
U.S. | 
Wichi
ta, 
Kans
as | 
1989 
19
89
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
89
0 
1989 
Murd
er of 
Imam 
Imad 
Rashi
d 
Khali
fa 
19
89
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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E
vt
00
45
4 
Bega
n 
Acqui
ring 
Prope
rty 
for 
UBL 
in 
Suda
n 
19
89
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
84
5 Move
d to 
Corsi
ca 19
89
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
82
8 
Move 
to 
Qatar 19
89
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
83
6 
Move 
to 
UAE 19
89
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
06
1 Retur
n to 
Saudi 
Arabi
a 
19
89
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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24
6 
Went 
to 
Mira
m 
Shah 
City 
19
89
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
09
2 Spent 
time 
in 
Chak
ary 
19
89
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
77
7 
Death 
| 
Af/Pa
k 
Borde
r | 
1989
1124 
19
89
11
24
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
47
3 
1990 
Bomb
ing of 
Gren
wich 
Villa
ge 
Gay 
Bar 
19
90
04
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
37
6 Arriv
al in 
U.S. | 
? | 
1990 
19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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Azma
rai 
Wedd
ing 
19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
26
3 
1990 
Murd
er of 
Egypt
ian 
Parlia
ment 
Speak
er 
Rifaat 
al-
Mahg
oub 
19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
00
3 
1990 
Rebel
lion 
for 
Toure
g 
Reco
gnitio
n 
19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
91
8 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion 
(Juve
nile 
Deten
tion) | 
Chica
go, IL 
| 
1990
0702 
19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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8 Lived 
in 
Saudi 
Arabi
a 
19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
85
2 
Move
d to 
Milan 19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
06
8 
Retur
n to 
U.S. 19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
81
2 
Move 
to 
Dar 
es 
Salaa
m 
19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
81
9 Move 
to 
Mala
ysia 19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
82
6 Move 
to 
Pesha
war 19
90
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
89
5 
1990 
Murd
er of 
Rabbi 
Meye
r 
Kaha
ne 
19
90
11
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
89
7 
1991 
Murd
er of 
Must
afa 
Shala
bi 
19
91
03
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
77
8 
Death 
| 
Broo
klyn, 
NY | 
1991
0301 
19
91
03
01
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
42
1 Revo
cation 
of 
Passp
ort 
19
91
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
66
2 1991 
Hajj 
Pilgri
mage 19
91
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
36
4 
Arriv
al in 
Dalla
s | 
Dalla
s, TX 
| 1991 
19
91
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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E
vt
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2 
Bayat 
to 
UBL 19
91
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
99
4 1991 
Prote
st in 
Jorda
n 
19
91
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
66
9 
1991 
Hijac
king 
of 
Passe
nger 
Jet 
19
91
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
39
1 
Arriv
ed in 
Afgh
anista
n | 
Afgh
anista
n | 
1991 
19
91
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
25
2 
Arres
t 
(Firea
rms 
Charg
e) | 
Brow
ard 
Count
y, FL 
| 
1991
0702 
19
91
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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/A
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3 Arriv
al in 
Engla
nd 19
92
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
87
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92
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
23
3 Visit 
to 
Russi
a 19
92
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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to 
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8 1992-
1995 
Bosni
an 
Jihad 
19
92
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39
 
E
vt
01
15
5 Traini
ng in 
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an 19
92
07
02
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
92
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Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion 
(Firea
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Charg
e) | 
Brow
ard 
Count
y, FL 
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92
08
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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6 Trip 
to 
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Arres
t | 
JFK 
Airpo
rt, 
New 
York 
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9/1/1
992 
19
92
09
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
38
1 
Arriv
al in 
U.S. | 
Jerse
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City, 
NJ | 
9/1/1
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19
92
09
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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5 Trip 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Traini
ng in 
NYC 
Area 
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0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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00
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15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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/A
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1992 
Com
muna
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Riots 
in 
Bomb
ay 
19
92
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15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
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5 
1993 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Nuns 
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ter 
and 
Fatim
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Uriba
ren 
19
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01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
 
E
vt
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8 Trip 
to 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
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3 
1993 
Parim
ilitary 
Traini
ng in 
NYC 
Area 
19
93
02
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0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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E
vt
00
43
8 
1993 
Dinne
r at 
UBL'
s to 
Celeb
rate 
Acqui
sition 
of 
Aircr
aft 
19
93
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
00
8 
1993 
Worl
d 
Trade 
Cente
r 
Bomb
ings 
19
93
02
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 
10
00
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
 
E
vt
00
61
5 1993 
Escap
e to 
Pakist
an 
19
93
02
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
49
7 
1993 
Bomb
ing of 
Zamb
oanga 
Int'l 
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rt 
19
93
02
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
18
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Arres
t | 
Jerse
y 
City, 
NJ | 
3/4/1
993 
19
93
03
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Arres
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Broo
klyn, 
NY | 
3/5/1
993 
19
93
03
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
64
5 
Fled 
U.S. 
19
93
03
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
25
4 
Arres
t | 
Mapl
ewoo
d, NJ 
| 
3/10/
1993 
19
93
03
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
28
1 1993 
Bomb
ay 
Bomb
ings 
19
93
03
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25
7 
71
3 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
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1993 
Grena
de 
Attac
k on 
Mahi
m 
Fishe
rman'
s 
Colon
y 
(1993 
Bomb
ay 
Attac
ks) 
19
93
03
12
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
02
28
2 
1993 
Plaza 
Theat
er 
Bomb
ing 
(1993 
Bomb
ay 
Attac
ks) 
19
93
03
12
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
36
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
28
4 
1993 
Worli 
Bomb
ing 
(1993 
Bomb
ay 
Attac
ks) 
19
93
03
12
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11
3 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
28
3 
1993 
Bomb
ing of 
of 
Zaver
i 
Bazaa
r 
(1993 
Bomb
ay 
Attac
ks) 
19
93
03
12
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
 
57
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
28
8 
1993 
Bomb
ing of 
Luck
y 
Petrol 
Pump 
(1993 
Bomb
ay 
Attac
ks) 
19
93
03
12
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
 
38
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
14
1 
Arres
t | 
Egypt 
| 
3/12/
1993 
19
93
03
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
28
6 
1993 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Dhanj
i St. 
(1993 
Bomb
ay 
Attac
ks) 
19
93
03
12
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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N
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er
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tio
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E
vt
02
28
7 
1993 
Grena
de 
Attac
k on 
Shar 
Airpo
rt 
(1993 
Bomb
ay 
Attac
ks) 
19
93
03
12
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
76
0 Lived 
in 
Sydn
ey 19
93
03
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
27
8 
Arres
t | 
Newa
rk, NJ 
| 
3/25/
1993 
19
93
03
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
73
2 
Left 
McNi
mr 
Street 
Offic
es 
19
93
06
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
18
1 
Arres
t | 
Jerse
y 
City, 
NJ | 
6/24/
1993 
19
93
06
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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Plot 
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to 
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Plot 
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19
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l to 
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18
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t | 
Jerse
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City, 
NJ | 
7/199
3 
19
93
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
34
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Arres
t | 
Wild
wood
, NJ | 
3417
2 
19
93
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
05
0 
Accid
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Deton
ation 
of 
Bomb 
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93
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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NYC 
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8/3/1
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93
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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Suici
de 
Attac
k on 
Egypt
's 
Interi
or 
Minis
ter 
(Faile
d 
Assas
sinati
on) 
19
93
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
05
7 
1993 
Airlin
e 
Hijac
king 
in 
Germ
any 
19
93
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
84
9 Move
d to 
Keny
a 19
93
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
85
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Shoot
ing at 
Cairo'
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Semir
amis 
Inter-
Conti
nental 
Hotel 
19
93
10
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Arres
t | 
Cairo
, 
Egypt 
| 
1993
1026 
19
93
10
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
10
2 
1993 
Suici
de 
Atte
mpt 
While 
in 
Custo
dy 
19
93
11
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
54
4 
Crash
ed 
UBL'
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Plane 
Durin
g 
Test 
Flight 
19
93
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
76
8 Livin
g in 
Nairo
bi 19
93
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
84
4 Move
d to 
Cairo
, 
Egypt 
19
93
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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vt
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17
8 Trave
l to 
Khart
oum 19
93
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
09
8 
1993 
Bomb
ing of 
Train
s in 
Mum
bai 
19
93
12
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
65
8 
1993 
Grena
de 
Attac
k on 
Roma
n 
Catho
lic 
Churc
h 
19
93
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
 
14
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
06
0 Retur
n to 
Nairo
bi 19
93
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
18
4 Trave
l to 
Nairo
bi 19
93
12
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
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1 
1994 
Atte
mpt 
to 
obtai
n 
South 
Afric
an 
Urani
um 
19
94
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
00
97
2 
1994 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Israel
i 
Emba
ssy in 
Bang
kok 
19
94
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
82
1 Move 
to 
Nairo
bi 19
94
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
26
7 
1994 
Kidna
pping 
of Fr. 
Cirilo 
Naca
dora 
19
94
06
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
73
0 Left 
Lond
on 
Offic
es 
19
94
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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Arres
t | 
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E
vt
01
12
1 
1994 
Theft 
of 
$110,
000 
of 
AQ 
Funds 
19
94
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
39
1 Yeme
ni 
Civil 
War 19
94
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
42
2 
Finan
cial 
Asset
s 
Froze
n By 
Saudi 
Gov't 
19
94
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
43
1 Arriv
ed in 
Afgh
anista
n 
19
94
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1371 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
75
5 
Exec
ution 
| 
Khart
oum, 
Suda
n | 
1994
0702 
19
94
07
02
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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6 
1994 
Kidna
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of Fr. 
Clare
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94
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
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2 
1994 
Killin
g of 
Frenc
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Natio
nals 
in 
Algie
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19
94
08
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Death 
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Philip
pines 
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94
08
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0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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vt
02
26
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94
08
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
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0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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00
73
7 Left 
Soma
lia for 
Keny
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19
94
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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9 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Nairo
bi, 
Keny
a | 
1994
1015 
19
94
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
93
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Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Presi
dent 
Clint
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19
94
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
00
27
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Arres
t | 
Nairo
bi, 
Keny
a | 
late 
1994 
19
94
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
69
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Kidna
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of 
Amer
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Brito
ns in 
India 
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94
11
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
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n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
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1994 
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U.S. 
Cargo 
Plane
s 
19
94
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
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02
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Car-
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ing of 
Egypt
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Prime 
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(Faile
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sinati
on) 
19
94
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 
21
 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
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1994 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Land 
Surve
yors 
in the 
Philip
pines 
19
94
11
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
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00
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Manil
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
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1994 
Test 
Bomb
ing of 
PAL 
Flight
/Mur
der of 
Haru
ki 
Ikega
mi 
19
94
12
15
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 
10
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
00
44
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ny 
19
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12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
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22
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Los 
Angel
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15
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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00
25
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Manil
a, 
Philip
pines 
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19
95
01
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E
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in 
Philip
pines 19
95
01
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
20
6 
Arres
t | 
Lang
kawi 
Island
, 
Mala
ysia | 
1/11/
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19
95
01
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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00
93
3 
1995 
Plot 
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sinate 
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01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
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1 
Arres
t | 
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hi, 
Pakist
an | 
2/199
5 
19
95
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
07
7 Arres
t | ? | 
2/199
5 19
95
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15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
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7 
Arres
t | 
Manh
attan, 
NY | 
2/21/
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19
95
02
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
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Mass
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of 
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19
95
02
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
18
4 
Arres
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Philip
pines 
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3/1/1
995 
19
95
03
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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ra
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E
vt
00
29
6 
Arres
t | 
Pesha
war, 
Pakist
an | 
3/11/
1995 
19
95
03
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
00
19
0 
Arres
t | 
Kaloo
kan, 
Philip
pines 
| 
4/1/1
995 
19
95
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
00
25
3 
Arres
t | 
Manil
a, 
Philip
pines 
| 
4/1/1
995 
19
95
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
68
5 
1995 
Ipil 
Raid 19
95
04
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
13
4 
Arres
t | 
Dava
o, 
Philip
pines 
| 
4/26/
1995 
19
95
04
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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R
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t o
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 D
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E
vt
00
15
7 
Arres
t | 
Gener
al 
Santo
s, 
Philip
pines 
| 
4/26/
1995 
19
95
04
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
35
2 
Arres
t | 
Zamb
oanga 
City | 
4/26/
1995 
19
95
04
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
61
3 
Jailbr
eak | 
Manil
a, 
Philip
pines 
| 
1995
0529 
19
95
05
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
07
4 
1995 
Seizu
re of 
Hosta
ges at 
Hospi
tal in 
Stavr
opol 
19
95
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
0 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
68
0 
1995 
Faile
d 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Muba
rak 
19
95
06
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
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ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
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ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
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nt
er
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tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
81
6 
Arres
t | 
Addis 
Abab
a, 
Ethio
pia | 
1996
0626 
19
95
06
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
81
7 
Arres
t | 
Ethio
pia | 
1995
0627 
19
95
06
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
81
8 
Arres
t | 
Ethio
pia | 
1995
0628 
19
95
06
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
81
9 
1995 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Ethio
pian 
Auth
oritie
s 
19
95
07
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
82
0 
Death 
| 
Addis 
Abab
a, 
Ethio
pia | 
1995
0701 
19
95
07
01
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
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lt
 
T
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tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
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 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
09
5 Studi
ed in 
Irelan
d 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
46
5 1995 
Bojin
ka 
Plot 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
 
E
vt
00
99
0 
1995 
Plot 
to 
Overt
hrow 
Bhutt
o's 
Secon
d 
Gov't 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
42
7 
1995 
Attac
k on 
U.S. 
Milita
ry/Ai
d 
Missi
on in 
Saudi 
Arabi
a 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
19
7 Arres
t | 
Khart
oum | 
1995 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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lt
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 | 
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nk
no
w
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un
ct
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na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
31
6 
Arres
t | 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
1995 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
37
3 
Arriv
al in 
the 
Philip
pines 
| 
Philip
pines 
| 1995 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
61
0 
Arres
t | 
India 
| 
1995
0702 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
72
1 
Left 
Afgh
anista
n for 
Dar 
es 
Salaa
m 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
77
5 
Loss 
of 
most 
of 
UBL/
AQ's 
mone
y 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
42
7 Trave
l to 
Suda
n 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
42
8 Trave
l to 
Yeme
n 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
42
9 Trave
l to 
Mala
ysia 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
43
0 
Trave
l to 
Brazil 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
77
9 
Death 
| 
Bosni
a | 
1995
0702 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
78
0 
Death 
| 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
1995
0702 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
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E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
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D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
74
4 
Death 
| 
Egypt 
| 
1995
0702 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
94
6 
1995 
Raid 
on 
Alger
ian 
Secur
ity 
Force
s 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
15
1 Traini
ng in 
Bosni
a 19
95
07
02
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
40
3 Move
d to 
Florid
a 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
20
0 
Trave
l to 
Made
ra, 
Soma
lia 
19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
 
E
vt
00
81
7 Move 
to 
Lond
on 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
1385 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
17
9 Trave
l to 
Lond
on 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
21
0 Trave
l to 
Suda
n 19
95
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
18
8 
Arres
t | 
Jorda
n | 
7/30/
1995 
19
95
07
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
08
5 
Arres
t | 
Croat
ia | 
1995
0913 
19
95
09
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
92
6 
1995 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Benz
azir 
Bhutt
o 
19
95
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
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D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
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D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
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D
ea
th
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lic
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ili
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ou
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ea
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M
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si
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om
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ri
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ea
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K
IA
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ea
th
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id
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D
ea
th
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ul
 P
la
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ea
th
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xe
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by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
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R
ep
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t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
62
7 
1995 
Bomb
ing of 
Egypt
ian 
Emba
ssy in 
Islam
abad 
19
95
11
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
 
60
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
63
0 
Arres
t | 
Pesha
war, 
Pakist
an | 
1995
1203 
19
95
12
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
96
1 
Arres
t | 
Manil
a, 
Philip
pines 
| 
1995
1229 
19
95
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
82
1 
1995 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Muba
rak 
by 
Bomb
ing 
His 
Moto
rcade 
19
95
12
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
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nt
 N
um
be
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E
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nt
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Su
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nt
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ra
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in
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th
 
D
ea
th
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 C
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el
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ro
m
 D
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ti
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E
sc
ap
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ep
or
ta
ti
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H
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ri
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ag
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L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
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tio
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Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
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R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
99
5 
1995 
Kidna
pping 
at 
Trank
ini 
Falls 
19
95
12
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
86
8 
1996 
Arme
d 
Robb
ery of 
Bank 
in el-
Ayyat
, 
Egypt 
19
96
01
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
74
0 
Left 
Suda
n for 
the 
last 
time 
19
96
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
63
3 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Pakist
an | 
1996
0315 
19
96
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
63
3 
Arres
t | Al-
Hadit
ha, 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
1996
0328 
19
96
03
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 N
um
be
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nt
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 C
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ea
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ea
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no
w
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R
el
ea
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 f
ro
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 D
et
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E
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ap
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ep
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ta
ti
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H
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ag
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L
od
gi
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/T
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ve
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tio
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Pa
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tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
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R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
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Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
72
5 
Arres
t | 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
1996
0406 
19
96
04
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
72
6 
Arres
t | 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
1996
0407 
19
96
04
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
72
7 
Arres
t | 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
1996
0408 
19
96
04
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
39
4 
Arriv
es in 
Madri
d | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
4/199
6 
19
96
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
86
2 
1996 
Arme
d 
Assau
lt on 
Greek 
Touri
sts in 
Cairo 
19
96
04
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 18
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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R
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Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
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ra
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U
nk
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N
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un
ct
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l I
nt
er
ac
tio
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E
vt
02
81
2 
1996 
Nasce
nt 
Plot 
to 
Kidna
p 
Touri
sts to 
Secur
e 
Blind 
Sheik'
s 
Relea
se 
19
96
04
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
63
0 
Ferry
boad 
Accid
ent in 
Lake 
Victo
ria 
19
96
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
78
1 
Death 
| Lake 
Victo
ria, 
Afric
a | 
1996
0515 
19
96
05
15
 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
21
1 
Trave
l to 
Tanza
nia to 
searc
h for 
Abu 
Ubaid
ah al 
Bans
hiri 
19
96
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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nk
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w
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N
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ct
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l I
nt
er
ac
tio
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E
vt
00
81
0 Move 
to 
Austr
alia 19
96
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
42
4 
1996 
Khob
ar 
Towe
rs 
Bomb
ing 
19
96
06
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20
 
37
2 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
00
42
9 
1996 
Atte
mpt 
to 
establ
ish 
AQ 
cell in 
Leba
non 
19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
00
00
2 
$7,00
0 
Trans
fer 
for 
proje
ct in 
Mom
basa 
19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
44
7 1996 
Bank 
Robb
ery 19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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tic
 | 
Fi
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A
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ra
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tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
48
4 1996 
Bomb
ing of 
Paris 
Metro 
19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
 
86
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
18
5 Arres
t | 
Jorda
n | 
1996 
19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
27
4 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
1996
0702 
19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
31
3 
Death 
| 
Alger
ia | 
1996
0702 
19
96
07
02
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
57
1 
Arres
t | 
Jorda
n | 
1996
0702 
19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
71
1 
Arres
t | 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
1996
0702 
19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ra
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ed
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ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
83
0 
Move 
to 
Spain 19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
86
5 Move
d to 
Tangi
ers 19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
06
3 
Retur
n to 
Spain 19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
76
7 
Livin
g in 
Kand
ahar, 
Afgh
anista
n 
19
96
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
86
3 
1996 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Egypt
ian 
Polic
e in 
Centr
al 
Egypt 
19
96
07
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
86
4 
Death 
| 
Egypt 
| 
1996
0703 
19
96
07
03
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
57
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Jorda
n | 
1996
0815 
19
96
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
68
9 1996 
Fatwa 
Again
st 
U.S. 
19
96
08
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
71
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
1996
1015? 
19
96
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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1996 
Firefi
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Egypt
ian 
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e in 
Miny
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Provi
nce 
19
96
10
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
86
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Death 
| 
Miny
a 
Provi
nce, 
Egypt 
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1996
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19
96
10
16
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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86
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1996 
Firefi
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w/ 
Egypt
ian 
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e in 
Beni 
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0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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86
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Death 
| Beni 
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Egypt 
| 
1996
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1395 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
96
2 
1996 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
APE
C 
Sum
mit in 
Manil
a 
19
96
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
68
3 
Faile
d 
Atte
mpt 
to 
Estab
lish 
Traini
ng 
Camp 
in 
Chec
hnya 
19
96
12
15
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
68
1 
Arres
t | 
Dage
stan, 
Russi
a | 
1996
1215 
19
96
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
73
3 
Arres
t | 
Syria 
| 
1996
1215 
19
96
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Arres
t | 
Cana
da | 
1996
1215 
19
96
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
82
7 Move 
to 
Philip
pines 19
96
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
35
5 
Arres
ted 
(as 
coope
rating 
witne
ss) 
19
96
12
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
81
4 Move 
to 
Karac
hi 19
97
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
37
0 
Arriv
al in 
Spain 
| 
Tudel
a, 
Spain 
| 
2/199
7 
19
97
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Arres
t | 
Cana
da | 
1997
0315 
19
97
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
34
4 
Arres
t | 
Valen
cia, 
Spain 
| 
4/199
7 
19
97
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
02
68
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Dage
stan, 
Russi
a | 
1997
0515 
19
97
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
76
6 Livin
g in 
Florid
a 19
97
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
04
2 
Resid
ed in 
Qatar 19
97
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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4 
Arriv
al in 
U.K. | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
1997 
19
97
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
00
7 
Refus
al to 
Make 
Bayat 
to 
UBL 
19
97
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
37
7 
Loss 
of 
Leg 19
97
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
43
2 Livin
g in 
Hamb
urg 19
97
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
93
5 
1997(
?) 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
U.S. 
Naval 
Vesse
ls in 
Singa
pore 
19
97
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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3 
Arres
t | 
Calif
ornia 
| 
1997
0702? 
19
97
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
40
8 
1997 
Assas
sinati
on 
Plot 
Again
st 
Yeme
ni 
PM 
19
97
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
83
4 Move 
to 
Suda
n 19
97
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
16
7 
Trave
l 
betwe
en 
Keny
a and 
Tanza
nia 
19
97
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
24
8 
Arres
t | 
Manh
attan, 
NY | 
7/10/
1997 
19
97
07
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
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R
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 D
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 C
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ca
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te
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ba
nd
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rt
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ce
nt
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ev
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op
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ot
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hr
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oa
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k 
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tt
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nj
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B
R
N
 
T
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rm
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lt
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ac
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Fi
re
fi
gh
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T
ac
tic
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A
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si
na
ti
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T
ac
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B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
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pe
ra
tio
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ac
tic
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tu
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ge
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ij
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ki
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ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
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in
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rm
ed
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ss
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
91
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Jorda
n | 
1997
0715 
19
97
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
85
9 
Relea
se or 
Escap
e(?) 
from 
Egypt
ian 
Ment
al 
Instit
ution 
| 
Cairo
, 
Egypt 
| 
1997
0915 
19
97
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
05
2 
Retur
n to 
Como
ros 
Island
s 
19
97
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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 C
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nt
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ev
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op
ed
 
Pl
ot
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T
hr
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t/H
oa
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tt
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k 
A
tt
ac
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| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
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| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
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T
ac
tic
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A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
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O
pe
ra
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T
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fr
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tr
uc
tu
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 T
ar
ge
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T
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ij
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T
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ss
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lt
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ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
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un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
86
0 
1997 
Arme
d 
Assau
lt on 
Germ
an 
Touri
sts at 
Cairo'
s 
Egypt
ian 
Muse
um 
19
97
09
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
86
1 
Arres
t | 
Cairo
, 
Egypt 
| 
1997
0918 
19
97
09
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
73
3 Left 
Nairo
bi for 
U.S. 19
97
09
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
25
4 
1997 
Bomb
ing of 
Sadar 
Bazar 
(Delh
i) 
19
97
10
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
30
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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 C
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D
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t o
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ra
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tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
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o.
 F
un
ct
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na
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nt
er
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ns
 
E
vt
02
25
5 
1997 
Bomb
ing of 
Rani 
Bagh 
Mark
et 
(Delh
i) 
19
97
10
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 
16
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
60
3 
Disap
peara
nce 19
97
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
25
6 
1997 
Bomb
ing of 
Karol 
Bagh 
Mark
et 
(Delh
i) 
19
97
10
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 
34
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
77
8 1997 
Luxor 
Mass
acre 1
99
71
11
7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 58
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
02
83
1 
Death 
| 
Valle
y of 
the 
Quee
ns, 
Egypt 
| 
1997
1117 
19
97
11
17
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 C
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 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
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lt
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tic
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nk
no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
25
7 
1997 
Bomb
ing of 
Red 
Fort 
(Delh
i) 
19
97
11
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 
70
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
25
8 
1997 
Bomb
ing of 
Bus 
at 
Punja
bi 
Bagh 
(Delh
i) 
19
97
12
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 
25
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
25
9 
1998 
Bomb
ing 
Near 
Polic
e HQ 
(Delh
i) 
19
98
01
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
50
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
21
8 
1998 
Coim
bator
e 
Bomb
ings 
19
98
02
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 58
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
41
1 
1998 
Attac
k on 
Alger
ian 
Soldi
ers 
19
98
02
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 27
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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nk
no
w
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l I
nt
er
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tio
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E
vt
00
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4 1998 
Fatwa 
Again
st 
U.S. 
19
98
02
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
82
9 
Move 
to 
Rome 19
98
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
21
2 Trave
l to 
Yeme
n 19
98
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
29
2 
Arres
t | 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
1998
0405 
19
98
04
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
86
7 Move
d to 
Turke
y 19
98
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
52
7 
Traini
ng in 
OH 19
98
04
28
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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/A
 
E
vt
01
58
1 Bayat 
to 
Ba'as
yr 19
98
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
05
9 
1989-
2001 
Afgh
an 
Civil 
War 
19
98
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51
 
E
vt
00
80
9 Move 
to 
Afgh
anista
n 
19
98
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
81
1 Move 
to 
Bahra
in 19
98
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
12
8 Traini
ng in 
Afgh
anista
n 
19
98
07
02
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1411 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
68
7 
Arres
t | 
Tiran
a, 
Alban
ia | 
1998
0715 
19
98
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
16
3 
Trans
fer of 
Arms 
Traffi
cking 
Netw
orks 
from 
GIA 
to 
GSP
C 
19
98
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
89
8 
1998 
Murd
ers of 
Adam 
Wrig
ht 
and 
Mich
ael 
Hurle 
19
98
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
19
7 
Trave
l to 
Sanaa
, 
Yeme
n 
19
98
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
1412 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
26
1 
1998 
Bomb
ing 
Harya
n 
Road
ways 
Bus 
Termi
nal 
19
98
07
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
64
8 Flee 
to 
Afgh
anista
n 
19
98
08
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
00
9 
1998 
Emba
ssy 
Attac
ks 
(Nair
obi) 
19
98
08
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 21
2 
40
00
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 28
 
E
vt
00
01
5 
1998 
Emba
ssy 
Attac
k 
(Dar) 
19
98
08
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
85
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
00
39
7 
Arriv
es in 
Tanza
nia | 
Dar 
es 
Salaa
m, 
Tanza
nia | 
8/4/1
998 
19
98
08
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1413 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
72
3 
Left 
Dar 
es 
Salaa
m for 
Mom
basa 
19
98
08
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
 
E
vt
00
64
4 Fled 
to 
Karac
hi 19
98
08
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
19
5 
Arres
t | 
Karac
hi, 
Pakist
an | 
8/7/1
998 
19
98
08
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
78
2 
Death 
| Dar 
es 
Salaa
m, 
Tanza
nia | 
1998
0807 
19
98
08
07
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
78
3 
Death 
| 
Nairo
bi, 
Keny
a | 
1998
0807 
19
98
08
07
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1414 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
72
7 
Left 
Dar 
es 
Salaa
m for 
South 
Afric
a 
19
98
08
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
27
2 
Arres
t | 
Nairo
bi, 
Keny
a | 
8/11/
1998 
19
98
08
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
13
9 
Arres
t | 
Eastle
igh, 
Keny
a | 
8/12/
1998 
19
98
08
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
04
8 Retur
n to 
Britai
n 19
98
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
68
4 
Rendi
tion | 
Baku, 
Azerb
aijan | 
1998
0820 
19
98
08
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
1415 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
91
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Nairo
bi, 
Keny
a | 
1998
0822 
19
98
08
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
72
9 
Left 
Keny
a for 
the 
U.S. 
(in 
FBI 
Custo
dy) 
19
98
08
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
24
9 
Arres
t | 
Manh
attan, 
NY | 
9/10/
1998 
19
98
09
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
64
2 Fled 
to 
Afgh
anista
n 
19
98
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
82
0 Move 
to 
Moro
cco 19
98
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
1416 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
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Arres
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Manh
attan, 
NY | 
9/16/
1998 
19
98
09
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
74
7 Lived 
in 
Engla
nd 19
98
09
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
34
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t | 
Unite
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King
dom | 
9/27/
1998 
19
98
09
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
89
5 
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Kidna
pping 
of 
Olga 
Uspe
nskay
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(Wife 
of 
Ingus
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Advis
or) 
19
98
10
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Battle 
with 
Alger
ian 
Force
s 
19
98
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 37
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
77
3 
1998 
Murd
er of 
Abdel
aziz 
Fikri 
(for 
frequ
entin
g 
prosti
tutes) 
19
98
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
78
4 
Death 
| 
Yous
oufia, 
Moro
cco | 
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1015 
19
98
10
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
08
8 
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Shoot
-up of 
Lake
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Polic
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Statio
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11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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00
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1998 
Murd
er of 
Hom
osexu
al 
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98
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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1 
Arres
t | 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
1998
1116 
19
98
11
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
88
7 
1998 
Murd
er of 
Drug-
Lord 
Dann
y 
Kara
m 
19
98
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
78
5 
Death 
| 
Basil
an, 
Philip
pines 
| 
1998
1215 
19
98
12
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
81
4 
Arres
t | 
Aden, 
Yeme
n | 
1998
1224 
19
98
12
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
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E
vt
02
81
3 
1999 
Plot 
Again
st 
West
ern 
Targe
ts/Em
bassie
s in 
Yeme
n 
19
99
01
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
88
8 
1999 
Murd
er of 
Edwi
n 
Angel
es 
19
99
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
78
6 
Death 
| 
Camp
orna, 
Philip
pines 
| 
1999
0115 
19
99
01
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
62
2 
1999 
Depo
rtatio
n 
from 
Austr
alia to 
Indon
esia 
19
99
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
15
1 
Arres
t | 
Franc
e | 
3/199
9 
19
99
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
33
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Amm
an, 
Jorda
n | 
1999
0315 
19
99
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
45
7 
1999 
Robb
ery of 
Bank 
Centr
al 
Asia/
Bomb
ing of 
Warte
l 
Offic
e 
19
99
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
00
18
7 
Arres
t | 
Jorda
n | 
4/199
9 
19
99
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
52
8 Traini
ng in 
Germ
any 19
99
04
16
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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1999 
Bomb
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Istiql
al 
Mosq
ue 
19
99
04
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
42
5 Livin
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Near 
Kand
ahar 
19
99
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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vt
01
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| ? | 
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0611 19
99
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0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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00
36
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/A
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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1999-
2000 
Plot 
Again
st 
Sites 
Frequ
ented 
by 
U.S. 
Naval 
Perso
nnel 
in 
Singa
pore 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
00
92
8 
1999-
2001 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Mega
wati 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
 
E
vt
00
98
1 
1999 
Plot 
to 
Estab
lish 
Oreg
on-
based 
Jihadi
st 
Camp
s  
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
26
2 1999 
Mosc
ow 
Bomb
ings 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20
0 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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5 
1999 
Bomb
ing/A
ssassi
natio
n 
Atte
mpt 
on 
Kari
mov 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 16
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
91
2 
1999 
Hijac
king 
of 
India
n 
Airlin
er in 
Nepal 
(Host
ages 
Trade
d for 
Relea
se of 
Azhar
, et 
al) 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
88
3 
1999 
Murd
er of 
Asylu
m 
Seeke
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19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
89
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Murd
er of 
Politi
cian 
Joe 
Ferna
ndez 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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9 
1999 
Depo
rtatio
n to 
Moro
cco 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
60
1 
Arres
t | 
UAE 
| 
1999
0702 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
60
2 
Arres
t | 
Germ
any | 
1999
0702 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
07
2 
1999 
Robb
ery of 
South
ern 
Bank 
(Mala
ysia) 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
74
5 
Arres
t | 
Taif, 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
1999
0702 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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4 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
UAE 
| 
1999
0702 
19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
75
0 Lived 
in 
Irelan
d 19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
75
4 Lived 
in 
Mont
real 19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
19
6 Trave
l to 
Philip
pines 19
99
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
34
2 
Arres
t | 
Unite
d 
King
dom | 
7/12/
1999 
19
99
07
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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5 Resig
ned 
as 
Head 
of EIJ 
19
99
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
66
3 
1999 
Hatch
et 
Attac
k on 
Polic
eman 
19
99
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
89
2 
1999 
Murd
er of 
Joven
al 
Brun
o 
19
99
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
78
8 
Death 
| 
Sulu, 
Philip
pines 
| 
1999
0715 
19
99
07
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
07
3 Secon
d 
Chec
hen 
War 
19
99
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
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1999 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Japan
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Natio
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in 
Kyrg
yzsta
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19
99
08
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
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vt
02
82
7 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Yeme
n | 
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19
99
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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vt
01
28
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Said 
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Wedd
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99
10
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
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00
32
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a | 
10/5/
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19
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10
05
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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1999 
Arme
d 
Robb
ery of 
Gas 
Statio
n 
19
99
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
83
9 Move 
to 
Yeme
n 19
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10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
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Death 
| 
Bogo
r, 
Indon
esia | 
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1115 
19
99
11
15
 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
30
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Arres
t | 
Port 
Angel
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WA | 
12/14
/1999 
19
99
12
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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00
01
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Plot 
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12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
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1 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
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| 
1999
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19
99
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
09
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99 
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12
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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00
10
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12/19
/1999 
19
99
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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1999 
LAX 
Mille
nniu
m 
Bomb
ing 
Plot 
19
99
12
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
00
65
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d 
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Testi
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2E
+
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
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00
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6 Lived 
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Denm
ark 
2E
+
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
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7 Trave
l to 
Pakist
an 
2E
+
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
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1 Trave
l to 
Afgh
anista
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2E
+
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
00
73
6 
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Pakist
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E
+
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Left 
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n for 
Afgh
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+
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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18
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l to 
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2E
+
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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01
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2000 
Plot 
Again
st 
U.S.S
. The 
Sulliv
ans 
20
00
01
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
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4 
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20
00
01
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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Gunfi
ght 
w/ 
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ian 
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20
00
01
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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01
43
3 
9/11 
Plotte
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Hamb
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00
01
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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of 
Wilde 
Alme
da 
and 
Follo
wers 
(Jesus 
Mirac
le 
Crusa
de) 
20
00
07
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
88
6 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Amer
ican 
Clim
bers 
in 
Kyrg
yzsta
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00
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
90
7 2000 
Hajj 
Pilgri
mage 20
00
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
61
9 
2000 
Traini
ng/Pa
intbal
l at 
Myal
up 
20
00
07
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0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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00
05
8 
1999-
2002 
Confl
ict in 
Amb
on 
and 
Malu
ku 
20
00
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64
 
E
vt
00
66
4 Hidin
g in 
Bosni
a 20
00
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
08
9 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Busin
essma
n 
Niran
jan 
Shah 
20
00
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
33
8 
Arres
t | 
Tetou
an, 
Moro
cco | 
2000 
20
00
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
38
6 Arriv
al in 
UA | 
USA | 
2000 
20
00
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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02
74
5 
Death 
| 
Egypt 
| 
2000
0702 
20
00
07
02
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
91
3 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Germ
any | 
2000
0702? 
20
00
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
61
7 
2000 
Plot 
Again
st 
Sydn
ey 
Olym
pics 
20
00
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
23
5 Traini
ng in 
Chec
hnya 20
00
07
02
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
97
9 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Germ
an 
Journ
alist 
Andr
eas 
Loren
z 
20
00
07
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
98
1 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Frenc
h TV 
Crew 
20
00
07
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
48
4 2000 
Paint
ball 
in N. 
VA 
20
00
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
62
1 
Traini
ng in 
Austr
alia's 
Blue 
Moun
tains 
20
00
07
15
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
74
2 Lived 
in 
Afgh
anista
n 
20
00
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
48
5 
2000 
Bomb
ing of 
Philip
pine 
Amba
ssado
r's 
Resid
ence 
20
00
08
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 
21
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
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E
vt
01
77
2 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Jeffre
y 
Schill
ing 
20
00
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7
 
E
vt
00
85
6 Move
d to 
Sheffi
eld 20
00
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
98
7 
Arres
t | 
Zamb
oanga 
City, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2000
0824 
20
00
08
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
36
4 
9/200
0 Call 
For 
Jihad 
to 
Relea
se 
Priso
ners 
Every
where 
20
00
09
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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36
6 
Teste
d 
Explo
sives 
for 
2000 
Bomb
ing of 
U.S.S
. Cole 
20
00
09
01
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
98
2 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Mala
ysian
s 
from 
Panda
nan 
Island 
20
00
09
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
47
7 
2000 
Bomb
ing of 
Jakart
a 
Stock 
Exch
ange 
20
00
09
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
22
5 2000 
U.S.S
. Cole 
Attac
k 
20
00
10
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 27
 
39
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 25
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Plot 
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Day 
Bomb
ing) 
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30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 22
 
10
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0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
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vt
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43
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l to 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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/A
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Area 
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0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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27
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Relea
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from 
Deten
tion | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2001
0702 
20
01
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
94
5 
2001 
Plot 
to 
attack 
Klein
e-
Broge
l Air 
Base 
20
01
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
10
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Suici
de 
Bomb
ing 
Plots 
in 
Milan 
20
01
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
75
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Lived 
in 
Spain 20
01
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
81
3 Move 
to 
Jalala
bad 20
01
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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15
3 Traini
ng in 
Geor
gia 20
01
07
02
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
99
4 
Arres
t | 
Gener
al 
Santo
s 
City, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2001
0708 
20
01
07
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
02
81
5 
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t | 
Syria 
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2001
0715? 
20
01
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
15
4 Traini
ng in 
Indon
esia 20
01
07
15
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
17
3 Trave
l to 
Chec
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07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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7 
2001 
Bomb
ing of 
Churc
hes in 
East 
Jakart
a 
20
01
07
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
69
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
08
6 
2001 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Busin
essma
n Roy 
Burm
an 
20
01
07
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
13
6 
Arres
t | 
Dubai 
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7/28/
2001 
20
01
07
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
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01
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Atriu
m 
Plaza 
Bomb
ing 
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07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
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2001 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
the 
Israel
i 
Emba
ssy in 
India, 
Azerb
aijan, 
the 
Philip
pines, 
and 
Austr
alia 
20
01
08
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
41
9 Arriv
ed in 
Afgh
anista
n 
20
01
08
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
61
1 Enter
s 
Cana
da 20
01
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
48
0 
2001 
Jihadi 
Traini
ng in 
Oreg
on 
20
01
08
15
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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02
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2 
Arres
t | 
Cana
da | 
2001
0815 
20
01
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
66
0 
Arres
t | 
Eaga
n, 
MN | 
2001
0816 
20
01
08
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
39
9 
2001 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Ahme
d 
Shah 
Maso
ud 
20
01
09
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
 
E
vt
01
79
4 
Death 
| 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2001
0909 
20
01
09
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
88
6 
Death 
| 
Kwaj
a 
Bahu
ddin, 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2001
0909 
20
01
09
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Attac
ks on 
NYC/
DC/S
hanks
ville 
(9/11) 
20
01
09
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
29
77
 
60
00
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 57
 
E
vt
01
26
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Amer
ican 
Airlin
es 
Flight 
11 
(9/11) 
20
01
09
11
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 87
 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5
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01
25
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Airlin
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09
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0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5
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vt
01
25
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Amer
ican 
Airlin
es 
Flight 
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(9/11) 
20
01
09
11
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 59
 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5
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vt
01
79
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WTC
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2001
0911 
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09
11
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
1460 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
79
6 
Death 
| 
Penta
gon, 
Alexa
ndria, 
VA | 
2001
0911 
20
01
09
11
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
79
8 
Death 
| 
South 
Towe
r, 
WTC
, 
Manh
attan, 
NY | 
2001
0911 
20
01
09
11
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
25
7 
Unite
d 
Airlin
es 
Flight 
93 
(9/11) 
20
01
09
11
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40
 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
79
7 
Death 
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Shan
ksvill
e, PA 
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2001
0911 
20
01
09
11
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
61
7 2001 
Escap
e to 
Pakist
an 
20
01
09
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
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27
7 
Arres
t | 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
9/13/
2001 
20
01
09
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
10
7 
Arres
t | 
Belgi
um | 
9/13/
2001 
20
01
09
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
31
0 
Arres
t | 
Rotte
rdam, 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
9/13/
2001 
20
01
09
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
48
1 
2001 
Jihadi 
Traini
ng in 
Wash
ingto
n 
State 
20
01
09
15
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
92
3 
2001 
Plot 
Again
st US 
and 
Israel
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in 
Manil
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20
01
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
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02
79
5 
Arres
t | 
Chica
go, IL 
| 
2001
0919 
20
01
09
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
21
0 
Arres
t | 
Leice
ster, 
Engla
nd | 
9/25/
2001 
20
01
09
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
32
7 
Arres
t | 
Spain 
| 
9/26/
2001 
20
01
09
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
00
12
7 
Arres
t | 
Casca
nte, 
Spain 
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9/26/
2001 
20
01
09
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
34
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Arres
t | 
Valen
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Spain 
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9/26/
2001 
20
01
09
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
28
4 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
10/3/
2001 
20
01
10
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
51
1 
Arres
t | 
Afgh
anista
n-
Pakist
an 
Borde
r | 
10/5/
2001 
20
01
10
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
25
1 2001 
Fatwa 
Again
st 
U.S. 
20
01
10
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
91
3 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Islam
abad, 
Pakist
an | 
2001
1009 
20
01
10
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
26
1 
Arres
t | 
Milan
, Italy 
| 
10/10
/2001 
20
01
10
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1464 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
27
1 
Arres
t | 
Muni
ch, 
Germ
any | 
10/10
/2001 
20
01
10
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
67
2 
Arres
t | 
Afgh
anista
n-
Pakist
an 
Borde
r | 
2001
1011 
20
01
10
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
29
4 
2001 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Mum
bai 
Polic
e 
20
01
10
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
29
5 
Death 
| 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2001
1013 
20
01
10
13
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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vt
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29
3 
2001 
Plot 
to 
Murd
er 
Bolly
wood 
Star 
Aami
r 
Khan 
20
01
10
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
97
9 
2001 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
West
ern 
Emba
ssies 
in 
Singa
pore 
20
01
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
 
E
vt
01
36
9 
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Plot 
to 
Poiso
n 
U.S. 
Water 
Suppl
ies 
20
01
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
44
4 
2001 
Plot 
Again
st 
Singa
porea
n 
Minis
try of 
Defen
se 
20
01
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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vt
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69
6 
Arres
t | 
Tora 
Bora, 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2001
1015? 
20
01
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
00
6 
2001 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Maril
yn 
Chu 
20
01
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
78
6 
Arres
t | 
Cana
da | 
2001
1019 
20
01
10
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
57
4 Arres
t |  | 
2001
1024 20
01
10
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
40
5 
Arres
t | 
Afgh
anista
n-
Pakist
an 
Borde
r | 
11/20
01 
20
01
11
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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nk
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ct
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nt
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tio
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E
vt
00
23
1 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
11/13
/2001 
20
01
11
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
 
E
vt
00
16
2 
Arres
t | 
Grana
da, 
Spain 
| 
11/13
/2001 
20
01
11
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
46
4 
Board
ed 
toget
her in 
Philip
pines 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
88
0 
Death 
| 
Logar 
Provi
nce, 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2001
1115 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 1 # # # # # # # # # # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
17
5 Arres
t | 
Italy | 
11/20
01 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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E
vt
00
29
9 
Arres
t | 
Philip
pines 
| 
11/20
01 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
79
9 
Death 
| 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2001
1115 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
21
5 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
11/20
01 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
25
7 
Arres
t | 
Milan
, Italy 
| 
11/15
/2001 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
29
4 
Arres
t | 
Paran
aque 
City, 
Philip
pines 
| 
11/20
01 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
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3 
Arres
t | 
Spain 
| 
11/20
01 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
34
6 
Arres
t | 
Vanc
ouver
, CA | 
11/15
/2001 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
66
8 Hidin
g in 
Slova
kia 20
01
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
80
0 
Death 
| 
Logar 
Provi
nce, 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2001
1115 
20
01
11
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Plot 
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ssy in 
Rome 
20
02
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
05
3 Retur
n to 
Franc
e 20
02
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
1481 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
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E
vt
00
09
7 
Arres
t | 
Barce
lona, 
Spain 
| 
1/19/
2002 
20
02
01
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
17
0 
Arres
t | 
Hospi
talet 
de 
Llobr
egat | 
1/19/
2002 
20
02
01
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
06
5 
2002 
Attac
k on 
Calcu
tta's 
Amer
ican 
Cente
r 
20
02
01
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
01
91
4 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2002
0122 
20
02
01
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
02
09
4 
Death 
| 
Hazar
ibagh
, 
India 
| 
2002
0126 
20
02
01
26
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
19
2 
Arres
t | 
Karac
hi, 
Pakist
an | 
2/6/2
002 
20
02
02
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
28
6 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
2/12/
2002 
20
02
02
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
20
4 
Arres
t | 
Lahor
e, 
Pakist
an | 
3729
9 
20
02
02
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
55
0 
2002 
Danie
l 
Pearl 
Kidna
pping
/Mur
der 
20
02
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 10
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E
vt
01
70
7 
Arres
t | 
Oman 
| 
2002
0215 
20
02
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
17
2 Arres
t | 
Iran | 
2/15/
2002 
20
02
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
55
1 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
2008
0215 
20
02
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
16
9 
Arres
t | 
Ilford
, 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2002
0218 
20
02
02
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
57
7 2002 
Gujar
at 
Viole
nce 
20
02
02
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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w
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ct
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E
vt
01
56
3 2002 
Fitma
rt 
Bomb
ing 
20
02
03
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
 
40
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
02
09
0 
Arres
t | 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2002
0308 
20
02
03
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
76
7 
Arres
t | 
Garde
z, 
Afgh
anista
n 
20
02
03
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
25
2 
Arres
t | 
Manil
a, 
Philip
pines 
| 
3/13/
2002 
20
02
03
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
91
5 
Defac
to 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Islam
abad, 
Pakist
an | 
2002
0315 
20
02
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
30
3 
2002 
Amb
ush 
of 
India
n 
Offic
ers in 
Kash
mir 
20
02
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
56
4 
2002 
Arson 
of 
Kimb
all 
Plaza 
20
02
03
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
88
8 
Death 
| 
Chec
hnya | 
2002
0319 
20
02
03
19
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
74
6 
Arres
t | 
Saraj
evo, 
Bosni
a | 
2002
0321 
20
02
03
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
28
9 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
3/200
2 
20
02
03
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
23
8 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
4/24/
2002 
20
02
04
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
89
8 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Spain 
| 
2002
0426 
20
02
04
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
18
9 
Arres
t | 
Justic
e, IL | 
4/30/
2002 
20
02
04
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1489 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
40
6 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
5/200
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20
02
05
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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vt
02
28
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Indon
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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51
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Car-
bomb
ing of 
Shera
ton 
Hotel 
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05
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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49
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ing of 
Shera
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20
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Arres
t | 
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go, IL 
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05
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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02
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from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
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Spain 
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20
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05
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E
vt
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20
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15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
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to 
Assas
sinate 
Presi
dent 
Jimm
y 
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to 
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t | 
Spain 
| 
3745
4 
20
02
07
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
58
6 
Arres
t | 
Baran
gay 
Kura
n, 
Mind
anao, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2002
0721 
20
02
07
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
12
6 
Arres
t | 
Casab
lanca, 
Moro
cco | 
8/7/2
002 
20
02
08
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 C
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xe
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th
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R
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ea
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ea
th
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M
ea
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nk
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w
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A
rr
es
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et
en
ti
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R
el
ea
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 f
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m
 D
et
en
ti
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E
sc
ap
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D
ep
or
ta
ti
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H
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ilg
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m
ag
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L
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gi
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W
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di
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eb
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tb
al
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N
on
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er
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st
 C
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m
e 
R
ad
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iz
at
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tw
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D
ec
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L
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ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
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Pl
ot
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ot
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FB
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St
in
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Pl
ot
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In
te
rr
up
te
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Pl
ot
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A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
77
1 
2002 
Kidna
pping 
on 
Jolo 
Island 
20
02
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
27
0 
Arres
t | 
Moro
cco | 
8/200
2 
20
02
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
17
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2002
0821 
20
02
08
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
45
0 2002 
Gold 
Store 
Robb
ery 
20
02
08
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
 
E
vt
02
54
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Yeme
n | 
2002
0901 
20
02
09
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 C
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R
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 f
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 D
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ve
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al
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N
on
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st
 C
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m
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R
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al
iz
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tw
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D
ec
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L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
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Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
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St
in
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Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
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ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
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ta
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ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
79
9 
2002 
Assas
sinati
on 
Atte
mpt 
on 
Hami
d 
Karza
i 
20
02
09
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
80
2 
2002 
Bomb
ings 
of 
Kabul 
20
02
09
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 30
 
10
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
33
5 
Illega
l 
Entry 
into 
Jorda
n 
20
02
09
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
39
6 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
9/11/
2002 
20
02
09
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
80
6 
Death 
| 
Banta 
Provi
nce, 
Alger
ia | 
2002
0911 
20
02
09
11
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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D
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H
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L
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eb
ra
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tb
al
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N
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ri
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 C
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m
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R
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ic
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D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
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-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
68
0 
Arres
t | 
Lacka
wann
a, NY 
| 
2002
0915 
20
02
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
00
50
5 2002 
Britis
h 
Ricin 
'Plot' 
20
02
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
00
17
9 
Arres
t | 
Jakart
a, 
Indon
esia | 
9/200
2 
20
02
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
22
6 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
9/200
2 
20
02
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
36
1 
Arriv
al in 
Camb
odia | 
Phno
m 
Penh | 
9/200
2 
20
02
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 D
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D
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 D
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sc
ap
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H
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L
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al
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N
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st
 C
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m
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R
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al
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D
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L
ar
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-S
ca
le
M
ili
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ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
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in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
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 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
70
8 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
2002
0915 
20
02
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
91
9 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2002
0915 
20
02
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
22
5 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
9/19/
2002 
20
02
09
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
92
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2002
0920 
20
02
09
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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nt
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ea
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H
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al
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N
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 C
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m
e 
R
ad
ic
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D
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ca
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M
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A
ct
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Pl
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in
g 
Pl
ot
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te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
22
7 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
9/21/
2002 
20
02
09
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
89
9 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2002
0924 
20
02
09
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
20
9 
Arres
t | 
Leba
non | 
3752
6 
20
02
09
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
22
8 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
9/27/
2002 
20
02
09
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
69
4 
Arres
t | 
Mala
ysia | 
2002
0927 
20
02
09
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1508 
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nt
 N
um
be
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Event 
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E
ve
nt
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at
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Su
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E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
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th
 
D
ea
th
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A
cc
id
en
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ea
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ur
al
 C
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se
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th
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ke
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th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
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id
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D
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th
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ul
 P
la
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th
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xe
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by
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te
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Bomb
ing 
Near 
U.S. 
Emba
ssy in 
Kabul 
20
02
09
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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vt
01
36
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Attac
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Frenc
h Oil 
Tank
er 
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Vesse
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Limb
urg 
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10
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
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 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
40
7 
Arres
t | 
UAE 
| 
10/20
02 
20
02
10
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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se 
from 
Deten
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| 
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1001 
20
02
10
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
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Filika 
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N/A | 
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1008 
20
02
10
08
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
02
6 2002 
Bali 
Attac
ks 20
02
10
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20
2 
24
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 91
 
E
vt
00
48
6 
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Bomb
ing of 
Philip
pine 
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10
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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80
8 
Death 
| 
Kuta, 
Bali, 
Indon
esia | 
2002
1012 
20
02
10
12
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00
16
9 
Arres
t | 
Hamb
urg, 
Germ
any | 
10/20
02 
20
02
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
40
3 
2002 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Lawr
ence 
Foley 
20
02
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
71
5 
Arres
t | 
Portla
nd, 
OR | 
2002
1015 
20
02
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
00
92
4 
2002 
Plot 
Again
st US 
Comp
anies 
in 
Mind
anao 
20
02
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
90
1 2002 
Nord-
Ost 
Siege 20
02
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
0 
68
0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
1511 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
09
3 
Arres
t | 
Antw
erp, 
Belgi
um  | 
10/20
02 
20
02
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
58
7 Arres
t |  | 
2002
1015 20
02
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
76
5 
2002 
Bomb
ing of 
Depar
tment 
Store
s in 
Zamb
oanga 
20
02
10
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
58
8 
Arres
t | 
Indon
esia | 
2002
1018 
20
02
10
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
58
9 Arres
t |  | 
2002
1021 20
02
10
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
01
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0 
Jailbr
eak | 
Alabe
l, 
Saran
gani, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2002
1023 
20
02
10
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
65
5 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2002
1023 
20
02
10
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
65
6 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2005
0311 
20
02
10
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
80
3 
Arres
t | 
Islam
abad, 
Pakist
an | 
2002
1030 
20
02
10
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
14
8 
Arres
t | 
Faub
ourg-
Saint-
Denis
, 
Franc
e | 
11/27
/2002 
20
02
11
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
95
4 
2002 
Bomb
ing of 
BEST 
Bus 
in 
Mum
bai 
20
02
12
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 
30
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
 
E
vt
01
67
6 
Arres
t | 
Klape
n, 
Java, 
Indon
esia | 
2002
1203 
20
02
12
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
29
6 
Arres
t | 
Dubai
, 
UAE 
| 
2002
1203 
20
02
12
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
45
3 2002 
Makr
asar 
Bomb
ings 
20
02
12
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
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R
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lt
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ra
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lt
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tic
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U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
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un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
59
4 Arres
t |  | 
2002
1210 20
02
12
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
02
79
4 
Arres
t | 
Ottaw
a, 
Cana
da | 
2002
1210 
20
02
12
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
64
3 Fled 
to 
Alger
ia 20
02
12
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
09
3 
2002 
Stoni
ng for 
'Deba
ucher
y' 
(Extr
ajudic
ial 
Killin
g) 
20
02
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
95
8 
Arres
t | 
India 
| 
2002
1215 
20
02
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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ra
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nk
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N
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un
ct
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na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
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E
vt
00
47
2 
2002 
Bomb
ing of 
Chec
hen 
Gov't 
HQ 
20
02
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
81
0 
Death 
| 
Makr
asar, 
Indon
esia | 
2002
1215 
20
02
12
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
92
1 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Lahor
e, 
Pakist
an | 
2002
1215 
20
02
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
95
7 
Arres
t | 
Dubai
, 
UAE 
| 
2002
1215 
20
02
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ra
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tio
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E
vt
01
96
6 
Arres
t | 
Bulac
an, 
Manil
a, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2002
1215 
20
02
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
14
2 
Arres
t | 
Mala
ysia | 
2002
1215 
20
02
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
20
1 
Arres
t | La 
Cour
neuve
, 
Franc
e | 
12/16
/2002 
20
02
12
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
51
2 
Arres
t | 
Alger
ia | 
12/16
/2002 
20
02
12
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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er
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tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
96
7 
Arres
t | 
Lamit
an, 
Basil
an, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2002
1216 
20
02
12
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
68
1 
Arres
t | 
Lacka
wann
a, NY 
| 
2002
1217 
20
02
12
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
14
0 
Arres
t | 
Edinb
urgh, 
Scotl
and | 
12/18
/2002 
20
02
12
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
92
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
2002
1218 
20
02
12
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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lt
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gh
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A
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ra
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T
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tic
 | 
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no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
19
8 
Arres
t | 
Kilm
arnoc
k, 
Scotl
and | 
12/18
/2002 
20
02
12
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
21
7 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
12/18
/2002 
20
02
12
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
21
4 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
1/5/2
003 
20
03
01
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
95
9 
Jailbr
eak | 
Pune, 
India 
| 
2003
0107 
20
03
01
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
67
3 
Arres
t | 
Dorse
t, 
Engla
nd | 
2003
0112 
20
03
01
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
1525 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
59
5 Arres
t |  | 
2003
0113 20
03
01
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
00
88
5 
2003 
Murd
er of 
Const
able 
Steve
n 
Oake 
20
03
01
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
21
3 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
1/14/
2003 
20
03
01
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
62
3 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
2003
0115 
20
03
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
59
6 Arres
t |  | 
2003
0117 20
03
01
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
1526 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
67
3 
Arres
t | 
Kali
manta
n, 
Indon
esia | 
2003
0117 
20
03
01
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
21
2 
Arres
t | 
Lomb
ok 
Island
, 
Indon
esia | 
1/23/
2003 
20
03
01
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
95
5 
Arres
t | 
Dubai
, 
UAE 
| 
2003
0126 
20
03
01
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
95
6 
2003 
Depo
rtatio
n to 
India 
20
03
01
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
80
0 
2003 
Bomb
ing of 
Bridg
e 
Near 
Kand
ahar 
20
03
01
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1527 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
73
5 
Arres
t | 
Tanju
ng 
Pinan
g, 
Riau, 
Indon
esia | 
2003
0203 
20
03
02
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
23
7 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Crash 
Plane
s into 
Chan
gi 
Airpo
rt 
20
03
02
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
18
3 
2003 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
AFP 
(Raid 
of 
Bulio
k 
Comp
lex) 
20
03
02
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
62
8 Arres
t | 
Iran | 
2003
0215 
20
03
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
1528 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
22
0 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2/200
3 
20
03
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
34
1 
Arres
t | 
Ukrai
ne | 
2/200
3 
20
03
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
03
9 
Rendi
tion | 
Milan
, Italy 
| 
2003
0215 
20
03
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
29
7 
Arres
t | 
Dubai
, 
UAE 
| 
2003
0215 
20
03
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
74
0 
Arres
t | 
Quett
a, 
Pakist
an | 
2003
0215? 
20
03
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1529 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
59
7 Arres
t |  | 
2003
0217 20
03
02
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
29
8 
Arres
t | 
Dubai
, 
UAE 
| 
2003
0218 
20
03
02
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
75
9 
2003 
Awan
g 
Airpo
rt 
Bomb
ing 
20
03
02
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
70
1 
2003 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Europ
ean 
Touri
sts 
(Djan
et) 
20
03
02
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6
 
E
vt
00
70
3 
2003 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Europ
ean 
Touri
sts 
(Ouar
gia) 
20
03
02
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
 
1530 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
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Kidna
pping 
of 
Europ
ean 
Touri
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(Illizi
) 
20
03
02
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
 
E
vt
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17
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Convi
ction 
and 
Deten
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Lond
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Engla
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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62
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from 
Deten
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Bay, 
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| 
2003
0301? 
20
03
03
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
56
5 
2003 
Bomb
ing of 
Dava
o Int'l 
Airpo
rt 
20
03
03
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 21
 
10
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
70
6 
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Kidna
pping 
of 
Europ
ean 
Touri
sts 
(Nort
hern 
Mali) 
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03
03
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
25
3 
3/8/2
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Kidna
pping 
of 
Europ
ean 
Touri
sts 
(Sout
hern 
Alger
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20
03
03
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
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n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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2003 
Bomb
ing of 
Road 
b/w 
Kand
ahar 
and 
Heart 
20
03
03
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
30
6 
Arres
t | 
Rawa
lpindi
, 
Pakist
an | 
3/200
3 
20
03
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
72
0 
Leave
s 
Camb
odia 
for 
Thail
and 
20
03
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
69
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Arres
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20
03
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
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70
5 
2003 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Europ
ean 
Touri
sts 
(Sout
hern 
Alger
ia II) 
20
03
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17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
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4 
Arres
t | 
Norw
ay | 
2003
0320 
20
03
03
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
96
9 
Death 
| 
Baran
gay 
Malu
sob, 
Basil
an, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2003
0326 
20
03
03
26
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
50
9 
2003 
Call 
for 
Holy 
War 
Again
st 
U.S. 
20
03
03
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
80
7 
2003 
Rock
et 
Attac
k on 
ISAF 
Head
quart
ers in 
Kabul 
20
03
03
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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4 
2003 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Europ
ean 
Touri
sts 
(Tam
anras
set) 
20
03
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
39
2 
Arres
t | 
mom
basa, 
Keny
a | 
4/2/2
003 
20
03
04
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
56
6 2003 
Bomb
ing of 
Sasa 
Warf 
20
03
04
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 16
 
10
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
64
5 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Norw
ay | 
2003
0402 
20
03
04
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
92
4 
Arres
t | 
Saudi 
Araba
i | 
2003
0405 
20
03
04
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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4 
Arres
t | 
Cotab
ato 
City, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2003
0408 
20
03
04
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
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Confl
ict in 
Mind
anao 
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03
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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01
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4/200
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20
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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8 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Manil
a 
20
03
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
23
6 Visite
d 
Casab
lanca 20
03
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
06
8 
Arres
t | 
Indon
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2003
0424 
20
03
04
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
45
1 
2003 
Bomb
ing of 
Soeka
rno-
Hatta 
Airpo
rt 
(Jakar
ta) 
20
03
04
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
10
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
10
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Bomb
ing in 
Tel 
Aviv 
20
03
04
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
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39
7 
Arres
t | 
Karac
hi, 
Pakist
an | 
4/29/
2003 
20
03
04
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
13
2 
Death 
| Tel 
Aviv, 
Israel 
| 
2003
0429 
20
03
04
29
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
40
9 
Arres
t | 
Karac
hi, 
Pakist
an | 
5/200
3 
20
03
05
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
59
9 Arres
t |  | 
2003
0507 20
03
05
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
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2 
2003 
Kroro
nadal 
City 
Bomb
ings 
20
03
05
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
50
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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8 
2003 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
West
ern 
Comp
ounds 
in 
Riyad
h 
20
03
05
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 29
 
20
0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 20
 
E
vt
00
45
0 
2003 
Battle 
to 
Free 
Kidna
pping 
Victi
ms 
20
03
05
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
35
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Arriv
al in 
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alia | 
Sydn
ey, 
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alia | 
5/200
3 
20
03
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
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00
30
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t | 
Phno
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Penh | 
5/200
3 
20
03
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
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Bank 
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Meda
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20
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05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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6 
Arres
t | 
Bang
kok, 
Thail
and | 
5/200
3 
20
03
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
37
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Arriv
al in 
Sydn
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Sydn
ey, 
Austr
alia | 
5/200
3 
20
03
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
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0 Arres
t |  | 
2003
0515 20
03
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
76
4 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Unsp
ecifie
d 
Targe
ts in 
Zamb
oanga 
20
03
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
73
8 
Left 
Spain 
20
03
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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E
vt
00
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7 2003 
Casab
lanca 
Bomb
ings 
20
03
05
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 45
 
10
0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 19
 
E
vt
01
81
1 
Death 
| 
Casab
lanca, 
Moro
cco | 
2003
0516 
20
03
05
16
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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/A
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Arres
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Casab
lanca, 
Moro
cco | 
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20
03
05
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
00
1 
2003 
Raid 
on 
Earth
quake 
Aid 
Conv
oys 
20
03
05
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Fez, 
Moro
cco | 
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E
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81
2 
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Casab
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Moro
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05
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0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
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2 2003 
MILF 
Cease
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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26
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Arres
t | 
Moro
cco | 
5/30/
2003 
20
03
05
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
07
7 
2003 
Car 
Chase
/Firef
ight 
w/ 
Saudi 
Polic
e 
20
03
05
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
07
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t | 
Turba
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Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
2003
0531 
20
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05
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
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07
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0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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E
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2003 
Nasce
nt 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Hotel
s/Crui
se 
Ships 
in 
Mom
basa 
(Follo
w-up 
to 
Kika
mbala
) 
20
03
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
02
92
7 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Reuni
on 
Island 
20
03
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
92
6 
Arres
t | 
Paris, 
Franc
e | 
2003
0601 
20
03
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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5 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k US 
Housi
ng 
Comp
ound 
in 
Saudi 
Arabi
a 
20
03
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
33
7 
Arres
t | 
Tangi
ers | 
6/3/2
003 
20
03
06
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
52
4 
2003 
Nasce
nt 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Presi
dent 
Geor
ge W. 
Bush 
20
03
06
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
69
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Arres
t | 
Medi
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Saudi 
Arabi
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2003
0609 
20
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06
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Arres
t | 
Kuala 
Lump
ur, 
Mala
ysia | 
2003
0609 
20
03
06
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
60
1 Arres
t |  | 
2003
0612 20
03
06
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
08
5 
Arres
t | 
Algec
iras, 
Spain 
| 
6/14/
2003 
20
03
06
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
92
3 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Tetou
an, 
Moro
cco | 
2003
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20
03
06
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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02
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Arres
t | 
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esia | 
2003
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03
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1546 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
86
4 
Move
d to 
Syria 20
03
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
39
8 
Arres
t | 
Eastle
igh, 
Keny
a | 
6/17/
2003 
20
03
06
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
81
3 
Death 
| Beni 
Amra
ne, 
Alger
ia | 
2003
0618 
20
03
06
18
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
71
3 
2003 
Killin
g of 2 
Pakist
ani 
Polic
emen 
20
03
06
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
97
0 
Arres
t | 
Philip
pines 
| 
2003
0624 
20
03
06
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
07
2 
Arres
t | 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
2003
0626 
20
03
06
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1547 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
60
2 Arres
t |  | 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Relea
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2003 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Camp 
Lemo
nier 
in 
Djibo
uti 
20
03
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
 
E
vt
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11
9 Test 
of 
Deton
ators 20
03
07
02
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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vt
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Plot 
to 
Bomb 
U.S. 
Emba
ssy in 
Nairo
bi 
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07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
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29
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Plot 
to 
Blow
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Unde
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Gas 
Tanks 
in 
Balti
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20
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07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
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Plot 
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and 
Airpo
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20
03
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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Plot 
to 
Bomb 
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attack 
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/A
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/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
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4 Left 
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a for 
Ethio
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02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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US 
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Yeme
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20
03
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
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01
38
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2003 
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Presi
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03
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
74
9 Lived 
in 
Franc
e 20
03
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
66
7 Hidin
g in 
Pakist
an 20
03
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
23
5 Visite
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Britai
n 20
03
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
07
3 
2003 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Saudi 
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03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
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/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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5 
Death 
| Al-
Jawaf
, 
Saudi 
Araba
i | 
2003
0703 
20
03
07
03
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
81
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Death 
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Philip
pines 
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2003
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20
03
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0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
90
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eak | 
Manil
a, 
Philip
pines 
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2003
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03
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
60
3 Arres
t |  | 
2003
0715 2
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
62
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Iran | 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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00
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Arres
t | 
Camb
odia | 
7/200
3 
20
03
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
65
4 
Arres
t | 
Bang
kok, 
Thail
and | 
2003
0715 
20
03
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
05
4 Retur
n to 
Germ
any 20
03
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
56
2 
2003 
Negot
iation
s/Cea
sefire 
w/ 
Philip
pine 
Gov't 
20
03
07
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
06
0 
Arres
t | 
Gulha
n-e-
Iqbal, 
Pakist
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2003
0723 
20
03
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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2 
2003 
Attac
k on 
Mum
bai 
City 
Bus 
20
03
07
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 52
 
15
0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
39
3 
Arres
t | 
Mom
basa, 
Keny
a | 
8/1/2
003 
20
03
08
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
13
4 
Death 
| 
Mom
basa, 
Keny
a | 
2003
0801 
20
03
08
01
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
13
8 
Death 
| 
Jakart
a, 
Indon
esia | 
2003
0805 
20
03
08
05
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
09
4 
Arres
t | 
Ayutt
haya, 
Thail
and | 
8/11/
2003 
20
03
08
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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2003 
Jakart
a 
Marri
ott 
Attac
k 
20
03
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
15
0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 21
 
E
vt
00
93
7 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
APE
C 
Sum
mit/ 
West
ern 
Emba
ssies 
in 
Thail
and/C
omm
ercial 
Airlin
ers 
20
03
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
33
6 
2003 
Bomb
ing of 
Jorda
nian 
Emba
ssy in 
Bagh
dad 
20
03
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
 
40
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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R
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T
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ra
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tic
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 | 
U
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lt
 
T
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 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
99
5 
2003 
Shelt
ering 
of 
Hind
us 
after 
Mons
oon 
20
03
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
67
4 
Arres
t | 
Kali
manta
n, 
Indon
esia | 
2003
0815 
20
03
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
81
6 
Death 
| 
Philip
pines 
| 
2003
0815 
20
03
08
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
58
7 
Arres
t | 
Bagh
dad, 
Iraq | 
2003
0815 
20
03
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
69
2 
Arres
t | 
Khart
oum, 
Suda
n | 
2003
0815 
20
03
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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um
be
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nt
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 C
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ri
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th
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K
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ea
th
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id
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th
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D
ea
th
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te
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ea
th
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t o
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ea
th
 
D
ea
th
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ea
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w
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rr
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et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
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 f
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m
 D
et
en
ti
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E
sc
ap
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ep
or
ta
ti
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H
aj
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ilg
ri
m
ag
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L
od
gi
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ra
ve
l 
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ed
di
ng
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el
eb
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tio
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in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
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tw
a/
D
ec
re
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L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
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FB
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St
in
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Pl
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te
rr
up
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Pl
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A
ba
nd
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rt
ed
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N
as
ce
nt
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ot
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D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
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T
hr
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t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
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In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
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H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
30
2 
Arres
t | 
Phuk
et, 
Thail
and | 
8/23/
2003 
20
03
08
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
51
5 
2003 
Car-
bomb
ing of 
Mum
bai 
20
03
08
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 52
 
15
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
11
4 
2003 
Taxi 
Bomb
ing of 
Mum
bai 
20
03
08
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
58
8 
2003 
Car 
Bomb
ing of 
Shiite
s in 
Najaf 
20
03
08
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12
4 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
91
6 
Arres
t | 
Denm
ark | 
2003
0829 
20
03
08
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
81
7 
Death 
| 
Srina
gar, 
India 
| 
2003
0830 
20
03
08
30
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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m
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-S
ca
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ct
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Pl
ot
 
Pl
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FB
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Pl
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ot
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D
ev
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op
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ot
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T
hr
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tt
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k 
A
tt
ac
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| K
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le
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A
tt
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| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
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C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
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Fi
re
fi
gh
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T
ac
tic
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A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
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B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
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id
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O
pe
ra
tio
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T
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fr
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tu
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ar
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te
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H
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H
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U
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lt
 
T
ac
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 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
94
1 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Delhi 
20
03
08
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
08
0 Arres
t | ? | 
9/1/2
003 20
03
09
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
16
3 
Arres
t | 
Grena
da, 
Spain 
| 
9/5/2
003 
20
03
09
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
81
8 
Death 
| 
Srina
gar, 
India 
| 
2003
0906 
20
03
09
06
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
07
4 
Arres
t | 
Yeme
n | 
2003
0909 
20
03
09
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
26
0 
Arres
t | 
Milan
, Italy 
| 
9/200
3 
20
03
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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A
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nj
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T
ac
tic
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C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
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ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
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Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
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si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
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O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
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fr
as
tr
uc
tu
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 T
ar
ge
te
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T
ac
tic
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H
ij
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ki
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T
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tic
 | 
H
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ak
in
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T
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tic
 | 
U
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rm
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 A
ss
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
04
5 
Resig
ned/R
emov
ed as 
Emir/
Leade
r 
20
03
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
72
2 
Arres
t | 
Sabah
, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2003
0915 
20
03
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
81
9 
Death 
| 
Kash
mir | 
2003
0915 
20
03
09
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
20
2 
Arres
t | 
Mala
ysia 
|2003
0915 
20
03
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
89
4 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2003
0915 
20
03
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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N
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nt
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D
ev
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op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
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t/H
oa
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A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
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| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
08
8 
Arres
t | 
Alica
nte, 
Spain 
| 
9/19/
2003 
20
03
09
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
19
6 
Arres
t | 
Gulah
an-e-
Iqbal, 
Pakist
an | 
9/22/
2003 
20
03
09
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
 
E
vt
02
07
6 
2003 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Saudi 
Polic
e in 
Jizan 
20
03
09
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
07
5 
Death 
| 
Jizan, 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
2003
0924 
20
03
09
24
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
35
3 
Arres
t | 
Zamb
oanga
, 
Philip
pines 
| 
9/25/
2003 
20
03
09
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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D
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R
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E
vt
01
97
7 
2003 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Filipi
no 
TV 
Journ
alists 
20
03
09
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
70
5 
Death 
| 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2003
1002 
20
03
10
02
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
70
6 
2003 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Pakist
ani 
Force
s 
20
03
10
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
29
8 
Arres
t | 
Philip
pines 
| 
10/2/
2003 
20
03
10
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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7 
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Assas
sinati
on of 
Nurse 
Annal
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Tonel
li 
(Soml
iland 
Killin
g) 
20
03
10
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
33
2 
Arres
t | 
Sydn
ey, 
Austr
alia | 
10/9/
2003 
20
03
10
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
29
7 
Arres
t | 
Philip
pines 
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10/10
/2003 
20
03
10
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
82
0 
Death 
| 
Mind
anao, 
Philip
pines 
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2003
1012 
20
03
10
12
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
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t | 
Spain 
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10/14
/2003 
20
03
10
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
37
1 
Arriv
al in 
Spain 
| 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
10/20
03 
20
03
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
09
8 
Arres
t | 
Barce
lona, 
Spain 
| 
10/15
/2003 
20
03
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
27
5 
Arres
t | 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
10/20
03 
20
03
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
82
1 
Death 
| 
Islam
abad, 
Pakist
an | 
2003
1015 
20
03
10
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
41
6 
Arres
t | 
Mom
basa, 
Keny
a | 
10/18
/2003 
20
03
10
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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nk
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w
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N
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un
ct
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na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
53
8 
2003 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Britis
h 
Teach
ers 
(Som
alilan
d 
Killin
g) 
20
03
10
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
06
1 
Arres
t | 
Singa
pore | 
2003
1023 
20
03
10
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
06
2 
Arres
t | 
Singa
pore | 
2003
1025 
20
03
10
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
05
5 
Arres
t | 
Cireb
on, 
West 
Java, 
Indon
esia | 
2003
1029 
20
03
10
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
41
2 
Arres
t | 
Turke
y | 
11/20
03 
20
03
11
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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N
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tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
13
5 
Death 
| 
Istanb
ul, 
Turke
y | 
2003
1115 
20
03
11
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
23
2 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
11/20
03 
20
03
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
13
6 
Death 
| 
Istanb
ul, 
Turke
y | 
2003
1120 
20
03
11
20
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
74
1 
Arres
t | 
Yeme
n | 
2003
1125 
20
03
11
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
16
1 
Arres
t | 
Glouc
ester, 
Engla
nd | 
11/27
/2003 
20
03
11
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
01
60
4 Arres
t |  | 
2003
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03
11
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
72
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Indon
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
47
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Plot 
to 
Attac
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Polic
e HQ 
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03
12
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
00
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ing of 
Airpo
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Road 
in 
Jolo 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
89
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ing of 
Train 
in 
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ntuki, 
Russi
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20
03
12
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 41
 
20
0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
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Arres
t | 
Indan
an, 
Sulu | 
Philip
pines 
20
03
12
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
88
9 
2003 
Bomb
ing of 
Mosc
ow's 
natio
nal 
Hotel 
20
03
12
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
41
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Turke
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12/10
/2003 
20
03
12
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
40
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Atte
mpt 
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Perve
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Mush
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
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n 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
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15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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14
3 
Arres
t | 
Engla
nd | 
12/20
03 
20
03
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
07
8 
Sente
nced 
in 
Abse
ntia 
for 
Role 
in 
Casab
lanca 
Attac
ks 
20
03
12
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
41
8 
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t | 
Turke
y | 
12/19
/2003 
20
03
12
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
40
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12/25
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Assas
sinati
on 
Atte
mpt 
on 
Perve
z 
Mush
arraf 
20
03
12
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
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vt
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2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Pakist
an 
Bible 
Socie
ty 
20
04
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
10
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
75
6 
2004 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Philip
pine 
VP 
Candi
date 
Loren 
Legar
da 
20
04
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
72
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Yeme
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0115 
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01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
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12
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2004 
Threa
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Made 
Again
st 
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Statio
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20
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
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1 
Arres
t | 
Kurdi
stan, 
Iraq | 
2004
0125 
20
04
01
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
06
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Arres
t | 
Belfa
st, 
Irelan
d | 
2004
0201 
20
04
02
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
31
5 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Iraqi 
Polic
e 
Statio
n in 
Iskan
dariy
a 
20
04
02
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 55
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
31
4 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Iraqi 
Army
's 
Bagh
dad 
Recru
iting 
Statio
n 
20
04
02
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1572 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
18
6 
Arres
t | 
Jorda
n | 
2/200
4 
20
04
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
31
8 
Arres
t | 
Sint-
Jans-
Mole
nbeek
, 
Belgi
um | 
2/200
4 
20
04
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
31
7 
2004 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Coalit
ion 
Force
s in 
Habb
aniya 
20
04
02
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
31
6 
Death 
| 
Habb
aniya, 
Iraq | 
2004
0225 
20
04
02
25
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
74
9 
2004 
Super
Ferry 
14 
Bomb
ing 
20
04
02
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11
6 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
26
3 
2004 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
AFP 
in 
Jolo 
20
04
03
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
26
2 
Death 
| Jolo, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2004
0303 
20
04
03
03
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
31
8 
2004 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Basra 
Durin
g 
Ashur
a 
20
04
03
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
31
9 
2004 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Kirku
k 
Durin
g 
Ashur
a 
20
04
03
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
75
4 
Arres
t | 
Abya
ne, 
Yeme
n | 
2004
0304 
20
04
03
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
1574 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
32
0 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Bagh
dad 
Durin
g 
Ashur
a 
20
04
03
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 60
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
32
1 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Karba
la 
Durin
g 
Ashur
a 
20
04
03
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 60
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
65
7 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0313 
20
04
03
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
00
31
1 
Arres
t | 
San 
Sebas
tian, 
Spain 
| 
3/15/
2004 
20
04
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
59
7 Depar
ture 
from 
Spain 20
04
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
1575 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
77
9 2004 
Madri
d 
Attac
ks 
20
04
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 19
1 
20
50
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
 
E
vt
01
60
5 Arres
t |  | 
2004
0315 20
04
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
24
9 
2004 
Wana 
Raid 
by 
Pakist
ani 
Army 
20
04
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
75
5 
Arres
t | 
Philip
pines 
| 
2004
0315 
20
04
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
89
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0318 
20
04
03
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1576 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
23
5 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
3/19/
2004 
20
04
03
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
00
42
5 
2004 
Attac
k on 
Rang
ers' 
Van 
20
04
03
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
62
4 
Arres
t | 
Abya
n, 
Yeme
n | 
2004
0319 
20
04
03
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
65
9 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0320 
20
04
03
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
72
8 
2004 
Battle 
Again
st 
Pakist
ani 
Milita
ry 
(Marc
h 16-
28) 
20
04
03
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1577 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
66
7 
Arres
t | 
Tangi
ers, 
Moro
cco | 
2004
0325 
20
04
03
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
65
8 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0326 
20
04
03
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
66
0 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0329 
20
04
03
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
34
0 
Arres
t | 
Ujena
, 
Spain 
| 
3/29/
2004 
20
04
03
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
60
6 Arres
t |  | 
2004
0330 20
04
03
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
1578 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
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Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
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2004
0330 
20
04
03
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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vt
02
21
5 
2004 
Peace 
Talks 
w/ 
Philip
pine 
Gov't 
20
04
03
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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02
89
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Relea
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from 
Deten
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Spain 
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2004
0402 
20
04
04
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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13
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Spain 
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4/2/2
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20
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02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
74
1 2004 
Lega
nes 
Suici
de 
20
04
04
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
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2 
Death 
| 
Lega
nes, 
Spain 
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2004
0403 
20
04
04
03
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
 
E
vt
01
24
2 
Warn
ed 
Lega
nes 
Apart
ment 
20
04
04
03
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
70
9 
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Pakist
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2004
0403 
20
04
04
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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80
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Ward
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Provi
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2004
0403 
20
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
00
71
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Killin
g of 5 
Pakist
ani 
Polic
emen 
20
04
04
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
 
1580 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
61
4 Escap
e to 
Belgi
um 20
04
04
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
23
9 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
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4/6/2
004 
20
04
04
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
73
9 Arres
t | 
USA | 
2004
0406 
20
04
04
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
82
3 
Death 
| 
Kupw
ara 
Distri
ct, 
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u and 
Kash
mir | 
2004
0408 
20
04
04
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0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
51
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Car-
bomb
ing of 
Marin
a 
Club 
(Kara
chi) 
20
04
04
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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4 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Yeme
n | 
2004
0411 
20
04
04
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
55
9 
2004 
Plot 
to 
Use 
Chem
. 
Weap
ons 
Again
st 
Jorda
n 
20
04
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
49
6 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
UN 
Build
ing in 
Dama
scus 
20
04
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
33
4 
Arres
t | 
Sydn
ey, 
Austr
alia | 
4/200
4 
20
04
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
64
0 
Fled 
Austr
alia 
for 
Leba
non 
20
04
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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0 
Arres
t | 
Manil
a, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2004
0415 
20
04
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
04
9 
Arres
t | 
Philip
pines 
| 
2004
0415 
20
04
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
54
7 
Death 
| 
Falluj
ah, 
Iraq | 
2004
0415 
20
04
04
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
66
1 
Arres
t | 
Spain 
| 
2004
0415 
20
04
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
76
3 
2004 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Unsp
ecifie
d 
Targe
ts in 
Zamb
oanga 
20
04
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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7 Visite
d 
Lond
on 20
04
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
33
3 
Arres
t | 
Sydn
ey, 
Austr
alia | 
4/16/
2004 
20
04
04
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
08
3 
Arres
t | 
Alcal
a de 
Henar
es, 
Spain 
| 
4/18/
2004 
20
04
04
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
88
7 
Death 
| 
Chec
hnya | 
2004
0418 
20
04
04
18
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1584 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
38
7 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Germ
an 
Aid 
Work
er/Mu
rder 
of 
Keny
an 
Contr
act 
Empl
oyees 
(Som
alilan
d 
Killin
g) 
20
04
04
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
65
9 
Arres
t | 
Doqo
shey, 
Soma
lia | 
2004
0419 
20
04
04
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
11
1 
Arres
t | 
Berra
chid, 
Moro
cco | 
4/20/
2004 
20
04
04
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
1585 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
92
4 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Falls 
Churc
h, VA 
| 
2004
0420 
20
04
04
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
88
8 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0423 
20
04
04
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
66
5 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0423 
20
04
04
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1586 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
72
9 
Shaka
i 
Agree
ment 
(Pard
on in 
Exch
ange 
for 
Expel
ling 
Forei
gn 
Fight
ers 
from 
Wazir
istan) 
20
04
04
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
66
6 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0426 
20
04
04
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
15
4 
Arres
t | 
Fuenl
abrad
a, 
Spain 
| 
4/26/
2004 
20
04
04
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1587 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
12
4 
Arres
t | 
Casab
lanca, 
Moro
cco | 
4/30/
2004 
20
04
04
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
90
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0430 
20
04
04
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
88
9 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0505 
20
04
05
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
10
6 
2004 
Suici
de 
bomb
ing of 
Hyde
ri 
Mosq
ue 
(Shiit
e) 
20
04
05
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 45
 
12
7 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
1588 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
29
3 
Arres
t | 
Paral
a, 
Spain 
| 
5/7/2
004 
20
04
05
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
32
2 
2004 
Kidna
pping
/Behe
ading 
of 
Amer
ican 
Nicho
las 
Berg 
20
04
05
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
92
5 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0511 
20
04
05
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
46
3 
Noor
din's 
Secon
d 
Wedd
ing 
20
04
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
1589 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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2004 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
Iraqi 
Gove
rning 
Coun
cil 
20
04
05
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
13
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t | 
Chad 
| 
5/18/
2004 
20
04
05
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
32
6 
Arres
t | 
Spain 
| 
5/21/
2004 
20
04
05
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
00
48
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Bomb
ing of 
Pakist
an-
Amer
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ral 
Cente
r 
20
04
05
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 # 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
82
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Pakist
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2004
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20
04
05
30
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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5 Arres
t | 
Iraq | 
2004
0530 
20
04
05
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
87
5 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Ali 
Reza 
Mosq
ue 
(Shiit
e) 
20
04
05
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
38
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
12
5 
Arres
t | 
Casab
lanca, 
Moro
cco | 
6/1/2
004 
20
04
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
25
9 
Arres
t | 
Milan
, Italy 
| 
6/7/2
004 
20
04
06
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
66
2 
Arres
t | 
Astur
ias, 
Spain 
| 
2004
0609 
20
04
06
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
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3 
2004 
Assas
sinati
on 
Atte
mpt 
on 
Gen. 
Ahsa
n 
Salee
m 
Hayat 
20
04
06
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
U
n 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
80
9 
2004 
Killin
g of 
Chine
se 
Engin
eers 
in 
Kund
uz 
Provi
nce 
20
04
06
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
90
6 
2004 
Pakist
ani 
Army 
Raid 
on 
Jihadi 
Safeh
ouses 
20
04
06
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
66
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Spain 
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2004
0611 
20
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06
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Arres
t | 
Karac
hi, 
Pakist
an | 
6/12/
2004 
20
04
06
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
23
0 
2004 
Kidna
pping 
& 
Behe
ading 
of 
Amer
ican 
Contr
actor 
Paul 
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20
04
06
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
87
6 
Arres
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Pakist
an | 
2004
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20
04
06
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
87
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Death 
| 
Karch
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Pakist
an | 
2004
0612 
20
04
06
12
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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0 
Arres
t | 
Baghl
an, 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2004
0612 
20
04
06
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
32
9 
2004 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
GE 
Contr
actors 
in 
Bagh
dad 
20
04
06
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
91
8 
2004 
Plot 
Again
st 
Nucle
ar 
React
or in 
Holla
nd 
20
04
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
22
4 
2004 
Truck
-
Bomb
ing of 
Alger
ian 
Electr
ical 
Facili
ty 
20
04
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Arres
t | 
Nethe
rlands 
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6/200
4 
20
04
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
66
3 
Arres
t | 
Britai
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0615 
20
04
06
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
00
99
1 
2004 
Plot 
to 
Shoot
-
Down 
an El-
Al 
Flight 
in 
Zuric
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20
04
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
73
0 
Death 
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Wana
, 
Pakist
an | 
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0617 
20
04
06
17
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
23
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Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Saudi 
Polic
e 
20
04
06
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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32
6 
2004 
Kidna
pping
/Behe
ading 
of 
Korea
n 
Kim 
Sun Il 
20
04
06
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
23
1 
Death 
| 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
2004
0618 
20
04
06
18
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
82
5 
Death 
| al-
Qasr, 
Alger
ia | 
2004
0620 
20
04
06
20
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
11
0 
Arres
t | 
Beni 
Mella
l, 
Moro
cco | 
6/21/
2004 
20
04
06
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
89
2 
False 
Repor
t of 
Death 
| 
Ingus
hetia, 
Russi
a | 
2004
0622 
20
04
06
22
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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30
9 
Arres
t | 
Rotte
rdam, 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
2004
0624 
20
04
06
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
32
7 2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Mosu
l 
20
04
06
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 62
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
32
8 
2004 
Arme
d 
Assau
lt on 
Baqu
ba 
20
04
06
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
33
7 
2004 
Kidna
pping
/Behe
ading 
of 
Bulga
rian 
Truck
ers 
20
04
06
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
70
4 
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t | 
Suko
harjo, 
Java, 
Indon
esia | 
2004
0630 
20
04
06
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
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E
vt
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70
1 
Arres
t | 
Moga
dishu, 
Soma
lia | 
2004
0630 
20
04
06
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
24
1 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
7/1/2
004 
20
04
07
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
54
5 2004 
Crevi
ce 
Plot 20
04
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
 
E
vt
01
07
1 
2004 
Robb
eries 
in 
Switz
erlan
d 
20
04
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
00
91
7 
2004 
Plot 
again
st 
Dutch 
Politi
cians 
20
04
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
76
9 2004 
Jolo 
Bomb
ings 20
04
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
20
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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E
vt
00
31
7 
Arres
t | 
Shaka
i, 
Pakist
an | 
7/2/2
004 
20
04
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
69
6 
Arres
t | 
Mala
ysia | 
2004
0702 
20
04
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
92
6 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
2004
0702 
20
04
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
92
7 2004 
Depo
rtatio
n to 
Spain 
20
04
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
15
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Mala
ysia | 
2004
0702  
20
04
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
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00
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in 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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Provi
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20
04
07
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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00
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in 
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 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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8 Arres
t |  | 
2004
0725 20
04
07
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
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04
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2004 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Coalit
ion 
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s in 
Mosu
l 
20
04
08
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
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08
04
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vt
02
69
3 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Khart
oum, 
Suda
n | 
2004
0808 
20
04
08
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
03
5 
2004 
WM
D 
Plot 
Again
st 
NYS
E and 
other 
US 
Finan
cial 
Targe
ts 
20
04
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
01
48
6 
2004 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
NYC 
Subw
ay 
Near 
RNC 
20
04
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
22
3 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
8/200
4 
20
04
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
28
0 
Arres
t | 
North
ern 
Iraq | 
8/200
4 
20
04
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
70
3 
Arres
t | 
New 
York, 
NY | 
2004
0827 
20
04
08
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
35
4 
Arres
t | 
Zuric
h, 
Switz
erlan
d | 
3822
7 
20
04
08
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
46
1 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Austr
alian 
Emba
ssy in 
Jakart
a 
20
04
09
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
 
15
0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 24
 
E
vt
02
05
6 
Death 
| 
Jakart
a, 
Indon
esia | 
2004
0909 
20
04
09
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
46
1 
2004 
Besla
n 
Scho
ol 
Siege 
20
04
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 38
5 
78
3 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
 
E
vt
01
89
4 
Death 
| 
Besla
n, 
Russi
a | 
2004
0915 
20
04
09
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
60
9 Arres
t |  | 
2004
0915 20
04
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
89
3 
Arres
t | 
Besla
n, 
Russi
a | 
2004
0915 
20
04
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
92
8 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Leba
non | 
2004
0915 
20
04
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
57
5 
2004 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Amer
ican 
and 
Britis
h 
Engin
eers 
in 
Bagh
dad 
20
04
09
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
92
9 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Indon
esia | 
2004
0916 
20
04
09
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
57
6 
2004 
Behe
ading 
of 
Amer
ican 
Engin
eer 
Euge
ne 
Arms
trong 
20
04
09
19
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
57
8 
2004 
Kidna
pping
/Behe
ading 
of 
'Iraqi 
Intel 
Offic
ers' 
20
04
09
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
82
6 
Death 
| 
Nawa
bshah
, 
Pakist
an | 
2004
0928 
20
04
09
28
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
83
4 2004 
Taba 
Bomb
ings 20
04
10
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 34
 
17
1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
 
E
vt
02
83
9 
Death 
| 
Taba, 
Egypt 
| 
2004
1007 
20
04
10
07
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
82
7 
Death 
| 
Karac
hi, 
Pakist
an | 
2004
1009 
20
04
10
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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E
vt
02
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2 
2004 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Chine
se 
Engin
eers 
20
04
10
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
57
7 
2004 
Behe
ading 
of 
Britis
h 
Engin
eer 
Ken 
Bigle
y 
20
04
10
09
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
23
4 
Death 
| 
Gamu
rziye
vo, 
Russi
a | 
2004
1010 
20
04
10
10
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
95
3 
2004 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Spani
sh 
Natio
nal 
Court 
Build
ing in 
Madri
d 
20
04
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
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ra
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nt
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tio
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E
vt
00
16
8 
Arres
t | 
Hamb
urg, 
Germ
any | 
10/15
/2004 
20
04
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
58
3 Bayat 
to 
Kevin 
James 20
04
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
11
7 
Arres
t | 
Caba
nuela
s, 
Spain 
| 
10/18
/2004 
20
04
10
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
14
2 
Arres
t | El 
Ejido, 
Spain 
| 
10/18
/2004 
20
04
10
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
24
4 
Arres
t | 
Mala
ga, 
Spain 
| 
10/18
/2004 
20
04
10
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ra
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E
vt
00
08
9 
Arres
t | 
Alme
ria, 
Spain 
| 
10/19
/2004 
20
04
10
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
11
8 
Arres
t | 
Caba
nuela
s, 
Spain 
| 
10/19
/2004 
20
04
10
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
15
6 
Arres
t | 
Gandi
a, 
Spain 
| 
10/19
/2004 
20
04
10
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
23
0 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
10/19
/2004 
20
04
10
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
29
1 
Arres
t | 
Pamp
lona, 
Spain 
| 
10/19
/2004 
20
04
10
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
57
9 
2004 
Faile
d 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Mo. 
Essa 
Baher 
(Com
mand
er 
Iraqi 
Nat'l 
Guar
d) 
20
04
10
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
73
1 
2004 
Battle 
Again
st 
Pakist
ani 
Milita
ry in 
Spink
ai 
Ragh
zai 
20
04
10
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
58
0 
2004 
Exec
ution 
of 
Shose
i 
Koda 
20
04
10
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ra
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nk
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N
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un
ct
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na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
74
7 
Arres
t | 
Zamb
oanga
, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2004
1025 
20
04
10
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
 
E
vt
01
88
3 
Arres
t | 
South 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2004
1101 
20
04
11
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
12
3 
2004 
Theo 
Van 
Gogh 
Murd
er 
20
04
11
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
64
1 
Fled 
Nethe
rlands 20
04
11
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
66
8 
Arres
t | 
Bogo
r, 
Indon
esia | 
2004
1105 
20
04
11
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
1615 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
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nk
no
w
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N
o.
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un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
23
3 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
11/8/
2004 
20
04
11
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
23
4 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
11/9/
2004 
20
04
11
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
66
1 2004 
Hagu
e 
Stand
off 
20
04
11
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
16
7 
Arres
t | 
Hagu
e, 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
11/10
/2004 
20
04
11
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
50
1 
Rudi
menta
ry 
Traini
ng in 
Geor
gia, 
USA 
20
04
11
15
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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20
8 
Arres
t | 
Lava
pies, 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2/2/2
005 
20
05
02
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
25
6 
Arres
t | 
Melill
a, 
Spain 
| 
2/3/2
005 
20
05
02
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
05
7 Retur
n to 
Lond
on 20
05
02
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
75
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2005 
Valen
tine's 
Day 
Bomb
ing 
20
05
02
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 
10
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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vt
01
75
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Philip
pines 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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2/200
5 
20
05
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
15
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Arres
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Solo, 
Java, 
Indon
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0215 
20
05
02
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
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Relea
se 
from 
Deten
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Madri
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Spain 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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vt
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Ashur
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Attac
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20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 39
 
15
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0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
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Shoot
-out 
w/ 
Karac
hi 
Polic
e 
20
05
03
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
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0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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hi, 
Pakist
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3/2/2
005 
20
05
03
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
41
0 
2005 
Attac
k on 
Alger
ian 
Muni
cipal 
Guar
ds 
20
05
03
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 18
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
15
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3/7/2
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05
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
59
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Bomb
ing of 
Bagh
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Sadr 
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20
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 
40
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
90
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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E
vt
01
50
0 
2005-
2006 
Nasce
nt 
Plot 
to 
target 
U.S. 
Oil 
Refin
eries 
and 
Milita
ry 
Bases 
20
05
03
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
99
0 
Death 
| 
Bicut
an 
Priso
n, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2005
0315 
20
05
03
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
99
1 
2005 
Bicut
an 
Priso
n 
Riot 
20
05
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
02
06
6 
Arres
t | 
Mind
anao, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2005
0315 
20
05
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
31
9 
Arres
t | 
Sloug
h, 
Engla
nd | 
3/19/
2005 
20
05
03
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
22
6 
2005 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
Theat
er in 
Qatar 
20
05
03
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
22
7 
Death 
| 
Qatar 
| 
2005
0320 
20
05
03
20
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
05
3 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Mala
ysia | 
2005
0322 
20
05
03
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
97
1 
Arres
t | 
Zamb
oanga 
City, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2005
0326 
20
05
03
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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lt
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tic
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nk
no
w
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N
o.
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un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
52
6 2005 
Chlef 
Attac
k 20
05
03
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
02
27
1 
Arres
t | 
Detro
it, MI 
| 
2005
0327 
20
05
03
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
23
7 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
4/1/2
005 
20
05
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
 
E
vt
00
16
0 
Arres
t | 
Getaf
e, 
Spain 
| 
4/1/2
005 
20
05
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
29
2 
Arres
t | 
Parac
uellos 
del 
Jaram
a, 
Spain 
| 
4/1/2
005 
20
05
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
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B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
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lt
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gh
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tic
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ng
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tic
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pe
ra
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lt
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ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
61
0 Arres
t |  | 
2005
0401 20
05
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
64
0 
2005 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Saudi 
Force
s in 
Al-
Rus 
20
05
04
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
63
8 
Death 
| Al-
Rus, 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
2005
0403 
20
05
04
03
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
93
3 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2005
0405 
20
05
04
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
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lt
 
T
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tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
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un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
93
4 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
2005
0406 
20
05
04
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
84
8 
2005 
Bomb
ing of 
Cairo'
s 
Khan 
al-
Khali
li 
Bazaa
r 
20
05
04
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
 
E
vt
02
84
9 
Death 
| 
Cairo
, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0407 
20
05
04
07
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
85
0 
Arres
t | 
Cairo
, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0410 
20
05
04
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ra
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nk
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un
ct
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l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
08
4 
Arres
t | 
Algec
iras, 
Spain 
| 
4/12/
2005 
20
05
04
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
85
1 
Arres
t | 
Cairo
, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0417 
20
05
04
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
85
3 
Death 
| 
Cairo
, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0428 
20
05
04
28
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
85
5 
2005 
Arme
d 
Assau
lt on 
Touri
st 
Busse
s in 
Cairo 
20
05
04
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
85
4 
Arres
t | 
Cairo
, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0428 
20
05
04
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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ra
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rm
ed
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ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
85
2 
2005 
Bomb
ing 
Near 
Cairo'
s 
Egypt
ian 
Muse
um 
20
05
04
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 7 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
25
5 
Arres
t | 
Mard
an, 
Pakist
an | 
5/4/2
005 
20
05
05
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
85
6 
Arres
t | 
Libya 
| 
2005
0507 
20
05
05
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
90
3 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2005
0510 
20
05
05
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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D
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 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
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 D
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 C
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nd
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rt
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N
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ce
nt
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D
ev
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op
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T
hr
ea
t/H
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tt
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A
tt
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| K
il
le
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A
tt
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ur
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T
ac
tic
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B
R
N
 
T
ac
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A
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 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
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Fi
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gh
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A
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B
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ra
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
90
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2005
0511 
20
05
05
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
51
1 
Traini
ng in 
Engla
nd's 
Lake 
Distri
ct 
20
05
05
15
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
33
1 
Arres
t | 
Switz
erlan
d | 
5/200
5 
20
05
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
09
8 
2005 
Suici
de 
attack 
in 
Iraq 
20
05
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 8 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
33
5 
Arres
t | 
Syria 
| 
5/200
5 
20
05
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 C
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ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
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nt
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ev
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op
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hr
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tt
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k 
A
tt
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| K
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le
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A
tt
ac
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| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
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A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
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Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
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A
ss
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si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
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B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
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pe
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n 
T
ac
tic
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fr
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tr
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tu
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ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
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ij
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ki
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T
ac
tic
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T
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tic
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rm
ed
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ss
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
13
0 
Death 
| 
Bagh
dad, 
Iraq | 
2005
0515 
20
05
05
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
39
8 
2005 
Arson 
of 
Stanis
lavsk
y and 
Nemi
rovic
h-
Danc
henko 
Theat
er 
20
05
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
89
1 
2005 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Iraqi 
Gove
rning 
Coun
cil 
Presi
dent 
20
05
05
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
33
9 
Arres
t | 
Tours
, 
Franc
e | 
5/18/
2005 
20
05
05
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 C
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nt
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ev
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op
ed
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hr
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oa
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k 
A
tt
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k 
| K
il
le
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A
tt
ac
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nj
ur
ed
 
T
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tic
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C
B
R
N
 
T
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tic
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rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
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Fi
re
fi
gh
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T
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tic
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A
ss
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si
na
ti
on
 
T
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tic
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B
om
bi
ng
 
T
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tic
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pe
ra
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tr
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ar
ge
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
09
1 
Arres
t | 
Amst
erda
m, 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
5/19/
2005 
20
05
05
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
55
7 
Death 
| 
Ninev
eh, 
Iraq | 
2005
0525 
20
05
05
25
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
48
7 
2005 
Arme
d 
Robb
ery of 
Gas 
Statio
n in 
Los 
Angel
es, 
CA 
20
05
05
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
55
8 
2005 
Car 
Bomb
ing of 
Bagh
dad 
Airpo
rt 
Chec
kpoin
t 
20
05
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
15
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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T
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A
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A
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T
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tic
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C
B
R
N
 
T
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tic
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A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
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A
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ra
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ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
89
5 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2005
0601 
20
05
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
24
7 White
water 
Rafti
ng 20
05
06
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
00
2 
2005 
Raid 
on 
Mauri
tanian 
Milita
ry 
Post 
20
05
06
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
01
82
8 
Death 
| 
Lemg
heitty
, 
Mauri
tania | 
2005
0604 
20
05
06
04
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
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B
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N
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lt
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
42
3 
2005 
Attac
k on 
North
ern 
Mauri
tanian 
L'Mg
hiti 
Army 
Camp 
20
05
06
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
 
17
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
82
9 
Death 
| Mali 
| 
2005
0604 
20
05
06
04
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
02
31
1 
Arres
t | 
Sacra
ment
o, CA 
| 
2005
0605 
20
05
06
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
48
9 
2005 
Arme
d 
Robb
ery of 
Gas 
Statio
n in 
Torre
nce, 
CA 
20
05
06
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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B
R
N
 
T
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A
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lt
 
T
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Fi
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T
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A
ss
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T
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B
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ng
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ra
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
87
8 
2004 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Shiite
s in 
Pakist
an 
20
05
06
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
87
9 
Arres
t | 
Swat, 
Pakist
an | 
2005
0609 
20
05
06
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
49
0 
2005 
Arme
d 
Robb
ery of 
Gas 
Statio
n in 
Playa 
Del 
Rey, 
CA 
20
05
06
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
24
0 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
6/14/
2005 
20
05
06
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
56
0 
Arres
t | 
Mosu
l, Iraq 
| 
2005
0614 
20
05
06
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Attac
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
63
9 
2005 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Saudi 
Force
s in 
Riyad
h 
20
05
07
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
63
7 
Death 
| 
Riyad
h, 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
2005
0703 
20
05
07
03
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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Lond
on 
Bomb
ings 
(7/7) 
20
05
07
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 56
 
70
0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 17
 
E
vt
00
47
1 
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Bomb
ing of 
Aldga
te 
Unde
rgrou
nd 
(7/7) 
20
05
07
07
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
 
17
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0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
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King'
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Cross 
Bomb
ing 
(7/7) 
20
05
07
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1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 27
 
14
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0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
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48
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Bomb
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Death 
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Aldga
te, 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2005
0707 
20
05
07
07
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
83
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Death 
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2005
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07
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0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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| 
Kings 
Cross
, 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2005
0707 
20
05
07
07
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| 
Tavis
tock 
Sq, 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2005
0707 
20
05
07
07
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1648 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
56
1 
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t | 
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Iraq | 
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20
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07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
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Jailbr
eak | 
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Afgh
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n | 
2005
0710 
20
05
07
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
00
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Arres
t | 
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ia | 
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5 
20
05
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
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Relea
se 
from 
Deten
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2005
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07
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
69
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Lond
on 
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Bomb
ing 
20
05
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
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E
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02
56
3 
2005 
Kidna
pping
/Assa
ssinat
ion of 
Alger
ian 
Diplo
mats 
20
05
07
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
50
6 
2005 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Little 
Wor
mwo
od 
Scrub
s 
(21/7) 
20
05
07
21
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
50
7 
2005 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Hack
ney 
Bus 
(21/7) 
20
05
07
21
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
50
8 
2005 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Shep
herd's 
Bush 
(21/7) 
20
05
07
21
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
01
50
9 
2005 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Warr
en 
Street 
Statio
n 
(21/7) 
20
05
07
21
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
51
0 
2005 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Stock
well 
Train 
(21/7) 
20
05
07
21
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
83
3 
2005 
Shar
m al-
Sheik 
Attac
ks 
20
05
07
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 88
 
15
0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
02
83
6 
2005 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Egypt
ian 
Polic
e at 
'Ataq
a 
Mtns. 
20
05
07
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ra
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w
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N
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un
ct
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na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
83
5 
Death 
| 
'Ataq
a 
Moun
tains, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0725 
20
05
07
25
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
68
7 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2005
0726 
20
05
07
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
11
2 
Arres
t | 
Birmi
ngha
m, 
Engla
nd | 
7/27/
2005 
20
05
07
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
16
5 
Arres
t | 
Gujra
nwala
, 
Pakist
an | 
7/28/
2005 
20
05
07
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
68
8 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2005
0729 
20
05
07
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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nt
er
ac
tio
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E
vt
01
72
0 
Arres
t | 
Rome
, Italy 
| 
2005
0730 
20
05
07
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
27
9 
Arres
t | 
Engla
nd | 
2005
0731 
20
05
07
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
27
7 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2005
0807 
20
05
08
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
84
1 
Arres
t | al-
Arish
, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0814 
20
05
08
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
84
3 
Death 
| al-
Arish
, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0815 
20
05
08
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
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un
ct
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l I
nt
er
ac
tio
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E
vt
01
76
1 
2005 
Zamb
oanga 
City 
Bomb
ings 
20
05
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
26
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
87
0 
2005 
IED 
Attac
k on 
Cana
dian 
MOF 
Troop
s 
20
05
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
50
2 
Failur
e to 
Join 
Lashk
ar e-
Taiba 
20
05
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
84
4 
Arres
t | Al-
Arish
, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0815 
20
05
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
22
9 
2005 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Saudi 
Polic
e 
20
05
08
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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N
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un
ct
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na
l I
nt
er
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tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
22
8 
Death 
| 
Medi
na, 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
2005
0818 
20
05
08
18
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
84
2 
Arres
t | al-
Arish
, 
Egypt 
| 
2005
0818 
20
05
08
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
54
3 
2005 
Rock
et 
Attac
k on 
USS 
Ashla
nd 
and 
USS 
Kears
arge 
20
05
08
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
02
54
4 
Arres
t | 
Syria 
| 
2005
0822 
20
05
08
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
56
4 
2005 
Decla
ration 
of 
"Full-
Scale 
War 
on 
Shiite
s All 
Over 
Iraq" 
20
05
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
46
6 
2005 
Robb
ery of 
Mobil
e 
Phon
e 
Shop 
20
05
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
51
3 2005 
Car 
Bomb
ing in 
Iraq 
20
05
09
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 60
 
70
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
56
6 
2005 
Bomb
ing of 
Balad 
(Shiit
e 
Town
) 
20
05
09
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 60
 
70
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
46
7 2005 
Bali 
Bomb
ings 20
05
10
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 26
 
10
0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
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E
vt
02
13
9 
Death 
| 
Jimba
rong, 
Indon
esia | 
2005
1001 
20
05
10
01
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
69
4 
Arres
t | 
Khart
oum, 
Suda
n | 
2005
1005 
20
05
10
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
27
4 
Arres
t | 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
10/14
/2005 
20
05
10
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
56
8 
Death 
| 
Rama
di, 
Iraq | 
2005
1014 
20
05
10
14
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
50
8 
Call 
for 
End 
to 
Confl
ict in 
Alger
ia 
20
05
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
91
9 
2005 
Plot 
Again
st 
Schip
hol 
Airpo
rt 
20
05
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
64
4 
Arres
t | 
Bosni
a | 
2005
1019 
20
05
10
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
56
9 
2005 
Suici
de 
Car 
Bomb
ing of 
Palest
ine 
Hotel 
20
05
10
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 
15
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
56
9 
2005 
Delhi 
Bomb
ings 
(Pre-
Diwal
i 
Blasts
) 
20
05
10
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 62
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
 
E
vt
02
90
9 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
2005
1101 
20
05
11
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
67
4 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2005
1104 
20
05
11
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
64
1 
Arres
t | 
Quett
a, 
Pakist
an | 
2005
1104 
20
05
11
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
65
1 
Arres
t | 
Melb
ourne
, 
Austr
alia | 
2005
1108 
20
05
11
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
 
E
vt
02
65
0 
Arres
t | 
Sydn
ey, 
Austr
alia | 
2005
1108 
20
05
11
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
 
E
vt
02
64
9 
2005 
Suici
de 
Plot 
Again
st 
Sydn
ey 
20
05
11
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
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E
vt
02
64
8 
2005 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Austr
alian 
Polic
e 
20
05
11
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
05
7 
Arres
t | 
Java, 
Indon
esia | 
2005
1108 
20
05
11
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
56
7 
2005 
Bomb
ing of 
West
ern 
Hotel
s in 
Amm
an 
20
05
11
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 60
 
11
5 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
02
05
8 
2005 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Detac
hmen
t-88 
in 
Mela
ng 
20
05
11
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
54
5 
Death 
| 
Amm
an, 
Jorda
n | 
2005
1109 
20
05
11
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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E
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83
4 
Death 
| East 
Java, 
Indon
esia | 
2005
1109 
20
05
11
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
54
6 
Arres
t | 
Amm
an, 
Jorda
n | 
2005
1113 
20
05
11
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
53
8 
Video 
Praisi
ng 
Zawa
hri 
and 
Urgin
g 
Iraqi 
Insur
gency 
Onwa
rd 
20
05
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
99
7 
2005 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
AFP 
in 
Tawi-
Tawi 
20
05
11
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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vt
01
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8 
Death 
| 
Buan 
Villa
ge, 
Pangl
ima, 
Sugal
a, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2005
1116 
20
05
11
16
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
99
9 
Arres
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Buan 
Villa
ge, 
Pangl
ima, 
Sugal
a, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2005
1116 
20
05
11
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
74
2 
Death 
| 
Miran 
Shah, 
Pakist
an | 
2005
1201 
20
05
12
01
 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
01
49
9 
2005 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
U.S. 
Oil 
Pipeli
nes 
and 
Refin
eries 
20
05
12
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
30
4 
Arres
t | 
Pragu
e, 
Czec
h 
Repu
blic | 
12/11
/2005 
20
05
12
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
50
3 
2006 
'Plot' 
to 
Bomb 
the 
Sears 
Towe
r 
20
05
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
20
0 
Arres
t | 
Kurin
g-gai, 
Sydn
ey, 
Austr
alia | 
12/20
05 
20
05
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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0 
Arres
t | 
Spain 
| 
2005
1219 
20
05
12
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
27
6 
Arres
t | 
Gatwi
ck, 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2005
1220 
20
05
12
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
51
5 
Firear
ms 
Traini
ng in 
Goul
dsbor
o, PA 
20
06
01
03
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
87
9 
2006 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Amer
ican 
Journ
alist 
Jill 
Carro
ll 
20
06
01
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
34
7 
Arres
t | 
Vilan
ova, 
Spain 
| 
1/10/
2006 
20
06
01
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
31
2 
Arres
t | 
Santa 
Colo
ma de 
Gram
anet, 
Spain 
| 
1/12/
2006 
20
06
01
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
30
5 
Arres
t | 
Rabat
, 
Moro
cco | 
1/200
6 ? 
20
06
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
83
6 
Death 
| 
Toudj
a, 
Alger
ia | 
2006
0117 
20
06
01
17
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
14
6 
Arres
t | 
Estep
ona, 
Spain 
| 
1/22/
2006 
20
06
01
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
27
8 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2006
0128 
20
06
01
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
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90
3 
Jailbr
eak | 
Yeme
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2006
0203 
20
06
02
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
02
10
7 
2006 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Karna
vati 
Expre
ss 
20
06
02
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
77
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2006 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing 
Near 
U.S. 
Cons
ulate 
in 
Karac
hi 
20
06
03
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
57
1 
2006 
Varan
asi 
Bomb
ings 
20
06
03
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 22
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
50
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2006 
'Plot' 
to 
Bomb 
FBI 
Build
ings 
20
06
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15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
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E
vt
02
88
0 
2006 
Kidna
pping
/Killi
ng of 
Amer
ican 
Christ
ian 
Aid 
Work
er 
Tom 
Fox 
20
06
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
07
9 Arres
t | ? | 
3/200
6 20
06
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
61
3 Arres
t |  | 
2006
0323 20
06
03
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
20
4 
2006 
Bomb
ing of 
Coop
erativ
e 
Mark
et in 
Jolo 
20
06
03
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
88
7 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2006
0407 
20
06
04
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
00
06
2 
2006 
Amb
ush 
of 
Alger
ian 
Custo
ms 
Offici
als 
20
06
04
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
25
3 
2006 
Bomb
ing of 
Jama 
Masji
d 
(Delh
i) 
20
06
04
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
10
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
10
4 
Arres
t | 
New 
Delhi
, 
India 
| 
2006
0415 
20
06
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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E
vt
01
83
7 
Death 
| 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2006
0415 
20
06
04
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
10
5 
Death 
| New 
Delhi
, 
India 
| 
2006
0415 
20
06
04
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
64
0 
Arres
t | 
Bangl
adesh 
| 
2006
0417 
20
06
04
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
54
0 
2006 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Pakist
ani 
Force
s 
20
06
04
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
53
9 
Death 
| 
Khaar
, 
Pakist
an | 
2006
0421 
20
06
04
21
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
83
2 2006 
Daha
b 
Bomb
ings 
20
06
04
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 23
 
62
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
84
6 
Death 
| 
Daha
b, 
Egypt 
| 
2006
0424 
20
06
04
24
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
15
4 
2006 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Detac
hmen
t-88 
(Won
osobo 
Raid) 
20
06
04
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
83
8 
Death 
| 
Wono
sobo, 
Indon
esia | 
2006
0429 
20
06
04
29
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
15
5 
Arres
t | 
Wono
sobo, 
Indon
esia | 
2006
0429 
20
06
04
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
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E
vt
01
73
8 
Arres
t | 
Unite
d 
King
dom | 
2006
0506 
20
06
05
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
83
7 
2006 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Egypt
ian 
Polic
e 
Near 
Arish 
20
06
05
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
83
8 
Death 
| Near 
al-
Arish
, 
Egypt 
| 
2006
0509 
20
06
05
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
84
0 
Arres
t | al-
Arish
, 
Egypt 
| 
2006
0509 
20
06
05
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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00
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0 
Arres
t | 
Barce
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Spain 
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20
06
05
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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3 
2006 
Plot 
to 
Cond
uct 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing in 
Iraq 
20
06
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
84
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Death 
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Egypt 
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20
06
05
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0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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01
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Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2006
0606 
20
06
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06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Iraq | 
2006
0608 
20
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0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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20
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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6 Hidin
g in 
Soma
lia 20
06
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
49
5 
2005 
Arme
d 
Robb
ery of 
Gas 
Statio
n in 
Waln
ut, 
CA 
20
06
06
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
49
6 
2005 
Arme
d 
Robb
ery of 
Gas 
Statio
n in 
Oran
ge, 
CA 
20
06
06
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
55
2 
2006 
Paint
ball 
Near 
Lond
on 
20
06
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
93
9 Arres
t | 
Iraq | 
2006
0702? 
20
06
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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01
50
5 
2006 
Liqui
d 
Bomb 
Plot 
Targe
ting 
Lond
on to 
US 
Flight
s 
20
06
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
17
5 
Arres
t | 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2006
0702 
20
06
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
94
7 
2006 
Plot 
West
erners 
in 
Centr
al 
Asia 
20
06
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
69
5 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Khart
oum, 
Suda
n | 
2006
0704 
20
06
07
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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0 
Arres
t | 
Solo, 
Indon
esia | 
2006
0706 
20
06
07
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
08
2 
Arres
t | 
Bolto
n, 
Engla
nd | 
2006
0707  
20
06
07
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
00
24
2 
Arres
t | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
7/10/
2006 
20
06
07
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
84
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Death 
| 
Ingus
hetia | 
2006
0710 
20
06
07
10
 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
03
6 2006 
Mum
bai 
Attac
ks 
20
06
07
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20
9 
71
4 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 29
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8 
2006 
Joges
hwari 
Train 
Bomb
ing 
(2006 
Mum
bai 
Attac
ks) 
20
06
07
11
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
10
9 
2006 
Mira 
Road 
Train 
Bomb
ing 
(2006 
Mum
bai 
Attac
ks) 
20
06
07
11
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
11
0 
2006 
Khar 
Train 
Bomb
ing 
(2006 
Mum
bai 
Attac
ks) 
20
06
07
11
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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lt
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w
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N
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un
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l I
nt
er
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tio
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E
vt
02
11
1 
2006 
Matu
nga 
Train 
Bomb
ing--
Bandr
a 
Statio
n 
(2006 
Mum
bai 
Attac
ks) 
20
06
07
11
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
11
8 
2006 
Boriv
ali 
Statio
n 
Train 
Bomb
ing 
(2006 
Mum
bai 
Attac
ks) 
20
06
07
11
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
11
2 
Death 
| 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2006
0711 
20
06
07
11
 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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R
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T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
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T
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tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
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ic
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pe
ra
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ar
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lt
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ac
tic
 | 
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nk
no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
84
1 
Death 
| 
Midd
elbur
g, 
Nethe
rlands 
| 
2006
0715 
20
06
07
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
11
9 
Arres
t | 
Madh
ubani
, 
Bihar
, 
India 
20
06
07
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
93
7 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Paris, 
Franc
e | 
2006
0721 
20
06
07
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
09
7 
False 
Repor
t of 
Arres
t | 
Mom
basa, 
Keny
a | 
2006
0721 
20
06
07
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 D
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nt
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ea
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 C
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 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
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t o
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 D
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tic
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B
R
N
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rm
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 A
ss
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lt
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Fi
re
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gh
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ra
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lt
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tic
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nk
no
w
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N
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un
ct
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na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
10
0 
Arres
t | 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2006
0724 
20
06
07
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
09
9 
Arres
t | 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2006
0726 
20
06
07
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
11
7 
Arres
t | 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2006
0727 
20
06
07
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
12
0 
Arres
t | 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2006
0729 
20
06
07
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
93
8 
2006 
Depo
rtatio
n to 
Tunis
ia 
20
06
08
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 C
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B
R
N
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rm
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lt
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Fi
re
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ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
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T
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 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
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 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
74
0 
Arres
t | 
Walth
amsto
, 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2006
0809 
20
06
08
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
69
0 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2006
0809 
20
06
08
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
63
6 
Arres
t | 
Baha
walpu
t, 
Pakist
an | 
2006
0809 
20
06
08
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
23
8 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2006
0810 
20
06
08
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
 
E
vt
02
55
3 
Arres
t | 
Sanaa
, 
Yeme
n | 
2006
0815 
20
06
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 D
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 C
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T
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 | 
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ss
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
62
4 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Austr
alia | 
2006
0815 
20
06
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
58
2 
Bayat 
to 
Taib 20
06
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
12
6 
2006 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Polic
e at 
Anto
p Hill 
20
06
08
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
12
5 
Death 
| 
Anto
p 
Hill, 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2006
0820 
20
06
08
20
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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hr
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A
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B
R
N
 
T
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 A
ss
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lt
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Fi
re
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tic
 | 
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ss
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si
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T
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 | 
B
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ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
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ic
id
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O
pe
ra
tio
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T
ac
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fr
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tr
uc
tu
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 T
ar
ge
te
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H
ij
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ng
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ac
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 | 
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ed
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ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
12
7 
2006 
Plot 
Again
st 
Atom
ic 
Resea
rch 
Cente
r 
and/o
r 
Siddh
ivina
yak 
Temp
le 
20
06
08
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
11
5 
Terro
rist 
Traini
ng in 
South
east 
Engla
nd 
20
06
09
01
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
97
6 
Death 
| Jolo, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2006
0904 
20
06
09
04
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
41
2 2006 
Attac
k on 
Batna 20
06
09
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 22
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n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1682 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
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E
vt
01
10
4 
2006 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
Alger
ian 
Coast 
Guar
d 
Barra
cks 
20
06
09
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 28
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
57
6 
2006 
Male
gaon 
Bomb
ing 
20
06
09
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 37
 
12
5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
96
0 
Arres
t | 
Engla
nd | 
2006
0910? 
20
06
09
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
 
E
vt
02
79
6 
Death 
| 
Basra
, Iraq 
| 
2006
0925 
20
06
09
25
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
12
4 
Arres
t | 
Hyde
rabad, 
India 
| 
2006
0930 
20
06
09
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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6 
Arres
t | 
Bega
um, 
India 
| 
2006
1003 
20
06
10
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
19
1 2006 
Cotab
ato 
Bomb
ings 
20
06
10
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
10
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
53
0 
2006 
Bomb
ing in 
Makil
ala 
City 
20
06
10
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
49
0 
2006 
Bomb
ing of 
Polic
e 
Statio
ns in 
Alger
ia 
(Algi
ers) 
20
06
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
32
9 
Arres
t | 
Switz
erlan
d | 
10/20
06 
20
06
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
01
46
8 
2006 
Ham
mer 
Attac
k on 
Christ
ian 
Conv
ert/Pr
eache
r 
Yosu
a 
Wina
di 
20
06
10
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
 
E
vt
01
63
7 
Arres
t | 
Band
ung, 
Indon
esia | 
2006
1016 
20
06
10
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
63
4 
Arres
t | 
Sanaa
, 
Yeme
n | 
2006
1017 
20
06
10
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
63
5 
2006 
Plot 
to 
Smug
gle 
Arms 
to 
Soma
lia 
20
06
10
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
1685 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
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vt
01
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2 
Death 
| 
Ching
ai, 
Pakist
an | 
2006
1030 
20
06
10
30
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
19
0 
Arres
t | 
Tacur
ong 
City, 
Mind
anao, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2006
1113 
20
06
11
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
76
2 
2006 
Plot 
Again
st 
ASE
AN 
Sum
mit 
20
06
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
73
7 
Arres
t | 
Turke
y | 
2006
1115 
20
06
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
93
9 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Indon
esia | 
2006
1115 
20
06
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
63
6 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Yeme
n | 
2006
1203 
20
06
12
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
68
2 
Arres
t | 
Lacka
wann
a, NY 
| 
2006
1205 
20
06
12
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
41
4 
2006 
Attac
k on 
Halli
burto
n 
Conv
oy 
20
06
12
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
94
0 
2006 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Cherr
yVale 
Shop
ping 
Cente
r 
(Rock
ford, 
IL) 
20
06
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
28
6 Soma
li 
Civil 
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12
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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| 
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Soma
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2007
0107 
20
07
01
07
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
84
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Death 
| 
Djebe
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Terif, 
Tunis
ia | 
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0115 
20
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01
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
67
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Arres
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Philip
pines 
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0115 
20
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
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04
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Firefi
ght at 
Bud 
Daho 
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tain 
20
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01
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
04
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pines 
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20
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0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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1689 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
14
8 
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t | 
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ysia | 
2007
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20
07
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03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
48
9 
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Bomb
ing of 
Polic
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Statio
ns in 
Alger
ia 
(Tizi 
Ouzo
u) 
20
07
02
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
48
8 
2007 
Bomb
ing of 
Polic
e 
Statio
ns in 
Alger
ia 
(Bou
merd
es) 
20
07
02
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 
10
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
51
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2006-
2007 
Plot 
to 
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k JFK 
Airpo
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20
07
02
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
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Cherr
y 
Hill, 
NJ 
20
07
02
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
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2007 
Suici
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k on 
Bagra
m Air 
Base 
Durin
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20
07
02
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 23
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
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9 
2007 
Abort
ed/Fa
iled 
Plan 
to 
Rob 
Chine
se-
Owne
d 
Busin
esses 
in 
Lamp
ung 
20
07
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
94
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Indon
esia | 
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0315 
20
07
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
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Attac
ks on 
Ethio
pian 
Troop
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20
07
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
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Arres
t | 
Lamp
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0315 
20
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03
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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01
94
1 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Lamp
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Indon
esia | 
2007
0316 
20
07
03
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
11
4 
2007 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Pakist
ani 
Milita
ry 
20
07
03
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
01
94
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Iraq | 
2007
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07
03
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
11
5 
Death 
| 
Poon
ch, 
Kash
mir, 
Pakist
an 
20
07
03
28
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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01
94
3 
2007 
Depo
rtatio
n to 
Austr
alia 
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07
03
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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1 
2007 
Suici
de 
Attac
ks on 
Algie
rs 
20
07
04
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 33
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
24
4 
Arres
t | 
Colu
mbus, 
Ohio | 
2007
0411 
20
07
04
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
24
5 
2007 
Non-
specif
ic 
Plot 
to 
Attac
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Amer
icans 
Abro
ad 
Using 
WM
D 
20
07
04
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
14
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Assau
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Basil 
Hotel 
(Mog
adish
u) 
20
07
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
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n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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2 
2007 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Road-
Const
ructio
n 
Work
ers 
20
07
04
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
97
3 
2007 
Behe
ading 
of 
Road-
Const
ructio
n 
Work
ers 
20
07
04
23
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
66
4 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Britai
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2007
0425 
20
07
04
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
89
7 2007 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Delhi 
20
07
04
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
89
8 
Arres
t | 
Delhi
, 
India 
| 
2007
0426 
20
07
04
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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E
vt
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73
5 
2007 
Suici
de 
Attac
k 
Targe
ting 
Pakist
an's 
Interi
or 
Minis
ter 
20
07
04
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 27
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
88
2 
2007 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Coalit
ion 
Force
s 
Near 
Taji 
20
07
05
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
88
1 Death 
| Taji, 
Iraq | 
2007
0502 
20
07
05
02
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
51
6 
2006-
2007 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k Fort 
Dix 
20
07
05
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
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7 
Arres
t | 
Cherr
y 
Hill, 
NJ | 
2007
0507 
20
07
05
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
02
14
6 
2007 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Soma
li 
Judge 
20
07
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
84
5 
Death 
| 
Alger
ia | 
2007
0515 
20
07
05
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
62
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Austr
alia | 
2007
0517 
20
07
05
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
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5 2007 
Gora
khpur 
Bomb
ings 
20
07
05
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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2 2007 
Hyde
rabad 
Bomb
ings 
20
07
05
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 42
 
54
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
70
4 
Arres
t | 
New 
York, 
NY | 
2007
0601 
20
07
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
73
6 
Arres
t | 
Trini
dad | 
2007
0602 
20
07
06
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
89
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2007
0604 
20
07
06
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
71
6 
Arres
t | 
Port-
of-
Spain
, 
Trini
dad | 
2007
0605 
20
07
06
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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nd
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ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
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N
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ce
nt
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ot
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D
ev
el
op
ed
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ot
 | 
T
hr
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oa
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A
tt
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k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
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A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
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C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
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Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
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In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
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ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
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rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
22
2 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
6/7/2
007 
20
07
06
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
47
1 
2007 
Murd
er of 
Dago 
Sima
mora 
20
07
06
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
16
3 
Arres
t | 
Bany
umas, 
Java, 
Indon
esia | 
2007
0610 
20
07
06
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
16
4 
Arres
t | 
Yogy
akarta
, 
Indon
esia | 
2007
0610 
20
07
06
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
18
6 
2007 
Kidna
pping 
of Fr. 
Gianc
arlo 
Bossi 
20
07
06
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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 N
um
be
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 D
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nt
 
T
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in
in
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D
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ea
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id
en
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N
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 C
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 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
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 f
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 D
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 C
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ce
nt
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ev
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op
ed
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ot
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hr
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oa
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tt
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k 
A
tt
ac
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il
le
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A
tt
ac
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| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
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B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
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rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
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Fi
re
fi
gh
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T
ac
tic
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si
na
ti
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B
om
bi
ng
 
T
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tic
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ic
id
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pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
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fr
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tr
uc
tu
re
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ar
ge
te
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T
ac
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ij
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ki
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ac
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ta
ge
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ak
in
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ac
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rm
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au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
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U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
60
1 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Saudi 
Arabi
a | 
2007
0615 
20
07
06
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
56
7 
2007 
Atte
mpte
d 
Car-
Bomb
ing of 
Lond
on 
20
07
06
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
31
3 
Arres
t | 
Santa 
Colo
ma de 
Gram
anet, 
Spain 
| 
6/29/
2007 
20
07
06
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
56
8 
2007 
Atte
mpte
d 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
Glasg
ow 
Airpo
rt 
20
07
06
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
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 C
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E
vt
01
64
8 
Arres
t | 
Ches
hire, 
Engla
nd | 
2007
0630 
20
07
06
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
66
3 
Arres
t | 
Glasg
ow, 
Scotl
and | 
2007
0630 
20
07
06
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
68
6 
Arres
t | 
Liver
pool, 
Engla
nd | 
2007
0630 
20
07
06
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
38
1 
2007 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
Spani
sh 
Touri
sts in 
Yeme
n 
20
07
07
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
84
6 
Death 
| 
Amiz
our, 
Alger
ia | 
2007
0730 
20
07
07
01
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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A
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T
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C
B
R
N
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A
rm
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au
lt
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gh
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A
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si
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ra
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ar
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U
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lt
 
T
ac
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 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
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 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
93
0 
2007 
Plot 
Again
st 
U.S. 
Milita
ry 
Base 
in 
Hana
u 
20
07
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
41
3 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
2007 
20
07
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
63
5 
Arres
t | 
Austr
alia | 
2007
0702 
20
07
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
74
2 
Arres
t | 
Yeme
n | 
2007
0702 
20
07
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
94
4 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Yeme
n | 
2007
0702 
20
07
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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D
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T
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A
tt
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A
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T
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tic
 | 
C
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R
N
 
T
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A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
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A
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B
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O
pe
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tic
 | 
In
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ar
ge
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H
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ac
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H
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U
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rm
ed
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ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
94
5 2007 
Depo
rtatio
n to 
USA 
20
07
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
91
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Pakist
an | 
2007
0702 
20
07
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
60
3 2007 
Red 
Mosq
ue 
Seige 
20
07
07
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
24
8 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
04
3 
2007 
Behe
ading 
of 
AFP 
Marin
es at 
Albar
kah 
20
07
07
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
10
0 
2007 
Suici
de 
Attac
k on 
Alger
ian 
Army 
Barra
cks 
20
07
07
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
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In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
89
6 
Death 
| 
Band
erwah
, 
Pakist
an | 
2007
0718 
20
07
07
18
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
67
0 
Arres
t | 
Spain 
| 
2007
0724 
20
07
07
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
73
4 
Death 
| 
Zhob, 
Pakist
an | 
2007
0724 
20
07
07
24
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
90
5 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Madri
d, 
Spain 
| 
2007
0726 
20
07
07
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
94
6 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Austr
alia | 
2007
0727 
20
07
07
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1704 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
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E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
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in
in
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D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
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A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
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ur
al
 C
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se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
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lic
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M
ili
ta
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 'E
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ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
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ri
ke
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ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
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id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
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ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
72
3 
Arres
t | 
San 
Jose, 
CA | 
2007
0802 
20
07
08
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
84
8 
Death 
| 
Glasg
ow, 
Scotl
and | 
2007
0803 
20
07
08
03
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
16
6 
2007 
Amb
ush 
of 
AFP 
Troop
s in 
Jolo 
20
07
08
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
65
6 
Arres
t | 
Decat
ur, IL 
| 
2007
0815 
20
07
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
10
3 
Death
? | 
Syria 
| 
2007
0815 
20
07
08
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
92
9 
Arres
t | 
Frank
furt, 
Germ
any | 
2007
0815 
20
07
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
92
8 
Arres
t | 
Ulm, 
Germ
any | 
2007
0904 
20
07
09
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
11
0 
Surre
nder | 
Alger
ia | 
2007
0922 
20
07
09
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
40
4 
2007 
Assas
sinati
on 
Atte
mpt 
on 
Bena
zir 
Bhutt
o 
20
07
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 14
0 
U
n 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
72
3 
2007 
Captu
re of 
300 
Pakist
ani 
Soldi
ers 
20
07
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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 D
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nt
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in
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 C
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D
ea
th
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ti
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 f
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 D
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ra
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tb
al
l 
N
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-T
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st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
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tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
74
3 
Arres
t | 
Yeme
n | 
2007
1015 
20
07
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
84
9 
Death 
| 
Gama
roo, 
Kash
mir | 
2007
1015 
20
07
10
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
94
7 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Yeme
n | 
2007
1015 
20
07
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
93
2 
Arres
t | 
Turke
y | 
2007
1015 
20
07
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
04
2 
Arres
t | 
Mind
anao, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2007
1016 
20
07
10
16
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1707 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
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ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
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in
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th
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ea
th
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 C
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D
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R
ep
or
t o
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ea
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ea
th
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no
w
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es
t/D
et
en
ti
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R
el
ea
se
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ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
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D
ep
or
ta
ti
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H
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j P
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ri
m
ag
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L
od
gi
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/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
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eb
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tio
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Pa
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tb
al
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N
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-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
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R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
74
8 
2007 
Bomb
ing of 
Glori
etta 2 
Mall 
20
07
10
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
12
9 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
04
1 
Arres
t | 
Tawi-
Tawi, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2007
1109 
20
07
11
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
22
4 
2007 
Varan
asi 
Court
house 
Bomb
ing 
20
07
11
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20
 
10
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
85
0 
Death 
| 
Algie
rs, 
Alger
ia | 
2007
1211 
20
07
12
11
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
10
5 
2007 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
Alger
ian 
Gov't 
Build
ing 
20
07
12
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1708 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
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at
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Su
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nt
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 C
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D
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 P
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 | 
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ea
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ea
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w
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 f
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 D
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ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
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di
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/C
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tio
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Pa
in
tb
al
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N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
10
8 
2007 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
UN 
Offic
es 
(Algi
ers) 
20
07
12
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
04
0 
2007 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Mayo
ral 
Staffe
rs 
20
07
12
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
47
0 
2007 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Café 
Bedu
delin 
Bukit
tinggi 
20
07
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
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07
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
01
29
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Assas
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Bena
zir 
Bhutt
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07
12
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25
 
91
 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
02
12
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Death 
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20
07
12
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10
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
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20
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01
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
 
E
vt
02
77
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Death 
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20
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01
14
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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20
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01
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02
20
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 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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Arres
t | 
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kchot
t, 
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tania | 
1/200
8 
20
08
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
69
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Arres
t | 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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E
vt
02
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2008 
Attac
k on 
Belgi
an 
Touri
sts 
20
08
01
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
12
8 
Arres
t | 
North 
West 
Fronti
er 
Provi
nce, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
0119 
20
08
01
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
75
7 
2008 
Plot 
to 
Suici
de 
Bomb 
Barce
lona's 
Subw
ay 
Syste
m 
20
08
01
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
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Arres
t | 
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lona, 
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| 
2008
0120 
20
08
01
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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North 
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Pakist
an | 
2008
0128 
20
08
01
28
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
03
9 
2008 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Fema
le 
Trade
r in 
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01
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
20
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Firefi
ght 
w/ 
AFP 
in 
Tawi-
Tawi 
20
08
01
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
20
5 
Death 
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Pangl
ima 
Sugal
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Philip
pines 
20
08
01
31
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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20
7 
Arres
t | 
Tawi-
Tawi, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2008
0131 
20
08
01
31
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
27
7 
2008 
Attac
k on 
Pakist
ani 
Air 
Force 
Base 
in 
Sargo
dha 
20
08
02
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
17
2 
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t | 
Pakist
an | 
2008
0207 
20
08
02
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
85
1 
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| 
Dama
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Syria 
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2008
0212 
20
08
02
12
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
70
7 
2008 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Europ
ean 
Touri
sts 
(Sout
hern 
Alger
ia I) 
20
08
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
20
3 
Arres
t | 
Dava
o, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2008
0219 
20
08
02
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
29
2 
2008 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Lt. 
Gen. 
Mush
taq 
Beig 
20
08
02
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
 
30
 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
01
39
9 
Arres
t | 
Lahor
e, 
Pakist
an | 
2/26/
2008 
20
08
02
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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E
vt
01
90
5 
Jailbr
eak | 
Singa
pore | 
2008
0227 
20
08
02
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
27
9 
2008 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
Luna 
Capre
se 
Resta
urant 
(Isla
maba
d) 
20
08
03
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 
10
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
77
1 
2008 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
US 
Milita
ry 
Base 
in 
Afgh
anista
n 
20
08
03
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
 
19
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
77
3 
Death 
| 
Kabul
, 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2008
0303 
20
08
03
03
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ra
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E
vt
02
74
7 
Death 
| 
Bajau
r, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
0314 
20
08
03
14
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
24
6 Arres
t | 
Mali | 
3/200
8 
20
08
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
70
7 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
0315? 
20
08
03
15
 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
76
5 
Death 
| 
Wana
, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
0315 
20
08
03
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
03
8 
Arres
t | 
Zamb
oanga 
City, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2008
0321 
20
08
03
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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nt
er
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tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
78
4 
2008 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Journ
alist 
Sean 
Lang
an 
20
08
03
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
61
4 Arres
t |  | 
2008
0415 20
08
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
88
3 
Death 
| 
Bagh
dad, 
Iraq 
|2008
0424 
20
08
04
24
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
77
6 
2008 
Assas
sinati
on 
Atte
mpt 
on 
Hami
d 
Karza
i 
20
08
04
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
77
8 
2008 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
Afgh
an 
Force
s in 
Kabul 
20
08
04
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ct
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na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
77
7 
Death 
| 
Kabul
, 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2008
0430 
20
08
04
27
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
85
2 
Death 
| 
Dusa
mare
b, 
Soma
lia | 
2008
0501 
20
08
05
01
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
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57
3 2008 
Ahme
dabad 
Bomb
ing 
20
08
07
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 56
 
20
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
63
1 
Arres
t | 
Ahme
dabad
, 
India 
| 
2008
0727 
20
08
07
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
60
9 
Death 
| 
South 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
0728 
20
08
07
28
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
63
9 
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t | 
Bang
alore, 
India 
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0729 
20
08
07
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
17
4 
Death 
| | 
2008
0731 
(repor
ted) 
20
08
07
31
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
01
26
7 
2003 
Raid/
Bomb
ing/H
arun 
Escap
e 
20
08
08
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
71
3 
2008 
Amb
ush 
of 
Pakist
ani 
Troop
s 
20
08
08
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 22
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
75
0 
Death 
| 
South 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
0813 
20
08
08
13
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
28
1 
2008 
Pakist
ani 
Indep
enden
ce 
Day 
Bomb
ing 
20
08
08
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
03
7 2008 
Mum
bai 
Attac
ks 
20
08
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 16
4 
30
8 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 34
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E
vt
02
18
9 
2008 
Attac
ks on 
Civili
ans in 
Lana
o del 
Norte 
20
08
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
 
E
vt
02
19
3 
2008 
Attac
ks on 
Civili
ans in 
North 
Cotab
ato 
20
08
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
69
9 
2008 
Bomb
ing of 
Leba
nese 
Soldi
ers 
20
08
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
66
4 
Arres
t | 
Gujar
at, 
India 
| 
2008
0815 
20
08
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
75
1 
Death 
| 
Pakist
an | 
2008
0904 
20
08
09
04
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
74
8 
Death 
| 
Miran 
Shah, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
0908 
20
08
09
08
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
23
9 
Acqui
ttal 
and 
Relea
se | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2008
0908 
20
08
09
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
57
0 2008 
Delhi 
Bomb
ings 20
08
09
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 30
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
 
E
vt
02
21
2 
2008 
Battle 
w/ 
AFP 
Troop
s in 
Magu
indan
ao 
20
08
09
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
08
7 
Arres
t | 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2008
0915 
20
08
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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E
vt
02
62
9 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Iran | 
2008
0915 
20
08
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
00
42
1 
2008 
Attac
k on 
Mauri
tanian 
Milita
ry 
20
08
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
59
5 
2008 
Attac
k on 
U.S. 
Emba
ssy in 
Yeme
n 
20
08
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
57
8 
2008 
Shoot
-out 
w/ 
Delhi 
Polic
e 
20
08
09
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
85
3 
Death 
| 
Delhi
, 
India 
| 
2008
0919 
20
08
09
19
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
61
6 Arres
t |  | 
2008
0921 20
08
09
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
40
0 
Arres
t | 
Gujrn
wala, 
Pakist
an | 
9/23/
2008 
20
08
09
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
64
1 
Arres
t | Bel 
Tara, 
Uttar 
Prade
sh, 
India 
| 
2008
0924 
20
08
09
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
64
2 
Arres
t | 
Bhiw
andi, 
India 
| 
2008
0924 
20
08
09
24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1731 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
64
6 
Arres
t | 
Chem
bur, 
Mum
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Death 
| 
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Iraq | 
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0925 
20
08
09
25
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
29
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Engin
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
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21
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20
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15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
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Murd
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/PLO 
Mem
ber 
Mutaf
a al-
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20
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15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
75
2 
2008 
Embe
zzlem
ent of 
Pakist
ani 
Talib
an 
Funds 
20
08
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
61
0 
Death 
| 
Wana
, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
1016 
20
08
10
16
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1734 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
75
3 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
1031 
20
08
10
31
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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50
 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
 
E
vt
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B
R
N
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tic
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rm
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lt
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re
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gh
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ac
tic
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ti
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T
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B
om
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ng
 
T
ac
tic
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pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
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fr
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tr
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tu
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ar
ge
te
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ac
tic
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ij
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ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
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os
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ak
in
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T
ac
tic
 | 
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rm
ed
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ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
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U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
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un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
71
0 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
2008
1115 
20
08
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
95
0 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Indon
esia | 
2008
1115 
20
08
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
74
9 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
1119 
20
08
11
19
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
85
5 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2008
1122 
20
08
11
22
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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 D
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 C
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t o
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 f
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 D
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op
ed
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hr
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oa
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tt
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k 
A
tt
ac
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| K
il
le
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A
tt
ac
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| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
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T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
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B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
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In
fr
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tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
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ij
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ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
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ak
in
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T
ac
tic
 | 
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rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
54
9 
2008 
Hijac
king 
of the 
MV 
Kube
r 
(Boat
--
Mum
bai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
23
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
11
3 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on | 
2008
1125 
20
08
11
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
54
2 
2008 
Attac
k on 
Taj 
Maha
l 
Hotel 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 31
 
25
0 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 10
 
E
vt
01
54
8 
2008 
Attac
k on 
Tride
nt-
Ober
oi 
Hotel 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 32
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 7
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op
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ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
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A
tt
ac
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A
tt
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| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
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C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
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T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
54
1 
2008 
Attac
k on 
Nari
man 
Hous
e 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 5
 
E
vt
01
54
6 
2008 
Hijac
king 
of 
Skod
a Car 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
53
9 
2008 
Attac
k on 
Leop
old 
Café 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
54
3 
2008 
Attac
k on 
Mum
bai 
CST 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 58
 
10
4 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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 C
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D
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 C
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C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
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rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
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ac
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Fi
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gh
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tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
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B
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ng
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pe
ra
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ki
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ac
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ta
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ak
in
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T
ac
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 | 
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na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
54
0 
2008 
Mazg
aon 
Taxi 
Blast 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 
15
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
54
7 
2008 
Gunfi
ght at 
Chow
patti 
Beac
h 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
54
4 
2008 
Hijac
king 
of 
Polic
e 
Vehic
le 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
55
0 
2008 
Murd
er of 
Solan
ki 
(Kub
er's 
Capta
in) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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 D
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 C
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D
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R
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 C
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N
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nt
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D
ev
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op
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T
hr
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t/H
oa
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tt
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k 
A
tt
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| K
il
le
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A
tt
ac
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| I
nj
ur
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T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
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Fi
re
fi
gh
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T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
55
1 
2008 
Attac
k on 
Cama 
Hospi
tal 
(2008 
Mum
bai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
55
2 
2008 
Attac
k on 
Bysta
nders 
Outsi
de 
Metro 
Theat
er 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
55
3 
2008 
Vile 
Parle 
Taxi 
Bomb
ing 
(Mu
mbai 
Ramp
age) 
20
08
11
26
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1741 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
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D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
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D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
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R
ep
or
t o
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D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
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A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
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E
vt
01
65
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Arres
t | 
Chow
patti 
Beac
h, 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2008
1126 
20
08
11
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
85
6 
Death 
| 
Chow
patti 
Beac
h, 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2008
1126 
20
08
11
26
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
85
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| 
Nari
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Chab
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bai, 
India 
| 
2008
1127 
20
08
11
27
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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E
vt
01
85
8 
Death 
| 
Ober
oi 
Tride
nt 
Seash
ore, 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2008
1128 
20
08
11
28
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
85
9 
Death 
| Taj 
Maha
l, 
Mum
bai, 
India 
| 
2008
1129 
20
08
11
29
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
00
20
2 
Arres
t | 
Lahor
e, 
Pakist
an | 
12/10
/2008 
20
08
12
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
69
9 
2008 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Cana
dian 
Diplo
mats 
20
08
12
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
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E
vt
02
19
5 
2008 
Bomb
ing of 
Malls 
in 
Iligan 
20
08
12
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 
48
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
19
7 
2008 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
AFP 
in 
Tubo
d 
20
08
12
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
19
6 
2008 
Faile
d 
Bomb
ing of 
Iligan
/Assa
ssinat
ion 
Atte
mpt 
on 
Glori
a 
Maca
pagal
-
Arroy
o 
20
08
12
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
21
7 
Arres
t | 
Keral
a, 
India 
| 
2008
1225  
20
08
12
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
01
86
0 
Death 
| 
Pakist
an | 
2009
0101 
20
09
01
01
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
97
5 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Red 
Cross 
Work
ers 
20
09
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
 
E
vt
02
82
8 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2009
0115 
20
09
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
58
4 Bayat 
to 
Wahi
shi 20
09
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
22
1 
Arres
t | 
Hdera
bad, 
India 
| 
2009
0120 
20
09
01
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
70
0 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Edwi
n 
Dyer 
and 
Other 
Europ
ean 
Touri
sts 
20
09
01
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
71
4 
Arres
t | 
Pesha
war, 
Pakist
an | 
2009
0122 
20
09
01
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
07
0 
Arres
t | 
Rawa
lpindi
, 
Pakist
an | 
2009
0129 
20
09
01
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
 
E
vt
02
19
8 
Loss 
of 
Troop
s 
Who 
Surre
ndere
d to 
AFP 
20
09
02
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
00
07
5 Arres
t | ? | 
2/15/
2009 20
09
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
07
6 Arres
t | ? | 
2/18/
2009 20
09
02
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
29
4 
2009 
Attac
k on 
Sri 
Lank
an 
Crick
et 
Team 
20
09
03
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
 9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
82
9 
Arres
t | 
Lond
on, 
Engla
nd | 
2009
0315 
20
09
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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Attac
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Islam
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Polic
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Statio
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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08
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Skirm
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Alger
ian 
Auth
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U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
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Conv
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95
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1 
2009 
Britis
h Plot 
Again
st 
Manc
hester 
(Com
panio
n Plot 
to N. 
Zazi 
Plot) 
20
09
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
61
7 
Arres
t | 
Johor
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Mala
ysia | 
2009
0401 
20
09
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
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Death 
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Pakist
an | 
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0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
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2009 
Conq
uest 
of 
Buner 
20
09
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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02
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AFP 
in 
Jolo 
20
09
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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66
1 
Arres
t | 
Engla
nd | 
2009
0408 
20
09
04
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
66
2 
Arres
t | 
Engla
nd | 
2009
0415 
20
09
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
03
4 
2009 
Assas
sinati
on 
Atte
mpt 
on 
Sulu 
Gov. 
Abdu
sakur 
Tan 
20
09
05
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
10
 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
04
0 
Reno
unce
ment 
of 
Jihad 
20
09
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
12
2 
2009 
Theft 
of 
Rifles 
from 
Libya
n 
Milita
ry 
Base 
20
09
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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Relea
se 
from 
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tion | 
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05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
03
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
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03
5 
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05
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
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Engla
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20
09
05
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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2 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Germ
an 
and 
Britis
h 
Natio
nals 
in 
Yeme
n 
20
09
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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01
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iting 
Statio
n 
20
09
06
01
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51
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Faile
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mpt 
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Attac
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Army 
Recru
iting 
Cente
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(KY) 
20
09
06
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
03
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2009 
Firefi
ght 
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PNP 
in 
Inand
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(6/11) 
20
09
06
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
03
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Inand
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Philip
pines 
| 
2009
0611 
20
09
06
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0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
00
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Exec
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20
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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vt
00
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4 
2009 
Amb
ush 
of 
Alger
ian 
Polic
e 
20
09
06
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
19
9 
2009 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
AFP 
in 
Guin
dulun
gan 
20
09
06
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
20
0 
Death 
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Guin
dulun
gan, 
Philip
pines 
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2009
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20
09
06
18
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
03
1 
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Firefi
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w/ 
AFP 
in 
Jolo 
(6/21) 
20
09
06
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
65
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ap, 
Java, 
Indon
esia | 
2009
0621 
20
09
06
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
01
35
5 
2009 
Najib
ullah 
Zazi 
NYC 
Subw
ay 
Plot 
20
09
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
26
1 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
Atte
mpt/
Murd
er of 
Saudi 
Hunte
rs 
20
09
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
17
7 
Suici
de in 
Priso
n | 
Libya 
| 
2009
0702 
20
09
07
02
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
06
3 
2009 
Bomb
ings 
in 
Cotab
ato 
City 
20
09
07
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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E
vt
02
06
4 
Arres
t | 
Cotab
ato 
City, 
Mind
anao, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2009
0705 
20
09
07
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
02
9 
2009 
Bomb
ing of 
Trans
co 
Towe
r 
20
09
07
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
02
8 
2009 
Car 
Bomb
ing in 
Iligan 
City 
20
09
07
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
02
7 
2009 
Bomb
ing of 
Churc
h/Gas 
Statio
n in 
Jolo 
20
09
07
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
 
27
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
02
6 
Arres
t | 
Indan
an, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2009
0709 
20
09
07
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
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E
vt
02
09
2 
Arres
t | 
Shari
atpur, 
Bangl
adesh 
| 
2009
0710 
20
09
07
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
42
0 
2009 
Attac
k on 
Malia
n 
Army 
Conv
oy 
20
09
07
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 28
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
47
6 
2009 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Indon
esian 
Presi
dent 
Yudh
oyon
o 
20
09
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
40
1 
Arres
t | 
Sabzi 
Mand
i, 
Pakist
an | 
7/15/
2009 
20
09
07
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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nt
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op
ed
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hr
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tt
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k 
A
tt
ac
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| K
il
le
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A
tt
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| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
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ic
id
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O
pe
ra
tio
n 
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ac
tic
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tr
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tu
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ar
ge
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T
ac
tic
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ij
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T
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tic
 | 
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T
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tic
 | 
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ed
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ss
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
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un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
47
2 
2009 
Jakart
a 
Marri
ott/Ri
tz 
Carlt
on 
Bomb
ings 
20
09
07
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
 
53
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
01
86
1 
Death 
| 
Jakart
a, 
Indon
esia | 
2009
0717 
20
09
07
17
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
61
8 Arres
t |  | 
2009
0722 20
09
07
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
18
5 2009 
MILF 
Cease
fire 2
00
90
72
5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
66
9 
Arres
t | 
Jakart
a, 
Indon
esia | 
2009
0805 
20
09
08
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 D
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 C
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D
ea
th
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t o
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w
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et
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el
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 f
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m
 D
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E
sc
ap
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ep
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ta
ti
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ri
m
ag
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od
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di
ng
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el
eb
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Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
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er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
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ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
86
2 
Death 
| 
Tema
nggu
ng, 
Indon
esia | 
2009
0807 
20
09
08
07
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
86
3 
Death 
| 
Jatias
ih, 
Bekas
i, 
Indon
esia | 
2009
0808 
20
09
08
08
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
95
3 
Arres
t | 
North 
West 
Fronti
er 
Provi
nce, 
Pakist
an | 
2009
0808 
20
09
08
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 D
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b-
E
ve
nt
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in
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th
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 C
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 D
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ap
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od
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di
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al
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on
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 C
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m
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ad
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ca
le
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ili
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Pl
ot
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FB
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Pl
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te
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Pl
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nd
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rt
ed
 
Pl
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 | 
N
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ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
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t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
59
3 
2009 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing 
Targe
ting 
Saudi 
Princ
e 
Moha
mme
d bin 
Nayef 
20
09
08
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
86
4 Death 
|  | 
2009
0815 20
09
08
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
59
9 Death 
| | 
2009
0815 20
09
08
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
67
7 
Arres
t | 
Kuni
ngan, 
Java, 
Indon
esia | 
2009
0817 
20
09
08
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
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 N
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be
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nt
 D
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nt
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D
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th
 
D
ea
th
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cc
id
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ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
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D
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t o
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 D
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 C
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rt
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Pl
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N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
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D
ev
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op
ed
 
Pl
ot
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T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
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k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
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le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
67
8 
Arres
t | 
Kuni
ngan, 
Java, 
Indon
esia | 
2009
0818 
20
09
08
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
71
9 
Arres
t | 
Moh
mand
, 
Pakist
an | 
2009
0818 
20
09
08
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
71
1 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
2009
0823 
20
09
08
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
61
9 Arres
t |  | 
2009
0825 2
00
90
82
5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
99
6 Arres
t | 
USA | 
2009
0827 
20
09
08
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 D
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 C
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R
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D
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T
hr
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A
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A
tt
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| K
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A
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k 
| I
nj
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T
ac
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 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
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T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
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si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
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O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
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tr
uc
tu
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ar
ge
te
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T
ac
tic
 | 
H
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T
ac
tic
 | 
H
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ta
ge
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in
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T
ac
tic
 | 
U
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rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
21
3 
Arres
t | 
Mids
ayap, 
North 
Cotab
ato, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2009
0905 
20
09
09
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
76
0 
False 
Repor
t of 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2009
0907 
20
09
09
07
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
75
9 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2009
0914 
20
09
09
14
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
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nt
 N
um
be
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E
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 D
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Su
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nt
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 C
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D
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R
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 D
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ra
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N
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 C
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at
io
n 
Fa
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D
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L
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-S
ca
le
M
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A
ct
io
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Pl
ot
 
Pl
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FB
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St
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g 
Pl
ot
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te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
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A
ba
nd
on
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/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
53
2 
2009 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ings 
again
st 
Peace
keepe
rs in 
Moga
dishu 
20
09
09
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
86
5 
Death 
| 
Baraa
we, 
Soma
lia | 
2009
0915 
20
09
09
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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24
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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vt
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
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ing in 
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Plot 
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of 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
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U
n 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
18
7 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
of Fr. 
Mich
ael 
Sinno
tt 
20
09
10
11
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E
vt
00
43
5 
2009 
Atte
mpte
d 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
Italia
n 
Army 
Barra
cks 
20
09
10
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
26
2 
Arres
t | 
Milan
, Italy 
| 
10/12
/2009 
20
09
10
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
01
8 
2009 
Bomb
ing of 
Cell 
Towe
r in 
Indan
an 
20
09
10
14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
60
4 
2009 
Attac
ks on 
Polic
e 
Targe
ts in 
Lahor
e 
20
09
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 26
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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ra
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N
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un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
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E
vt
02
60
5 
2009 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
Polic
e 
Statio
n in 
Kohat 
20
09
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
01
0 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Teach
er 
Gabri
el 
Caniz
ares 
20
09
10
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
01
7 
2009 
Bomb
ing of 
Lagto
h 
Bridg
e 
20
09
10
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
01
9 
2009 
Bomb
ing of 
Cell 
Towe
r in 
Paran
g 
20
09
10
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
02
0 
2009 
Road
side 
Bomb
ing in 
Zamb
oanga 
20
09
10
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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T
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ra
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tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
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U
nk
no
w
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N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
01
5 
2009 
Bomb
ing of 
Tang
an-
Tang
an 
Bridg
e 
20
09
10
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
55
5 2009 
Fort 
Hood 
Shoot
ing 
20
09
11
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
 
29
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
47
5 
2009 
Assas
sinati
on 
Atte
mpt 
of 
Germ
an 
Red 
Cross 
Work
er 
20
09
11
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
31
4 
Arres
t | 
Santa 
Pola, 
Spain 
| 
11/7/
2009 
20
09
11
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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ra
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lt
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w
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N
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un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
01
4 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Plyw
ood 
Facto
ry 
Empl
oyees 
in 
Basil
an 
20
09
11
10
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
59
4 
2009 
Amb
ush 
of 
Yeme
ni 
Secur
ity 
Offic
ers 
and 
Body
guard
s 
20
09
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 U
n 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
70
6 
Arres
t | 
Niger
ia | 
2009
1115 
20
09
11
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
71
0 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Pierre 
Cama
tte 
20
09
11
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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ra
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na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
71
2 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Spani
sh 
Aid 
Work
ers 
20
09
11
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
24
0 
Death 
| 
Spalg
a, 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2009
1208 
20
09
12
08
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
31
5 
Arres
t | 
Sargo
dha, 
Pakist
an | 
12/9/
2009 
20
09
12
09
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
02
17
6 
False 
Repor
t of 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2009
1211 
20
09
12
11
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1774 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
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 C
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ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
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A
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B
om
bi
ng
 
T
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id
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O
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ra
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T
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T
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tic
 | 
H
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H
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
00
70
9 
2009 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Italia
n 
Touri
sts 
20
09
12
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
95
1 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Barce
lona, 
Spain 
| 
2009
1218 
20
09
12
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
26
8 
2009 
Faile
d  
'Unde
rpants
' 
Bomb
ing 
on 
Christ
mas 
Day 
20
09
12
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
65
8 
Arres
t | 
Detro
it, MI 
| 
2009
1225 
20
09
12
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
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 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
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er
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 C
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m
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ad
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at
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tw
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D
ec
re
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L
ar
ge
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ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
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ot
 
Pl
ot
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FB
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St
in
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Pl
ot
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In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
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A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
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N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
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T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
17
9 
2010 
Prohi
bition 
Again
st 
MILF 
Partic
ipatio
n in 
Philip
pine 
Electi
ons 
20
09
12
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
58
0 
2009 
Suici
de 
Bomb
ing of 
U.S. 
Base 
in 
Afgh
anista
n 
(Dou
ble 
Agent 
Bomb
ing) 
20
09
12
30
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
86
7 
Death 
| 
Khost
, 
Afgh
anista
n | 
2009
1230 
20
09
12
30
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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nt
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ev
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A
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A
tt
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ur
ed
 
T
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tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
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tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
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id
e 
O
pe
ra
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n 
T
ac
tic
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In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
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 | 
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tic
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tic
 | 
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ed
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ss
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
91
7 
Arres
t | 
Spain 
| 
2010
0107 
20
10
01
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
71
8 
Arres
t | 
Quee
ns, 
NY | 
2010
0108 
20
10
01
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
61
4 
Death 
| 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0109 
20
10
01
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
25
2 
False 
Repor
t of 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0114 
20
10
01
14
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
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tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
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rm
ed
 A
ss
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lt
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Fi
re
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gh
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tic
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A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
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ng
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O
pe
ra
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T
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tr
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ar
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H
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U
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ed
 A
ss
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
72
2 
False 
Repor
t of 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0114 
20
10
01
14
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
55
6 
Death 
| al-
Jouf, 
Yeme
n | 
2010
0115 
20
10
01
15
 
0 0 1 # # # # # # # # # # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
86
8 
Death 
| 
Yata
ma, 
Yeme
n | 
2010
0115 
20
10
01
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
01
74
4 
Arres
t | 
Yeme
n | 
2010
0115 
20
10
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 N
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 D
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nt
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 C
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 C
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ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
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nt
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ev
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op
ed
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ot
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T
hr
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t/H
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A
tt
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k 
A
tt
ac
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| K
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A
tt
ac
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ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
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C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
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A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
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Fi
re
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gh
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ac
tic
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A
ss
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si
na
ti
on
 
T
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B
om
bi
ng
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id
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pe
ra
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tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
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lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
95
2 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Sargo
dha, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0115 
20
10
01
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
01
3 
2010 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Road 
Work
ers in 
Sulu 
20
10
02
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
20
8 
2010 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Fishe
rman/
Ex-
Soldi
er 
20
10
02
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
20
9 
Arres
t | 
Ipil, 
Zamb
oanga
, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2010
0207 
20
10
02
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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A
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 A
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lt
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ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
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lt
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ac
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 | 
U
nk
no
w
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N
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 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
12
3 
2010 
Bomb
ing of 
Germ
an 
Baker
y in 
Pune 
20
10
02
13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
 
E
vt
02
24
8 
2010 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
AFP 
in 
Maim
bung, 
Sulu 
20
10
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
62
6 
Arres
t | 
Aceh, 
Indon
esia | 
2010
0215 
20
10
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
67
5 
Arres
t | 
Kans
as 
City, 
MO | 
2010
0215 
20
10
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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D
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R
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 D
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ra
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 C
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at
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ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
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el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
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A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
69
7 
Relea
se 
from 
Deten
tion | 
Guant
anam
o 
Bay, 
Cuba 
| 
2010
0215? 
20
10
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
69
8 
2010 
Depo
rtatio
n to 
Alger
ia 
20
10
02
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
76
8 
Death 
| 
Dand
ay 
Darpa
khel, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0218 
20
10
02
18
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
01
2 
Arres
t | 
Manil
a, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2010
0219 
20
10
02
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1781 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
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Event 
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E
ve
nt
 D
at
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Su
b-
E
ve
nt
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in
in
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th
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id
en
t 
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ea
th
 | 
N
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al
 C
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se
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ea
th
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M
ili
ta
ry
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ou
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er
' 
D
ea
th
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M
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le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
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id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
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Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
00
5 
Arres
t | 
Indan
an, 
Sulu, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2010
0220 
20
10
02
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
30
5 
2010 
Firefi
ghts 
w/ 
AFP 
in 
Jolo 
20
10
02
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
24
7 
Death 
| 
Maim
bung, 
Sulu, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2010
0221 
20
10
02
21
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
67
1 
Arres
t | 
Janth
o, 
Aceh 
Besar
, 
Indon
esia | 
2010
0222 
20
10
02
22
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
1782 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
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M
ili
ta
ry
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nc
ou
nt
er
' 
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ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
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ea
th
 | 
K
IA
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ea
th
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Su
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D
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th
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ul
 P
la
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ea
th
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xe
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by
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ta
te
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ea
th
 | 
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ls
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or
t o
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ea
th
 
D
ea
th
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M
ea
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 U
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no
w
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rr
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t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
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ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
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L
od
gi
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ra
ve
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W
ed
di
ng
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el
eb
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tio
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Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
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St
in
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Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
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bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
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t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
00
9 
2010 
Firefi
ghte 
w/ 
AFP 
in 
Sulu 
20
10
02
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
01
1 
Death 
| 
Patik
ul, 
Sulu, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2010
0223 
20
10
02
23
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
76
9 
Death 
| 
Dand
ay 
Darpa
khel, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0224 
20
10
02
24
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
24
9 
Arres
t | 
Tagui
g 
City, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2010
0303 
20
10
03
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
1783 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
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Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
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D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
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D
ea
th
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Po
lic
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M
ili
ta
ry
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ou
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er
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ea
th
 | 
M
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si
le
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ri
ke
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ea
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 | 
K
IA
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D
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 D
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E
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ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
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di
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tb
al
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 C
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m
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ca
le
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ili
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ct
io
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Pl
ot
 
Pl
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FB
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St
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Pl
ot
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te
rr
up
te
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Pl
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 | 
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ba
nd
on
ed
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bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
71
5 
Death 
| Swat 
Valle
y, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0305 
20
10
03
05
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
02
22
3 
Arres
t | 
India-
Nepal 
Borde
r | 
2010
0305 
20
10
03
05
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
67
0 
Arres
t | 
Jakart
a, 
Indon
esia | 
2010
0306 
20
10
03
06
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
93
8 
False 
Repor
t of 
Arres
t | 
Karac
hi, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0308 
20
10
03
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
86
9 
Death 
| 
Jakart
a, 
Indon
esia | 
2010
0309 
20
10
03
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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ve
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be
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 D
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nt
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 C
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D
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 f
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 D
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 C
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ca
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Pl
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Pl
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rr
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Pl
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A
ba
nd
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rt
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Pl
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N
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ce
nt
 
Pl
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D
ev
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op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
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t/H
oa
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A
tt
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k 
A
tt
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| K
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A
tt
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| I
nj
ur
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T
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C
B
R
N
 
T
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tic
 | 
A
rm
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 A
ss
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lt
 
T
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Fi
re
fi
gh
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 | 
A
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si
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T
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 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
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tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
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O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
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tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
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T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
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ki
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T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
87
0 
Death 
| 
Pamu
lang, 
Indon
esia | 
2010
0309 
20
10
03
09
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
52
3 
2010 
Nasce
nt 
Plant 
to 
Bomb 
Amer
ican 
Stadi
ums 
(Soldi
er 
Field
?) 
20
10
03
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
87
1 
Death 
| 
Aceh, 
Indon
esia | 
2010
0312 
20
10
03
12
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
62
0 Arres
t |  | 
2010
0312 20
10
03
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
62
7 
Arres
t | 
Aceh, 
Indon
esia | 
2010
0312 
20
10
03
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
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D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
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cc
id
en
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 | 
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at
ur
al
 C
au
se
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lic
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nt
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th
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si
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ri
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ea
th
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K
IA
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ea
th
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id
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D
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th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
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xe
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by
 S
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th
 | 
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R
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ea
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ea
th
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M
ea
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 U
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w
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t/D
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el
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 f
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 D
et
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sc
ap
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j P
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L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
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al
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N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
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R
ad
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al
iz
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io
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D
ec
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e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
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A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
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 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
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 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
02
25
0 
2010 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Metro 
Manil
a 
20
10
03
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
02
00
4 
Arres
t | 
Zamb
oanga 
City, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2010
0317 
20
10
03
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
62
5 
Arres
t | 
Aceh 
Besar
, 
Indon
esia | 
2010
0318 
20
10
03
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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01
62
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03
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E
vt
01
73
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2010
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20
10
03
19
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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vt
01
62
2 Arres
t |  | 
2010
0320 20
10
03
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
62
3 Arres
t |  | 
2010
0323 20
10
03
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
30
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2010 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
AFP 
at 
Patik
ul-
area 
Camp 
20
10
03
26
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
65
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go, IL 
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2010
0327 
20
10
03
27
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
65
9 
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Gunfi
ght 
w/ 
Alger
ian 
Army 
20
10
03
28
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 
U
n 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
1787 
 
E
ve
nt
 N
um
be
r 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 D
at
e 
Su
b-
E
ve
nt
 
T
ra
in
in
g 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
A
cc
id
en
t 
D
ea
th
 | 
N
at
ur
al
 C
au
se
s 
D
ea
th
 | 
Po
lic
e/
M
ili
ta
ry
 'E
nc
ou
nt
er
' 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
is
si
le
/B
om
b 
St
ri
ke
 
D
ea
th
 | 
K
IA
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fo
ul
 P
la
y 
D
ea
th
| E
xe
cu
te
d 
by
 S
ta
te
 
D
ea
th
 | 
Fa
ls
e 
R
ep
or
t o
f 
D
ea
th
 
D
ea
th
 | 
M
ea
ns
 U
nk
no
w
n 
A
rr
es
t/D
et
en
ti
on
 
R
el
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 D
et
en
ti
on
 
E
sc
ap
e 
D
ep
or
ta
ti
on
 
H
aj
j P
ilg
ri
m
ag
e 
L
od
gi
ng
/T
ra
ve
l 
W
ed
di
ng
/C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
Pa
in
tb
al
l 
N
on
-T
er
ro
ri
st
 C
ri
m
e 
R
ad
ic
al
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
tw
a/
D
ec
re
e 
L
ar
ge
-S
ca
le
M
ili
ta
ry
A
ct
io
n 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
 | 
FB
I 
St
in
g 
Pl
ot
 | 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
Pl
ot
 | 
A
ba
nd
on
ed
/A
bo
rt
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
N
as
ce
nt
 
Pl
ot
 | 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 
Pl
ot
 | 
T
hr
ea
t/H
oa
x 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
tt
ac
k 
| K
il
le
d 
A
tt
ac
k 
| I
nj
ur
ed
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
C
B
R
N
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Fi
re
fi
gh
t 
T
ac
tic
 | 
A
ss
as
si
na
ti
on
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
B
om
bi
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
Su
ic
id
e 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
T
ac
tic
 | 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 T
ar
ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 
E
vt
01
41
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Arres
t | 
Kamp
ala, 
Ugan
da | 
4/201
0 
20
10
04
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
94
8 
Death 
| 
Yeme
n | 
2010
0405? 
20
10
04
05
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
/A
 
E
vt
01
69
8 
Arres
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Meda
n, 
Indon
esia | 
2010
0411 
20
10
04
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
 
E
vt
01
87
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Death 
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Aceh 
Besar
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Indon
esia | 
2010
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20
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04
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0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
21
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2010 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Busin
esswo
man 
Nena 
Tore
moch
a 
20
10
04
12
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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ge
te
d 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
ij
ac
ki
ng
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
H
os
ta
ge
 T
ak
in
g 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
na
rm
ed
 A
ss
au
lt
 
T
ac
tic
 | 
U
nk
no
w
n 
N
o.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l I
nt
er
ac
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E
vt
00
70
8 
2010 
Kidna
pping 
of ISI 
Offic
ers 
and 
Journ
alist 
20
10
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
78
0 
2010 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Col. 
Imam 
(For
mer 
ISI 
Offic
er) 
20
10
04
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
76
4 
Death 
| 
Tikrit
, Iraq 
| 
2010
0418 
20
10
04
18
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
02
88
4 
Arres
t | 
Tikrit
, Iraq 
| 
2010
0418 
20
10
04
18
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
vt
01
57
9 
2010 
Time
s 
Squar
e 
Attac
k 
20
10
05
01
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
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E
vt
01
71
7 
Arres
t | 
Quee
ns, 
New 
York 
| 
2010
0503 
20
10
05
03
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
89
3 
2010 
Murd
er of 
Khali
d 
Khaw
aja 
20
10
05
15
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
87
3 
Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0515 
20
10
05
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
61
5 
Death 
| 
Boya, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
0521 
20
10
05
21
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
30
7 
2010 
Firefi
ght 
w/ 
AFP 
in 
Sulu 
20
10
06
04
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
/A
 
N
/A
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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E
vt
02
30
6 
Death 
| 
Sulu, 
Philip
pines 
| 
2010
0604 
20
10
06
04
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
89
9 
2010 
Alleg
ed 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Non-
Speci
fied 
India
n 
Targe
ts 
20
10
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
vt
02
30
0 
2010 
Plot 
to 
Use 
Mum
bai-
Style 
Tacti
cs in 
Europ
e 
20
10
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
01
52
6 
2010 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
DC 
Metro
rail 
20
10
07
02
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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Plot 
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Relea
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Deten
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20
10
09
25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
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Plot 
to 
Break 
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Out 
of 
Priso
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10
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13
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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7 
Arres
t | 
Orakz
ai, 
Pakist
an | 
2010
1023 
20
10
10
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
59
8 
2010 
Plot 
to 
Remo
te-
Bomb 
Cargo 
Plane
s in 
Flight 
20
10
10
29
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
22
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Varan
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Bomb
ing 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 # 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
00
15
8 
Arres
t | 
Geno
a, IL | 
12/8/
2010 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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02
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Stock
holm 
Bomb
ing 
20
10
12
11
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
87
7 
Death 
| 
Stock
holm, 
Swed
en | 
2010
1211 
20
10
12
11
 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
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2010 
Kidna
pping 
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Nurse 
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Cuart
ocruz 
20
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14
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
87
2 
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t | 
Stoke
-on-
Trent, 
Engla
nd | 
2010
1220 
20
10
12
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 
E
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02
87
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2010
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20
10
12
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Arres
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Lond
on, 
Engla
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1220 
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10
12
20
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
 
E
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Plot 
to 
Attac
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Lond
on 
Land
marks 
at 
Christ
mas 
20
10
12
21
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
 
E
vt
02
22
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Death 
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2011
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20
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01
05
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
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25
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Shiite
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Durin
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Ashur
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25
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
 
U
n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
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and 
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20
11
02
08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
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Death 
| 
North 
Wazir
istan, 
Pakist
an | 
2011
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20
11
02
15
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
01
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1 
Arres
t | 
Lubb
ock, 
TX | 
2011
0223 
20
11
02
23
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
00
1 
2011 
Kidna
pping 
of 
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do de 
La 
Cruz 
20
11
03
07
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
 
E
vt
02
87
5 
Arres
t | 
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Scotl
and | 
2011
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11
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08
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
E
vt
02
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7 
Arres
t | 
Pakist
an | 
2011
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20
11
03
17
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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APPENDIX F: LIST OF EVENTS DIVIDED BY BALEIAN CATEGORY AND ORDERED BY YEAR 
 
 
A Note on interpretation: Although the numbers included in the tables below have the appeal of hard statistics, cautious interpretation 
is vital.  Aside from the obvious impact that incomplete data has on the grouping process that underlies this statistical estimate, the 
numbers may sometimes understate organization‘s involvement by excluding indirect support.  Individuals involved in the Islamist 
extremist movement often assist other jihadists without knowing the exact purpose of their help.  In large part, this ignorance is willful 
and deliberate, since it prevents logistical supporters on the periphery of an attack from providing authorities with information that 
might compromise an operation.  However, this safeguard also obfuscates historical studies of terrorism; it is sometimes impossible to 
pair monies and materiel to specific attacks even after events enter the open-source record.  Consequently, some important participants 
in terror attacks may remain two steps removed from an incident, and the tables above may understate the involvement of some 
organizations in events. 
 Issues of scale also complicate efforts to estimate organizational responsibility for attacks, especially as they pertain to the 
finance of terrorism.  Although monetary transactions vary greatly in their amount, the estimative process treats all interactions as 
equal.  For example, the model treats KSM‘s negligible financing of his nephew Ramzi Yousef‘s 1993 attack on the World Trade 
Center—KSM wired 660 USD into an account used by the conspirators1178—as identical to the tens of thousands of dollars that KSM 
helped to funnel to the 9/11 attackers to support their training and living expenses in the U.S.1179  Metrics for evaluating the scale of 
operational ties to an attack are less clear, because it is, for example, debatable whether an attack planner or the triggerman who 
detonated a blast played a greater role, but regardless of the actual answer, the weight of operational interactions certainly varies in 
ways that the estimate does not take into account.  Unfortunately, ambiguities inherent to the field of terrorism research prevent these 
scaling issues from being adequately resolved, because the true financial cost of terror attacks is rarely, if ever, known, and the total 
                                                          
1178 Chitra Ragavan, Nacy L. Bentrup, Ann M. Wakefield, Shelia Thalhimer, and Monica m. Ekman, "Tracing terror's roots," U.S. News and World Report, 
February 24, 2003; Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," The New Yorker, September 13, 2010; 9/11 
Commission Report. 
1179 9/11 Commission Report 
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weight and number of individual‘s operational interactions can only be partially reconstructed, even when using the best sources 
available.        
In the end, the estimates of operational involvement should be read in broad terms.  There is a substantial difference between al-
Qaida‘s 43.33 percent involvement in the 1997 Luxor Massacre, in which armed gunmen targeted tourists visiting Egyptian historical 
sites, and the organization‘s total responsibility for the following year‘s bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi.  However, there is 
little reason to assume that al-Qaida‘s 38.89 percent involvement in the 2001 plot against the U.S. Embassy in Paris indicates 
substantially more organizational responsibility than the terror group‘s 37.5 percent involvement in the same year‘s bombing of the 
Atrium Mall in Jakarta, irrespective of the Paris plot‘s 1.39 percentage edge.  Simply put, this estimate cannot be approached in the 
same way as more familiar statistics derived from physical measurements or economic data. 
 Small values are not, however, always irrelevant.  They may indicate organizations that provided indirect support by virtue of 
shared members, or, in the case of the Taliban, by providing the physical sanctuary necessary to prepare for events in lands far 
removed from the actual attack.  Moreover, small values can indicate organizations that merit close monitoring, because they may 
share additional ties not yet in evidence.  Finally, when small values appear alongside an unexpected partner organization, it may 
indicate burgeoning organizational partnerships that herald future patterns of functional cooperation, especially when these 
measurements occurred in years that only recently drew to a close. 
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Table 10.6 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the First Baleian Category 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
1 
E
vt
01
26
3 
1990 
Murd
er of 
Egpyt
ian 
Parlia
ment 
Speak
er 
Rifaat 
al-
Mahg
oub 
19
90
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
00
41
5 
1993 
Attac
k on 
Hotel 
Housi
ng 
U.S. 
Servic
emen 
19
93
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
00
04
9 
1994 
Abort
ed 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
US 
Emba
ssy in 
Riyad
h 
19
94
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
22
3 
1994 
Truck 
Bomb
ing in 
Riyad
h 
19
94
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
36
1 
1994 
Plot 
Again
st 
Weste
rn 
Target
s in 
Seneg
al 
19
94
 
1 0 
70
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
30
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
5 
1808 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
1 
E
vt
01
35
8 
1994 
Plot 
Again
st 
Djibo
uti 
19
94
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
00
93
5 
1994 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Presid
ent 
Clinto
n 
19
94
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
5 
1 
E
vt
01
42
6 
1994 
Plot 
Again
st 
U.S. 
Cargo 
Planes 
19
94
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
00
47
8 
1994 
Bomb
ing of 
Manil
a 
Theat
er 
19
94
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
00
97
2 
1994 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Israeli 
Emba
ssy in 
Bangk
ok 
19
94
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
00
93
3 
1995 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Pope 
John 
Paul 
II 
19
95
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1 
E
vt
00
46
5 1995 
Bojin
ka 
Plot 
19
95
 
1 0 
55
.5
6 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
44
.4
4 
10
0.
00
 
18
 
1 
E
vt
01
37
3 
1998 
Plot 
to Use 
Stinge
r 
Missil
19
98
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1809 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
es 
Again
st US 
Milita
ry 
Target
s in 
Saudi 
Arabi
a 
1 
E
vt
00
01
5 
1998 
Emba
ssy 
Attac
k 
(Dar) 
19
98
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
14
 
1 
E
vt
00
00
9 
1998 
Emba
ssy 
Attac
ks 
(Nairo
bi) 
19
98
 
0 1 
91
.0
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
8.
93
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
28
 
1 
E
vt
01
26
2 1999 
Mosc
ow 
Bomb
ings 
19
99
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
36
3 
2000 
Plot 
Again
st 
U.S.S. 
The 
Sulliv
ans 
20
00
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
22
5 2000 
U.S.S. 
Cole 
Attac
k 
20
00
 
0 1 
75
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
3.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
13
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
3.
67
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
4.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
25
 
1 
E
vt
01
31
8 
2001 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
the 
Pana
ma 
Canal 
20
01
 
1 0 
75
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
1 
E
vt
01
34
7 
2001 
Plot 
ot 
Bomb 
the 
Israeli 
Emba
ssy in 
India, 
20
01
 
1 0 
75
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
1810 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
Azerb
aijan, 
the 
Philip
pines, 
and 
Austr
alia 
1 
E
vt
00
55
0 
2002 
Danie
l Pearl 
Kidna
pping/
Murd
er 
20
02
 
0 1 
76
.9
2 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
3.
85
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
19
.2
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
13
 
1 
E
vt
02
80
1 
2002 
Bomb 
Plot 
Again
st 
Interi
m 
Karza
i 
Gov't 
20
02
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
00
49
4 
2002 
Bomb
ing of 
Tunisi
an 
Synag
ogue 
20
02
 
0 1 
91
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
8.
33
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
6 
1 
E
vt
00
97
8 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
U.S. 
Navy 
Ships 
in 
Straig
hts of 
Gibral
tar 
20
02
 
1 0 
75
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
25
.0
0 
10
0.
00
 
4 
1 
E
vt
01
32
3 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Thai 
Night
clubs 
Cateri
ng to 
Weste
rners 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
20
02
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
1811 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
1 
E
vt
01
38
6 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Kidna
p 
Weste
rn Aid 
Work
ers in 
Harge
ysa 
20
02
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
02
93
7 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Ships 
in the 
Straig
hts of 
Horm
uz 
20
02
 
1 0 
75
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
02
93
6 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k U.S. 
Naval 
Vesse
ls/Oil 
Tanke
rs in 
Straig
hts of 
Gibral
ter 
20
02
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
02
79
9 
2002 
Assas
sinati
on 
Attem
pt on 
Hami
d 
Karza
i 
20
02
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
36
7 
2002 
Attac
k on 
Frenc
h Oil 
Tanke
r 
Merch
ant 
Vesse
l 
Limb
20
02
 
0 1 
60
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
40
.0
0 
10
0.
00
 
5 
1812 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
urg 
1 
E
vt
01
31
5 
2002 
Filika 
Island 
Attac
k on 
U.S. 
Marin
es 
20
02
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1 
E
vt
00
48
6 
2002 
Bomb
ing of 
Philip
pine 
Consu
late 
20
02
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
37
4 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Crash 
a 
Small 
Plane 
Into a 
Milita
ry 
Vesse
l 
20
02
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
02
80
5 
2002 
Missil
e 
Attac
k on 
Kabul'
s 
Main 
Power 
Statio
n 
20
02
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
26
5 
2002 
Attem
pt to 
Shoot
-
Down 
Israeli 
Airlin
er 
20
02
 
0 1 
92
.8
6 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
7.
14
 
10
0.
00
 
14
 
1 
E
vt
01
26
4 
2002 
Suicid
e 
Bomb
ing of 
Paradi
20
02
 
0 1 
86
.8
4 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
2.
63
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
.5
3 
10
0.
00
 
19
 
1813 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
se 
Hotel 
(Mom
basa-
Kika
mbala
) 
1 
E
vt
01
37
8 
2003 
Suicid
e 
Bomb
ing of 
Weste
rn 
Comp
ounds 
in 
Riyad
h 
20
03
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
20
 
1 
E
vt
01
37
5 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k US 
Housi
ng 
Comp
ound 
in 
Saudi 
Araba
i 
20
03
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
53
6 
2003 
Nasce
nt 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Hotels
/Cruis
e 
Ships 
in 
Mom
basa 
(Follo
w-up 
to 
Kika
mbala
) 
20
03
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
1 
E
vt
01
52
4 
2003 
Nasce
nt 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
20
03
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1814 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
Presid
ent 
Georg
e W. 
Bush 
1 
E
vt
01
27
5 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
U.S. 
Emba
ssy in 
Nairo
bi 
20
03
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1 
E
vt
01
38
5 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Shoot
-
Down 
Eithio
pian 
Jetline
r in 
Somal
ia 
20
03
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
35
1 2003 
Istanb
ul 
Bomb
ings 
20
03
 
0 1 
75
.9
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
9.
26
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
5.
56
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
3.
70
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
5.
56
 
10
0.
00
 
18
 
1 
E
vt
01
31
4 
Plot 
to 
Attac
h U.S. 
Naval 
Vesse
les in 
Djibo
uti 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
20
03
 
1 0 
71
.4
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
28
.5
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
7 
1 
E
vt
01
36
8 
2003 
Karac
hi 
Plot 
Again
st US 
Consu
late, 
Weste
rn 
Resid
ences, 
and 
Airpo
rt 
20
03
 
1 0 
66
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1815 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
1 
E
vt
01
34
8 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
El-Al 
Flight 
Leavi
ng 
Bangk
ok 
20
03
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
01
35
0 
2003-
2004 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Ameri
can 
Target 
in 
South 
Korea 
20
03
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
02
33
6 
2003 
Bomb
ing of 
Jorda
nian 
Emba
ssy in 
Baghd
ad 
20
03
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
02
58
8 
2003 
Car 
Bomb
ing of 
Shiite
s in 
Najaf 
20
03
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
00
40
6 
12/14/
2003 
Assas
sinati
on 
Attem
pt on 
Perve
z 
Mush
arraf 
20
03
 
0 1 
63
.8
9 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
8.
33
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
5.
56
 
0.
00
 
5.
56
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
10
0.
00
 
6 
1 
E
vt
00
40
7 
12/25/
2003 
Assas
sinati
on 
Attem
pt on 
Perve
z 
20
03
 
0 1 
63
.8
9 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
8.
33
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
5.
56
 
0.
00
 
5.
56
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
10
0.
00
 
6 
1816 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
Mush
arraf 
1 
E
vt
00
42
5 
2004 
Attac
k on 
Range
rs' 
Van 
20
04
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
02
55
9 
2004 
Plot 
to Use 
Chem
. 
Weap
ons 
Again
st 
Jorda
n 
20
04
 
1 0 
75
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
02
32
2 
2004 
Kidna
pping/
Behea
ding 
of 
Ameri
can 
Nicho
las 
Berg 
20
04
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
02
32
3 
2004 
Suicid
e 
Bomb
ing of 
Ezzed
ine 
Slaim 
(Presi
dent 
of 
Iraqi 
Gover
ning 
Counc
il) 
20
04
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
01
22
4 
2004 
Truck
-
Bomb
ing of 
Alegri
an 
Electr
ical 
20
04
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1817 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
Facilit
y 
1 
E
vt
02
71
7 
2008 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Pakist
ani 
Police 
Office
rs, 
State 
Bank 
Offici
als, et 
al 
20
08
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1 
E
vt
01
55
6 
2008 
Murd
er of 
Retire
d 
Pakist
ani 
Gener
al 
20
08
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
01
58
0 
2009 
Suicid
e 
Bomb
ing of 
U.S. 
Base 
in 
Afgha
nistan 
(Doub
le 
Agent 
Bomb
ing) 
20
09
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1 
E
vt
02
30
0 
2010 
Plot 
to Use 
Mum
bai-
Style 
Tactic
s in 
Europ
e 
20
10
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1 
E
vt
01
34
6 Plot 
to 
Bomb 
U.S. 
Emba
U
nk
n 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1818 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
ssies 
in 
Indon
esia, 
Austr
alia, 
and 
Japan 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
1 
E
vt
01
35
3 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
NAT
O HQ 
in 
Europ
e 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
U
nk
n 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1 
E
vt
01
35
4 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Kisse
nger-
owne
d Oil 
Comp
any 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
U
nk
n 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
 
  
1819 
 
Table 10.7 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the Second Baleian Category 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
2 
E
vt
01
48
5 
2000 
Plot 
to 
Bom
b 
Mall 
in 
Colu
mbus
, OH 
20
00
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
2 
E
vt
00
94
5 
2001 
Plot 
to 
attac
k 
Klein
e-
Brog
el Air 
Base 
20
01
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
2 
E
vt
00
92
2 
2001 
Plot 
again
st 
U.S. 
Emba
ssy in 
Paris 
20
01
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
97
.2
2 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
2.
78
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
18
 
2 
E
vt
01
31
7 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
U.S. 
Nava
l 
Vess
els/O
il 
Tank
ers in 
Horm
uz, 
Gibra
lter, 
and 
Singa
pore 
20
01
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
5 
1820 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
2 
E
vt
00
04
2 
2001 
Attac
ks on 
NYC
/DC/
Shan
sville 
(9/11
) 
20
01
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
74
.4
2 
0.
00
 
0.
88
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
1.
32
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
18
.2
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
88
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
2.
49
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
1.
75
 
10
0.
00
 
57
 
2 
E
vt
01
36
9 
Plot 
to 
Poiso
n 
U.S. 
Wate
r 
Suppl
ies 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
20
01
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
83
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
6 
2 
E
vt
01
08
5 2001 
Shoe-
Bom
bing 
Plot 
20
01
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
87
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
12
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
2 
E
vt
01
32
0 
2002-
2003 
Plot 
Agai
nst 
Susp
ensio
n 
Bridg
es in 
NYC 
20
02
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
61
.1
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
22
.2
2 
10
0.
00
 
9 
2 
E
vt
01
32
2 
2002 
Plot 
Agai
nst 
Heat
hrow 
Airpo
rt and 
Britis
h 
Land
mark
s 
20
02
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
70
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
30
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
5 
2 
E
vt
01
37
1 
2002-
2003 
Plot 
to 
Smug
gle 
Expl
osive
20
02
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
27
.7
8 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
22
.2
2 
10
0.
00
 
9 
1821 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
s into 
NYC 
via 
Texti
le 
Ship
ment
s 
2 
E
vt
00
03
2 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
L.A. 
Usin
g 
9/11 
Tacti
cs 
('Sec
ond 
Wave
' of 
9/11 
Attac
ks) 
20
02
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
4.
17
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
43
.7
5 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
2.
08
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
16
 
2 
E
vt
00
00
1 
2002 
"Dirt
y 
Bom
b" 
Plot 
20
02
 
1 0 
66
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
10
0.
00
 
3 
2 
E
vt
02
92
7 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Bom
b 
Reun
ion 
Islan
d 
20
03
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
66
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
10
0.
00
 
3 
2 
E
vt
01
29
7 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Blow
-up 
Unde
rgrou
nd 
Gas 
Tank
s in 
Balit
more 
20
03
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1822 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
2 
E
vt
00
54
5 2004 
Crevi
ce 
Plot 
20
04
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
85
.7
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
14
.2
9 
10
0.
00
 
7 
2 
E
vt
00
03
9 
2005 
Lond
on 
Bom
bings 
(7/7) 
20
05
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
17
 
2 
E
vt
00
69
2 
2005 
July 
21 
Lond
on 
Bom
b Plot 
20
05
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
9 
2 
E
vt
01
50
5 
2006 
Liqui
d 
Bom
b Plot 
Targe
ting 
Lond
on to 
US 
Fligh
ts 
20
06
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
87
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
12
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
12
 
2 
E
vt
02
75
7 
2008 
Plot 
to 
Suici
de 
Bom
b 
Barce
lona's 
Subw
ay 
Syste
m 
20
08
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
11
 
2 
E
vt
01
35
5 
2009 
Najib
ullah 
Zazi 
NYC 
Subw
ay 
Plot 
20
09
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
66
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
10
0.
00
 
6 
2 
E
vt
01
55
5 
2008 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Danis
h 
20
09
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
80
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
13
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
6.
67
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
15
 
1823 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
Publi
shers 
of 
Moha
mme
d 
Carto
ons 
2 
E
vt
01
52
3 
2010 
Nasc
ent 
Plant 
to 
Bom
b 
Amer
ican 
Stadi
ums 
(Sold
ier 
Field
?) 
20
10
 
1 0 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
2 
E
vt
01
34
9 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
"Dee
p in 
Israel
" 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
U
nk
n 
1 0 
0.
00
 
83
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
2 
E
vt
01
32
1 
Plot 
Agai
nst 
the 
Sears 
Towe
r 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
U
nk
n 
1 0 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
2 
E
vt
01
34
5 
Plot 
to 
Use 
9/11-
Style 
Tacti
cs 
Agai
nst 
Elat, 
Israel 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
U
nk
n 
1 0 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1824 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
2 
E
vt
01
35
2 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
U.S. 
Nucl
ear 
Plant
s 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
U
nk
n 
1 0 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
 
 
Table 10.8 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the Third Baleian Category 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
3 
E
vt
00
43
1 
1994 
Attem
pt to 
obtain 
South 
Afric
an 
Urani
um 
19
94
 
1 0 
21
.4
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
78
.5
7 
10
0.
00
 
14
 
3 
E
vt
02
68
8 
1994 
Failed 
Attac
k on 
Khan 
al-
Khalil
i 
Touri
st 
Distri
ct of 
Cairo 
19
94
 
0 1 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
75
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1825 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
3 
E
vt
02
68
0 
1995 
Failed 
Assas
sinati
on of 
Muba
rak 
19
95
 
0 1 
6.
25
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
93
.7
5 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
8 
3 
E
vt
02
62
7 
1995 
Bomb
ing of 
Egypt
ian 
Emba
ssy in 
Islam
abad 
19
95
 
0 1 
45
.8
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
45
.8
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
8.
33
 
10
0.
00
 
12
 
3 
E
vt
00
77
8 1997 
Luxor 
Mass
acre 
19
97
 
0 1 
46
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
46
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
6.
67
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
5 
3 
E
vt
01
44
3 
Plot 
Again
st 
Sites 
Frequ
ented 
by 
U.S. 
Naval 
Perso
nnel 
in 
Singa
pore 
19
99
 
1 0 
43
.0
6 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
5.
56
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
43
.0
6 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
8.
33
 
10
0.
00
 
12
 
3 
E
vt
00
92
8 
1999 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Mega
wati 
19
99
 
1 0 
6.
25
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
68
.7
5 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
25
.0
0 
10
0.
00
 
8 
3 
E
vt
00
01
6 
1999 
Jorda
n 
Mille
nium 
Bomb 
Plot 
19
99
 
1 0 
32
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
2.
50
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
32
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
2.
50
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
30
.0
0 
10
0.
00
 
10
 
3 
E
vt
00
71
6 
1999 
LAX 
Mille
nium 
Bomb
ing 
Plot 
19
99
 
1 0 
14
.2
9 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
42
.8
6 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
42
.8
6 
10
0.
00
 
14
 
1826 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
3 
E
vt
02
61
7 
2000 
Plot 
Again
st 
Sydne
y 
Olym
pics 
20
00
 
1 0 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
3 
E
vt
00
48
5 
2000 
Bomb
ing of 
Philip
pine 
Amba
ssado
r's 
Resid
ence 
20
00
 
0 1 
24
.4
4 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
36
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
36
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
2.
22
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
15
 
3 
E
vt
00
02
1 
2000 
Christ
mas 
Eve 
Bomb
ings 
20
00
 
0 1 
42
.7
2 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
14
.1
8 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
42
.7
2 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
38
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
87
 
3 
E
vt
00
47
9 
2000 
Bomb
ing of 
Manil
a 
Train 
Statio
n 
(Rizal 
Day 
Bomb
ing) 
20
00
 
0 1 
9.
26
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
40
.7
4 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
40
.7
4 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
9.
26
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
18
 
3 
E
vt
00
01
9 
2001 
Atriu
m 
Plaza 
Bomb
ing 
20
01
 
0 1 
6.
25
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
93
.7
5 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
8 
3 
E
vt
00
92
3 
2001 
Plot 
Again
st US 
and 
Iraeli 
Emba
ssis in 
Manil
a 
20
01
 
1 0 
19
.4
4 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
69
.4
4 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
11
.1
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
6 
3 
E
vt
00
97
9 
2001 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Weste
rn 
20
01
 
1 0 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
70
.8
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
4.
17
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
24
 
1827 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
Emba
ssies 
in 
Singa
pore 
3 
E
vt
01
56
3 2002 
Fitma
rt 
Bomb
ing 
20
02
 
0 1 
6.
67
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
86
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
6.
67
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
5 
3 
E
vt
01
56
4 
2002 
Arson 
of 
Kimb
all 
Plaza 
20
02
 
0 1 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
66
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
3 
E
vt
01
37
6 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Israel 
20
02
 
1 0 
12
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
12
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
75
.0
0 
10
0.
00
 
4 
3 
E
vt
00
96
3 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
Weste
rn 
Emba
ssies 
in 
Phno
m 
Penh 
20
02
 
1 0 
11
.1
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
88
.8
9 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
9 
3 
E
vt
00
02
6 2002 
Bali 
Attac
ks 
20
02
 
0 1 
47
.0
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
52
.5
6 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
37
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
91
 
3 
E
vt
01
45
3 2002 
Makr
asar 
Bomb
ings 
20
02
 
0 1 
2.
38
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
95
.2
4 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
2.
38
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
14
 
3 
E
vt
02
80
7 
2003 
Rock
et 
Attac
k on 
ISAF 
Head
quarte
rs in 
Kabul 
20
03
 
0 1 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1828 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
3 
E
vt
00
93
7 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Attac
k 
APE
C 
Sum
mit/ 
Weste
rn 
Emba
ssies 
in 
Thail
and/C
omme
rical 
Airlin
ers 
20
03
 
1 0 
27
.7
8 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
61
.1
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
11
.1
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
3 
E
vt
00
03
3 
2003 
Jakart
a 
Marri
ott 
Attac
k 
20
03
 
0 1 
11
.9
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
83
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
4.
76
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
21
 
3 
E
vt
00
48
2 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Pakist
an 
Bible 
Societ
y 
20
04
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
66
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
3 
E
vt
00
77
9 2004 
Madri
d 
Attac
ks 
20
04
 
0 1 
3.
13
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
84
.3
8 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
12
.5
0 
10
0.
00
 
16
 
3 
E
vt
00
71
4 
2004 
Killin
g of 5 
Pakist
ani 
Police
men 
20
04
 
0 1 
11
.1
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
88
.8
9 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
9 
3 
E
vt
00
51
4 
2004 
Car-
bomb
ing of 
Marin
a 
Club 
(Kara
chi) 
20
04
 
0 1 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
75
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
1829 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
3 
E
vt
00
48
3 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Pakist
an-
Amer
ican 
Cultu
ral 
Cente
r 
20
04
 
0 1 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
83
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
6 
3 
E
vt
00
41
3 
2004 
Assas
sinati
on 
Attem
pt on 
Gen. 
Ahsa
n 
Salee
m 
Hayat 
20
04
 
0 1 
7.
69
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
92
.3
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
13
 
3 
E
vt
00
92
0 
2004 
Plot 
again
st 
U.S. 
Cons
ulate 
in 
Karac
hi 
20
04
 
1 0 
11
.1
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
88
.8
9 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
9 
3 
E
vt
00
03
5 
2004 
WM
D 
Plot 
Again
st 
NYS
E and 
other 
US 
Finan
cial 
Targe
ts 
20
04
 
1 0 
10
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
80
.0
0 
10
0.
00
 
10
 
3 
E
vt
01
46
1 
2004 
Bomb
ing of 
Austr
alian 
Emba
ssy in 
Jakart
a 
20
04
 
0 1 
2.
08
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
97
.9
2 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
24
 
1830 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Event 
Name 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
3 
E
vt
01
52
2 
2008 
Nasce
nt 
Plot 
to 
Bomb 
Long 
Island 
Rail 
Syste
m 
20
08
 
1 0 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
3 
E
vt
00
03
7 2008 
Mum
bai 
Attac
ks 
20
08
 
0 1 
5.
88
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
85
.2
9 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
8.
82
 
10
0.
00
 
34
 
3 
E
vt
02
24
1 2010 
Norw
ay 
Bomb 
Plot 
20
08
 
1 0 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
75
.0
0 
10
0.
00
 
4 
3 
E
vt
01
31
9 
Plot 
to 
Assas
sinate 
Presid
ent 
Jimm
y 
Carter 
and 
Other 
Form
er 
U.S. 
Presid
ents 
(Date 
Unkn
own) 
U
nk
n 
1 0 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
33
.3
3 
10
0.
00
 
3 
 
  
1831 
 
Table 10.9 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the Fourth Baleian Category 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
4 
E
vt
00
00
8 
1993 
Worl
d 
Trad
e 
Cent
er 
Bom
bing
s 
19
93
 
0 1 
36
.3
6 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
22
 
4 
E
vt
01
30
5 
1993 
Plot 
to 
Brea
k El-
Sayy
id 
Nosa
ir 
Out 
of 
Attic
a 
19
93
 
1 0 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
4 
E
vt
00
93
0 
1993 
Plot 
to 
Assa
ssina
te 
Mub
arak 
19
93
 
1 0 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
6 
4 
E
vt
00
97
3 
1993 
Plot 
to 
Bom
b 
Jewi
sh 
Neig
hbor
hood
s in 
NYC 
19
93
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
4 
E
vt
00
00
4 
1993 
Plot 
agai
nst 
NYC 
land
mark
s 
19
93
 
1 0 
1.
96
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
94
.1
2 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
5.
88
 
10
0.
00
 
51
 
1832 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
4 
E
vt
00
92
5 
1993 
Plot 
to 
Assa
ssina
te 
Bena
zir 
Bhut
to 
19
93
 
1 0 
42
.8
6 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
42
.8
6 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
57
.1
4 
10
0.
00
 
7 
4 
E
vt
01
96
3 
1994 
Kidn
appi
ng of 
Land 
Surv
eyor
s in 
the 
Phili
ppin
es 
19
94
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
4 
E
vt
00
42
7 
1995 
Atta
ck 
on 
U.S. 
Milit
ary/
Aid 
Miss
ion 
in 
Saud
i 
Arab
ia 
19
95
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
01
99
5 
1995 
Kidn
appi
ng at 
Tran
kini 
Falls 
19
95
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
4 
E
vt
01
96
5 
2000 
Kidn
appi
ng of 
Stud
ents/
Teac
hers 
in 
Sumi
sip 
20
00
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
87
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
12
.5
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
1833 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
4 
E
vt
01
77
2 
2000 
Kidn
appi
ng of 
Jeffr
ey 
Schil
ling 
20
00
 
0 1 
14
.2
9 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
7 
4 
E
vt
00
98
7 
2000 
Plot 
to 
Mou
nt 
Gas-
Atta
ck 
on 
Euro
pean 
Parli
ame
nt 
20
00
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
4 
E
vt
01
44
5 
2001 
Plot 
Agai
nst 
Paya 
Leba
r 
Airb
ase 
20
01
 
1 0 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
4 
E
vt
01
75
7 
2001 
Kidn
appi
ng of 
Tour
ists 
from 
Dos 
Palm
as 
Reso
rt 
(Pala
wan) 
20
01
 
0 1 
5.
88
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
17
 
4 
E
vt
01
76
7 
2001 
Kidn
appi
ng at 
Hosp
ital 
in 
Lami
tan 
20
01
 
0 1 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
1834 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
4 
E
vt
01
44
7 
2001 
Bom
bing 
of 
Chur
ches 
in 
East 
Jakar
ta 
20
01
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
00
98
8 
2001 
Plot 
to 
Mou
nt 
Gas-
Atta
ck 
on 
Fran
ce 
20
01
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
00
97
5 
2002 
Plot 
to 
Bom
b 
U.S. 
Emb
assy 
in 
Rom
e 
20
02
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
00
78
6 
2002 
McD
onal
d's 
Atta
ck in 
Leba
non 
20
02
 
0 1 
20
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
5 
4 
E
vt
02
23
7 
2003 
Plot 
to 
Cras
h 
Plan
es 
into 
Chan
gi 
Airp
ort 
20
03
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
00
51
7 
2003 
Casa
blan
ca 
Bom
bing
20
03
 
0 1 
21
.0
5 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
92
.1
1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
2.
63
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
5.
26
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
19
 
1835 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
s 
4 
E
vt
01
53
8 
2003 
Assa
ssina
tion 
of 
Briti
sh 
Teac
hers 
(So
malil
and 
Killi
ng) 
20
03
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
4 
E
vt
01
75
6 
2004 
Plot 
to 
Bom
b 
Phili
ppin
e VP 
Cand
idate 
Lore
n 
Lega
rda 
20
04
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
4 
E
vt
00
95
3 
2004 
Plot 
to 
Atta
ck 
Span
ish 
Nati
onal 
Cour
t 
Buil
ding 
in 
Mad
rid 
20
04
 
1 0 
8.
33
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
12
 
4 
E
vt
00
46
2 2005 
Bisk
ra 
Atta
ck 
20
05
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
6 
4 
E
vt
01
75
1 2005 
Vale
ntine
's 
20
05
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1836 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
Day 
Bom
bing 
4 
E
vt
00
52
6 2005 
Chle
f 
Atta
ck 
20
05
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
6 
4 
E
vt
00
42
3 
2005 
Atta
ck 
on 
Nort
hern 
Mau
ritani
an 
L'M
ghiti 
Arm
y 
Cam
p 
20
05
 
0 1 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
83
.3
3 
10
0.
00
 
6 
4 
E
vt
02
54
3 
2005 
Rock
et 
Atta
ck 
on 
USS 
Ashl
and 
and 
USS 
Kear
sarge 
20
05
 
0 1 
20
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
5 
4 
E
vt
01
46
7 2005 
Bali 
Bom
bing
s 
20
05
 
0 1 
27
.2
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
11
 
4 
E
vt
00
03
6 2006 
Mu
mbai 
Atta
cks 
20
06
 
0 1 
20
.6
9 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
93
.1
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
6.
90
 
10
0.
00
 
29
 
4 
E
vt
02
19
1 
2006 
Cota
bato 
Bom
bing
s 
20
06
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1837 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
4 
E
vt
02
70
8 
2007 
Suici
de 
Atta
ck 
on 
Bagr
am 
Air 
Base 
Duri
ng 
Chen
ey's 
Visit 
20
07
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
4 
E
vt
02
24
5 
2007 
Non-
speci
fic 
Plot 
to 
Atta
ck 
Ame
rican
s 
Abro
ad 
Usin
g 
WM
D 
20
07
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
01
10
1 
2007 
Suici
de 
Atta
cks 
on 
Algi
ers 
20
07
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
4 
E
vt
02
14
4 
2007 
Assa
ult 
on 
Basil 
Hote
l 
(Mo
gadis
hu) 
20
07
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
02
73
5 
2007 
Suici
de 
Atta
ck 
Targ
eting 
Paki
20
07
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
1838 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
stan'
s 
Inter
ior 
Mini
ster 
4 
E
vt
01
38
1 
2007 
Suici
de 
Bom
bing 
of 
Span
ish 
Tour
ists 
in 
Yem
en 
20
07
 
0 1 
66
.6
7 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
4 
E
vt
00
40
4 
2007 
Assa
ssina
tion 
Atte
mpt 
on 
Bena
zir 
Bhut
to 
20
07
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
4 
E
vt
01
27
7 
2008 
Atta
ck 
on 
Paki
stani 
Air 
Forc
e 
Base 
in 
Sarg
odha 
20
08
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
4 
E
vt
01
29
2 
2008 
Assa
ssina
tion 
of 
Lt. 
Gen. 
Mus
htaq 
Beig 
20
08
 
0 1 
10
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
48
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
48
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
3.
33
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
 
4 
E
vt
02
77
1 2008 
Suici
de 
Bom
bing 
20
08
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1839 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
of 
US 
Milit
ary 
Base 
in 
Afgh
anist
an 
4 
E
vt
01
27
8 
2008 
Bom
bing 
of 
Dani
sh 
Emb
assy 
in 
Isla
mab
ad 
20
08
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
4 
E
vt
02
72
1 
2008 
Behe
adin
g of 
Afgh
an 
'Spie
s' 
20
08
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
01
29
8 
2008 
Plot 
to 
Atta
ck 
NYC 
Land
mark
s 
20
08
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
01
57
3 
2008 
Ahm
edab
ad 
Bom
bing 
20
08
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
6 
4 
E
vt
01
27
6 
2008 
Isla
mab
ad 
Marr
iott 
Bom
bing 
20
08
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
41
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
41
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
4 
E
vt
02
78
3 
2008 
Kidn
appi
ng of 
Jour
nalis
20
08
 
0 1 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
83
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
16
.6
7 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
1840 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
t 
Davi
d 
Roh
de 
4 
E
vt
02
23
6 
2009 
Nasc
ent 
Plot 
to 
Atta
ck 
Mala
ysia 
20
09
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
01
38
2 
2009 
Kidn
appi
ng of 
Ger
man 
and 
Briti
sh 
Nati
onals 
in 
Yem
en 
20
09
 
0 1 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
01
47
6 
2009 
Plot 
to 
Assa
ssina
te 
Indo
nesia
n 
Presi
dent 
Yud
hoyo
no 
20
09
 
1 0 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
6 
4 
E
vt
01
47
2 
2009 
Jakar
ta 
Marr
iott/
Ritz 
Carlt
on 
Bom
bing
s 
20
09
 
0 1 
15
.3
8 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
84
.6
2 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
15
.3
8 
10
0.
00
 
13
 
4 
E
vt
02
59
3 2009 
Suici
de 
Bom
bing 
20
09
 
0 1 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
1841 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
Targ
eting 
Saud
i 
Princ
e 
Moh
amm
ed 
bin 
Naye
f 
4 
E
vt
01
26
8 
2009 
Chri
stma
s 
Day 
'Und
erpa
nts' 
Bom
b 
Plot 
20
09
 
0 1 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
4 
E
vt
02
25
0 
2010 
Plot 
to 
Bom
b 
Metr
o 
Mani
la 
20
10
 
1 0 
25
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
4 
E
vt
01
27
1 
2010 
Plot 
to 
Bom
b 
Undi
sclos
ed 
Ken
yan 
Targ
ets 
20
10
 
1 0 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
1 
4 
E
vt
01
89
9 
2010 
Alle
ged 
Plot 
to 
Atta
ck 
Non-
Spec
ified 
India
n 
Targ
ets 
20
10
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
4 
1842 
 
B
al
eC
at
 
E
ve
nt
 I
D
 
Even
t 
Nam
e 
E
ve
nt
 Y
ea
r 
P
lo
t 
A
tt
ac
k 
A
Q
 A
lu
m
ni
 
al
-F
uq
ra
 
A
Q
A
P
 
A
Q
IM
 
A
R
C
F
 
A
S
G
 
B
aI
 
D
-C
om
pa
ny
 
E
IJ
 
F
at
ah
 a
l I
sl
am
 
G
IC
M
 
G
R
G
 
H
aq
qa
ni
 N
et
w
or
k 
H
of
st
ad
 G
ro
up
 
H
U
JI
 
IG
 
JA
M
 
JI
 
JI
S
 
Ju
nd
al
la
h 
L
eT
/I
nd
M
uj
 
L
J 
M
fM
 
P
al
em
ba
ng
 
R
aw
-9
 
R
S
M
 
R
S
R
S
C
B
M
 
S
au
dH
iz
b 
S
ha
ba
ab
 
S
oD
 
T
T
P 
T
Q
J 
(H
iz
ba
ll
ah
) 
(M
IL
F
) 
(H
IG
) 
(G
IA
) 
(T
al
ib
an
) 
(H
A
M
A
S
) 
(G
A
M
) 
(L
eJ
) 
(A
Q
I)
 
O
th
er
/U
nk
no
w
n 
S
um
 
T
ot
al
 I
nt
er
ac
ti
on
s 
4 
E
vt
02
16
0 
2010 
Plot 
to 
Kidn
ap 
Oil 
Exec
utive
s 
20
10
 
1 0 
50
.0
0 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
2 
4 
E
vt
01
27
0 
2010 
Kam
pala 
Bom
bing
s 
20
10
 
0 1 
4.
35
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
23
 
4 
E
vt
02
59
8 
2010 
Plot 
to 
Rem
ote-
Bom
b 
Carg
o 
Plan
es in 
Fligh
t 
20
10
 
1 0 
33
.3
3 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
3 
4 
E
vt
02
87
4 
2010 
Plot 
to 
Atta
ck 
Lond
on 
Land
mark
s at 
Chri
stma
s 
20
10
 
1 0 
11
.1
1 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
9 
 
  
1843 
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Target
s/Emb
assies 
in 
Yemen 
19
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E
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Bombi
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Istiqlal 
Mosqu
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r of 
Asylu
m 
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0.
00
 
1 
6 
E
vt
01
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2 
1999 
Hijack
ing of 
Indian 
Airline
r in 
Nepal 
(Hosta
ges 
Traded 
for 
Releas
e of 
Azhar, 
et al) 
19
99
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
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0.
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0.
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00
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0.
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1 
6 
E
vt
00
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4 
1999 
Murde
r of 
Politici
an Joe 
Fernan
dez 
19
99
 
0 1 
0.
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0.
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1 
6 
E
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66
3 
1999 
Hatche
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on 
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man 
6 
E
vt
00
89
2 
1999 
Murde
r of 
Jovena
l 
Bruno 
19
99
 
0 1 
0.
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0.
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0.
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0.
00
 
1 
6 
E
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88
4 
1999 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Japans
e 
Nation
als in 
Kyrgy
zstan 
19
99
 
0 1 
0.
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0.
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0.
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0.
00
 
0.
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0.
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0.
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6 
2000 
Plot to 
Bomb 
Israeli 
Embas
sy in 
Canber
ra 
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00
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0.
00
 
1 
6 
E
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02
30
2 
2000 
Captur
e/Behe
ading 
of 
Indian 
Officer 
in 
Kashm
ir 
20
00
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
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0.
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1 
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E
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0 
2000 
Attem
pted 
Assass
ination 
of 
Matori 
Abdul 
Jalil 
20
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0 1 
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E
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Kidna
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of 20 
Asian 
and 
Europe
an 
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es 
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6 
E
vt
01
99
3 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of Fr. 
Rhoel 
Gallar
do 
20
00
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
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00
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0.
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0.
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0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
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0.
00
 
1 
6 
E
vt
02
04
8 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Foreig
n 
Journa
lists in 
Sulu 
20
00
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
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0.
00
 
0.
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1 
6 
E
vt
01
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3 
2000 
Raid/K
idnapp
ing on 
Pearl 
Farm 
Beach 
Resort 
20
00
 
0 1 
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00
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00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
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0.
00
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0.
00
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00
 
6 
6 
E
vt
01
98
0 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Wilde 
Almed
a and 
Follow
ers 
(Jesus 
Miracl
e 
Crusad
e) 
20
00
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
10
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
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00
 
1 
6 
E
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02
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9 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Busine
ssman 
Niranj
an 
Shah 
20
00
 
0 1 
0.
00
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00
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00
 
0.
00
 
0.
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0.
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00
 
2 
6 
E
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01
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9 
2000 
Kidna
pping 
of 
Germa
n 
Journa
list 
Andre
as 
Lorenz 
20
00
 
0 1 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
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00
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Kidna
pping 
of 
French 
TV 
Crew 
20
00
 
0 1 
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Kidna
pping 
of 
Malay
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from 
Panda
nan 
Island 
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7 
2000 
Bombi
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Excha
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